80 FR 72779 - Information and Guidance on the Inspection, Testing, and Maintenance of Emergency Window Exits on Railroad Passenger Cars
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Railroad Administration Federal Register Volume 80, Issue 224 (November 20, 2015)
Federal Railroad Administration
Federal Register Volume 80, Issue 224 (November 20, 2015)
| Page Range | 72779-72781 | |
| FR Document | 2015-29641 |
[Federal Register Volume 80, Number 224 (Friday, November 20, 2015)] [Notices] [Pages 72779-72781] From the Federal Register Online [www.thefederalregister.org] [FR Doc No: 2015-29641] ----------------------------------------------------------------------- DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION Federal Railroad Administration Information and Guidance on the Inspection, Testing, and Maintenance of Emergency Window Exits on Railroad Passenger Cars AGENCY: Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) Department of Transportation (DOT). ACTION: Notice. ----------------------------------------------------------------------- SUMMARY: FRA has become aware of occurrences when emergency window exits on passenger cars did not operate [[Page 72780]] as intended because the emergency pull handle became detached from the window gasket when pulled, the gasket tore into multiple pieces, or the gasket was otherwise difficult to remove. While investigating these occurrences, FRA discovered that some railroads were not following, or did not clearly understand, the existing Federal regulations on the inspection, testing, and maintenance (ITM) of these window exits, particularly the requirement that a railroad must utilize a test sampling method that conforms with a formalized statistical test method. FRA does not believe any of these occurrences involved passengers or precluded passengers from opening a window in an emergency situation. However, in light of these concerns, FRA is issuing this document to provide information and guidance to railroads operating passenger train service on the existing regulatory requirements regarding ITM of emergency window exits. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Mr. Daniel Knote, Staff Director, Passenger Rail Division, Office of Railroad Safety, FRA, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, DC 20590, (631) 965-1827; or Mr. Michael Hunter, Trial Attorney, Office of Chief Counsel, FRA, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, DC 20590, (202) 493-0368. SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: I. Historical Background on Existing Requirements The current ITM requirements for emergency window exit operability are found in Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 238.113(e) and 238.307(c)(4)(i)(B).\1\ These sections require each passenger railroad to test (at an interval not to exceed 184 days, as part of the periodic mechanical inspection) a representative sample \2\ of its passenger car emergency window exits to determine they ``operate as intended'' and ``properly operate,'' respectively. Title 49 CFR 238.113(e) further requires the sampling method to ``conform with a formalized statistical test method.'' --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\ Before FRA's November 29, 2013, Passenger Train Emergency Systems II final rule (78 FR 71786), the requirement to test a representative sample of emergency window exits was in 49 CFR 239.107(b)(2) and required each passenger railroad ``to verify that they are operating properly.'' \2\ The requirement to test a representative sample of emergency window exits, which was based in large part on Emergency Order No. 20 (EO 20), was codified by FRA's May 4, 1998, Passenger Train Emergency Preparedness final rule (E-Prep final rule). See 63 FR 24630, 24669-24670; EO 20, Notice No. 1, 61 FR 6876, 6881, Feb. 22, 1996, and Notice No. 2, 61 FR 8703, Mar. 5, 1996. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- As FRA explained in Emergency Order 20 (EO 20), a February 16, 1996, passenger train accident in Silver Spring, Maryland, involving a cab car on fire that filled with smoke, raised concerns that at least some of the train occupants could not exit through the windows.\3\ This accident demonstrated why emergency windows must be readily identifiable and operable when needed. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \3\ The National Transportation Safety Board's (NTSB) Railroad Accident Report on this accident reported that it took a Safety Board investigator several minutes to remove the left-side, front emergency window exit of the last passenger coach in the train's consist. See NTSB/RAR-97/02 report at 17 (July 3, 1997). An NTSB investigator could not remove the same car's right-side, rear emergency window exit, which was later removed by another investigator after approximately 3 minutes of physical exertion. The report further noted that the lubricant used to install these windows had hardened over time. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- FRA has continually reminded railroads that these windows ``provide an additional means of egress in life-threatening situations requiring very rapid exit, such as an on-board fire or submergence of the car in a body of water.'' See Passenger Train Emergency Systems (PTES) II final rule (78 FR 71786, 71802). In FRA's February 1, 2008, PTES final rule, FRA reminded railroads of the requirement to test emergency window exits using commonly accepted sampling techniques \4\ to determine how many windows to test. See 73 FR 6370, 6384. In doing so, FRA reemphasized that sampling should be conducted to meet a 95-percent confidence level that no defective units remain after completing the tests for the windows in the sample. See id. Further, in the Passenger Train Emergency Preparedness (E-Prep) final rule, FRA stated that each railroad should ``properly consider the nature and characteristics of its operations and passenger equipment to plan for routine and scheduled inspection, maintenance, and repair.'' 63 FR 24669. FRA also made clear its expectations regarding the inspection and maintenance of emergency exits: \4\ Railroads should conduct their sampling under either Military Standard MIL-STD-105(E), ``Sampling for Attributes'' (formally cancelled by the U.S. Department of Defense, but still acceptable for FRA's representative sampling purposes) or acceptable non-Government, standard sampling procedures and tables for inspection by attributes, such as the American National Standards Institute (ANSI)/ASQC Z1.4-1993, ``Sampling Procedures for Inspections by Attributes.'' See 73 FR 6370, 6384. Visual inspections must be performed periodically to verify that no emergency exit has a broken release mechanism or other overt sign that would render it unable to function in an emergency. Maintenance, including lubrication or scheduled replacement of depreciated parts or mechanisms, must be performed in accordance with standard industry practice and/or manufacturer recommendations. All emergency exits that are found during the course of an inspection or maintenance cycle to be broken, disabled, or otherwise incapable of performing their intended safety function must be repaired before the railroad may return the car to passenger --------------------------------------------------------------------------- service. Id. II. FRA Review of Railroads' Emergency Window Testing Programs When FRA reviewed various railroads' emergency window exit testing programs, it discovered that some railroads were not following, or did not clearly understand, the Federal regulations on the ITM of emergency window exits. This was particularly true with respect to adopting a sampling method that conforms with a formalized statistical test method and to recording window test failures. As a result, FRA is providing this guidance to ensure all railroads have in place an appropriate window testing program and understand which window tests they must record as failures. Specifically, FRA considers a window to have failed testing if the window or a window component (e.g., gasket, pull handle) does not operate as intended, considering both the window design and whether the window removal was ``rapid and easy'' when opened in a manner simulating a passenger trying to remove the window in an emergency (e.g., to escape a car on fire). Examples of window test failures some railroads were not categorizing as such include situations where the emergency pull handle separated from the gasket, or where the gasket tore or needed to be removed in multiple pieces.\5\ In addition, FRA observed one railroad testing its windows by carefully pulling out the window gasket to try to avoid detaching the handle or damaging the gasket. FRA recognizes that many railroads prefer to reinstall the same gaskets and handles for the emergency windows after performing the tests. However, FRA makes clear it does not consider such a careful test to be properly conducted because a passenger would not act that way in an emergency. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \5\ FRA makes clear that for any window that is intentionally designed with one or more counter-intuitive features (such as an emergency pull handle that separates from the gasket when pulled, or a gasket that needs to be removed in multiple pieces), the railroad must ensure that such features are clearly explained in the required operating instructions posted for the affected emergency window exits. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- FRA also discovered that some railroads believed they were not required to formally adopt a sampling program because they were testing 100 percent of their emergency window exits over a 1- to 2-year period. FRA [[Page 72781]] appreciates these railroads' efforts for what they believed was going above and beyond what is considered a reasonable sample size. However, FRA makes clear that for a railroad to truly test 100 percent of its windows, the railroad would need to test all of the emergency windows in each of its cars at least once during a 184-day period. FRA also clarifies that simply testing 100 percent of the emergency window exits does not necessarily ensure that the windows will operate as intended when needed in an emergency situation. As discussed in this document, it is how a railroad characterizes the results of those tests and what a railroad does with the results of those tests that will help ensure the windows will operate as intended. Choosing the number of windows to test (whether it is 20 percent or 100 percent) is only the first step. Second, if testing fewer than 100 percent of the windows in a 184-day period, railroads must also ensure the sample is representative of the various window types in its fleet or fleets.\6\ Third, even if a railroad is testing 100 percent of its emergency window exits, it must have a program in place that requires monitoring of the tests to determine whether the test results demonstrate a 95-percent confidence level that all emergency window exits operate as intended. Although EO 20, Notice No. 1, would have required testing all window exits on a specific series or type of car if one such car had a defective window exit, the amended order, Notice No. 2, permitted the use of commonly accepted sampling techniques to determine how many additional windows to test. See 61 FR 8703, 8705. In general, these principles require that the greater the percentage of windows initially found defective, the greater the percentage of windows the railroad will have to test. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \6\ Railroads can easily set up a simple spreadsheet (using off- the-shelf software) to generate a random sample that includes windows representing all of the window types in a railroad's fleet or fleets. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- FRA expects all railroads to: (1) Conduct periodic reviews of records of window testing using an acceptable attribute sampling method to determine whether they are achieving a 95-percent confidence level that no defective units remain; \7\ (2) assess the probable cause of any window test failures; and (3) address any such failures. In setting up their testing programs, railroads must set the confidence level of the sample at 95 percent or more and set the defect (failure) rate at less than 5 percent.\8\ To perform their analyses, railroads must review the test results at the end of a sampling period (at a minimum) and take further action if the testing reveals that 5 percent or more of the windows in the sample are defective. When assessing the probable cause(s) of any window test failures, railroads should consider whether the failures are a result of design issues, useful life issues, or other systemic issues common to a particular window design or windows in service of a similar age. If the test failure appears to be due to a systemic issue, then the potential exists for the failure to repeatedly present itself. In such cases, FRA strongly urges that the railroad consider replacing all the emergency windows or window components of like design or similar service age, as applicable. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \7\ Although the goal is to have no defective units remaining in a railroad's emergency window population, FRA recognizes that because the railroad is performing a statistical sample that achieves a 95-percent confidence level, there will always be a possibility that some defective units remain. \8\ These numbers are not intended always to add up to 100. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- As stated in the E-Prep final rule, a railroad must repair any window found to be broken, disabled, or otherwise incapable of performing its intended safety function before the railroad may return the car to passenger service. See 63 FR 24669. This remains true even when the number of windows that failed is below the 5-percent defect rate threshold. Railroads should also document the remedial action(s) planned or taken to address the window test failures, and create a timetable for window inspection and replacement for the window type or car series to remedy the problem in the most expedient manner. III. Maintenance of Emergency Window Exits As noted above, FRA expects railroads to periodically perform visual inspections to verify no emergency window exit has a broken release mechanism or other overt indication that would render it unable to function in an emergency. Ideally, railroads would incorporate these visual inspections as part of the interior calendar day mechanical inspections of passenger cars, since they already need to inspect the window markings daily to ensure that the safety-related signage is in place and legible. See 49 CFR 238.305(c)(7). As demonstrated by the 1996 accident that led to EO 20 (in which some of the window gaskets could not readily be pulled out due to lack of lubrication and maintenance), it is important that maintenance, including lubrication or scheduled replacement of degraded parts or mechanisms, be performed using standard industry practice and/or manufacturer recommendations to ensure that window exits will operate as intended during an emergency. This will also help to prevent a situation where a passenger in an emergency would panic or be delayed by trying to determine how to remove a window after the pull handle breaks off or a piece of the gasket tears off, for example. Finally, FRA discovered in its investigations that some employees were installing the window gaskets with a sharp tool (such as a screwdriver), which may have damaged the gaskets and may explain why, when pulled, the gaskets were not coming out in one piece as designed. Therefore, to ensure that railroads perform proper maintenance, the railroads should ensure that employees have and use proper tools when installing emergency windows to avoid damaging the window gaskets. As noted previously, FRA is issuing this document to provide basic information and guidance to railroads operating passenger train service to ensure that they understand the existing regulatory requirements regarding the ITM of emergency window exits. FRA believes that compliance with the existing emergency window exit regulatory requirements will help ensure the safety of the Nation's railroad employees, passengers, and the general public. FRA may take other appropriate actions it deems necessary to ensure the highest level of safety, including pursuing other corrective measures under its rail safety authority. Issued in Washington, DC, on November 17, 2015. Robert C. Lauby, Associate Administrator for Railroad Safety Chief Safety Officer. [FR Doc. 2015-29641 Filed 11-19-15; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 4910-06-P
![Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 224 / Friday, November 20, 2015 / Notices 72779
County, Pa.; Consumptive Use of Up to Eveleth from the south end of the 5. Historic and Cultural Resources:
4.9990 mgd; Approval Date: October 30, Midway neighborhood to the existing Section 106 of the National Historic
2015. MN 135 exit ramp for the start of new Preservation Act of 1966, as amended
Authority: Pub. L. 91–575, 84 Stat. 1509 four-lane construction. The new [16 U.S.C. 470f]; Archeological
et seq., 18 CFR parts 806, 807, and 808. alignment, consisting of approximately Resources Protection Act of 1977 [16
two and one-half miles of new four-lane U.S.C. 470aa–470mm]; Archeological
Dated: November 17, 2015.
roadway and non-motorized and Historic Preservation Act [16 U.S.C.
Stephanie L. Richardson,
accommodations, responds to the loss of 469–469c].
Secretary to the Commission. roadway easement for existing US 53, 6. Social and Economic: Farmland
[FR Doc. 2015–29672 Filed 11–19–15; 8:45 am] meets regional and inter-regional system Policy Protection Act (FPPA) [7 U.S.C.
BILLING CODE 7040–01–P performance targets, and maintains local 4201–4209].
connectivity. 7. Wetlands and Water Resources:
The FHWA signed a combined Final Clean Water Act (Section 404, Section
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS) 401, Section 319) [33 U.S.C. 1251–
and Record of Decision (ROD) for the 1387]; Land and Water Conservation
Federal Highway Administration project on September 10, 2015. On Fund (LWCF) [16 U.S.C. 4601–4604];
September 25, 2015, FHWA published a Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA) [42
Notice of Final Federal Agency Actions U.S.C. 300f–300j–26]; Rivers and
‘‘Notice of Availability for the combined
on Proposed Highway in Minnesota Harbors Act of 1899 [33 U.S.C. 401–406;
FEIS and ROD in the Federal Register
AGENCY: Federal Highway [80 FR 57807]. The USACE has taken Wetlands Mitigation [23 U.S.C. 119(g)
Administration (FHWA), US DOT. final agency actions with the meaning of and 133(b)(14)].
ACTION: Notice of limitations on claims 23 U.S.C. 139(l)(1) by issuing a Section 8. Executive Orders: E.O. 11990
for judicial reviews by FHWA. 404 permit for the project. The actions Protection of Wetlands; E.O. 11988
by FHWA and USACE, associated final Floodplain Management; E.O. 12898,
SUMMARY: This notice announces actions actions by other Federal agencies, and Federal Actions to Address
taken by FHWA that are final within the the laws under which such actions were Environmental Justice in Minority
meaning of 23 U.S.C. 139(l)(1). The taken, are described in the FHWA and Populations and Low Income
actions relate to a proposed highway USACE decisions and its project Populations; E.O. 11593 Protection and
project, United States Highway 53 records, referenced as FHWA Final EIS Enhancement of Cultural Resources;
between Virginia and Eveleth, in Saint Number 20150270 and USACE Permit E.O. 13007 Indian Sacred Sites; E.O.
Louis County in the State of Minnesota. Number 2011–00769–DWW. That 13287 Preserve America; E.O. 13175
Those actions grant licenses, permits, information is available by contacting Consultation and Coordination with
and approvals for the project. FHWA or USACE at the address Indian Tribal Governments; E.O. 11514
DATES: By this notice, FHWA is advising provided above. Protection and Enhancement of
the public of the final agency actions Information about the project and Environmental Quality; E.O. 13112
subject to 23 U.S.C. 139(l)(1). A claim project records are also available from Invasive Species.
seeking judicial review of the Federal MnDOT at the addresses provided (Catalog of Domestic Assistance Program
agency actions on the highway project above. The FEIS and ROD can be Number 20.205, Highway Planning and
will be barred unless the claim is filed viewed at and downloaded from the Construction. The regulations implementing
on or before April 18, 2016. If the MnDOT project Web site (http:// Executive Order 12372 regarding
Federal law that authorizes judicial www.dot.state.mn.us/d1/projects/ intergovernmental consultation on Federal
review of a claim provides a time period hwy53relocation/eis.html). The Section programs and activities apply to this
program.)
of less than 150 days for filing such a 404 permit is available from USACE
claim, then that shorter time period still contact above and is typically posted at Authority: 23 U.S.C. 139(l)(1).
applies. the USACE Saint Paul District Web site Issued on: November 6, 2015.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For (http://www.mvp.usace.army.mil/ David J Scott,
FHWA: Philip Forst, Environmental Missions/Regulatory.aspx). This notice Assistant Division Administrator, Saint Paul,
Specialist, FHWA, Minnesota Division, applies to the FEIS and ROD [80 FR Minnesota.
380 Jackson Street, Suite 500, Saint 57807] as well as all Federal agency [FR Doc. 2015–29412 Filed 11–19–15; 8:45 am]
Paul, MN 55101, phil.forst@dot.gov, final actions taken since the issuance of BILLING CODE 4910–RY–P
Phone: (651) 291–6100. For the United the Federal Register notice described
States Army Corps of Engineers above. The laws under which actions
(USACE): Daryl Wierzbinski, Saint Paul were taken include, but are not limited DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
District Regulatory Project Manager to:
Duluth Office, 600 South Lake Avenue, 1. General: National Environmental Federal Railroad Administration
Suite 211, Duluth, MN 55802, Phone: Policy Act (NEPA) [42 U.S.C. 4321–
(218)720–5291. For the Minnesota 4351]; Federal-Aid Highway Act [23 Information and Guidance on the
Department of Transportation, Pat U.S.C. 109 and 23 U.S.C. 128]. Inspection, Testing, and Maintenance
Huston, Project Director, Minnesota 2. Air: Clean Air Act [42 U.S.C. 7401– of Emergency Window Exits on
Department of Transportation (MnDOT), 7671q] Railroad Passenger Cars
District 1, 1123 Mesaba Avenue, Duluth, 3. Land: Section 4(f) of the AGENCY: Federal Railroad
tkelley on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with NOTICES
MN 55811, Phone: (218) 725–2707. Department of Transportation Act of Administration (FRA) Department of
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Notice is 1966 [49 U.S.C. 303; 23 U.S.C. 138]. Transportation (DOT).
hereby given that FHWA and USACE 4. Wildlife: Endangered Species Act ACTION: Notice.
have taken final agency actions by [16 U.S.C. 1531–1544 and Section
issuing approvals for the following 1536]; Fish and Wildlife Coordination SUMMARY: FRA has become aware of
transportation project in the State of Act [16 U.S.C. 661–667d]; Migratory occurrences when emergency window
Minnesota: US 53 between Virginia and Bird Treaty Act [16. U.S.C. 703–712]. exits on passenger cars did not operate
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![Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 224 / Friday, November 20, 2015 / Notices 72781
appreciates these railroads’ efforts for set the confidence level of the sample at mechanisms, be performed using
what they believed was going above and 95 percent or more and set the defect standard industry practice and/or
beyond what is considered a reasonable (failure) rate at less than 5 percent.8 To manufacturer recommendations to
sample size. However, FRA makes clear perform their analyses, railroads must ensure that window exits will operate as
that for a railroad to truly test 100 review the test results at the end of a intended during an emergency. This
percent of its windows, the railroad sampling period (at a minimum) and will also help to prevent a situation
would need to test all of the emergency take further action if the testing reveals where a passenger in an emergency
windows in each of its cars at least once that 5 percent or more of the windows would panic or be delayed by trying to
during a 184-day period. FRA also in the sample are defective. When determine how to remove a window
clarifies that simply testing 100 percent assessing the probable cause(s) of any after the pull handle breaks off or a
of the emergency window exits does not window test failures, railroads should piece of the gasket tears off, for example.
necessarily ensure that the windows consider whether the failures are a Finally, FRA discovered in its
will operate as intended when needed result of design issues, useful life issues, investigations that some employees
in an emergency situation. As discussed or other systemic issues common to a were installing the window gaskets with
in this document, it is how a railroad particular window design or windows a sharp tool (such as a screwdriver),
characterizes the results of those tests in service of a similar age. If the test which may have damaged the gaskets
and what a railroad does with the failure appears to be due to a systemic and may explain why, when pulled, the
results of those tests that will help issue, then the potential exists for the gaskets were not coming out in one
ensure the windows will operate as failure to repeatedly present itself. In piece as designed. Therefore, to ensure
intended. such cases, FRA strongly urges that the that railroads perform proper
Choosing the number of windows to railroad consider replacing all the maintenance, the railroads should
test (whether it is 20 percent or 100 emergency windows or window ensure that employees have and use
percent) is only the first step. Second, components of like design or similar proper tools when installing emergency
if testing fewer than 100 percent of the service age, as applicable. windows to avoid damaging the
windows in a 184-day period, railroads As stated in the E-Prep final rule, a window gaskets.
must also ensure the sample is railroad must repair any window found As noted previously, FRA is issuing
representative of the various window to be broken, disabled, or otherwise this document to provide basic
types in its fleet or fleets.6 Third, even incapable of performing its intended information and guidance to railroads
if a railroad is testing 100 percent of its safety function before the railroad may operating passenger train service to
emergency window exits, it must have return the car to passenger service. See ensure that they understand the existing
a program in place that requires 63 FR 24669. This remains true even regulatory requirements regarding the
monitoring of the tests to determine when the number of windows that ITM of emergency window exits. FRA
whether the test results demonstrate a failed is below the 5-percent defect rate believes that compliance with the
95-percent confidence level that all threshold. Railroads should also existing emergency window exit
emergency window exits operate as document the remedial action(s) regulatory requirements will help
intended. Although EO 20, Notice No. 1, planned or taken to address the window ensure the safety of the Nation’s railroad
would have required testing all window test failures, and create a timetable for employees, passengers, and the general
exits on a specific series or type of car window inspection and replacement for public. FRA may take other appropriate
if one such car had a defective window the window type or car series to remedy actions it deems necessary to ensure the
exit, the amended order, Notice No. 2, the problem in the most expedient highest level of safety, including
permitted the use of commonly manner. pursuing other corrective measures
accepted sampling techniques to under its rail safety authority.
determine how many additional III. Maintenance of Emergency Window
windows to test. See 61 FR 8703, 8705. Exits Issued in Washington, DC, on November
17, 2015.
In general, these principles require that As noted above, FRA expects
the greater the percentage of windows railroads to periodically perform visual Robert C. Lauby,
initially found defective, the greater the inspections to verify no emergency Associate Administrator for Railroad Safety
percentage of windows the railroad will window exit has a broken release Chief Safety Officer.
have to test. mechanism or other overt indication [FR Doc. 2015–29641 Filed 11–19–15; 8:45 am]
FRA expects all railroads to: (1) that would render it unable to function BILLING CODE 4910–06–P
Conduct periodic reviews of records of in an emergency. Ideally, railroads
window testing using an acceptable would incorporate these visual
attribute sampling method to determine inspections as part of the interior DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
whether they are achieving a 95-percent calendar day mechanical inspections of
confidence level that no defective units Saint Lawrence Seaway Development
passenger cars, since they already need Corporation
remain; 7 (2) assess the probable cause of to inspect the window markings daily to
any window test failures; and (3) ensure that the safety-related signage is Advisory Board; Notice of Meeting
address any such failures. In setting up in place and legible. See 49 CFR
their testing programs, railroads must 238.305(c)(7). As demonstrated by the Pursuant to Section 10(a)(2) of the
1996 accident that led to EO 20 (in Federal Advisory Committee Act (Pub.
6 Railroads can easily set up a simple spreadsheet
which some of the window gaskets L. 92–463; 5 U.S.C. App. I), notice is
(using off-the-shelf software) to generate a random hereby given of a meeting of the
sample that includes windows representing all of could not readily be pulled out due to
tkelley on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with NOTICES
the window types in a railroad’s fleet or fleets. lack of lubrication and maintenance), it Advisory Board of the Saint Lawrence
7 Although the goal is to have no defective units is important that maintenance, Seaway Development Corporation
remaining in a railroad’s emergency window including lubrication or scheduled (SLSDC), to be held from 2:00 p.m. to
population, FRA recognizes that because the 4 p.m. (EDT) on Tuesday, December 15,
railroad is performing a statistical sample that
replacement of degraded parts or
achieves a 95-percent confidence level, there will
2015,via conference call at the SLSDC’s
always be a possibility that some defective units 8 These numbers are not intended always to add Policy Headquarters, 55 M Street SE.,
remain. up to 100. Suite 930, Washington, DC 20003.
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Document Created: 2015-12-14 13:58:59
Document Modified: 2015-12-14 13:58:59
| Category | Regulatory Information | |
| Collection | Federal Register | |
| sudoc Class | AE 2.7: GS 4.107: AE 2.106: | |
| Publisher | Office of the Federal Register, National Archives and Records Administration | |
| Section | Notices | |
| Action | Notice. | |
| Contact | Mr. Daniel Knote, Staff Director, Passenger Rail Division, Office of Railroad Safety, FRA, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, DC 20590, (631) 965-1827; or Mr. Michael Hunter, Trial Attorney, Office of Chief Counsel, FRA, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, DC 20590, (202) 493-0368. | |
| FR Citation | 80 FR 72779 |
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