Federal Communications Commission.

Marlene H. Dortch,
Secretary, Office of the Secretary.

[FR Doc. 2017–25411 Filed 11–22–17; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6712–01–P

FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION

Notice to All Interested Parties of Intent To Terminate the Receivership of 10337, Community First Bank—Chicago

Notice is hereby given that the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC or Receiver) as Receiver for Community First Bank—Chicago, Chicago, Illinois, intends to terminate its receivership for said institution. The FDIC was appointed Receiver of Community First Bank—Chicago on February 4, 2011. The liquidation of the receivership assets has been completed. To the extent permitted by available funds and in accordance with law, the Receiver will be making a final dividend payment to proven creditors.

Based upon the foregoing, the Receiver has determined that the continued existence of the receivership will serve no useful purpose. Consequently, notice is given that the receivership shall be terminated, to be effective no sooner than thirty days after the date of this notice. If any person wishes to comment concerning the termination of the receivership, such comment must be made in writing and sent within thirty days of the date of this notice to: Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Division of Resolutions and Receiverships, Attention: Receivership Oversight Department 34.6, 1601 Bryan Street, Dallas, TX 75201.

No comments concerning the termination of the receivership will be considered which are not sent within this time frame.


Robert E. Feldman,
Executive Secretary, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.

[FR Doc. 2017–25210 Filed 11–22–17; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6712–01–P

FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM

Change in Bank Control Notices; Acquisitions of Shares of a Bank or Bank Holding Company

The notificants listed below have applied under the Change in Bank Control Act (12 U.S.C. 1817(jj)) and § 225.41 of the Board's Regulation Y (12 CFR 225.41) to acquire shares of a bank or bank holding company. The factors that are considered in acting on the notices are set forth in paragraph 7 of the Act (12 U.S.C. 1817(jj)).

The notices are available for immediate inspection at the Federal Reserve Bank indicated. The notices also will be available for inspection at the offices of the Board of Governors. Interested persons may express their views in writing to the Reserve Bank indicated for that notice or to the offices of the Board of Governors. Comments must be received not later than December 7, 2017.

1. Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas
   (Robert L. Tripplett III, Senior Vice President)
   2200 North Pearl Street, Dallas, Texas 75201–2272:
   J. Edgerton Pierson, Jr. and the Jim Pierson Revocable Grantor Trust, both of Shreveport, Louisiana; to retain voting shares of City Bancshares, Inc., Natchitoches, Louisiana; and Virginia T. Pierson, Mary Lou Pierson Brown, Phillip G. Brown, each of Natchitoches, Louisiana, Patricia Pierson McAlpine, Kingwood, Texas, and J. Edgerton Pierson, Jr.; as a group acting in concert to collectively retain voting shares of City Bancshares, Inc., Natchitoches, Louisiana and thereby, indirectly retain shares of City Bank & Trust Company, Natchitoches, Louisiana.

   Ann E. Misback,
   Secretary of the Board.

[FR Doc. 2017–25338 Filed 11–22–17; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6712–01–P

SUMMARY:

On August 9, 2017, the Board published in the Federal Register proposed guidance on supervisory expectations for boards of directors of firms supervised by the Federal Reserve. The proposal addresses supervisory expectations for boards of directors of bank holding companies, savings and loan holding companies, state member banks, U.S. branches and agencies of foreign banking organizations, and systemically important nonbank financial companies designated by the Financial Stability Oversight Council for supervision by the Federal Reserve. For the largest domestic bank and savings and loan holding companies and systemically important nonbank financial companies, the proposal would establish attributes of effective boards centered on the board’s core responsibilities, which support safety and soundness, and would provide the framework with which the Federal Reserve would evaluate the effectiveness of a firm’s boards of directors. For all domestic bank and savings and loan holding companies, certain existing Federal Reserve Supervision and Regulation letters containing supervisory expectations for boards of directors would be revised or eliminated to more clearly distinguish a board’s responsibilities from those of senior management and allow boards to focus