80 FR 57572 - Order Relating to Aiman Ammar, Rashid Albuni, Engineering Construction & Contracting Co., Advanced Tech Solutions, and iT Wave FZCO
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
Bureau of Industry and Security Federal Register Volume 80, Issue 185 (September 24, 2015)
Bureau of Industry and Security
Federal Register Volume 80, Issue 185 (September 24, 2015)
| Page Range | 57572-57576 | |
| FR Document | 2015-24248 |
[Federal Register Volume 80, Number 185 (Thursday, September 24, 2015)] [Notices] [Pages 57572-57576] From the Federal Register Online [www.thefederalregister.org] [FR Doc No: 2015-24248] ----------------------------------------------------------------------- DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE Bureau of Industry and Security Order Relating to Aiman Ammar, Rashid Albuni, Engineering Construction & Contracting Co., Advanced Tech Solutions, and iT Wave FZCO Washington, DC 20230 In the Matter of: Aiman Ammar, a/k/a Ayman Ammar, with last known addresses of: Princess Tower, Apartment 3803, Al Sufouh Street, Dubai Marina, Dubai, UAE and 1265 Camden Way, Yuba City, CA 95991; Rashid Albuni, with last known addresses of: Dubai Silicon Oasis, Office # AG 05-2, Dubai, UAE and The Gardens Building 65, Apartment 12, Dubai, UAE; Engineering Construction & Contracting Co., with last known addresses of: P.O. Box 25858, Damascus, Syria and Abu Romana Area, Shahin Building, Ground Floor, Damascus, Syria; Advanced Tech Solutions, a/k/a Advanced Technology Solutions, with last known addresses of: P.O. Box 25858, Damascus, Syria and Moasa Square, Takriti Building, Fourth Floor, Damascus, Syria; iT Wave FZCO, a/k/a iT-Wave, a/k/a ITEX-Wave FZCO, with last known addresses of: Dubai Silicon Oasis, Office # AG 05-2, Dubai, UAE and The Gardens Building 65, Apartment 12, Dubai, UAE, Respondents 14-BIS-0006 The Bureau of Industry and Security, U.S. Department of Commerce (``BIS''), has notified Aiman Ammar a/k/a Ayman Ammar (``Ammar''), of Dubai, United Arab Emirates (``U.A.E.''), Rashid Albuni (``Albuni''), of Dubai, U.A.E., Engineering Construction & Contracting Co. (``ECC''), of Damascus, Syria, Advanced Technology Solutions a/k/a Advanced Tech Solutions (``ATS''), of Damascus, Syria, and iT [[Page 57573]] Wave FZCO a/k/a iT-Wave a/k/a ITEX-Wave FZCO (``iT-Wave''), of Dubai, U.A.E. (collectively, ``Respondents''), that it has initiated an administrative proceeding against the Respondents pursuant to Section 766.3 of the Export Administration Regulations (the ``Regulations''),\1\ and Section 13(c) of the Export Administration Act of 1979, as amended (the ``Act''),\2\ through the issuance of a Charging Letter to Respondents that alleges that Respondents violated the Regulations. Specifically, the charges are: --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\ The Regulations are currently codified in the Code of Federal Regulations at 15 CFR parts 730 through 774 (2015). The charged violations occurred in 2010-2013. The Regulations governing the violations at issue are found in the 2010-2013 versions of the Code of Federal Regulations (15 CFR parts 730 through 774). The 2015 Regulations set forth the procedures that apply to this matter. \2\ 50 U.S.C. app. sections 2401-2420 (2000). Since August 21, 2001, the Act has been in lapse and the President, through Executive Order 13222 of August 17, 2001 (3 CFR, 2001 Comp. 783 (2002)), which has been extended by successive Presidential Notices, the most recent being that of August 7, 2015 (80 FR 48233 (Aug. 11, 2015)), has continued the Regulations in effect under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701, et seq.) (2006 & Supp. IV 2010). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- As to all Respondents: Charge 1 15 CFR 764.2(d)--Conspiracy To Export or Reexport to Syria Computer Equipment and Software Designed for Use in Monitoring and Controlling Web Traffic 1. Ammar, Albuni, ECC, ATS, and iT-Wave conspired and acted in concert with others, known and unknown, to bring about or do an act that constitutes a violation of the Regulations. The conspiracy was formed by and among Ammar, Albuni, ECC, and ATS in or about October 2010. iT-Wave joined the conspiracy by no later than in or about January 2013, and the conspiracy continued through at least in or about March 2013. The purpose of the conspiracy was to bring about exports and reexports without the required U.S. Government authorization to Syria, including the Syrian Telecommunications Establishment (``STE''), of computer equipment and software designed for use in monitoring and controlling Web traffic and of other associated equipment. All of these items were subject to the Regulations, and nearly all of them were classified under Export Control Classification Number (``ECCN'') 5A002 and controlled for National Security and Anti-Terrorism reasons and as Encryption Items.\3\ The items exported or reexported to Syria pursuant to the conspiracy were valued in total at approximately $1.8 million. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \3\ A limited number of the items were designated as ``EAR99'' under the Regulations. EAR99 is a designation for items that are subject to the Regulations, but not listed on the Commerce Control List. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2. The United States has a long-standing and widely-known trade embargo against Syria. With the exception of certain medicines and food, no item subject to the Regulations may be exported or reexported to Syria without a Department of Commerce license, as set forth at all times pertinent hereto in General Order No. 2, codified in Supplement No. 1 to part 736 of the Regulations.\4\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \4\ General Order No. 2 was issued pursuant to the Syria Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act of 2003. On December 12, 2011, the controls on exports and reexports to Syria were moved to Section 746.9 of the Regulations. The licensing requirements continued unchanged. See 76 FR 77115 (Dec. 12, 2011). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 3. In furtherance of the conspiracy, Ammar and Albuni directed activities in and/or from the U.A.E. and Syria in a scheme to export or reexport U.S.-origin or U.S.-controlled equipment and software for use in Syria and in several instances to fulfill contracts with the state- run STE. As set forth in further detail below, Albuni negotiated sales, submitted purchase orders, and served as the end user contact for shipments of controlled items while identifying himself as General Manager of ATS, a Syrian company that has been in operations in the U.A.E., and as Manager of iT-Wave, which identifies itself as an internet computer technology company based in the U.A.E. with operations in Syria. Ammar directed payments for the unlawful exports and reexports to Syria from personal and business bank accounts, including payments from the accounts of ECC, a company based in Damascus, Syria. ECC and ATS share the same P.O. Box address in Damascus, Syria, and upon information and belief are related companies. Ammar also identified himself as the Chief Executive Officer of iT- Wave. 4. Both directly and through regional resellers, Ammar, Albuni, ECC, ATS, and iT-Wave arranged for the procurement of U.S.-origin or U.S.-controlled items for use in Syria. Through various entities, these individuals falsely represented, directly and indirectly, to U.S. companies or their authorized distributors or resellers that the items were intended for end users in such locations as Iraq, Afghanistan, Turkey, Egypt and U.A.E, when they actually were intended for Syria, primarily STE. A. Equipment and Software Unlawfully Procured by Respondents in 2010- 2011 for Use in Monitoring and Controlling Web Traffic, including by the Syrian Telecommunications Establishment (``STE'') 5. In or about August 2010, Albuni, holding himself out as General Manager of ATS of Damascus, Syria, requested pricing information from a regional reseller for products produced by Blue Coat Systems, Inc., of Sunnyvale, California (``Blue Coat''). The regional reseller provided the order to Computerlinks FZCO, the authorized distributor in the Middle East for Blue Coat. On or about October 29, 2010, Computerlinks FZCO placed with Blue Coat an order for eight devices used to monitor and control web traffic along with accompanying equipment and software. In order to evade the Regulations, Albuni concealed the fact that the items were destined for Syria, by falsely representing to Blue Coat, through Computerlinks FZCO and the regional reseller, that the items were intended for the Iraq Ministry of Telecom, and provided his personal email address as the end user contact, which also did not indicate a Syrian location. Upon receiving the order, Blue Coat reexported the items from its facility in the Netherlands to Computerlinks FZCO in the U.A.E. On or about December 15, 2010, Computerlinks FZCO directed the items' transfer within the U.A.E. for their subsequent shipment to ECC in Damascus, Syria, for use by the state-run STE. A shipping request notice identified Ammar as the point of contact at ECC for the shipment. 6. On or about December 31, 2010, using the same reseller and distributor channel as for the October 29, 2010 order, a second order was placed for six of the same Blue Coat devices, again with false information being provided indicating that the items were intended for the Iraq Ministry of Telecom and listing the end user contact as Albuni, when the items were in fact destined for Syria. Upon receiving the order, Blue Coat shipped the items from the United States to Computerlinks FZCO in the U.A.E. On or about February 9, 2011, Computerlinks FZCO directed that three of the six devices be transferred within the U.A.E. for their subsequent shipment to ECC in Damascus, Syria. In an air waybill dated February 10, 2011, the freight forwarder identified Ammar as the point of contact for ECC in Damascus, Syria. 7. To satisfy outstanding bills to Computerlinks FZCO for the items for which they falsely stated were for use in [[Page 57574]] Iraq, Albuni and Ammar arranged or directed four wire transfers to Computerlinks FZCO between February 2, 2011, and May 17, 2011, from both Ammar and ECC. Prompted by an email dated April 6, 2011, from an intermediary connected with these shipments, Albuni was asked to arrange a letter for Ammar to transfer the remaining balance owed to Computerlinks FZCO. Ammar had previously made a wire transfer as an initial deposit payment to Computerlinks FZCO on February 2, 2011. He directed a second payment from ECC on April 13, 2011, and made two additional wire transfer payments from an account in his name in Damascus, Syria, on May 12 and 17, 2011. 8. On or about May 15, 2011, using a similar reseller and distribution channel, an order was placed for five more devices, along with accompanying equipment and software, from Blue Coat, this time falsely stating that the items were intended for Liwalnet, an Internet service provider in Afghanistan, when in fact the items were again destined for Syria. After the items arrived in the U.A.E. from the Netherlands, on or about May 26, 2011, Computerlinks FZCO directed its freight forwarder to consolidate the remaining three of the six devices and software from the December 31, 2010 order, along with the five devices and software from the May 15, 2011 order, and transfer the ownership of all eight devices and the accompanying equipment within the U.A.E. After the transfer of ownership, Albuni, identifying himself as General Manager of ATS, directed the subsequent shipment of the items to Syria. 9. Finally, on or about June 5, 2011, an order was placed for three additional Blue Coat devices, along with accompanying equipment and software, this time falsely stating that the items were destined purportedly for Turkey for a company named Turkish Marine Services, when the items were in fact destined for Syria. After the items arrived in the U.A.E. from the Netherlands, on or about June 27, 2011, Computerlinks FZCO directed its freight forwarders to transfer ownership of the items within the U.A.E. Albuni in his capacity as General Manager of ATS directed the freight forwarder to ship to him at ATS, which has the same address as ECC in Syria. 10. ECC paid for the May and June orders by two wire transfers dated, respectively, July 12 and 14, 2011. B. Additional Equipment Unlawfully Procured by Respondents in 2011 for Use by STE 11. On or about March 24, 2011, Albuni, through his ATS email account, notified a different regional reseller that ATS had received an STE contract and needed assistance in placing orders for the Brocade ServerIron ADX 1000 and related items. These items distribute network or application traffic (load balance) across a number of servers to increase capacity and reliability of applications for networks and large enterprise data centers. On March 27, 2011, an employee of this regional reseller responded that he was negotiating about the order with Mindware, Brocade's authorized reseller in the Middle East, and that he had requested that the reseller ask Brocade to start the manufacturing process so that the items could be delivered in six weeks. After receiving the regional reseller's invoice, Albuni secured payment for the items from Ammar, who, on or about May 10, 2011, directed payment to the regional reseller for the order from ECC's bank account. 12. When Brocade, the U.S. manufacturer, requested end user information in conjunction with its approval of the order on or about April 11, 2011, false information was provided indicating that the end user was a company in Egypt, when in fact the items were destined for STE in Syria. When the order arrived in the U.A.E. in early May 2011, a co-conspirator traveled from Damascus to Dubai to inspect the shipment and found the shipment to be acceptable. Emails received by Albuni indicate that the shipment was eventually delivered to Syria on or about May 17, 2011. C. Hard Drives Unlawfully Procured by Respondents in 2013 for Use by STE 13. Subsequently, in emails and other correspondence among STE and Albuni at ATS and iT-Wave, STE identified hard drive issues relating to three products, some of which were items exported or reexported in 2010-2011 as part of the conspiracy. On or about January 29, 2013, Albuni, identifying himself as a representative of iT-Wave, placed orders with a U.S. company for three hard drives, falsely stating that the items were intended for iT-Wave in Dubai, U.A.E., when in fact the items were destined for STE in Syria. On or about January 30, 2013, the hard drives were shipped from the United States to the U.A.E. to a ship to and bill to address for iT-Wave in Dubai, U.A.E., and transshipped to Syria after their arrival in Dubai. Emails indicate that the hard drives arrived in Damascus, Syria, in early March 2013. 14. Following the failure of additional hard drives, STE sought to acquire more hard drives through Albuni. On or about March 6, 2013, Albuni, holding himself out as a representative of iT-Wave, placed another order with the same U.S. company for the same type of hard drives, again falsely stating that the items were intended for iT-Wave in Dubai, U.A.E., when in fact the items were destined for STE in Syria. On or about the same day, the hard drives were shipped from the United States to iT-Wave in Dubai and transshipped to Syria after their arrival in the U.A.E. Financial records maintained by Ammar, who served both as CEO of iT-Wave and Managing Director of ECC, indicate that ECC paid for the transport of the hard drives from Dubai to Damascus, Syria, for use by STE. D. Knowledge 15. As set forth above, Respondents knew at all pertinent times hereto that the items were destined for end users in Syria, as evidenced by, inter alia, email discussions among and between Respondents, the resellers and the forwarders that indicated the final destination was Syria, shipping documents showing Syria as the ultimate destination, and wire transfer payment made from Syria for the items. 16. Respondents also knew at all times pertinent hereto that exports and reexports of the items to Syria were prohibited by the United States' trade embargo against Syria and related export control laws. For example, in an interview with BIS and the Department of Homeland Security special agents on or about August 6, 2013, Ammar admitted that he was ``one hundred percent'' aware of U.S. sanctions on Syria and stated that ``[b]efore the sanctions started, I worked for this American company . . . and when the sanctions started, they told me to Syria we cannot ship.'' During this interview, he had a business card that identified him as the managing director of ECC. Based on emails, Albuni, in turn, was aware of U.S. sanctions on Syria, which prevented U.S. companies from having registered partners in Syria, as early as in or about October 2009. Moreover, in correspondence dated November 29, 2010, Albuni indicated that he knew that there were problems shipping to Syria and suggested placing STE orders through a regional reseller, falsely stating that the items were for an Iraq project. 17. As also set forth above, Ammar and Albuni managed and/or controlled ECC, ATS, and iT-Wave, through which [[Page 57575]] they and their other co-conspirators, named and unnamed, acted in concert pursuant to a scheme involving a series of transactions to evade the Regulations. 18. In so doing, Ammar, Albuni, ECC, ATS, and iT-Wave each violated Section 764.2(d) of the Regulations. As to all Respondents except iT-Wave: Charges 2-5: 15 CFR 764.2(h)--Evasion 19. As set forth in Paragraphs 1-10 and 15-17, supra, which are realleged and incorporated herein, on four occasions from on or about October 29, 2010, through in or about July 2011, Albuni, Ammar, ECC, and ATS engaged in transactions or took actions with intent to evade the Regulations in connection with the unlawful export and reexport to Syria of items subject to the Regulations. The items included equipment and software designed for use in monitoring and controlling Web traffic that are classified under ECCN 5A002, controlled for National Security and Anti-Terrorism reasons and as Encryption Items, and valued at $1,548,959. Respondents knew at all pertinent times hereto that exports and reexports of the items to Syria were prohibited by the Regulations. 20. In so doing, Ammar, Albuni, ECC, and ATS committed four violations of Section 764.2(h) of the Regulations and are jointly and severally liable for those violations. Charge 6: 15 CFR 764.2(h)--Evasion 21. As set forth in Paragraphs 1-4, 11-12, and 15-17, supra, which are realleged and incorporated herein, on one occasion between in or about March 2011, and in or about April 2011, Ammar, Albuni, ECC, and ATS engaged in a transaction or took actions with the intent to evade the Regulations in connection with the unlawful export or reexport to Syria of items subject to the Regulations for use by STE. The items included data servers and associated parts that are classified under ECCN 5A002, controlled as Encryption Items for National Security and Anti-Terrorism reasons, or designated EAR99, and valued at approximately $249,000. Ammar, Albuni, ECC, and ATS knew at all times pertinent hereto that exports or reexports of the items to Syria were prohibited by the Regulations. 22. In so doing, Ammar, Albuni, ECC, and ATS committed one violation of Section 764.2(h) of the Regulations and are jointly and severally liable for that violation. As to all Respondents except ATS: Charges 7-8: 15 CFR 764.2(h)--Evasion 23. As set forth in Paragraphs 1-4 and 13-17, supra, which are realleged and incorporated herein, between in or about January 2013, and in or about March 2013, Ammar, Albuni, ECC, and iT-Wave engaged in transactions or took actions with the intent to evade the Regulations in connection with the unlawful export or reexport to Syria of items subject to the Regulations for use by STE. The items were U.S.-origin hard drives designated as EAR99 and valued in total at approximately $884. Ammar, Albuni, ECC, and iT-Wave knew at all times pertinent hereto that exports or reexports of the items to Syria were prohibited by the Regulations. 24. In so doing, Ammar, Albuni, ECC, and iT-Wave committed two violations of Section 764.2(h) of the Regulations and are jointly and severally liable for those violations. WHEREAS, BIS and Respondents have entered into a Settlement Agreement pursuant to Section 766.18(b) of the Regulations, whereby they agreed to settle this matter in accordance with the terms and conditions set forth therein; and WHEREAS, I have approved of the terms of such Settlement Agreement; IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED: FIRST, Respondents shall be assessed a civil penalty in the amount of $7,000,000. Respondents are jointly and severally liable for the payment of this civil penalty. Payment of $250,000 shall be made to the U.S. Department of Commerce in four installments as follows: $62,500 not later than March 1, 2016; $62,500 not later than September 1, 2016; $62,500 not later than March 1, 2017; and $62,500 not later than September 1, 2017. Payment shall be made in the manner specified in the attached instructions. Payment of the remaining $6,750,000 shall be suspended for a period of two years from the date of this Order, and thereafter shall be waived, provided that during this two-year payment probationary period under this Order, Respondent has committed no violation of the Act, or any regulation, order, license or authorization issued thereunder and has made full and timely payment of $250,000 as set forth above. If any of the four installment payments is not fully and timely made, any remaining scheduled installment payments and any suspended penalty may become due and owing immediately. SECOND, pursuant to the Debt Collection Act of 1982, as amended (31 U.S.C. 3701-3720E (2000)), the civil penalty owed under this Order accrues interest as more fully described in the attached Notice, and if payment is not made by the due date specified herein, Respondents will be assessed, in addition to the full amount of the civil penalty and interest, a penalty charge and an administrative charge, as more fully described in the attached Notice. THIRD, for the applicable time periods, starting from the date of this Order, that are set forth in Paragraph Sixth below, Aiman Ammar a/ k/a Ayman Ammar, with last known addresses of Princess Tower, Apartment 3803, Al Sufouh Street, Dubai Marina, Dubai, U.A.E., and 1265 Camden Way, Yuba City, CA 95991; Rashid Albuni, with last known addresses of The Gardens Building 65, Apartment 12, Dubai, U.A.E., and Dubai Silicon Oasis, Office #AG 05-2, Dubai, U.A.E.; Engineering Construction & Contracting Co., with last known addresses of P.O. Box 25858, Damascus, Syria, and Abu Romana Area, Shahin Building, Ground Floor, Damascus, Syria; Advanced Tech Solutions a/k/a Advanced Technology Solutions, with last known addresses of P.O. Box 25858, Damascus, Syria, and Moasa Square, Takriti Building, Fourth Floor, Damascus, Syria; and iT Wave FZCO a/k/a iT-Wave a/k/a ITEX-Wave FZCO, with last known addresses of Dubai Silicon Oasis, Office #AG 05-2, Dubai, U.A.E., and The Gardens Building 65, Apartment 12, Dubai, U.A.E., and when acting for or on their behalf, their successors, assigns, directors, officers, employees, representatives, or agents (hereinafter each a ``Denied Person'' and collectively the ``Denied Persons''), may not, directly or indirectly, participate in any way in any transaction involving any commodity, software or technology (hereinafter collectively referred to as ``item'') exported or to be exported from the United States that is subject to the Regulations, or in any other activity subject to the Regulations, including, but not limited to: A. Applying for, obtaining, or using any license, license exception, or export control document; B. Carrying on negotiations concerning, or ordering, buying, receiving, using, selling, delivering, storing, disposing of, forwarding, transporting, financing, or otherwise servicing in any way, any transaction involving any item exported or to be exported from the United States that is subject to the Regulations, or in any other activity subject to the Regulations; or C. Benefitting in any way from any transaction involving any item exported or to be exported from the United States that is subject to the Regulations, or in [[Page 57576]] any other activity subject to the Regulations. FOURTH, for the applicable time periods, starting from the date of this Order, that are set forth in Paragraph Sixth below, no person may, directly or indirectly, do any of the following: A. Export or reexport to or on behalf of a Denied Person any item subject to the Regulations; B. Take any action that facilitates the acquisition or attempted acquisition by a Denied Person of the ownership, possession, or control of any item subject to the Regulations that has been or will be exported from the United States, including financing or other support activities related to a transaction whereby a Denied Person acquires or attempts to acquire such ownership, possession or control; C. Take any action to acquire from or to facilitate the acquisition or attempted acquisition from a Denied Person of any item subject to the Regulations that has been exported from the United States; D. Obtain from a Denied Person in the United States any item subject to the Regulations with knowledge or reason to know that the item will be, or is intended to be, exported from the United States; or E. Engage in any transaction to service any item subject to the Regulations that has been or will be exported from the United States and which is owned, possessed or controlled by a Denied Person, or service any item, of whatever origin, that is owned, possessed or controlled by a Denied Person if such service involves the use of any item subject to the Regulations that has been or will be exported from the United States. For purposes of this paragraph, servicing means installation, maintenance, repair, modification or testing. FIFTH, after notice and opportunity for comment as provided in section 766.23 of the Regulations, any person, firm, corporation, or business organization related to a Denied Person by affiliation, ownership, control, or position of responsibility in the conduct of trade or related services may also be made subject to the provisions of this Order for the applicable time periods, starting from the date of this Order, that are set forth in Paragraph Sixth, below. SIXTH, that the provisions of Paragraphs Third, Fourth, and Fifth, above, shall apply for the following periods of time: A. As to Engineering Construction & Contracting Co., and when acting for or on its behalf, its successors, assigns, directors, officers, employees, representatives, or agents, for a period of seven (7) years from the date of this Order; B. As to Advanced Tech Solutions a/k/a Advanced Technology Solutions, and when acting for or on its behalf, its successors, assigns, directors, officers, employees, representatives, or agents, for a period of seven (7) years from the date of this Order; C. As to Rashid Albuni, and when acting for or on his behalf, his successors, assigns, representatives, agents, or employees, for a period of six (6) years from the date of this Order; D. As to Aiman Ammar a/k/a Ayman Ammar, and when acting for or on his behalf, his successors, assigns, representatives, agents, or employees, for a period of five (5) years from the date of this Order; and E. As to iT Wave FZCO a/k/a iT-Wave a/k/a ITEX-Wave FZCO, and when acting for or on its behalf, its successors, assigns, directors, officers, employees, representatives, or agents, for a period of four (4) years from the date of this Order. SEVENTH, Respondents shall not take any action or make or permit to be made any public statement, directly or indirectly, denying the allegations in the Charging Letter or this Order. The foregoing does not affect Respondents' testimonial obligations in any proceeding, nor does it affect its right to take legal or factual positions in civil litigation or other civil proceedings in which the U.S. Department of Commerce is not a party. EIGHTH, that the Charging Letter, the Settlement Agreement, and this Order shall be made available to the public. NINTH, that this Order shall be served on Respondents, and shall be published in the Federal Register. This Order, which constitutes the final agency action in this matter, is effective immediately.\5\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \5\ Review and consideration of this matter have been delegated to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Export Enforcement. Issued this 18th day of September, 2015. Richard R. Majauskas, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Export Enforcement. [FR Doc. 2015-24248 Filed 9-23-15; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE P
![57572 Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 185 / Thursday, September 24, 2015 / Notices
2015. Last-minute changes to the required to present a government photo Commerce. The CDAC provides advice
schedule are possible, which could identification, such as a passport, and recommendations, to include
prevent giving advance public notice of driver’s license, or government process and infrastructure
schedule adjustments. identification. U.S. citizens must improvements, to the Secretary, DOC
DATES: October 29–30, 2015. On October present a U.S. photo ID, such as a and the DOC data-bureau leadership on
29th, the meeting will begin at current state driver’s license. Foreign ways to make Commerce data easier to
approximately 9 a.m. and end at Nationals must present a valid passport find, access, use, combine and
approximately 5 p.m. (MT). On October or a permanent resident ID (‘‘green disseminate. The aim of this advice
30th, the meeting will begin at card’’). All IDs must be originals only— shall be to maximize the value of
approximately 9 a.m. and end at no photocopies accepted. Foreign Commerce data to all users including
approximately 1 p.m. (MT). nationals participating in the public governments, businesses, communities,
meeting are subject to advance security academia, and individuals.
ADDRESSES: The meeting will be held at
screening procedures. The Committee is established in
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Forms of ID: Department of Homeland accordance with the Federal Advisory
Administration’s David Skaggs Research Security has determined that regular Committee Act (Title 5, United States
Center, 325 Broadway, Boulder, CO driver’s licenses (and ID cards) from the Code, Appendix 2, Section 10(a)(b)).
80305. following jurisdictions are not
The meeting is open to the public (See Dated: September 19, 2015.
acceptable for entry into the facilities:
‘‘ENTRY REQUIRMENTS’’). Members of Austin Durrer,
American Samoa, Arizona, Louisiana,
the public are welcome to observe the Chief of Staff for Under Secretary for
Maine, Minnesota, and New York. Economic Affairs, Economics and Statistics
business of the meeting in person or via
Driver’s licenses from these states or Administration.
webcast on the CDAC Web site linked
territory will not be accepted for
to http://www.esa.gov. A public [FR Doc. 2015–24334 Filed 9–23–15; 8:45 am]
building entry.
comment session is scheduled on Alternatively, forms of acceptable ID BILLING CODE P
Friday, October 30, 2015. The public are:
may submit statements or questions in
person or via the CDAC Twitter handle: —Enhanced IDs from New York; DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
—U.S. Passport or Passport card;
#CDACMTG. If you plan to make oral —DOD CAC card;
statements regarding any of the items on Bureau of Industry and Security
—Federal Agency HSPD–12 IDs;
the agenda, you must may sign-up on —Veterans ID; Order Relating to Aiman Ammar,
site prior to the Public Comment —Military ID; Rashid Albuni, Engineering
session. However, individuals with —Military Dependents ID;
Construction & Contracting Co.,
extensive questions or statements must —Trusted Traveler card—Global Entry,
SENTRI, or NEXUS; and Advanced Tech Solutions, and iT Wave
submit them in writing to: FZCO
—Transportation Workers Identification
DataAdvisoryCouncil@doc.gov (subject
Credential (TWIC).
line ‘‘OCTOBER 2015 CDAC Meeting Washington, DC 20230
Public Comment’’), or by letter to the Please visit the ‘‘Security Procedure In the Matter of: Aiman Ammar, a/k/a
Director of External Communication and for Visitors’’ on the Boulder Labs Web Ayman Ammar, with last known addresses
DFO, CDAC, Department of Commerce, site http://www.boulder.noaa.gov/ of: Princess Tower, Apartment 3803, Al
Economics and Statistics ?q=node/3 for the complete list of entry Sufouh Street, Dubai Marina, Dubai, UAE
Administration, 1401 Constitution Ave. requirements for the David Skaggs and 1265 Camden Way, Yuba City, CA
Research Center. 95991; Rashid Albuni, with last known
NW., Washington, DC 20230. Such addresses of: Dubai Silicon Oasis, Office #
submissions will be included in the The meeting is physically accessible
AG 05–2, Dubai, UAE and The Gardens
record for the meeting if received by to persons with disabilities. Requests for Building 65, Apartment 12, Dubai, UAE;
Tuesday, October 20, 2015. sign language interpretation or other Engineering Construction & Contracting Co.,
Entry Requirements: If you plan to auxiliary aids should be directed to the with last known addresses of: P.O. Box
attend the meeting in person, you must Director of External Communication as 25858, Damascus, Syria and Abu Romana
complete registration no later than soon as possible, preferably two weeks Area, Shahin Building, Ground Floor,
prior to the meeting. Damascus, Syria; Advanced Tech Solutions,
Tuesday, October 20, 2015. To register, a/k/a Advanced Technology Solutions, with
please send an email to Seating is available to the public on
a first-come, first-served basis. last known addresses of: P.O. Box 25858,
DataAdvisoryCouncil@doc.gov with the Damascus, Syria and Moasa Square, Takriti
following information: FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Building, Fourth Floor, Damascus, Syria; iT
1. First and Last name; Burton Reist, BReist@doc.gov Director of Wave FZCO, a/k/a iT-Wave, a/k/a ITEX-
2. Organization (if applicable); External Communication and DFO, Wave FZCO, with last known addresses of:
3. Email address; CDAC, Department of Commerce, Dubai Silicon Oasis, Office # AG 05–2, Dubai,
4. State of ID (if applicable), Economics and Statistics UAE and The Gardens Building 65,
Administration, 1401 Constitution Ave. Apartment 12, Dubai, UAE, Respondents
5. Indicate if you are a U.S. Citizen or
a Foreign National; and NW., Washington, DC 20230, telephone 14–BIS–0006
6. If you are a not a citizen, please (202) 482–3331. The Bureau of Industry and Security,
indicate your country of citizenship. SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The CDAC U.S. Department of Commerce (‘‘BIS’’),
On-Site Security Requirements: Due to is comprised of 19 members, the has notified Aiman Ammar a/k/a
the required security screening upon Commerce Chief Data Officer, and the Ayman Ammar (‘‘Ammar’’), of Dubai,
tkelley on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with NOTICES
entry, individuals attending should Economic and Statistics Administration. United Arab Emirates (‘‘U.A.E.’’),
arrive early to allow for the extra time The Council provides an organized and Rashid Albuni (‘‘Albuni’’), of Dubai,
to clear the security process. Each continuing channel of communication U.A.E., Engineering Construction &
visitor to the David Skaggs Research between recognized experts in the data Contracting Co. (‘‘ECC’’), of Damascus,
Center is required to sign in and receive industry (collection, compilation, Syria, Advanced Technology Solutions
a visitor badge from the Visitors Center. analysis, dissemination and privacy a/k/a Advanced Tech Solutions
Each person attending the meeting is protection) and the Department of (‘‘ATS’’), of Damascus, Syria, and iT
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![57574 Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 185 / Thursday, September 24, 2015 / Notices
Iraq, Albuni and Ammar arranged or B. Additional Equipment Unlawfully hard drives arrived in Damascus, Syria,
directed four wire transfers to Procured by Respondents in 2011 for in early March 2013.
Computerlinks FZCO between February Use by STE 14. Following the failure of additional
2, 2011, and May 17, 2011, from both hard drives, STE sought to acquire more
11. On or about March 24, 2011,
Ammar and ECC. Prompted by an email hard drives through Albuni. On or about
Albuni, through his ATS email account,
dated April 6, 2011, from an March 6, 2013, Albuni, holding himself
notified a different regional reseller that
intermediary connected with these out as a representative of iT-Wave,
ATS had received an STE contract and
shipments, Albuni was asked to arrange placed another order with the same U.S.
needed assistance in placing orders for
a letter for Ammar to transfer the company for the same type of hard
the Brocade ServerIron ADX 1000 and
remaining balance owed to drives, again falsely stating that the
related items. These items distribute
Computerlinks FZCO. Ammar had items were intended for iT-Wave in
network or application traffic (load
previously made a wire transfer as an Dubai, U.A.E., when in fact the items
balance) across a number of servers to were destined for STE in Syria. On or
initial deposit payment to increase capacity and reliability of about the same day, the hard drives
Computerlinks FZCO on February 2, applications for networks and large were shipped from the United States to
2011. He directed a second payment enterprise data centers. On March 27, iT-Wave in Dubai and transshipped to
from ECC on April 13, 2011, and made 2011, an employee of this regional Syria after their arrival in the U.A.E.
two additional wire transfer payments reseller responded that he was Financial records maintained by
from an account in his name in negotiating about the order with Ammar, who served both as CEO of iT-
Damascus, Syria, on May 12 and 17, Mindware, Brocade’s authorized reseller Wave and Managing Director of ECC,
2011. in the Middle East, and that he had indicate that ECC paid for the transport
8. On or about May 15, 2011, using a requested that the reseller ask Brocade of the hard drives from Dubai to
similar reseller and distribution to start the manufacturing process so Damascus, Syria, for use by STE.
channel, an order was placed for five that the items could be delivered in six
weeks. After receiving the regional D. Knowledge
more devices, along with accompanying
equipment and software, from Blue reseller’s invoice, Albuni secured 15. As set forth above, Respondents
payment for the items from Ammar, knew at all pertinent times hereto that
Coat, this time falsely stating that the
who, on or about May 10, 2011, directed the items were destined for end users in
items were intended for Liwalnet, an
payment to the regional reseller for the Syria, as evidenced by, inter alia, email
Internet service provider in Afghanistan,
order from ECC’s bank account. discussions among and between
when in fact the items were again
12. When Brocade, the U.S. Respondents, the resellers and the
destined for Syria. After the items manufacturer, requested end user forwarders that indicated the final
arrived in the U.A.E. from the information in conjunction with its destination was Syria, shipping
Netherlands, on or about May 26, 2011, approval of the order on or about April documents showing Syria as the
Computerlinks FZCO directed its freight 11, 2011, false information was ultimate destination, and wire transfer
forwarder to consolidate the remaining provided indicating that the end user payment made from Syria for the items.
three of the six devices and software was a company in Egypt, when in fact 16. Respondents also knew at all
from the December 31, 2010 order, along the items were destined for STE in times pertinent hereto that exports and
with the five devices and software from Syria. When the order arrived in the reexports of the items to Syria were
the May 15, 2011 order, and transfer the U.A.E. in early May 2011, a co- prohibited by the United States’ trade
ownership of all eight devices and the conspirator traveled from Damascus to embargo against Syria and related
accompanying equipment within the Dubai to inspect the shipment and export control laws. For example, in an
U.A.E. After the transfer of ownership, found the shipment to be acceptable. interview with BIS and the Department
Albuni, identifying himself as General Emails received by Albuni indicate that of Homeland Security special agents on
Manager of ATS, directed the the shipment was eventually delivered or about August 6, 2013, Ammar
subsequent shipment of the items to to Syria on or about May 17, 2011. admitted that he was ‘‘one hundred
Syria. percent’’ aware of U.S. sanctions on
C. Hard Drives Unlawfully Procured by Syria and stated that ‘‘[b]efore the
9. Finally, on or about June 5, 2011, Respondents in 2013 for Use by STE
an order was placed for three additional sanctions started, I worked for this
Blue Coat devices, along with 13. Subsequently, in emails and other American company . . . and when the
accompanying equipment and software, correspondence among STE and Albuni sanctions started, they told me to Syria
this time falsely stating that the items at ATS and iT-Wave, STE identified we cannot ship.’’ During this interview,
were destined purportedly for Turkey hard drive issues relating to three he had a business card that identified
for a company named Turkish Marine products, some of which were items him as the managing director of ECC.
Services, when the items were in fact exported or reexported in 2010–2011 as Based on emails, Albuni, in turn, was
part of the conspiracy. On or about aware of U.S. sanctions on Syria, which
destined for Syria. After the items
January 29, 2013, Albuni, identifying prevented U.S. companies from having
arrived in the U.A.E. from the
himself as a representative of iT-Wave, registered partners in Syria, as early as
Netherlands, on or about June 27, 2011,
placed orders with a U.S. company for in or about October 2009. Moreover, in
Computerlinks FZCO directed its freight
three hard drives, falsely stating that the correspondence dated November 29,
forwarders to transfer ownership of the
items were intended for iT-Wave in 2010, Albuni indicated that he knew
items within the U.A.E. Albuni in his Dubai, U.A.E., when in fact the items that there were problems shipping to
capacity as General Manager of ATS
tkelley on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with NOTICES
were destined for STE in Syria. On or Syria and suggested placing STE orders
directed the freight forwarder to ship to about January 30, 2013, the hard drives through a regional reseller, falsely
him at ATS, which has the same address were shipped from the United States to stating that the items were for an Iraq
as ECC in Syria. the U.A.E. to a ship to and bill to project.
10. ECC paid for the May and June address for iT-Wave in Dubai, U.A.E., 17. As also set forth above, Ammar
orders by two wire transfers dated, and transshipped to Syria after their and Albuni managed and/or controlled
respectively, July 12 and 14, 2011. arrival in Dubai. Emails indicate that the ECC, ATS, and iT-Wave, through which
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![57576 Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 185 / Thursday, September 24, 2015 / Notices
any other activity subject to the seven (7) years from the date of this DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
Regulations. Order;
FOURTH, for the applicable time International Trade Administration
B. As to Advanced Tech Solutions
periods, starting from the date of this a/k/a Advanced Technology Solutions,
Order, that are set forth in Paragraph and when acting for or on its behalf, its [A–570–970]
Sixth below, no person may, directly or successors, assigns, directors, officers,
indirectly, do any of the following: Multilayered Wood Flooring From the
employees, representatives, or agents, People’s Republic of China:
A. Export or reexport to or on behalf
for a period of seven (7) years from the Preliminary Results of the Changed
of a Denied Person any item subject to
date of this Order; Circumstances Review of Sino-Maple
the Regulations;
B. Take any action that facilitates the C. As to Rashid Albuni, and when (JiangSu) Co., Ltd.
acquisition or attempted acquisition by acting for or on his behalf, his
a Denied Person of the ownership, successors, assigns, representatives, AGENCY: Enforcement and Compliance,
possession, or control of any item agents, or employees, for a period of six International Trade Administration,
subject to the Regulations that has been (6) years from the date of this Order; Department of Commerce.
or will be exported from the United SUMMARY: On March 13, 2015, the
D. As to Aiman Ammar a/k/a Ayman Department of Commerce (the
States, including financing or other Ammar, and when acting for or on his
support activities related to a ‘‘Department’’) initiated a changed
behalf, his successors, assigns, circumstance review (‘‘CCR’’) of the
transaction whereby a Denied Person representatives, agents, or employees,
acquires or attempts to acquire such antidumping duty (‘‘AD’’) order on
for a period of five (5) years from the multilayered wood flooring from the
ownership, possession or control;
date of this Order; and People’s Republic of China (‘‘PRC’’) in
C. Take any action to acquire from or
to facilitate the acquisition or attempted E. As to iT Wave FZCO a/k/a iT-Wave response to a request from Sino-Maple
acquisition from a Denied Person of any a/k/a ITEX-Wave FZCO, and when (JiangSu) Co., Ltd. (‘‘Sino-Maple’’), an
item subject to the Regulations that has acting for or on its behalf, its successors, exporter of subject merchandise to the
been exported from the United States; assigns, directors, officers, employees, United States.1 Pursuant to section
D. Obtain from a Denied Person in the representatives, or agents, for a period of 751(b) of the Tariff Act of 1930, as
United States any item subject to the four (4) years from the date of this amended (‘‘the Act’’), and 19 CFR
Regulations with knowledge or reason Order. 351.216, the Department preliminarily
to know that the item will be, or is determines that Sino-Maple is the
SEVENTH, Respondents shall not take successor-in-interest to Jiafeng Wood
intended to be, exported from the any action or make or permit to be made
United States; or (Suzhou) Co., Ltd. (‘‘Jiafeng’’) for
any public statement, directly or purposes of the AD order on
E. Engage in any transaction to service
indirectly, denying the allegations in the multilayered wood flooring from the
any item subject to the Regulations that
Charging Letter or this Order. The PRC and, as such, is entitled to Jiafeng’s
has been or will be exported from the
foregoing does not affect Respondents’ cash deposit rate with respect to entries
United States and which is owned,
possessed or controlled by a Denied testimonial obligations in any of subject merchandise. We invite
Person, or service any item, of whatever proceeding, nor does it affect its right to interested parties to comment on these
origin, that is owned, possessed or take legal or factual positions in civil preliminary results.
controlled by a Denied Person if such litigation or other civil proceedings in DATES: Effective: September 24, 2015.
service involves the use of any item which the U.S. Department of
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
subject to the Regulations that has been Commerce is not a party.
Krisha Hill, AD/CVD Operations, Office
or will be exported from the United EIGHTH, that the Charging Letter, the IV, Enforcement and Compliance,
States. For purposes of this paragraph, Settlement Agreement, and this Order International Trade Administration,
servicing means installation, shall be made available to the public. U.S. Department of Commerce, 14th
maintenance, repair, modification or Street and Constitution Avenue NW.,
NINTH, that this Order shall be
testing. Washington, DC 20230; telephone: (202)
served on Respondents, and shall be
FIFTH, after notice and opportunity 482–4037.
for comment as provided in section published in the Federal Register.
This Order, which constitutes the SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
766.23 of the Regulations, any person,
firm, corporation, or business final agency action in this matter, is Background
organization related to a Denied Person effective immediately.5
by affiliation, ownership, control, or On December 23, 2014, Sino-Maple
Issued this 18th day of September, 2015. requested that the Department initiate
position of responsibility in the conduct
Richard R. Majauskas, an expedited CCR to confirm that Sino-
of trade or related services may also be
made subject to the provisions of this Deputy Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Maple is the successor-in-interest to
Order for the applicable time periods, Export Enforcement. Jiafeng for purposes of determining AD
starting from the date of this Order, that [FR Doc. 2015–24248 Filed 9–23–15; 8:45 am] liabilities.2 For a complete description
are set forth in Paragraph Sixth, below. BILLING CODE P of events that followed the initiation of
SIXTH, that the provisions of
1 See Initiation of Antidumping Duty Changed
Paragraphs Third, Fourth, and Fifth,
Circumstances Review: Multilayered Wood Flooring
tkelley on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with NOTICES
above, shall apply for the following From the People’s Republic of China, 80 FR 13328
periods of time: (March 13, 2015) (Initiation Notice).
A. As to Engineering Construction & 2 See Letter from Sino-Maple to the Department
Contracting Co., and when acting for or regarding, ‘‘Multilayered Wood Flooring from the
PRC: Request of Sino-Maple (Jiangsu) Co., Ltd. and
on its behalf, its successors, assigns, 5 Review and consideration of this matter have
Jiafeng Wood (Suzhou) Co., Ltd. for Changed
directors, officers, employees, been delegated to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Circumstances Review’’ (December 23, 2014) (‘‘CCR
representatives, or agents, for a period of Commerce for Export Enforcement. Request’’).
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Document Created: 2018-02-26 10:18:07
Document Modified: 2018-02-26 10:18:07
| Category | Regulatory Information | |
| Collection | Federal Register | |
| sudoc Class | AE 2.7: GS 4.107: AE 2.106: | |
| Publisher | Office of the Federal Register, National Archives and Records Administration | |
| Section | Notices | |
| FR Citation | 80 FR 57572 |
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