83 FR 17701 - Draft Safety Advisory Related to Temporary Signal Suspensions AGENCY: Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), Department of Transportation (DOT)

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Railroad Administration

Federal Register Volume 83, Issue 78 (April 23, 2018)

Page Range		17701-17703
FR Document		2018-08406

This document provides notice of FRA's intent to issue a Safety Advisory addressing railroad operations under temporary signal suspensions. The Safety Advisory would identify existing industry best practices railroads utilize when implementing temporary signal suspensions and would recommend that railroads conducting rail operations under temporary signal suspensions develop and implement procedures and practices consistent with the identified best practices. The Safety Advisory would also recommend that railroads take certain other actions to ensure the safety of railroad operations during temporary signal suspensions. FRA believes that actions consistent with the draft Safety Advisory will reduce the risk of serious injury or death both to railroad employees and members of the public. FRA invites public comment on all aspects of the draft Safety Advisory.

Federal Register, Volume 83 Issue 78 (Monday, April 23, 2018)

[Federal Register Volume 83, Number 78 (Monday, April 23, 2018)]
[Notices]
[Pages 17701-17703]
From the Federal Register Online [www.thefederalregister.org]
[FR Doc No: 2018-08406]

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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Railroad Administration

[Docket No. FRA-2018-0037; Notice No. 1] [Draft Safety Advisory 2018-
01]

Draft Safety Advisory Related to Temporary Signal Suspensions
AGENCY: Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), Department of
Transportation (DOT)

ACTION: Notice of draft Safety Advisory; request for comment.

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SUMMARY: This document provides notice of FRA's intent to issue a
Safety Advisory addressing railroad operations under temporary signal
suspensions. The Safety Advisory would identify existing industry best
practices railroads utilize when implementing temporary signal
suspensions and would recommend that railroads conducting rail
operations under temporary signal suspensions develop and implement
procedures and practices consistent with the identified best practices.
The Safety Advisory would also recommend that railroads take certain
other actions to ensure the safety of railroad operations during
temporary signal suspensions. FRA believes that actions consistent with
the draft Safety Advisory will reduce the risk of serious injury or
death both to railroad employees and members of the public. FRA invites
public comment on all aspects of the draft Safety Advisory.

DATES: Interested persons are invited to submit comments on the draft
Safety Advisory provided below on or before June 22, 2018.

ADDRESSES: Comments in response to this notice may be submitted by any
of the following methods:
Website: The Federal eRulemaking Portal,
www.Regulations.gov. Follow the website's online instructions for
submitting comments.
Fax: 202-493-2251.
Mail: Docket Management Facility, U.S. Department of
Transportation, Room W12-140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE, Washington, DC
20590.
Hand Delivery: Docket Management Facility, U.S. Department
of Transportation, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE, Room W12-140 on the
Ground level of the West Building, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday
through Friday, except Federal holidays.
Instructions: All submissions must include the agency name, docket
name, and docket number for this notice, Docket No. FRA-2018-0037;
Notice No. 1. Note that all comments received will be posted without
change to http://www.Regulations.gov, including any personal
information provided. Please see the Privacy Act Statement in this
document.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Douglas Taylor, Staff Director,
Operating Practices, Office of Railroad Safety, FRA, 1200 New Jersey
Avenue SE, Washington, DC 20590, telephone (202) 493-6255; or Carolyn
Hayward-Williams, Staff Director, Signal & Train Control Division,
Office of Railroad Safety, FRA, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE, Washington,
DC 20590, telephone (202) 493-6399.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Draft Safety Advisory

A review of FRA's accident/incident data shows that overall, rail
transportation, both passenger and freight, is safe. However, recent
rail accidents occurring in areas where a railroad has temporarily
suspended the signal system, typically for purposes of maintenance,
repair, or installation of additional components for a new or existing
system, demonstrate that rail operations during the signal suspension
present increased safety risks. Further, these accidents show that if
the increased risks associated with rail operations under a temporary
signal suspension are not addressed, serious unsafe conditions and
practices are introduced into rail transportation.
Most recently, on February 4, 2018, both the engineer and conductor
of National Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak) Train P09103 were
killed and 115 passengers injured,\1\ when their train collided head-on
with a CSX Transportation, Inc. freight train (Train F77703). The
collision occurred at approximately 2:27 a.m. in Cayce, South Carolina
when the Amtrak train, traveling south from New York City, New York, to
Miami, Florida, and operating on a track warrant, was diverted from the
main track through a misaligned switch. The misaligned switch sent the
Amtrak train into the siding where the CSX train was parked, resulting
in a head-on collision with an impact speed of 50 miles per hour (mph).
The lead locomotive and six of the seven cars in the Amtrak train
derailed. At the time of the accident, eight Amtrak crew members and
139 passengers were on board the train.
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\1\ Including 92 individuals who were transported to medical
facilities for treatment and 23 people who received first aid at a
triage area established near the accident site.
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While the cause of the February 4, 2018, accident has not yet been
determined, FRA's preliminary investigation indicates that despite the
CSX train crew reporting to the train dispatcher that the switch was
lined correctly, the crew did not restore the main track switch to its
normal position as required by Federal regulation (49 CFR 218.105) and
CSX's own operating rules. Instead, it appears the crew left the switch
misaligned in the reverse position (i.e., lined for the siding, not the
main line). Amtrak Train P09103 was the next train to traverse this
location. The misaligned switch diverted the Amtrak train into the
siding and into the standing CSX train parked on the siding. Notably,
CSX signal personnel had suspended the signal system for the area where
the accident occurred to upgrade the system with positive train control
(PTC) technology.\2\ Signal personnel had stopped working for the day
at the time of the accident, yet the temporary signal suspension
remained in place.
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\2\ PTC is a system designed to prevent train-to-train
collisions, overspeed derailments, incursions into established work
zone limits, and the movement of a train through a switch left in
the wrong position, as described in subpart I of 49 CFR part 236 and
49 U.S.C. 20157(i)(5).
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The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is investigating
this accident under its legal authority. 49 U.S.C. 1101 et seq.; 49 CFR
831.2(b). As is customary, FRA is participating in the NTSB's
investigation and is also investigating the accident under its own
authority. 49 U.S.C. 20902; 49 CFR 1.89(a). While NTSB has not yet
issued any formal findings, on February 13, 2018, NTSB issued a Safety
Recommendation Report \3\ regarding

[[Page 17702]]

train operations during signal suspensions to FRA. In its report, NTSB
recommended that FRA issue an emergency order directing railroads to
require train crews to approach switches at restricted speed when
signal suspensions are in effect and a switch has been reported relined
for a main track. NTSB further recommended that after the switch
position is verified, train crews should be required to report to the
dispatcher that the switch is correctly lined for the main track before
subsequent trains are permitted to operate at maximum-authorized speed.
FRA is issuing this draft Safety Advisory consistent with the NTSB's
recommendation. Issuance of a Safety Advisory allows FRA to make all
railroads aware of both the safety concerns identified and information
and practices that specifically address the issues raised. Moreover,
issuance of a Safety Advisory provides all railroads the flexibility to
review and revise their existing operating rules and practices as
necessary to ensure the safety of their rail operations, without
imposing rigid, and inherently limited, new requirements on the
industry.
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\3\ NTSB, Safety Recommendation Report: Train Operation During
Signal Suspension, Report No. RSR-18/01, Recommendation No. R-18-005
(Feb. 13, 2018), https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Reports/RSR1801.pdf (NTSB Report).
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As noted in the NTSB Report, a similar accident occurred on March
14, 2016, near Granger, Wyoming, when at 9:41 p.m., a westbound Union
Pacific Railroad (UP) freight train (Train KG1LAC-13) traveled from the
main track through a switch into a controlled siding and collided head-
on with a standing eastbound UP freight train (Train LCK41-14). The
collision occurred at a recorded speed of 30 mph and the engineer of
the striking train sustained minor injuries. Similar to the recent
accident in Cayce, South Carolina, at the time of this 2016 accident,
UP was installing and testing PTC technology on the main track. While
this work was in progress, UP suspended the signals in the area and
established absolute blocks intended to provide for the safe movement
of trains through the area without signals. NTSB determined the
probable cause of the accident was the employee-in-charge incorrectly
using information from a conversation with the train dispatcher as
authorization to send a train into the area where the signal system
suspension was in effect. The NTSB also found that a contributing
factor was the involved conductor pilot's failure to check the switch
position before authorizing the train to enter the area.
The trains involved in both the Cayce, South Carolina, and Granger,
Wyoming, accidents were operating under temporary signal suspensions
where the signal systems that would normally govern operations through
the areas were suspended as the railroads installed additional
components to comply with the statutory mandate to implement a PTC
system.
FRA realizes that railroads suspend signal systems for a variety of
reasons, including for example, maintenance or repair purposes, to
install a new system, or to add additional components to an existing
system. Although temporary signal suspensions are necessarily common
occurrences, rail operations under signal suspensions should be rare
and appropriately limited. FRA believes that, as exemplified by the
accidents described above, rail operations under the temporary loss of
protections provided by an existing signal system have a high potential
of introducing new safety risks and amplify the safety risks
encountered because railroad employees accustomed to the safety an
existing signal system provides must operate in an environment they may
not encounter on a regular basis. Indeed, a temporary signal suspension
requires operating employees to immediately apply operating rules and
practices different than those to which they are accustomed. Because a
person's routine may include learned habits that are difficult to set
aside when a temporary condition is imposed, operating employees may
also need specialized instruction on the applicable rules and
practices. Such risks must be addressed to provide for the safety of
train operations during the loss of protection afforded by the signal
system. Moreover, if a railroad elects to operate trains in signal
suspension territory, the scope of the signal suspension should be
limited in both geographic area and duration and rail operations
through or within the territory should be limited.
Federal regulations do not prohibit railroads from temporarily
suspending existing signal systems for purposes of performing
maintenance, upgrades, repairs, or implementing PTC technology.
However, FRA regulations in 49 CFR part 235 require railroads to apply
for FRA approval for certain discontinuances and modifications of
signal systems. Specifically, FRA's regulations provide for both a
formal approval process in 49 CFR 235.5 for a variety of signal system
changes and also an expedited approval process in 49 CFR 235.6 for
modifications directly associated with the implementation of a PTC
system. Although the safety of railroad operations during temporary
signal suspensions may be addressed under these approval processes,
part 235 also excludes various signal system changes from FRA approval
(49 CFR 235.7).
FRA's regulations also require individual railroads to adopt and
comply with operating rules addressing the operation of hand-operated
main track switches. See 49 CFR 218.105. Specifically, Sec. 218.105
requires railroads to designate in writing the normal position of hand-
operated main track switches and, with limited exceptions, requires
those switches to be lined and locked in the designated position when
not in use. That same section requires employees to conduct a job
briefing before leaving a location where any hand-operated main track
switch was operated and all crewmembers to communicate to confirm the
position of the switch. Further, Sec. 218.105 generally requires an
employee releasing the limits of a main track authority in non-signaled
territory (including an area under temporary signal suspension) where a
hand-operated switch is used to clear the main track to report to the
train dispatcher that the hand-operated main track switch has been
restored to its normal position and locked, prior to departing the
switch's location and after conducting the required job briefing. Upon
the employee's report, Sec. 218.105 requires the train dispatcher to
repeat the reported switch position information to the employee
releasing the limits and requires the employee releasing the limits to
confirm to the train dispatcher that the information is correct.
In addition to these regulatory requirements, virtually all
railroads have adopted additional operational protections to ensure the
safety of rail operations when an existing signal system is temporarily
suspended. FRA reviewed the current operating practices of several
railroads and engaged in discussions with these railroads to identify
the industry's best safety practices related to temporary suspension of
an existing signal system. As a result of this outreach, FRA believes
that certain operational safeguards railroads already undertake
constitute the best practices within the industry when temporarily
suspending a signal system. These best practices, include:
Take all practical measures to ensure sufficient personnel
are present to continue signal work until the system is restored to
proper operation. If sufficient personnel are not present, the signal
suspension should be terminated until such time as sufficient personnel
are on hand.
If a railroad elects to allow train traffic through
suspension limits:

[[Page 17703]]

[cir] Establish the smallest limits possible for the signal
suspension (if possible, no more than three (3) control points or use
phased limits to allow restoration of the signal system as work is
completed);
[cir] Minimize the duration of the signal suspension to the
shortest time period possible (if possible, no more than twelve (12)
hours); and
[cir] Take all practical measures to ensure only through traffic is
allowed to operate within the limits (avoiding any train meets or any
moves requiring the manipulation of switches within the suspension
limits).
If any switches within the suspension limits are
manipulated, consistent with 49 CFR 218.105(d), establish an effective
means of verifying that all switches have been returned to the proper
position prior to any train traffic operating through the limits. (For
example, require spiking or clamping of switches followed by locking
for through movement after use; utilize a signal employee to tend the
switch and to establish agreement between assigned crewmembers and the
switch tender that the switch is properly lined; and/or require the
first train through the limits after the manipulation of any switch to
operate at restricted speed).
Recommendations: Considering the accidents discussed above, and to
ensure the safety of the Nation's railroads, their employees, and the
public, FRA recommends that railroads take actions consistent with the
following:
1. Develop and implement procedures and practices consistent with
the industry best practices discussed above for rail operations
conducted under temporary signal suspensions.
2. Inform employees of the circumstances surrounding the February
4, 2018, accident in Cayce, South Carolina, and the March 14, 2016,
accident near Granger, Wyoming, discussed above, emphasizing the
potential consequences of misaligned switches and the relevant Federal
regulations and railroad operating rules intended to prevent such
accidents.
3. Review, and as appropriate, revise all operating rules related
to operating hand-operated main track switches (including operating
rules required by 49 CFR 218.105(d)), to enhance them to ensure (a)
train crews and others restore switches to their normal position after
use, and (b) the position of switches are clearly communicated to train
control employees and/or dispatcher(s) responsible for the movement of
trains through the area where the signal system is temporarily
suspended. In doing so, railroads should pay particular attention to
those main track switches where employees report clear of the main
track to the train dispatcher.
4. Increase supervisory operational oversight and conduct
operational testing on the applicable operating rules pertaining to the
operation of hand-operated main track switches. This should include
face-to-face initial job briefings with all train and engine (T&E)
crews that will operate in any area where the signal system will be
temporarily suspended.
5. Enhance instruction on the relevant operating rules concerning
the operation of hand-operated main track switches in non-signaled
areas, including the operating rules required by 49 CFR 218.105(d)
during both initial and periodic instruction required by 49 CFR 217.11.
In doing so, railroads should emphasize the applicability of the rules
to area(s) where the signal system is temporarily suspended and the
need to ensure and verify that all hand-operated main track switches
manipulated within any suspension limits have been returned to the
proper position prior to operating any trains through the limits.
6. Stress to T&E employees the importance of thorough and accurate
job briefings when operating hand-operated main track switches,
particularly in areas where the signal system is temporarily suspended,
and specifically when releasing main track authority. Ensure adequate
processes and procedures are in place enabling clear and timely
communication of switch positions between and among all dispatching,
T&E, and train control employees responsible for operating, performing
work, or authorizing trains to operate through areas where the signal
system is temporarily suspended, including processes and procedures for
communicating switch position information during shift handovers.
Encourage employees, in case of any doubt or uncertainty regarding the
position of such switches, to immediately contact the train dispatcher
or take other appropriate action to confirm the position of the switch
prior to authorizing a train to operate through the limits of the area.
FRA requests public comment on all aspects of this draft Safety
Advisory.
Privacy Act Statement: Anyone can search the electronic form of all
comments received into any of DOT's dockets by the name of the
individual submitting the comment (or signing the comment, if submitted
on behalf of an association, business, labor union, etc.). You may
review DOT's complete Privacy Act Statement in the Federal Register
published on April 11, 2000 (65 FR 19477), or you may visit http://www.regulations.gov/#!privacyNotice.

Issued in Washington, DC, on April 18, 2018.
Ronald Louis Batory,
Administrator.
[FR Doc. 2018-08406 Filed 4-20-18; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-06-P

Federal Register / Vol. 83, No. 78 / Monday, April 23, 2018 / Notices 17701

Whether the proposed collection is ADDRESSES: Comments in response to train collided head-on with a CSX
necessary for the FHWA’s performance; this notice may be submitted by any of Transportation, Inc. freight train (Train
(2) the accuracy of the estimated the following methods: F77703). The collision occurred at
burdens; (3) ways for the FHWA to • Website: The Federal eRulemaking approximately 2:27 a.m. in Cayce, South
enhance the quality, usefulness, and Portal, www.Regulations.gov. Follow the Carolina when the Amtrak train,
clarity of the collected information; and website’s online instructions for traveling south from New York City,
(4) ways that the burden could be submitting comments. New York, to Miami, Florida, and
minimized, including the use of • Fax: 202–493–2251. operating on a track warrant, was
electronic technology, without reducing • Mail: Docket Management Facility, diverted from the main track through a
the quality of the collected information. U.S. Department of Transportation, misaligned switch. The misaligned
The agency will summarize and/or Room W12–140, 1200 New Jersey switch sent the Amtrak train into the
include your comments in the request Avenue SE, Washington, DC 20590. siding where the CSX train was parked,
for OMB’s clearance of this information • Hand Delivery: Docket Management resulting in a head-on collision with an
collection. Facility, U.S. Department of impact speed of 50 miles per hour
Transportation, 1200 New Jersey (mph). The lead locomotive and six of
Authority: The Paperwork Reduction Act Avenue SE, Room W12–140 on the
of 1995; 44 U.S.C. Chapter 35, as amended; the seven cars in the Amtrak train
Ground level of the West Building, derailed. At the time of the accident,
and 49 CFR 1.48.
between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday eight Amtrak crew members and 139
Issued On: April 17, 2018. through Friday, except Federal holidays. passengers were on board the train.
Michael Howell, Instructions: All submissions must While the cause of the February 4,
Information Collection Officer . include the agency name, docket name, 2018, accident has not yet been
[FR Doc. 2018–08394 Filed 4–20–18; 8:45 am] and docket number for this notice, determined, FRA’s preliminary
BILLING CODE 4910–22–P
Docket No. FRA–2018–0037; Notice investigation indicates that despite the
No. 1. Note that all comments received CSX train crew reporting to the train
will be posted without change to http:// dispatcher that the switch was lined
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION www.Regulations.gov, including any correctly, the crew did not restore the
personal information provided. Please main track switch to its normal position
Federal Railroad Administration see the Privacy Act Statement in this as required by Federal regulation (49
document. CFR 218.105) and CSX’s own operating
[Docket No. FRA–2018–0037; Notice No. 1] FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: rules. Instead, it appears the crew left
[Draft Safety Advisory 2018–01] Douglas Taylor, Staff Director, the switch misaligned in the reverse
Operating Practices, Office of Railroad position (i.e., lined for the siding, not
Draft Safety Advisory Related to Safety, FRA, 1200 New Jersey Avenue the main line). Amtrak Train P09103
Temporary Signal Suspensions SE, Washington, DC 20590, telephone was the next train to traverse this
AGENCY: Federal Railroad (202) 493–6255; or Carolyn Hayward- location. The misaligned switch
Administration (FRA), Department of Williams, Staff Director, Signal & Train diverted the Amtrak train into the siding
Transportation (DOT) Control Division, Office of Railroad and into the standing CSX train parked
Safety, FRA, 1200 New Jersey Avenue on the siding. Notably, CSX signal
ACTION: Notice of draft Safety Advisory; SE, Washington, DC 20590, telephone personnel had suspended the signal
request for comment. (202) 493–6399. system for the area where the accident
SUMMARY: This document provides SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: occurred to upgrade the system with
positive train control (PTC) technology.2
notice of FRA’s intent to issue a Safety Draft Safety Advisory Signal personnel had stopped working
Advisory addressing railroad operations
A review of FRA’s accident/incident for the day at the time of the accident,
under temporary signal suspensions.
data shows that overall, rail yet the temporary signal suspension
The Safety Advisory would identify
transportation, both passenger and remained in place.
existing industry best practices railroads The National Transportation Safety
utilize when implementing temporary freight, is safe. However, recent rail
accidents occurring in areas where a Board (NTSB) is investigating this
signal suspensions and would accident under its legal authority. 49
recommend that railroads conducting railroad has temporarily suspended the
signal system, typically for purposes of U.S.C. 1101 et seq.; 49 CFR 831.2(b). As
rail operations under temporary signal is customary, FRA is participating in the
suspensions develop and implement maintenance, repair, or installation of
additional components for a new or NTSB’s investigation and is also
procedures and practices consistent investigating the accident under its own
with the identified best practices. The existing system, demonstrate that rail
operations during the signal suspension authority. 49 U.S.C. 20902; 49 CFR
Safety Advisory would also recommend 1.89(a). While NTSB has not yet issued
that railroads take certain other actions present increased safety risks. Further,
these accidents show that if the any formal findings, on February 13,
to ensure the safety of railroad 2018, NTSB issued a Safety
operations during temporary signal increased risks associated with rail
operations under a temporary signal Recommendation Report 3 regarding
suspensions. FRA believes that actions
consistent with the draft Safety suspension are not addressed, serious
unsafe conditions and practices are who received first aid at a triage area established
Advisory will reduce the risk of serious near the accident site.
injury or death both to railroad introduced into rail transportation. 2 PTC is a system designed to prevent train-to-
Most recently, on February 4, 2018, train collisions, overspeed derailments, incursions
employees and members of the public.
amozie on DSK30RV082PROD with NOTICES

both the engineer and conductor of into established work zone limits, and the
FRA invites public comment on all movement of a train through a switch left in the
National Railroad Passenger Corporation
aspects of the draft Safety Advisory. wrong position, as described in subpart I of 49 CFR
(Amtrak) Train P09103 were killed and part 236 and 49 U.S.C. 20157(i)(5).
DATES: Interested persons are invited to 115 passengers injured,1 when their 3 NTSB, Safety Recommendation Report: Train
submit comments on the draft Safety Operation During Signal Suspension, Report No.
Advisory provided below on or before 1 Including 92 individuals who were transported RSR–18/01, Recommendation No. R–18–005 (Feb.
June 22, 2018. to medical facilities for treatment and 23 people Continued

VerDate Sep<11>2014 17:09 Apr 20, 2018 Jkt 244001 PO 00000 Frm 00060 Fmt 4703 Sfmt 4703 E:\FR\FM\23APN1.SGM 23APN1

17702 Federal Register / Vol. 83, No. 78 / Monday, April 23, 2018 / Notices

train operations during signal accidents were operating under 235 also excludes various signal system
suspensions to FRA. In its report, NTSB temporary signal suspensions where the changes from FRA approval (49 CFR
recommended that FRA issue an signal systems that would normally 235.7).
emergency order directing railroads to govern operations through the areas FRA’s regulations also require
require train crews to approach switches were suspended as the railroads individual railroads to adopt and
at restricted speed when signal installed additional components to comply with operating rules addressing
suspensions are in effect and a switch comply with the statutory mandate to the operation of hand-operated main
has been reported relined for a main implement a PTC system. track switches. See 49 CFR 218.105.
track. NTSB further recommended that FRA realizes that railroads suspend Specifically, § 218.105 requires railroads
after the switch position is verified, signal systems for a variety of reasons, to designate in writing the normal
train crews should be required to report including for example, maintenance or position of hand-operated main track
to the dispatcher that the switch is repair purposes, to install a new system, switches and, with limited exceptions,
correctly lined for the main track before or to add additional components to an requires those switches to be lined and
subsequent trains are permitted to existing system. Although temporary locked in the designated position when
operate at maximum-authorized speed. signal suspensions are necessarily not in use. That same section requires
FRA is issuing this draft Safety common occurrences, rail operations employees to conduct a job briefing
Advisory consistent with the NTSB’s under signal suspensions should be rare before leaving a location where any
recommendation. Issuance of a Safety and appropriately limited. FRA believes hand-operated main track switch was
Advisory allows FRA to make all that, as exemplified by the accidents operated and all crewmembers to
railroads aware of both the safety described above, rail operations under communicate to confirm the position of
concerns identified and information and the temporary loss of protections the switch. Further, § 218.105 generally
practices that specifically address the provided by an existing signal system requires an employee releasing the
issues raised. Moreover, issuance of a have a high potential of introducing limits of a main track authority in non-
Safety Advisory provides all railroads new safety risks and amplify the safety signaled territory (including an area
the flexibility to review and revise their risks encountered because railroad under temporary signal suspension)
existing operating rules and practices as employees accustomed to the safety an where a hand-operated switch is used to
necessary to ensure the safety of their existing signal system provides must clear the main track to report to the train
rail operations, without imposing rigid, operate in an environment they may not dispatcher that the hand-operated main
and inherently limited, new encounter on a regular basis. Indeed, a track switch has been restored to its
requirements on the industry. temporary signal suspension requires normal position and locked, prior to
As noted in the NTSB Report, a operating employees to immediately departing the switch’s location and after
similar accident occurred on March 14, apply operating rules and practices conducting the required job briefing.
2016, near Granger, Wyoming, when at different than those to which they are Upon the employee’s report, § 218.105
9:41 p.m., a westbound Union Pacific accustomed. Because a person’s routine requires the train dispatcher to repeat
Railroad (UP) freight train (Train may include learned habits that are the reported switch position
KG1LAC–13) traveled from the main difficult to set aside when a temporary information to the employee releasing
track through a switch into a controlled condition is imposed, operating the limits and requires the employee
siding and collided head-on with a employees may also need specialized releasing the limits to confirm to the
standing eastbound UP freight train instruction on the applicable rules and train dispatcher that the information is
(Train LCK41–14). The collision practices. Such risks must be addressed correct.
occurred at a recorded speed of 30 mph to provide for the safety of train In addition to these regulatory
and the engineer of the striking train operations during the loss of protection requirements, virtually all railroads
sustained minor injuries. Similar to the afforded by the signal system. Moreover, have adopted additional operational
recent accident in Cayce, South if a railroad elects to operate trains in protections to ensure the safety of rail
Carolina, at the time of this 2016 signal suspension territory, the scope of operations when an existing signal
accident, UP was installing and testing the signal suspension should be limited system is temporarily suspended. FRA
PTC technology on the main track. in both geographic area and duration reviewed the current operating practices
While this work was in progress, UP and rail operations through or within of several railroads and engaged in
suspended the signals in the area and the territory should be limited. discussions with these railroads to
established absolute blocks intended to Federal regulations do not prohibit identify the industry’s best safety
provide for the safe movement of trains railroads from temporarily suspending practices related to temporary
through the area without signals. NTSB existing signal systems for purposes of suspension of an existing signal system.
determined the probable cause of the performing maintenance, upgrades, As a result of this outreach, FRA
accident was the employee-in-charge repairs, or implementing PTC believes that certain operational
incorrectly using information from a technology. However, FRA regulations safeguards railroads already undertake
conversation with the train dispatcher in 49 CFR part 235 require railroads to constitute the best practices within the
as authorization to send a train into the apply for FRA approval for certain industry when temporarily suspending
area where the signal system suspension discontinuances and modifications of a signal system. These best practices,
signal systems. Specifically, FRA’s include:
was in effect. The NTSB also found that
regulations provide for both a formal • Take all practical measures to
a contributing factor was the involved
approval process in 49 CFR 235.5 for a ensure sufficient personnel are present
conductor pilot’s failure to check the
variety of signal system changes and to continue signal work until the system
switch position before authorizing the
amozie on DSK30RV082PROD with NOTICES

also an expedited approval process in is restored to proper operation. If
train to enter the area.
The trains involved in both the Cayce, 49 CFR 235.6 for modifications directly sufficient personnel are not present, the
South Carolina, and Granger, Wyoming, associated with the implementation of a signal suspension should be terminated
PTC system. Although the safety of until such time as sufficient personnel
13, 2018), https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/
railroad operations during temporary are on hand.
AccidentReports/Reports/RSR1801.pdf (NTSB signal suspensions may be addressed • If a railroad elects to allow train
Report). under these approval processes, part traffic through suspension limits:

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Document Created: 2018-04-21 00:33:14
Document Modified: 2018-04-21 00:33:14

Category		Regulatory Information
Collection		Federal Register
sudoc Class		AE 2.7: GS 4.107: AE 2.106:
Publisher		Office of the Federal Register, National Archives and Records Administration
Section		Notices
Action		Notice of draft Safety Advisory; request for comment.
Dates		Interested persons are invited to submit comments on the draft Safety Advisory provided below on or before June 22, 2018.
Contact		Douglas Taylor, Staff Director, Operating Practices, Office of Railroad Safety, FRA, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE, Washington, DC 20590, telephone (202) 493-6255; or Carolyn Hayward-Williams, Staff Director, Signal & Train Control Division, Office of Railroad Safety, FRA, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE, Washington, DC 20590, telephone (202) 493-6399.
FR Citation		83 FR 17701

83 FR 17701 - Draft Safety Advisory Related to Temporary Signal Suspensions AGENCY: Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), Department of Transportation (DOT)

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATIONFederal Railroad Administration

Federal Register Volume 83, Issue 78 (April 23, 2018)

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Railroad Administration