of the Secretary at 202–205–2000. General information concerning the Commission may also be obtained by accessing its internet server (*https://www.usitc.gov*). The public record for these reviews may be viewed on the Commission's electronic docket (EDIS) at *https://edis.usitc.gov*.

For further information concerning the conduct of these reviews and rules of general application, consult the Commission's Rules of Practice and Procedure, part 201, subparts A through E (19 CFR part 201), and part 207, subparts A, D, E, and F (19 CFR part 207).

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: On September 4, 2026, the Commission determined that it should proceed to full reviews in the subject five-year reviews pursuant to section 751(c) of the Tariff Act of 1930 (19 U.S.C. 1675(c)). The Commission found that both the domestic and respondent interested party group responses from Japan to its notice of institution (91 FR 32435, June 1, 2026) were adequate, and determined to conduct a full review of the order on imports from Japan. The Commission also found that the respondent interested party group responses from France and Spain were inadequate but determined to conduct full reviews of the orders on imports from those countries in order to promote administrative efficiency in light of its determinations to conduct a full review of the order with respect to Japan. A record of the Commissioners' votes will be available from the Office of the Secretary and at the Commission's website.

Authority: These reviews are being conducted under authority of title VII of the Tariff Act of 1930; this notice is published pursuant to § 207.62 of the Commission's rules.

By order of the Commission.

Issued: September 25, 2026.

Sharon Bellamy,

Supervisory Hearings and Information Officer.

[FR Doc. 2026–19914 Filed 9–28–26; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7020–02–P

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Drug Enforcement Administration

[Docket No. 25–73]

Johann Farley, M.D.; Decision and Order

On August 29, 2025, the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA or Government) issued an Order to Show Cause (OSC) to Johann Farley, M.D., of Merrillville, Indiana (Registrant). Request for Final Agency Action (RFAA), Exhibit (RFAAX) 1, at 1, 3. The OSC proposed the revocation of Registrant's DEA registration, No. BF8869628,[1] alleging that he has been mandatorily excluded ''from participation in Medicare, Medicaid, and all Federal health care programs pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1320a–7(a).'' *Id.* at 1 (citing 21 U.S.C. 824(a)(5)).

On August 10, 2026, the Government submitted an RFAA to the Administrator requesting that the Agency[2] issue a default final order revoking Registrant's registration. RFAA, at 1, 4. After carefully reviewing the entire record and conducting the analysis as set forth in detail below, the Agency grants the Government's RFAA and revokes Registrant's registration.

I. Procedural History

On August 29, 2025, a DEA Diversion Investigator personally served the OSC on Registrant and sent an electronic copy of the OSC to his registered email address. RFAAX 2, at 1–2. On September 26, 2025, Registrant, through counsel, submitted a timely hearing request and answer to the Office of Administrative Law Judges. RFAAX 3. The matter was assigned to an administrative law judge, and on April 29, 2026, the Chief Administrative Law Judge (Chief ALJ) issued an Order for Prehearing Statements, ordering the Government to file a prehearing statement by May 13, 2026, and Registrant to file a prehearing statement by May 27, 2026. RFAAX 4, at 2, 4.

The Government timely filed its prehearing statement on May 12, 2026. RFAAX 5. On June 3, 2026, the Chief ALJ issued an Order Directing Compliance, noting that Registrant had not filed a prehearing statement by the initial May 27 deadline, and providing Registrant with a second opportunity to file a prehearing statement by June 8, 2026. RFAAX 6, at 1.

On the same day, Registrant sent an email to OALJ stating that the Order Directing Compliance was the '' 'first notification' '' he had received in this matter, after which the Government forwarded its prehearing statement to Registrant. RFAAX 7, at 1, n.1. On June 9, 2026, the Chief ALJ issued an Order Finding [Registrant] in Default and Terminating Proceedings (Termination Order), finding that Registrant failed for the second time to file a prehearing statement.[3] RFAAX 7. The Chief ALJ further found Registrant in default for ''display[ing] a pattern of noncompliance with [the Chief ALJ's] orders'' and failing to defend his case. *Id.* at 2 (citing 21 CFR 1301.43(c)(3)). Accordingly, the Chief ALJ terminated the proceedings. *Id.*

II. Registrant Is in Default

DEA regulations provide that a registrant ''who has requested a hearing fails to plead . . . or otherwise defend'' his case, shall be deemed to be in default. 21 CFR 1301.43(c)(3). Unless excused, a default is deemed to constitute ''an admission of the factual allegations of the [OSC].'' 21 CFR 1301.43(e).

The OSC notified Registrant that he would ''be deemed to have waived the right to a hearing and to be in default'' if he failed to plead or defend his case after requesting a hearing. RFAAX 1, at 2 (citing 21 CFR 1301.43(c)(3)). The Chief ALJ's Order for Prehearing Statements and Order Directing Compliance also notified Registrant of the same. RFAAX 4, at 4; RFAAX 6, at 1.

Registrant was provided with two opportunities to file a prehearing statement and was notified in the OSC, Order for Prehearing Statements, and Order Directing Compliance that a failure to defend his case would result in a finding of default and deemed admission of the OSC's factual allegations. RFAAX 1, at 2; RFAAX 4, at 4; RFAAX 6, at 1. And yet, Registrant failed to file a prehearing statement as ordered by the Chief ALJ in two separate orders. RFAAX 4; RFAAX 6.

Accordingly, the Agency finds that the Chief ALJ did not err in finding

[1] According to the OSC and Agency records, Registrant's registration expired on September 30, 2025. RFAAX 1, at 1. The Agency has previously held that it is within its jurisdiction and discretion to adjudicate a matter to finality where a registration expired after issuance of an OSC and before issuance of a final order. *See Jeffrey D. Olsen, M.D.,* 84 FR 68474, 68475–79 (2019); *see also Abdul Naushad, M.D.,* 89 FR 54059, 54060 (2024) (applying the same principle and adjudicating a matter to finality where a registration expired before issuance of the OSC). Here, adjudicating the matter to finality will achieve similar goals as in *Olsen;* it will support future interactions between the Agency and Registrant, inform current and prospective members of the registrant community about the Agency's expectations, provide continuing education to all DEA personnel, help coordinate law enforcement efforts, and inform stakeholders, such as legislators and the public, about the Agency's work. *Olsen,* 84 FR at 68479.

[2] The Controlled Substances Act delegates authority to the Attorney General, who has delegated it to the Administrator of DEA (the Agency). 28 CFR 0.100.

[3] The Termination Order notes that the Order for Prehearing Statements, Government's prehearing statement, and Order Directing Compliance were sent to the correct email address on file for Registrant's attorney. RFAAX 7, at 1, n.1. The Termination Order also notes that OALJ ''received no non-delivery notification when serving either the [Order for Prehearing Statements] or [Order Directing Compliance]'' on Registrant. *Id.*

Registrant in default and terminating proceedings pursuant to 21 CFR 1301.43(c)(3). RFAAX 7; *see Hollywood Med. Rehab. Care, Inc.,* 90 FR 47827, 47827–28 (2025) (affirming the ALJ's finding of default where the registrant failed to comply with multiple deadlines to file an answer); *see also Robert L. Carter, D.D.S.,* 90 FR 9631, 9631–32 (2025) (collecting cases and affirming the ALJ's authority to find a waiver of the right to a hearing and terminate proceedings for noncompliance with filing deadlines); *Mert Kivanc, D.O.,* 90 FR 48429, 48429 (2025) (same).

The Agency further finds that Registrant is in default and, therefore, is deemed to have admitted to the factual allegations in the OSC. 21 CFR 1301.43(c)(3), (e), (f)(1).

III. Findings of Fact

In light of Registrant's default, the factual allegations in the OSC are deemed admitted. 21 CFR 1301.43(e). Accordingly, the Agency finds, and Registrant is deemed to have admitted, that on June 11, 2024, in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana, Registrant pleaded guilty to one count of health care fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1347. RFAAX 1, at 2. Further, based on this conviction, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Office of Inspector General (HHS/OIG), mandatorily excluded Registrant from participation in Medicare, Medicaid, and all Federal health care programs pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1320a–7(a) for a minimum period of 12 years, effective May 20, 2025. *Id.* Accordingly, the Agency finds substantial record evidence that Registrant has been mandatorily excluded from participation in Medicare, Medicaid, and all Federal health care programs pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1320a–7(a).

IV. Discussion

Pursuant to 21 U.S.C. 824(a)(5), the Attorney General is authorized to suspend or revoke a registration upon finding that the registrant ''has been excluded (or directed to be excluded) from participation in a program pursuant to section 1320a–7(a) of Title 42.'' The exclusion must be mandatory, rather than permissive, to constitute a basis for revocation under 21 U.S.C. 824(a)(5). *Kansky J. Delisma, M.D.,* 85 FR 23845, 23849 (2020). The underlying conviction forming the basis for mandatory exclusion from participation in federal health care programs need not involve controlled substances to provide the grounds for revocation pursuant to 21 U.S.C. 824(a)(5). *Moustafa M. Aboshady, M.D.,* 90 FR 15992, 15993 n.5 (2025).

The Government has the burden of proof in this proceeding, 21 CFR 1301.44(e), and the Agency must make its findings based on ''substantial [record] evidence.'' [4] 5 U.S.C. 556(d); *see* 5 U.S.C. 706(2); 21 U.S.C. 877. If the Government meets its burden of establishing a *prima facie* case that Registrant ''has been excluded (or directed to be excluded) from participation in a program pursuant to [42 U.S.C.] 1320a–7(a),'' 21 U.S.C. 824(a)(5), then the burden shifts to Registrant to demonstrate that he can be trusted with registration. *Delisma,* 85 FR at 23846, 23849, 23851.

Here, the Agency found above that HHS/OIG mandatorily excluded Registrant from participation in Medicare, Medicaid, and all Federal health care programs pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1320a–7(a). Accordingly, the Agency finds that the Government has established a *prima facie* case for revoking Registrant's registration under 21 U.S.C. 824(a)(5).

V. Sanction

Where, as here, the Government has met its *prima facie* burden of showing that Registrant's registration should be revoked, the burden shifts to Registrant to show why he can be entrusted with a registration. *Morall* v. *Drug Enf't Admin.,* 412 F.3d 165, 174 (D.C. Cir. 2005); *Jones Total Health Care Pharmacy, LLC* v. *Drug Enf't Admin.,* 881 F.3d 823, 830 (11th Cir. 2018); *Delisma,* 85 FR at 23853. The issue of trust is necessarily a fact-dependent determination based on the circumstances presented by the individual registrant. *Jones Total Health Care Pharmacy,* 881 F.3d at 833; *Jeffrey Stein, M.D.,* 84 FR 46968, 46972 (2019). Moreover, as ''past performance is the best predictor of future performance,'' the Agency requires that a registrant who has committed acts inconsistent with the public interest accepts responsibility for those acts, understands the gravity and seriousness of the misconduct, and demonstrates that the registrant will not engage in future misconduct. *ALRA Labs., Inc.* v. *Drug Enf't Admin.,* 54 F.3d 450, 452 (7th Cir. 1995); *Jones Total Health Care Pharmacy,* 881 F.3d at 831–33. The Agency requires a registrant's unequivocal acceptance of responsibility. *Janet S. Pettyjohn, D.O.,* 89 FR 82639, 82641 (2024); *Mohammed Asgar, M.D.,* 83 FR 29569, 29573 (2018); *Jones Total Health Care Pharmacy,* 881 F.3d at 830–31. In addition, a registrant's candor during the investigation and hearing, if one is requested, is an important factor in determining acceptance of responsibility and the appropriate sanction. *Jones Total Health Care Pharmacy,* 881 F.3d at 830–31; *Hoxie* v. *Drug Enf't Admin.,* 419 F.3d 477, 483–84 (6th Cir. 2005). Further, the Agency considers the egregiousness and extent of the misconduct as significant factors in determining the appropriate sanction. *Jones Total Health Care Pharmacy,* 881 F.3d at 834 & n.4. The Agency also considers the need to deter similar acts by a registrant and by the community of registrants. *Stein,* 84 FR at 46972–73.

Here, although Registrant initially requested a hearing, he failed to ''plead . . . or otherwise defend'' and was deemed to be in default. 21 CFR 1301.43(c)(3). To date, Registrant has not filed any motion to set aside the default with the Office of the Administrator. *Id.* Thus, Registrant has made no representations as to his future compliance with the CSA nor made any demonstration that he can be entrusted with registration. Moreover, the evidence presented by the Government shows that Registrant was convicted of charges related to defrauding health care benefits programs, further indicating that Registrant cannot be trusted with registration.

Accordingly, the Agency will order that Registrant's registration be revoked.

Order

Pursuant to 28 CFR 0.100(b) and the authority vested in me by 21 U.S.C. 824(a), I hereby revoke DEA Certificate of Registration, No. BF8869628, issued to Johann Farley, M.D. Further, pursuant to 28 CFR 0.100(b) and the authority vested in me by 21 U.S.C. 823(g)(1), I hereby deny any pending applications of Johann Farley, M.D., to renew or modify this registration, as well as any other pending application of Johann Farley, M.D., for additional registration in Indiana. This Order is effective October 29, 2026.

Signing Authority

This document of the Drug Enforcement Administration was signed on September 21, 2026, by DEA Administrator Terrance C. Cole. That document with the original signature and date is maintained by DEA. For administrative purposes only, and in compliance with requirements of the

[4] According to the CSA, ''[f]indings of fact by the [DEA Administrator], if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive.'' 21 U.S.C. 877. Here, where Registrant is found to be in default, all the factual allegations in the OSC are deemed to be admitted. These uncontested and deemed admitted facts constitute evidence that exceeds the ''substantial evidence'' standard of 21 U.S.C. 877.

Office of the Federal Register, the undersigned DEA Federal Register Liaison Officer has been authorized to sign and submit the document in electronic format for publication, as an official document of DEA. This administrative process in no way alters the legal effect of this document upon publication in the **Federal Register**.

Heather Achbach,

Federal Register Liaison Officer, Drug Enforcement Administration.

[FR Doc. 2026–19821 Filed 9–28–26; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4410–09–P

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Drug Enforcement Administration

Angela Turner-Brown, N.P.; Decision and Order

On November 18, 2025, the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA or Government) issued an Order to Show Cause (OSC) to Angela Turner-Brown, N.P., of Evansville, Indiana (Registrant). Request for Final Agency Action (RFAA), Exhibit (RFAAX) 2, at 1, 4. The OSC proposed the revocation of Registrant's Certificate of Registration No. MB0434035, alleging that Registrant is ''currently without authority to prescribe, administer, dispense, or otherwise handle controlled substances in the State of Indiana, the state in which [she is] registered with DEA.'' *Id.* at 2 (citing 21 U.S.C. 824(a)(3)).[1]

The OSC notified Registrant of her right to file a written request for hearing, and that if she failed to file such a request, she would be deemed to have waived her right to a hearing and be in default. *Id.* at 2–3 (citing 21 CFR 1301.43). Here, Registrant did not request a hearing, and the Agency finds her to be in default. RFAA, at 2–3.[2] ''A default, unless excused, shall be deemed to constitute a waiver of the registrant's/applicant's right to a hearing and an admission of the factual allegations of the [OSC].'' 21 CFR 1301.43(e).

Further, ''[i]n the event that a registrant . . . is deemed to be in default . . . DEA may then file a request for final agency action with the Administrator, along with a record to support its request. In such circumstances, the Administrator may enter a default final order pursuant to [21 CFR] 1316.67.'' *Id.* at 1301.43(f)(1). Here, the Government has requested final agency action based on Registrant's default pursuant to 21 CFR 1301.43(c), (f), 1301.46. RFAA, at 4; *see also* 21 CFR 1316.67.

Findings of Fact

The Agency finds that, in light of Registrant's default, the factual allegations in the OSC are deemed admitted. According to the OSC, on October 31, 2023, Registrant's Indiana Controlled Substances Registration (CSR) Prescriptive Authority license expired by its own terms. RFAAX 2, at 2. Further, on October 31, 2025, Registrant's Indiana Advanced Practice Registered Nurse (APRN) Prescriptive Authority license expired by its own terms. *Id.*

According to Indiana online records, of which the Agency takes official notice,[3] both Registrant's Indiana CSR Prescriptive Authority license and Registrant's Indiana APRN Prescriptive Authority license are expired. Indiana Licensing Enterprise License Search, *https://mylicense.in.gov/everification* (last visited date of signature of this Order). Accordingly, the Agency finds that Registrant is not licensed to handle controlled substances in Indiana, the state in which she is registered with DEA.[4]

Discussion

Pursuant to 21 U.S.C. 824(a)(3), the Attorney General is authorized to suspend or revoke a registration issued under 21 U.S.C. 823 ''upon a finding that the registrant . . . has had his State license or registration suspended . . . [or] revoked . . . by competent State authority and is no longer authorized by State law to engage in the . . . dispensing of controlled substances.'' With respect to a practitioner, DEA has also long held that the possession of authority to dispense controlled substances under the laws of the state in which a practitioner engages in professional practice is a fundamental condition for obtaining and maintaining a practitioner's registration. *Gonzales* v. *Oregon,* 546 U.S. 243, 270 (2006) (''The Attorney General can register a physician to dispense controlled substances 'if the applicant is authorized to dispense . . . controlled substances under the laws of the State in which he practices.' . . . The very definition of a 'practitioner' eligible to prescribe includes physicians 'licensed, registered, or otherwise permitted, by the United States or the jurisdiction in which he practices' to dispense controlled substances. § 802(21).''). The Agency has applied these principles consistently. *See, e.g., Lawrence Rudolph, D.M.D.,* 89 FR 79310 (2024); *Henry-Norbert O. Ndekwe, M.D.,* 90 FR 15990 (2025); *Benson Sergiles, P.A.,* 90 FR 32016 (2025); *Ashley Vermillion, N.P.,* 91 FR 35270 (2026).[5]

According to Indiana statute, and subject to exceptions irrelevant here, ''[e]very person who dispenses or proposes to dispense any controlled substance within Indiana must have a registration issued by the [Indiana Board of Pharmacy] in accordance with the board's rules.'' Ind. Code 35–48–3–3(b) (2025). Further, ''dispense'' means ''to deliver a controlled substance to an ultimate user or research subject by or pursuant to the lawful order of a

[1] According to Agency records, Registrant's DEA registration expired on July 31, 2026. The fact that a registrant allows her registration to expire during the pendency of an OSC does not impact the Agency's jurisdiction or prerogative under the Controlled Substances Act (CSA) to adjudicate the OSC to finality. *Jeffrey D. Olsen, M.D.,* 84 FR 68474, 68476–68479 (2019).

[2] Based on the Government's submissions in its RFAA dated April 8, 2026, the Agency finds that service of the OSC on Registrant was adequate. The included declaration from a DEA Diversion Investigator (DI) indicates that on or about November 20, 2025, the DI mailed copies of the OSC to both Registrant's registered address and Registrant's residential address. RFAAX 3, at 3. The copy of the OSC that was sent to Registrant's residential address was successfully delivered and signed for by ''A. Brown,'' with the DI receiving FedEx Proof of Delivery. *Id.; see also id.,* Attachments D–E.

[3] Under the Administrative Procedure Act, an agency ''may take official notice of facts at any stage in a proceeding—even in the final decision.'' United States Department of Justice, Attorney General's Manual on the Administrative Procedure Act 80 (1947) (Wm. W. Gaunt & Sons, Inc., Reprint 1979).

[4] Pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 556(e), ''[w]hen an agency decision rests on official notice of a material fact not appearing in the evidence in the record, a party is entitled, on timely request, to an opportunity to show the contrary.'' The material fact here is that Registrant, as of the date of this Decision and Order, is not licensed to handle controlled substances in Indiana. Accordingly, Registrant may dispute the Agency's finding by filing a properly supported motion for reconsideration of findings of fact within fifteen calendar days of the date of this Order. Any such motion and response shall be filed and served by email to the other party and to the Office of the Administrator, Drug Enforcement Administration, at *dea.addo.attorneys@dea.gov.*

[5] This rule derives from the text of two provisions of the Controlled Substances Act (CSA). First, Congress defined the term ''practitioner'' to mean ''a physician . . . or other person licensed, registered, or otherwise permitted, by . . . the jurisdiction in which he practices . . . , to distribute, dispense, . . . [or] administer . . . a controlled substance in the course of professional practice.'' 21 U.S.C. 802(21). Second, in setting the requirements for obtaining a practitioner's registration, Congress directed that ''[t]he Attorney General shall register practitioners . . . if the applicant is authorized to dispense . . . controlled substances under the laws of the State in which he practices.'' 21 U.S.C. 823(g)(1). Because Congress has clearly mandated that a practitioner possess state authority in order to be deemed a practitioner under the CSA, DEA has held repeatedly that revocation of a practitioner's registration is the appropriate sanction whenever he is no longer authorized to dispense controlled substances under the laws of the state in which he practices. *See, e.g., Elias Garcia Garcia, P.A.,* 90 FR 31242 (2025); *Jason Weakley, R.N., A.P.R.N.,* 90 FR 10085 (2025); *Khursheed Haider, M.D.,* 90 FR 21950 (2025).