81 FR 85168 - Airworthiness Directives; Airbus Helicopters (Previously Eurocopter France) Helicopters
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration Federal Register Volume 81, Issue 227 (November 25, 2016)
Federal Aviation Administration
Federal Register Volume 81, Issue 227 (November 25, 2016)
| Page Range | 85168-85169 | |
| FR Document | 2016-27639 |
[Federal Register Volume 81, Number 227 (Friday, November 25, 2016)] [Proposed Rules] [Pages 85168-85169] From the Federal Register Online [www.thefederalregister.org] [FR Doc No: 2016-27639] [[Page 85168]] ======================================================================= ----------------------------------------------------------------------- DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION Federal Aviation Administration 14 CFR Part 39 [Docket No. FAA-2015-3657; Directorate Identifier 2012-SW-069-AD] RIN 2120-AA64 Airworthiness Directives; Airbus Helicopters (Previously Eurocopter France) Helicopters AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT. ACTION: Proposed rule; withdrawal. ----------------------------------------------------------------------- SUMMARY: The FAA is withdrawing a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM). The NPRM proposed to supersede airworthiness directive (AD) 2007-25-08 for Eurocopter France (now Airbus Helicopters) Model SA-365N1, AS- 365N2, AS 365 N3, SA-366G1, EC 155B, and EC155B1 helicopters. The proposed actions were intended to prevent damage to the tail gearbox (TGB) control shaft and rod assembly bearing resulting in end play, loss of tail rotor pitch control, and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter. Since we issued the NPRM, we have received reports of new occurrences of loss of yaw control due to failure of the control rod bearing and determined that different actions at shorter time intervals are necessary to correct the unsafe condition. Accordingly, we withdraw the proposed rule. DATES: As of November 25, 2016, the proposed rule to amend 14 CFR part 39 published September 2, 2015 (80 FR 53024) is withdrawn. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: David Hatfield, Aviation Safety Engineer, Safety Management Group, Rotorcraft Directorate, FAA, 10101 Hillwood Pkwy., Fort Worth, TX 76177; telephone (817) 222-5116; email [email protected]. SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: On August 21, 2015, the FAA issued an NPRM that proposed to amend 14 CFR part 39 to remove AD 2007-25-08 (72 FR 69604, December 10, 2007) and add a new AD for Airbus Helicopters (previously Eurocopter France) Model SA 365N1, AS-365N2, AS 365 N3, SA- 366G1, EC 155B, and EC155B1 helicopters. The NPRM published in the Federal Register on September 2, 2015 (80 FR 53024). The NPRM proposed to require, at specified intervals, checking the TGB oil level and inspecting the TGB magnetic plug for chips at specified intervals. The NPRM also proposed replacing the TGB guide bushes, inspecting the bearing of the TGB control shaft and rod assembly for M50 type particles, and performing measurements of play in the TGB control shaft and rod assembly. Finally, after replacing the guide bush, the NPRM proposed repetitively performing measurements for play in the TGB control shaft and rod assembly. The NPRM did not apply to helicopters with TGB part number (P/N) 365A33-6005-09 installed, which Airbus Helicopters refers to as Modification 07 65B63. At the time the NPRM was published, we had received new reports of loss of yaw control due to failure of the control rod bearing. The proposed actions were intended to prevent damage to the bearing resulting in end play, loss of tail rotor pitch control, and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter. Actions Since the NPRM Was Issued Since we issued the NPRM (80 FR 53024, September 2, 2015), EASA issued Emergency AD No. 2016-0097-E, dated May 23, 2016, which was subsequently revised by AD No. 2016-0097R1, dated May 25, 2016, to correct a paragraph reference. EASA AD No. 2016-0097R1 advises that a technical investigation of an AS 365 N3 accident revealed a damaged TGB bearing. EASA further states that the affected control rod had been repetitively inspected as required by a previous AD, EASA AD No. 2012- 0170R2, dated June 20, 2014, and that the investigation is still ongoing to determine the root cause of the damage and why the damage was not discovered during the inspections. EASA AD No. 2016-0097R1 requires repetitive inspections of the TGB oil level and magnetic chip detector. EASA AD No. 2016-0097R1 also requires replacing bearing P/N 704A33-651-093 or P/N 704A33-651-104 with an improved bearing P/N 704A33-651-245 or 704A33-651-246, which is terminating action for the repetitive inspections of the magnetic chip detector but not of the oil level. The EASA AD also describes an alternative repetitive inspection for play that would defer replacing the bearing for an additional 110 hours time-in-service. In light of this latest information, we are issuing a separate action to supersede AD 2007-25-08 (72 FR 69604, December 10, 2007) with immediately effective requirements. Accordingly, we are withdrawing the NPRM. Comments After our NPRM (80 FR 53024, September 2, 2015) was published, we received two comments from one commenter. Request Airbus Helicopters requested that the applicability be changed to exclude helicopters with MOD 07 65B63 (which installs TGB P/N 365A33 6005-09) instead of those with TGB P/N 365A33 6005-09. When asked for additional information to support this comment, Airbus Helicopters stated that by excluding only helicopters with TGB P/N 365A33 6005-09, the NPRM would apply to helicopters with a new (future) TGB P/N that would not be subject to the unsafe condition. If instead the NPRM were to exclude helicopters with MOD 07 65B63, it would also exclude future TGB P/Ns. MOD 07 65B63 would be required before any future MOD that may install a new part-numbered TGB. We agree with the commenter's concern. However, because we are withdrawing the NPRM and issuing a separate action with different corrective requirements, the commenter's request is no longer necessary. Airbus Helicopters also requested that the compliance intervals for performing the measurements for play include the longer interval allowed for helicopters with MOD 07 65B57. We agree that the longer inspection intervals are acceptable for helicopters with MOD 07 65B57. However, because we are withdrawing the NPRM and issuing a separate action with different corrective requirements, the commenter's request is no longer necessary. Withdrawal of the NPRM constitutes only such action and does not preclude the agency from issuing another notice in the future nor does it commit the agency to any course of action in the future. Since this action only withdraws an NPRM, it is neither a proposed nor a final rule; therefore, it is not covered under Executive Order 12866, the Regulatory Flexibility Act, or DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979). List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39 Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by reference, Safety. The Withdrawal Accordingly, the notice of proposed rulemaking, Docket No. FAA- 2015-3657; Directorate Identifier 2012-SW-069-AD, published in the Federal Register on September 2, 2015 (80 FR 53024), is withdrawn. [[Page 85169]] Issued in Fort Worth, Texas, on November 2, 2016. Lance T. Gant, Manager, Rotorcraft Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service. [FR Doc. 2016-27639 Filed 11-23-16; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 4910-13-P
![85168 Federal Register / Vol. 81, No. 227 / Friday, November 25, 2016 / Proposed Rules
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION control shaft and rod assembly for M50 Request
type particles, and performing
Federal Aviation Administration measurements of play in the TGB Airbus Helicopters requested that the
control shaft and rod assembly. Finally, applicability be changed to exclude
14 CFR Part 39 after replacing the guide bush, the helicopters with MOD 07 65B63 (which
NPRM proposed repetitively performing installs TGB P/N 365A33 6005–09)
[Docket No. FAA–2015–3657; Directorate
Identifier 2012–SW–069–AD] measurements for play in the TGB instead of those with TGB
control shaft and rod assembly. The P/N 365A33 6005–09. When asked for
RIN 2120–AA64 NPRM did not apply to helicopters with additional information to support this
TGB part number (P/N) 365A33–6005– comment, Airbus Helicopters stated that
Airworthiness Directives; Airbus
09 installed, which Airbus Helicopters by excluding only helicopters with TGB
Helicopters (Previously Eurocopter
refers to as Modification 07 65B63. At P/N 365A33 6005–09, the NPRM would
France) Helicopters
the time the NPRM was published, we apply to helicopters with a new (future)
AGENCY: Federal Aviation had received new reports of loss of yaw TGB P/N that would not be subject to
Administration (FAA), DOT. control due to failure of the control rod the unsafe condition. If instead the
ACTION: Proposed rule; withdrawal. bearing. The proposed actions were NPRM were to exclude helicopters with
intended to prevent damage to the MOD 07 65B63, it would also exclude
SUMMARY: The FAA is withdrawing a bearing resulting in end play, loss of tail future TGB P/Ns. MOD 07 65B63 would
notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM). rotor pitch control, and subsequent loss be required before any future MOD that
The NPRM proposed to supersede of control of the helicopter. may install a new part-numbered TGB.
airworthiness directive (AD) 2007–25–
08 for Eurocopter France (now Airbus Actions Since the NPRM Was Issued We agree with the commenter’s
Helicopters) Model SA–365N1, AS– concern. However, because we are
Since we issued the NPRM (80 FR
365N2, AS 365 N3, SA–366G1, EC 155B, 53024, September 2, 2015), EASA withdrawing the NPRM and issuing a
and EC155B1 helicopters. The proposed issued Emergency AD No. 2016–0097–E, separate action with different corrective
actions were intended to prevent dated May 23, 2016, which was requirements, the commenter’s request
damage to the tail gearbox (TGB) control subsequently revised by AD No. 2016– is no longer necessary.
shaft and rod assembly bearing resulting 0097R1, dated May 25, 2016, to correct Airbus Helicopters also requested that
in end play, loss of tail rotor pitch a paragraph reference. EASA AD No. the compliance intervals for performing
control, and subsequent loss of control 2016–0097R1 advises that a technical the measurements for play include the
of the helicopter. Since we issued the investigation of an AS 365 N3 accident longer interval allowed for helicopters
NPRM, we have received reports of new revealed a damaged TGB bearing. EASA with MOD 07 65B57.
occurrences of loss of yaw control due further states that the affected control
to failure of the control rod bearing and We agree that the longer inspection
rod had been repetitively inspected as intervals are acceptable for helicopters
determined that different actions at required by a previous AD, EASA AD
shorter time intervals are necessary to with MOD 07 65B57. However, because
No. 2012–0170R2, dated June 20, 2014,
correct the unsafe condition. we are withdrawing the NPRM and
and that the investigation is still
Accordingly, we withdraw the proposed issuing a separate action with different
ongoing to determine the root cause of
rule. corrective requirements, the
the damage and why the damage was
DATES: As of November 25, 2016, the commenter’s request is no longer
not discovered during the inspections.
proposed rule to amend 14 CFR part 39 necessary.
EASA AD No. 2016–0097R1 requires
published September 2, 2015 (80 FR repetitive inspections of the TGB oil Withdrawal of the NPRM constitutes
53024) is withdrawn. level and magnetic chip detector. EASA only such action and does not preclude
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: AD No. 2016–0097R1 also requires the agency from issuing another notice
David Hatfield, Aviation Safety replacing bearing P/N 704A33–651–093 in the future nor does it commit the
Engineer, Safety Management Group, or P/N 704A33–651–104 with an agency to any course of action in the
Rotorcraft Directorate, FAA, 10101 improved bearing P/N 704A33–651–245 future.
Hillwood Pkwy., Fort Worth, TX 76177; or 704A33–651–246, which is Since this action only withdraws an
telephone (817) 222–5116; email terminating action for the repetitive NPRM, it is neither a proposed nor a
david.hatfield@faa.gov. inspections of the magnetic chip final rule; therefore, it is not covered
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: On August detector but not of the oil level. The under Executive Order 12866, the
21, 2015, the FAA issued an NPRM that EASA AD also describes an alternative Regulatory Flexibility Act, or DOT
proposed to amend 14 CFR part 39 to repetitive inspection for play that would Regulatory Policies and Procedures (44
remove AD 2007–25–08 (72 FR 69604, defer replacing the bearing for an FR 11034, February 26, 1979).
December 10, 2007) and add a new AD additional 110 hours time-in-service.
for Airbus Helicopters (previously In light of this latest information, we List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39
Eurocopter France) Model SA 365N1, are issuing a separate action to
supersede AD 2007–25–08 (72 FR Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation
AS–365N2, AS 365 N3, SA–366G1, EC
155B, and EC155B1 helicopters. The 69604, December 10, 2007) with safety, Incorporation by reference,
NPRM published in the Federal immediately effective requirements. Safety.
Register on September 2, 2015 (80 FR Accordingly, we are withdrawing the
ehiers on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with PROPOSALS
The Withdrawal
53024). The NPRM proposed to require, NPRM.
at specified intervals, checking the TGB Accordingly, the notice of proposed
Comments rulemaking, Docket No. FAA–2015–
oil level and inspecting the TGB
magnetic plug for chips at specified After our NPRM (80 FR 53024, 3657; Directorate Identifier 2012–SW–
intervals. The NPRM also proposed September 2, 2015) was published, we 069–AD, published in the Federal
replacing the TGB guide bushes, received two comments from one Register on September 2, 2015 (80 FR
inspecting the bearing of the TGB commenter. 53024), is withdrawn.
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![Federal Register / Vol. 81, No. 227 / Friday, November 25, 2016 / Proposed Rules 85169
Issued in Fort Worth, Texas, on November Avenida de Aragón 404, 28022 Madrid, Defense and Space S.A. Model CN–235,
2, 2016. Spain; fax +34 91 585 31 27; email CN–235–100, CN–235–200, and CN–
Lance T. Gant, MTA.TechnicalService@airbus.com. 235–300 airplanes, and Model C–295
Manager, Rotorcraft Directorate, Aircraft You may view this service information airplanes. The MCAI states:
Certification Service. at the FAA, Transport Airplane Leakage of a motorised cross-feed fuel
[FR Doc. 2016–27639 Filed 11–23–16; 8:45 am] Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue SW., valve Part Number (P/N) 7923227F was
BILLING CODE 4910–13–P Renton, WA. For information on the reported on a CN–235–100M aeroplane. The
availability of this material at the FAA, leakage was observed through the valve
call 425–227–1221. electrical connectors and detected during
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION accomplishment of a functional check in
Examining the AD Docket accordance with the CN–235 aeroplane
Federal Aviation Administration You may examine the AD docket on Maintenance Review Board Report (MRB–
the Internet at http:// PV01M), task 28.007. Identical motorised fuel
14 CFR Part 39 www.regulations.gov by searching for valves are installed on CN–235 and C–295
aeroplanes, corresponding to civil type
and locating Docket No. FAA–2016–
[Docket No. FAA–2016–9386; Directorate design, as cross-feed, shut-off and defueling
Identifier 2016–NM–056–AD] 9386; or in person at the Docket valves, as applicable to aeroplane model and
Management Facility between 9 a.m. configuration.
RIN 2120–AA64 and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, This condition, if not detected and
except Federal holidays. The AD docket corrected, could lead to failure of a motorised
Airworthiness Directives; Airbus contains this proposed AD, the fuel valve and consequent improper fuel
Defense and Space S.A. (Formerly regulatory evaluation, any comments system functioning or, in case of the presence
Known as Construcciones received, and other information. The of an ignition source, possibly resulting in an
Aeronauticas, S.A.) Airplanes street address for the Docket Operations aeroplane fire.
office (telephone 800–647–5527) is in To address this potentially unsafe
AGENCY: Federal Aviation condition, Airbus Defense & Space (D&S)
Administration (FAA), DOT. the ADDRESSES section. Comments will
issued Alert Operators Transmission (AOT)–
be available in the AD docket shortly CN235–28–0001 and AOT–C295–28–0001 to
ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking
after receipt. provide inspection instructions.
(NPRM).
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For the reasons described above, this
SUMMARY: We propose to adopt a new Shahram Daneshmandi, Aerospace [EASA] AD requires an inspection of the
airworthiness directive (AD) for all Engineer, International Branch, ANM– affected motorised fuel valves and,
Airbus Defense and Space S.A. Model 116, Transport Airplane Directorate, depending on findings, accomplishment of
FAA, 1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, applicable corrective action(s) [(valve
CN–235, CN 235–100, CN 235–200, and replacement)].
CN 235–300 airplanes, and Model C– WA 98057–3356; telephone 425–227–
295 airplanes. This proposed AD was 1112; fax 425–227–1149. You may examine the MCAI in the
prompted by leakage of a motorized SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: AD docket on the Internet at http://
cross-feed fuel valve. This proposed AD www.regulations.gov by searching for
Comments Invited and locating Docket No. FAA–2016–
would require an inspection of the
affected fuel valves and, depending on We invite you to send any written 9386.
findings, applicable corrective action(s). relevant data, views, or arguments about
Related Service Information Under 1
We are proposing this AD to detect and this proposed AD. Send your comments
CFR Part 51
correct leaks in a motorized cross-feed to an address listed under the
fuel valve, which could lead to failure ADDRESSES section. Include ‘‘Docket No. Airbus Defense and Space S.A. has
of the fuel valve and consequent FAA–2016–9386; Directorate Identifier issued AOT–CN235–28–0001, dated
improper fuel system functioning or, in 2016–NM–056–AD’’ at the beginning of February 19, 2016; and AOT–C295–28–
case of the presence of an ignition your comments. We specifically invite 0001, dated February 19, 2016. The
source, an airplane fire. comments on the overall regulatory, service information describes
economic, environmental, and energy procedures for inspecting and replacing
DATES: We must receive comments on
aspects of this proposed AD. We will the motorized fuel valves. The service
this proposed AD by January 9, 2017. information also describes procedures
consider all comments received by the
ADDRESSES: You may send comments, closing date and may amend this for reporting inspection findings. These
using the procedures found in 14 CFR proposed AD based on those comments. documents are distinct since they apply
11.43 and 11.45, by any of the following We will post all comments we to different airplane models. This
methods: receive, without change, to http:// service information is reasonably
• Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to www.regulations.gov, including any available because the interested parties
http://www.regulations.gov. Follow the personal information you provide. We have access to it through their normal
instructions for submitting comments. will also post a report summarizing each course of business or by the means
• Fax: 202–493–2251. substantive verbal contact we receive identified in the ADDRESSES section.
• Mail: U.S. Department of about this proposed AD.
Transportation, Docket Operations, M– FAA’s Determination and Requirements
30, West Building Ground Floor, Room Discussion of This Proposed AD
W12–140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., The European Aviation Safety Agency This product has been approved by
Washington, DC 20590. (EASA), which is the Technical Agent the aviation authority of another
ehiers on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with PROPOSALS
• Hand Delivery: Deliver to Mail for the Member States of the European country, and is approved for operation
address above between 9 a.m. and 5 Union, has issued Airworthiness in the United States. Pursuant to our
p.m., Monday through Friday, except Directive 2016–0071, dated April 11, bilateral agreement with the State of
Federal holidays. 2016 (referred to after this as the Design Authority, we have been notified
For service information identified in Mandatory Continuing Airworthiness of the unsafe condition described in the
this NPRM, contact Airbus Defense and Information, or ‘‘the MCAI’’), to correct MCAI and service information
Space, Services/Engineering Support, an unsafe condition for all Airbus referenced above. We are proposing this
VerDate Sep<11>2014 14:01 Nov 23, 2016 Jkt 241001 PO 00000 Frm 00006 Fmt 4702 Sfmt 4702 E:\FR\FM\25NOP1.SGM 25NOP1](https://thefederalregister.org/doc/81_FR_85395/page/2.svg)
Document Created: 2016-11-23 23:18:30
Document Modified: 2016-11-23 23:18:30
| Category | Regulatory Information | |
| Collection | Federal Register | |
| sudoc Class | AE 2.7: GS 4.107: AE 2.106: | |
| Publisher | Office of the Federal Register, National Archives and Records Administration | |
| Section | Proposed Rules | |
| Action | Proposed rule; withdrawal. | |
| Dates | As of November 25, 2016, the proposed rule to amend 14 CFR part 39 published September 2, 2015 (80 FR 53024) is withdrawn. | |
| Contact | David Hatfield, Aviation Safety Engineer, Safety Management Group, Rotorcraft Directorate, FAA, 10101 Hillwood Pkwy., Fort Worth, TX 76177; telephone (817) 222-5116; email [email protected] | |
| FR Citation | 81 FR 85168 | |
| RIN Number | 2120-AA64 | |
| CFR Associated | Air Transportation; Aircraft; Aviation Safety; Incorporation by Reference and Safety |
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