82 FR 14251 - Self-Regulatory Organizations; Miami International Securities Exchange LLC; Notice of Filing and Immediate Effectiveness of a Proposed Rule Change To Amend MIAX Options Rule 515, Execution of Orders and Quotes

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION

Federal Register Volume 82, Issue 51 (March 17, 2017)

Page Range14251-14256
FR Document2017-05345

Federal Register, Volume 82 Issue 51 (Friday, March 17, 2017)
[Federal Register Volume 82, Number 51 (Friday, March 17, 2017)]
[Notices]
[Pages 14251-14256]
From the Federal Register Online  [www.thefederalregister.org]
[FR Doc No: 2017-05345]


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SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION

[Release No. 34-80230; File No. SR-MIAX-2017-12]


Self-Regulatory Organizations; Miami International Securities 
Exchange LLC; Notice of Filing and Immediate Effectiveness of a 
Proposed Rule Change To Amend MIAX Options Rule 515, Execution of 
Orders and Quotes

March 13, 2017.
    Pursuant to the provisions of Section 19(b)(1) of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 (``Act'') \1\ and Rule 19b-4 thereunder,\2\ notice 
is hereby given that on March 3, 2017, Miami International Securities 
Exchange, LLC (``MIAX Options'' or ``Exchange'') filed with the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (``Commission'') a proposed rule 
change as described in Items I and II below, which Items have been 
prepared by the Exchange. The Commission is publishing this notice to 
solicit comments on the proposed rule change from interested persons.
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    \1\ 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(1).
    \2\ 17 CFR 240.19b-4.
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I. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement of the Terms of Substance 
of the Proposed Rule Change

    The Exchange is filing a proposal to amend Exchange Rule 515, 
Execution of Orders and Quotes.
    The text of the proposed rule change is available on the Exchange's 
Web site at http://www.miaxoptions.com/rule-filings, at MIAX's 
principal office, and at the Commission's Public Reference Room.

II. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement of the Purpose of, and 
Statutory Basis for, the Proposed Rule Change

    In its filing with the Commission, the Exchange included statements 
concerning the purpose of and basis for the proposed rule change and 
discussed any comments it received on the proposed rule change. The 
text of these statements may be examined at the places specified in 
Item IV below. The Exchange has prepared summaries, set forth in 
sections A, B, and C below, of the most significant aspects of such 
statements.

A. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement of the Purpose of, and 
Statutory Basis for, the Proposed Rule Change

1. Purpose
    The purpose of the proposal is to amend Exchange Rule 515(c) to 
enhance the price protection process of the Exchange's System.\3\ The 
proposal will (i) eliminate a Member's \4\ ability to disable the price 
protection process, (ii) refine the settings associated with the price 
protection process, (iii) propose a new behavior of the price 
protection process to remove certain orders immediately following the 
commencement of a trading halt and at the end of each trading session, 
and (iv) eliminate the establishment of a price protection limit for 
orders received (A) prior to the open or during a trading halt, and (B) 
during a prior trading session that remain on the Book \5\ at the 
conclusion of the opening process.\6\
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    \3\ The term ``System'' means the automated trading system used 
by the Exchange for the trading of securities. See Exchange Rule 
100.
    \4\ The term ``Member'' means an individual or organization 
approved to exercise the trading rights associated with a Trading 
Permit. Members are deemed ``members'' under the Exchange Act. See 
Exchange Rule 100.
    \5\ The term ``Book'' means the electronic book of buy and sell 
orders and quotes maintained by the System. See Exchange Rule 100.
    \6\ See Exchange Rule 503(f).
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    The Exchange provides a price protection process for all orders 
(excluding Market Maker \7\ orders) as part of its commitment to 
providing risk protection for Member's orders.\8\ The price protection 
process prevents an order from being executed beyond the price 
designated in the order's price

[[Page 14252]]

protection instructions (the ``price protection limit'').\9\ The 
starting point for establishing an order's price protection limit is 
the NBBO \10\ at the time the order is received by the System, or the 
MBBO \11\ if the ABBO \12\ is crossing the MBBO at the time of receipt. 
The Exchange refers to this value internally as the initial reference 
price (``IRP''). The Member may determine the number of Minimum Price 
Variations (``MPVs'') \13\ away from the IRP that it wants to use to 
establish its price protection limit. If the order is a ``buy,'' some 
number of Minimum Price Variations (``MPVs''), either as designated by 
the Member or as defaulted by the Exchange, is added to the IRP to 
establish the order's price protection limit. If the order is a 
``sell,'' some number of MPVs, either as designated by the Member or 
defaulted by the Exchange, is subtracted from the IRP to establish the 
order's price protection limit. When an order's price protection limit 
is triggered, the order (or the remaining contracts of an order) is 
canceled by the System.
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    \7\ The term ``Market Makers'' refers to ``Lead Market Makers'', 
``Primary Lead Market Makers'' and ``Registered Market Makers'' 
collectively. See Exchange Rule 100.
    \8\ See Exchange Rule 519 for additional order protections.
    \9\ See Exchange Rule 515(c)(1).
    \10\ The term ``NBBO'' means the national best bid or offer as 
calculated by the Exchange based on market information received by 
the Exchange from OPRA. See Exchange Rule 100.
    \11\ The term ``MBBO'' means the best bid or offer on the 
Exchange. See Exchange Rule 100.
    \12\ The term ``ABBO'' or ``Away Best Bid or Offer'' means the 
best bid(s) or offer(s) disseminated by other Eligible Exchanges 
(defined in Rule 1400(f)) and calculated by the Exchange based on 
market information received by the Exchange from OPRA. See Exchange 
Rule 100.
    \13\ See Exchange Rule 510.
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    Current Rule 515(c)(1) provides that ``[m]arket participants may 
designate or disable price protection instructions on an order by order 
basis.'' In order to enhance the Exchange's price protection process, 
the Exchange proposes to amend the Rule so that market participants no 
longer have the option to disable price protection instructions on 
orders. The Exchange believes that this enhancement benefits market 
participants and the options market as a whole, as this will ensure 
that all eligible orders have at least some level of price protection. 
While this proposal effectively mandates usage of the price protection 
process, the Exchange notes that market participants will still have 
the ability to set price protection instructions a significant number 
of MPVs away from the IRP (as discussed below) should they so elect, 
therefore the Exchange does not view the proposal as a material or 
significant change.
    Additionally, the Exchange proposes to enhance the price protection 
process by refining the settings associated with this process. 
Currently in the System, Members may disable price protection by 
providing a value of -1 in the price protection instructions, or 
Members may enable price protection by selecting an MPV value from a 
range (in whole numbers only) of 0 through 99--that is, the number of 
MPVs beyond the IRP that an order may trade. Providing Members with 
such a wide range of MPV settings could render the price protection 
process ineffective, should a Member select an MPV setting at the upper 
end of that range. Accordingly, the Exchange proposes to establish a 
narrower range of MPV settings, and to insert the range into the Rule. 
While this range will be determined by the Exchange and announced to 
Members through a Regulatory Circular, the range will be (in whole 
numbers only) no less than zero (0) MPVs and no greater than twenty 
(20) MPVs away from the IRP.
    The Exchange also proposes to establish a range of MPV settings 
from which the Exchange may select to serve as the default value for 
price protection instructions, should a market participant not provide 
its own price protection instructions for its order. The current Rule 
states that this default price protection will be one MPV away from the 
NBBO at the time of receipt, or the MBBO if the ABBO is crossing the 
MBBO. The Exchange now proposes to establish a range of MPV settings 
from one (1) to five (5) MPVs away from the NBBO at the time of 
receipt. The Exchange will announce the default value for the price 
protection instruction to Members through a Regulatory Circular, such 
value shall be in whole numbers only and shall apply universally to all 
products traded on the Exchange. The Exchange believes that having a 
range of MPV settings to choose from will provide greater flexibility 
to the Exchange and enable it to select an appropriate global default 
MPV value where one is not provided by the market participant.
    Except as discussed below, orders can be received by the Exchange 
either prior to or after completion of the opening process. Orders may 
have a limit price (``limit orders'') \14\ or be priced to buy or sell 
at the current market price (``market orders'').\15\ A market order 
represents a willingness to buy or sell at the best price available at 
the time of execution. A market order to buy could execute at the 
maximum price permitted by the Exchange,\16\ whereas a market order to 
sell could execute at the minimum price permitted by the Exchange, or 
one (1) MPV above zero.\17\ When orders are received after the opening 
process is complete and when the market is in a regular trading state, 
the price protection process tethers the order's price to the current 
NBBO, (or MBBO if the ABBO is crossing the MBBO at the time of 
receipt), and provides protection (based on the number of MPVs supplied 
by the Member or defaulted by the Exchange) for orders that are priced 
through the NBBO.
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    \14\ A limit order is an order to buy or sell a stated number of 
option contracts at a specified price or better. See Exchange Rule 
516.
    \15\ A market order is an order to buy or sell a stated number 
of option contracts at the best price available at the time of 
execution. See Exchange Rule 516.
    \16\ The Exchange notes that the maximum price that an order may 
be executed at in the System is $1,999.99.
    \17\ A market order to sell could execute at $.01 in an option 
class quoted and traded in increments as low as $.01; or at $.05 in 
an option class quoted and traded in increments as low as $.05. See 
Exchange Rule 510.
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Limit Orders
    For purposes of this Rule 515(c), the Exchange is proposing to 
consider the effective limit price of a limit order to be the limit 
price of the order. Depending upon the NBBO at the time of receipt by 
the System, and the order's price protection instructions, the order's 
price protection limit can be considered either ``more aggressive'' 
(equal to or higher than the order's effective limit price for a buy 
order or equal to or lower than the order's effective limit price for a 
sell order) or ``less aggressive'' (lower than the order's effective 
limit price for a buy order or higher than the order's effective limit 
price for a sell order) than the order's effective limit price. When an 
order's price protection limit is equal to or more aggressive than its 
effective limit price, the order's effective price protection limit 
will be the order's limit price, as an order will never trade through 
its limit price on the Exchange.
Market Orders
    For purposes of evaluating market orders under the proposed price 
protection process outlined in this Rule, the Exchange is proposing to 
consider the effective limit price of a market order to buy to be the 
maximum price currently permitted by the Exchange's System,\18\ and the 
effective limit price for a market order to sell to be one (1) MPV 
above zero ($.01 for options quoted and traded in increments as low as 
$.01, or $.05 for options quoted and traded in increments as low as 
$.05).\19\
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    \18\ See supra note 16.
    \19\ See Exchange Rule 510.
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    Depending upon the NBBO at the time of receipt by the System, and 
the order's price protection instructions, the order's price protection 
limit can either

[[Page 14253]]

be more aggressive (equal to or higher than the order's effective limit 
price for a buy order or equal to or lower than the order's effective 
limit price for a sell order) or less aggressive (lower than the 
order's effective limit price for a buy order or higher than the 
order's effective limit price for a sell order) than the order's 
effective limit price.
    The price protection process will remain unchanged for orders 
received after the opening process has been completed, when the market 
is in a regular trading session. For both limit and market orders, when 
an order's price protection limit is triggered, the order, or the 
remaining contracts of the order, is canceled. Under the current rule, 
this cancellation will only occur during regular trading and can 
possibly result in an order not receiving an execution at the price 
anticipated by the Member when the order was submitted, as a result of 
a price protection limit that is less aggressive than the order's 
effective limit price. Under the current rule, an order with a price 
protection limit less aggressive than the order's effective limit price 
will persist throughout the course of an entire trading day, including 
through a trading halt, (provided the order's price protection limit 
isn't triggered).
    The Exchange now proposes to evaluate orders at the conclusion of 
each trading session (including after a trading halt as defined in Rule 
504), to identify those orders that have a price protection limit that 
is less aggressive than the order's effective limit price, in addition 
to current functionality. The Exchange believes it is in the best 
interest of its Members to proactively identify orders on the Book that 
have a price protection limit that is less aggressive than the order's 
effective limit price at the conclusion of each trading session when 
the market is not in a regular trading state. Given that these orders 
will never trade to their effective limit price, the Exchange proposes 
to cancel these orders from the Book so that Members can benefit from 
an increase in the amount of time available to re-evaluate the current 
market conditions prior to resubmitting the order to the Exchange.
    The following examples demonstrate how the proposed process would 
work for non-routable limit orders.

Option MPV = $.01
MBBO: $1.00 x $1.05
ABBO: $1.01 x $1.03
NBBO: $1.01 x $1.03
    Order #1 Received: Buy @$1.08 GTC, Price Protection MPVs: 2
1. Order is managed to the ABBO
2. Effective limit price: $1.08 (bid)
3. Display price: $1.02 (bid)
4. Book price: $1.03 (bid)
5. Price protection limit: $1.05 [(IRP + 2 MPVs) or ($1.03 + $.02)]
6. The order's price protection limit ($1.05) is less aggressive than 
the order's effective limit price ($1.08)

    Order #2 Received: Buy @$1.04 GTC, Price Protection MPVs: 2

1. Order is Managed to the ABBO
2. Effective limit price: $1.04
3. Display price: $1.02 (bid)
4. Book price: $1.03 (bid)
5. Price protection limit: $1.05 [(IRP + 2 MPVs) or ($1.03 + $.02)]
6. The order's price protection limit ($1.05) is more aggressive than 
the order's effective limit price ($1.04)

    The Market closes (or Halts as per Rule 504).
1. Order #1 is canceled as the order's price protection limit ($1.05) 
is less aggressive than its effective limit price ($1.08). Under 
proposed Interpretations and Policies .04, the System will cancel a buy 
order when the order's price protection limit is lower than the order's 
effective limit price.
2. Order #2 is maintained on the Book as the order's price protection 
limit ($1.05) is more aggressive than its effective limit price 
($1.04). Under proposed Interpretations and Policies .04, the System 
will not cancel a buy order when the order's price protection limit is 
higher than the order's effective limit price.

    The following examples demonstrate how the proposed process would 
work for non-routable market orders.

Option MPV = $.01
MBBO: $1.00 x $1.05
ABBO: $1.01 x $1.03
NBBO: $1.01 x $1.03

    Order # 3 Received: Buy @the Market GTC, Price Protection MPVs: 2

1. Order is Managed to the ABBO
2. Effective limit price: $1,999.99 (Exchange Maximum)
3. Display price: $1.02 (bid)
4. Book price: $1.03 (bid)
5. Price protection limit: $1.05 [(IRP + 2 MPVs) or ($1.03 + $.02)]
6. The order's price protection limit ($1.05) is less aggressive than 
the order's effective limit price ($1,999.99)
Option MPV = $.01
MBBO: $.00 x $.15
ABBO: $.05 x $.15
NBBO: $.05 x $.15

    Order #4 Received: Sell @the Market, Price Protection MPVs: 2

1. Order is managed to the ABBO
2. Effective limit price: $.01
3. Display price: $.06 (offer)
4. Book price: $.05 (offer)
5. Price protection limit: $.03 [(IRP-2 MPVs) or (.05-$.02)]
6. The order's price protection limit ($.03) is less aggressive than 
the order's effective limit price ($.01)

    Order #5 Received: Sell @the Market, Price Protection MPVs: 4

1. Order is managed to the ABBO
2. Effective limit price: $.01
3. Display price: $.06 (offer)
4. Book price: $.05 (offer)
5. Price protection limit: $.01 [(IRP-4 MPVs) or ($.05-$.04)]
6. The order's price protection limit ($.01) is equal to the order's 
effective limit price ($.01)

    The Market closes (or Halts as per Rule 504).

3. Order #3 is canceled as the order's price protection limit ($1.05) 
is less aggressive than the orders effective limit price ($1,999.99). 
Under proposed Interpretations and Policies .04, the System will cancel 
a buy order when the order's price protection limit is lower than the 
order's effective limit price.
 Order #4 is canceled as the order's price protection limit 
($0.03) is less aggressive than its effective limit price ($0.01). 
Under proposed Interpretations and Policies .04, the System will cancel 
a sell order when the order's price protection limit is higher than the 
order's effective limit price.
 Order #5 is maintained on the Book as the order's price 
protection limit ($0.01) is equal to its effective limit price ($0.01). 
Under proposed Interpretations and Policies .04, the System will not 
cancel a sell order when the order's price protection limit is not 
higher than the order's effective limit price.

    The Exchange believes that its proposal to cancel orders at the end 
of a trading session, when the order's price protection limit is less 
aggressive than the order's effective limit price, will afford market 
participants the opportunity to evaluate whether to re-submit their 
orders and/or establish a different price and/or price protection 
instructions, based on then-current market conditions, prior to the 
opening of the next trading session. Given that the Exchange can 
discern when an order may not fill at the price levels anticipated, 
(based on an order having a price protection limit that is less 
aggressive than the order's effective limit price), the Exchange 
believes the most prudent course of action in these circumstances is to 
return the order to the Member for analysis and evaluation, while the 
market is not in a regular

[[Page 14254]]

trading state, (e.g., a Member submitting a non-routable market order 
to sell in an option class quoting in $.01 increments, when the MBBO is 
$0.00 x $0.15 and the NBBO is $0.05 x $0.15, could expect to sell at 
every price increment down to $.01. However, if the Exchange default 
price protection instruction is 2 MPVs, the order would receive a price 
protection limit of $0.03. When the price protection limit is 
triggered, the order, or the remaining contracts of the order, would be 
canceled, and the order would not execute at $0.02 or $0.01).
    Specifically, the Exchange proposes to adopt new Interpretations 
and Policies .04, to state that the System will cancel certain orders 
from the Book immediately following the commencement of a trading halt 
pursuant to Rule 504, and at the end of each trading session, when the 
order's price protection limit is less aggressive than the order's 
effective limit price. Interpretations and Policies .04 further states 
that, for the purposes of this Rule, the effective limit price of a 
limit order will be the order's limit price; the effective limit price 
of a market order to buy, will be the maximum price currently permitted 
by the Exchange; \20\ and the effective limit price of a market order 
to sell, will be one (1) MPV as established by Rule 510, either $.01 
for option classes quoted and traded in increments as low as $.01, or 
$.05 for option classes quoted and traded in increments as low as $.05.
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    \20\ See supra note 16.
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    Finally, the Exchange proposes to eliminate the establishment of a 
price protection limit for orders that are received prior to the open 
or during a trading halt and for orders that remain on the Book at the 
conclusion of the opening process. Orders received prior to the opening 
process or during a trading halt and orders carried over from a prior 
trading session participate in the opening process. This is true today 
under existing Exchange rules and is not changing under this proposal. 
The Exchange has a single opening process that is used to open the 
System for trading at the start of the day, and to reopen the System 
for trading after an intraday halt.\21\ During the opening process, the 
opening price serves as a price protection limit for all orders 
participating in the opening, and orders that are priced through the 
opening price are canceled at the conclusion of the opening 
process.\22\ \23\ Following the opening process, the System currently 
assigns a new IRP equal to the NBBO to any such orders that remain 
unexecuted after the opening process is complete.
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    \21\ See Exchange Rule 503.
    \22\ See Exchange Rule 503(f)(2)(vii)(B)(5).
    \23\ The Exchange notes that market orders will never remain on 
the book after the opening process concludes, as by definition these 
orders will always be priced through the opening price and will be 
filled to the extent possible and then conceled at the conclusion of 
the opening process.
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    The Exchange now proposes to eliminate the establishment of a price 
protection limit for orders that have participated in the opening 
process and that remain on the Book. As proposed, orders that are 
received prior to the open or during a trading halt and orders from a 
prior trading session that remain on the Book after the opening process 
concludes, will be booked and managed at the order's limit price. An 
order that is received prior to the open or during a trading halt and 
that remains on the Book after the opening process concludes is not 
priced through the opening price and may be booked and managed at its 
limit price. The order's limit price serves as the most effective price 
protection limit as an order will never trade through its limit price 
on the Exchange.
    During a regular trading session, an order with a price protection 
limit that is more aggressive than its limit price will either rest on 
the Book or fill to its limit price and no further. An order with a 
price protection limit that is less aggressive than its limit price 
will either rest on the Book or fill to its price protection limit, 
which once triggered will cancel the order, or the remaining contracts 
of the order, which in all cases will be before the order has a chance 
to trade to its limit price. As proposed, at the conclusion of each 
trading session, the System will cancel orders with a price protection 
limit that is less aggressive than the order's effective limit price. 
Therefore, the only orders that will remain in the System from a prior 
session to participate in the opening will be orders with a price 
protection limit that is more aggressive than the order's effective 
limit price. As previously discussed, limit orders with a price 
protection limit more aggressive than the order's effective limit price 
are managed to their limit price, as a limit order will never execute 
through its limit price, and the price protection limit is not a factor 
for these orders. Therefore, additional price protection is unnecessary 
for orders that remain on the Book after participating in the opening 
process as orders on the Exchange will never trade through their limit 
price.
    The Exchange believes that the enhancements it is proposing to its 
price protection process in the proposed rule change should assist 
market participants in making informed decisions concerning trading 
opportunities by clarifying the relationship between an order's limit 
price, price protection limit, and the operation of the Exchange's 
price protection process. The Exchange believes that the detailed 
description of this functionality belongs in the Exchange's Rules in 
order to inform market participants whose orders are being managed, 
that such orders may be canceled by the Exchange under certain 
circumstances, and the reasons therefore. The proposed rule change 
should assist market participants in making decisions concerning price 
limits and routing decisions. While this proposal effectively mandates 
usage of the price protection process, the Exchange notes that market 
participants will still have the ability to set price protection limits 
at higher thresholds should they so elect, therefore the Exchange does 
not view the proposal as a material or significant change.
2. Statutory Basis
    MIAX believes that its proposed rule change is consistent with 
Section 6(b) of the Act \24\ in general, and furthers the objectives of 
Section 6(b)(5) of the Act \25\ in particular, in that it is designed 
to prevent fraudulent and manipulative acts and practices, to promote 
just and equitable principles of trade, to foster cooperation and 
coordination with persons engaged in facilitating transactions in 
securities, to remove impediments to and perfect the mechanisms of a 
free and open market and a national market system and, in general, to 
protect investors and the public interest. The system protections 
described above are designed in the interest of protecting investors 
and to assure fair and orderly markets on the Exchange.
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    \24\ 15 U.S.C. 78f(b).
    \25\ 15 U.S.C. 78f(b)(5).
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    Specifically, the Exchange operates an electronic marketplace in 
which orders are processed and executed in less than one second. 
Without any safeguards, orders that outsize the liquidity available at 
the displayed best bid or offer on the Exchange could potentially trade 
at prices far below the best bid and far above the best offer, creating 
extreme volatility in the marketplace and poor executions for 
investors.
    The Exchange believes that the proposed rule change to enhance the 
price protection process of the Exchange's System will protect 
investors and the public interest. The Exchange believes that reducing 
the number of price levels at which an incoming order can execute

[[Page 14255]]

appropriately balances the interests of investors seeking execution of 
their orders and the Exchange's obligations to provide a fair and 
orderly market. Further, the Exchange believes that defining the 
minimum and maximum range of MPVs available to the Members within the 
Rule promotes transparency and clarity in the Exchange's rules and 
protects investors and the public interest.
    Additionally, the proposal provides the Exchange with a range of 
values to select from when establishing a default price protection 
limit, which provides greater flexibility for the Exchange to 
adequately tailor its default setting to market conditions. Providing 
default values will benefit market participants and the options market 
as a whole as this will ensure that all eligible orders have a minimal 
level of price protection. The proposal to eliminate a Member's ability 
to disable the price protection process will facilitate transactions in 
securities as Members will have greater confidence that protections are 
in place that reduce the risk of executions at prices that are 
significantly through the market. Additionally, the Exchange believes 
that this benefits all market participants by ensuring that all 
eligible orders have some level of price protection. As a result, the 
enhancements to the price protection process promotes just and 
equitable principles of trade. While this proposal effectively mandates 
usage of the price protection process, the Exchange notes that market 
participants will still have the ability to set price protection limits 
at high thresholds should they so elect, therefore the Exchange does 
not view the proposal as a material or significant change.
    The Exchange believes that its proposal to remove orders with a 
price protection limit less aggressive than the order's effective limit 
price at the conclusion of a trading session (or after a trading halt 
as defined in Rule 504) to be in the best interest of the investor as 
these orders will never fill to their effective limit price. The price 
protection process will cancel an order, or the remaining contracts of 
an order, when the price protection limit is triggered during regular 
trading. The Exchange believes it is in the best interest of investors 
for the Exchange to return an order with a price protection limit that 
is less aggressive than the order's effective limit price to the 
Member, while the market is not in regular trading, so that the Member 
has more time to evaluate whether to re-submit the order and/or 
establish a different price and/or different price protection 
instructions, based on the then-current market conditions. 
Specifically, the Exchange believes the proposed change will remove 
impediments to and perfect the mechanism of a free and open market by 
providing market participants with more time to evaluate their orders 
which will promote fair and orderly markets, increase overall market 
confidence, and promote the protection of investors.
    The Exchange believes that the elimination of a price protection 
limit for orders that are received prior to the opening or during a 
trading halt and for orders received during a prior trading session 
that remain on the book following the Opening Process (other than the 
price protection afforded by opening price) provides transparency and 
clarity in the Exchange's rules. As noted above, the Exchange believes 
that booking and posting these orders at their limit price provides the 
same level of protection as the price protection process, as an order 
will never trade through its limit price on the Exchange. The Exchange 
believes it is in the interest of investors and the public to 
accurately describe the behavior of the Exchange's System in its rules 
as this information may be used by investors to make decisions 
concerning the submission of their orders. Transparency and clarity are 
consistent with the Act because it removes impediments to and perfects 
the mechanism of a free and open market and a national market system, 
and, in general, protects investors and the public interest by 
accurately describing the behavior of the Exchange's System.
    The Exchange believes its proposal to add new Interpretations and 
Policies .04 protects investors and the public interest by clearly 
stating in the Exchange's rules the method by which the Exchange is 
evaluating orders for removal by the System. Further, the Exchange 
believes that providing the definition of effective limit price 
provides clarity and transparency in the Exchange's rules. 
Additionally, the Exchange's proposal to remove orders where the price 
protection limit for a buy order is lower than the order's effective 
limit price; and where the price protection limit for a sell order is 
higher than the order's effective limit price, contributes to the 
maintenance of a fair and orderly market by returning orders that would 
not fill to their effective limit price to the market participant for 
re-evaluation while the market is not in a regular trading state. 
Market participants can evaluate the current market conditions and 
consider re-submitting their order with a new price and/or new price 
protection instructions while the market is not active.
    The Exchange believes this proposal will provide MIAX participants 
with a better understanding of the Exchange's price protection process. 
The description of the System's functionality is designed to promote 
just and equitable principles of trade by providing a clear and 
accurate description to all participants of how the price protection 
process is applied and should assist investors in making decisions 
concerning their orders. Further, the Exchange believes that the price 
protection process provides market participants with an appropriate 
level of risk protection on their orders and contributes to the 
maintenance of a fair and orderly market.
    Additionally, the Exchange notes that it has an affiliate Exchange, 
MIAX PEARL, LLC (``MIAX PEARL'') and that MIAX Options and MIAX PEARL 
have similar rules.\26\ A substantially similar rule on MIAX PEARL 
became operative when the Exchange commenced operations on February 6, 
2017.\27\ Further, MIAX Options and MIAX PEARL also have a number of 
common Members and on each Exchange, where feasible, the Exchange 
intends to implement similar behavior to provide consistency between 
the Exchanges so as to avoid confusion among Members. Aligning similar 
rules on the Exchange and MIAX PEARL provides transparency and clarity 
in the rules and minimizes the potential for confusion, thereby 
protecting investors and the public interest.
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    \26\ The Exchange notes that MIAX PEARL incorporates the 
following Chapters of the MIAX Options Rule Book by reference: 
Chapter III, VII, VIII, IX, XI, XIII, XIV, XV, and XVI.
    \27\ See MIAX PEARL Rule 515.
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B. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement on Burden on Competition

    The Exchange does not believe that the proposed rule change will 
impose any burden on competition that is not necessary or appropriate 
in furtherance of the purposes of the Act. Specifically, the Exchange 
believes the proposed changes will not impose any burden on intra-
market competition because it applies to all MIAX participants equally. 
In addition, the Exchange does not believe the proposal will impose any 
burden on inter-market competition as the proposal is intended to 
protect investors by providing further enhancements and transparency 
regarding the Exchange's price protection functionality.

[[Page 14256]]

C. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement on Comments on the Proposed 
Rule Change Received From Members, Participants, or Others

    Written comments were neither solicited nor received.

III. Date of Effectiveness of the Proposed Rule Change and Timing for 
Commission Action

    Because the foregoing proposed rule change does not: (i) 
Significantly affect the protection of investors or the public 
interest; (ii) impose any significant burden on competition; and (iii) 
become operative for 30 days after the date of the filing, or such 
shorter time as the Commission may designate, it has become effective 
pursuant to 19(b)(3)(A) of the Act \28\ and Rule 19b-4(f)(6) \29\ 
thereunder.
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    \28\ 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(3)(A).
    \29\ 17 CFR 240.19b-4(f)(6). In addition, Rule 19b-4(f)(6) 
requires a self-regulatory organization to give the Commission 
written notice of its intent to file the proposed rule change at 
least five business days prior to the date of filing of the proposed 
rule change, or such shorter time as designated by the Commission. 
The Exchange has satisfied this requirement.
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    A proposed rule change filed pursuant to Rule 19b-4(f)(6) under the 
Act \30\ normally does not become operative for 30 days after the date 
of its filing. However, Rule 19b-4(f)(6)(iii) \31\ permits the 
Commission to designate a shorter time if such action is consistent 
with the protection of investors and the public interest. In its filing 
with the Commission, the Exchange has asked the Commission to waive the 
30-day operative delay so that the proposal may become operative 
immediately upon filing. The Commission believes that waiving the 30-
day operative delay is consistent with the protection of investors and 
the public interest. The Exchange notes that the Exchange and MIAX 
PEARL have common Members and the proposal will provide, where 
feasible, consistent functionality between the Exchange and MIAX PEARL, 
and thus reduce complexity and avoid potential confusion among Members. 
Accordingly, the Commission hereby waives the operative delay and 
designates the proposal operative upon filing.\32\
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    \30\ 17 CFR 240.19b-4(f)(6).
    \31\ 17 CFR 240.19b-4(f)(6)(iii).
    \32\ For purposes only of waiving the 30-day operative delay, 
the Commission has also considered the proposed rule's impact on 
efficiency, competition, and capital formation. See 15 U.S.C. 
78c(f).
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    At any time within 60 days of the filing of the proposed rule 
change, the Commission summarily may temporarily suspend such rule 
change if it appears to the Commission that such action is necessary or 
appropriate in the public interest, for the protection of investors, or 
otherwise in furtherance of the purposes of the Act. If the Commission 
takes such action, the Commission shall institute proceedings to 
determine whether the proposed rule should be approved or disapproved.

IV. Solicitation of Comments

    Interested persons are invited to submit written data, views, and 
arguments concerning the foregoing, including whether the proposed rule 
change is consistent with the Act. Comments may be submitted by any of 
the following methods:

Electronic Comments

     Use the Commission's Internet comment form (http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro.shtml); or
     Send an email to [email protected]. Please include 
File Number SR- MIAX-2017-12 on the subject line.

Paper Comments

     Send paper comments in triplicate to Secretary, Securities 
and Exchange Commission, 100 F Street NE., Washington, DC 20549-1090.

All submissions should refer to File Number SR-MIAX-2017-12. This file 
number should be included on the subject line if email is used. To help 
the Commission process and review your comments more efficiently, 
please use only one method. The Commission will post all comments on 
the Commission's Internet Web site (http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro.shtml). Copies of the submission, all subsequent amendments, all 
written statements with respect to the proposed rule change that are 
filed with the Commission, and all written communications relating to 
the proposed rule change between the Commission and any person, other 
than those that may be withheld from the public in accordance with the 
provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552, will be available for Web site viewing and 
printing in the Commission's Public Reference Room, 100 F Street NE., 
Washington, DC 20549, on official business days between the hours of 
10:00 a.m. and 3:00 p.m. Copies of the filing also will be available 
for inspection and copying at the principal office of the Exchange. All 
comments received will be posted without change; the Commission does 
not edit personal identifying information from submissions. You should 
submit only information that you wish to make available publicly. All 
submissions should refer to File Number SR-MIAX-2017-12 and should be 
submitted on or before April 7, 2017.
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    \33\ 17 CFR 200.30-3(a)(12).

    For the Commission, by the Division of Trading and Markets, 
pursuant to delegated authority.\33\
Eduardo A. Aleman,
Assistant Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2017-05345 Filed 3-16-17; 8:45 am]
 BILLING CODE 8011-01-P


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CategoryRegulatory Information
CollectionFederal Register
sudoc ClassAE 2.7:
GS 4.107:
AE 2.106:
PublisherOffice of the Federal Register, National Archives and Records Administration
SectionNotices
FR Citation82 FR 14251 

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