dollars deals related to Venezuelan corruption and represented that connections with BPA would facilitate these transactions.

For example, a TPML (“TPML 4”), who has worked with the Sinaloa cartel, facilitated the transfer of bulk cash derived from narcotics trafficking in the United States and facilitated financial transactions involving the proceeds of other crimes. TPML 4 intentionally bolstered connections with BPA to attract money laundering clients and requested that clients send smaller transfers through accounts at other institutions and to only use accounts at BPA for large transactions. In communications with co-conspirators, TPML 4 advertised a relationship with BPA in attempts to attract potential money laundering deals. TPML 4 told clients that this relationship with BPA and other government officials would ensure that their transactions would not be scrutinized by the financial community. In addition, TPML 4 also marketed services to potential clients by providing specific wire transfer instructions for accounts at BPA.

TPML 4 used many methods to avoid detection by law enforcement, including planning to increase operations during the U.S. government shutdown in 2013. TPML 4 used many Panamanian, Spanish, and Swiss shell corporations to attract clients. Several of these shell corporations had bank accounts, including at BPA.

BPA’s failure to monitor transactions for apparent red flag activity attracts TPMLs. Many third-party money laundering transactions conducted through BPA lack an apparent business purpose and would be identified as high risk by a bank with sufficient AML/CFT controls. For example, BPA processed millions of U.S. dollar transactions that listed BPA’s Andorran address for the originator’s or beneficiary’s address. Although there may be rare occasions when use of the bank’s address as a bank customer’s address of record is legitimate, the processing of a high percentage of transactions not containing accurate customer address information indicates failure to conduct sufficient due diligence on a customer, failure to adequately monitor transactions, or possible complicity in money laundering by disguising the origin of funds. BPA also attracts TPMLs by knowingly providing services to shell and shelf companies and unlicensed money transmitters. As noted above, TPMLs rely on shell and shelf companies to shield the identities of their clients in criminal activity. BPA’s facilitation of this high-risk business allows TPMLs to obscure the beneficial ownership of these accounts.

BPA accesses the U.S. financial system through direct correspondent accounts held at four U.S. banks. Between approximately 2009 through 2014, BPA processed hundreds of millions of dollars through its U.S. correspondents. These transactions contained numerous indicators of high-risk money laundering typologies, including widespread shell company activity, unlicensed money transmitters, and other high-risk business customers. For example, BPA processed tens of millions of dollars on behalf of unlicensed money transmitters through one U.S. correspondent. The U.S. correspondent requested that BPA sign an agreement to discontinue processing these transactions through its account. After these concerns arose, the U.S. correspondent closed BPA’s account.

In addition, 62 percent of BPA’s outgoing transactions through one U.S. correspondent bank involved only four high-risk customers. These customers, deemed high-risk by the U.S. correspondent bank, included a shell company, an Internet business, and two non-bank financial institutions. Between approximately 2007 and 2012, BPA also used its U.S. correspondents to send or receive wire transfers totaling more than $50 million for Panamanian shell companies that share directors, agents, and the same address. These transfers involved large, round dollar amounts and did not specify a purpose for the transactions. When U.S. correspondents requested additional information, BPA either failed to respond or provided extremely limited information.

IV. The Extent to Which BPA Is Used for Legitimate Business Purposes

It is difficult to assess the information available the extent to which BPA is used for legitimate business purposes. BPA provides services in private banking, personal banking, and corporate banking. These services include typical bank products such as savings accounts, corporate accounts, credit cards, and financing. BPA provides services to high-risk customers including international foreign operated shell companies, businesses likely engaged in unlicensed money transmission, and senior foreign political officials. Because of the demonstrated cooperation of high level management at BPA with TPMLs, BPA’s legitimate business activity is at high risk of being abused by money launderers.

V. The Extent to Which This Action Is Sufficient To Guard Against International Money Laundering and Other Financial Crimes

FinCEN’s March 13, 2015 proposed imposition of the fifth special measure, pursuant to 31 U.S.C. 5318(a)(b)(5), would guard against the international money laundering and other financial crimes described above directly by restricting the ability of BPA to access the U.S. financial system to process transactions, and indirectly by public notification to the international financial community of the risks posed by dealing with BPA and TPMLs.

Dated: March 6, 2015.

Jennifer Shasky Calvery,
Director, Financial Crimes Enforcement Network.

For further information contact:

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Jennifer Shasky Calvery, Director, Financial Crimes Enforcement Network.

DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY

Internal Revenue Service

Proposed Collection; Comment Request for Forms 9779, 9783, 9787, and 9789

AGENCY: Internal Revenue Service (IRS), Treasury.

ACTION: Notice and request for comments.

SUMMARY: The Department of the Treasury, as part of its continuing effort to reduce paperwork and respondent burden, invites the general public and other Federal agencies to take this opportunity to comment on proposed and/or continuing information collections, as required by the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995, Pub. L. 104–13 (44 U.S.C. 3506(c)(2)(A)). Currently, the IRS is soliciting comments concerning Forms 9779, 9783, 9787, and 9789. Electronic Federal Tax Payment System (EFTPS).

DATES: Written comments should be received on or before May 12, 2015 to be assured of consideration.

ADDRESSES: Direct all written comments to Christie Preston, Internal Revenue Service, Room 6129, 1111 Constitution Avenue NW., Washington, DC 20224.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Requests for additional information or copies of the forms and instructions should be directed to LaNita Van Dyke, Internal Revenue Service, Room 6517, 1111 Constitution Avenue NW., Washington, DC 20224, or through the internet at Laniita.VanDyke@irs.gov.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Title: Electronic Federal Tax Payment System (EFTPS).
OMB Number: 1545–1467.
Form Number: Forms 9779, 9783, 9787, and 9789.
Abstract: These forms are used by business and individual taxpayers to enroll in the Electronic Federal Tax Payment System (EFTPS). EFTPS is an electronic remittance processing system the Service uses to accept electronically transmitted federal tax payments. EFTPS (1) establishes and maintains a taxpayer data base which includes entity information from the taxpayers or their banks, (2) initiates the transfer of the tax payment amount from the taxpayer’s bank account, (3) validates the entity information and selected elements for each taxpayer, and (4) electronically transmits taxpayer payment data to the IRS.
Current Actions: The total burden hours have decreased. The burden hours have changed from 4,470,000 to 4,350,000 with a decrease total of 120,000 hours. The decrease is due to each Spanish form becoming obsolete.
Type of Review: Revision of a currently approved collection.
Affected Public: Individuals, business or other for-profit organizations, and state, local or tribal governments.
Estimated Number of Respondents: 4,350,000.
Estimated Total Annual Burden Hours: 726,450.
The following paragraph applies to all of the collections of information covered by this notice:
An agency may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, a collection of information unless the collection of information displays a valid OMB control number. Books or records relating to a collection of information must be retained as long as their contents may become material in the administration of any internal revenue law. Generally, tax returns and tax return information are confidential, as required by 26 U.S.C. 6103.
Request for Comments: Comments submitted in response to this notice will be summarized and/or included in the request for OMB approval. Comments will be of public record. Comments are invited on: (a) Whether the collection of information is necessary for the proper performance of the functions of the agency, including whether the information has practical utility; (b) the accuracy of the agency’s estimate of the burden of the collection of information; (c) ways to enhance the quality, utility, and clarity of the information to be collected; (d) ways to minimize the burden of the collection of information on respondents, including the use of automated collection techniques or other forms of information technology; and (e) estimates of capital or start-up costs and costs of operation, maintenance, and purchase of services to provide information.
Christie Preston,
IRS Tax Analyst.
DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY
Office of Foreign Assets Control
Sanctions Actions Pursuant to Executive Order 13224
AGENCY: Office of Foreign Assets Control, Treasury.
ACTION: Notice.
SUMMARY: The Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) is removing the name of 1 individual and 8 entities, whose property and interests in property were blocked pursuant to E.O.13224, from the list of Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons (SDN List).
DATES: OFAC’s actions described in this notice were effective February 26, 2015.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Electronic and Facsimile Availability
The SDN List and additional information concerning OFAC sanctions programs are available from OFAC’s Web site (www.treas.gov/ofac). Certain general information pertaining to OFAC’s sanctions programs is also available via facsimile through a 24-hour fax-on-demand service, tel.: 202/ 622–0077.
Notice of OFAC Actions
On February 26, 2015, OFAC removed the following 1 individual and 8 entities from the SDN List.
Individuals
1. NADA, Youssef (a.k.a. NADA, Youssef M.); a.k.a. NADA, Youssef Mustafa), Via Per Arogno 32, Compione d’Italia CH–6911, Switzerland; Via Arogno 32, Compione d’Italia CH–6911, Italy; Via Riasc 4, Compione d’Italia CH–6911, Switzerland; DOB 17 May 1931; alt. DOB 17 May 1937; P.O.B Alexandria, Egypt; citizen Tunisia (individual) [SDGT].

Entities
1. ASAT TRUST REG., Altenbach 8, Vaduz 9490, Liechtenstein [SDGT].
2. BA TAQWA FOR COMMERCE AND REAL ESTATE COMPANY LIMITED (n.k.a. HOCHBURG, AG), Vaduz, Liechtenstein; formerly c/o Asat Trust reg., Vaduz, Liechtenstein [SDGT].
3. BANK AL TAQWA LIMITED (a.k.a. AL TAQWA BANK; a.k.a. BANK AL TAQWA), P.O. Box N-4877, Nassau, Bahamas; The c/o Arthur D. Hanna & Company, 10 Deveaux Street, Nassau, Bahamas, The [SDGT].
4. NADA INTERNATIONAL ANSTALT, Vaduz, Liechtenstein; formerly c/o Asat Trust reg., Vaduz, Liechtenstein [SDGT].
5. NADA MANAGEMENT ORGANIZATION SA (f.k.a. AL TAQWA MANAGEMENT ORGANIZATION SA), Viale Stefano Franscini 22, Lugano CH– 6900 TI, Switzerland [SDGT].
6. WALDENBERG, AG (f.k.a. AL TAQWA TRADE, PROPERTY AND INDUSTRY; f.k.a. AL TAQWA TRADE, PROPERTY AND INDUSTRY COMPANY LIMITED; f.k.a. AL TAQWA TRADE, PROPERTY AND INDUSTRY ESTABLISHMENT; f.k.a. HIMMAT ESTABLISHMENT), c/o Asat Trust Reg., Altenbach 8, Vaduz 9490, Liechtenstein; Via Posero, 2, Compione d’Italia 22060, Italy [SDGT].
7. YOUSSEF M. NADA, Via Riasc 4, Compione d’Italia I CH–6911, Switzerland [SDGT].
All property and interests in property of the individual and entities that are in or hereafter come within the United States or the possession or control of United States persons are now unblocked.
Dated: February 26, 2015.
John E. Smith,
Acting Director, Office of Foreign Assets Control.