

AS355NP, and EC130B4 helicopters, certificated in any category.

(d) Subject

Joint Aircraft System Component (JASC) Code 2500, Cabin equipment/furnishings.

(e) Unsafe Condition

This AD was prompted by a report of a release of the load on the cargo hook without manual release initiation by the pilot. The FAA is issuing this AD to prevent the unintended loss of the load on the cargo hook. The unsafe condition, if not addressed, could result in in-flight loss of cargo load and cause injury to persons on the ground.

(f) Compliance

Comply with this AD within the compliance times specified, unless already done.

(g) Required Actions

(1) Except as specified in paragraphs (h) and (i) of this AD: Comply with all required actions and compliance times specified in, and in accordance with European Union Aviation Safety Agency AD 2026–0146, dated July 24, 2026 (EASA AD 2026–0146).

(2) For purpose of this AD, a “sling cycle” is defined as one landing with or without stopping the rotor or one external load-carrying operation; an external load-carrying operation occurs each time a helicopter picks up an external load and drops it off.

(h) Exceptions to EASA AD 2026–0146

(1) Where EASA AD 2026–0146 refers to its effective date, this AD requires using the effective date of this AD.

(2) Where paragraph (1) of EASA AD 2026–0146 specifies “a ‘visual check’”, this AD requires replacing that text with “an ‘inspection’”.

(3) Where EASA AD 2026–0146 specifies a “check for free play”, this AD requires replacing that text with “inspection for free play”.

(4) Where paragraph (2) of EASA AD 2026–0146 specifies “mission”, this AD requires replacing that text with “operation”.

(5) Where Note 1 of paragraph (2) of EASA AD 2026–0146 allows the check for free play to be accomplished by a suitably authorized pilot, this AD requires that action be accomplished by persons authorized under 14 CFR 43.3.

(6) This AD does not adopt the “Remarks” section of EASA AD 2026–0146.

(i) No Reporting Requirement

Although the material referenced in EASA AD 2026–0146 specifies to submit certain information to the manufacturer, this AD does not include that requirement.

(j) Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs)

(1) The Manager, International Validation Branch, FAA, has the authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if requested using the procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19. In accordance with 14 CFR 39.19, send your request to your principal inspector or local Flight Standards District Office, as appropriate. If sending information directly to the manager of the International Validation

Branch, send it to the attention of the person identified in paragraph (k) of this AD and email to: AMOC@faa.gov.

(2) Before using any approved AMOC, notify your appropriate principal inspector, or lacking a principal inspector, the manager of the local flight standards district office/certificate holding district office.

(k) Additional Information

For more information about this AD, contact Anthony Kenward, Aviation Safety Engineer, FAA, 1600 Stewart Avenue, Suite 410, Westbury, NY 11590; phone: (817) 222–5152; email: anthony.b.kenward@faa.gov.

(l) Material Incorporated by Reference

(1) The Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference of the material listed in this paragraph under 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51.

(2) You must use this material as applicable to do the actions required by this AD, unless the AD specifies otherwise.

(i) European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) AD 2026–0146, dated July 24, 2026.

(ii) [Reserved]

(3) For EASA material identified in this AD, contact EASA, Konrad-Adenauer-Ufer 3, 50668 Cologne, Germany; phone: +49 221 8999 000; email: ADs@easa.europa.eu; website: easa.europa.eu.

(4) You may view this material at the FAA, Airworthiness Products Section, Operational Safety Branch, 10101 Hillwood Parkway, Fort Worth, TX 76177. For information on the availability of this material at the FAA, call (817) 222–5110.

(5) You may view this material at the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA). For information on the availability of this material at NARA, visit www.archives.gov/federal-register/cfr/ibr-locations or email fr.inspection@nara.gov.

Issued on October 20, 2026.

Steven W. Thompson,

Acting Deputy Director, Compliance & Airworthiness Division, Aircraft Certification Service.

[FR Doc. 2026–21856 Filed 10–26–26; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. FAA–2026–2725; Project Identifier AD–2025–00999–T; Amendment 39–23497; AD 2026–21–08]

RIN 2120–AA64

Airworthiness Directives; The Boeing Company Airplanes

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

ACTION: Final rule.

SUMMARY: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain The Boeing Company Model 737–700,

–700C, –800, and –900ER series airplanes. This AD was prompted by a leak through the form-in-place (FiP) gasket at the engine fuel shutoff valve access panel found during a leak check. This AD requires a detailed inspection of the left- and right-side FiP gasket at the engine fuel shutoff valve access panel for correct sealant installation, a fluid leak test of the engine fuel shutoff valve access panels for any leak, and applicable on-condition actions. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.

DATES: This AD is effective December 1, 2026.

The Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference of a certain publication listed in this AD as of December 1, 2026.

ADDRESSES:

AD Docket: You may examine the AD docket at regulations.gov under Docket No. FAA–2026–2725; or in person at Docket Operations between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. The AD docket contains this final rule, any comments received, and other information. The address for Docket Operations is U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket Operations, M–30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12–140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE, Washington, DC 20590.

Material Incorporated by Reference:

- For Boeing material identified in this AD, contact Boeing Commercial Airplanes, Attention: Contractual & Data Services (C&DS), 2600 Westminister Blvd., MC 110–SK57, Seal Beach, CA 90740–5600; telephone 562–797–1717; website myboeingfleet.com.

- You may view this material at the FAA, Airworthiness Products Section, Operational Safety Branch, 2200 South 216th St., Des Moines, WA. For information on the availability of this material at the FAA, call 206–231–3195. It is also available at regulations.gov under Docket No. FAA–2026–2725.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Erica Bayles, Aviation Safety Engineer, FAA, 2200 South 216th St., Des Moines, WA 98198; phone: 907–271–5844; email: erica.e.bayles@faa.gov.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Background

The FAA issued a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) to amend 14 CFR part 39 by adding an AD that would apply to certain The Boeing Company Model 737–700, –700C, –800, and –900ER series airplanes. The NPRM was published in the **Federal Register** on March 26, 2026 (91 FR 14654). The NPRM was prompted by a leak through

the FiP gasket at the engine fuel shutoff valve access panel found during a leak check, completed as part of a nonconformance disposition for the Boeing Company Model 737–8, 737–9, and 737–8200 airplanes. An investigation found that the fairing requirements of the engine fuel shutoff valve access panel caused thin regions of the FiP gasket, which caused the manufacturer to apply non-permitted sealant after the initial FiP gasket had cured, resulting in an uneven sealing surface on the engine fuel shutoff valve access panel and leak. In the NPRM, the FAA proposed to require a detailed inspection of the left- and right-side FiP gasket at the engine fuel shutoff valve access panel for correct sealant installation, a fluid leak test of the engine fuel shutoff valve access panels for any leak, and applicable on-condition actions. The FAA is issuing this AD to address incorrect or missing sealant installation. The unsafe condition, if not addressed, could result in fuel leaking onto the engine exhaust nozzle and a possible fire on the ground.

Discussion of Final Airworthiness Directive

Comments

The FAA received comments from an anonymous commenter who supported the NPRM without change.

The FAA received additional comments from four commenters, including Aviation Partners Boeing (APB), American Airlines (American), Southwest Airlines (Southwest), and United Airlines (United). The following presents the comments received on the NPRM and the FAA's response to each comment.

Request To Combine Proposed ADs

American requested that the FAA rescind the proposed AD and instead add the affected airplanes and proposed requirements to another proposed AD (Docket No. FAA–2026–2716, Project Identifier AD–2025–00990–T). American noted, although the proposed ADs reference different service information and different airplane models, both proposed ADs would mandate similar requirements. American stated consolidating these actions into a single NPRM would improve clarity and enhance compliance management without changing the technical intent of the inspection or impacting airplane airworthiness.

The FAA disagrees with this request. The FAA acknowledges that some operators may prefer to address the unsafe condition with a single AD;

however, other operators may prefer that the FAA issue two separate ADs. Additionally, when the manufacturer develops two separate service bulletins to address an unsafe condition on different airplane models, proceeding with two separate ADs, in general, allows the FAA to address the unsafe condition on all airplane models in a timely manner. For example, if development of one service bulletin is delayed, the rulemaking process would be delayed for all affected airplane models.

Effect of Winglets on Accomplishment of the Proposed Actions

APB stated that the blended or split scimitar winglets installed per Supplemental Type Certificate (STC) ST00830SE does not affect compliance with the proposed requirements.

The FAA agrees that the installation of STC ST00830SE does not affect the ability to accomplish the actions required by this AD. The FAA has not changed this AD in this regard.

Request To Clarify Applicability Difference

United requested the FAA clarify why the applicability of the proposed AD was expanded beyond the effectivity of Boeing Alert Requirements Bulletin 737–57A1359 RB, dated October 3, 2025 (original issue of the Boeing Alert Requirements Bulletin). United stated this clarification would assist operators in understanding the unsafe condition and ensure consistent implementation across the affected fleet.

The FAA expanded the applicability of the AD based on a report from the manufacturer indicating that certain airplanes were incorrectly excluded from the effectivity of the original issue of the Boeing Alert Requirements Bulletin. The missed airplanes are associated with the service information mandated by AD 2013–08–18, Amendment 39–17435 (78 FR 25377, May 1, 2013). Those airplanes had the FiP gasket incorporated in production, but a fluid leak test was not required as part of AD 2013–08–18 and its associated service information. Since the same non-conformance may have been introduced in production on those airplanes, the FAA concluded those airplanes must be included in the applicability of this AD.

Further, after issuance of the NPRM, Boeing issued Boeing Alert Requirements Bulletin 737–57A1359 RB, Revision 1, dated June 25, 2026 (Revision 1 of the Boeing Alert Requirements Bulletin), to include the additional airplane serial numbers referenced in the applicability of the

proposed AD. Therefore, the FAA has updated paragraph (c) of this AD to reference Revision 1 of the Boeing Alert Requirements Bulletin.

Request To Remove Exceptions to Service Information Instructions

American requested that the FAA remove the exceptions in paragraphs (h)(2), (3), and (4) from the proposed AD and instead adopt the instructions in the compliance tables and appendices of the original issue of the Boeing Alert Requirements Bulletin. American stated that the language in the service information sufficiently defines the corrective action, and that retaining this information helps maintain consistency and minimizes the potential for misinterpretation.

The FAA notes that the exception in paragraph (h)(2) is necessary because the “on-condition corrective action(s)” specified in tables 1 and 2 of the Compliance and Accomplishment Instructions of the original issue of the Boeing Alert Requirements Bulletin are not defined in that bulletin. Similarly, the exceptions in paragraphs (h)(3) and (4) are necessary because Appendices A and B of the original issue of the Boeing Alert Requirements Bulletin do not explicitly specify to replace the FiP gasket if any leak is found during the fluid leak test. However, the FAA reviewed Revision 1 of the Boeing Alert Requirements Bulletin and determined that Revision 1 negates the need for the exceptions in paragraphs (h)(2), (3), and (4) of the proposed AD. Therefore, the FAA has revised paragraph (g) of this AD to require accomplishing all the applicable actions in Revision 1 of the Boeing Alert Requirements Bulletin. Additionally, the FAA has added paragraph (i) to this AD to provide credit for accomplishing the actions in paragraph (g) of this AD before the effective date of this AD using the original issue of the Boeing Alert Requirements Bulletin, except as provided by the exceptions in paragraphs (i)(1) through (3) of this AD.

Request To Clarify Post-AD Requirements

Southwest asked if the FAA agrees that, after completing the actions required by this AD, an alternative method of compliance (AMOC) is not required to maintain the airplane per the Boeing aircraft maintenance manual (AMM). Southwest stated a certain task in the Boeing AMM provides instructions that vary subtly from the procedures in Boeing Alert Requirements Bulletin 737–57A1359 RB.

The FAA agrees that an AMOC is not needed to maintain the airplane after complying with the requirements of this AD if the airplane is maintained per the Boeing AMM. The FAA notes that the unsafe condition was introduced during airplane production through the application of non-permitted sealant after the initial FiP gasket had cured. Since the FAA has not received any reports of in-service events where anomalies were introduced during maintenance based on AMM instructions, the FAA considers the relevant AMM tasks to be appropriate. Further, Boeing has updated the AMM task to include notes to prevent sealant touch-up after the initial sealant application. Boeing has also updated the AMM procedures for the fluid leak test to match the procedures in the required service information. Those updates in the AMM instructions are expected to

support operators for improved maintenance of the FiP gasket installed at the engine fuel shutoff valve access panel.

Conclusion

The FAA reviewed the relevant data, considered any comments received, and determined that air safety requires adopting this AD as proposed. Accordingly, the FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products. Except for minor editorial changes, this AD is adopted as proposed in the NPRM. None of the changes will increase the economic burden on any operator.

Material Incorporated by Reference Under 1 CFR Part 51

The FAA reviewed Boeing Alert Requirements Bulletin 737–57A1359 RB, Revision 1, dated June 25, 2026.

This material specifies procedures for a detailed inspection of the FiP gasket at the engine fuel shutoff valve access panel of the left- and right-side wing for correct sealant installation, a fluid leak test of the engine fuel shutoff valve access panels for any leak, and applicable on-condition actions. On-condition actions include replacing the FiP gasket, repairing any leaks, and repeating the leak test until no leak is found.

This material is reasonably available because the interested parties have access to it through their normal course of business or by the means identified in the ADDRESSES section.

Costs of Compliance

The FAA estimates that this AD affects 1,030 airplanes of U.S. registry. The FAA estimates the following costs to comply with this AD:

ESTIMATED COSTS				
Action	Labor cost	Parts cost	Cost per product	Cost on U.S. operators
Inspection	1 work-hour × \$85 per hour = \$85	\$0	\$85	\$87,550
Leak test	1 work-hour × \$85 per hour = \$85	0	85	87,550

The FAA estimates the following costs to do any necessary replacements that would be required based on the

results of the inspection. The agency has no way of determining the number of

aircraft that might need these replacements:

ON-CONDITION COSTS			
Action	Labor cost	Parts cost	Cost per product
Replacement	2 work-hours × \$85 per hour = \$170	Negligible	\$170.

The FAA has received no definitive data on which to base the cost estimates for the on-condition repairs specified in this AD.

The FAA has included all known costs in its cost estimate. According to the manufacturer, however, some or all of the costs of this AD may be covered under warranty, thereby reducing the cost impact on affected operators.

Authority for This Rulemaking

Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA’s authority to issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, section 106, describes the authority of the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII: Aviation Programs, describes in more detail the scope of the Agency’s authority.

The FAA is issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: General requirements. Under

that section, Congress charges the FAA with promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition that is likely to exist or develop on products identified in this rulemaking action.

Regulatory Findings

This AD will not have federalism implications under Executive Order 13132. This AD will not have a substantial direct effect on the States, on the relationship between the national government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government.

For the reasons discussed above, I certify that this AD:

- (1) Is not a “significant regulatory action” under Executive Order 12866,
- (2) Will not affect intrastate aviation in Alaska, and
- (3) Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39

Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by reference, Safety.

The Amendment

Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the Administrator, the FAA amends 14 CFR part 39 as follows:

**PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS
DIRECTIVES**

■ 1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.

§ 39.13 [Amended]

■ 2. The FAA amends § 39.13 by adding the following new airworthiness directive:

2026–21–08 The Boeing Company:
Amendment 39–23497; Docket No.
FAA–2026–2725; Project Identifier AD–
2025–00999–T.

(a) Effective Date

This airworthiness directive (AD) is effective December 1, 2026.

(b) Affected ADs

None.

(c) Applicability

This AD applies to The Boeing Company Model 737–700, –700C, –800, and –900ER series airplanes, certificated in any category, as identified in Boeing Alert Requirements Bulletin 737–57A1359 RB, Revision 1, dated June 25, 2026.

(d) Subject

Air Transport Association (ATA) of America Code 57, Wings.

(e) Unsafe Condition

This AD was prompted by a leak through the form-in-place (FiP) gasket at the engine fuel shutoff valve access panel found during a leak check. An investigation found that the fairing requirements of the engine fuel shutoff valve access panel caused thin regions of the FiP gasket, which caused non-permitted sealant to be applied after the initial FiP gasket had cured, resulting in an uneven sealing surface on the engine fuel shutoff valve access panel and leak. The FAA is issuing this AD to address incorrect or missing sealant installation. The unsafe condition, if not addressed, could result in fuel leaking onto the engine exhaust nozzle and a possible fire on the ground.

(f) Compliance

Comply with this AD within the compliance times specified, unless already done.

(g) Required Actions

Except as specified by paragraph (h) of this AD: At the applicable times specified in the “Compliance” paragraph of Boeing Alert Requirements Bulletin 737–57A1359 RB, Revision 1, dated June 25, 2026, do all applicable actions identified in, and in accordance with, the Accomplishment Instructions of Boeing Alert Requirements Bulletin 737–57A1359 RB, Revision 1, dated June 25, 2026.

Note 1 to paragraph (g): Guidance for accomplishing the actions required by this AD can be found in Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 737–57A1359, Revision 1, dated June 25, 2026, which is referred to in Boeing Alert Requirements Bulletin 737–57A1359 RB, Revision 1, dated June 25, 2026.

(h) Exceptions to Requirements Bulletin Specifications

Where the Compliance Time columns of the tables in the “Compliance” paragraph of Boeing Alert Requirements Bulletin 737–57A1359 RB, Revision 1, dated June 25, 2026, refer to the original issue date of Requirements Bulletin 737–57A1359 RB, this AD requires using the effective date of this AD.

(i) Credit for Previous Actions

This paragraph provides credit for the actions specified in paragraph (g) of this AD, if those actions were performed before the effective date of this AD using Boeing Alert Requirements Bulletin 737–57A1359 RB, dated October 3, 2025, except as specified by paragraphs (i)(1) through (3) of this AD:

(1) Where Table 1 and Table 2 in the Compliance and Accomplishment Instructions paragraphs of Boeing Alert Requirements Bulletin 737–57A1359 RB, dated October 3, 2025, specifies “Do a fluid leak test of the engine fuel shutoff valve access panel for any leak. If any leak is found, do all applicable on-condition corrective action(s) and repeat the leak test until no leak is found”, this AD requires replacing that text with “Do a fluid leak test of the engine fuel shutoff valve access panel for any leak. If any leak is found, replace the FiP gasket and repeat the leak test until no leak is found”.

(2) Where step 4.b. of Appendix A in Boeing Alert Requirements Bulletin 737–57A1359 RB, dated October 3, 2025, specifies “If any water leaks from the engine fuel shutoff valve access panel in less than two minutes, the fluid leak test has failed”, this AD requires replacing that text with “If any water leaks from the engine fuel shutoff valve access panel in less than two minutes, the fluid leak test has failed. Replace the FiP gasket in accordance with Figure 3 and repeat the leak test until no leak is found”.

(3) Where step 4.b. of Appendix B in Boeing Alert Requirements Bulletin 737–57A1359 RB, dated October 3, 2025, specifies “If any water leaks from the engine fuel shutoff valve access panel in less than two minutes, the fluid leak test has failed”, this AD requires replacing that text with “If any water leaks from the engine fuel shutoff valve access panel in less than two minutes, the fluid leak test has failed. Replace the FiP gasket in accordance with Figure 4 and repeat the leak test until no leak is found”.

(j) Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs)

(1) The Manager, AIR–520, Continued Operational Safety Branch, FAA, has the authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if requested using the procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19. In accordance with 14 CFR 39.19, send your request to your principal inspector or responsible Flight Standards Office, as appropriate. If sending information directly to the manager of the Continued Operational Safety Branch, send it to the attention of the person identified in paragraph (k)(1) of this AD. Information may be emailed to: AMOC@faa.gov. Before using any approved AMOC, notify your appropriate principal inspector, or lacking a principal inspector, the manager of the responsible Flight Standards Office.

(2) An AMOC that provides an acceptable level of safety may be used for any repair, modification, or alteration required by this AD if it is approved by The Boeing Company Organization Designation Authorization (ODA) that has been authorized by the Manager, AIR–520, Continued Operational Safety Branch, FAA, to make those findings. To be approved, the repair method, modification deviation, or alteration deviation must meet the certification basis of the airplane, and the approval must specifically refer to this AD.

(k) Additional Information

(1) For more information about this AD, contact Erica Bayles, Aviation Safety Engineer, FAA, 2200 South 216th St., Des Moines, WA 98198; phone: 907–271–5844; email: erica.e.bayles@faa.gov.

(2) Material identified in this AD that is not incorporated by reference is available at the address specified in paragraph (l)(3) of this AD.

(l) Material Incorporated by Reference

(1) The Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference of the material listed in this paragraph under 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51.

(2) You must use this material as applicable to do the actions required by this AD, unless the AD specifies otherwise.

(i) Boeing Alert Requirements Bulletin 737–57A1359 RB, Revision 1, dated June 25, 2026.

(ii) [Reserved]

(3) For Boeing material identified in this AD, contact Boeing Commercial Airplanes, Attention: Contractual & Data Services (C&DS), 2600 Westminister Blvd., MC 110–SK57, Seal Beach, CA 90740–5600; telephone 562–797–1717; website myboeingfleet.com.

(4) You may view this material at the FAA, Airworthiness Products Section, Operational Safety Branch, 2200 South 216th St., Des Moines, WA. For information on the availability of this material at the FAA, call 206–231–3195.

(5) You may view this material at the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA). For information on the availability of this material at NARA, visit www.archives.gov/federal-register/cfr/ibr-locations or email fr.inspection@nara.gov.

Issued on October 20, 2026.

Lona C. Saccomando,

Acting Deputy Director, Integrated Certificate Management Division, Aircraft Certification Service.

[FR Doc. 2026–21862 Filed 10–26–26; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P