of a radiological emergency, to establish plume exposure and ingestion pathway emergency planning zones for nuclear power plants, and to ensure that licensees maintain effective offsite and onsite radiological emergency plans. The standards and requirements for these regulations were developed by considering the risks associated with operation of a power reactor at its licensed full-power level. These risks include the potential for a reactor accident with offsite radiological dose consequences.

As discussed previously in Section III, because FCS is permanently shut down and defueled, there is no longer a risk of a significant offsite radiological release from a design-basis accident exceeding EPA early phase PAGs at the exclusion area boundary. In the unlikely event of a beyond-design-basis accident affecting the SFP that results in a complete loss of heat removal via modes of cooling or heat transfer, there will be well over 10 hours available before an offsite release might occur and, therefore, at least 10 hours to initiate appropriate mitigating actions to restore a means of heat removal to the spent fuel. If a radiological release were projected to be transferred under this unlikely scenario, a minimum of 10 hours is considered sufficient time for offsite authorities to implement protective actions using a CEMP approach to protect the health and safety of the public.

Exemptions from the offsite EP requirements in 10 CFR part 50 have previously been approved by the NRC when the site-specific analyses show that at least 10 hours is available following a loss of SFP coolant inventory accident with no air cooling (or other methods of removing decay heat) until cladding of the hottest fuel assembly reaches the zirconium rapid oxidation temperature. The NRC staff concluded in its previously granted exemptions, as it does with the OPPD requested EP exemptions, that if a minimum of 10 hours is available to initiate mitigative actions consistent with plant conditions, or if needed, for offsite authorities to implement protective actions using a CEMP approach, then formal offsite radiological emergency plans, required under 10 CFR part 50, are not necessary or will not be detrimental and will not delay shutdown and defueled facilities.

Additionally, FCS committed to maintaining SFP makeup strategies in its emergency plans and reduction in the scope of the beyond-design-basis accident that will result in an offsite radiological release exceeding the EPA early phase PAGs at the exclusion area boundary. In the unlikely event of a beyond-design-basis accident affecting the SFP that results in a complete loss of heat removal via modes of cooling or heat transfer, there will be well over 10 hours available before an offsite release might occur and, therefore, at least 10 hours to initiate appropriate mitigating actions to restore a means of heat removal to the spent fuel. If a radiological release were projected to be transferred under this unlikely scenario, a minimum of 10 hours is considered sufficient time for offsite authorities to implement protective actions using a CEMP approach to protect the health and safety of the public.

Exemptions from the offsite EP requirements in 10 CFR part 50 have previously been approved by the NRC when the site-specific analyses show that at least 10 hours is available following a loss of SFP coolant inventory accident with no air cooling (or other methods of removing decay heat) until cladding of the hottest fuel assembly reaches the zirconium rapid oxidation temperature. The NRC staff concluded in its previously granted exemptions, as it does with the OPPD requested EP exemptions, that if a minimum of 10 hours is available to initiate mitigative actions consistent with plant conditions, or if needed, for offsite authorities to implement protective actions using a CEMP approach, then formal offsite radiological emergency plans, required under 10 CFR part 50, are not necessary or will not be detrimental and will not delay shutdown and defueled facilities.

Additionally, FCS committed to maintaining SFP makeup strategies in its emergency plans and reduction in the scope of the beyond-design-basis accident that will result in an offsite radiological release exceeding the EPA early phase PAGs at the exclusion area boundary.

Exemptions from the offsite EP requirements in 10 CFR part 50 have previously been approved by the NRC when the site-specific analyses show that at least 10 hours is available following a loss of SFP coolant inventory accident with no air cooling (or other methods of removing decay heat) until cladding of the hottest fuel assembly reaches the zirconium rapid oxidation temperature. The NRC staff concluded in its previously granted exemptions, as it does with the OPPD requested EP exemptions, that if a minimum of 10 hours is available to initiate mitigative actions consistent with plant conditions, or if needed, for offsite authorities to implement protective actions using a CEMP approach, then formal offsite radiological emergency plans, required under 10 CFR part 50, are not necessary or will not be detrimental and will not delay shutdown and defueled facilities.

Additionally, FCS committed to maintaining SFP makeup strategies in its emergency plans and reduction in the scope of the beyond-design-basis accident that will result in an offsite radiological release exceeding the EPA early phase PAGs at the exclusion area boundary.
Kenneth Miller (Petitioners), requesting that the NRC take enforcement-related action with regard to all operating nuclear power plants. The petitioner’s requests and the director’s decision are included in the SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION section of this document.

DATES: The director’s decision was issued on December 12, 2017.

ADRESSES: Please refer to Docket ID NRC–2016–0061 when contacting the NRC about the availability of information regarding this document. You may obtain publicly-available information related to this document using any of the following methods:

- Federal Rulemaking Website: Go to http://www.regulations.gov and search for Docket ID NRC–2016–0061. Address questions about NRC docket to Carol Gallagher; telephone: 301–415–3463; email: Carol.Gallagher@nrc.gov. For technical questions, contact the individual(s) listed in the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT section of this document.
- NRC’s Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS): You may obtain publicly-available documents online in the ADAMS Public Documents collection at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. To begin the search, select “ADAMS Public Documents” and then select “Begin Web-based ADAMS Search.” For problems with ADAMS, please contact the NRC’s Public Document Room (PDR) reference staff at 1–800–397–4209, 301–415–4737, or by email to pdr.resource@nrc.gov. The ADAMS accession number for each document referenced (if it is available in ADAMS) is provided the first time that it is mentioned in this document.
- NRC’s PDR: You may examine and purchase copies of public documents at the NRC’s PDR, Room O1–F21, One White Flint North, 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland 20852.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Notice is hereby given that the Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, has issued a director’s decision (ADAMS Accession No. ML17304A893) under Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) section 2.206 on a petition filed by the Petitioners on February 19, 2016 (ADAMS Accession No. ML16050A223). The Petitioners requested that the NRC take enforcement action against all operating nuclear power plants.

Specifically, the Petitioners requested that the NRC either: (1) Issue orders to require immediate corrective actions including compensatory measures to address the operability of electric power systems in accordance with their plant technical specifications, and to implement plant modifications in accordance with current NRC regulatory requirements and staff guidance provided in the references within the 2.206 petition; or (2) issue orders to immediately shut down the nuclear power plants that are operating without addressing the significant design deficiency identified in NRC Bulletin 2012–01, “Design Vulnerability in Electric Power System,” dated July 27, 2012. (ADAMS Accession No. ML12074A115) since the licensees are not in compliance with their technical specifications (typically Section 3.8.1) related to onsite and offsite power systems.

On February 24, 2016, the NRC’s petition manager acknowledged receipt of the petition and offered the Petitioners an opportunity to address the Petition Review Board (PRB). The Petitioners declined an opportunity to address the PRB on the basis that the petition already contained all of the relevant facts to support the PRB’s review.

The NRC sent a copy of the proposed director’s decision to the Petitioners and to the licensees for comment by letters dated September 18, 2017 (ADAMS Accession Nos. ML17156A197 and ML17156A214). The Petitioners and the licensees were provided the opportunity to provide comments on any part of the proposed director’s decision that was considered to be erroneous or any issues in the petition that were not addressed. The Petitioners provided comments by letter dated October 11, 2017 (ADAMS Accession No. ML17291A040), and the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) provided comments, on behalf of licensees, by letter dated October 16, 2017 (ADAMS Accession No. ML17291A846). No new information was provided. To enhance the clarity of the director’s decision, the NRC staff revised the description of the NRC’s accident sequence precursor (ASP) program provided in Section D of the director’s decision, to differentiate between condition and event assessments. The comments from the Petitioners and NEI, along with the NRC staff’s responses to the comments, are included as an attachment to the director’s decision. The attachment identifies any updates to the director’s decision, as a result of comments received from the Petitioners and NEI.

The Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, has determined that the request(s) to issue orders to operating reactor licensees regarding an open phase condition be denied. The reasons for this decision are explained in the Director’s Decision DD–17–04, pursuant to 10 CFR 2.206. The NRC will file a copy of the director’s decision with the Secretary of the Commission for the Commission’s review in accordance with 10 CFR 2.206. As provided by this regulation, the director’s decision will constitute the final action of the Commission 25 days after the date of the decision unless the Commission, on its own motion, institutes a review of the director’s decision in that time.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 19th day of December 2017.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Tanya M. Mensah,
Senior Project Manager, ROP Oversight and Generic Communications Branch, Division of Inspection and Regional Support, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.

[FR Doc. 2017–27583 Filed 12–21–17; 8:45 am]

POSTAL REGULATORY COMMISSION


New Postal Products

AGENCY: Postal Regulatory Commission.

ACTION: Notice.

SUMMARY: The Commission is noticing recent Postal Service filings for the Commission’s consideration concerning negotiated service agreements. This notice informs the public of the filing, invites public comment, and takes other administrative steps.

DATES: Comments are due: December 26, 2017 (Comment due date applies to MC2018–58 and CP2018–95; CP2018–96; CP2018–97); December 27, 2017 (Comment due date applies to MC2018–59 and CP2018–98; CP2018–99).

ADDRESSES: Submit comments electronically via the Commission’s Filing Online system at http://www.prc.gov. Those who cannot submit comments electronically should contact the person identified in the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT section by telephone for advice on filing alternatives.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
David A. Trissell, General Counsel, at 202–789–6820.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Table of Contents
1. Introduction