83 FR 28244 - Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards Personnel Surety Program
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY Federal Register Volume 83, Issue 117 (June 18, 2018)
Federal Register Volume 83, Issue 117 (June 18, 2018)
| Page Range | 28244-28251 | |
| FR Document | 2018-12523 |
[Federal Register Volume 83, Number 117 (Monday, June 18, 2018)] [Notices] [Pages 28244-28251] From the Federal Register Online [www.thefederalregister.org] [FR Doc No: 2018-12523] ======================================================================= ----------------------------------------------------------------------- DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards Personnel Surety Program AGENCY: National Protection and Programs Directorate (NPPD), Department of Homeland Security (DHS). ACTION: 30-Day notice and request for comments; revision of information collection request: 1670-0029. ----------------------------------------------------------------------- SUMMARY: The DHS NPPD Office of Infrastructure Protection (IP), Infrastructure Security Compliance Division (ISCD) will submit the following information collection request (ICR) to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) for review and clearance in accordance with the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995. NPPD previously published this ICR, in the Federal Register on December 27, 2017, for a 60-day public comment period. In this notice NPPD is responding to seven commenters that submitted comments in response to the 60-day notice previously published for this ICR and soliciting public comment concerning this ICR for an additional 30 days. DATES: Comments are encouraged and will be accepted until July 18, 2018. ADDRESSES: Interested persons are invited to submit written comments on the proposed information collection to the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, OMB. Comments should be addressed to OMB Desk Officer, Department of Homeland Security, National Protection and Programs Directorate and sent via electronic mail to [email protected]. All submissions must include the words ``Department of Homeland Security'' and the OMB Control Number 1670- 0029. Comments submitted in response to this notice may be made available to the public through relevant websites. For this reason, please do not include in your comments information of a confidential nature, such as sensitive personal information or proprietary information. Please note that responses to this public comment request containing any routine notice about the confidentiality of the communication will be treated as public comments that may be made available to the public notwithstanding the inclusion of the routine notice. Comments that include trade secrets, confidential commercial or financial information, Chemical-terrorism Vulnerability Information (CVI), Sensitive Security Information (SSI), or Protected Critical Infrastructure Information (PCII) should not be submitted to the public regulatory docket. Please submit such comments separately from other comments in response to this notice. Comments containing trade secrets, confidential commercial or financial information, CVI, SSI, or PCII should be appropriately marked and packaged in [[Page 28245]] accordance with applicable requirements and submitted by mail to the DHS/NPPD/IP/ISCD CFATS Program Manager at the Department of Homeland Security, 245 Murray Lane SW, Mail Stop 0610, Arlington, VA 20528-0610. Comments must be identified by OMB Control Number 1670-0029. The Department will forward all comments received by the submission deadline to the OMB Desk Officer. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Questions and requests for additional information may be directed to Amy Graydon or the CFATS Program Manager via email at [email protected] or telephone at (866) 323-2957. SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: On December 18, 2014, the President signed into law the Protecting and Securing Chemical Facilities from Terrorist Attacks Act of 2014, Public Law 113-254 (CFATS Act of 2014) providing long-term authorization for the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS) program. The CFATS Act of 2014 codified the Department's authority to implement the CFATS program into the Homeland Security Act of 2002. See 6 U.S.C. 621 et. seq. Section 550 of the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act of 2007, Public Law 109-295 (2006) (``Section 550''), provided (and the CFATS Act of 2014 continues to provide) the Department with the authority to identify and regulate the security of high-risk chemical facilities using a risk-based approach. On April 9, 2007, the Department issued the CFATS Interim Final Rule (IFR), implementing this statutory mandate. See 72 FR 17688. Section 550 required (and the CFATS Act of 2014 continues to require) that the Department establish risk-based performance standards (RBPS) for high-risk chemical facilities. Through the CFATS regulations, the Department promulgated 18 RBPS. Each chemical facility that has been finally determined by the Department to be high-risk must submit, for Department approval, a Site Security Plan (SSP) or an Alternative Security Program (ASP), whichever the high-risk chemical facility chooses, that satisfies each applicable RBPS. RBPS 12 requires high-risk chemical facilities to perform appropriate background checks on and ensure appropriate credentials for facility personnel, and, as appropriate, unescorted visitors with access to restricted areas or critical assets. RBPS 12(iv) specifically requires high-risk chemical facility to implement measures designed to identify people with terrorist ties. For the purposes of the CFATS Personnel Surety Program (PSP), `people' in RBPS 12(iv) is in reference to affected individuals (i.e., facility personnel or unescorted visitors with or seeking access to restricted areas or critical assets at high-risk chemical facilities). Identifying affected individuals who have terrorist ties is an inherently governmental function and requires the use of information held in government-maintained databases that are unavailable to high- risk chemical facilities. See 72 FR 17688, 17709 (April 9, 2007). Thus, under RBPS 12(iv), the Department and high-risk chemical facilities must work together to satisfy the ``terrorist ties'' aspect of the Personnel Surety performance standard. In accordance with the Homeland Security Act of 2002, as amended by the CFATS Act of 2014, the following options are available to enable high-risk chemical facilities to facilitate the vetting of affected individuals for terrorist ties: Option 1. High-risk chemical facilities may submit certain information about affected individuals, which the Department will use to vet those individuals for terrorist ties. Specifically, the identifying information about affected individuals will be compared against identifying information of known or suspected terrorists contained in the Federal Government's consolidated and integrated terrorist watch list, the Terrorist Screening Database (TSDB), which is maintained by the Department of Justice (DOJ) Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in the Terrorist Screening Center (TSC).\1\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\ For more information about the TSDB, see DOJ/FBI-019 Terrorist Screening Records System, last published in full as 77 FR 26580 (May 25, 2017). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Option 2. High-risk chemical facilities may submit information about affected individuals who already possess certain credentials or documentation that rely on security threat assessments conducted by the Department. This will enable the Department to verify the continuing validity of these credentials or documentation. Option 3. High-risk chemical facilities may comply with RBPS 12(iv) without submitting to the Department information about affected individuals who possess Transportation Worker Identification Credentials (TWICs), if a high-risk chemical facility electronically verifies and validates the affected individual's TWICs through the use of TWIC readers (or other technology that is periodically updated using the Canceled Card List). Option 4. High-risk chemical facilities may visually verify certain credentials or documents that are issued by a Federal screening program that periodically vets enrolled individuals against the TSDB. The Department continues to believe that visual verification has significant security limitations and, accordingly, encourages high-risk chemical facilities choosing this option to identify in their SSPs the means by which they plan to address these limitations. In addition to the options described above for satisfying RBPS 12(iv), a high-risk chemical facility is welcome to propose alternative or supplemental options in its SSP that are not described in this document. The Department will assess the adequacy of such alternative or supplemental options on a facility-by-facility basis in the course of evaluating each facility's SSP. Under Option 3 and Option 4, a high-risk chemical facility would not need to submit information about an affected individual to the Department. These Options are only mentioned in this notice for informational purposes, and there will be no analysis of Option 3 and Option 4 in this information collection request. This information collection request does not propose changes to who qualifies as an affected individual. There are certain groups of persons that the Department does not consider to be affected individuals, such as (1) Federal officials that gain unescorted access to restricted areas or critical assets as part of their official duties; (2) state and local law enforcement officials that gain unescorted access to restricted areas or critical assets as part of their official duties; and (3) emergency responders at the state or local level that gain unescorted access to restricted areas or critical assets during emergency situations. OMB is particularly interested in comments that: 1. Evaluate whether the proposed collection of information is necessary for the proper performance of the functions of the agency, including whether the information will have practical utility; 2. Evaluate the accuracy of the agency's estimate of the burden of the proposed collection of information, including the validity of the methodology and assumptions used; 3. Enhance the quality, utility, and clarity of the information to be collected; and 4. Minimize the burden of the collection of information on those who are to respond, including through the use of appropriate automated, [[Page 28246]] electronic, mechanical, or other technological collection techniques or other forms of information technology, e.g., permitting electronic submissions of responses. The current information collection for the CFATS PSP (IC 1670-0029) will expire on August 31, 2018.\2\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \2\ The current information collection for CFATS Personnel Surety Program may be found at https://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/PRAViewICR?ref_nbr=201312-1670-001. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Summary of Proposed Revisions to the Information Collection The Department is seeking a revision to the CFATS PSP Information Collection to: (1) Obtain approval to collect information about affected individuals from all high-risk chemical facilities rather than only Tier 1 and Tier 2 high-risk chemical facilities; (2) update the estimated number of annual respondents from 195,000 to 72,607 based on historical information collected since the Department implemented the CFATS PSP; and (3) update the estimated time per respondent from 0.58 hours to 0.1667 hours based upon historical data collected by the Department since the implantation of the CFATS PSP. Collection at All High-Risk Chemical Facilities In response to multiple comments on the current ICR, the Department agreed to a ``phased implementation'' of the CFATS PSP to Tier 1 and Tier 2 high-risk chemical facilities. Based on lessons learned and the near completion of the implementation at Tier 1 and Tier 2 high-risk chemical facilities, the Department now seeks to close a security gap by implementing CFATS PSP at all high-risk chemical facilities. As implemented at Tier 1 and Tier 2 high-risk chemical facilities, the Department will roll out the CFATS PSP in a ``phased implementation'' to Tier 3 and Tier 4 high-risk chemical facilities. Updates to Burden Estimate Based on Historical Information The Department implemented the CFATS PSP in December 2015. Since implementation, the Department has evaluated many of the assumptions it used when estimating the burden estimate of this Information Collection. As a result, several of the assumptions can be revised using actual data rather than assumptions. The burden methodology and revised estimates are described in, ``The Department's Methodology in Estimating the Burden for CFATS PSP Information Collection.'' Information Collected About Affected Individuals This information collection request does not propose changes to the information collected on affected individuals. Option 1: Collecting Information To Conduct Direct Vetting If high-risk chemical facilities select Option 1 to satisfy RBPS 12(iv) for an affected individual, the following information about the affected individual would be submitted to the Department:For U.S. Persons (U.S. citizens and nationals, as well as U.S. lawful permanent residents): [cir] Full Name; [cir] Date of Birth; and [cir] Citizenship or Gender. For Non-U.S. Persons: [cir] Full Name; [cir] Date of Birth; [cir] Citizenship; and [cir] Passport information and/or alien registration number. To reduce the likelihood of false positives in matching against records in the Federal Government's consolidated and integrated terrorist watchlist, high-risk chemical facilities would also be able to submit the following optional information about an affected individual to the Department: Aliases; Gender (for Non-U.S. Persons); Place of Birth; and/or Redress Number.\3\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \3\ For more information about Redress Numbers, please go to http://www.dhs.gov/one-stop-travelers-redress-process#1. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- High-risk chemical facilities have the option to create and use the following field(s) to collect and store additional information to assist with the management of an affected individual's records. Any information collected in this field will not be used to support vetting activities. User Defined Field(s) Table 1 summarizes the biographic data that would be submitted to the Department under Option 1. Table 1--Required and Optional Data for an Affected Individual Under Option 1 ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Data elements submitted to the For a non-U.S. department For a U.S. person person ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Full Name..................... Required............. Date of Birth................. Required............. Gender........................ Must provide......... Optional. Citizenship................... Citizenship or Gender Required. Passport Information and/or N/A.................. Required. Alien Registration Number. Aliases....................... Optional............. Place of Birth................ Optional............. Redress number................ Optional............. User Defined Field(s)......... Optional (Not used for vetting purposes). ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Option 2: Collecting Information To Use Vetting Conducted Under Other DHS Programs In lieu of submitting information to the Department under Option 1 for vetting of terrorist ties, high-risk chemical facilities also have the option, where appropriate, to submit information to the Department to electronically verify that an affected individual is currently enrolled in another DHS program that vets for terrorist ties. To verify an affected individual's enrollment in one of these programs under Option 2, the Department would collect the following information about the affected individual: Full Name; Date of Birth; and Program-specific information or credential information, such as unique number or issuing entity (e.g., state for Commercial Driver's License [CDL] associated with an Hazardous Material Endorsement [HME]). To reduce the likelihood of false positives, high-risk chemical facilities may also submit the following optional [[Page 28247]] information about an affected individual to the Department: Aliases; Gender; Place of Birth; and/or Citizenship. High-risk chemical facilities have the option to create and use the following field(s) to collect and store additional information to assist with the management of an affected individual's records. Any information collected in this field will not be used to support vetting activities. User Defined Field(s) Table 2 summarizes the biographic data that would be submitted to the Department under Option 2. Table 2--Required and Optional Data for an Affected Individual Under Option 2 ------------------------------------------------------------------------ ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Data Elements Submitted to the Department ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Full Name..................................... Required. Date of Birth................................. Required. Program-specific information or credential Required. information, such as expiration date, unique number, or issuing entity. Aliases....................................... Optional. Gender........................................ Optional. Place of Birth................................ Optional. Citizenship................................... Optional. User Defined Field(s)......................... Optional (Not used for vetting purposes). ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Other Information Collected The Department may also contact a high-risk chemical facility or its designees to request additional information (e.g., visa information) pertaining to an affected individual in order to clarify suspected data errors or resolve potential matches (e.g., an affected individual has a common name). Such requests will not imply, and should not be construed to indicate, that an affected individual's information has been confirmed as a match to a record of an individual with terrorist ties. The Department may also collect information provided by individuals or high-risk chemical facilities in support of any adjudication requests under Subpart C of the CFATS regulation,\4\ or in support of any other redress requests.\5\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \4\ See 6 CFR 27.300-345. \5\ More information about access, correction, and redress requests under the Freedom of Information Act and the Privacy Act can be found in Section 7.0 of the Privacy Impact Assessment for the CFATS Personnel Surety Program, dated May 4, 2011, and available at http://www.dhs.gov/privacy-documents-national-protection-and-programs-directorate-nppd. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Responses to Comments Submitted During 60-Day Comment Period The Department solicited comments on four questions: (1) Evaluate whether the proposed collection of information is necessary for the proper performance of the functions of the agency, including whether the information will have practical utility; (2) Evaluate the accuracy of the agency's estimate of the burden of the proposed collection of information, including the validity of the methodology and assumptions used; (3) Enhance the quality, utility, and clarity of the information to be collected; and (4) Minimize the burden of the collection of information on those who are to respond, including through the use of appropriate automated, electronic, mechanical, or other technological collection techniques or other forms of information technology, e.g., permitting electronic submissions of responses. In response to the 60-Day Notice that solicited comments about the CFATS PSP ICR, the Department received twenty-seven comments from seven commenters. The seven commenters were all industry association. Comments Related to Whether the Proposed Collection of Information Is Necessary for the Proper Performance of the Function of the Agency, Including Whether the Information Will Have Practical Utility Comment: Four commenters suggested that the Department conduct further assessments on the PSP: One commenter suggested that the Department ``should not expand the program until it can see the successes and failures it has with Tier 1 and Tier 2 facilities.'' Further, the commenter suggested a ``formal assessment, in conjunction with the Department of Justice and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, on the benefits and positive outcomes of running PSP-gained information through the TSDB [Terrorist Screening Database]'' be conducted. The commenter also suggested that such a review could evaluate the effectiveness of the CFATS PSP and opportunities ``to make it more effective.'' A second commenter encouraged the Department to ``examine the effectiveness of such screening before proceeding to subject the bulk of CFATS regulated facilities to these additional measures.'' The second commenter suggested the Department conduct a comprehensive evaluation, similar to the comprehensive evaluation the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is conducting with respect to the Transportation Worker Identification Credentials (TWIC) Program,\6\ before determining whether to expand the CFATS PSP to Tier 3 and Tier 4 covered chemical facilities. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \6\ See Section 1(b)(3) of Public Law 114-278, which may be viewed at https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-bill/710/text/pl?overview=closed. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- A third commenter referenced an ongoing Government Accountability Office (GAO) assessment of the CFATS program and speculated that the GAO assessment might review the implementation of the CFATS PSP. The commenter suggested that the Department could benefit from considering the results of the GAO assessment with respect ``to tailoring implementation of PSP for Tier 3 and 4 facilities.'' The commenter also suggested that if the GAO assessment does not include a review of the CFATS PSP, the Department should undertake such an analysis. In conclusion, the same commenter suggested that the Department not expand the CFATS PSP to Tier 3 and Tier 4 covered chemical facilities until such an analysis has been conducted and the results used to inform the CFATS PSP ICR. A fourth commenter requested that the Department allow a third- party review of the CFATS PSP after a suitable period of time has passed to determine if the program adds value to the security of the nation. Response: The Department does not believe that additional analysis is needed prior to OMB approving the collection of information concerning affected individuals from all covered chemical facilities. The Department has closely reviewed how Tier 1 and Tier 2 covered chemicals facilities have implemented the check for terrorist ties. Tier 1 and Tier 2 covered chemical facilities have varied by size, complexity, security issue, and location. [[Page 28248]] Additionally, vetting for terrorist ties for all four tiers of covered facilities is required by CFATS. Members of the public commented on the CFATS rulemaking in 2007 before the regulation was finalized, and DHS considered all public comments (including comments about terrorist ties vetting and background checks) in coming to the reasoned decision to vet affected individuals for terrorist ties at all tiered facilities as part of the program. DHS disagrees that a modification to the program to eliminate this requirement for Tiers 3 and 4 or to indefinitely delay its rollout in order to conduct additional analysis would be appropriate. Preventing terrorist access to high-risk chemical facilities' restricted areas and critical assets is a core purpose of CFATS, and failure to conduct terrorist ties checks may allow terrorist to gain access. Comment: One commenter reiterated its continued objection to the inclusion of railroad employees is within the scope of CFATS because the commenter claims that inclusion of railroad employees lacks a risk- based justification. Response: Under CFATS, the Department regulates covered chemical facilities that present a high risk from terrorist attack. Effectively regulating chemical facility security involves assessing whether terrorists have access to facilities, and terrorists seeking access might not be limited to facility employees. To help reduce risk to high-risk facilities, the Department requires covered chemical facilities to conduct a check for terrorist ties on affected individuals (e.g., facility personnel and unescorted visitors) with or seeking access to restricted areas and critical assets. A covered chemical facility has the discretion to decide if they want to escort railroad employees as visitors, identify railroad employees as affected individuals, or treat them in some other way consistent with CFATS requirements. Identifying railroad employees as affected individuals would require a covered chemical facility to ensure that those personnel are screened for terrorist ties pursuant to 6 CFR 27.230(a)(12). In ensuring affected individuals are screened for terrorist ties, the facility has the discretion to choose from four options for vetting affected individuals or propose alternatives or supplemental options in its SSP or ASP (See 82 FR 61312, 61316).\7\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \7\ The Department described the options for screening for terrorist ties on page 82 FR 61313 of its 60-day notice which may be viewed at https://www.federalregister.gov/d/2017-27519/page-61313. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Comment: One commenter highlighted the Department of Transportation (DOT) requirement at 49 CFR 172.802(a)(1) which states, ``Personnel security. Measures to confirm information provided by job applicants hired for positions that involve access to and handling of the hazardous materials covered by the security plan. . . .'' The commenter suggested that railroad employees having undergone such a background check and demonstrated their reliability by being stewards of the chemical during transit, should ``not suddenly seem suspect simply by crossing a fence line at a covered chemical facility.'' Response: It is the Department's understanding that the sort of background checks discussed by the commenter do not include checks for terrorist ties. Checks for terrorist ties are required under CFATS (6 CFR 27.230(a)(12)). Comments Related to the Accuracy of the Agency's Estimate of the Burden of the Proposed Collection of Information, Including the Validity of the Methodology and Assumptions Used Comment: One commenter recognizes the assumptions that release facilities may have more affected individuals than theft and diversion facilities, that there are an average of 106 employees per facility, and that the time it takes to vet an affected individual may be valid, but states, ``it is not clear upon what information they [the assumptions] are based.'' Response: The Department based the assumptions on historical data collected by the Department since the implementation of the CFATS PSP. Specifically, for the difference between release and theft and diversion facilities, the Department recognizes that high-risk chemical facilities for release security issues may take a facility-wide approach rather than an asset-based approach in defining their restricted areas, which may result in a higher number of affected individuals than theft and diversion facilities. Therefore, the Department reviewed the number of release sites to ensure the estimated number of respondents for the Tier 3 and Tier 4 high-risk chemical facilities were comparable to the historical data received by the Department since the implementation of the CFATS PSP. The Department found that the release security issues for Tier 1 and Tier 2 high-risk chemical facilities made up 38 percent of the total Tier 1 and Tier 2 high-risk chemical facility population. For Tier 3 and Tier 4 high-risk chemical facilities, the release security issue made up 25 percent of the total Tier 3 and Tier 4 high-risk chemical facility population. Based on these findings, the Department is satisfied that the Tier 1 and Tier 2 high-risk chemical facility historical data provided a valid representation of what the Department can expect from Tier 3 and Tier 4 high-risk chemical facilities. Specifically for the 106 employees, the Department estimates that under this collection there are (a) 200 Tier 1 and Tier 2 high-risk chemical facilities that did submit or will have to submit information about affected individuals under the current ICR, and (b) 3,700 Tier 3 and Tier 4 high-risk chemical facilities that will submit for the first time under this new collection. Historically, each Authorizer submitted, on average, 180 initial respondents, with each Authorizer responsible for 1.7 high-risk chemical facilities. Dividing 180 affected individuals per Authorizer by 1.7 high-risk chemical facilities results in an average of 106 initial respondents submitted per high-risk chemical facility. The Department's estimate per respondent (affected individual) is based on industry feedback and historical data collected on their use of the CFATS PSP application. The Department has estimated the time per respondent to be 5 minutes per submission of a record about an affected individual. Since this estimate is based on current submissions from Tier 1 and Tier 2 high-risk chemical facilities, the Department has chosen an estimate of 10 minutes per record to provide a more conservative estimate. Comment: Two commenters expressed concern that the ICR did not appear to account for the burden associated with part-time or seasonal employees or contractors that qualify as affected individuals. Response: The Department's estimate of the number of affected individuals in the 60-day notice was based on actual data submitted by covered chemical facilities at which seasonal and part-time employees (to include contractors) are considered affected individuals. Thus, the Department concludes that the historical data relied upon in the 60-day notice incorporates seasonal and part-time employees. Comment: Three commenters felt the personal identifiable information collection is not ``usual and customary'': One commenter disagreed with the Department's decision to invoke 5 CFR 1320.3(b)(2) to exclude ``certain activities and costs related to the PSP data collection process.'' The commenter suggested that two assumptions made by the Department are not accurate. Specifically, that (a) the Department's assumption that facilities [[Page 28249]] already possess the information necessary to submit under Option 1 or Option 2 of the CFATS PSP; and (b) the Department's assumption that additional data collection is not required and there is no further burden imposed by this Information Collection beyond submitting the information to the Department under Option 1 or Option 2. A second commenter also objected to the exclusion of ``the time needed for a site security officer to manage data collection, submissions, and tracking'' under 5 CFR 1320.3(b)(2) which is similar to some of the examples provided by the first commenter. A third commenter expressed concern similar in nature that the estimated time per respondent does not appear to account for acquiring the necessary personal information to compare against the TSDB. Response: The Department evaluated each of the examples provided by the commenters. The Department's evaluation of the examples provided by the commenters are below: i. The Department considered whether the CFATS PSP ICR should be revised to account for the burden associated with coordinating with CFATS-facility stakeholders, including Human Resources, Procurement, and/or Contract Administration to explain the PSP requirements and determine how best to gather the data from different populations (e.g., employees and resident and non-resident contractors). One commenter clarified elsewhere in its comments that the coordination included creating separate groups \8\ and ``PSP Submitter [user] accounts for each contract company, which may include hundreds of different contract companies in cases where a large facility is tiered for a release security issue.'' After considering the comment, the Department did not revise the CFATS PSP ICR because this burden is properly accounted for under a separate and different ICR. The establishment of Chemical Security Assessment Tool (CSAT) accounts, such as a PSP Submitter, and the assignment of such accounts to ``groups'' is covered under Information Collection 1670- 0007.\9\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \8\ The term ``groups'' is a technical term used by the Department to describe how a covered chemical facility may manage the access to records about affected individuals in the CSAT Personnel Surety application. The Department describes ``groups'' and provides additional information about how to create and manage ``groups in section 9.5 of the CSAT User Manual which may be viewed at https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/csat-portal-user-manual-508-2.pdf. \9\ Information Collection 1670-0007 was approved by OMB on July 14, 2016. The Notice of Action and Information Collection 1670-0007 may be viewed at https://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/PRAViewICR?ref_nbr=201604-1670-001. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- ii. The Department considered whether the CFATS PSP ICR should be revised to account for the burden associated with ``developing and providing communications, Privacy Act notices, and data collection forms to affected individuals.'' After considering the comment, the Department did not revise the CFATS PSP ICR because, as described earlier in this notice, this burden is already accounted for in the 10 minutes per respondent burden estimate. iii. The Department considered whether the CFATS PSP ICR should be revised to account for the burden associated with ``ensuring that all affected individuals provide the necessary [personally identifiable information] PII--and following up with those that do not.'' After considering the comment, the Department did not revise the CFATS PSP ICR. The collection of data from affected individuals by a covered chemical facility or its designees is excluded under 5 CFR 1320.3(b)(2). iv. The Department considered whether the CFATS PSP ICR should be revised to account for the burden associated with ``training personnel to use the CSAT PSP application.'' After considering the comment, the Department did not revise the CFATS PSP ICR because the burden is properly accounted for under Information Collection 1670- 0007. v. The Department considered whether the CFATS PSP ICR should be revised to account for the burden associated with ``ensuring change management (e.g., once the initial data is gathered and uploaded, the facility still must account for new hires and new contractors-- and further incorporate this into the facility access process).'' After considering the comment, the Department did not revise the CFATS PSP ICR because the burden is already accounted for in this ICR (See 82 FR 61312, 61316).\10\ The Department laid out the expectations to submit both existing affected individuals as well as new affected individuals in the ICR notices associated with the current Information Collection and in the CFATS PSP Implementation Notice. The clear expectation for covered chemical facilities to submit new affected individuals is therefore inherently a part of the actual historical data upon which the Department relied in the 60-day notice. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \10\ The Department described its assumptions, to include updates and corrections, about the estimated time per respondent on page 82 FR 61316 of its 60-day notice which may be viewed at https://www.federalregister.gov/d/2017-27519/page-61316. Comment: One commenter suggested that the CFATS PSP is being implemented on a facility-by-facility basis rather than a company-wide basis, which encourages duplicative processes for information collection and vetting and dramatically increases the burdens on railroads serving more than one company location. Response: The Department has designed the CFATS Program as a whole, and the CFATS PSP in particular, to allow for a company-wide approach. This has been mentioned in previous notices \11\ and can be found in current program guidance and resources.\12\ Some companies have opted to implement a company-wide approach to the PSP while others have not. The design of the CFATS PSP and this ICR allows each company with multiple covered chemical facilities to choose for itself whether or not, or to what degree, to adopt a company-wide approach under CFATS. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \11\ The possibility of a company-wide approach is mentioned in: (1) The CFATS PSP 30-Day notice and request for comments published on February 3, 2014 at 79 FR 6422 that may be viewed at https://www.federalregister.gov/d/2014-02082/page-6422, and (2) the CFATS PSP 60-Day notice and request for comments published on March 22, 2013 at 78 FR 17684 that may be viewed at https://www.federalregister.gov/d/2013-06184/page-17684. \12\ The Department describes the potential for a company-wide approach in CFATS PSPImplementation Notice published on December 18, 2015 at 80 FR 79064 that may be viewed at https://www.federalregister.gov/d/2015-31625/page-79064. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Comment: One commenter expressed concern that the estimated time per respondent of five minutes ``does not appear to include the additional time necessary to notify employees of the PSP requirement, obtain consent . . .'' Response: As previously discussed, the Department did not revise the CFATS PSP ICR because this burden is already accounted for in the 10 minutes per respondent burden estimate. Comment: One commenter is concerned with the time it takes Authorizer to create CSAT accounts for contractors. Response: The Department accounts for the burden related to the creation of CSAT accounts for contractors under Information Collection 1670-0007.\13\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \13\ Information Collection 1670-0007 was approved by OMB on July 14, 2016. The Notice of Action and Information Collection 1670- 0007 may be viewed at https://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/PRAViewICR?ref_nbr=201604-1670-001. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Comments Related to the Quality, Utility, and Clarity of the Information To Be Collected The Department did not receive any comments related to the quality, utility, and clarity of the information to be collected. Comments Related To Minimizing the Burden of the Collection of the Information on Those Who Are To Respond, Including Through the Use of Appropriate Automated, Electronic Mechanical, or Other Technological Collection Techniques or Other Forms of Information Technology, e.g., Permitting Electronic Submissions of Responses Comment: Two commenters suggested that the Department use a flexible approach in the rollout: One commenter requested a phased roll out of the CFATS PSP to Tier 3 and Tier 4 covered chemical facilities. A second commenter ``appreciate[d] that DHS is proposing to roll out these requirements in a phased method . . .'' The same commenter also encouraged the Department to consider a ``site's various risk factors, including location, number of employees, types and [[Page 28250]] volumes of chemicals of interest, and likely offsite incident consequences'' when planning the phased-in approach. Response: The Department agrees that a flexible approach is appropriate for the rollout of the PSP to Tier 3 and Tier 4 covered chemical facilities. If approved, the Department plans to implement the CFATS PSP in a phased manner to Tier 3 and Tier 4 covered chemical facilities over a three year period. Similar to the successful and recent retiering effort, the Department plans to consider the number of facilities assigned to a single Authorizer when notifying facilities to implement the PSP, as not to overwhelm a single Authorizer. The Department will also allow the flexibility for Authorizers, if desired, to complete the process for their facilities before notification by the Department. Comment: One commenter suggested that the Department has downplayed the use of ``existing options'' that could lessen the burdens on third- party service providers, such as railroads, that employ affected individuals as defined by the covered chemical facility. The commenter suggested that one such ``existing option'' is real-time video monitoring as a means of escort. Response: The Department has explicitly mentioned in multiple notices associated with this Information Collection (see 79 FR 6418, 6420) and in CFATS PSP resources the possibility of innovative escorting alternatives such as video monitoring. The Department has also worked with facilities to identify other alternatives for a covered chemical facility to limit who is an affected individual. Furthermore, the Department provided the following guidance to covered chemical facilities in the CFATS PSP Implementation Notice: \14\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \14\ This specific text from the CFATS Personnel Surety Program Implementation Notice may be found on 80 FR 79060 and can be viewed at https://www.federalregister.gov/d/2015-31625/page-79060. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- ``A high-risk chemical facility will have flexibility to tailor its implementation of the CFATS Personnel Surety Program to fit its individual circumstances and, in this regard, to best balance who qualifies as an affected individual, unique security issues, costs, and burden. For example, a high-risk chemical facility may, in its Site Security Plan: Restrict the numbers and types of persons allowed to access its restricted areas and critical assets, thus limiting the number of persons who will need to be checked for terrorist ties. Define its restricted areas and critical assets, thus potentially limiting the number of persons who will need to be checked for terrorist ties. Choose to escort visitors accessing restricted areas and critical assets in lieu of performing terrorist ties background checks under the CFATS Personnel Surety Program. The high-risk chemical facility may propose in its SSP traditional escorting solutions and/or innovative escorting alternatives such as video monitoring (which may reduce facility security costs), as appropriate, to address the unique security risks present at the facility [emphasis added].'' Comment: One commenter urged the Department to not include additional pre-conditions to the CFATS PSP that would preclude covered chemical facilities from leveraging the background checks performed in compliance with the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF) Employee Possessor Program under Option 4. Response: The Department has not modified the CFATS PSP to preclude a covered chemical facility from the potential of leveraging the vetting conducted by ATF under Option 4 for affected individuals who possess a Federal explosives license/permit. Comment: One commenter requested that the Department modify CSAT to allow designated employees such as human resource professionals the ability to upload and edit information about affected individuals without having to access CVI. Response: The Department currently provides the ability to restrict human resource professionals from accessing CVI in CSAT. If a user is designated as only a Personnel Surety Submitter and is not assigned any other facility roles, they are not able to access the CVI documentation. Other Comments Submitted in Response to the Information Collection Request Comment: One commenter suggested that compliance with the CFATS PSP exposes railroad employee PII and exacerbates cyber-security risk. Response: The Department disagrees with the commenter that the CFATS PSP exposes PII and exacerbates cyber security risk. If (1) a covered chemical facility opts to identify the employee of a third- party service provider as an affected individual, and (2) a covered chemical facility opts to implement Option 1 or Option 2 in their SSP or ASP then the Department has designed the CSAT Personnel Surety Program Application to allow third-party companies, such as a railroad, to be granted access to the CSAT Personnel Surety Application for the express purpose of submitting information about affected individuals directly to the Department. If a covered chemical facility opts to implement Option 3 or Option 4, information about affected individuals is not submitted to the Department. Option 3 allows high-risk chemical facilities to comply with the PSP by electronically verifying and validating the affected individual's TWICs through the use of TWIC readers. Option 4 provides high-risk chemical facilities with the option to visually verify certain credentials or documents that are issued by a Federal screening program that periodically vets enrolled individuals against the TSDB. Comment: One commenter suggested that the Department ``has encouraged covered chemical facilities to collect information that exceeds the legal requirements.'' Response: The Department outlined in the ICR all data elements and identified the ones that are required for a submission under Option 1 or Option 2. While the minimum data is sufficient, it is the considered judgement of the Department that additional information reduces the likelihood of false positives in matching against records in the federal government's consolidated and integrated terrorist watchlist. Although helpful in reducing false positives, this additional information is optional. Comment: Two commenters made suggestions as it relates to the consistency of inspections: One commenter requested that the Department ``work with facilities that have already been inspected to make sure inspections are being handled in a consistent fashion.'' A second commenter reported that there are ``many regional inconsistencies in how inspectors conduct inspections within a region.'' Response: Although this comment is outside the scope of the information collect request, DHS agrees and continues to work to ensure inspection consistency across the country. Comment: One industry association commented that any updates to the CFATS regulation should be flexible and tangible for facility compliance. Response: This information collection request does not modify existing regulations. Comment: One commenter suggested that a contradiction exists between the CFATS PSP and the railroads compliance with DOT regulations. Response: The Department disagrees with the commenter. If a covered chemical facility opts to identify a railroad employee as an affected individual, the performance of railroads [[Page 28251]] with respect to complying with DOT regulations, does not materially alter the fact that a railroad employee is an affected individual. Covered chemical facilities must ensure that affected individuals have appropriate background checks performed, to include a check for terrorist ties. This ICR allows covered chemical facilities, and their service providers that employ affected individuals, an opportunity to enable a check for terrorist ties to be performed against the TSDB. Comment: One commenter stated that the CFATS PSP, as currently designed, ``does not take into consideration that Tier 3 and 4 facilities present a comparatively lower risk profile than Tier 1 and 2 sites.'' The commenter suggested that the Department acknowledge the lower risk profile of Tier 3 and Tier 4 covered chemical facilities and not require them to comply with 6 CFR 27.230(a)(12)(iv). The commenter requested that Tier 3 and Tier 4 covered chemical facilities still be allowed to voluntarily participate. Response: The Department believes that 6 CFR 27.230(a)(12)(iv) mitigates the risk of an individual with terrorist ties having insider access. Terrorist insiders could cause significant harm to the United States through access to any tiered chemical facility. To achieve the anti-terrorism objective of CFATS, it is necessary to mitigate this risk by conducting terrorist ties checks at all covered facilities. RBPS 12 accordingly requires terrorist ties checks for facilities of all four tiers. Comment: One commenter questioned the effectiveness of the CFATS PSP if ``absent a clear national security, homeland security, or law enforcement rationale . . . DHS does not follow-up with the company to alert it of the possible threat.'' The commenter further stated that the ``value of conducting TSDB screening is questionable if an identified bad actor is permitted continued access to [chemicals of interest] unbeknownst to the facility, which is in the best position to ensure that the person is not afforded that opportunity.'' Response: The Department's design of the CFATS Program is intended to promote and enhance the security of high-risk chemical facilities; the PSP is one element of the larger CFATS Program. To prevent a significant threat to a facility or loss of life, a high-risk chemical facility will be contacted where appropriate and in accordance with federal law and policy, and per law enforcement and intelligence requirements. The Department's Methodology in Estimating the Burden for the CFATS PSP This 30-day notice relies on the analysis and resulting burden estimates in the 60-day notice for this instrument. Analysis Title: Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS) Personnel Surety Program. OMB Number: 1670-0029. Instrument: CFATS Personnel Surety Program. Frequency: ``Other.'' Affected Public: Business or other for-profit. Number of Annual Respondents: 72,607 respondents (estimate). Estimated Time per Respondent: 0.1667 hours (10 minutes). Total Annual Burden Hours: 12,101 hours. Total Annual Burden Cost (capital/startup): $1,719,409. Total Annual Burden Cost: $955,191. Total Recordkeeping Burden: $0. David Epperson, Chief Information Officer. [FR Doc. 2018-12523 Filed 6-15-18; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 9110-9P-P
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Place: National Institutes of Health, 6701 Review: Understanding and Modifying ACTION: 30-Day notice and request for
Rockledge Drive, Bethesda, MD 20892 Temporal Dynamics of Coordinated Neural comments; revision of information
(Virtual Meeting). Activity. collection request: 1670–0029.
Contact Person: Katherine M. Malinda, Date: July 12, 2018.
Ph.D., Scientific Review Officer, Center for Time: 11:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m. SUMMARY: The DHS NPPD Office of
Scientific Review, National Institutes of Agenda: To review and evaluate grant Infrastructure Protection (IP),
Health, 6701 Rockledge Drive, Room 4140, applications. Infrastructure Security Compliance
MSC 7814, Bethesda, MD 20892, 301–435– Place: National Institutes of Health, 6701
0912, Katherine_Malinda@csr.nih.gov. Division (ISCD) will submit the
Rockledge Drive, Bethesda, MD 20892
(Virtual Meeting).
following information collection request
Name of Committee: Center for Scientific
Review Special Emphasis Panel; Member Contact Person: Jana Drgonova, Ph.D., (ICR) to the Office of Management and
Conflict: AIDS and AIDS Related Research. Scientific Review Officer, Center for Budget (OMB) for review and clearance
Date: July 10, 2018. Scientific Review, National Institutes of in accordance with the Paperwork
Time: 10:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m. Health, 6701 Rockledge Drive, Room 5213, Reduction Act of 1995. NPPD
Agenda: To review and evaluate grant Bethesda, MD 20892, 301–827–2549, previously published this ICR, in the
applications. jdrgonova@mail.nih.gov. Federal Register on December 27, 2017,
Place: National Institutes of Health, 6701 Name of Committee: Center for Scientific for a 60-day public comment period.
Rockledge Drive, Bethesda, MD 20892 Review Special Emphasis Panel; Member In this notice NPPD is responding to
(Virtual Meeting). Conflict: Integrative Neuroscience.
Contact Person: Shalanda A. Bynum,
seven commenters that submitted
Date: July 12, 2018. comments in response to the 60-day
Ph.D., MPH, Scientific Review Officer, Center Time: 1:00 p.m. to 3:30 p.m.
for Scientific Review, National Institutes of notice previously published for this ICR
Agenda: To review and evaluate grant and soliciting public comment
Health, 6701 Rockledge Drive, Room 3206,
applications.
Bethesda, MD 20892, 301–755–4355,
Place: National Institutes of Health, 6701
concerning this ICR for an additional 30
bynumsa@csr.nih.gov. days.
Rockledge Drive, Bethesda, MD 20892
Name of Committee: Center for Scientific (Telephone Conference Call). DATES: Comments are encouraged and
Review Special Emphasis Panel; Convergent Contact Person: Jasenka Borzan, Ph.D., will be accepted until July 18, 2018.
Neuroscience: From Genomic Association to Scientific Review Officer, Center for
Causation. ADDRESSES: Interested persons are
Scientific Review, National Institutes of invited to submit written comments on
Date: July 10, 2018. Health, 6701 Rockledge Drive, Room 4214,
Time: 11:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m. the proposed information collection to
MSC 7814, Bethesda, MD 20892–7814, 301–
Agenda: To review and evaluate grant
435–1787, borzanj@csr.nih.gov.
the Office of Information and Regulatory
applications. Affairs, OMB. Comments should be
Place: National Institutes of Health, 6701 Name of Committee: Biology of
Development and Aging Integrated Review
addressed to OMB Desk Officer,
Rockledge Drive, Bethesda, MD 20892 Department of Homeland Security,
(Virtual Meeting). Group; International and Cooperative
Projects—1 Study Section. National Protection and Programs
Contact Person: Jana Drgonova, Ph.D.,
Scientific Review Officer, Center for Date: July 13, 2018. Directorate and sent via electronic mail
Scientific Review, National Institutes of Time: 10:30 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. to dhsdeskofficer@omb.eop.gov. All
Health, 6701 Rockledge Drive, Room 5213, Agenda: To review and evaluate grant submissions must include the words
Bethesda, MD 20892, 301–827–2549, applications. ‘‘Department of Homeland Security’’
jdrgonova@mail.nih.gov. Place: National Institutes of Health, 6701 and the OMB Control Number 1670–
Name of Committee: Center for Scientific Rockledge Drive, Bethesda, MD 20892. 0029.
Review Special Emphasis Panel; Small Contact Person: Seetha Bhagavan, Ph.D., Comments submitted in response to
Business: Neuroscience Assay, Diagnostics Scientific Review Officer, Center for this notice may be made available to the
and Animal Model Development. Scientific Review, National Institutes of public through relevant websites. For
Date: July 12–13, 2018. Health, 6701 Rockledge Drive, Room 5194, this reason, please do not include in
Time: 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. MSC 7846, Bethesda, MD 20892, (301) 237–
Agenda: To review and evaluate grant 9838, bhagavas@csr.nih.gov.
your comments information of a
applications. confidential nature, such as sensitive
(Catalogue of Federal Domestic Assistance
Place: The Crown Plaza Seattle Hotel, 1113 personal information or proprietary
Program Nos. 93.306, Comparative Medicine;
6th Ave., Seattle, WA 98101. 93.333, Clinical Research, 93.306, 93.333, information. Please note that responses
Contact Person: Susan Gillmor, Ph.D., 93.337, 93.393–93.396, 93.837–93.844, to this public comment request
Scientific Review Officer, National Institutes 93.846–93.878, 93.892, 93.893, National containing any routine notice about the
of Health, Center for Scientific Review, 6701 Institutes of Health, HHS) confidentiality of the communication
Rockledge Drive, Bethesda, MD 20892, 301– will be treated as public comments that
435–1730, susan.gillmor@nih.gov. Dated: June 12, 2018.
may be made available to the public
Name of Committee: Center for Scientific Natasha M. Copeland,
notwithstanding the inclusion of the
Review Special Emphasis Panel; Center for Program Analyst, Office of Federal Advisory routine notice.
Neuroscience and Regenerative Medicine Committee Policy.
Program.
Comments that include trade secrets,
[FR Doc. 2018–12920 Filed 6–15–18; 8:45 am] confidential commercial or financial
Date: July 12, 2018.
Time: 10:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m.
BILLING CODE 4140–01–P information, Chemical-terrorism
Agenda: To review and evaluate grant Vulnerability Information (CVI),
applications. Sensitive Security Information (SSI), or
Place: National Institutes of Health, 6701 Protected Critical Infrastructure
Rockledge Drive, Bethesda, MD 20892 DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND Information (PCII) should not be
(Virtual Meeting). SECURITY submitted to the public regulatory
amozie on DSK3GDR082PROD with NOTICES1
Contact Person: Chittari V. Shivakumar,
Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism docket. Please submit such comments
Ph.D., Scientific Review Officer, National
Institutes of Health, Center for Scientific Standards Personnel Surety Program separately from other comments in
Review, 6701 Rockledge Drive, Bethesda, MD response to this notice. Comments
20892, 301–408–9098, chittari.shivakumar@ AGENCY:National Protection and containing trade secrets, confidential
nih.gov. Programs Directorate (NPPD), commercial or financial information,
Name of Committee: Center for Scientific Department of Homeland Security CVI, SSI, or PCII should be
Review Special Emphasis Panel; PAR (DHS). appropriately marked and packaged in
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electronic, mechanical, or other 2 high-risk chemical facilities, the individual would be submitted to the
technological collection techniques or Department now seeks to close a Department:
other forms of information technology, security gap by implementing CFATS • For U.S. Persons (U.S. citizens and
e.g., permitting electronic submissions PSP at all high-risk chemical facilities. nationals, as well as U.S. lawful
of responses. As implemented at Tier 1 and Tier 2 permanent residents):
The current information collection for high-risk chemical facilities, the Æ Full Name;
the CFATS PSP (IC 1670–0029) will Department will roll out the CFATS PSP Æ Date of Birth; and
expire on August 31, 2018.2 in a ‘‘phased implementation’’ to Tier 3 Æ Citizenship or Gender.
and Tier 4 high-risk chemical facilities. • For Non-U.S. Persons:
Summary of Proposed Revisions to the Æ Full Name;
Information Collection Updates to Burden Estimate Based on
Historical Information Æ Date of Birth;
The Department is seeking a revision Æ Citizenship; and
to the CFATS PSP Information The Department implemented the Æ Passport information and/or alien
Collection to: (1) Obtain approval to CFATS PSP in December 2015. Since registration number.
collect information about affected implementation, the Department has To reduce the likelihood of false
individuals from all high-risk chemical evaluated many of the assumptions it positives in matching against records in
used when estimating the burden the Federal Government’s consolidated
facilities rather than only Tier 1 and
estimate of this Information Collection. and integrated terrorist watchlist, high-
Tier 2 high-risk chemical facilities; (2)
As a result, several of the assumptions risk chemical facilities would also be
update the estimated number of annual
can be revised using actual data rather
respondents from 195,000 to 72,607 able to submit the following optional
than assumptions. The burden
based on historical information information about an affected individual
methodology and revised estimates are
collected since the Department to the Department:
described in, ‘‘The Department’s
implemented the CFATS PSP; and (3) • Aliases;
Methodology in Estimating the Burden
update the estimated time per • Gender (for Non-U.S. Persons);
for CFATS PSP Information Collection.’’
respondent from 0.58 hours to 0.1667 • Place of Birth; and/or
hours based upon historical data Information Collected About Affected • Redress Number.3
collected by the Department since the Individuals High-risk chemical facilities have the
implantation of the CFATS PSP. This information collection request option to create and use the following
does not propose changes to the field(s) to collect and store additional
Collection at All High-Risk Chemical
information collected on affected information to assist with the
Facilities
individuals. management of an affected individual’s
In response to multiple comments on records. Any information collected in
the current ICR, the Department agreed Option 1: Collecting Information To this field will not be used to support
to a ‘‘phased implementation’’ of the Conduct Direct Vetting vetting activities.
CFATS PSP to Tier 1 and Tier 2 high- If high-risk chemical facilities select • User Defined Field(s)
risk chemical facilities. Based on Option 1 to satisfy RBPS 12(iv) for an Table 1 summarizes the biographic
lessons learned and the near completion affected individual, the following data that would be submitted to the
of the implementation at Tier 1 and Tier information about the affected Department under Option 1.
TABLE 1—REQUIRED AND OPTIONAL DATA FOR AN AFFECTED INDIVIDUAL UNDER OPTION 1
For a non-
Data elements submitted to the department For a U.S. person U.S. person
Full Name .................................................................................... Required.
Date of Birth ................................................................................ Required.
Gender ......................................................................................... Must provide ............................................................................... Optional.
Citizenship ................................................................................... Citizenship or Gender ................................................................. Required.
Passport Information and/or Alien Registration Number ............. N/A .............................................................................................. Required.
Aliases ......................................................................................... Optional.
Place of Birth ............................................................................... Optional.
Redress number .......................................................................... Optional.
User Defined Field(s) .................................................................. Optional (Not used for vetting purposes).
Option 2: Collecting Information To Use individual is currently enrolled in • Program-specific information or
Vetting Conducted Under Other DHS another DHS program that vets for credential information, such as unique
Programs terrorist ties. number or issuing entity (e.g., state for
To verify an affected individual’s Commercial Driver’s License [CDL]
In lieu of submitting information to associated with an Hazardous Material
enrollment in one of these programs
the Department under Option 1 for
under Option 2, the Department would Endorsement [HME]).
vetting of terrorist ties, high-risk
collect the following information about To reduce the likelihood of false
amozie on DSK3GDR082PROD with NOTICES1
chemical facilities also have the option,
the affected individual: positives, high-risk chemical facilities
where appropriate, to submit
information to the Department to • Full Name; may also submit the following optional
electronically verify that an affected • Date of Birth; and
2 The current information collection for CFATS www.reginfo.gov/public/do/PRAViewICR?ref_ 3 For more information about Redress Numbers,
Personnel Surety Program may be found at https:// nbr=201312-1670-001. please go to http://www.dhs.gov/one-stop-travelers-
redress-process#1.
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![Federal Register / Vol. 83, No. 117 / Monday, June 18, 2018 / Notices 28247
information about an affected individual High-risk chemical facilities have the this field will not be used to support
to the Department: option to create and use the following vetting activities.
• Aliases; field(s) to collect and store additional • User Defined Field(s)
• Gender; information to assist with the Table 2 summarizes the biographic
• Place of Birth; and/or management of an affected individual’s data that would be submitted to the
• Citizenship. records. Any information collected in Department under Option 2.
TABLE 2—REQUIRED AND OPTIONAL DATA FOR AN AFFECTED INDIVIDUAL UNDER OPTION 2
Data Elements Submitted to the Department
Full Name ............................................................................................................................................. Required.
Date of Birth ......................................................................................................................................... Required.
Program-specific information or credential information, such as expiration date, unique number, or Required.
issuing entity.
Aliases .................................................................................................................................................. Optional.
Gender .................................................................................................................................................. Optional.
Place of Birth ........................................................................................................................................ Optional.
Citizenship ............................................................................................................................................ Optional.
User Defined Field(s) ........................................................................................................................... Optional (Not used for vetting purposes).
Other Information Collected (3) Enhance the quality, utility, and conduct a comprehensive evaluation, similar
clarity of the information to be to the comprehensive evaluation the
The Department may also contact a Transportation Security Administration
collected; and
high-risk chemical facility or its (TSA) is conducting with respect to the
(4) Minimize the burden of the
designees to request additional Transportation Worker Identification
collection of information on those who
information (e.g., visa information) Credentials (TWIC) Program,6 before
are to respond, including through the determining whether to expand the CFATS
pertaining to an affected individual in
use of appropriate automated, PSP to Tier 3 and Tier 4 covered chemical
order to clarify suspected data errors or
electronic, mechanical, or other facilities.
resolve potential matches (e.g., an
technological collection techniques or A third commenter referenced an ongoing
affected individual has a common
other forms of information technology, Government Accountability Office (GAO)
name). Such requests will not imply,
e.g., permitting electronic submissions assessment of the CFATS program and
and should not be construed to indicate, speculated that the GAO assessment might
of responses.
that an affected individual’s information review the implementation of the CFATS
In response to the 60-Day Notice that
has been confirmed as a match to a PSP. The commenter suggested that the
solicited comments about the CFATS
record of an individual with terrorist Department could benefit from considering
PSP ICR, the Department received
ties. the results of the GAO assessment with
twenty-seven comments from seven respect ‘‘to tailoring implementation of PSP
The Department may also collect
commenters. The seven commenters for Tier 3 and 4 facilities.’’ The commenter
information provided by individuals or
were all industry association. also suggested that if the GAO assessment
high-risk chemical facilities in support
Comments Related to Whether the does not include a review of the CFATS PSP,
of any adjudication requests under
the Department should undertake such an
Subpart C of the CFATS regulation,4 or Proposed Collection of Information Is
analysis. In conclusion, the same commenter
in support of any other redress Necessary for the Proper Performance of suggested that the Department not expand
requests.5 the Function of the Agency, Including the CFATS PSP to Tier 3 and Tier 4 covered
Whether the Information Will Have chemical facilities until such an analysis has
Responses to Comments Submitted
Practical Utility been conducted and the results used to
During 60-Day Comment Period inform the CFATS PSP ICR.
Comment: Four commenters
The Department solicited comments A fourth commenter requested that the
suggested that the Department conduct Department allow a third-party review of the
on four questions: further assessments on the PSP:
(1) Evaluate whether the proposed CFATS PSP after a suitable period of time
One commenter suggested that the has passed to determine if the program adds
collection of information is necessary value to the security of the nation.
Department ‘‘should not expand the program
for the proper performance of the until it can see the successes and failures it
functions of the agency, including has with Tier 1 and Tier 2 facilities.’’ Further, Response: The Department does not
whether the information will have the commenter suggested a ‘‘formal believe that additional analysis is
practical utility; assessment, in conjunction with the needed prior to OMB approving the
(2) Evaluate the accuracy of the Department of Justice and the Federal Bureau collection of information concerning
agency’s estimate of the burden of the of Investigation, on the benefits and positive affected individuals from all covered
proposed collection of information, outcomes of running PSP-gained information chemical facilities. The Department has
including the validity of the through the TSDB [Terrorist Screening closely reviewed how Tier 1 and Tier 2
methodology and assumptions used; Database]’’ be conducted. The commenter
also suggested that such a review could
covered chemicals facilities have
evaluate the effectiveness of the CFATS PSP implemented the check for terrorist ties.
amozie on DSK3GDR082PROD with NOTICES1
4 See 6 CFR 27.300–345. and opportunities ‘‘to make it more Tier 1 and Tier 2 covered chemical
5 More information about access, correction, and effective.’’ facilities have varied by size,
redress requests under the Freedom of Information A second commenter encouraged the complexity, security issue, and location.
Act and the Privacy Act can be found in Section
7.0 of the Privacy Impact Assessment for the CFATS
Department to ‘‘examine the effectiveness of
Personnel Surety Program, dated May 4, 2011, and such screening before proceeding to subject 6 See Section 1(b)(3) of Public Law 114–278,
available at http://www.dhs.gov/privacy- the bulk of CFATS regulated facilities to which may be viewed at https://www.congress.gov/
documents-national-protection-and-programs- these additional measures.’’ The second bill/114th-congress/house-bill/710/text/pl?overview
directorate-nppd. commenter suggested the Department =closed.
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Additionally, vetting for terrorist ties Comment: One commenter and Tier 4 high-risk chemical facility
for all four tiers of covered facilities is highlighted the Department of population. Based on these findings, the
required by CFATS. Members of the Transportation (DOT) requirement at 49 Department is satisfied that the Tier 1
public commented on the CFATS CFR 172.802(a)(1) which states, and Tier 2 high-risk chemical facility
rulemaking in 2007 before the ‘‘Personnel security. Measures to historical data provided a valid
regulation was finalized, and DHS confirm information provided by job representation of what the Department
considered all public comments applicants hired for positions that can expect from Tier 3 and Tier 4 high-
(including comments about terrorist ties involve access to and handling of the risk chemical facilities.
vetting and background checks) in hazardous materials covered by the Specifically for the 106 employees,
coming to the reasoned decision to vet security plan. . . .’’ The commenter the Department estimates that under
affected individuals for terrorist ties at suggested that railroad employees this collection there are (a) 200 Tier 1
all tiered facilities as part of the having undergone such a background and Tier 2 high-risk chemical facilities
program. DHS disagrees that a check and demonstrated their reliability that did submit or will have to submit
modification to the program to eliminate by being stewards of the chemical information about affected individuals
this requirement for Tiers 3 and 4 or to during transit, should ‘‘not suddenly under the current ICR, and (b) 3,700
indefinitely delay its rollout in order to seem suspect simply by crossing a fence Tier 3 and Tier 4 high-risk chemical
conduct additional analysis would be line at a covered chemical facility.’’ facilities that will submit for the first
appropriate. Preventing terrorist access Response: It is the Department’s time under this new collection.
to high-risk chemical facilities’ understanding that the sort of Historically, each Authorizer submitted,
restricted areas and critical assets is a background checks discussed by the on average, 180 initial respondents,
core purpose of CFATS, and failure to commenter do not include checks for with each Authorizer responsible for 1.7
conduct terrorist ties checks may allow terrorist ties. Checks for terrorist ties are high-risk chemical facilities. Dividing
terrorist to gain access. required under CFATS (6 CFR 180 affected individuals per Authorizer
Comment: One commenter reiterated 27.230(a)(12)). by 1.7 high-risk chemical facilities
its continued objection to the inclusion Comments Related to the Accuracy of results in an average of 106 initial
of railroad employees is within the the Agency’s Estimate of the Burden of respondents submitted per high-risk
scope of CFATS because the commenter the Proposed Collection of Information, chemical facility.
claims that inclusion of railroad Including the Validity of the The Department’s estimate per
employees lacks a risk-based Methodology and Assumptions Used respondent (affected individual) is
justification. based on industry feedback and
Response: Under CFATS, the Comment: One commenter recognizes historical data collected on their use of
Department regulates covered chemical the assumptions that release facilities the CFATS PSP application. The
may have more affected individuals Department has estimated the time per
facilities that present a high risk from
than theft and diversion facilities, that respondent to be 5 minutes per
terrorist attack. Effectively regulating
there are an average of 106 employees submission of a record about an affected
chemical facility security involves
per facility, and that the time it takes to individual. Since this estimate is based
assessing whether terrorists have access
vet an affected individual may be valid, on current submissions from Tier 1 and
to facilities, and terrorists seeking access
but states, ‘‘it is not clear upon what Tier 2 high-risk chemical facilities, the
might not be limited to facility
information they [the assumptions] are
employees. To help reduce risk to high- Department has chosen an estimate of
based.’’
risk facilities, the Department requires 10 minutes per record to provide a more
Response: The Department based the
covered chemical facilities to conduct a assumptions on historical data collected conservative estimate.
check for terrorist ties on affected Comment: Two commenters
by the Department since the
individuals (e.g., facility personnel and expressed concern that the ICR did not
implementation of the CFATS PSP.
unescorted visitors) with or seeking appear to account for the burden
Specifically, for the difference between
access to restricted areas and critical associated with part-time or seasonal
release and theft and diversion facilities,
assets. A covered chemical facility has employees or contractors that qualify as
the Department recognizes that high-risk
the discretion to decide if they want to affected individuals.
chemical facilities for release security
escort railroad employees as visitors, Response: The Department’s estimate
issues may take a facility-wide approach
identify railroad employees as affected of the number of affected individuals in
rather than an asset-based approach in
individuals, or treat them in some other the 60-day notice was based on actual
defining their restricted areas, which
way consistent with CFATS data submitted by covered chemical
may result in a higher number of
requirements. Identifying railroad facilities at which seasonal and part-
affected individuals than theft and
employees as affected individuals time employees (to include contractors)
diversion facilities. Therefore, the
would require a covered chemical are considered affected individuals.
Department reviewed the number of
facility to ensure that those personnel Thus, the Department concludes that
release sites to ensure the estimated
are screened for terrorist ties pursuant to the historical data relied upon in the 60-
number of respondents for the Tier 3
6 CFR 27.230(a)(12). day notice incorporates seasonal and
and Tier 4 high-risk chemical facilities
In ensuring affected individuals are part-time employees.
were comparable to the historical data Comment: Three commenters felt the
screened for terrorist ties, the facility received by the Department since the
has the discretion to choose from four personal identifiable information
implementation of the CFATS PSP. The collection is not ‘‘usual and customary’’:
options for vetting affected individuals Department found that the release
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or propose alternatives or supplemental security issues for Tier 1 and Tier 2 One commenter disagreed with the
options in its SSP or ASP (See 82 FR high-risk chemical facilities made up 38 Department’s decision to invoke 5 CFR
61312, 61316).7 1320.3(b)(2) to exclude ‘‘certain activities and
percent of the total Tier 1 and Tier 2 costs related to the PSP data collection
7 The Department described the options for
high-risk chemical facility population. process.’’ The commenter suggested that two
screening for terrorist ties on page 82 FR 61313 of
For Tier 3 and Tier 4 high-risk chemical assumptions made by the Department are not
its 60-day notice which may be viewed at https:// facilities, the release security issue accurate. Specifically, that (a) the
www.federalregister.gov/d/2017-27519/page-61313. made up 25 percent of the total Tier 3 Department’s assumption that facilities
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![Federal Register / Vol. 83, No. 117 / Monday, June 18, 2018 / Notices 28249
already possess the information necessary to iii. The Department considered whether resources.12 Some companies have
submit under Option 1 or Option 2 of the the CFATS PSP ICR should be revised to opted to implement a company-wide
CFATS PSP; and (b) the Department’s account for the burden associated with approach to the PSP while others have
assumption that additional data collection is ‘‘ensuring that all affected individuals
not required and there is no further burden
not. The design of the CFATS PSP and
provide the necessary [personally identifiable
imposed by this Information Collection information] PII—and following up with this ICR allows each company with
beyond submitting the information to the those that do not.’’ After considering the multiple covered chemical facilities to
Department under Option 1 or Option 2. comment, the Department did not revise the choose for itself whether or not, or to
A second commenter also objected to the CFATS PSP ICR. The collection of data from what degree, to adopt a company-wide
exclusion of ‘‘the time needed for a site affected individuals by a covered chemical approach under CFATS.
security officer to manage data collection, facility or its designees is excluded under 5 Comment: One commenter expressed
submissions, and tracking’’ under 5 CFR CFR 1320.3(b)(2). concern that the estimated time per
1320.3(b)(2) which is similar to some of the iv. The Department considered whether the
examples provided by the first commenter.
respondent of five minutes ‘‘does not
CFATS PSP ICR should be revised to account
A third commenter expressed concern appear to include the additional time
for the burden associated with ‘‘training
similar in nature that the estimated time per personnel to use the CSAT PSP application.’’ necessary to notify employees of the
respondent does not appear to account for After considering the comment, the PSP requirement, obtain consent . . .’’
acquiring the necessary personal information Department did not revise the CFATS PSP Response: As previously discussed,
to compare against the TSDB. ICR because the burden is properly the Department did not revise the
Response: The Department evaluated accounted for under Information Collection CFATS PSP ICR because this burden is
each of the examples provided by the 1670–0007. already accounted for in the 10 minutes
commenters. The Department’s v. The Department considered whether the per respondent burden estimate.
CFATS PSP ICR should be revised to account Comment: One commenter is
evaluation of the examples provided by
for the burden associated with ‘‘ensuring concerned with the time it takes
the commenters are below: change management (e.g., once the initial Authorizer to create CSAT accounts for
i. The Department considered whether the data is gathered and uploaded, the facility
CFATS PSP ICR should be revised to account still must account for new hires and new
contractors.
for the burden associated with coordinating contractors—and further incorporate this into
Response: The Department accounts
with CFATS-facility stakeholders, including the facility access process).’’ After for the burden related to the creation of
Human Resources, Procurement, and/or considering the comment, the Department CSAT accounts for contractors under
Contract Administration to explain the PSP did not revise the CFATS PSP ICR because Information Collection 1670–0007.13
requirements and determine how best to the burden is already accounted for in this
gather the data from different populations ICR (See 82 FR 61312, 61316).10 The
Comments Related to the Quality,
(e.g., employees and resident and non- Department laid out the expectations to Utility, and Clarity of the Information
resident contractors). One commenter submit both existing affected individuals as To Be Collected
clarified elsewhere in its comments that the well as new affected individuals in the ICR The Department did not receive any
coordination included creating separate notices associated with the current
groups 8 and ‘‘PSP Submitter [user] accounts comments related to the quality, utility,
Information Collection and in the CFATS and clarity of the information to be
for each contract company, which may PSP Implementation Notice. The clear
include hundreds of different contract expectation for covered chemical facilities to
collected.
companies in cases where a large facility is submit new affected individuals is therefore
tiered for a release security issue.’’ After Comments Related To Minimizing the
inherently a part of the actual historical data Burden of the Collection of the
considering the comment, the Department upon which the Department relied in the 60-
did not revise the CFATS PSP ICR because Information on Those Who Are To
day notice.
this burden is properly accounted for under Respond, Including Through the Use of
a separate and different ICR. The Comment: One commenter suggested Appropriate Automated, Electronic
establishment of Chemical Security that the CFATS PSP is being Mechanical, or Other Technological
Assessment Tool (CSAT) accounts, such as a implemented on a facility-by-facility Collection Techniques or Other Forms of
PSP Submitter, and the assignment of such basis rather than a company-wide basis,
accounts to ‘‘groups’’ is covered under
Information Technology, e.g., Permitting
which encourages duplicative processes Electronic Submissions of Responses
Information Collection 1670–0007.9
ii. The Department considered whether the for information collection and vetting
Comment: Two commenters suggested
CFATS PSP ICR should be revised to account and dramatically increases the burdens
that the Department use a flexible
for the burden associated with ‘‘developing on railroads serving more than one
approach in the rollout:
and providing communications, Privacy Act company location. One commenter requested a phased
notices, and data collection forms to affected Response: The Department has
individuals.’’ After considering the comment, roll out of the CFATS PSP to Tier 3 and
designed the CFATS Program as a
the Department did not revise the CFATS Tier 4 covered chemical facilities.
whole, and the CFATS PSP in A second commenter ‘‘appreciate[d]
PSP ICR because, as described earlier in this
particular, to allow for a company-wide that DHS is proposing to roll out these
notice, this burden is already accounted for
in the 10 minutes per respondent burden approach. This has been mentioned in requirements in a phased method . . .’’
estimate. previous notices 11 and can be found in The same commenter also encouraged
current program guidance and the Department to consider a ‘‘site’s
8 The term ‘‘groups’’ is a technical term used by
10 The Department described its assumptions, to
various risk factors, including location,
the Department to describe how a covered chemical
facility may manage the access to records about include updates and corrections, about the number of employees, types and
affected individuals in the CSAT Personnel Surety estimated time per respondent on page 82 FR 61316
application. The Department describes ‘‘groups’’ of its 60-day notice which may be viewed at https:// 12 The Department describes the potential for a
and provides additional information about how to www.federalregister.gov/d/2017-27519/page-61316. company-wide approach in CFATS
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create and manage ‘‘groups in section 9.5 of the 11 The possibility of a company-wide approach is PSPImplementation Notice published on December
CSAT User Manual which may be viewed at https:// mentioned in: (1) The CFATS PSP 30-Day notice 18, 2015 at 80 FR 79064 that may be viewed at
www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/csat- and request for comments published on February 3, https://www.federalregister.gov/d/2015-31625/page-
portal-user-manual-508-2.pdf. 2014 at 79 FR 6422 that may be viewed at https:// 79064.
9 Information Collection 1670–0007 was approved www.federalregister.gov/d/2014-02082/page-6422, 13 Information Collection 1670–0007 was
by OMB on July 14, 2016. The Notice of Action and and (2) the CFATS PSP 60-Day notice and request approved by OMB on July 14, 2016. The Notice of
Information Collection 1670–0007 may be viewed at for comments published on March 22, 2013 at 78 Action and Information Collection 1670–0007 may
https://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/PRAViewICR FR 17684 that may be viewed at https:// be viewed at https://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/
?ref_nbr=201604-1670-001. www.federalregister.gov/d/2013-06184/page-17684. PRAViewICR?ref_nbr=201604-1670-001.
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![28250 Federal Register / Vol. 83, No. 117 / Monday, June 18, 2018 / Notices
volumes of chemicals of interest, and the number of persons who will need to purpose of submitting information about
likely offsite incident consequences’’ be checked for terrorist ties. affected individuals directly to the
when planning the phased-in approach. • Choose to escort visitors accessing Department.
Response: The Department agrees that restricted areas and critical assets in lieu If a covered chemical facility opts to
a flexible approach is appropriate for of performing terrorist ties background implement Option 3 or Option 4,
the rollout of the PSP to Tier 3 and Tier checks under the CFATS Personnel information about affected individuals
4 covered chemical facilities. If Surety Program. The high-risk chemical is not submitted to the Department.
approved, the Department plans to facility may propose in its SSP Option 3 allows high-risk chemical
implement the CFATS PSP in a phased traditional escorting solutions and/or facilities to comply with the PSP by
manner to Tier 3 and Tier 4 covered innovative escorting alternatives such as electronically verifying and validating
chemical facilities over a three year video monitoring (which may reduce the affected individual’s TWICs through
period. Similar to the successful and facility security costs), as appropriate, to the use of TWIC readers. Option 4
recent retiering effort, the Department address the unique security risks provides high-risk chemical facilities
plans to consider the number of present at the facility [emphasis with the option to visually verify certain
facilities assigned to a single Authorizer added].’’ credentials or documents that are issued
when notifying facilities to implement Comment: One commenter urged the by a Federal screening program that
the PSP, as not to overwhelm a single Department to not include additional periodically vets enrolled individuals
Authorizer. The Department will also pre-conditions to the CFATS PSP that against the TSDB.
allow the flexibility for Authorizers, if would preclude covered chemical Comment: One commenter suggested
desired, to complete the process for facilities from leveraging the that the Department ‘‘has encouraged
their facilities before notification by the background checks performed in covered chemical facilities to collect
Department. compliance with the Bureau of Alcohol, information that exceeds the legal
Comment: One commenter suggested Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives requirements.’’
that the Department has downplayed (ATF) Employee Possessor Program Response: The Department outlined
the use of ‘‘existing options’’ that could under Option 4. in the ICR all data elements and
lessen the burdens on third-party Response: The Department has not identified the ones that are required for
service providers, such as railroads, that modified the CFATS PSP to preclude a a submission under Option 1 or Option
employ affected individuals as defined covered chemical facility from the 2. While the minimum data is sufficient,
by the covered chemical facility. The potential of leveraging the vetting it is the considered judgement of the
commenter suggested that one such conducted by ATF under Option 4 for Department that additional information
‘‘existing option’’ is real-time video affected individuals who possess a reduces the likelihood of false positives
monitoring as a means of escort. Federal explosives license/permit. in matching against records in the
Response: The Department has Comment: One commenter requested federal government’s consolidated and
explicitly mentioned in multiple notices that the Department modify CSAT to integrated terrorist watchlist. Although
associated with this Information allow designated employees such as helpful in reducing false positives, this
Collection (see 79 FR 6418, 6420) and in human resource professionals the ability additional information is optional.
CFATS PSP resources the possibility of to upload and edit information about Comment: Two commenters made
innovative escorting alternatives such as affected individuals without having to suggestions as it relates to the
video monitoring. The Department has access CVI. consistency of inspections:
also worked with facilities to identify Response: The Department currently One commenter requested that the
other alternatives for a covered chemical provides the ability to restrict human Department ‘‘work with facilities that
facility to limit who is an affected resource professionals from accessing have already been inspected to make
individual. Furthermore, the CVI in CSAT. If a user is designated as sure inspections are being handled in a
Department provided the following only a Personnel Surety Submitter and consistent fashion.’’
guidance to covered chemical facilities is not assigned any other facility roles, A second commenter reported that
in the CFATS PSP Implementation they are not able to access the CVI there are ‘‘many regional
Notice: 14 documentation. inconsistencies in how inspectors
‘‘A high-risk chemical facility will Other Comments Submitted in Response conduct inspections within a region.’’
have flexibility to tailor its Response: Although this comment is
to the Information Collection Request
implementation of the CFATS Personnel outside the scope of the information
Comment: One commenter suggested collect request, DHS agrees and
Surety Program to fit its individual that compliance with the CFATS PSP
circumstances and, in this regard, to continues to work to ensure inspection
exposes railroad employee PII and consistency across the country.
best balance who qualifies as an affected exacerbates cyber-security risk. Comment: One industry association
individual, unique security issues, Response: The Department disagrees commented that any updates to the
costs, and burden. For example, a high- with the commenter that the CFATS CFATS regulation should be flexible
risk chemical facility may, in its Site PSP exposes PII and exacerbates cyber and tangible for facility compliance.
Security Plan: security risk. If (1) a covered chemical Response: This information collection
• Restrict the numbers and types of facility opts to identify the employee of request does not modify existing
persons allowed to access its restricted a third-party service provider as an regulations.
areas and critical assets, thus limiting affected individual, and (2) a covered Comment: One commenter suggested
the number of persons who will need to chemical facility opts to implement that a contradiction exists between the
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be checked for terrorist ties. Option 1 or Option 2 in their SSP or CFATS PSP and the railroads
• Define its restricted areas and ASP then the Department has designed compliance with DOT regulations.
critical assets, thus potentially limiting the CSAT Personnel Surety Program Response: The Department disagrees
14 This specific text from the CFATS Personnel
Application to allow third-party with the commenter. If a covered
Surety Program Implementation Notice may be
companies, such as a railroad, to be chemical facility opts to identify a
found on 80 FR 79060 and can be viewed at https:// granted access to the CSAT Personnel railroad employee as an affected
www.federalregister.gov/d/2015-31625/page-79060. Surety Application for the express individual, the performance of railroads
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with respect to complying with DOT The Department’s Methodology in ADDRESSES: For how and where to send
regulations, does not materially alter the Estimating the Burden for the CFATS information, see Request for New
fact that a railroad employee is an PSP Information.
affected individual. Covered chemical This 30-day notice relies on the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For
facilities must ensure that affected analysis and resulting burden estimates whom to contact for species-specific
individuals have appropriate in the 60-day notice for this instrument. information, see Request for New
background checks performed, to
Analysis Information. Individuals who are
include a check for terrorist ties. This
hearing impaired or speech impaired
ICR allows covered chemical facilities, Title: Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism may call the Federal Relay Service at
and their service providers that employ Standards (CFATS) Personnel Surety 800–877–8337 for TTY assistance.
affected individuals, an opportunity to Program.
enable a check for terrorist ties to be SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
OMB Number: 1670–0029.
performed against the TSDB. Instrument: CFATS Personnel Surety Why do we conduct 5-year reviews?
Comment: One commenter stated that Program.
the CFATS PSP, as currently designed, Frequency: ‘‘Other.’’ Under the Endangered Species Act of
‘‘does not take into consideration that Affected Public: Business or other for- 1973, as amended (Act; 16 U.S.C. 1531
Tier 3 and 4 facilities present a profit. et seq.), we maintain lists of endangered
comparatively lower risk profile than Number of Annual Respondents: 72,607 and threatened wildlife and plant
Tier 1 and 2 sites.’’ The commenter respondents (estimate). species (referred to as the List) in the
suggested that the Department Estimated Time per Respondent: 0.1667 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) at 50
acknowledge the lower risk profile of hours (10 minutes). CFR 17.11 (for wildlife) and 17.12 (for
Tier 3 and Tier 4 covered chemical Total Annual Burden Hours: 12,101 plants). Section 4(c)(2)(A) of the Act
facilities and not require them to hours. requires us to review each listed
comply with 6 CFR 27.230(a)(12)(iv). Total Annual Burden Cost (capital/ species’ status at least once every 5
The commenter requested that Tier 3 startup): $1,719,409. years. For additional information about
and Tier 4 covered chemical facilities Total Annual Burden Cost: $955,191. 5-year reviews, refer to our factsheet at
still be allowed to voluntarily Total Recordkeeping Burden: $0. http://www.fws.gov/endangered/what-
participate. we-do/recovery-overview.html.
David Epperson,
Response: The Department believes Chief Information Officer. What information do we consider in
that 6 CFR 27.230(a)(12)(iv) mitigates [FR Doc. 2018–12523 Filed 6–15–18; 8:45 am] our review?
the risk of an individual with terrorist
ties having insider access. Terrorist
BILLING CODE 9110–9P–P A 5-year review considers all new
insiders could cause significant harm to information available at the time of the
the United States through access to any review. In conducting these reviews, we
tiered chemical facility. To achieve the DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR consider the best scientific and
anti-terrorism objective of CFATS, it is commercial data that have become
Fish and Wildlife Service available since the listing determination
necessary to mitigate this risk by
conducting terrorist ties checks at all [FWS–R8–ES–2018–N009; or most recent status review, such as:
covered facilities. RBPS 12 accordingly FXES11130800000–189–FF08E00000] (A) Species biology, including but not
requires terrorist ties checks for limited to population trends,
Endangered and Threatened Wildlife distribution, abundance, demographics,
facilities of all four tiers.
and Plants; Initiation of 5-Year Status and genetics;
Comment: One commenter questioned
Reviews of 50 Species in California, (B) Habitat conditions, including but
the effectiveness of the CFATS PSP if
Nevada, and the Klamath Basin of not limited to amount, distribution, and
‘‘absent a clear national security,
Oregon suitability;
homeland security, or law enforcement
rationale . . . DHS does not follow-up AGENCY: Fish and Wildlife Service, (C) Conservation measures that have
with the company to alert it of the Interior. been implemented to benefit the
possible threat.’’ The commenter further ACTION: Notice of initiation of reviews;
species;
stated that the ‘‘value of conducting request for information. (D) Threat status and trends in
TSDB screening is questionable if an relation to the five listing factors (as
identified bad actor is permitted SUMMARY: We, the U.S. Fish and defined in section 4(a)(1) of the Act);
continued access to [chemicals of Wildlife Service (Service), are initiating and
interest] unbeknownst to the facility, 5-year status reviews of 50 species in (E) Other new information, data, or
which is in the best position to ensure California, Nevada, and the Klamath corrections, including but not limited to
that the person is not afforded that Basin of Oregon under the Endangered taxonomic or nomenclatural changes,
opportunity.’’ Species Act of 1973, as amended (Act). identification of erroneous information
Response: The Department’s design of A 5-year review is based on the best contained in the List, and improved
the CFATS Program is intended to scientific and commercial data available analytical methods.
promote and enhance the security of at the time of the review; therefore, we Any new information will be
high-risk chemical facilities; the PSP is are requesting submission of any new considered during the 5-year review and
one element of the larger CFATS information on these species that has will also be useful in evaluating the
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Program. To prevent a significant threat become available since the last review. ongoing recovery programs for the
to a facility or loss of life, a high-risk DATES: To ensure consideration in our species.
chemical facility will be contacted reviews, we are requesting submission
Which species are under review?
where appropriate and in accordance of new information no later than August
with federal law and policy, and per law 17, 2018. However, we will continue to This notice announces our active
enforcement and intelligence accept new information about any review of the species listed in the table
requirements. species at any time. below.
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Document Created: 2018-06-18 15:50:54
Document Modified: 2018-06-18 15:50:54
| Category | Regulatory Information | |
| Collection | Federal Register | |
| sudoc Class | AE 2.7: GS 4.107: AE 2.106: | |
| Publisher | Office of the Federal Register, National Archives and Records Administration | |
| Section | Notices | |
| Action | 30-Day notice and request for comments; revision of information collection request: 1670-0029. | |
| Dates | Comments are encouraged and will be accepted until July 18, 2018. | |
| Contact | Questions and requests for additional information may be directed to Amy Graydon or the CFATS Program Manager via email at [email protected] or telephone at (866) 323-2957. | |
| FR Citation | 83 FR 28244 |
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