Identify Friend or Foe (IFF) Systems. Also provided are spare and repair parts, communications, test, and support equipment, publications and technical documentation, airworthiness and maintenance support, site surveys and bed down planning, personnel training and training equipment, operational flight test, U.S. Government and contractor technical and logistics personnel services, and other related elements of logistics support. The estimated cost was $1.5 billion. Major Defense Equipment (MDE) constituted $765 million of this total.

This transmittal reports the retrofit of MQ-9s to become weapons capable, and the inclusion of 100 GBU–49 Enhanced Paveway dual mode GPS and laser guided bomb kits comprised of MXU–650 Air Foil Group (AFG) and MAU–210 Enhanced Computer Control Group (ECCG); 200 FMU–152 fuzes; 650 AGM–114R Hellfire missiles, with active warheads; 45 AGM–114R Hellfire training missiles, without active warheads; and 6 Hellfire Captive Air Training Missiles.

The retrofit and inclusion of MDE not enumerated in the original notification will result in an increase in the cost of MDE by $210 million. The total case value will increase to $1.71 billion. The estimated cost was $1.5 billion. Major Defense Equipment (MDE) constituted $765 million of this total.

This notification is being provided as the retrofit of the MQ-9 systems to become weapons capable, and the inclusion of MDE items not originally notified represents an increase in capability. Enhancement of France’s MQ-9 will provide strike capability to augment the current intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capability.

Justification: Enhancement of France’s MQ-9 to provide strike capability will contribute to the foreign and national security policies of the United States by enhancing the ISR and strike capability of a NATO ally. This creates a multi-role capability to provide rapid response to neutralize threats without having to employ secondary aircraft from French, U.S., or coalition partners, in support of national, NATO, and UN-mandated operations. This further contributes to commonality between ISR, weapons, and munitions capabilities which will greatly increase the interoperability between the U.S., French militaries and other peacekeeping forces.

Sensitivity of Technology: France currently owns and operates an unarmed version of the MQ-9 Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) system. No new Critical Program Information is involved in the weaponization process. In addition to weaponization kits and pylons, software and hardware upgrades, survey and test, and training and training equipment, sensitive or classified elements of the upgrade will include:

a. The AGM–114R Hellfire is a rail-launched guided missile. The guidance system employs a Semi-Active Laser (SAL) seeker and an analogue autopilot. The SAL misses home on the laser energy reflected off a target that has been illuminated by a laser designator. The laser designator can be on either the launch platform or another platform. The Hellfire uses a pulse-coded laser illumination so that the missile will only lock on to its chosen target, and has a multi-purpose selectable warhead. The weapon system hardware, as an “all Up Round” is UNCLASSIFIED. The highest level of classified information to be disclosed regarding the AGM–114R Hellfire missile is SECRET, based upon the software.

b. The Captive Air Training Missiles (CATM) consists of a functional guidance section coupled to an inert missile bus and is used for flight training but cannot be launched. The missile has an operational SAL seeker that can search for and lock-on to designated targets. It functions like a tactical missile (without launch capability) during captive carry on the aircraft, making it suitable for training aircrew in simulated Hellfire missile target acquisition and lock.

c. GBU–49 Enhanced Paveway II (EP II) is a maneuverable, free-laser Guided Bomb (LGB) that guides to the target using a GPS-aided INS and dual mode laser seeker. The GBU-49 consists of an Electronic Computer Control Group (ECCG) with laser detector sensor and a warhead specific Air Foil Group (AFG) that attaches to the nose and tail of a GP bomb body respectively. The GBU–49 uses a 500lb (MK–82 or BLU–111) GP bomb body fitted with the MXU–650 AFG and MAU–210 ECCG to guide to its laser designated target. The hardware is UNCLASSIFIED; technical data and documents are classified up to SECRET.

d. FMU–152 is the Joint Programmable Bomb Fuze: a multi-function hard/soft target fuze that is used on for multiple different Mk-series bombs. The fuze can be programmed on the wing or in flight and is used with the JDAM, Paveway, and Enhanced Paveway bombs. The hardware is UNCLASSIFIED; technical data and documents are UNCLASSIFIED.

date Report Delivered to Congress: July 26, 2018

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Office of the Secretary

Defense Advisory Committee on Investigation, Prosecution, and Defense of Sexual Assault in the Armed Forces; Notice of Federal Advisory Committee Meeting

AGENCY: General Counsel of the Department of Defense, Defense Advisory Committee on Investigation, Prosecution, and Defense of Sexual Assault in the Armed Forces, Department of Defense.

ACTION: Notice of Federal Advisory Committee meeting.

SUMMARY: The Department of Defense (DoD) is publishing this notice to announce that the following Federal Advisory Committee meeting of the Defense Advisory Committee on Investigation, Prosecution, and Defense of Sexual Assault in the Armed Forces will take place.

DATES: Open to the public Thursday August 23, 2018 from 2:00 p.m. to 4:00 p.m.

ADDRESSES: One Liberty Center, 875 N Randolph Street, Suite 1432, Arlington, Virginia 22203.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Dwight Sullivan, 703–695–1055 (Voice), 703–693–3903 (Facsimile), dwight.h.sullivan.civ@mail.mil (Email). Mailing address is DACIPAD, One Liberty Center, 875 N Randolph Street, Suite 150, Arlington, Virginia 22203. Website: http://dacipad.whs.mil/. The most up-to-date changes to the meeting agenda can be found on the website.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Due to circumstances beyond the control of the Department of Defense (DoD) and the Designated Federal Officer, the Defense Business Board was unable to provide public notification required by 41 CFR 102–3.150(a) concerning the meeting on August 8, 2018 of the Defense Business Board. Accordingly, the Advisory Committee Management Officer for the Department of Defense, pursuant to 41 CFR 102–3.150(b), waives the 15-calendar day notification requirement. This meeting is being held under the provisions of the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA) of 1972 (5 U.S.C. Appendix, as amended), the Government in the Sunshine Act of 1976 (5 U.S.C. 552b, as amended), and 41 CFR 102–3.140 and 102–3.150.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Office of the Secretary of Defense
Defense Business Board; Notice of Federal Advisory Committee Meeting

AGENCY: Chief Management Officer, Department of Defense.

ACTION: Notice of Federal Advisory Committee meeting.

SUMMARY: The Department of Defense (DoD) is publishing this notice to announce that the following Federal Advisory Committee meeting of the Defense Business Board ("the Board") will take place.

DATES: Closed to the public Wednesday, August 8, 2018 from 8:00 a.m. to 1:00 p.m.

ADDRESSES: Rooms 3E155 & 3EB63 in the Pentagon, Washington, DC.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Roma Laster, (703) 697–2168 (Voice), (703) 614–4365 (Facsimile), roma.k.laster.civ@mail.mil (Email). Mailing address is Defense Business Board, 1155 Defense Pentagon, Room 5B1088A, Washington, DC 20301–1155. The Board’s website is: http://dbb.defense.gov/.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Due to circumstances beyond the control of the Department of Defense (DoD) and the Designated Federal Officer, the Defense Business Board was unable to provide public notification required by 41 CFR 102–3.150(a) concerning the meeting on August 8, 2018 of the Defense Business Board. Accordingly, the Advisory Committee Business Management Officer for the Department of Defense, pursuant to 41 CFR 102–3.150(b), waives the 15-calendar day notification requirement. This meeting is being held under the provisions of the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA) (5 U.S.C., Appendix), the Government in the Sunshine Act (5 U.S.C. 552b), and 41 CFR 102–3.140 and 102–3.150.

Purpose of the Meeting: The mission of the Board is to examine and advise the Secretary of Defense and the Deputy Secretary of Defense, through the Chief Management Officer (CMO) of the Department of Defense on overall DoD management and governance. The Board provides independent advice which reflects an outside private sector perspective on proven and effective best business practices that can be applied to DoD.

Agenda: The meeting will begin at 8:00 a.m. in Room 3E155 with opening remarks from Ms. Roma Laster, the Board’s Designated Federal Officer (DFO, and Mr. Bill Simon, Chairman of the Board. Following opening comments, the Board will receive briefings from the Boston Consulting Group and McKinsey & Company, Inc. on cost management efforts within the Department. The Board will next meet in Room 3EB63 with the Secretary and the Deputy Secretary of the Defense for a classified discussion of the National Defense Strategy. The meeting will adjourn not later than 1:00 p.m.

Meeting Accessibility: In accordance with section 10(d) of the FACA and 41 CFR 102–3.155, the DoD has determined that the Board’s meeting will be closed to the public. Specifically, the CMO, in consultation with the DoD Office of General Counsel, has determined in writing that the meeting will be closed to the public because it will consider matters covered by 5 U.S.C. 552b(c)(1) and (c)(4).

The U.S. Code section 552b(c)(1) determination is based on the consideration that the Secretary and the Deputy Secretary of Defense discussions will involve classified matters of national defense or foreign policy. Such classified material is so intertwined with the unclassified material that it cannot reasonably be segregated into separate discussions without disclosing secret or otherwise classified material. The 5 U.S.C. 552b(c)(4) determination is based on the fact that both the Boston Consulting Group and McKinsey & Company, Inc. will disclose commercial information that is privileged or confidential. To permit the meeting to be open to the public would preclude discussion of such matters and would greatly diminish the ultimate utility of the Board’s advice and recommendations to the DoD.