Region, 10101 Hillwood Pkwy., Room 6N–321, Fort Worth, TX 76177.

(j) Subject
   Joint Aircraft Service Component (JASC) Code: 6210, Main Rotor Blades.
   Issued in Fort Worth, Texas, on January 9, 2018.
   James A. Grigg,
   Acting Director, Compliance & Airworthiness Division, Aircraft Certification Service.

Appendix 1 to AD 2018–02–07
   Please report the following by mail to the Los Angeles ACO Branch, Compliance and Airworthiness Division, FAA, 3960 Paramount Blvd., Lakewood, California 90712; attn: Galib Abumerr; or by email to galib.abumerr@faa.gov.

   (1) Date of inspection:
   (2) Aircraft N-number:
   (3) M/R blade serial number:
   (4) M/R blade hours of time-in-service:
   (5) Location of each crack:
   (6) Dimension of each crack:
   (7) Primary operating location of the M/R blade:

   [FR Doc. 2018–00658 Filed 1–16–18; 8:45 am]
   BILLING CODE 4910–13–P

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 39


RIN 2120–AA64

Airworthiness Directives; Fokker Services B.V. Airplanes

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

ACTION: Final rule; request for comments.

SUMMARY: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Fokker Services B.V. Model F28 Mark 0070 and Mark 0100 series airplanes. This AD requires contacting the FAA to obtain instructions for addressing the unsafe condition on these products, and doing the actions specified in those instructions. This AD was prompted by an erroneous radio altimeter reading, which caused certain systems to respond in a way that led to loss of speed. We are issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.

DATES: This AD becomes effective February 15, 2018.

We must receive comments on this AD by March 5, 2018.

ADDRESSES: You may send comments, using the procedures found in 14 CFR 11.43 and 11.45, by any of the following methods:
   • Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to http://www.regulations.gov. Follow the instructions for submitting comments.
   • Fax: 202–493–2251.

   • Hand Delivery: U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket Operations, M–30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12–140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE, Washington, DC, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays.

   Examining the AD Docket
   You may examine the AD docket on the internet at http://www.regulations.gov by searching for and locating Docket No. FAA–2017–1249; or in person at the Docket Operations office between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. The AD docket contains this AD, the regulatory evaluation, any comments received, and other information. The street address for the Docket Operations office (telephone: 800–647–5527) is in the ADDRESSES section. Comments will be available in the AD docket shortly after receipt.


SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Discussion
   The European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), which is the Technical Agent for the Member States of the European Union, has issued EASA AD 2013–0112, dated May 28, 2013 (referred to after this as the Mandatory Continuing Airworthiness Information, or “the MCAI”), to correct an unsafe condition for all Fokker Services B.V. Model F28 Mark 0070 and Mark 0100 series airplanes. The MCAI states:

Following an accident * * * [of an] aeroplane on final approach, the investigating body determined that an important contributing factor to the accident was an erroneous reading of −7 to −8 feet from the left Radio Altimeter (RA). The responses of the autothrottle and autopilot systems to this erroneous RA system reading led to speed loss and, in combination with operational factors, caused the aeroplane to hit the ground before reaching the runway.

Fokker Services conducted an evaluation of the effects of unflagged erroneous low RA system indications in response to the recommendations in the investigator’s report. The result of the evaluation was a new “ERRONEOUS RADIO ALTITUDE INDICATION” abnormal procedure in the Airplane Flight Manual (AFM). This new procedure includes pulling the circuit breaker of a failed RA system, and in support of this, new yellow identification collars to the RA circuit breakers are to be introduced to improve instantaneous recognition, both visual and tactile, in low illumination and under increased workload conditions.

In order to prevent an unsafe condition, similar to the one that contributed to the accident described above, this [EASA] AD requires incorporation of the new abnormal procedure in the AFM and installation of the new yellow RA circuit breaker identification collars.


FAA’s Determination and Requirements of This AD
   This product has been approved by the aviation authority of another country, and is approved for operation in the United States. Pursuant to our bilateral agreement with the State of Design Authority, we have been notified of the unsafe condition described in the MCAI. We are issuing this AD because we evaluated all pertinent information and determined the unsafe condition exists and is likely to exist or develop on other products of the same type design.

FAA’s Determination of the Effective Date

Since there are currently no domestic operators of this product, we find good cause that notice and opportunity for prior public comment are unnecessary. In addition, for the reason(s) stated above, we find that good cause exists for making this amendment effective in less than 30 days.

Comments Invited
   This AD is a final rule that involves requirements affecting flight safety, and we did not precede it by notice and opportunity for public comment. We invite you to send any written relevant data, views, or arguments about this AD. Send your comments to an address listed under the ADDRESSES section. Include “Docket No. FAA–2017–1249; Product Identifier 2013–NM–104–AD” at the beginning of your comments. We specifically invite comments on the overall regulatory, economic, environmental, and energy aspects of this AD. We will consider all comments received by the closing date and may amend this AD based on those comments.
We will post all comments we receive, without change, to http://www.regulations.gov, including any personal information you provide. We will also post a report summarizing each substantive verbal contact we receive about this AD.

Costs of Compliance

Currently, there are no affected U.S.-registered airplanes. This AD requires contacting the FAA to obtain instructions for addressing the unsafe condition, and doing the actions specified in those instructions. Based on the actions specified in the MCAI AD, we are providing the following cost estimates for an affected airplane that is placed on the U.S. Register in the future:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Action</th>
<th>Labor cost</th>
<th>Parts cost</th>
<th>Cost per product</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Modification</td>
<td>1 work-hour × $85 per hour = $85</td>
<td>$9</td>
<td>$94</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Authority for This Rulemaking**

Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA's authority to issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, section 106, describes the authority of the FAA Administrator. “Subtitle VII: Aviation Programs,” describes in more detail the scope of the Agency’s authority.

We are issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in “Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: General requirements.” Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition that is likely to exist or develop on products identified in this rulemaking action.

This AD is issued in accordance with authority delegated by the Executive Director, Aircraft Certification Service, as authorized by FAA Order 8000.51C. In accordance with that order, issuance of ADs is normally a function of the Compliance and Airworthiness Division, but during this transition period, the Executive Director has delegated the authority to issue ADs applicable to transport category airplanes to the Director of the System Oversight Division.

**Regulatory Findings**

We determined that this AD will not have federalism implications under Executive Order 13132. This AD will not have a substantial direct effect on the States, on the relationship between the national government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government.

For the reasons discussed above, I certify that this AD:

1. Is not a “significant regulatory action” under Executive Order 12866;
2. Is not a “significant rule” under the DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979);
3. Will not affect intrastate aviation in Alaska; and
4. Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.

**List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39**

Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by reference, Safety.

**Adoption of the Amendment**

Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the Administrator, the FAA amends 14 CFR part 39 as follows:

**PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES**

1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:

   Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.

   § 39.13 [Amended]

2. The FAA amends § 39.13 by adding the following new airworthiness directive (AD):

   2018–02–03 Fokker Services B.V.:
   Amendment 39–19156; Docket No. FAA–2017–1249; Product Identifier 9–ANM–116–AMOC-
   2365 Federal Register

   (a) Effective Date
   This AD becomes effective February 1, 2018.

   (b) Affected ADs
   None.

   (c) Applicability
   This AD applies to Fokker Services B.V. Model F28 Mark 0070 and Mark 0100 series airplanes, certificated in any category, all serial numbers.

   (d) Subject
   Air Transport Association (ATA) of America Code 34, Navigation.

   (e) Reason
   This AD was prompted by an erroneous radio altimeter (RA) reading, which caused certain systems to respond in a way that led to loss of speed. We are issuing this AD to ensure the flight crew has procedures for detecting erroneous RA readings. Erroneous RA readings could cause the autothrottle and autopilot systems to respond by causing a loss of speed, which, in combination with operational factors, could cause an airplane to hit the ground before reaching the runway.

   (f) Compliance
   Comply with this AD within the compliance times specified, unless already done.

   (g) Required Action(s)
   Within 30 days after the effective date of this AD, request instructions from the Manager, International Section, Transport Standards Branch, FAA, to address the unsafe condition specified in paragraph (e) of this AD; and accomplish the action(s) at the times specified in, and in accordance with, those instructions. Guidance can be found in Mandatory Continuing Airworthiness Information (MCAI) European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) AD 2013–0112, dated May 28, 2013.

   (h) Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs)
   The Manager, International Section, Transport Standards Branch, FAA, has the authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if requested using the procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19. In accordance with 14 CFR 39.19, send your request to your principal inspector or local Flight Standards District Office, as appropriate. If sending information directly to the International Section, send it to the attention of the person identified in paragraph (i)(2) of this AD. Information may be emailed to: 9–ANM–116–AMOC-REQUESTS@faa.gov. Before using any approved AMOC, notify your appropriate principal inspector, or lacking a principal inspector, the manager of the local flight standards district office/certificate holding district office.

   (i) Related Information

(j) Material Incorporated by Reference

None.

Issued in Renton, Washington, on January 5, 2018.

Michael Kaszycki,
Acting Director, System Oversight Division, Aircraft Certification Service.

[FR Doc. 2018–00656 Filed 1–16–18; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 39


RIN 2120–AA64

Airworthiness Directives; The Enstrom Helicopter Corporation Helicopters

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

ACTION: Final rule.

SUMMARY: We are superseding Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2015–08–51 for the Enstrom Helicopter Corporation (Enstrom) Model F–28A, F–28C, F–28C–2, F–28C–2R, 280C, F–28F, F–28F–R, 280F, 280FX, and 480 helicopters. AD 2015–08–51 required an inspection of the main rotor spindle (spindle) and reporting the inspection results to the FAA. This new AD was prompted by additional reports of cracked spindles and requires establishing a life limit and a recurring inspection. The actions of this AD are intended to prevent the unsafe condition on these products.

DATES: This AD is effective February 21, 2018.

ADDRESSES: For service information identified in this final rule, contact Enstrom Helicopter Corporation, 2209 22nd Street, Menominee, MI; telephone (906) 863–1200; fax (906) 863–6821; or at www.enstromhelicopter.com. You may view this referenced service information at the FAA, Office of the Regional Counsel, Southwest Region, 10101 Hillwood Pkwy., Room 6N–321, Fort Worth, TX 76177.

Exercising the AD Docket

You may examine the AD docket on the internet at http://www.regulations.gov in Docket No.

FAA–2017–0141; or in person at the Docket Management Facility between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. The AD docket contains this AD, the economic evaluation, any comments received, and other information. The address for the Docket Office (phone: 800–647–5527) is Document Management Facility, U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket Operations, M–30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12–140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE, Washington, DC 20590.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Manzoor Javed, Senior Aerospace Engineer, Chicago ACO Branch, Compliance and Airworthiness Division, FAA, 2300 East Devon Ave., Des Plaines, IL 60018; telephone (847) 294–8112; email manzoor.javed@faa.gov.

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION:

Discussion


The NPRM published in the Federal Register on March 2, 2017 (82 FR 12309). The NPRM was prompted by additional reports of cracked spindles. Based on review of in-service data and a fatigue analysis, the FAA determined a life limit and recurring MPIs are necessary to reduce the risk of a crack developing in a spindle. We also determined the reporting requirement in AD 2015–08–51 is no longer necessary. Accordingly, the NPRM proposed to require an MPI of the spindle every 500 hours time-in-service (TIS) until the spindle reaches its new life limit of 1,500 hours TIS.

Since the NPRM was issued, the FAA’s Aircraft Certification Service has changed its organizational structure. The new structure replaces product directorates with functional divisions. We have revised some of the office titles and nomenclature throughout this Final rule to reflect the new organizational changes. Additional information about the new structure can be found in the Notice published on July 25, 2017 (82 FR 34564).

Comments

After our NPRM was published, we received comments from 50 commenters.

A. Support for the NPRM

One commenter supported the 500-hour repetitive inspection proposed by the NPRM.

B. Comments Regarding the FAA’s Justification of the Unsafe Condition

Many commenters, including Enstrom, disagreed with the FAA’s determination that an unsafe condition exists and requested the FAA provide more information about the additional cracks that prompted this AD.

Request: A few commenters noted the entire fleet has been inspected in accordance with AD 2015–08–51 and no additional cracks were found. Other commenters stated no additional cracks have been found in the area of a spindle where a failure could cause a catastrophic accident. A few commenters, including Enstrom, stated no additional cracking has been reported in the same location as that of the accident spindle.

Other commenters requested the FAA provide information about the number of additional reported cracks and whether there is any correlation between cracks and manufacturing dates or suppliers. Enstrom stated the cracked spindles discovered after the accident were manufactured between 1975 to 1980 by two specific suppliers.

FAA Response: We agree to provide information about the cracks that prompted this AD. Contrary to the previous commenters stating there were no additional cracks found by the inspections required by AD 2015–08–51, those inspection results revealed 34 cracked spindle assemblies. The commenters are correct that the additional cracking was not in the same location as that of the accident spindle. The location of the additional 34 spindle cracks was at the hole for the cotter pin securing the lamiflex bearing nut. However, we disagree that the additional cracks were not in an area where a failure could cause a catastrophic accident. A spindle assembly is a primary structural element and a critical part. Flight with any known crack is prohibited in primary