83 FR 58685 - Safety Advisory Related to Temporary Signal Suspensions
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Railroad Administration Federal Register Volume 83, Issue 224 (November 20, 2018)
Federal Railroad Administration
Federal Register Volume 83, Issue 224 (November 20, 2018)
| Page Range | 58685-58688 | |
| FR Document | 2018-25311 |
[Federal Register Volume 83, Number 224 (Tuesday, November 20, 2018)] [Notices] [Pages 58685-58688] From the Federal Register Online [www.thefederalregister.org] [FR Doc No: 2018-25311] ----------------------------------------------------------------------- DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION Federal Railroad Administration [Docket No. FRA-2018-0037; Notice No. 2; Safety Advisory 2018-02] Safety Advisory Related to Temporary Signal Suspensions AGENCY: Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), Department of Transportation (DOT). ACTION: Notice of Safety Advisory. ----------------------------------------------------------------------- SUMMARY: FRA is issuing this Safety Advisory addressing railroad operations under temporary signal suspensions. This Safety Advisory recommends the use of industry best practices when planning and implementing temporary signal suspensions, including when conducting rail operations under temporary signal suspensions. This Safety Advisory also recommends that railroads develop and implement procedures and practices consistent with the identified best practices and that railroads take certain other actions to ensure the safety of railroad operations during temporary signal suspensions. FRA believes that actions consistent with this Safety Advisory will reduce the risk of serious injury or death both to railroad employees and members of the public. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Douglas Taylor, Staff Director, Operating Practices, Office of Railroad Safety, FRA, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE, Washington, DC 20590, telephone (202) 493-6255; or Carolyn Hayward-Williams, Staff Director, Positive Train Control/Signal & Train Control Division, Office of Railroad Safety, FRA, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE, Washington, DC 20590, telephone (202) 493-6399. SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Background On April 23, 2018, FRA published a notice of a draft Safety Advisory in the Federal Register addressing railroad operations during temporary signal suspensions. 83 FR 17701. As stated in the draft Safety Advisory, a review of FRA's accident/incident data shows that overall, rail transportation, both passenger and freight, is safe. However, recent rail accidents occurring in areas where a railroad has temporarily suspended the signal system, typically for purposes of maintenance, repair, or installation of additional components for a new or existing system, demonstrate that rail operations during signal suspensions present increased safety risks. In the draft Safety Advisory, FRA specifically noted the February 4, 2018 accident in Cayce, South Carolina, in which the engineer and conductor of National Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak) Train P09103 were killed and 115 passengers injured,\1\ when their train collided head-on with a CSX Transportation, Inc. freight train (Train F77703). As noted in the draft Safety Advisory, while the cause of this accident has not yet been determined, FRA's preliminary investigation indicates that despite the CSX train crew reporting to the train dispatcher that the switch was lined correctly, the crew did not restore the main track switch to its normal position as required by Federal regulation (Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 218.105) and CSX's own operating rules. The misaligned switch diverted the next train to traverse the location (the Amtrak train) into the siding and into the standing CSX train parked on the siding. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\ Including 92 individuals who were transported to medical facilities for treatment and 23 people who received first aid at a triage area established near the accident site. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- In the draft Safety Advisory, FRA also noted the March 14, 2016 accident near Granger, Wyoming, which occurred when a Union Pacific Railroad (UP) freight train traveled from the main track through a misaligned switch into a controlled siding and collided head-on with another UP freight train standing on the siding. Notably, both the Cayce and Granger accidents occurred while the operating railroads were installing and testing positive train control (PTC) technology and while the railroads had temporarily suspended the signals in the accident areas to perform installation and testing activities. In the Granger accident, while the signals were suspended, UP established absolute blocks intended to provide for the safe movement of trains through the area without signals. In the Cayce accident, the Amtrak train was operating on a track warrant and at the time of the accident, signal personnel had stopped working for the day, yet the temporary signal suspension remained in place. As explained in the draft Safety Advisory, the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) determined that the probable cause of the Granger accident was the employee-in-charge incorrectly using information from a conversation with the train dispatcher as authorization to send a train into the area where the signal system suspension was in effect. The NTSB also found that a contributing factor was the conductor pilot's failure to check the switch position before authorizing the train to enter the area. Both FRA and the NTSB's investigations into the Cayce accident are ongoing and while neither agency has yet issued any formal findings, on February 13, 2018, the NTSB issued a Safety Recommendation Report \2\ to FRA regarding train operations during signal suspensions. In its report, the NTSB recommended that FRA issue an emergency order directing railroads to require train crews to approach switches at restricted speed when signal suspensions are in effect and a switch has been reported relined for a main track (NTSB Safety Recommendation R-18-005). The NTSB further recommended that after the switch position is verified, train crews should be required to report to the dispatcher that the switch is correctly lined for the main track before [[Page 58686]] subsequent trains are permitted to operate at maximum-authorized speed. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \2\ NTSB, Safety Recommendation Report: Train Operation During Signal Suspension, Report No. RSR-18/01, Recommendation No. R-18-005 (Feb. 13, 2018), https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Reports/RSR1801.pdf. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- FRA issued the draft Safety Advisory consistent with the purpose of the NTSB's recommendation and to ensure all railroads were made aware of both the safety concerns identified and information and practices available to specifically address the issues raised. Moreover, FRA intended the draft Safety Advisory to provide railroads the flexibility to review and revise their existing operating rules and practices as necessary to ensure the safety of their operations, without imposing rigid and inherently limited, new requirements on the industry. FRA intended the draft Safety Advisory to provide an opportunity for interested parties and industry experts to provide input on potential ways to prevent future accidents such as those that occurred in Granger and Cayce by sharing known industry best practices and seeking input on the same. In the draft Safety Advisory, FRA noted the following best practices that some railroads were already implementing:Taking all practical measures to ensure sufficient personnel are present to continue signal work until the system is restored to proper operation. If sufficient personnel are not present, the signal suspension is terminated until such time as sufficient personnel are on hand. If a railroad elects to allow train traffic through signal suspension limits: o Establishing the smallest limits possible for the signal suspension (if possible, no more than three (3) control points or use phased limits to allow restoration of the signal system as work is completed); [cir] Minimizing the duration of the signal suspension to the shortest time period possible (if possible, no more than twelve (12) hours); and [cir] Taking all practical measures to ensure only through traffic is allowed to operate within the limits (avoiding any train meets or any movements requiring the manipulation of switches within the suspension limits). If any switches within the suspension limits are manipulated, consistent with 49 CFR 218.105, establishing an effective means of verifying that all switches have been returned to the proper position prior to any train traffic operating through the limits. (For example, require spiking or clamping of switches followed by locking for through movement after use; utilize a signal employee to tend the switch and to establish agreement between assigned crew members and the switch tender that the switch is properly lined; and/or require the first train through the limits after the manipulation of any switch to operate at restricted speed). Among other recommendations, in the draft Safety Advisory, FRA recommended that railroads develop and implement procedures and practices consistent with these industry best practices for operations conducted under temporary signal suspensions. FRA also recommended that railroads increase supervisory operational oversight and conduct operational testing on the applicable operating rules pertaining to the operation of hand-operated main track switches and that this increased oversight should include face-to-face initial job briefings with all train and engine crews that will operate in any area where the signal system will be temporarily suspended. Discussion of Comments Received in Response To Draft Safety Advisory In response to the draft Safety Advisory, FRA received comments from the NTSB, the Association of American Railroads and the American Short Line and Regional Railroad Association (AAR/ASLRRA), Amtrak, the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers and Trainmen (BLET), the Transportation Division of the International Association of Sheet Metal, Air, Rail and Transportation Workers (SMART) and individuals involved in railroad transportation. Some commenters, including the NTSB, BLET, and SMART expressed the view that FRA's issuance of a Safety Advisory did not go far enough to address the safety issues associated with signal suspensions. These commenters expressed the view that FRA should mandate solutions through the regulatory process.\3\ FRA respectfully disagrees with these commenters. FRA believes that when properly implemented and complied with, FRA's existing regulations (e.g., 49 CFR part 218, subpart F) and the railroads' related operating rules effectively address the safety issues involved. Moreover, given the variety of circumstances under which railroads may need to temporarily suspend signal systems, FRA does not believe mandating a ``one size fits all'' solution is practical or in the interest of railroad safety. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \3\ On June 11, 2018, recognizing FRA's publication of the draft Safety Advisory, the NTSB classified FRA's response to Safety Recommendation R-18-005 as ``Open--Unacceptable Response.'' In its letter to FRA, the NTSB noted that it did not agree with FRA that ``an advisory goes far enough to ensure safety.'' --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The NTSB further commented that the draft Safety Advisory offered ``contradictory statements'' in noting that the Advisory provided railroads the ``flexibility to review and revise their existing operating rules and practices as necessary to ensure the safety of their rail operations, without imposing rigid, and inherently limited, new requirements on the industry'' and at the same time stating that temporary signal suspensions ``are necessarily common occurrences'' and that ``rail operations under signal suspensions should be rare and appropriately limited.'' These statements are not contradictory. FRA recognizes that signal suspensions are necessary to maintain and upgrade signal systems. In recent years railroads have improved upon installation and testing processes to minimize the extent and duration of signal suspensions. Furthermore, some railroads have sought to limit or prohibit operations through signal suspensions, and FRA agrees that in some circumstances, limiting or prohibiting operations through signal suspensions may be appropriate. Accordingly, in this Safety Advisory, FRA is recommending that before initiating a planned temporary signal system suspension, a railroad conduct a risk assessment to, among other things, evaluate whether rail operations through and/or within the suspension limits should continue during the suspension. The NTSB further recommended that FRA require railroads, when operating trains during signal suspensions, to establish ``an effective means for verifying that all switches have been returned to the proper position prior to any train traffic operating through'' the suspension limits. The NTSB agreed with FRA's statement in the draft Safety Advisory that spiking or clamping switches, followed by locking the switches for through movement after use is one way to effectively verify switch position. In its comments, the NTSB also reiterated its Safety Recommendation R-18-005 recommending that FRA require train crews to approach switches at restricted speed when signal suspensions are in effect and a switch has been reported relined for a main track. The NTSB also recommended FRA convert the draft Safety Advisory into a regulation. As noted previously, FRA does not agree with this recommendation. FRA does, however, agree with the NTSB, and other commenters' recommendation that restricted speed may be an effective mitigation measure, and in this Safety Advisory FRA is specifically reiterating that as a potential best practice to be employed as appropriate. [[Page 58687]] BLET echoed the NTSB's restricted speed recommendation and expressed the view that it is irrelevant that both the Granger and Cayce accidents occurred while signal suspensions were in effect. Instead, from an operational standpoint, BLET asserted that the issue needing to be addressed is misaligned switches in non-signaled territory. As such, BLET expressed the view that FRA should not only implement NTSB Safety Recommendation R-18-005 as a regulation, but FRA should also implement the NTSB's Safety Recommendation R-12-29. NTSB Safety Recommendation R-12-29 recommended that until appropriate switch position warning technology is installed on main track switches, the first train through any dark territory after a main track switch had been reported relined for the main track must approach the switch location at restricted speed until the train crew reported to the dispatcher that the switch is correctly lined for the main track.\4\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \4\ NTSB previously closed R-12-29 after reconsideration of the recommendation noting that 49 CFR part 218, subpart F addresses the intent of the recommendation in an alternative manner. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- SMART urged FRA to establish ``uniform safety procedures'' noting that many SMART members operate trains over more than one railroad. In addition, SMART suggested FRA issue an emergency order requiring railroads to adopt the best practice of spiking and locking main track switches when trains operate over a section of track where a signal system is suspended or ``turned off and abandoned.'' In their comments, AAR/ASLRRA expressed agreement with the draft Safety Advisory's recommendation that railroads develop and implement procedures and practices for operations under temporary signal suspensions consistent with industry best practices. In their comments, however, AAR/ASLRRA suggested that certain aspects of the best practices FRA identified in the draft Safety Advisory should be modified. Specifically, AAR/ASLRRA suggested that FRA's recommended best practices should not limit signal suspensions to three control points and 12 hours in duration. Instead, noting the often complex nature of signal work, AAR/ASLRRA suggested that best practices should simply be for railroads to limit the number of control points involved in signal suspensions and the duration of the signal suspensions to the extent practicable. AAR/ASLRRA also expressed agreement with FRA's recommendation for increased supervisory operational oversight of the application of operating rules regarding the operation of hand-operated switches, but suggested that face-to-face initial job briefings with train and engine crews operating in signal suspension areas are ``not always feasible'' or the most effective solution. Thus, AAR/ASLRRA suggested that FRA revise its recommendation to allow for job briefings regarding temporary signal suspensions through bulletin or notice from the dispatcher, as opposed to a face-to-face job briefing. Given the variety of reasons a railroad may choose or need to suspend its signal system and the variety of circumstances under which such suspensions are conducted, FRA generally agrees with AAR/ASLRRA's comments that no geographic limit or time duration should be specified as a matter of industry-wide best practice. Accordingly, FRA believes railroads should limit the geographic scope and time duration of signal suspensions to the extent possible given the particular circumstances, but agrees that no hard limit on the number of control points, specific ways of limiting the geographic scope (such as using phased limits), or duration of signal suspensions should be specified. FRA also generally agrees that face-to-face job briefings may not always be practical if a signal suspension results from an unplanned event, such as a storm as referenced in AAR/ASLRRA's comments. This Safety Advisory, however, is specifically directed to the best practices for carrying out planned signal suspensions and thus, AAR/ASLRRA's comment on job briefings is outside the scope of this Advisory. Amtrak generally expressed support for the recommendations in the draft Safety Advisory and additionally shared its experience in developing and implementing a Safety Management System (SMS) to enhance communication of safety concerns and issues. Amtrak also referenced its February 2018 initiation of the development of a formal risk assessment methodology to identify, analyze, assess, and mitigate risks due to human error associated with operating passenger service through territories in which the normal signal systems have been temporarily suspended. Amtrak explained that upon notification of a signal system suspension from a host railroad, using a collaborative process with departments across the railroad (including Operating Practices, System Safety, and local Train and Engine staff), Amtrak performs a risk assessment to identify appropriate operational mitigations including, but not limited to, speed restrictions, alternate routing, or service suspensions. Amtrak explained that each risk assessment and the mitigations prescribed are reviewed and approved by Amtrak senior leadership and the results of that assessment and approved operational mitigations are communicated to affected employees and shared with Amtrak's host railroad. Amtrak indicates in its comments that it has performed over thirty risk assessments and is committed to continuously improving the assessment process. FRA believes Amtrak's comments have merit and in this Safety Advisory is revising its recommendations to railroads to include a risk assessment component. Safety Advisory 2018-02 \5\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \5\ The draft Safety Advisory published on April 23, 2018, was captioned ``Draft Safety Advisory 2018-01.'' Subsequent to publication of the draft Safety Advisory, however, on July 27, 2018, FRA published a separate Safety Advisory addressing electrode- induced rail pitting from pressure electric welding. That Safety Advisory was numbered 2018-01. Accordingly, FRA has revised the number assigned to this Safety Advisory to 2018-02. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Railroads suspend signal systems for a variety of reasons, including for maintenance or repair purposes, to install a new system, or to add additional components to an existing system. As exemplified by the accidents described above, rail operations under the temporary loss of protections provided by an existing signal system have the potential to introduce new safety risks and amplify existing safety risks because railroad employees accustomed to the safety an existing signal system provides must operate in an environment they may not encounter on a regular basis. A temporary signal suspension requires operating employees to immediately apply operating rules and practices different from those to which they are accustomed. Because a person's routine may include learned habits that are difficult to set aside when a temporary condition is imposed, operating employees may also need specialized instruction on the applicable rules and practices. Such risks must be addressed to provide for the safety of train operations during the loss of protection afforded by the signal system. As discussed in detail in the draft Safety Advisory, Federal regulations require railroads to apply for FRA approval for certain discontinuances and modifications of signal systems, but Federal regulations do not prohibit railroads from temporarily suspending existing signal systems for purposes of performing maintenance, upgrades, repairs, or implementing PTC technology. See 49 CFR 235.7. FRA does [[Page 58688]] not believe that Federal regulations should include such a prohibition. FRA's regulations already require individual railroads to adopt and comply with operating rules addressing the operation of hand-operated main track switches. See 49 CFR 218.105. In addition to the regulatory requirements, virtually all railroads have adopted additional operational protections to ensure the safety of rail operations when an existing signal system is temporarily suspended. FRA believes certain operational safeguards that railroads already undertake constitute the best practices within the industry when temporarily suspending a signal system. These best practices include: Take all practical measures to ensure sufficient personnel are present to continue signal work until the system is restored to proper operation. If sufficient personnel are not present, terminate the signal suspension until sufficient personnel are on hand. If a railroad elects to allow train traffic through signal suspension limits: [cir] Establish the smallest limits possible for the signal suspension; [cir] Minimize the duration of the signal suspension to the shortest time period possible; [cir] Take all practical measures to ensure only through traffic is allowed to operate within the limits (avoiding any train meets or any movements requiring the manipulation of switches within the suspension limits). If any switches within the signal suspension limits are manipulated, consistent with 49 CFR 218.105, establish an effective means of verifying that all switches have been returned to the proper position prior to any train traffic operating through the limits (for example, require spiking or clamping of switches followed by locking for through movement after use; utilize a signal employee to tend the switch and to establish agreement between assigned crew members and the switch tender that the switch is properly lined; and/or require the first train through the limits after the manipulation of any switch to operate at restricted speed). Recommendations: After careful consideration of the comments received in response to the draft Safety Advisory, and to ensure the safety of the Nation's railroads, their employees, and the public, FRA recommends that railroads take immediate actions consistent with the following: 1. Before initiating a planned temporary suspension of a signal system, perform a risk assessment to determine the most effective and safest way to implement the suspension. The risk assessment should include consideration of the need to minimize the geographic scope and duration of the suspension and evaluate whether rail operations through and/or within the suspension limits should continue during the suspension. If a railroad concludes operations through or within the suspension limits may continue, the risk assessment should identify appropriate operational mitigations including, but not limited to, speed restrictions or alternate routing. The risk assessment should be performed with the input of all affected railroad departments (e.g., Operating, Signal and Train Control, System Safety, and involved Train and Engine Staff), and any approved operational mitigations should be clearly communicated to all affected employees in advance of initiating the suspension or allowing the employees to operate through or within the suspension limits. 2. Develop and implement procedures and practices consistent with the industry best practices discussed above for rail operations conducted under temporary signal suspensions. 3. Inform employees of the circumstances surrounding the February 4, 2018, accident in Cayce, South Carolina, and the March 14, 2016, accident near Granger, Wyoming, discussed above, emphasizing the potential consequences of misaligned switches and the relevant Federal regulations and railroad operating rules intended to prevent such accidents. 4. Review, and as appropriate, revise all operating rules related to operating hand-operated main track switches (including operating rules required by 49 CFR 218.105), to enhance them to ensure (a) train crews and others restore switches to their normal position after use, and (b) the position of switches are clearly communicated to train control employees and/or dispatcher(s) responsible for the movement of trains through the area where the signal system is temporarily suspended. In doing so, railroads should pay particular attention to those main track switches where employees report clear of the main track to the train dispatcher. 5. Increase supervisory operational oversight and conduct operational testing on the applicable operating rules pertaining to the operation of hand-operated main track switches. This should include face-to-face initial job briefings with all train and engine (T&E) crews that will operate in any area where the signal system will be temporarily suspended. 6. Enhance instruction on the relevant operating rules concerning the operation of hand-operated main track switches in non-signaled territory, including the operating rules required by 49 CFR 218.105(d) during both initial and periodic instruction required by 49 CFR 217.11. In doing so, railroads should emphasize the applicability of the rules to any area(s) where the signal system is temporarily suspended and the need to ensure and verify that all hand-operated main track switches manipulated within any suspension limits have been returned to the proper position prior to operating any trains through the limits. 7. Stress to T&E employees the importance of thorough and accurate job briefings when operating hand-operated main track switches, particularly in areas where the signal system is temporarily suspended, and specifically when releasing main track authority. Ensure adequate processes and procedures are in place enabling clear and timely communication of switch positions between and among all dispatching, T&E, and train control employees responsible for operating, performing work, or authorizing trains to operate through areas where the signal system is temporarily suspended. These processes and procedures should include processes and procedures for communicating switch position information during shift handovers. Encourage employees, in case of any doubt or uncertainty regarding the position of hand-operated switches, to immediately contact the train dispatcher or take other appropriate action to confirm the position of the switch prior to authorizing a train to operate through the limits of the area. FRA encourages railroads to take immediate action consistent with the recommendations of this Safety Advisory and to take any other actions appropriate to help ensure the safety of the Nation's railroads. FRA may modify this Safety Advisory or take other appropriate actions necessary to ensure the highest level of safety on the Nation's railroads. Issued in Washington, DC. Ronald L. Batory, Administrator. [FR Doc. 2018-25311 Filed 11-19-18; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 4910-06-P
![Federal Register / Vol. 83, No. 224 / Tuesday, November 20, 2018 / Notices 58685
of the annual medical certification to with the identified best practices and the standing CSX train parked on the
the employer for retention in the that railroads take certain other actions siding.
driver’s qualification file, or keep a copy to ensure the safety of railroad In the draft Safety Advisory, FRA also
of his/her driver’s qualification file if operations during temporary signal noted the March 14, 2016 accident near
he/she is self-employed. The driver suspensions. FRA believes that actions Granger, Wyoming, which occurred
must also have a copy of the exemption consistent with this Safety Advisory when a Union Pacific Railroad (UP)
when driving, for presentation to a duly will reduce the risk of serious injury or freight train traveled from the main
authorized Federal, State, or local death both to railroad employees and track through a misaligned switch into
enforcement official. The exemption members of the public. a controlled siding and collided head-on
will be rescinded if: (1) The person fails FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: with another UP freight train standing
to comply with the terms and Douglas Taylor, Staff Director, on the siding.
conditions of the exemption; (2) the Operating Practices, Office of Railroad Notably, both the Cayce and Granger
exemption has resulted in a lower level Safety, FRA, 1200 New Jersey Avenue accidents occurred while the operating
of safety than was maintained before it SE, Washington, DC 20590, telephone railroads were installing and testing
was granted; or (3) continuation of the (202) 493–6255; or Carolyn Hayward- positive train control (PTC) technology
exemption would not be consistent with Williams, Staff Director, Positive Train and while the railroads had temporarily
the goals and objectives of 49 U.S.C. Control/Signal & Train Control Division, suspended the signals in the accident
31136(e) and 31315. Office of Railroad Safety, FRA, 1200 areas to perform installation and testing
New Jersey Avenue SE, Washington, DC activities. In the Granger accident, while
VI. Preemption
20590, telephone (202) 493–6399. the signals were suspended, UP
During the period the exemption is in SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: established absolute blocks intended to
effect, no State shall enforce any law or provide for the safe movement of trains
regulation that conflicts with this Background
through the area without signals. In the
exemption with respect to a person On April 23, 2018, FRA published a Cayce accident, the Amtrak train was
operating under the exemption. notice of a draft Safety Advisory in the operating on a track warrant and at the
VII. Conclusion Federal Register addressing railroad time of the accident, signal personnel
operations during temporary signal had stopped working for the day, yet the
Based on its evaluation of the 12 suspensions. 83 FR 17701. As stated in temporary signal suspension remained
exemption applications, FMCSA renews the draft Safety Advisory, a review of in place.
the exemptions of the aforementioned FRA’s accident/incident data shows that As explained in the draft Safety
drivers from the epilepsy and seizure overall, rail transportation, both Advisory, the National Transportation
disorders prohibition in 49 CFR 391.41 passenger and freight, is safe. However, Safety Board (NTSB) determined that
(b)(8). In accordance with 49 U.S.C. recent rail accidents occurring in areas the probable cause of the Granger
31136(e) and 31315, each exemption where a railroad has temporarily accident was the employee-in-charge
will be valid for two years unless suspended the signal system, typically incorrectly using information from a
revoked earlier by FMCSA. for purposes of maintenance, repair, or conversation with the train dispatcher
Issued on: November 9, 2018. installation of additional components as authorization to send a train into the
Larry W. Minor, for a new or existing system, area where the signal system suspension
Associate Administrator for Policy. demonstrate that rail operations during was in effect. The NTSB also found that
[FR Doc. 2018–25278 Filed 11–19–18; 8:45 am] signal suspensions present increased a contributing factor was the conductor
BILLING CODE 4910–EX–P
safety risks. In the draft Safety Advisory, pilot’s failure to check the switch
FRA specifically noted the February 4, position before authorizing the train to
2018 accident in Cayce, South Carolina, enter the area. Both FRA and the
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION in which the engineer and conductor of NTSB’s investigations into the Cayce
National Railroad Passenger Corporation accident are ongoing and while neither
Federal Railroad Administration (Amtrak) Train P09103 were killed and agency has yet issued any formal
[Docket No. FRA–2018–0037; Notice No. 2;
115 passengers injured,1 when their findings, on February 13, 2018, the
Safety Advisory 2018–02] train collided head-on with a CSX NTSB issued a Safety Recommendation
Transportation, Inc. freight train (Train Report 2 to FRA regarding train
Safety Advisory Related to Temporary F77703). As noted in the draft Safety operations during signal suspensions. In
Signal Suspensions Advisory, while the cause of this its report, the NTSB recommended that
accident has not yet been determined, FRA issue an emergency order directing
AGENCY: Federal Railroad FRA’s preliminary investigation
Administration (FRA), Department of railroads to require train crews to
indicates that despite the CSX train approach switches at restricted speed
Transportation (DOT). crew reporting to the train dispatcher when signal suspensions are in effect
ACTION: Notice of Safety Advisory. that the switch was lined correctly, the and a switch has been reported relined
SUMMARY: FRA is issuing this Safety crew did not restore the main track for a main track (NTSB Safety
Advisory addressing railroad operations switch to its normal position as required Recommendation R–18–005). The NTSB
under temporary signal suspensions. by Federal regulation (Title 49 Code of further recommended that after the
This Safety Advisory recommends the Federal Regulations (CFR) 218.105) and switch position is verified, train crews
use of industry best practices when CSX’s own operating rules. The should be required to report to the
planning and implementing temporary misaligned switch diverted the next dispatcher that the switch is correctly
signal suspensions, including when train to traverse the location (the lined for the main track before
conducting rail operations under Amtrak train) into the siding and into
2 NTSB, Safety Recommendation Report: Train
temporary signal suspensions. This 1 Including 92 individuals who were transported Operation During Signal Suspension, Report No.
Safety Advisory also recommends that to medical facilities for treatment and 23 people RSR–18/01, Recommendation No. R–18–005 (Feb.
railroads develop and implement who received first aid at a triage area established 13, 2018), https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/
procedures and practices consistent near the accident site. AccidentReports/Reports/RSR1801.pdf.
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not believe that Federal regulations risk assessment should include non-signaled territory, including the
should include such a prohibition. consideration of the need to minimize operating rules required by 49 CFR
FRA’s regulations already require the geographic scope and duration of 218.105(d) during both initial and
individual railroads to adopt and the suspension and evaluate whether periodic instruction required by 49 CFR
comply with operating rules addressing rail operations through and/or within 217.11. In doing so, railroads should
the operation of hand-operated main the suspension limits should continue emphasize the applicability of the rules
track switches. See 49 CFR 218.105. during the suspension. If a railroad to any area(s) where the signal system
In addition to the regulatory concludes operations through or within is temporarily suspended and the need
requirements, virtually all railroads the suspension limits may continue, the to ensure and verify that all hand-
have adopted additional operational risk assessment should identify operated main track switches
protections to ensure the safety of rail appropriate operational mitigations manipulated within any suspension
operations when an existing signal including, but not limited to, speed limits have been returned to the proper
system is temporarily suspended. FRA restrictions or alternate routing. The risk position prior to operating any trains
believes certain operational safeguards assessment should be performed with through the limits.
that railroads already undertake the input of all affected railroad 7. Stress to T&E employees the
constitute the best practices within the departments (e.g., Operating, Signal and importance of thorough and accurate job
industry when temporarily suspending Train Control, System Safety, and briefings when operating hand-operated
a signal system. These best practices involved Train and Engine Staff), and main track switches, particularly in
include: any approved operational mitigations areas where the signal system is
• Take all practical measures to should be clearly communicated to all temporarily suspended, and specifically
ensure sufficient personnel are present affected employees in advance of when releasing main track authority.
to continue signal work until the system initiating the suspension or allowing the Ensure adequate processes and
is restored to proper operation. If employees to operate through or within procedures are in place enabling clear
sufficient personnel are not present, the suspension limits. and timely communication of switch
terminate the signal suspension until 2. Develop and implement procedures positions between and among all
sufficient personnel are on hand. and practices consistent with the dispatching, T&E, and train control
• If a railroad elects to allow train industry best practices discussed above employees responsible for operating,
traffic through signal suspension limits: for rail operations conducted under performing work, or authorizing trains
Æ Establish the smallest limits temporary signal suspensions. to operate through areas where the
possible for the signal suspension; 3. Inform employees of the signal system is temporarily suspended.
Æ Minimize the duration of the signal circumstances surrounding the February These processes and procedures should
suspension to the shortest time period 4, 2018, accident in Cayce, South include processes and procedures for
possible; Carolina, and the March 14, 2016,
Æ Take all practical measures to communicating switch position
accident near Granger, Wyoming,
ensure only through traffic is allowed to information during shift handovers.
discussed above, emphasizing the
operate within the limits (avoiding any Encourage employees, in case of any
potential consequences of misaligned
train meets or any movements requiring doubt or uncertainty regarding the
switches and the relevant Federal
the manipulation of switches within the position of hand-operated switches, to
regulations and railroad operating rules
suspension limits). immediately contact the train dispatcher
intended to prevent such accidents.
• If any switches within the signal 4. Review, and as appropriate, revise or take other appropriate action to
suspension limits are manipulated, all operating rules related to operating confirm the position of the switch prior
consistent with 49 CFR 218.105, hand-operated main track switches to authorizing a train to operate through
establish an effective means of verifying (including operating rules required by the limits of the area.
that all switches have been returned to 49 CFR 218.105), to enhance them to FRA encourages railroads to take
the proper position prior to any train ensure (a) train crews and others restore immediate action consistent with the
traffic operating through the limits (for switches to their normal position after recommendations of this Safety
example, require spiking or clamping of use, and (b) the position of switches are Advisory and to take any other actions
switches followed by locking for clearly communicated to train control appropriate to help ensure the safety of
through movement after use; utilize a employees and/or dispatcher(s) the Nation’s railroads. FRA may modify
signal employee to tend the switch and responsible for the movement of trains this Safety Advisory or take other
to establish agreement between assigned through the area where the signal appropriate actions necessary to ensure
crew members and the switch tender system is temporarily suspended. In the highest level of safety on the
that the switch is properly lined; and/ doing so, railroads should pay particular Nation’s railroads.
or require the first train through the attention to those main track switches Issued in Washington, DC.
limits after the manipulation of any where employees report clear of the Ronald L. Batory,
switch to operate at restricted speed). main track to the train dispatcher. Administrator.
Recommendations: After careful 5. Increase supervisory operational [FR Doc. 2018–25311 Filed 11–19–18; 8:45 am]
consideration of the comments received oversight and conduct operational BILLING CODE 4910–06–P
in response to the draft Safety Advisory, testing on the applicable operating rules
and to ensure the safety of the Nation’s pertaining to the operation of hand-
railroads, their employees, and the operated main track switches. This
public, FRA recommends that railroads should include face-to-face initial job DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY
take immediate actions consistent with briefings with all train and engine (T&E)
Financial Crimes Enforcement Network
the following: crews that will operate in any area
1. Before initiating a planned where the signal system will be Senior Executive Service; Combined
temporary suspension of a signal temporarily suspended. Performance Review Board (PRB)
system, perform a risk assessment to 6. Enhance instruction on the relevant
determine the most effective and safest operating rules concerning the operation AGENCY:Financial Crimes Enforcement
way to implement the suspension. The of hand-operated main track switches in Network (‘‘FinCEN’’), Treasury.
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Document Created: 2018-11-20 07:59:26
Document Modified: 2018-11-20 07:59:26
| Category | Regulatory Information | |
| Collection | Federal Register | |
| sudoc Class | AE 2.7: GS 4.107: AE 2.106: | |
| Publisher | Office of the Federal Register, National Archives and Records Administration | |
| Section | Notices | |
| Action | Notice of Safety Advisory. | |
| Contact | Douglas Taylor, Staff Director, Operating Practices, Office of Railroad Safety, FRA, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE, Washington, DC 20590, telephone (202) 493-6255; or Carolyn Hayward-Williams, Staff Director, Positive Train Control/Signal & Train Control Division, Office of Railroad Safety, FRA, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE, Washington, DC 20590, telephone (202) 493-6399. | |
| FR Citation | 83 FR 58685 |
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