price discovery process. The proposed rule changes would eliminate the use of the intermediary in the price submission process and instead require CPs to submit required price information directly to ICC. In order to implement the direct price submission process, ICC proposed to amend its Pricing Policy to (1) require CPs to establish direct connectivity with ICC and use a FIX API to provide ICC with the required price information, (2) add references to FIX API terminology, and (3) make revisions reflecting the replacement of existing trade date files with FIX API firm trade messages. Moreover, ICC proposed amending the Pricing Policy to note that ICC will send FIX API messages directly to CPs, and removed references to the intermediary and its “Value Added Service API” previously used. Although ICC proposed additional minor changes to the timing of various steps in the pricing process, these proposed changes would not affect the actual settlement submission windows.

In addition to the changes described above, ICC also proposed changes with respect to the format of information required to be submitted by CPs for the iTraxx Australia and iTraxx Asia Ex-Japan Indices, as well as the CDX.NA.HY and CDS.EM indices. ICC also proposed modifications to the process for distributing end-of-day prices, which will result in ICC publishing to CPs separate messages setting forth end-of-day price information for single name and index CDS.

III. Discussion and Commission Findings

Section 19(b)(2)(C) of the Act directs the Commission to approve a proposed rule change of a self-regulatory organization if it finds that such proposed rule change is consistent with the requirements of the Act and the rules and regulations thereunder applicable to such organization. Section 17A(b)(3)(F) of the Act requires, among other things, that the rules of a registered clearing agency be designed to promote the prompt and accurate discovery and settlement of securities transactions and, to the extent applicable, derivative agreements, contracts, and transactions. Rule 17Ad–22(d)(4) requires, in relevant part, that a registered clearing agency shall establish, implement, maintain, and enforce written policies and procedures reasonably designed to identify sources of operational risk and minimize them through the development of appropriate systems, controls, and procedures; implement systems that are reliable, resilient and secure, and have adequate, scalable capacity.

The Commission finds that the proposed rule change, which modifies ICC’s Pricing Policy to implement a direct price submission process for CPs, is consistent with Section 17A of the Act and Rule 17Ad–22 thereunder. The proposed rule change is consistent with the requirements of Section 17A(b)(3)(F) that the rules of a registered clearing agency be designed to promote the prompt and accurate clearance and settlement of securities transactions and, to the extent applicable, derivative agreements, contracts, and transactions. By reducing operational risk the proposed rule changes reduce the likelihood that ICC will be unable to complete its end-of-day price discovery process. Completion of the end-of-day price discovery process is a necessary and essential element in ICC’s clearance and settlement processes. The Commission believes that the proposed changes should enhance ICC’s ability to complete the necessary pricing process effectively and thereby promote the prompt and accurate clearance and settlement of derivative agreements, contracts and transactions consistent with Section 17A(b)(3)(F).

For similar reasons, the proposed rule changes are also consistent with Rule 17Ad–22(d)(4) in that they are designed to reduce operational risk outside of ICC’s control. The proposed rule changes are intended to reduce ICC’s external operational risk by allowing ICC to control the price submission process through the implementation of systems designed to provide for direct connection and communication with CPs instead of relying on an intermediary to collect price information needed for ICC’s price discovery process. As a result, because ICC will be able to reduce its reliance on intermediaries and thereby reduce operational risk that is outside of its control, the proposed rule changes are consistent with the requirements of Rule 17Ad–22(d)(4).

IV. Conclusion

It is therefore ordered, pursuant to Section 19(b)(2) of the Act that the proposed rule change (SR–ICC–2017–003), as amended by Amendment No. 1, be, and hereby is, approved.

For the Commission by the Division of Trading and Markets, pursuant to delegated authority.

Robert W. Errett,
Deputy Secretary.

[FR Doc. 2017–11963 Filed 6–8–17; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 8011–01–P

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION


Self-Regulatory Organizations;
Chicago Board Options Exchange, Incorporated; Notice of Filing of a Proposed Rule Change Relating to Disaster Recovery

June 5, 2017.

Pursuant to Section 19(b)(1) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“Act”) and Rule 19b–4 thereunder, notice is hereby given that on May 24, 2017, Chicago Board Options Exchange, Incorporated (“CBOE” or the “Exchange”) filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (“Commission”) the proposed rule change as described in Items I, II, and III below, which Items have been prepared by the Exchange. The Commission is publishing this notice to solicit comments on the proposed rule change from interested persons.

I. Self-Regulatory Organization’s Statement of the Terms of Substance of the Proposed Rule Change

The Exchange proposes to amend Rule 6.18 relating to disaster recovery. The text of the proposed rule change is available on the Exchange’s Web site (http://www.cboe.com/AboutCBOE/CBOElegalRegulatoryHome.aspx), at the Exchange’s Office of the Secretary, and at the Commission’s Public Reference Room.

II. Self-Regulatory Organization’s Statement of the Purpose of, and Statutory Basis for, the Proposed Rule Change

In its filing with the Commission, the Exchange included statements concerning the purpose of and basis for the proposed rule change and discussed any comments it received on the proposed rule change. The text of these
The Exchange proposes to amend Rule 6.18 relating to disaster recovery. Specifically, the Exchange proposes to make changes to Rule 6.18 to: (1) Allow the Exchange to establish certain additional temporary requirements applicable to particular Designated BCP/DR Participants during use of the back-up data center; (2) provide that the Exchange may determine to temporarily allow trading in proprietary classes of options and classes of options exclusively-licensed by the Exchange in an exclusively floor-based environment via open outcry in order to preserve the Exchange’s ability to provide fair and orderly markets in those classes in the event that the Exchange’s primary and back-up data centers become inoperable or otherwise unavailable for use due to a significant systems failure, disaster, or other unusual circumstances; (3) permit the Exchange to deactivate certain nonessential systems and systems functionalities in response to limited systems disruptions or malfunctions, security intrusions, systems compliance issues, or other unusual circumstances; and (4) permit the Exchange to restrict access of a TPH or associated person to the Exchange’s trading floor could still be used and that in the event that the trading floor were inoperable, the Exchange could still operate using a floorless configuration or screen-based only environment on the Exchange’s primary data center. References to the DRF and other irrelevant portions of the original rule were eliminated or replaced with references to Exchange’s primary and back-up data centers as appropriate.

In 2015, Rule 6.18 was again amended to add greater detail to the Exchange’s disaster recovery rules and harmonize the disaster recovery rules with newly implemented disaster recovery-related regulatory imperatives of Regulation Systems Compliance and Integrity ("Regulation SCI"), which superseded and replaced the SEC’s voluntary Automation Review Policy. In doing so, the Exchange made certain changes to Rule 6.18 to provide additional details regarding the Exchange’s back-up trading systems continuity and disaster recovery plans, and testing and update its disaster recovery rules to ensure consistency with Regulation SCI.

The Exchange now proposes to make additional changes to its disaster recovery rules to provide the Exchange authority to take additional steps necessary to preserve the Exchange’s ability to conduct business in the event that the Exchange’s primary and/or back-up data center(s) become inoperable or otherwise unavailable for use due to a significant systems failure, disaster or other unusual circumstances and make clear in the Rules the intermediary steps that the Exchange may take to disable certain systems and users’ connectivity while continuing to operate its primary data center. The Exchange believes this authority serves the interests of all investors and the general public, because it helps the Exchange ensure its continuous operation and ability to maintain fair and orderly markets in the event of a significant systems failure or other unusual circumstance.

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the Hybrid Trading System 10 and other Exchange systems if such access poses a significant threat to the Exchange’s ability to operate systems essential to maintain a fair and orderly market. The Exchange proposes to add new Rule 6.18(b)(iv)(B) (Alternative BCP/DR Participant Obligations), which would provide that during the use of the back-up data center, the Exchange may, if necessary for the maintenance of fair and orderly markets, establish heightened quoting obligations for Designated BCP/DR Participants in a class in which the Designated BCP/DR Participant is already an appointed Lead Market-Maker or Market-Maker up to the standards specified for Designated Primary Market-Makers (“DPMs”) specified in Rule 8.85(a) 11 and/or disallow the ability to deselect an appointment intraday in a class in which the Designated BCP/DR Participant is already an appointed Market-Maker. 12 Proposed Rule

6.18(b)(iv)(B) would also provide that the Exchange would notify market participants of any such additional temporary requirements prior to implementation in a reasonable manner as determined by the Exchange. 13 The Exchange believes this extended authority would afford the Exchange with necessary flexibility to address unexpected contingencies that may arise if a disaster or other unusual circumstances occur, causing the Exchange to use the back-up data center and help ensure that the Exchange operate a fair and orderly market in the event of a market emergency. The Exchange also proposes non-substantive changes to the lettering in paragraph (b)(iv) to accommodate the addition of new Rule 6.18(b)(iv)(B). Accordingly, current Rule 6.18(b)(iv)(B) would become Rule 6.18(b)(iv)(C), and current Rule 6.18(b)(iv)(C) would become Rule 6.18(b)(iv)(D).

The Exchange proposes to add Rule 6.18(c) (Operation via Open Outcry), which would provide that if the Exchange’s primary and back-up data centers become inoperable or otherwise unavailable for use due to a significant systems failure, disaster, or other unusual circumstances, in the interests of maintaining fair and orderly markets or for the protection of investors, the Exchange may determine, on a class-by-class basis, to temporarily allow trading in its exclusively-licensed and/or proprietary products 14 in an exclusively floor-based environment via open outcry in order to preserve the Exchange’s ability to conduct business in those option classes. 15 Similar to the Exchange’s authority in current Rule 6.18(c) (proposed Rule 6.18(d)), which permits the Exchange to operate in a screen-based only environment if the trading floor facility is inoperable, proposed Rule 6.18(c) would afford the Exchange necessary flexibility to temporarily operate in open outcry in order to trade certain classes of options that are either proprietary or exclusively-licensed in the event that the Exchange’s primary and back-up
data centers are inoperable due to a significant systems failure, disaster, or other unusual circumstances. The Exchange believes that the providing authority for it to temporarily operate in an exclusively floor-based environment in such a situation would help ensure the Exchange’s ability to continue to conduct business and help preserve the Exchange’s ability to continuously provide fair and orderly markets in classes of options that are only traded on CBOE or exclusively-licensed to CBOE. The Exchange also proposes non-substantive changes to the lettering in Rule 6.18 to accommodate the addition of new Rule 6.18(c). Accordingly, current Rule 6.18(c) would become Rule 6.18(d).

The Exchange also proposes to add Rule 6.18(e) (Deactivation of Certain Systems), which would provide that in the event of a systems disruption or malfunction, security intrusion, systems compliance issue, or other unusual circumstances, the Exchange may, in accordance with the Rules or if necessary to maintain fair and orderly markets or to protect investors, temporarily deactivate certain systems or systems functionalities that are not essential to conducting business on the Exchange. Many of the systems and systems functionalities described in the Rules are provided optionally by the Exchange to enhance participants’ trading experience, but are not required to be active under the Rules and are not necessary for the Exchange to conduct business. 16 As is described in the Rules, many of the Exchange’s systems functionalities may be made available (or unavailable) by the Exchange on a class-by-class basis. Such systems and systems functionalities that are non-essential to conducting business on the Exchange include, but are not limited to, Public Automated Routing (“PAR”) 17 workstations, the Automated Improvement Mechanism (“AIM”), 18 and the Solicitation Auction Mechanism (“SAM”). 19

In addition, the activation of other functionalities may not be described by rule, but could be suspended temporarily (e.g., until the earlier of the end of a trading session or until systems disruptions could be remedied) if disruption or malfunction of that functionality were to interfere with the Exchange’s ability to conduct business in a fair and orderly manner. For example, if a certain order type were to

10 Under Rule 1.1(aaa), the “Hybrid Trading System” refers to (i) the Exchange’s trading platform that allows Market-Makers to submit electronic quotes in their appointed classes and (ii) any connectivity to the foregoing trading platform that is administered by or on behalf of the Exchange, such as a communications hub.

11 Currently, under Rule 8.85(a)[i], for example, DPMs must provide continuous electronic quotes (as defined in Rule 1.1(ccc)) in at least the lesser of 99% of the non-adjusted option series or 100% of the non-adjusted option series minus one call-put pair, with the term “call-put pair” referring to one call and one put that cover the same underlying instrument and have the same expiration date and exercise price, and assure that its disseminated market quotations are accurate. Compliance with this quoting obligation applies to all of a DPM’s allocated classes collectively. The Exchange will determine compliance by a DPM with this quoting obligation on a monthly basis. However, with determining compliance with this obligation on a monthly basis does not relieve a DPM from meeting this obligation on a daily basis, nor does it prohibit the Exchange from taking disciplinary action against DPM for failing to meet this obligation each trading day. See Rule 8.85(a)[i]. Accordingly, under proposed Rule 6.18(b)(iv)(B), during use of the back-up data center, the Exchange could require that Market-Makers in SPXW provide continuous electronic quotes in up to 99% of the non-adjusted option series or 100% of the non-adjusted option series minus one call-put pair, with the term “call-put pair” referring to one call and one put that cover the same underlying instrument and have the same expiration date and exercise price, and assure that its disseminated market quotations are accurate. Compliance with this quoting obligation applies to all of a DPM’s allocated classes collectively. The Exchange will determine compliance by a DPM with this quoting obligation on a monthly basis. However, with determining compliance with this obligation on a monthly basis does not relieve a DPM from meeting this obligation on a daily basis, nor does it prohibit the Exchange from taking disciplinary action against DPM for failing to meet this obligation each trading day. See Rule 8.85(a)[i]. Accordingly, under proposed Rule 6.18(b)(iv)(B), during use of the back-up data center, the Exchange could require that Market-Makers in SPXW provide continuous electronic quotes in up to 99% of the non-adjusted option series or 100% of the non-adjusted option series minus one call-put pair.

12 In accordance with Rule 1001(a)(2)(v) of Regulation SCI, the Exchange maintains written policies and procedures reasonably designed to ensure that its trading systems (including with respect to both the Exchange’s primary and back-up data center trading systems), have levels of capacity, integrity, resiliency, availability, and security adequate to maintain the Exchange’s operational capability and promote the maintenance of fair and orderly markets, including, but not limited to business continuity and disaster recovery, and which the Exchange believes are reasonably designed to achieve two-hour resumption of all trading systems that are essential to conducting business on the Exchange and which the Exchange believes are reasonably designed to support resumption in a significantly shorter amount of time, including, but not limited to with respect to those systems that are essential to the trading of proprietary products and products exclusively licensed for trading on the Exchange.

13 The Exchange would make these notifications on the Systems Notification page on the Exchange’s Web site, via the Exchange’s Order Management Terminals (“OMTs”), via an Exchange-used messaging service, and/or other reasonable notification mechanisms.

14 See supra at note 4.

15 See supra at note 12.


17 See generally Rule 6.12, Rule 6.12A.

18 See generally Rule 6.74A.

19 See generally Rule 6.74B.
cause a wider system malfunction or a certain complex order product could not be created without triggering widespread systems issues the Exchange might announce, via its systems status page or otherwise, the suspension of the availability of that order type or complex product. If such an event impacts a non-essential system or system functionality, the Exchange may deem it necessary to maintain fair and orderly markets to deactivate that system or functionality until any issues are resolved to prevent any potential harm to investors. Proposed Rule 6.18(e) would also provide that the Exchange would notify market participants of any such deactivation, and subsequent reactivation, promptly and in a reasonable manner determined by the Exchange. The Exchange may make these notifications on the Systems Notification page on the Exchange’s Web site, via the OMT, via an Exchange-used messaging service such as SendWordNow. The Exchange proposes Rule 6.18(f) (Connectivity Restriction), which would permit the Exchange to temporarily restrict a TPH’s or associated person’s access to the Hybrid Trading System or other electronic trading systems if it is determined by the President (or senior-level designee) of the Exchange, that because of a systems issue, such access threatens the Exchange’s ability to operate systems essential to the maintenance of fair and orderly markets. Such access would remain restricted until the end of the trading session or an earlier time if the President (or senior-level designee) of the Exchange, in consultation with the affected TPH(s), determines that lifting the restriction no longer poses a threat to the Exchange’s ability to operate systems essential to conducting business or continuing to maintain a fair and orderly market on the Exchange or to investors. In the current electronic trading environment, if a TPH’s systems malfunctions or is compromised, it could disrupt the Exchange’s systems or market or harm other investors. For example, software malfunctions may pose a risk to the Exchange’s systems, investors, and the general public without proper risk controls. Proposed Rule 6.18(f) would simply give the Exchange the authority to activate additional risk controls to stem the access of a TPH that has experienced a systems disruption or malfunction, which poses undue risk to the Exchange.

2 Statutory Basis

The Exchange believes the proposed rule change is consistent with the Act and the rules and regulations thereunder applicable to the Exchange and, in particular, the requirements of Section 6(b) of the Act. Specifically, the Exchange believes the proposed rule change is consistent with the Section 6(b)(5) requirements that the rules of an exchange be designed to prevent fraudulent and manipulative acts and practices, to promote just and equitable principles of trade, to foster cooperation and coordination with persons engaged in regulating, clearing, settling, processing information with respect to, and facilitating transactions in securities, to remove impediments and perfect the mechanism of a free and open market and a national market system, and, in general, to protect investors and the public interest. Additionally, the Exchange believes the proposed rule change is consistent with the Section 6(b)(5) requirement that the rules of an exchange not be designed to permit unfair discrimination between customers, issuers, brokers, or dealers.

The proposed rule change is designed to promote the Exchange’s ability to ensure the continued operation of a fair and orderly market in the event of a systems failure, disaster, or other unusual circumstances that might threaten the ability to conduct business on the Exchange. The Exchange recognizes that switching operations to the back-up data center may occur in times of uncertainty or great volatility in the markets. It is at these times that the investors may have the greatest need for viable, trustworthy marketplaces. The proposed rule change seeks to ensure that such a marketplace will exist when most needed and thus, the Exchange believes that the proposed rule protects investors in the most fundamental sense.

In particular, the Exchange believes that proposed Rule 6.18(b)(iv)(B) allowing the Exchange, during the use of the back-up data center to (1) establish heightened quoting obligations for Designated BCP/DR Participants in a class in which the Designated BCP/DR Participant is already an appointed Lead Market-Maker or Market-Maker up to the standards specified for Designated Primary Market-Makers specified in Rule 8.65(a) and/or (2) disallow the ability to deselect an appointment intraday in a class in which the Designated BCP/DR Participant is already an appointed Market-Maker would help ensure the maintenance of a fair and orderly market in the event of a disaster, which is in the interests of all market participants, investors, and the general public. The Exchange believes that adopting rules that help ensure that markets are open and available during times of turmoil and emergency is an important goal consistent with the Act. In the same vein, the Exchange believes that proposed Rule 6.18(c), which would permit the Exchange, in the interests of maintaining fair and orderly markets or for the protection of investors, to temporarily allow trading in certain proprietary and exclusively-licensed options classes, which only trade on the Exchange or the Exchange and the Exchange’s affiliated exchanges, in an exclusively floor-based environment via open outcry to preserve the Exchange’s ability conduct business on the Exchange in those option classes. The Exchange believes that this proposed provision would help the Exchange maintain fair and orderly markets in these classes during a disaster situation and would serve the interests of market participants, investors, and the general public by helping to ensure that the Exchange’s proprietary and exclusively-licensed

\[20\]For example, if the creation of a certain complex order product (e.g., the October/November calendar spread in class XYZ) were to cause significant trading disruptions in an entire class (e.g., trading in all of XYZ), the Exchange might determine to turn off calendar spreads or complex orders in general in the class in order to help ensure that regular trading (i.e., trading of simple orders) in the class remained available. Notably, Rule 6.33C permits the Exchange to determine which classes and which complex order origin types (i.e., non-broker-dealer public customer, broker-dealers that are not Market-Makers or specialists on an options exchange, and/or Market-Makers or specialists on an options exchange) are eligible for entry into the COB and whether such complex orders can route directly to the COB and/or from PAR to the COB. Note also, in this case, if the Exchange were to suspend such complex order types, complex products could still be “created” by legging.

\[21\]See CBOE Regulatory Circular RG14–030 (SendWordNow Smart Notification Services).

\[22\]In determining whether to a TPH’s access threatens the Exchange’s ability to operate systems essential to the maintenance of fair and orderly markets and/or determine that lifting the restriction no longer poses a threat to the Exchange’s ability to operate systems essential to conducting business or continuing to maintain a fair and orderly market on the Exchange or to investors, a designee of the President of the Exchange might announce, via its Exchange maintain fair and orderly markets to deactivate that system, and, in general, to protect investors and the public interest. Additionally, the Exchange believes the proposed rule change is consistent with the Section 6(b)(5) requirement that the rules of an exchange not be designed to permit unfair discrimination between customers, issuers, brokers, or dealers.

\[23\]In determining whether the proposed provision would help the Exchange maintain fair and orderly markets in these classes during a disaster situation and would serve the interests of market participants, investors, and the general public by helping to ensure that the Exchange’s proprietary and exclusively-licensed options classes, which only trade on the Exchange or the Exchange and the Exchange’s affiliated exchanges, in an exclusively floor-based environment via open outcry to preserve the Exchange’s ability conduct business on the Exchange in those option classes. The Exchange believes that this proposed provision would help the Exchange maintain fair and orderly markets in these classes during a disaster situation and would serve the interests of market participants, investors, and the general public by helping to ensure that the Exchange’s proprietary and exclusively-licensed
products remain available for trading in the event of a significant systems failure, disaster, or other unusual circumstances. The Exchange also believes that deactivation of certain systems in proposed Rule 6.18(e), whether by rule or otherwise, in order to ensure that the Exchange is able to provide a fair and orderly market in the face of systems disruptions and malfunction is in the best interests of market participants, investors, and the general public.

Similarly, the Exchange believes that the proposed connectivity restriction in proposed Rule 6.18(f) would help ensure that the Exchange remains open and available to all market participants. The Exchange notes that other connectivity restrictions are already in place on the Exchange.\(^{27}\) Furthermore, the Exchange believes that proposed Rule 6.18(f) is consistent with Section 6(b)(7)\(^{28}\) of the Act, which requires the Exchange to adopt rules that provide a fair procedure for the disciplining of members and persons associated with members, the denial of membership to any person seeking membership therein, the barring of any person from becoming associated with a member thereof, and the prohibition or limitation by the exchange of any person with respect to access to services offered by the exchange or a member thereof.

The Exchange notes that proposed Rule 6.18(f) is not aimed at denying access to a particular TPH, but rather making sure that the Exchange remains accessible to all other TPHs that do not threaten the Exchange’s ability to conduct normal business operations. The Exchange notes that as soon as the President of the Exchange (or designee), working with the TPH organization that poses a threat to the Exchange, were able to confirm that the TPH organization no longer posed such a threat, access to the Exchange would be restored to that TPH. The Exchange believes that this is a fair result and is in the best interests of all market participants, investors, and the general public.

The Exchange also believes that the proposed rule change promotes just and equitable principles of trade by adding detail and clarity to the Rules. The proposed rule change seeks to provide additional clarity to the Exchange’s disaster recovery rules, putting all market participants on notice as to how the Exchange will function in case of significant systems disruption or other disaster situation. The Exchange is continuously updating the Rules to provide additional detail, clarity, and transparency regarding its operations and trading systems and regulatory authority. The Exchange believes that the adoption of detailed, clear, and transparent rules reduces burdens on competition and promotes just and equitable principles of trade. The Exchange also believes that adding greater detail to the Rules regarding the Exchange’s ability to ensure the continuous operation of the market and preserve the ability to conduct business on the Exchange will increase confidence in the markets and encourage wider participation in the markets and greater investment.

B. Self-Regulatory Organization’s Statement on Burden on Competition

The Exchange does not believe that the proposed rule change will impose any burden on competition that is not necessary or appropriate in furtherance of the purposes of the Act. Rather, the proposed rule change will help ensure that competitive markets remain operative in the event of a systems failure or other disaster event. The Exchange notes that the proposed rule change is designed to provide the Exchange with authority to require market participants to participate in, and provide necessary liquidity to, the market to ensure that the Exchange functions in a fair and orderly manner in the event of a significant systems failure, disaster, or other unusual circumstances. Accordingly, the Exchange believes that the proposed rule change is designed to ensure fair and competitive markets at time when they may be most needed.

\(^{27}\) See, e.g., Rules 6.23A (Trading Permit Holder Connectivity) and 6.23C (Technical Disconnect). Under Rule 6.23A(b), the Exchange may limit the number of messages sent by Trading Permit Holders accessing the Exchange electronically in order to protect the integrity of the Hybrid trading system. In addition, the Exchange may impose restrictions on the use of a computer connected through an application programming interface (“API”) if it believes such restrictions are necessary to ensure the proper performance of the system. Any such restrictions shall be objectively determined and submitted to the Commission for approval pursuant to a rule change filing under Section 19(b) of the Exchange Act. Under Rule 6.23A(a), when a CBOE Application Server (“CAS”) loses communication with a Client Application such that a CAS does not receive an appropriate response to a Heartbeat Request within “x” period of time, the Technical Disconnect Mechanism will automatically logoff the Trading Permit Holder’s affected Client Application and automatically cancel all the Trading Permit Holder’s Market-Maker quotes, if applicable, and open orders with a time-in-force of “day” resting in the Books, before allowing resting on a PAR workstation or order management terminal (“day orders”), if the Trading Permit Holder enables that optional service, posted through the affected Client Application.

provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552, will be available for Web site viewing and printing in the Commission's Public Reference Room, 100 F Street NE., Washington, DC 20549 on official business days between the hours of 10:00 a.m. and 3:00 p.m. Copies of such filing also will be available for inspection and copying at the principal office of the Exchange. All comments received will be posted without change; the Commission does not edit personal identifying information from submissions. You should submit only information that you wish to make available publicly. All submissions should refer to File Number SR-CBOE–2017–044, and should be submitted on or before June 30, 2017.

For the Commission, by the Division of Trading and Markets, pursuant to delegated authority.29

Robert W. Errett,
Deputy Secretary.

[FR Doc. 2017–11962 Filed 6–8–17; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 8011–01–P

SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION
[Disaster Declaration #15153 and #15154; Missouri Disaster #MO–00082]

President Declaration of a Major Disaster for Public Assistance Only for the State of Missouri

AGENCY: U.S. Small Business Administration.

ACTION: Notice.

SUMMARY: This is a Notice of the Presidential declaration of a major disaster for Public Assistance Only for the State of Missouri (FEMA–4317–DR), dated 06/02/2017. Incident: Severe Storms, Tornadoes, Straight-line Winds, and Flooding. Incident Period: 04/28/2017 through 05/11/2017.

DATES: Effective 06/02/2017.

Physical Loan Application Deadline Date: 08/01/2017.
Economic Injury (EIDL) Loan Application Deadline Date: 03/02/2018.


SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Notice is hereby given that as a result of the

President’s major disaster declaration on 06/02/2017, Private Non-Profit organizations that provide essential services of governmental nature may file disaster loan applications at the address listed above or other locally announced locations.

The following areas have been determined to be adversely affected by the disaster:


The Interest Rates are:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>For Physical Damage:</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Non-Profit Organizations with Credit Available Elsewhere</td>
<td>2.500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Profit Organizations without Credit Available Elsewhere</td>
<td>2.500</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>For Economic Injury:</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Non-Profit Organizations without Credit Available Elsewhere</td>
<td>2.500</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The number assigned to this disaster for physical damage is 151536 and for economic injury is 151546.

(Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance Number 59008)

James E. Rivera,
Associate Administrator for Disaster Assistance.

[FR Doc. 2017–11971 Filed 6–8–17; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 8025–01–P

SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION
[Disaster Declaration #15151 and #15152; Missouri Disaster #MO–00081]

President Declaration of a Major Disaster for the State of Missouri

AGENCY: U.S. Small Business Administration.

ACTION: Notice.

SUMMARY: This is a Notice of the Presidential declaration of a major disaster for the State of Missouri (FEMA–4317–DR), dated 06/02/2017. Incident: Severe Storms, Tornadoes, Straight-line Winds, and Flooding. Incident Period: 04/28/2017 through 05/11/2017.

DATES: Effective 06/02/2017.

**Physical Loan Application Deadline Date:** 08/01/2017

**Economic Injury (EIDL) Loan Application Deadline Date:** 03/02/2018

**ADDRESS:** Submit completed loan applications to: U.S. Small Business Administration, 409 3rd Street SW., Suite 6050, Washington, DC 20416, (202) 205–6734.

**SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:** Notice is hereby given that as a result of the President’s major disaster declaration on 06/02/2017, applications for disaster loans may be filed at the address listed above or other locally announced locations.

The following areas have been determined to be adversely affected by the disaster:


**Contiguous Counties (Economic Injury Loans Only):**


Arkansas: Baxter, Benton, Boone, Carroll, Clay, Craighead, Fulton, Greene, Marion, Mississippi, Randolph, Sharp.

Illinois: Madison, Monroe, Saint Clair.

Kansas: Cherokee, Crawford, Jackson.

Oklahoma: Delaware, Ottawa.

Tennessee: Dyer, Lake.

The Interest Rates are:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>For Physical Damage:</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Homeowners with Credit Available Elsewhere</td>
<td>3.875</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homeowners without Credit Available Elsewhere</td>
<td>1.938</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Businesses with Credit Available Elsewhere</td>
<td>6.430</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Businesses without Credit Available Elsewhere</td>
<td>3.215</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Profit Organizations with Credit Available Elsewhere</td>
<td>2.500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Profit Organizations without Credit Available Elsewhere</td>
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