(vi) Sales Commission, Fee, etc., Paid, Offered, or Agreed to be Paid: None (vii) Sensitivity of Technology Contained in the Defense Article or Defense Services Proposed to be Sold: See Attached Annex

(viii) Date Report Delivered to Congress: November 17, 2017

* As defined in Section 47(6) of the Arms Export Control Act.

Policy Justification

Georgia—Javelin Missile and Command Launch Units

The Government of Georgia has requested to purchase four hundred and ten (410) Javelin Missiles, and seventy-two (72) Javelin Command Launch Units (CLUs) (includes two (2) Javelin Block 1 CLUs to be used as spares). Also included are ten (10) Basic Skills Trainers (BST); up to seventy (70) simulated rounds; U.S. Government and contractor technical assistance; transportation; and other related elements of logistics and program support. The total estimated cost is \$75 million.

This proposed sale will contribute to the foreign policy and national security of the United States by improving the security of Georgia. The Javelin system will provide Georgia with increased capacity to meet its national defense requirements. Georgia will have no difficulty absorbing this system into its armed forces.

The proposed sale of this equipment and support will not alter the basic military balance in the region.

The prime contractors will be Raytheon/Lockheed Martin Javelin Joint Venture of Orlando, Florida, and Tucson, Arizona. However, these missiles are being provided from U.S. Army stock and the CLUs will be obtained from on-hand Special Defense Acquisition Fund (SDAF)-purchased stock. There are no known offset agreements proposed in conjunction with this potential sale.

Implementation of this proposed sale will require the assignment of approximately one (1) U.S. Government and two (2) contractor representatives to Georgia.

There will be no adverse impact on U.S. defense readiness as a result of this proposed sale.

Transmittal No. 17-59

Notice of Proposed Issuance of Letter of Offer Pursuant to Section 36(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act

Annex

Item No. vii

(vii) Sensitivity of Technology:

- 1. The Javelin Weapon System is a medium-range, man portable, shoulder-launched, fire and forget, anti-tank system for infantry, scouts, and combat engineers. It may also be mounted on a variety of platforms including vehicles, aircraft and watercraft. The system weighs 49.5 pounds and has a maximum range in excess of 2,500 meters. They system is highly lethal against tanks and other systems with conventional and reactive armors. The system possesses a secondary capability against bunkers.
- 2. Javelin's key technical feature is the use of fire-and-forget technology which allows the gunner to fire and immediately relocate or take cover. Additional special features are the top attack and/or direct fire modes, an advanced tandem warhead and imaging infrared seeker, target lock-on before launch, and soft launch from enclosures or covered fighting positions. The Javelin missile also has a minimum smoke motor thus decreasing its detection on the battlefield.
- 3. The Javelin Weapon System is comprised of two major tactical components, which are a reusable Command Launch Unit (CLU) and a round contained in a disposable launch tube assembly. The CLU incorporates an integrated day-night sight that provides a target engagement capability in adverse weather and countermeasure environments. The CLU may also be used in a stand-alone mode for battlefield surveillance and target detection. The CLU's thermal sight is a second generation Forward Looking Infrared (FLIR) sensor. To facilitate initial loading and subsequent updating of software, all on-board missile software is uploaded via the CLU after mating and prior to launch.

4. The missile is autonomously guided to the target using an imaging infrared seeker and adaptive correlation tracking algorithms. This allows the gunner to take cover or reload and engage another target after firing a missile. The missile has an advanced tandem warhead and can be used in either the top attack or direct fire modes (for target undercover). An onboard flight computer guides the missile to the selected target.

5. The Javelin Missile System hardware and the documentation are UNCLASSIFIED. The missile software which resides in the CLU is considered SENSITIVE. The sensitivity is primarily in the software programs which instruct the system how to operate in the presence of countermeasures. The overall hardware is also considered sensitive in that the infrared

- wavelengths could be useful in attempted countermeasure development.
- 6. If a technologically advanced adversary obtains knowledge of the specific hardware and software elements, the information could be used to develop countermeasures or equivalent systems that might reduce weapon system effectiveness or be used in the development of a system with similar or advanced capabilities.
- 7. A determination has been made that Georgia can provide substantially the same degree of protection for the sensitive technology being released as the U.S. Government. This proposed sale is necessary to further the U.S. foreign policy and national security objectives outlined in the Policy Justification.
- 8. All defense articles and services listed on this transmittal are authorized for release and export to the Government of Georgia.

[FR Doc. 2017–25980 Filed 12–1–17; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 5001-06-P

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Office of the Secretary

[Transmittal No. 17-67]

Arms Sales Notification

AGENCY: Defense Security Cooperation Agency, Department of Defense.

ACTION: Arms sales notice.

SUMMARY: The Department of Defense is publishing the unclassified text of an arms sales notification.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Pamela Young, (703) 697–9107, pamela.a.young14.civ@mail.mil or Kathy Valadez, (703) 697–9217, kathy.a.valadez.civ@mail.mil; DSCA/ DSA-RAN.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This 36(b)(1) arms sales notification is published to fulfill the requirements of section 155 of Public Law 104–164 dated July 21, 1996. The following is a copy of a letter to the Speaker of the House of Representatives, Transmittal 17–67 with attached Policy Justification and Sensitivity of Technology.

Dated: November 28, 2017.

Aaron Siegel,

Alternate OSD Federal Register Liaison Officer, Department of Defense.

BILLING CODE 5001-06-P



DEFENSE SECURITY COOPERATION AGENCY

201 12TH STAFFT SOUTH, \$15,289. **ARLINGTON, VA 32202 5408**

The Honorable Paul D. Ryan Speaker of the House U.S. House of Representatives Washington, DC 20515

NOV 14 2011

Dear Mr. Speaker:

Pursuant to the reporting requirements of Section 36(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act, as amended, we are forwarding horowith Transmittal No. 17-67, concerning the Army's proposed Letter(s) of Offer and Acceptance to the Government of Polaral for defense articles and services estimated to cost \$10.5 billion. After this letter is delivered to your office, we plan to issue a news release to notify the public of this proposed sale,

Lieutenant General, USA

Director

Enclosures:

- Transmittal
- Policy Justification.
- Sensitivity of Technology



BILLING CODE 5001-06-C

Transmittal No. 17–67

Notice of Proposed Issuance of Letter of Offer Pursuant to Section 36(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act, as amended

- (i) Prospective Purchaser: Government of Poland
 - (ii) Total Estimated Value:

\$ 3.7 billion Other

Major Defense Equipment * \$ 6.8 billion \$10.5 billion Total

(iii) Description and Quantity or Quantities of Articles or Services under Consideration for Purchase: This is phase one of a two-phase program for an Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) Battle Command System (IBCS)—enabled Patriot Configuration-3+ with Modernized Sensors and Components consisting of: Major Defense Equipment (MDE):

Four (4) AN/MPQ-65 Radar Sets

Four (4) Engagement Control Stations

Four (4) Radar Interface Units (RIU) Modification Kits

Sixteen (16) M903 Launching Stations adapted

Eighteen (18) Launcher Integrated Network Kits (LINKs) (includes two (2) spares)

Two hundred and eight (208) Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) Missile Segment Enhancement (MSE) Missiles

Eleven (11) PAC-3 MSE Test Missiles

IBCS Software

Six (6) Current Operations—IBCS Engagement Operations Centers (EOCs)

Six (6) Engagement Operations—IBCS EOCs

Two (2) Future Operations—IBCS EOCs Fifteen (15) Integrated Fire Control Network (IFCN) Relays

Four (4) Electrical Power Plants (EPP) III Five (5) Multifunctional Information Distribution Systems/Low Volume Terminals (MIDS/LVTs) Non-MDE includes:

Also included with this request are communications equipment, tools and test equipment, range and test programs, support equipment, prime movers, generators, publications and technical documentation, training equipment, spare and repair parts, personnel training, Technical Assistance Field Team (TAFT), U.S. Government and contractor technical, engineering, and logistics support services, Systems Integration and Checkout (SICO), field office support, and other related elements of logistics and program support.

(iv) Military Department: Army (v) Prior Related Cases, if any: None (vi) Sales Commission, Fee, etc., Paid, Offered, or Agreed to be Paid: None

(vii) Sensitivity of Technology Contained in the Defense Article or Defense Services Proposed to be Sold: See Attached Annex.

(viii) Date Report Delivered to Congress: November 14, 2017

* As defined in Section 47(6) of the Arms Export Control Act.

POLICY JUSTIFICATION

Poland—Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) Battle Command System (IBCS)-enabled Patriot Configuration-3+ with Modernized Sensors and Components

The Government of Poland has requested to purchase phase one of a two-phase program for an Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) Battle Command System (IBCS) enabled Patriot Configuration-3+ with Modernized Sensors and Components consisting of four (4) AN/MPQ-65 radar sets, four (4) engagement control stations, four (4) Radar Interface Units (RIU) modification kits, sixteen (16) M903 Launching stations adapted, eighteen (18) Launcher Integrated Network Kits (LINKs) (includes two (2) spares), two hundred and eight (208) Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) Missile Segment Enhancement (MSE) missiles, eleven (11) PAC-3 MSE test missiles, IBCS software, two (2) future operations—IBCS Engagement

Operations Centers (EOCs), six (6) current operations-IBCS EOCs, six (6) engagement operations-IBCS EOCs, fifteen (15) Integrated Fire Control Network (IFCN relays, four (4) Electrical Power Plants (EPP) III, and five (5) Multifunctional Information Distribution Systems/Low Volume Terminals (MIDS/LVTs). Also included with this request are communications equipment, tools and test equipment, range and test programs, support equipment, prime movers, generators, publications and technical documentation, training equipment, spare and repair parts, personnel training, Technical Assistance Field Team (TAFT), U.S. Government and contractor technical, engineering, and logistics support services, Systems Integration and Checkout (SICO), field office support, and other related elements of logistics and program support. The total estimated program cost is \$10.5. billion.

This proposed sale will support the foreign policy and national security objectives of the United States by helping to improve the security of a NATO ally which has been, and continues to be an important force for political stability and economic progress in Europe. This sale is consistent with U.S. initiatives to provide key allies in the region with modern systems that will enhance interoperability with U.S. forces and increase security.

Poland will use the IBCS-enabled Patriot missile system to improve its missile defense capability, defend its territorial integrity, and deter regional threats. The proposed sale will increase the defensive capabilities of the Polish Military to guard against hostile aggression and shield the NATO allies who often train and operate within Poland's borders. Poland will have no difficulty absorbing this system into its armed forces.

The proposed sale of these missiles and equipment will not alter the basic military balance in the region.

The prime contractors will be Raytheon Corporation in Andover, Massachusetts, Lockheed-Martin in Dallas, Texas, and Northrop Grumman in Falls Church, Virginia. The purchaser requested offsets. At this time, offset agreements are undetermined and will be defined in negotiations between the purchaser and contractors.

Implementation of this proposed sale will require approximately 42 U.S. Government and 55 contractor representatives to travel to Poland for an extended period for equipment deprocessing/fielding, system checkout, training, and technical and logistics support.

There will be no adverse impact on U.S. defense readiness as a result of this proposed sale.

Transmittal No. 17-67

Notice of Proposed Issuance of Letter of Offer Pursuant to Section 36(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act

Annex

Item No. vii

(vii) Sensitivity of Technology: 1. The Patriot Air Defense System contains classified CONFIDENTIAL hardware components, SECRET tactical software and CRITICAL/SENSITIVE technology. Patriot ground support equipment and Patriot missile hardware contain CONFIDENTIAL components and the associated launcher hardware is UNCLASSIFIED. Information on system performance capabilities, effectiveness, survivability, missile seeker capabilities, select software/software documentation and test data are classified up to and including SECRET. The items requested represent significant technological advances for Poland. The Patriot Air Defense System continues to hold a significant technology lead over other surface-to-air missile systems in the world.

2. The Patriot Air Defense System's sensitive/critical technology is primarily in the area of design and production know-how and primarily inherent in the design, development and/or manufacturing data related to certain components. The list of components is classified CONFIDENTIAL. For more information contact the PEO Missiles and Space Lower Tier Project Office.

3. The Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) Battle Command System (IBCS) contains classified SECRET tactical software, UNCLASSIFIED hardware components, a few classified SECRET hardware components and CRITICAL/SENSITIVE technology. Information on Integrated Fire Control (IFC) Network performance, Integrated System Requirements and Effectiveness, Common Command and Control Requirements and Performance, Precision of sensor, shelter, launcher, and Plug & Fight module time references, Detailed security device configurations, Cyber Security details, Distributed Track Management Processing, Distributed Control Management Processing, External Interface Data, IBCS Specifications, Critical Elements, Vulnerabilities and Weaknesses, and Test Data, Results, and Equipment are classified up to and including SECRET. The items requested represent significant technological advances for Poland Air and Missile Defense. The IBCS represents a

technology lead over any other Air and Missile Defense (AMD) Command and Control (C2) system existing today.

- 4. The IBCS sensitive/critical technology is primarily in software. And also resides in the design, developments, and manufacturing of certain components. The list of components containing sensitive/critical technology is classified SECRET.
- 5. The loss of this hardware, software, documentation and/or data could permit development of information which may lead to a significant threat to future U.S. military operations. If an adversary were to obtain this sensitive technology, the missile system effectiveness could be compromised through reverse engineering techniques.
- 6. A determination has been made that Poland can provide substantially the same degree of protection for the sensitive technology being released as the U.S. Government. This proposed sale is necessary in furtherance of the U.S. foreign policy and national security objectives outlined in the Policy Justification.
- 7. All defense articles and services listed in this transmittal have been authorized for release and export to the Government of Poland.

[FR Doc. 2017–25996 Filed 12–1–17; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 5001–06–P

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Department of the Army, Corps of Engineers

Notice of Intent To Prepare a Joint Environmental Impact Statement/ Environmental Impact Report for the San Francisco Bay to Stockton General Reevaluation Report, San Francisco Bay, California

AGENCY: Department of the Army, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, DoD.

ACTION: Notice of intent.

SUMMARY: In accordance with the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) South Atlantic Division and the Port of Stockton are preparing an Environmental Impact Statement and Environmental Impact Report (EIS/EIR) to evaluate the efficiency of the movement of goods along the existing deep-draft navigation route extending from the Golden Gate, through San Pablo Bay and Carquinez Strait, to deep draft facilities at Avon, California. This Notice of Intent (NOI) represents a supplemental notice to the March 4, 2016, NOI released for the San Francisco Bay to Stockton Navigation

Improvement Study. This supplemental NOI is being released to notify the public that the study scope has been reduced to only consider improvements within the portion of the navigation project extending from San Francisco Bay to Avon. Work is now being conducted on an EIS/EIR with a reduced scope and project footprint, which is anticipated to be issued for public review in 2018. This NOI also re-opens the public scoping period.

The 2016 NOI proposed to deepen the John F. Baldwin channel from the West Richmond Channel through the Pinole Shoal Channel, Bulls Head Reach and Suisun Bay Channel to New York Slough Channel to a maximum depth of 45 feet mean lower low water (MLLW) and the Stockton Deep Water Ship Channel to a maximum depth of 40 feet MLLW. As of September, 2017, the portion of the authorized navigation project to the east of Avon is no longer under consideration for formulation of navigation improvements.

The revised study area extends from Central San Francisco Bay to Avon only and includes the West Richmond Channel, Pinole Shoal Channel, and Bulls Head Reach portion of the Suisun Bay Channel (west of Avon). The current authorized depth of this study area is 45 feet mean lower low water (MLLW), but is currently maintained at 35 feet MLLW.

The forthcoming EIS/EIR is a single purpose navigation improvement project to evaluate incremental deepening to a maximum depth of 38 feet MLLW within the channel reaches of the revised study area only.

DATES: Submit comments concerning this notice on or before thirty days after this posting. There will be no additional public meeting in conjunction with this scoping period.

ADDRESSES: Mail written comments concerning this notice to: U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Jacksonville District, Planning and Policy Division, Environmental Branch, P.O. Box 4970, Jacksonville, FL 32232–0019. Comment letters should include the commenter's physical mailing address and the project title.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Stacie Auvenshine, 904–314–6714 or email at *Stacie.j.auvenshine@usace.army.mil.*

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This EIS/EIR is intended to be sufficient in scope to address the federal, state, and local requirements and environmental issues concerning the proposed activities and permit approvals.

Project Area and Background Information: The authorized San Francisco Bay to Stockton, California, navigation project includes the John F. Baldwin and Stockton Ship Channels, which extend 75 nautical miles from the Pacific Ocean, just outside the Golden Gate, to the Port of Stockton. Modern vessels transiting the channels can require up to 55 feet of draft when fully laden. Given that these channels are maintained at 35 feet MLLW, most vessels utilizing the navigation channels between San Francisco Bay and Avon must be "light-loaded" (i.e., less than fully loaded with cargo) to navigate the channels with sufficient under-keel clearance. Light-loading is inefficient and increases the transportation cost and overall cost of shipped products because more trips must be made to carry the same volume of cargo.

The revised study area includes the West Richmond Channel, Pinole Shoal Channel, Carquinez Strait, and the Bulls Head Reach portion of the Suisun Bay Channel, ending at Avon. These channels are currently maintained at 35 feet MLLW, although the channels have an authorized depth of 45 feet MLLW.

The Draft EIS/EIR will analyze the project alternatives described below:

No Action, in which dredging would not occur and all construction-related activities would be avoided. Maintenance dredging would continue annually or on an as-needed basis and the federal standard placement sites would continue to be used.

Deepening to 37 feet MLLW, which would deepen the study area to a depth of 37 feet MLLW with an additional 2 feet of overdepth for a maximum depth of 39 feet MLLW. To account for rapid shoaling, a sediment trap would be constructed at Bulls Head Reach by dredging an additional 6 feet (including 2 feet of overdepth) to 43 feet MLLW.

Deepening to 38 feet MLLW, which would deepen the study area to a depth of 38 feet MLLW with an additional 2 feet of overdepth for a maximum depth of 40 feet MLLW. Under this alternative, a sediment trap at Bulls Head Reach would be constructed by dredging an additional 6 feet (including 2 feet of overdepth) to 44 feet MLLW.

Under both deepening alternatives, the dredged material will be placed at one or more permitted and economically feasible beneficial reuse sites.

Purpose and Need: The purpose of the project is to provide more efficient deep-draft navigation operations in a manner that minimizes adverse environmental effects. The need for the project is to address vessel restrictions imposed by the existing channel depths, which are inadequate to accommodate