

excessive barriers to redemption, may reduce the effectiveness of recalls and compromise consumer safety outcomes.

Accurate measurement of recall performance is an important component of the Commission's oversight of corrective action plans. The Commission therefore has an interest in assessing the effectiveness of the recalls it approves, including consumer participation rates and the extent to which hazardous products are removed from use. Recall fraud may distort redemption data and frustrate the Commission's ability to accurately assess the effectiveness of approved recalls, including whether hazardous products are being removed from the marketplace.

III. Information Requested

The Commission seeks information from manufacturers, importers, distributors, retailers, recall administrators, consumer advocates, and members of the public regarding the scope of recall fraud and potential approaches to mitigate such conduct. Comments should address, but are not limited to, the following:

1. Observed Recall Fraud

- Submission of altered, fabricated, or artificially generated images or other documentation purporting to demonstrate product destruction or eligibility for recall remedies.
- Fraudulent redemption attempts by a single individual or entity exceeding the number of products reasonably in possession.
- Other indicators or patterns suggesting fraudulent or abusive redemption behavior, including activity associated with organized or systematic schemes.
- The extent to which coordinated or commercial acquisition of recalled products affects recall effectiveness, including any associated benefits or risks.

2. Impacts of Recall Fraud

- Compliance costs associated with recall fraud.
- Effects on firms' willingness to agree voluntarily to refund-based or other corrective action plan remedies.
- Impacts on consumer participation rates and overall recall effectiveness.

3. Fraud Mitigation Measures

- Existing tools, technologies, or practices used to detect or deter recall fraud.
- Measures that reduce recall fraud without materially increasing burdens on legitimate consumers.

- Observed tradeoffs between fraud prevention and consumer access to recall remedies.

4. Potential Commission Actions

- Suggested steps the Commission could take, consistent with its statutory authorities, to reduce recall fraud.
 - Identification of any legal, regulatory, or operational constraints relevant to addressing recall fraud.
- The Commission encourages commenters to provide supporting data, examples, or analysis where practicable. Comments should explain the basis for any assertions regarding the prevalence, costs, or impacts of recall fraud. Instructions for submitting comments are provided in the **ADDRESSES** section of this document.

Alberta E. Mills,
Secretary, Consumer Product Safety Commission.
 [FR Doc. 2026-07328 Filed 4-14-26; 8:45 am]
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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Office of the Secretary

[Transmittal No. 26-23]

Arms Sales Notification

AGENCY: Defense Security Cooperation Agency, Department of Defense (DoD).
ACTION: Arms sales notice.

SUMMARY: The DoD is publishing unclassified text of an arms sales notification.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Urooj Zahra at (703) 695-6233, *urooj.zahra.civ@mail.mil*, or *dsca.ncr.rsrcmgmt.list.cns-mbx@mail.mil*.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This 36(b) arms sales notification is published to fulfill the requirements of section 155 of Public Law 104-164 dated July 21, 1996. The following is a copy of the attached Transmittal 26-23, Policy Justification, and Sensitivity of Technology.

Dated: April 10, 2026.
Stephanie J. Bost,
Alternate OSD Federal Register Liaison Officer, Department of Defense.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

TRANSMITTAL NO RSAT 26-23

NOTICE OF PROPOSED ISSUANCE OF LETTER OF OFFER PURSUANT TO SECTION 36(b)(1) OF THE ARMS EXPORT CONTROL ACT

- (i) *Prospective Purchaser:* Government of Jordan

(ii) *Total Estimated Value:*

Major Defense Equipment *	\$ 0
Other	\$280 million
TOTAL	\$280 million

Funding Source: Foreign Military Financing (FMF)

(iii) *Description and Quantity or Quantities of Articles or Services under Consideration for Purchase:*

Major Defense Equipment (MDE):
 None

Non-Major Defense Equipment:

The following non-MDE items will be included: Ku band multi-function radio frequency system radar and command and control system; generators; global positioning system receivers; spare and repair parts; special tools and test equipment; technical manuals and publications; training devices; new equipment training; U.S. Government and contractor technical, engineering, and logistics personnel services; concurrent spare parts, systems integration, and checkout support; field service representative support; contractor logistics support; program management reviews; and other related elements of logistics and program support.

(iv) *Military Department:* Army (JO-B-YFX)

(v) *Prior Related Cases, if any:* None

(vi) *Sales Commission, Fee, etc., Paid, Offered, or Agreed to be Paid:* None known at this time

(vii) *Sensitivity of Technology Contained in the Defense Article or Defense Services Proposed to be Sold:* See Attached Annex

(viii) *Date Report Delivered to Congress:* February 26, 2026

* as defined in Section 47(6) of the Arms Export Control Act

POLICY JUSTIFICATION

Jordan—Ku band multi-function radio frequency system radars

The Government of Jordan has requested to buy Ku band multi-function radio frequency system (KuMRFS) radars and command and control system; generators; global positioning system receivers; spare and repair parts; special tools and test equipment; technical manuals and publications; training devices; new equipment training; U.S. Government and contractor technical, engineering, and logistics personnel services; concurrent spare parts, systems integration, and checkout support; field service representative support; contractor logistics support; program management reviews; and other related

elements of logistics and program support. The estimated total cost is \$280 million.

This proposed sale will support the foreign policy and national security objectives of the United States by helping to improve the security of a Major Non-NATO Ally that is an important force for political stability and economic progress in the Middle East.

The proposed sale will improve Jordan's capability to meet current and future threats by sustaining a credible force that can deter adversaries and participate in CENTCOM operations. Jordan will have no difficulty absorbing these articles into its armed forces.

The proposed sale of this equipment and support will not alter the basic military balance in the region.

The principal contractor will be RTX Missile Defense Technologies, located in Tucson, AZ. At this time, the U.S. Government is not aware of any offset agreement proposed in connection with this potential sale. Any offset agreement will be defined in negotiations between the purchaser and the contractor.

Implementation of this proposed sale will require the temporary assignment of thirteen U.S. Government and twenty-four contractor representatives to Jordan for a duration of up to five years to support fielding, training, and sustainment activities.

There will be no adverse impact on U.S. defense readiness as a result of this proposed sale.

Transmittal No. 26–23

Notice of Proposed Issuance of Letter of Offer Pursuant to Section 36(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act

Annex

Item No. vii

(vii) *Sensitivity of Technology:*

1. The Ku band multi-function radio frequency system (KuMRFS) is a multi-function radar. The radar is capable of providing simultaneous counter-unmanned aircraft systems and counter-rocket, artillery, and mortar air surveillance, and effector support missions. The system leverages M-code global positioning system technology ensuring secure and precise navigation and timing. KuMRFS radar provides three-dimensional target location data enhancing situational awareness for command-and-control systems.

2. The highest level of classification of defense articles, components, and services included in this potential sale is SECRET.

3. If a technologically advanced adversary were to obtain knowledge of the specific hardware and software

elements, the information could be used to develop countermeasures that might reduce system effectiveness or be used in the development of a system with similar or advanced capabilities.

4. A determination has been made that Jordan can provide substantially the same degree of protection for the sensitive technology being released as the U.S. Government. This proposed sale is necessary in furtherance of the U.S. foreign policy and national security objectives outlined in the Policy Justification.

5. All defense articles and services listed in this transmittal have been authorized for release and export to the Government of Jordan.

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BILLING CODE 6001–FR–P

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Office of the Secretary

[Transmittal No. 0M–25]

Arms Sales Notification

AGENCY: Defense Security Cooperation Agency, Department of Defense (DoD).

ACTION: Arms sales notice.

SUMMARY: The DoD is publishing unclassified text of an arms sales notification.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Urooj Zahra at (703) 695–6233, urooj.zahra.civ@mail.mil, or dscn.ncr.rsrcmgmt.list.cns-mbx@mail.mil.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This 36(b) arms sales notification is published to fulfill the requirements of section 155 of Public Law 104–164 dated July 21, 1996. The following is a copy of the attached Transmittal 0M–25.

Dated: April 10, 2026.

Stephanie J. Bost,

Alternate OSD Federal Register Liaison Officer, Department of Defense.

Transmittal No. 0M–25

REPORT OF ENHANCEMENT OR UPGRADE OF SENSITIVITY OF TECHNOLOGY OR CAPABILITY (SEC. 36(B)(5)(A), AECA)

(i) *Prospective Purchaser:* Government of Kuwait

(ii) *Sec. 36(b)(1), AECA Transmittal No.:* 20–19

Date: December 28, 2020

Implementing Agency: Army

Funding Source: National Funds

(iii) *Description:* On December 28, 2020, Congress was notified by congressional certification transmittal

number 20–19 of the possible sale, under Section 36(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act, of eight (8) AH 64E Apache Longbow Attack Helicopters and the remanufacture sixteen (16) of their AH–64D Apache Longbow Attack Helicopters to the AH–64E configuration consisting of: eight (8) AH–64E Apache Helicopters (new procurement); sixteen (16) AH–64E Apache Helicopters (remanufacture); twenty-two (22) T700–GE 701D engines; thirty-six (36) remanufactured T700–GE 701D engines; twenty-seven (27) AN/AAR–57 Counter Missile Warning Systems (CMWS); eighteen (18) Embedded Global Position Systems with Inertial Navigation (EGI) with Multi-Mode Receiver (MMR); thirty-six (36) remanufactured EGIs with MMR; eight (8) AN/ASQ–170(V) Modernized Target Acquisition and Designation Sight/AN/AAQ–11 Pilot Night Vision Sensor (MTADS/PNVIS); seventeen (17) AN/APG–78 Longbow Fire Control Radars (FCR) with Radar Electronics Units (REU); seventeen (17) APR–48B Modernized Radar Frequency Interferometers (M–RFI); eighteen (18) M299 AGM–114 Hellfire Missile Launchers; four (4) remanufactured M299 AGM–114 Hellfire Missile Launchers; eighteen (18) Hydra 70 (70mm) 2.75 Inch Rocket M260 Rocket Launchers; four (4) remanufactured Hydra 70 (70mm) 2.75 Inch Rocket M260 Rocket Launchers; nine (9) M230E1 30mm Chain Gun M139 Area Weapons System (AWS) Guns; two (2) remanufactured M230E1 30mm Chain Gun M139 AWS Guns; one (1) Longbow Crew Trainer (LCT); and one (1) remanufactured LCT. Also included were fifty-four (54) AN/ARC 201 non-COMSEC Very-High Frequency/ Frequency Modulation (VHF/FM) radios; fifty-four (54) Ultra High Frequency (UHF) radios (AN/ARC 231 or MXF 4027); twenty-eight (28) Identify Friend or Foe Transponders (APX 123 or APX 119); twenty-seven (27) IDM 401 (Improved Data Modem); twenty-seven (27) Link 16 Datalinks; twenty-seven (27) AN/APR–39D (V)2 Radar Warning Receivers; twenty-seven (27) AN/AVR–2 Laser Warning Receivers; twenty-seven (27) Infrared Countermeasures Dispensers (2 flares, 1 chaff); nine (9) AN/ASN–157 Doppler Radar Velocity Sensors; nine (9) AN/ARN–149(V)3 Automatic Direction Finders (ADF); sixteen (16) remanufactured AN/ARN–149 (V)3 ADFs; nine (9) AN/APN–209 Radar Altimeters; twenty-seven (27) AN/ARN–153 Tactical Airborne Navigation (TACAN) systems; sixteen (16) Manned-Unmanned Teaming International (MUM-Ti) (UPR) Air-to-