Northeast Nuclear Energy Company, The Connecticut Light and Power Company, and The Western Massachusetts Electric Company; Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit 2; Environmental Assessment and Finding of No Significant Impact

[Federal Register Volume 64, Number 47 (Thursday, March 11, 1999)]
[Notices]
[Pages 12186-12187]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 99-6059]



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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Docket No. 50-336]


Northeast Nuclear Energy Company, The Connecticut Light and Power 
Company, and The Western Massachusetts Electric Company; Millstone 
Nuclear Power Station, Unit 2; Environmental Assessment and Finding of 
No Significant Impact

    The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) is 
considering issuance of an exemption from the requirements of Title 10 
of the Code of Federal Regulations, Part 50 (10 CFR Part 50), Appendix 
R, Sections III.G and III.J to Facility Operating License No. DPR-65, 
issued to the Northeast Nuclear Energy Company, et al., (NNECO or the 
licensee), for operation of the Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit 
2, located in Waterford, Connecticut.

Environmental Assessment

Identification of the Proposed Action

    Three fire areas at Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit 2 do not 
fully meet the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section 
III.G. These three areas are the Intake Structure (Appendix R Fire Area 
R-16), the East 480 Volt Switchgear Room (Appendix R Fire Area R-11), 
and the Charging Pump Room (Appendix R Fire Area R-4).
    The Intake Structure and East 480 Volt Switchgear Room are 
classified as alternate shutdown areas and are required to meet 10 CFR 
Part 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.3. The last paragraph of Section 
III.G.3 requires that a fire detection and a fixed fire suppression 
system be installed in the area, room, or zone under consideration. The 
Intake Structure and East 480 Volt Switchgear Rooms do not have fixed 
fire suppression systems. NNECO has requested exemptions to these 
requirements because the configuration of the intake structure and East 
480 Volt Switchgear rooms, the combustibles loading, the administrative 
procedures that limit and control transient combustibles, the in-place 
fire detection systems, the fire brigade and availability of manual 
fire suppression equipment, and the ability to provide AC power from 
Millstone, Unit 1 allow the licensee to meet the underlying purpose of 
the rule. The underlying purpose of the requirement to install a fixed 
fire suppression system in these areas, as required by Section III.G.3 
of Appendix R, is to limit fire damage to the dedicated or alternate 
shutdown capability.
    The Charging Pump Room is required to meet 10 CFR part 50, appendix 
R, Section III.G.2 requirements. Section III.G.2 requires separation of 
cables and equipment and associated non-safety circuits of redundant 
trains by one of three means (Section III.G.2a, b, or c). NNECO 
requests an exemption from this requirement because the Charging Pump 
Area does not fully meet any of the three options. NNECO's basis for 
the exemption request is that the configuration of the charging pump 
room, the combustibles loading, the cable separation modifications, the 
in-place fire detection systems, the fire brigade and availability of 
manual fire suppression equipment, and preplanned fire fighting 
strategies allow the licensee to meet the underlying purpose of the 
rule. The underlying purpose of the three applicable options under 
Section III.G.2, is to provide reasonable assurance that at least one 
train of equipment relied on to achieve and maintain safe shutdown is 
free of fire damage.
    The licensee also requested a fourth exemption from the 
requirements of 10 CFR part 50, appendix R, Section III.J to the extent 
that it requires emergency lighting units with at least an 8-hour 
battery power supply to light yard area access and egress routes for 
operation of safe shutdown equipment. The licensee based this exemption 
request primarily on in-place security lighting allowing the licensee 
to meet the underlying purpose of the rule. The underlying purpose of 
the rule is to ensure that lighting of sufficient duration and 
reliability is provided to allow operation of equipment required for 
post-fire, safe shutdown of the reactor.
    The proposed action is in accordance with the licensee's 
application for exemption dated July 31, 1998, as supplemented by 
letters dated September 24 and November 13, 1998.

The Need for the Proposed Action

    The proposed action is needed for the licensee to avoid the burden 
of full compliance with the regulations. Full compliance with the 
regulations would require the licensee to install fire suppression 
systems in the case of the Intake Structure and East 480 Volt 
Switchgear Rooms; and, a cable separation, fire suppression and/or fire 
barrier modification in the case of the Charging Pump Room. In the case 
of the yard area, full compliance would require battery powered lights 
to illuminate a large outdoor area for an 8-hour period. It is not 
considered practical to illuminate large outdoor areas with battery 
powered lighting for an 8-hour period. The licensee already has diesel 
powered security lighting in the same area and portable lighting 
equipment is also available. As noted above, the underlying purpose of 
the rule can be met without the burden of installing this equipment.

Environmental Impacts of the Proposed Action

    The Commission has completed its evaluation of the proposed action. 
The underlying purpose of the rules the licensee is requesting to be 
exempted from is to ensure that the plant can be safely shut down in 
the event of a fire.
    For the Intake Structure, based on the amount of combustible 
loading and combustible loading configuration, the licensee's 
administrative procedures that limit and control transient 
combustibles, the existing fire detection system, and the expected fire 
brigade response and subsequent extinguishment using manual equipment, 
the possibility of a fire developing to involve all three of the 
service water pumps is not considered likely. However, if this were to 
occur, the loss of all three of the service water pumps would not 
adversely impact the safe shutdown capability of the plant, based on 
the ability to provide power via a backfeed from Millstone Unit 1, and 
the ability of the plant to make necessary repairs to a service water 
pump, strainer, and power cable to achieve cold shutdown. The licensee 
stated that the Appendix R safe shutdown strategy for a fire in the 
Intake Structure accounts for the loss of all three service water 
pumps. In addition, the configuration for alternate shutdown in the 
Intake Structure had been previously found acceptable in the NRC SE 
dated July 17, 1990. The configuration has not changed since this 
approval.
    For the East 480V Switchgear Room, based on the amount of 
combustible loading and combustible loading configuration, the 
licensee's administrative procedures that limit and control transient 
combustibles, the existing fire detection system, the expected fire 
brigade response and subsequent fire extinguishment using manual fire 
suppression equipment, and the close proximity to the Control Room, 
there is reasonable assurance that a fire would not involve the entire 
area or spread beyond the area. The loss of the equipment in the east 
480V switchgear room does not adversely impact the safe shutdown 
capability of the plant based on the ability to provide power via a 
backfeed from Millstone Unit 1. In addition, the configuration for 
alternate shutdown in the east 480V switchgear room has previously been

[[Page 12187]]

found acceptable in the NRC SE, dated July 17, 1990. The configuration 
has not changed since this approval.
    For the Charging Pump Room, based on the configuration of the 
Charging Pump Room, the combustibles loading, the in-place fire 
detection systems, the expected fire brigade response and subsequent 
fire extinguishment using manual fire suppression equipment, and 
preplanned fire fighting strategies there is reasonable assurance that 
a fire would not cause the loss of all charging pumps.
    Based on the availability and reliability of the security lighting 
and the availability of portable lighting, there is reasonable 
assurance that the access and egress routes through the yard area that 
are relied on for safe shutdown of the facility can be accessed in the 
event of a fire.
    On the basis of its review, the staff concludes that the licensee 
will still have the capability to safely shut down the plant, in the 
event of a fire, after these exemptions have been granted.
    The proposed action will not increase the probability or 
consequences of accidents, no changes are being made in the types of 
any effluents that may be released off site, and there is no 
significant increase in occupational or public radiation exposure. 
Therefore, there are no significant radiological environmental impacts 
associated with the proposed action.
    With regard to potential non-radiological impacts, the proposed 
action does not involve any historic sites. It does not affect non-
radiological plant effluents and has no other environmental impact. 
Therefore, there are no significant non-radiological environmental 
impacts associated with the proposed action.
    Accordingly, the Commission concludes that there are no significant 
environmental impacts associated with the proposed action.

Alternatives to the Proposed Action

    As an alternative to the proposed action, the staff considered 
denial of the proposed action (i.e., the ``no-action'' alternative). 
Denial of the application would result in no change in current 
environmental impacts. The environmental impacts of the proposed action 
and the alternative action are similar.

Alternative Use of Resources

    This action does not involve the use of any resources not 
previously considered in the Final Environmental Statement for the 
Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit 2.

Agencies and Persons Consulted

    In accordance with its stated policy, on February 19, 1999, the 
staff consulted with the Connecticut State official, Dwayne Gardner of 
the Division of Radiation, Department of Environmental Protection, 
regarding the environmental impact of the proposed action. The State 
official had no comments.

Finding of No Significant Impact

    On the basis of the environmental assessment, the Commission 
concludes that the proposed action will not have a significant effect 
on the quality of the human environment. Accordingly, the Commission 
has determined not to prepare an environmental impact statement for the 
proposed action.
    For further details with respect to the proposed action, see the 
licensee's letter dated July 31, 1998, as supplemented by letters dated 
September 24 and November 13, 1998, which are available for public 
inspection at the Commission's Public Document Room, The Gelman 
Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC, and at the local public 
document room located at the Learning Resources Center, Three Rivers 
Community-Technical College, 574 New London Turnpike, Norwich, CT 06360 
and Waterford Public Library, 49 Rope Ferry Road, Waterford, CT 06385.

    Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 5th day of March 1999.

    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Elinor G. Adensam,
Director, Project Directorate I-2, Division of Licensing Project 
Management, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. 99-6059 Filed 3-10-99; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P