Illinois Power Company; Notice of Consideration of Issuance of Amendment to Facility Operating License, Proposed No Significant Hazards Consideration Determination, and Opportunity for a Hearing

[Federal Register Volume 64, Number 18 (Thursday, January 28, 1999)]
[Notices]
[Pages 4474-4476]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 99-1984]


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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Docket No. 50-461]


Illinois Power Company; Notice of Consideration of Issuance of 
Amendment to Facility Operating License, Proposed No Significant 
Hazards Consideration Determination, and Opportunity for a Hearing

    The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) is 
considering issuance of an amendment to Facility Operating License No. 
NPF-62 issued to Illinois Power Company (IP, or the licensee) for 
operation of the Clinton Power Station (CPS), located in DeWitt County, 
Illinois.
    The proposed amendment requests changes to the Technical 
Specification degraded voltage relay setpoints.
    Before issuance of the proposed license amendment, the Commission 
will have made findings required by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as 
amended (the Act) and the Commission's regulations.
    The Commission has made a proposed determination that the amendment 
request involves no significant hazards consideration. Under the 
Commission's regulations in 10 CFR 50.92, this means that operation of 
the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not (1) 
involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an 
accident previously evaluated; or (2) create the possibility of a new 
or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; 
or (3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. As 
required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of 
the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented 
below:

    (1) The proposed changes do not involve a significant increase 
in the probability or consequences of an accident previously 
evaluated.
    The degraded voltage relays are designed to respond to degraded 
voltage conditions from the offsite sources, and are not initiators 
of such a condition themselves. However, proper establishment of the 
degraded voltage relay setpoints is necessary to avoid inadvertent 
or unnecessary disconnection of the offsite source and transfer to 
the standby diesel generators (DGs) when the offsite sources are 
still capable of supplying adequate power to the plant safety buses. 
At the same time, proper establishment of the setpoints must also 
ensure that a transfer will occur when required so that power can be 
provided to safety loads, with voltage at greater than or equal to 
the minimum required voltage. The revised degraded voltage setpoints 
were established consistent with these requirements using an NRC-

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approved methodology. The revised setpoints (and the revised minimum 
bus voltage specified in the DG surveillances) take into account the 
new minimum required bus voltage required for all safety loads based 
on a more in-depth circuit analysis. Concurrently, the expected 
range of offsite voltage has been factored into the setpoint 
calculations to ensure that the offsite source can reset the 
degraded voltage relays at the minimum expected offsite voltage, 
thus maximizing the availability of the offsite source consistent 
with the intent of 10 CFR 50 Appendix A General Design Criterion 17.
    Raising the degraded voltage relay setpoints does not increase 
the probability of transferring the safety buses to the DGs. This is 
because the existing margin between the safety bus voltage (based on 
the minimum expected offsite voltage) and the upper reset value of 
the degraded voltage relay will be maintained by the static VAR 
compensators that are installed on the CPS auxiliary power system.
    Chapter 15 of the Clinton Updated Safety Analysis Report (USAR) 
discusses the effects of anticipated process disturbances to 
determine their consequences and the capability of the plant to 
control or accommodate such events. Subsection 15.2.6 discusses loss 
of a-c power, including loss of grid voltage. This discussion 
demonstrates that fuel design limits and reactor coolant pressure 
boundary design conditions are not exceeded. The proposed changes do 
not affect the discussion nor the conclusion of this evaluation.
    Due to the associated change in the tap setting for the reserve 
auxiliary transformer (RAT), the proposed changes involve some 
increased potential for overvoltage for certain loads. Although the 
estimated magnitude of the overvoltage to those loads is not severe, 
procedural guidance will be established to prevent or mitigate such 
a condition. This will minimize the potential for equipment failure 
due to overvoltage. Therefore, this aspect of the proposed changes 
does not involve a significant increase in the probability of 
failure of equipment important to safety.
    Based on the above, the proposed changes do not involve a 
significant increase in the probability or consequences of any 
accident previously evaluated.
    (2) The proposed changes do not create the possibility of a new 
or different kind of accident from any accident previously 
evaluated.
    The proposed changes involve setpoint changes for the degraded 
voltage relays and a change to the minimum bus voltage required to 
be achieved during DG testing. The setpoint changes to the relays 
alters their performance in an intended manner but in no other way 
affects their intended function. The change to the DG surveillance 
criteria is primarily administrative since the DGs have repeatedly 
shown that they are able to achieve this value during testing. The 
DGs themselves are physically unaffected. These changes by 
themselves thus involve no physical changes to the facility, no new 
failure modes of initiating conditions that could lead to a new or 
different accident.
    Notwithstanding the above, and as noted previously, the 
associated change in the RAT tap setting could involve an increased 
potential for overvoltage to some plant loads. As noted above, 
however, this potential is reduced by providing procedural guidance 
to plant operators. The potential for equipment failure due to 
overvoltage is thus minimized, and no new failure mode is thus 
introduced.
    Based on the above, the proposed changes do not involve any 
significant increase in the failure of plant equipment due either to 
overvoltage or inadequate voltage, and do not introduce any new 
failure modes or conditions that could lead to a new or different 
kind of accident. On this basis, the proposed changes do not create 
the possibility of a new or different accident from any accident 
previously evaluated.
    (3) None of the proposed changes involve a significant reduction 
in a margin of safety.
    The margin of safety that may be associated with the degraded 
voltage relays is the margin involved in ensuring adequate voltage 
to plant safety loads. The revised degraded voltage relay setpoints, 
as proposed, were established by an NRC-accepted methodology that 
ensures the revised setpoints will maintain this margin of safety. 
Consistent with this determination, the proposed revision of the 
lower voltage limit for the DG surveillances (SR3.8.1.2, SR 3.8.1.7, 
SR 3.8.1.11, SR 3.8.1.12, SR 3.8.1.15, SR 3.8.1.19, and SR 3.8.1.20) 
will assure that the DGs will be capable of controlling voltage to a 
range that will be adequate for the loads on the bus. This value was 
determined using revised voltage calculations and is consistent with 
the proposed degraded voltage setpoints. Therefore, the proposed 
changes do not involve a significant reduction in a margin of 
safety.

    The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on 
this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are 
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the 
amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.
    The Commission is seeking public comments on this proposed 
determination. Any comments received within 30 days of the date of 
publication of this notice will be considered in making any final 
determination.
    Normally, the Commission will not issue the amendment until the 
expiration of the 30-day notice period. However, should circumstances 
change during the notice period such that failure to act in a timely 
way would result, for example, in derating or shutdown of the facility, 
the Commission may issue the license amendment before the expiration of 
the 30-day notice period, provided that its final determination is that 
the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration. The final 
determination will consider all public and State comments received. 
Should the Commission take this action, it will publish in the Federal 
Register a notice of issuance and provide for opportunity for a hearing 
after issuance. The Commission expects that the need to take this 
action will occur very infrequently.
    Written comments may be submitted by mail to the Chief, Rules and 
Directives Branch, Division of Administrative Services, Office of 
Administration, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 
20555-0001, and should cite the publication date and page number of 
this Federal Register notice. Written comments may also be delivered to 
Room 6D59, Two White Flint North, 11545 Rockville Pike, Rockville, 
Maryland, from 7:30 a.m. to 4:15 p.m. Federal workdays. Copies of 
written comments received may be examined at the NRC Public Document 
Room, the Gelman Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC.
    The filing of requests for hearing and petitions for leave to 
intervene is discussed below.
    By March 1, 1999, the licensee may file a request for a hearing 
with respect to issuance of the amendment to the subject facility 
operating license and any person whose interest may be affected by this 
proceeding and who wishes to participate as a party in the proceeding 
must file a written request for a hearing and a petition for leave to 
intervene. Requests for a hearing and a petition for leave to intervene 
shall be filed in accordance with the Commission's ``Rules of Practice 
for Domestic Licensing Proceedings'' in 10 CFR Part 2. Interested 
persons should consult a current copy of 10 CFR 2.714, which is 
available at the Commission's Public Document Room, the Gelman 
Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC, and at the local public 
document room located at the Vespasian Warner Public Library, 310 N. 
Quincy Street, Clinton, IL 61727. If a request for a hearing or 
petition for leave to intervene is filed by the above date, the 
Commission or an Atomic Safety and Licensing Board, designated by the 
Commission or by the Chairman of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board 
Panel, will rule on the request and/or petition; and the Secretary or 
the designated Atomic Safety and Licensing Board will issue a notice of 
hearing or an appropriate order.
    As required by 10 CFR 2.714, a petition for leave to intervene 
shall set forth with particularity the interest of the petitioner in 
the proceeding, and how that interest may be affected by the results of 
the proceeding. The petition should specifically explain the reasons 
why intervention should be permitted with particular reference to the 
following factors: (1) the nature of the

[[Page 4476]]

petitioner's right under the Act to be made party to the proceeding; 
(2) the nature and extent of the petitioner's property, financial, or 
other interest in the proceeding; and (3) the possible effect of any 
order which may be entered in the proceeding on the petitioner's 
interest. The petition should also identify the specific aspect(s) of 
the subject matter of the proceeding as to which petitioner wishes to 
intervene. Any person who has filed a petition for leave to intervene 
or who has been admitted as a party may amend the petition without 
requesting leave of the Board up to 15 days prior to the first 
prehearing conference scheduled in the proceeding, but such an amended 
petition must satisfy the specificity requirements described above.
    Not later than 15 days prior to the first prehearing conference 
scheduled in the proceeding, a petitioner shall file a supplement to 
the petition to intervene which must include a list of the contentions 
which are sought to be litigated in the matter. Each contention must 
consist of a specific statement of the issue of law or fact to be 
raised or controverted. In addition, the petitioner shall provide a 
brief explanation of the bases of the contention and a concise 
statement of the alleged facts or expert opinion which support the 
contention and on which the petitioner intends to rely in proving the 
contention at the hearing. The petitioner must also provide references 
to those specific sources and documents of which the petitioner is 
aware and on which the petitioner intends to rely to establish those 
facts or expert opinion. Petitioner must provide sufficient information 
to show that a genuine dispute exists with the applicant on a material 
issue of law or fact. Contentions shall be limited to matters within 
the scope of the amendment under consideration. The contention must be 
one which, if proven, would entitle the petitioner to relief. A 
petitioner who fails to file such a supplement which satisfies these 
requirements with respect to at least one contention will not be 
permitted to participate as a party.
    Those permitted to intervene become parties to the proceeding, 
subject to any limitations in the order granting leave to intervene, 
and have the opportunity to participate fully in the conduct of the 
hearing, including the opportunity to present evidence and cross-
examine witnesses.
    If a hearing is requested, the Commission will make a final 
determination on the issue of no significant hazards consideration. The 
final determination will serve to decide when the hearing is held.
    If the final determination is that the amendment request involves 
no significant hazards consideration, the Commission may issue the 
amendment and make it immediately effective, notwithstanding the 
request for a hearing. Any hearing held would take place after issuance 
of the amendment.
    If the final determination is that the amendment request involves a 
significant hazards consideration, any hearing held would take place 
before the issuance of any amendment.
    A request for a hearing or a petition for leave to intervene must 
be filed with the Secretary of the Commission, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, Attention: Rulemakings and 
Adjudications Staff, or may be delivered to the Commission's Public 
Document Room, the Gelman Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC, 
by the above date. A copy of the petition should also be sent to the 
Office of the General Counsel, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 
Washington, DC 20555-0001, and to Leah Manning Stetzner, Vice 
President, General Counsel, and Corporate Secretary, 500 South 27th 
Street, Decatur, IL 62525, attorney for the licensee.
    Nontimely filings of petitions for leave to intervene, amended 
petitions, supplemental petitions and/or requests for hearing will not 
be entertained absent a determination by the Commission, the presiding 
officer, or the presiding Atomic Safety and Licensing Board that the 
petition and/or request should be granted based upon a balancing of the 
factors specified in 10 CFR 2.714(a)(1)(I)-(v) and 2.714(d).
    For further details with respect to this action, see the 
application for amendment dated January 20, 1999, which is available 
for public inspection at the Commission's Public Document Room, the 
Gelman Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC, and at the local 
public document room located at the Vespasian Warner Public Library, 
310 N. Quincy Street, Clinton, IL 61727.

    Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 22nd day of January 1999.

    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Jon B. Hopkins,
Senior Project Manager, Project Directorate III-2, Division of Reactor 
Projects--III/IV, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. 99-1984 Filed 1-27-99; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P