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B. * * * Applicants and licensees may reference either the AP1000 DCD Revision 19, APP-GW-GL-702, dated June 13, 2011, and the amendments thereto in DCP_NRC_003343, Supplemental Information to Support the AP1000 Design Certification Extension (Non-proprietary), and APP-GW-GL-705 Rev. 0, copyright 2021 (Supplemental Information), or the AP1000 DCD Revision 20, APP-GW-GL-702, Revision 2, dated 2026.

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V. Applicable Regulations

A. Except as indicated in paragraphs A.2, A.3, and B of this section, the regulations that apply to the AP1000 design, in DCD Revision 15, are in 10 CFR parts 20, 50, 73, and 100, codified as of January 23, 2006, that are applicable and technically relevant, as described in the FSER (NUREG-1793) and Supplement No. 1.

2. Except as indicated in paragraphs A.1, A.3, and B of this section, the regulations that apply to those portions of the AP1000 design, in DCD Revision 19, approved by Amendment 1 are in 10 CFR parts 20, 50, 73, and 100, codified as of December 30, 2011, that are applicable and technically relevant, as described in the Supplement No. 2 of the FSER (NUREG-1793).

3. Except as indicated in paragraphs A.1, A.2, and B of this section, the regulations that apply to those portions of the AP1000 design, in DCD Revision 20, are in 10 CFR parts 20, 50, 52, 73, and 100, codified as of December 28, 2026, that are applicable and technically relevant, as described in the safety evaluation for the renewal of this design certification (renewal FSER) (ADAMS Accession No. ML26225A350).

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VI. Issue Resolution

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B. * * * 1. All nuclear safety issues, except for the generic TS and other operational requirements, associated with the information in the FSER, Supplement Nos. 1 and 2, the Verification Evaluation Report (ADAMS Accession No. ML21131A221), and, if applicable, the renewal FSER; Tier 1 and Tier 2 (including referenced information, which the context indicates is intended as requirements, and the investment protection short-term availability controls in Section 16.3 of the DCD) as amended by Supplemental Information; and the rulemaking records for initial certification, Amendment 1, the duration extension of the AP1000 design, and the renewal;

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7. All environmental issues concerning severe accident mitigation design alternatives associated with the information in the NRC's EA for the AP1000 design, Appendix 1B of

Revision 15 of the generic DCD, the NRC's final EA for Amendment 1 to the AP1000 design, Appendix 1B of Revision 19 of the generic DCD, the NRC's final EA relating to the extension of the AP1000 standard design certification, the NRC's final EA relating to the renewal of the AP1000 standard design certification, and Appendix 1B of Revision 20 of the generic DCD, for plants referencing this appendix whose site parameters are within those specified in the severe accident mitigation design alternatives evaluation. Future applications relying on the AP1000 DCD Revision 20 under appendix D to part 52 will need to inflate the appropriate cost parameters (e.g., the dollar-per-person-rem value and undiscounted cost parameters).

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VII. Duration of This Appendix

This appendix may be referenced for a period of 40 years from December 28, 2026, except as provided for in 10 CFR 52.55(b) and 52.57(b). This appendix remains valid for an applicant or licensee who references this appendix until the application is withdrawn or the license expires, including any period of extended operation under a renewed license.

VIII. Processes for Changes and Departures

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B. * * * 6. a. An applicant who references the AP1000 design certification rule may depart from Tier 2 * information, which is designated with italicized text or brackets and an asterisk in the AP1000 design control document, without NRC approval, except for departures that:

(1) Involve a deviation from a code or standard credited in the plant-specific DCD for establishing the criteria for the design or construction of a structure, system, or component (SSC) important to safety;

(2) Result in a change to a design process described in the plant-specific DCD that is material to implementation of an industry standard or endorsed regulatory guidance;

(3) (i) Result in a change to the fuel criteria evaluation process, the fuel principal design requirements, or the nuclear design of the fuel or the reactivity control system that is material to a fuel or reactivity control system design function; or

(ii) Result in any change to the maximum fuel rod average burn-up limits or the small break LOCA analysis information in DCD Subsections 15.6.5.4B.2.2 or 15.6.5.4B.2.3;

(4) Adversely affect the containment debris limits or debris screen design criteria;

(5) Change the Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) type from a canned motor to a different type of RCP;

(6) Result in a change to the Passive Residual Heat Removal Heat Exchanger natural circulation test (first plant test), the Core Makeup Tank Heated Recirculation Tests (first three plants test), or the Automatic Depressurization System Blowdown Test (first three plants test) that is material to the test objectives or test performance criteria;

(7) Involve structural materials or analytical or design methods, including design codes and analytical assumptions,

that deviate from those credited in the plant-specific DCD for critical sections;

(8) Result in a change to the design of the steel faceplates, internal trusses, tie bars, or headed studs of the steel-concrete (SC) module walls in the Nuclear Island or the Shield Building, including SC-to-reinforced concrete (RC) connections; or

(9) Result in an increase in the demand to capacity (D/C) ratio of a critical section of the structure. The licensee must determine the D/C ratio under this condition for each critical section structural member including, but not limited to, wall segments, wall sections, concrete panels, slabs, or basemat sections, affected by a departure by:

(i) Using the Tier 2 * information in the DCD Section 3.8 or Appendix 3H table that directly states the D/C ratio or states the area of steel provided and the area of steel required for the affected structural member; or

(ii) Providing the same total area of steel across the entire critical section using any combination of rebar sizes and spacing allowed by the design basis codes used in the DCD as the total area of steel specified in DCD Section 3.8 and Appendix 3H tables marked Tier 2 *.

b. For a departure from Tier 2 * information that does not require prior NRC approval, the licensee must comply with the requirements for Tier 2 departures in paragraph B.5 of this section. The departure or change to Tier 2 * information must remain Tier 2 * information in the plant-specific DCD.

c. Departures from Tier 2 * information that are made under paragraph B.6 of this section do not require an exemption from this appendix.

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Dated: October 5, 2026.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Michael King,

Executive Director for Operations.

[FR Doc. 2026-21030 Filed 10-13-26; 8:45 am]

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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. FAA-2026-2289; Project Identifier MCAI-2025-01592-T; Amendment 39-23482; AD 2026-20-09]

RIN 2120-AA64

Airworthiness Directives; Bombardier, Inc., Airplanes

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

ACTION: Final rule.

SUMMARY: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Bombardier, Inc., Model BD-700-2A12 airplanes. This AD was prompted by

reports of low clearance in the right wing between the fuel line flexible coupling and the harness support bracket clip-nut, between the fuel line flexible coupling and hydraulic system, and between the hydraulic system and fuel vent tube. This AD requires rectifying the low clearance condition between the fuel line flexible coupling and the harness support bracket clip-nut, rectifying the low clearance condition between the fuel line flexible coupling and the hydraulic system, and doing an inspection for adequate clearance between the hydraulic system and the fuel vent tube and applicable on-conditions actions. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.

DATES: This AD is effective November 18, 2026.

The Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference of a certain publication listed in this AD as of November 18, 2026.

ADDRESSES:

AD Docket: You may examine the AD docket at *regulations.gov* under Docket No. FAA–2026–2289; or in person at Docket Operations between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. The AD docket contains this final rule, the mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI), any comments received, and other information. The address for Docket Operations is U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket Operations, M–30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12–140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE, Washington, DC 20590.

Material Incorporated by Reference:

- For Transport Canada material identified in this AD, contact Transport Canada, Transport Canada National Aircraft Certification, 159 Cleopatra Drive, Nepean, Ontario K1A 0N5, Canada; telephone 888–663–3639; email *TC.AirworthinessDirectives-Consignesdenavigabilite.TC@tc.gc.ca*. You may find this material on the Transport Canada website at *tc.canada.ca/en/aviation*.

- You may view this material at the FAA, Airworthiness Products Section, Operational Safety Branch, 2200 South 216th St., Des Moines, WA. For information on the availability of this material at the FAA, call 206–231–3195. It is also available at *regulations.gov* under Docket No. FAA–2026–2289.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Joseph Catanzaro, Aviation Safety Engineer, FAA, 1600 Stewart Avenue, Suite 410, Westbury, NY 11590; phone: 516–228–7300; email: *9-avs-nyaco-cos@faa.gov*.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Background

The FAA issued a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) to amend 14 CFR part 39 by adding an AD that would apply to certain Bombardier, Inc., Model BD–700–2A12 airplanes. The NPRM was published in the **Federal Register** on March 4, 2026 (91 FR 10522). The NPRM was prompted by Transport Canada AD CF–2025–49, dated October 1, 2025 (Transport Canada AD CF–2025–49) (also referred to as the MCAI), issued by Transport Canada, which is the aviation authority for Canada. The MCAI states there have been reports of low clearance in the right wing between the fuel line flexible coupling and the harness support bracket clip-nut located in bay 3, between the fuel line flexible coupling and hydraulic system 3 line located in bay 18, and between the hydraulic system 3 lines and fuel vent tube located in bay 20. These low clearance conditions, if not addressed, may result in an ignition source developing in the fuel tank in the event of a lightning strike.

In the NPRM, the FAA proposed to require rectifying the low clearance condition between the fuel line flexible coupling and the harness support bracket clip-nut, rectifying the low clearance condition between the fuel line flexible coupling and the hydraulic system, and doing an inspection for adequate clearance between the hydraulic system and the fuel vent tube and applicable on-conditions actions, as specified in Transport Canada AD CF–2025–49. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.

You may examine the MCAI in the AD docket at *regulations.gov* under Docket No. FAA–2026–2289.

Discussion of Final Airworthiness Directive

Comments

The FAA received comments from five individuals who supported the NPRM without change.

The FAA received additional comments from two other individuals. The following presents the comments received on the NPRM and the FAA's response to each comment.

Request To Clarify Why an Emergency AD Was Not Issued

Commenter #1 requested that the FAA clarify its determination that the unsafe condition does not meet the criteria for an emergency AD, given the potential interaction between fuel transfer systems, vibration-induced wear, and adjacent hydraulic and electrical components within the affected wing

structure. Additionally, the commenter asked (1) if the low clearance condition could contribute to fuel starvation scenarios under certain operational conditions; (2) if interim inspections, operational limitations, or manufacturer service bulletins should be implemented while the rulemaking process proceeds; (3) if a shortened compliance period or immediate corrective action would better mitigate the identified risk; (4) if additional technical analysis regarding system interaction between fuel, hydraulic, and electrical components should be included in the final rulemaking record.

The FAA issues an emergency AD when an unsafe condition exists that requires immediate adoption, and the risk to the flying public justifies forgoing notice and comment prior to adopting an emergency AD. In developing this rulemaking, the FAA evaluated the compliance times and all the available information provided by Transport Canada and the manufacturer. The FAA has no additional data that would support reducing the compliance time below that specified in Transport Canada AD CF–2025–49, or issuing an emergency AD to address the unsafe condition.

Further, the FAA provides the following additional information:

(1) The low clearance condition would not contribute to fuel starvation. There is no potential fouling condition of the fuel vent line and, therefore, no effect on the fuel system operation.

(2) The corrective actions and compliance times in Transport Canada AD CF–2025–49 are adequate for addressing the unsafe condition. Therefore, no interim actions, operational limitations, or additional service bulletins need to be mandated. However, operators are permitted to accomplish the requirements of this AD at an earlier time, or may voluntarily adopt service information, operational limitations, or additional inspections to address the unsafe condition.

(3) Neither a shorter compliance time nor immediate corrective action are necessary to address the unsafe condition. Based on the risk evaluation conducted by the manufacturer, the corrective actions and compliance times in Transport Canada AD CF–2025–49 are sufficient for mitigating the identified risk.

(4) There is no system failure associated with this unsafe condition; therefore, no technical analysis regarding system interaction between the fuel, hydraulic, and electrical components needs to be included in the rulemaking docket.

Request To Reopen the Comment Period or Revise the Proposed AD

Commenter #2 requested that the FAA either (1) re-open the comment period and add to the AD docket all materials incorporated by reference and the basis for the cost assumptions and warranty offset, or (2) revise the proposed AD to add the operative standard and un-offset cost estimate. The commenter stated that the FAA did not provide adequate information for the public to meaningfully evaluate and comment on the proposed requirements and costs of compliance. The commenter further stated if the FAA cannot provide these elements, the proposed AD cannot be evaluated for comment or supported as a matter of reasoned decision-making and should be withdrawn and reissued with a complete record.

The FAA disagrees with the requests. The FAA provides summaries and access details in the preamble and regulatory text, makes materials available for inspection at FAA and National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) offices, offers publisher contact information, and obtains formal incorporation by reference (IBR) approval from the Office of the Federal Register. These efforts are intended to ensure that all IBR materials meet the “reasonably available” standard required by 1 CFR part 51. The FAA did not change this AD as a result of this comment.

Further, the FAA notes that this AD incorporates by reference Transport Canada AD CF–2025–49, not the manufacturer service information referenced in Transport Canada AD CF–2025–49 (*i.e.*, non-IBR material). The

FAA posted Transport Canada AD CF–2025–49 to the AD docket when the NPRM was published in the **Federal Register**. The non-IBR material may only be posted before the final rule’s publication if it is already publicly available or if there is written consent from the owner of that material. Additionally, affected operators that must comply with the AD may obtain the non-IBR material directly from the manufacturer during the comment period through their normal course of business.

Further, the FAA based the estimated Costs of Compliance with this AD on information provided by the manufacturer. The number of estimated work hours and warranty terms are included in the manufacturer service bulletin, which is posted to the rulemaking docket upon publication of the final rule. The estimated parts cost was provided by the manufacturer. The FAA notes that no comments were received regarding the IBR material or estimated costs from any of the affected operators.

Conclusion

These products have been approved by the civil aviation authority of another country and are approved for operation in the United States. Pursuant to the FAA’s bilateral agreement with this State of Design Authority, that authority has notified the FAA of the unsafe condition described in the MCAI referenced above. The FAA reviewed the relevant data, considered any comments received, and determined that air safety requires adopting this AD as proposed. Accordingly, the FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe

condition on these products. Except for minor editorial changes, this AD is adopted as proposed in the NPRM. None of the changes will increase the economic burden on any operator.

Material Incorporated by Reference Under 1 CFR Part 51

Transport Canada AD CF–2025–49 specifies procedures for rectifying the low clearance condition between the fuel line flexible coupling and the harness support bracket clip-nut located in bay 3 of the right wing by replacing the clip-nut on the harness bracket in the right-hand wing between rib 3 and rib 4, rectifying the low clearance condition between the fuel line flexible coupling and the hydraulic system 3 line located in bay 18 of the right wing by replacing fuel tube assemblies in the right-hand wing between rib 17 and rib 20, doing an inspection for adequate clearance between the hydraulic system 3 lines and the fuel vent tube located in bay 20 of the right wing, and applicable on-conditions actions. On-condition actions include rectifying any low clearance condition found (*i.e.*, replace the hydraulic system support brackets in the right-hand wing between rib 19 and rib 21).

This material is reasonably available because the interested parties have access to it through their normal course of business or by the means identified in the **ADDRESSES** section.

Costs of Compliance

The FAA estimates that this AD affects 60 airplanes of U.S. registry. The FAA estimates the following costs to comply with this AD:

ESTIMATED COSTS FOR REQUIRED ACTIONS *

Labor cost	Parts cost	Cost per product	Cost on U.S. operators
9 work-hours × \$85 per hour = \$765	\$1,928	\$2,693	\$161,580

* Includes the replacement of the clip-nut, replacement of the fuel tube assemblies, and inspection for adequate clearance between the hydraulic system 3 lines and the fuel vent tube.

The FAA estimates the following costs to do any necessary on-condition action that would be required based on

the results of any required actions. The FAA has no way of determining the

number of aircraft that might need this on-condition action:

ESTIMATED COSTS OF ON-CONDITION ACTIONS *

Labor cost	Parts cost	Cost per product
14 work-hours × \$85 per hour = \$1,190	\$4,582	\$5,772

* Replacement of the hydraulic system support brackets.

The FAA has included all known costs in its cost estimate. According to

the manufacturer, however, some or all of the costs of this AD may be covered

under warranty, thereby reducing the cost impact on affected operators.

Authority for This Rulemaking

Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA's authority to issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, section 106, describes the authority of the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII: Aviation Programs, describes in more detail the scope of the Agency's authority.

The FAA is issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: General requirements. Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition that is likely to exist or develop on products identified in this rulemaking action.

Regulatory Findings

This AD will not have federalism implications under Executive Order 13132. This AD will not have a substantial direct effect on the States, on the relationship between the national government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government.

For the reasons discussed above, I certify that this AD:

- (1) Is not a "significant regulatory action" under Executive Order 12866,
- (2) Will not affect intrastate aviation in Alaska, and
- (3) Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39

Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by reference, Safety.

The Amendment

Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the Administrator, the FAA amends 14 CFR part 39 as follows:

PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES

- 1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.

§ 39.13 [Amended]

- 2. The FAA amends § 39.13 by adding the following new airworthiness directive:

2026–20–09 Bombardier, Inc.: Amendment 39–23482; Docket No. FAA–2026–2289; Project Identifier MCAI–2025–01592–T.

(a) Effective Date

This airworthiness directive (AD) is effective November 18, 2026.

(b) Affected ADs

None.

(c) Applicability

This AD applies to Bombardier, Inc., Model BD–700–2A12 airplanes, certificated in any category, as identified in Transport Canada AD CF–2025–49, dated October 1, 2025 (Transport Canada AD CF–2025–49).

(d) Subject

Air Transport Association (ATA) of America Code 57, Wings.

(e) Unsafe Condition

This AD was prompted by reports of low clearance in the right wing between the fuel line flexible coupling and the harness support bracket clip-nut located in bay 3, between the fuel line flexible coupling and hydraulic system 3 line located in bay 18, and between the hydraulic system 3 lines and fuel vent tube located in bay 20. The FAA is issuing this AD to address low clearance conditions. The unsafe condition, if not addressed, could result in an ignition source developing in the fuel tank in the event of a lightning strike.

(f) Compliance

Comply with this AD within the compliance times specified, unless already done.

(g) Requirements

Except as specified in paragraphs (h) and (i) of this AD: Comply with all required actions and compliance times specified in, and in accordance with, Transport Canada AD CF–2025–49.

(h) Exception to Transport Canada AD CF–2025–49

(1) Where Transport Canada AD CF–2025–49 refers to its effective date, this AD requires using the effective date of this AD.

(2) Where Transport Canada AD CF–2025–49 refers to hours air time, this AD requires using flight hours.

(i) No Reporting Requirement

Although the material referenced in Transport Canada AD CF–2025–49 specifies to submit certain information to the manufacturer, this AD does not include that requirement.

(j) Additional AD Provisions

The following provisions also apply to this AD:

(1) *Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs):* The Manager, International Validation Branch, FAA, has the authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if requested using the procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19. In accordance with 14 CFR 39.19, send your request to your principal inspector or responsible Flight Standards Office, as appropriate. If sending information directly

to the manager of the International Validation Branch, send it to the attention of the person identified in paragraph (k) of this AD and email to: AMOC@faa.gov. Before using any approved AMOC, notify your appropriate principal inspector, or lacking a principal inspector, the manager of the responsible Flight Standards Office.

(2) *Contacting the Manufacturer:* For any requirement in this AD to obtain instructions from a manufacturer, the instructions must be accomplished using a method approved by the Manager, International Validation Branch, FAA; or Transport Canada; or Bombardier, Inc.'s Transport Canada Design Approval Organization (DAO). If approved by the DAO, the approval must include the DAO-authorized signature.

(k) Additional Information

For more information about this AD, contact Joseph Catanzaro, Aviation Safety Engineer, FAA, 1600 Stewart Avenue, Suite 410, Westbury, NY 11590; phone: 516–228–7300; email: 9-avs-nyaco-cos@faa.gov.

(l) Material Incorporated by Reference

(1) The Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference of the material listed in this paragraph under 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51.

(2) You must use this material as applicable to do the actions required by this AD, unless this AD specifies otherwise.

(i) Transport Canada AD CF–2025–49, dated October 1, 2025.

(ii) [Reserved]

(3) For Transport Canada material identified in this AD, contact Transport Canada, Transport Canada National Aircraft Certification, 159 Cleopatra Drive, Nepean, Ontario K1A 0N5, Canada; telephone 888–663–3639; email TC.AirworthinessDirectives-Consignesdenavigabilite.TC@tc.gc.ca. You may find this material on the Transport Canada website at tc.canada.ca/en/aviation.

(4) You may view this material at the FAA, Airworthiness Products Section, Operational Safety Branch, 2200 South 216th St., Des Moines, WA. For information on the availability of this material at the FAA, call 206–231–3195.

(5) You may view this material at the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA). For information on the availability of this material at NARA, visit www.archives.gov/federal-register/cfr/ibr-locations or email fr.inspection@nara.gov.

Issued on September 25, 2026.

Steven W. Thompson,

Acting Deputy Director, Compliance & Airworthiness Division, Aircraft Certification Service.

[FR Doc. 2026–21010 Filed 10–13–26; 8:45 am]

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