First Paging Service Spectrum Auction Scheduled for December 7, 1999; Comment Sought on Reserve Prices or Minimum Opening Bids and Other Auction Procedural Issues

[Federal Register Volume 64, Number 127 (Friday, July 2, 1999)]
[Notices]
[Pages 36009-36013]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 99-16762]


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FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION

[DA 99-1103; Report No. AUC-99-26-A (Auction No. 26)]


First Paging Service Spectrum Auction Scheduled for December 7, 
1999; Comment Sought on Reserve Prices or Minimum Opening Bids and 
Other Auction Procedural Issues

AGENCY: Communications Commission.

ACTION: Notice; seeking comment.

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SUMMARY: This document seeks comment on establishing reserve prices or 
minimum opening bids and other procedures for the first Paging service 
auction. The intended effect of this document is to provide the public 
with an opportunity to comment on proposed auction procedures for 
Auction No. 26.

DATES: Comments are due on or before June 30, 1999.\1\ Reply comments 
are due on or before July 13, 1999.

    \1\ Note: This document was received by the Office of the 
Federal Register on June 28, 1999.
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ADDRESSES: To file formally, parties must submit an original and four 
copies to the Office of the Secretary, Federal Communications 
Commission, Room TW-B204, 445 12th Street SW, Washington, DC 20554. 
Parties must also submit one copy to Amy Zoslov, Chief, Auctions and 
Industry Analysis Division, Wireless Telecommunications Bureau, Federal 
Communications Commission, Room 4-A760, 445 12th Street, SW, 
Washington, DC 20554. Comments and reply comments will be available for 
public inspection during regular business hours in the FCC Public 
Reference Room, Room CY-A257, 445 12th Street SW, Washington, DC 20554.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
    Auctions Division: Lisa Hartigan, Operations, (202) 418-0660; Anne 
Napoli, Legal, (202) 418-0660, or Bob Reagle, Auctions Analysis, (717) 
338-2801.
    Commercial Wireless Division: Todd Slamowitz or Cyndi Thomas, 
Legal, (202) 418-0620.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This is a synopsis of Public Notice DA 99-
1103, released on June 7, 1999. The complete text of this Public 
Notice, including Attachment A (Summary of Licenses to be Auctioned, 
Upfront Payments, Minimum Opening Bids), which does not appear in this 
synopsis, is available for inspection and copying Monday through Friday 
from 9 a.m. to 4:30 p.m., in the Commission's Public Reference Room, 
located at 445 12th Street, SW, Room CY-A257, Washington, DC 20554. It 
can also be downloaded from the Commission's Auctions web site at 
https://www.fcc.gov/wtb/auctions. In addition, copies may be purchased 
from the Commission's copy contractor, International Transcription 
Services, Inc. (ITS), 1231 20th Street, NW, Washington, DC 20036, (202) 
857-3800.

Synopsis

    1. By this Public Notice, the Wireless Telecommunications Bureau 
(``Bureau'') announces the first in a series of auctions of Paging 
service licenses, scheduled to commence on December 7, 1999. As 
discussed in greater detail herein, the Bureau proposes that the first 
Paging auction be composed of 2,499 licenses in the 929 and 931 MHz 
bands (the ``Upper Bands Auction''). These licenses, which are 
available in 51 geographic areas known as Major Economic Areas (MEAs), 
encompass the United States, the Northern Mariana Islands, Guam, 
American Samoa, the United States Virgin Islands and Puerto Rico. In 
this Public Notice, we seek comment on this and other procedural issues 
relating to the Upper Bands Auction (Auction No. 26). Future public 
notices will include further details regarding application filing and 
payment deadlines, seminars, and other pertinent information for this 
auction. We will seek comment separately on procedural issues relating 
to the auction of licenses in the 35-36 MHz, 43-44 MHz, 152-159 MHz, 
and 454-460 MHz bands (collectively, the ``Lower Bands Auctions'').

I. Auction Sequence and License Groupings for the Paging Service 
Auctions

    2. In Revision of Parts 22 and 90 of the Commission's Rules to 
Facilitate Future Development of Paging Systems, Memorandum Opinion and 
Order on Reconsideration and Third Report and Order, FCC 99-98, 64 FR 
33762, June 24, 1999 (``Reconsideration Order''), the Commission 
concluded that the upper bands licenses should be awarded in each of 51 
Major Economic Areas (MEAs), and the lower bands licenses should be 
awarded in each of 175 Economic Areas (EAs). There are 12 channels in 
the 929 MHz band and 37 channels in the 931 MHz band, resulting in a 
total of 2,499 upper bands paging licenses. There is a significantly 
larger number of lower bands licenses (approaching 14,000); therefore, 
the Commission proposes to auction the upper bands licenses first and 
will seek comment on procedures and license groupings for the lower 
bands licenses at a later time. We seek comment on this proposal.

II. Reserve Price or Minimum Opening Bid for the Upper Bands Auction 
(Auction No. 26)

    3. The Balanced Budget Act of 1997 calls upon the Commission to 
prescribe methods by which a reasonable reserve price will be required 
or a minimum opening bid established when FCC licenses are subject to 
auction (i.e., because the Commission has received mutually exclusive 
applications for them), unless the Commission determines that a reserve 
price or minimum bid is not in the public interest. Consistent with 
this mandate, the Commission has directed the Bureau to seek comment on 
the use of a minimum opening bid and/or reserve

[[Page 36010]]

price prior to the start of each auction. The Bureau was directed to 
seek comment on the methodology to be employed in establishing each of 
these mechanisms. Among other factors the Bureau should consider is the 
amount of spectrum being auctioned, levels of incumbency, the 
availability of technology to provide service, the size of the 
geographic service areas, issues of interference with other spectrum 
bands, and any other relevant factors that reasonably could have an 
impact on valuation of the spectrum being auctioned. The Commission 
concluded that the Bureau should have the discretion to employ either 
or both of these mechanisms for future auctions.
    4. Normally, a reserve price is an absolute minimum price below 
which an item will not be sold in a given auction. Reserve prices can 
be either published or unpublished. A minimum opening bid, on the other 
hand, is the minimum bid price set at the beginning of the auction 
below which no bids are accepted. It is generally used to accelerate 
the competitive bidding process. Also, in a minimum opening bid 
scenario, the Bureau generally has the discretion to lower the amount 
later in the auction. In the event that a license is not sold in an 
auction, the Bureau also may lower the minimum opening bid or reserve 
price for that license in subsequent auctions. In anticipation of the 
first Paging service auction and in light of the Balanced Budget Act, 
the Bureau proposes to establish minimum opening bids for the Upper 
Bands Auction, and retain discretion to lower the minimum opening bids. 
The Bureau believes that the use of minimum opening bids is an 
effective auctions practice which has been used successfully in prior 
Commission auctions. A minimum opening bid, rather than a reserve 
price, will help to regulate the pace of the auction. Specifically, the 
Bureau proposes the following formula for calculating minimum opening 
bids on a license-by-license basis in the Upper Bands Auction (Auction 
No. 26): $.001 x Pops (the result rounded to the nearest hundred for 
levels below $10,000, and rounded to the nearest thousand for levels 
above $10,000), with a minimum of no less than $2,500 per license.
    5. This formula is intended to apply to all geographic paging 
licenses in the 929 and 931 bands, and was determined based upon the 
considerations explained above. The specific proposed minimum opening 
bids for each license are set forth in Attachment A of the complete 
Public Notice. Comment is sought on this proposal. If commenters 
believe that the formula proposed above for minimum opening bids will 
result in substantial numbers of unsold licenses, or is not a 
reasonable amount, or should instead operate as a reserve price, they 
should explain why this is so, and comment on the desirability of an 
alternative approach. Commenters are advised to support their claims 
with valuation analyses and suggested reserve prices or minimum opening 
bid levels or formulas. In establishing the formula for minimum opening 
bids, we particularly seek comment on such factors as, among other 
things, the amount of spectrum being auctioned, levels of incumbency, 
the availability of technology to provide service, the size of the 
geographic service areas, issues of interference with other spectrum 
bands and any other relevant factors that could reasonably have an 
impact on valuation of the Paging service spectrum. Alternatively, 
comment is sought on whether, consistent with the Balanced Budget Act, 
the public interest would be served by having no minimum opening bid or 
reserve price.

III. Other Auction Procedural Issues

    6. The Balanced Budget Act of 1997 requires the Commission to 
``ensure that, in the scheduling of any competitive bidding * * * an 
adequate period is allowed * * * before issuance of bidding rules, to 
permit notice and comment on proposed auction procedures * * *'' 
Consistent with the provisions of the Balanced Budget Act and to ensure 
that potential bidders have adequate time to familiarize themselves 
with the specific provisions that will govern the day-to-day conduct of 
an auction, the Commission directed the Bureau, under its existing 
delegated authority, to seek comment of a variety of auction-specific 
issues prior to the start of each auction. We therefore seek comment on 
the following issues relating to the Upper Bands Auction (Auction No. 
26).
a. Information Available to Bidders During the Course of the Auction
    7. In Revision of Part 22 and Part 90 of the Commission's Rules to 
Facilitate Future Development of Paging Systems, Second Report and 
Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, FCC 97-59, 62 FR 
11616, March 12, 1997 (``Second Report and Order'') the Commission 
concluded that, due to the large number of licenses to be auctioned, 
the advantages of limiting the disclosure of information available to 
bidders during the course of the Paging auctions (e.g., revealing only 
high bids and total number of bids on each license and withholding 
bidder identities) may help to speed the pace of the auctions. In the 
Reconsideration Order, 64 FR 33762, June 24, 1999, the Commission 
directed the Bureau to seek further comment on this issue. The Bureau 
tentatively concludes that it will be unnecessary to withhold bidder 
identities if the Paging licenses are auctioned in groups of 
approximately 2,500 or fewer licenses, as we have proposed to do with 
the Upper Band licenses. We seek comment on this tentative conclusion. 
In addition, we propose to disclose all information relating to the 
bids, including revealing all bids and withdrawals placed in each 
round, the identity of the bidder placing each bid or withdrawal, and 
the net and gross amounts of each bid or withdrawal during the Upper 
Bands Auction (Auction No. 26). We seek comment on this proposal.
b. Structure of Bidding Rounds, Activity Requirements, and Criteria for 
Determining Reductions in Eligibility
    8. We propose to divide the Upper Bands Auction into three stages: 
Stage One, Stage Two and Stage Three, each characterized by increased 
activity requirements. The auction will start in Stage One. We propose 
that the auction will generally advance to the next stage (i.e., from 
Stage One to Stage Two, and from Stage Two to Stage Three) when the 
auction activity level, as measured by the percentage of bidding units 
receiving new high bids, is below ten percent for three consecutive 
rounds of bidding in each Stage. However, we further propose that the 
Bureau retain the discretion to change stages unilaterally by 
announcement during the auction. In exercising this discretion, the 
Bureau will consider a variety of measures of bidder activity 
including, but not limited to, the auction activity level, the 
percentages of licenses (as measured in bidding units) on which there 
are new bids, the number of new bids, and the percentage increase in 
revenue. We seek comment on these proposals.
    9. In order to ensure that the auction closes within a reasonable 
period of time, an activity rule requires bidders to bid actively on a 
percentage of their maximum bidding eligibility during each round of an 
auction rather than waiting until the end to participate. A bidder that 
does not satisfy the activity rule will either lose bidding eligibility 
in the next round or use an activity rule waiver.
    10. For the Uppers Bands Auction (Auction No. 26), we propose that, 
in each round of Stage One of the auction, a bidder desiring to 
maintain its current eligibility is required to be active on licenses 
encompassing at least 80

[[Page 36011]]

percent of its current bidding eligibility. Failure to maintain the 
requisite activity level will result in a reduction in the bidder's 
bidding eligibility in the next round of bidding (unless an activity 
rule waiver is used). During Stage One, reduced eligibility for the 
next round will be calculated by multiplying the current round activity 
by five-fourths (\5/4\). In each round of the second stage of the 
auction, a bidder desiring to maintain its current eligibility is 
required to be active on at least 90 percent of its current bidding 
eligibility. During Stage Two, reduced eligibility for the next round 
will be calculated by multiplying the current round activity by ten-
ninths (\10/9\). In each round of Stage Three, a bidder desiring to 
maintain its current eligibility to required to be active on 98 percent 
of its current bidding eligibility. In this final stage, reduced 
eligibility for the net round will be calculated by multiplying the 
current round activity by fifty forty-ninths (\50/49\). We seek comment 
on these proposals.
c. Minimum Accepted Bids
    11. Once there is a standing high bid on a license, there will be a 
bid increment associated with that bid indicating the minimum amount by 
which the bid on that license can be raised. For the Upper Bands 
Auction (Auction No. 26), we will use a standard exponential smoothing 
methodology to calculate minimum bid increments, as we have done in 
several other auctions. The Bureau retains the discretion to change the 
minimum bid increment if it determines that circumstances so dictate. 
We seek comment on this proposal.
    12. The exponential smoothing formula calculates the bid increment 
for each license based on a weighted average of the activity received 
on each license in all previous rounds. This methodology will tailor 
the bid increment for each license based on activity, rather than 
setting a global increment for all licenses. For every license that 
receives a bid, the bid increment for the next round for that license 
will be established using the exponential smoothing formula.
    13. The calculation of the percentage bid increment for each 
license in a given round is made at the end of the previous round. The 
computation is based on an activity index, which is calculated as the 
weighted average of the activity in that round and the activity index 
from the prior round. The activity index at the start of the auction 
(round 0) will be set at 0. The current activity index is equal to a 
weighting factor times the number of new bids received on the license 
in the most recent bidding round plus one minus the weighting factor 
times the activity index from the prior round. The activity index is 
then used to calculate a percentage increment by multiplying a minimum 
percentage increment by one plus the activity index with that result 
being subject to a maximum percentage increment. The Commission will 
initially set the weighting factor at 0.5, the minimum percentage 
increment at 0.1, and the maximum percentage increment at 0.2.
Equations
Ai=(C*Bi)+((1-C)*A-1)
Ii+1=smaller of ((1+Ai)*N) and M

Where,

Ai=activity index for the current round (round i)
C=activity weight factor
Bi=number of bids in the current round (round i)
Ai-1=activity index from previous round (round i-1), 
A0 is 0
Ii+1=percentage bid increment for the next round (round i+1)
N=minimum percentage increment or bid increment floor
M=maximum percentage increment or bid increment ceiling

    Under the exponential smoothing methodology, once a bid has been 
received on a license, the minimum acceptable bid for that license in 
the following round will be the new high bid plus the dollar amount 
associated with the percentage increment (variable Ii+1 from 
above times the high bid). This result will be rounded to the nearest 
thousand if it is over ten thousand or to the nearest hundred if it is 
under ten thousand.

Examples
License 1

C=0.5, N=0.1, M=0.2

Round 1 (2 new bids, high bid=$1,000,000)
1. Calculation of percentage increment for round 2 using exponential 
smoothing:
    A1=(0.5*2)+(0.5*0)=1
    The smaller of I2=(1+1)*0.1=0.2 or 0.2 (maximum 
percentage increment)
2. Minimum bid increment for round 2 using the percentage increment 
(I2 from above)
    0.2*$1,000,000=$200,000
3. Minimum acceptable bid for round 2=1,200,000
Round 2 (3 new bids, high bid=2,000,000)
1. Calculation of percentage increment for round 3 using exponential 
smoothing:
    A2=(0.5*3)+(0.5*1)=2
    The smaller of I3=(1+2)*0.1=0.3 or 0.2 (maximum 
percentage increment)
Minimum bid in increment for round 3 using the percentage increment 
(I3 from above)
    0.2*$2,000,000=$400,000
3. Minimum acceptable bid for round 3=2,400,000
Round 3 (1 new bid, high bid=2,400,000)
1. Calculation of percentage increment for round 4 using exponential 
smoothing:
    A3=(0.5*1)+(0.5*2)=1.5
    The smaller of I4=(1+1.5)*0.1=0.25 or 0.2 (the maximum 
percentage increment)
2. Minimum bid increment for round 4 using the percentage increment 
(I4 from above)
    0.2* $2,400,000 = $480,000
3. Minimum acceptable bid for round 4 = 2,880,000
d. Initial Maximum Eligibility for Each Bidder
    14. The Bureau has delegated authority and discretion to determine 
an appropriate upfront payment for each license begin auctioned, taking 
into account such factors as the population in each geographic license 
area, and the value of similar spectrum. With these guidelines in mind, 
we propose to calculate upfront payments for the Upper Bands Auction on 
a license-by-license basis, using the following formula: $.0008 * Pops 
(the result rounded to the nearest hundred for levels below $10,000 and 
to the nearest thousand for levels above $10,000) with a minimum of no 
less than $2,500 per license.
    15. This formula is intended to apply to all geographic paging 
licenses in the 929 and 931 bands, and was determined based upon the 
considerations explained above. We seek comment on this proposal.
    16. We further propose that the amount of the upfront payment 
submitted by a bidder will determine the initial maximum eligibility 
(as measured in bidding units) for each bidder. Upfront payments will 
not be attributed to specific licenses, but instead will be translated 
into bidding units to define a bidder's initial maximum eligibility, 
which will define licenses on which bids may be placed. Eligibility 
cannot be increased during the auction. It is important that in 
calculating the upfront payment amount, an applicant determine the 
maximum number of bidding units it may wish to bid on (and/or hold high 
bids on) in any single round, and submit an upfront payment covering 
that number of bidding units. We seek comment on this proposal.

[[Page 36012]]

e. Activity Rule Waivers and Reducing Eligibility
    17. Use of an activity rule waiver preserves the bidder's current 
bidding eligibility despite the bidder's activity in the current round 
begin below the required minimum level. An activity rule waiver applies 
to an entire round of bidding and not to a particular license. Activity 
waivers are principally a mechanism for auction participants to avoid 
the loss of auction eligibility in the event that exigent circumstances 
prevent them from placing a bid in a particular round.
    18. The FCC auction system assumes that bidders with insufficient 
activity would prefer to use an activity rule waiver (if available) 
rather than lose bidding eligibility. Therefore, the system will 
automatically apply a waiver (known as an ``automatic waiver'') at the 
end of any bidding period where a bidder's activity level is below the 
minimum required unless: (1) There are no activity rule waivers 
available; or (2) the bidder overrides the automatic application of a 
waiver by reducing eligibility thereby meeting the minimum 
requirements.
    19. A bidder with insufficient activity that wants to reduce its 
bidding eligibility rather than use an activity rule waiver must 
affirmatively override the automatic waiver mechanism during the 
bidding period by using the reduce eligibility function in the 
software. In this case, the bidder's eligibility is permanently reduced 
to bring the bidder into compliance with the activity rules as 
described above. Once eligibility has been reduced, a bidder will not 
be permitted to regain its lost bidding eligibility.
    20. A bidder may proactively use an activity rule waiver as a means 
to keep an auction open without placing a bid. If a bidder submits a 
proactive waiver (using the proactive waiver function in the bidding 
software) during a bidding period in which no bids are submitted, the 
auction will remain open and the bidder's eligibility will be 
preserved. An automatic waiver invoked in a round in which there are no 
new valid bids will not keep the auction open.
    21. We propose that each bidder in the Upper Bands Auction (Auction 
No. 26) will be provided with five activity rule waivers that may be 
used in any round during the course of an auction as set forth above. 
We seek comment on this proposal.
f. Information Regarding Bid Withdrawal and Bid Removed
    22. For the Upper Bands Auction (Auction No. 26), we propose the 
following bid removal and bid withdrawal procedures. Before the close 
of a bidding period, a bidder has the option of removing any bids 
submitted in that round. By using the remove bid function in the 
software, a bidder may effectively ``unsubmit'' any bid placed within 
that round. A bidder removing a bid placed in the same round is not 
subject to withdrawal payments.
    23. Once a round closes, a bidder may no longer remove a bid. 
However, in any subsequent round, a high bidder may withdraw its 
standing high bids from previous rounds using the withdraw bid 
function. A high bidder that withdraws its standing high bid from a 
previous round is subject to the bid withdrawal payment provisions. We 
seek comment on these bid removal and bid withdrawal procedures.
    24. In Amendment of Part 1 of the Commission's Rules--Competitive 
Bidding Procedures, Third Report and Order and Second Further Notice of 
Proposed Rulemaking, FCC 97-413, 63 FR 2315, January 15, 1998 (``Part 1 
Third Report and Order''), the Commission explained that allowing bid 
withdrawals facilitates efficient aggregation of licenses and the 
pursuit of efficient backup strategies as information becomes available 
during the course of an auction. The Commission noted, however, that in 
some instances bidders may seek to withdraw bids for improper reasons, 
including to delay the close of an auction for strategic purposes. The 
Bureau, therefore, has discretion, in managing the auction, to limit 
the number of withdrawals to prevent strategic delay of the close of 
the auction or other abuses. The Commission stated that the Bureau 
should assertively exercise its discretion, consider limiting the 
number of rounds in which bidders may withdraw bids, and prevent 
bidders from bidding on a particular market if the Bureau finds that a 
bidder is abusing the Commission's bid withdrawal procedures.
    25. Applying this reasoning, we propose to limit each bidder in the 
Upper Bands Auction (Auction No. 26) to withdrawals in no more than two 
rounds during the course of each auction. To permit a bidder to 
withdraw bids in more than two rounds would likely encourage insincere 
bidding or the use of withdrawals for anti-competitive strategic 
purposes. The two rounds in which withdrawals are utilized will be at 
the bidder's discretion; withdrawals otherwise must be in accordance 
with the Commission's rules. There is no limit on the number of 
standing high bids that may be withdrawn in either of the rounds in 
which withdrawals are utilized. Withdrawals will remain subject to the 
bid withdrawal payment provisions specified in the Commission's rules. 
We seek comment on this proposal.
g. Stopping Rule
    26. In the Reconsideration Order, 64 FR 33762, June 24, 1999, the 
Commission upheld the hybrid simultaneous/license-by-license stopping 
rule that had been adopted for the paging auctions in the Second Report 
and Order, 62 FR 11616, March 12, 1997, but retained discretion for the 
Bureau to use another stopping rule after seeking further comment on 
this issue in the pre-auction process. The Bureau concludes that our 
proposal to conduct a series of auctions may eliminate the risk of 
unnecessarily protracted auctions, and likewise, the need for a hybrid 
stopping rule.
    27. Therefore, for the Upper Bands Auction (Auction No. 26), the 
Bureau proposes to employ a simultaneous stopping approach. The Bureau 
has discretion to establish stopping rules before or during multiple 
round auctions in order to terminate the auction within a reasonable 
time. A simultaneous stopping rule means that all licenses remain open 
until the first round in which no new acceptable bids, proactive 
waivers, or withdrawals are received. After the first such round, 
bidding close simultaneously on all licenses. Thus, unless 
circumstances dictate otherwise, bidding would remain open on all 
licenses until bidding stops on every license.
    28. We also seek comment on a modified version of the simultaneous 
stopping rule. The modified version of the stopping rule would close 
the auction for all licenses after the first round in which no bidder 
submits a proactive waiver, a withdrawal, or a new bid on any license 
on which it is not the standing high bidder. Thus, absent any other 
bidding activity, a bidder placing a new bid on a license for which it 
is the standing high bidder would not keep the auction open under this 
modified stopping rule. The Bureau further seeks comment on whether 
this modified stopping rule should be used unilaterally or only in 
stage of the auction.
    29. In addition, we propose that the Bureau retain the discretion 
to keep an auction open even if no new acceptable bids or proactive 
waivers are submitted and no previous high bids are withdrawn. In this 
event, the effect will be the same as if a bidder had submitted a 
proactive waiver. The activity rule, therefore, will apply as usual; 
and a

[[Page 36013]]

bidder with insufficient activity will either lose bidding eligibility 
or use a remaining activity rule waiver. We seek comment on this 
proposal.
    30. Finally, we propose that the Bureau reserve the right to 
declare that the auction will end after a specified number of 
additional rounds (``special stopping rule''). If the Bureau invokes 
this special rule, it will accept bids in the final round(s) only for 
licenses on which the high bid increased in at least one of the 
preceding specified number of rounds. The Bureau proposes to exercise 
this option only in certain circumstances, such as, for example, where 
the auction is proceeding very slowly, there is minimal overall bidding 
activity, or it appears likely that the auction will not close within a 
reasonable period of time. Before exercising this option, the Bureau is 
likely to attempt to increase the pace of the auction by, for example, 
moving the auction into the next stage (where bidders would be required 
to maintain a higher level of bidding activity), increasing the number 
of bidding rounds per day, and/or increasing the amount of the minimum 
bid increments for the limited number of licenses where there is still 
a high level of bidding activity. We seek comment on these proposals.
h. Information Relating to Auction Delay, Suspension or Cancellation
    31. For the Upper Bands Auction (Auction No. 26), we propose that, 
by public notice or by announcement during the auction, the Bureau may 
delay, suspend or cancel any auction in the event of natural disaster, 
technical obstacle, evidence of an auction security breach, unlawful 
bidding activity, administrative or weather necessity, or for any other 
reason that affects the fair and competitive conduct of competitive 
bidding. In such cases, the Bureau, in its sole discretion, may elect 
to: resume the auction starting from the beginning of the current 
round; resume the auction starting from some previous round; or cancel 
the auction in its entirety. Network interruption may cause the Bureau 
to delay or suspend an auction. We emphasize that exercise of this 
authority is solely within the discretion of the Bureau, and its use is 
not intended to be a substitute for situations in which bidders may 
wish to apply their activity rule waivers. We seek comment on hits 
proposal.

Federal Communications Commission.
Magalie Roman Salas,
Secretary.
[FR Doc. 99-16762 Filed 7-1-99; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6712-01-M