SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Executive Summary

A. Need for the Regulatory Action

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is proposing to revise its regulations to modernize security and fitness-for-duty requirements to enhance efficiency, consistent with Executive Order 14300, “Ordering the Reform of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.”

B. Major Provisions

Major provisions of this proposed rule, supported by accompanying draft guidance, include the following:

• Fitness for Duty Programs. The NRC is proposing effectiveness and efficiency improvements to the drug and alcohol testing requirements based on lessons learned from implementing title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) part 26, “Fitness for Duty Programs,” to align with select changes made by other Federal agency testing programs, and to address several petitions for rulemaking (PRMs). Changes include enabling the collection and drug testing of oral fluid specimens for all conditions for testing, a risk-informed reduction in the annual random testing rate for most licensee employees, enhancing blind performance testing requirements with additional program flexibilities and targeted sampling reductions, updating the refresher training interval, and eliminating the requirement for licensees to conduct annual audits of U.S. Department of Health and Human Services certified laboratories. The NRC also is proposing to extend the duration of applicability for the optional subpart K to 10 CFR part 26 fitness-for-duty programs for reactor construction, and to enable licensees and other entities to escort construction workers instead of subjecting those workers to a subpart K program. Under the fatigue management program requirements, the NRC is proposing to add a new exception from the work-hour controls for sequestration events, specifying alternative work hour controls and requirements that licensees may meet during such events. The NRC is also proposing to eliminate the annual reporting of fatigue management performance information to the NRC. These changes would reduce unnecessary regulatory burden.
• Security Requirements for Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations. The proposed rule would revise security requirements for independent spent fuel storage installations (ISFSIs) to improve clarity and consistency between the requirements for general license ISFSIs and specific license ISFSIs. Major provisions would allow standalone ISFSIs located outside a power reactor's protected area to implement security programs appropriate for their risk profile. The rule would streamline the process for updating ISFSI security plans and reduce the frequency of required submissions to the NRC. These changes would be responsive to stakeholder feedback and Commission direction, reducing licensee burden and facilitating efficient transitions to decommissioning.
• Physical Security Requirements. The NRC is proposing to modernize and streamline physical security requirements for nuclear power reactors and materials by shifting from prescriptive rules to performance-based, risk-informed criteria. The amendments would provide increased flexibility for implementing security measures and allow for the use of technology-inclusive approaches and alternatives tailored to diverse reactor designs. The proposal addresses access authorization, cybersecurity, safeguards information handling, event notifications, and training, and resolves industry concerns from recent rulemakings. In revising performance objectives, the changes would support innovation, reduce unnecessary regulatory burden, and maintain protection against credible threats.
• Facility Security Clearance and Safeguarding of National Security Information and Restricted Data. The NRC is proposing to revise 10 CFR part 95, “Facility Security Clearance and Safeguarding of National Security Information and Restricted Data,” to remove requirements that are duplicative and to ensure alignment with 32 CFR part 117, “National Industrial Security Program Operating Manual (NISPOM).” These changes would provide references to the applicable provisions of 32 CFR part 117 for implementation of the National Industrial Security Program.

C. Costs and Benefits

The NRC prepared a draft regulatory analysis to determine the expected quantitative costs and benefits of this proposed rule and associated draft guidance as well as qualitative factors to be considered in the NRC's rulemaking decision. The conclusion from the analysis is that this proposed rule and associated draft guidance would result ( printed page 38929) in net cost savings to the industry and the NRC, over the next 30 years, ranging from $561 million using a 7 percent discount rate to $1.01 billion using a 3 percent discount rate. For the industry, the net cost savings are estimated at $557 million (7 percent discount rate) and $1.01 billion (3 percent discount rate). For the NRC, the net cost savings are estimated at $3.4 million (7 percent discount rate) and $6.7 million (3 percent discount rate). On an annualized basis, the net cost savings to the industry and the NRC would be about $45.2 million per year at a 7 percent discount rate and $51.8 million per year at a 3 percent discount rate.

The draft regulatory analysis also considers qualitative factors, such as regulatory efficiency. These benefits would result from clarifications, administrative changes, and streamlining of processes (such as notifications), along with aligning requirements with existing Federal regulations instead of maintaining separate but similar NRC requirements.

For more information, please see the draft regulatory analysis (available in the NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML26113A051).

Table of Contents

I. Obtaining Information and Submitting Comments

A. Obtaining Information

B. Submitting Comments

II. Executive Order 14300: Ordering the Reform of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission

III. Background

IV. Discussion

A. Fitness for Duty Programs (Part 26)

B. Security Requirements for Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations (ISFSIs) (Parts 72 and 73)

C. Physical Security Requirements (Part 73)

D. Facility Security Clearance and Safeguarding of National Security Information and Restricted Data (Part 95)

V. Specific Requests for Comments

VI. Regulatory Flexibility Certification

VII. Regulatory Analysis

VIII. Backfitting and Issue Finality

IX. Cumulative Effects of Regulation

X. Plain Writing

XI. National Environmental Policy Act

XII. Paperwork Reduction Act

XIII. Executive Orders

A. Executive Order 12866: Regulatory Planning and Review (as Amended by Executive Order 14215, Ensuring Accountability for All Agencies)

B. Executive Order 14154: Unleashing American Energy

C. Executive Order 14192: Unleashing Prosperity Through Deregulation

D. Executive Order 14267: Reducing Anti-Competitive Regulatory Barriers

E. Executive Order 14270: Zero-Based Regulatory Budgeting To Unleash American Energy

XIV. Voluntary Consensus Standards

XV. Availability of Guidance

XVI. Availability of Documents

I. Obtaining Information and Submitting Comments

A. Obtaining Information

Please refer to Docket ID NRC-2025-1303 when contacting the NRC about the availability of information for this action. You may obtain publicly available information related to this action by any of the following methods:

• Federal Rulemaking Website: Go to www.regulations.gov and search for Docket ID NRC-2025-1303.
• NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS): You may obtain publicly available documents online in the ADAMS Public Documents collection at www.nrc.gov/​reading-rm/​adams.html. To begin the search, select “Begin ADAMS Public Search.” For problems with ADAMS, please contact the NRC's Public Document Room (PDR) reference staff at 1-800-397-4209, at 301-415-4737, or by email to PDR.Resource@nrc.gov. For the convenience of the reader, instructions about obtaining materials referenced in this document are provided in the “Availability of Documents” section.
• NRC's PDR: The PDR, where you may examine and order copies of publicly available documents, is open by appointment. To make an appointment to visit the PDR, please send an email to PDR.Resource@nrc.gov or call 1-800-397-4209 or 301-415-4737, between 8 a.m. and 4 p.m. eastern time, Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays.
• Public Meeting: The NRC will conduct a public meeting to describe the proposed amendments and answer questions from the public on the proposed rule. The NRC will publish a notice of the location, time, and agenda of the meeting on the NRC's public meeting website within 10 calendar days of the meeting. Stakeholders should monitor the NRC's public meeting website for information about the public meeting at: www.nrc.gov/​public-involve/​public-meetings/​index.cfm.

B. Submitting Comments

Comments must be submitted electronically using www.regulations.gov no later than 11:59 p.m. eastern time on July 27, 2026. Please include Docket ID NRC-2025-1303 in your comment submission.

The NRC cautions you not to include identifying or contact information that you do not want to be publicly disclosed in your comment submission. The NRC will post all comment submissions at www.regulations.gov as well as enter the comment submissions into ADAMS. The NRC does not routinely edit comment submissions to remove identifying or contact information.

If you are requesting or aggregating comments from other persons for submission to the NRC, then you should inform those persons not to include identifying or contact information that they do not want to be publicly disclosed in their comment submission. Your request should state that the NRC does not routinely edit comment submissions to remove such information before making the comment submissions available to the public or entering the comment into ADAMS.

II. Executive Order 14300: Ordering the Reform of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission

On May 23, 2025, President Donald J. Trump signed Executive Order (E.O.) 14300, “Ordering the Reform of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.” Section 5, “Reforming and Modernizing the NRC's Regulations,” requires the NRC to undertake a review and wholesale revision of its regulations and guidance documents as guided by the policies set forth in section 2 of the E.O. This rulemaking addresses section 5(g), which directs the NRC to “[r]evise the Reactor Oversight Process and reactor security rules and requirements to reduce unnecessary burdens and be responsive to credible risks.”

III. Background

Over the decades, the NRC has developed a comprehensive regulatory framework to ensure that licensee programs at nuclear facilities provide reasonable assurance that public health and safety is adequately protected and are in accord with the common defense and security. This proposed rule seeks to modernize the NRC's regulatory framework for licensee security programs—reducing regulatory burden, where appropriate, while continuing to provide reasonable assurance of adequate safety and security. The principal regulations relevant to this ( printed page 38930) proposed rule are set forth in 10 CFR parts 26; 72, “Licensing Requirements for the Independent Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel, High-Level Radioactive Waste, and Reactor-Related Greater Than Class C Waste”; 73, “Physical Protection of Plants and Materials”; and 95.

The regulations in 10 CFR part 26 govern fitness-for-duty (FFD) programs, including drug and alcohol testing and fatigue management, for personnel at nuclear power plants and certain other NRC-licensed facilities. The requirements are designed, in part, to provide reasonable assurance that individuals are trustworthy, reliable, and not under the influence of any substances, legal or illegal, or mentally or physically impaired from any cause that could adversely affect their ability to safely and competently perform their duties.

The regulations in 10 CFR part 72 set forth requirements for the licensing and operation of ISFSIs. These facilities are used to safely store spent nuclear fuel and certain other radioactive materials, both at power reactor sites and away from reactor sites. Part 72 includes both safety and security provisions, with physical protection requirements that vary depending on whether the ISFSI is operated under a general license or specific license.

The regulations in 10 CFR part 73 address the physical protection of plants and materials. Part 73 contains detailed requirements for physical security programs, access authorization, cybersecurity, and the protection of safeguards information. These requirements apply to commercial nuclear power reactors, fuel cycle facilities, and other licensees that possess special nuclear material (SNM). The regulation is structured to protect against the design basis threats of radiological sabotage and theft or diversion of SNM, and includes requirements for security organization, training, response strategies, and contingency planning.

The regulations in 10 CFR part 95 establish requirements for facility security clearances and the safeguarding of national security information and restricted data. These requirements are intended to ensure that NRC licensees and certificate holders who require access to classified information maintain appropriate security measures in accordance with the National Industrial Security Program.

The NRC recognizes the need to modernize and streamline its security and FFD regulations to reduce unnecessary regulatory burden, promote regulatory clarity, provide appropriate program flexibility, and support the deployment of innovative technologies, while also continuing to provide reasonable assurance that safety and security will be adequately maintained. This proposed rule aligns with national policy directives to facilitate the expansion of United States nuclear energy capacity, as articulated in recent Executive Orders and statutory mandates.

In addition to E.O. 14300, other recent E.O.s related to the expansion of United States nuclear energy capacity include E.O. 14156, “Declaring a National Energy Emergency” (90 FR 8433; January 29, 2025), which stressed the need for a reliable, diversified, and affordable supply of energy, and E.O. 14154, “Unleashing American Energy” (90 FR 8353; January 29, 2025), which stated that it is in the national interest to “unleash America's affordable and reliable energy and national resources.”

Recent statutory mandates related to nuclear energy capacity include the Nuclear Energy Innovation and Modernization Act (Pub. L. 115-439, 132 Stat. 5572) (NEIMA) and the Accelerating Deployment of Versatile, Advanced Nuclear for Clean Energy Act of 2024 (Pub. L. 118-67, 138 Stat. 1448) (ADVANCE Act). In response to NEIMA, the NRC recently issued a final rule establishing 10 CFR part 53, “Risk-Informed, Technology-Inclusive Regulatory Framework for Commercial Nuclear Power Plants,” which sets forth a regulatory framework for licensing and regulating advanced reactors (91 FR 15696; March 30, 2026). Part 53 is designed to accommodate a wide range of reactor technologies and business models, providing performance-based requirements that enable the use of modern safety and security approaches. As discussed in Section IV of this document, proposed changes as a part of this proposed rule would apply to licensees and applicants under 10 CFR parts 50, “Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities”; 52, “Licenses, Certifications, and Approvals for Nuclear Power Plants”; and 53. The proposed amendments are intended to provide enhanced regulatory flexibility for both current and future licensees, streamline administrative processes, and ensure that NRC requirements remain effective, efficient, and responsive to credible risks.

The NRC prepared an unofficial redline strikeout version of the proposed changes to regulatory text that is intended to help the reader identify the changes. The unofficial redline strikeout version of the proposed rule is publicly available and is listed in the “Availability of Documents” section. Comments on the rule text should refer to this proposed rule and not the unofficial redline strikeout version.

IV. Discussion

The discussion is organized by subject area because of the wide-ranging set of issues covered by this proposed rule. The proposed rule also includes minor editorial corrections.

A. Fitness for Duty Programs (Part 26)

The proposed rule would incorporate effectiveness and efficiency improvements into the NRC's FFD program requirements for drug and alcohol testing and fatigue management since the NRC's extensive amendments of part 26 in 2008 (73 FR 17176; March 31, 2008). These proposed effectiveness and efficiency changes would reduce unnecessary regulatory burden on licensees and other entities and address section 5(g) of E.O. 14300. This proposed rule focuses on three areas: (1) incorporating lessons learned from implementing part 26 since 2008; (2) aligning part 26 with select updates made to the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) Mandatory Guidelines for Federal Workplace Drug Testing Programs (HHS Guidelines) and the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) drug testing requirements in 49 CFR part 40, “Procedures for Transportation Workplace Drug and Alcohol Testing Programs”; and (3) addressing three PRMs.^[1]

Proposed changes to the drug and alcohol testing program requirements include the following: expanding the option to collect and drug test oral fluid specimens for all conditions for testing in § 26.31(c); implementing a risk-informed reduction to the annual random testing rate in § 26.31(d)(2)(vii) that applies to most licensee employees ( i.e., those that do not perform critical safety- or security-related functions); extending the duration of applicability for the optional FFD program for reactor construction under subpart K to 10 CFR part 26, “FFD Program for Construction”; enabling licensees and other entities to escort construction workers performing activities under § 26.4(f), as an alternative to those workers being subject to an FFD program; enhancing the § 26.168 blind performance testing requirements to ( printed page 38931) reduce unnecessary burden; eliminating annual audits of HHS-certified laboratories performed by licensees and other entities; updating the FFD program refresher training interval; and removing unused regulations (specifically, subpart F, “Licensee Testing Facilities”). Proposed changes to the fatigue management program requirements include alternative requirements that licensees can meet during a sequestration event and the elimination of the requirement to annually report fatigue management information to the NRC.

From 2010 through 2012, the NRC also received three PRMs (docketed by the NRC as PRM-26-4, PRM-26-7, and PRM-26-8), which the NRC determined to be appropriate for consideration in the rulemaking process; all three of the PRMs are being considered as part of this rulemaking. To address PRM-26-4, “California Association of Marriage and Family Therapists” (75 FR 51958; August 24, 2010), the NRC is proposing to add State-licensed or State-certified marriage and family therapists to the list of acceptable credentials in § 26.187(b) that qualify individuals to serve as substance abuse experts (SAEs). The NRC also considered the issues identified for rulemaking in PRM-26-7, “Certification of Substance Abuse Experts” (76 FR 61625; October 5, 2011), related to Certified Addiction Specialists. The NRC is not proposing to add the petitioner's requested Certified Addiction Specialist that has been certified by the American Academy of Health Care Providers in the Addictive Disorders to the list of acceptable credentials to serve as an SAE under § 26.187(b), and accordingly would deny PRM-26-7.

Finally, the NRC considered the issues identified for rulemaking in PRM-26-8, “Additional Synthetic Drug Testing” (78 FR 22209; April 15, 2013). The NRC determined that the 2022 part 26 final rule (87 FR 71422; November 22, 2022), in part, addressed the issues raised in this petition by expanding the drug testing panel to include additional semi-synthetic opioids (hydrocodone, hydromorphone, oxycodone, oxymorphone), methylenedioxy-methamphetamine (MDMA), and methylenedioxyamphetamine (MDA). Under § 26.31(d)(1)(i), licensees and other entities also have the ability to consult with local law enforcement, hospitals, and drug counseling services to determine if other drugs with abuse potential are being used in the geographic locale of facilities, and to expand the drug testing panels to include any controlled substance that is listed on Schedules I through V of section 202 of the Controlled Substances Act. In addition, under § 26.77(b), a licensee or other entity must take immediate action to prevent any individual from performing covered duties if they appear impaired, which provides reasonable assurance that impairment from any cause (including the use of both scheduled and unscheduled substances) can be addressed. Accordingly, the NRC is not proposing changes related to PRM-26-8 and would deny this petition.

HHS and DOT have also updated their drug testing program requirements since the 2008 and 2022 amendments to part 26. On October 12, 2023, HHS published final revisions to the HHS Guidelines for the testing of drugs in urine and oral fluid specimens (88 FR 70768 and 88 FR 70814, respectively). DOT published two final rules amending its drug and alcohol testing programs in 49 CFR part 40. One updated DOT's urine drug testing requirements (82 FR 52229; November 13, 2017), and the other enabled oral fluid drug testing (88 FR 27596; May 2, 2023). The HHS Guidelines govern Federal employee workplace drug testing programs at more than 100 Federal agencies and Federal agency drug testing programs ( e.g., DOT) that test civilians in safety- and security-sensitive positions similar to personnel tested under the NRC's FFD program in part 26. The NRC has historically relied on the HHS Guidelines to establish the technical requirements for the collection and testing of specimens for drugs and the review of test results. The NRC also relies on the DOT's drug and alcohol testing regulations in 49 CFR part 40 in certain situations for which HHS does not have guidelines; for example, the HHS Guidelines do not cover testing for alcohol or evaluating and returning individuals to covered duties following a positive drug or alcohol test result. The DOT-regulated entities also test millions of individuals each year, which provides valuable lessons learned from implementing a testing program covering a much larger worker population than exists in the U.S. nuclear industry. This proposed rule would incorporate select updates to the HHS Guidelines and DOT drug testing requirements into part 26.

(i) Drug and Alcohol Testing

(a) Program Implementation Milestone

The proposed rule includes a risk-informed change that would extend the implementation milestone for when a licensee or other entity must transition from the optional subpart K to an FFD program that meets all of the requirements of part 26, except subparts K and M, “Fitness for Duty Programs for Facilities Licensed under 10 CFR part 53.” The milestone would change from the receipt of special nuclear material in the form of fuel assemblies to before initial fuel load into the reactor.

The NRC has reassessed the risks presented during the construction of nuclear power reactors and has determined that implementation of § 26.3(a) and (c) and § 26.4(e)(1) is not commensurate with current risk insights. Section 26.3(a) currently requires, in part, that licensees authorized to operate a nuclear power reactor under part 50 and holders of a combined license (COL) under part 52 after the Commission has made the finding under § 52.103(g) shall implement the FFD program under the requirements of part 26, except for subparts K and M, before the receipt of SNM in the form of fuel assemblies. Under § 26.3(c), licensees and other entities constructing a nuclear power plant must implement their FFD program no later than receipt of SNM in the form of fuel assemblies. The risk associated with unirradiated fuel, however, does not increase when the fuel arrives onsite, because its engineered safety features, storage, and configuration have not changed since the fuel was in transit. For transit and receipt onsite, the same physical protection requirements ( i.e., § 73.67, “Licensee fixed site and in-transit requirements for the physical protection of special nuclear material of moderate and low strategic significance”) are applied to protect the fuel. Safety and security risks associated with unirradiated nuclear fuel begin to increase once the process of loading fuel into its operating configuration begins. The operational milestone “before initial fuel load into the reactor” therefore corresponds more closely to the start of NRC-licensed activities that could result in consequences adverse to public health and safety or the common defense and security than does the current milestone of receipt of nuclear fuel onsite. Further, this proposed milestone change is based on recent operating experience from implementing subpart K FFD programs at power reactor construction sites. Specifically, the NRC issued an exemption to the licensee for Vogtle Electric Generating Plant Units 3 and 4 to delay implementing FFD programs, except those that applied for construction, until initial fuel load (86 FR 73809; December 28, 2021). ( printed page 38932)

(b) Specimen Testing Options

The proposed rule would expand the option to collect and drug test oral fluid specimens for all conditions of testing specified under § 26.31(c). This proposed change would provide an effective method to thwart attempts to subvert the drug testing process because all oral fluid specimens would be collected under direct observation. Each year, approximately 25 to 30 percent of the drug testing violations under part 26 are identified subversion attempts. In most cases, a donor attempts to provide a specimen that did not come from their body ( e.g., synthetic urine). This action is possible because a donor typically provides a urine specimen inside a privacy enclosure. However, oral fluid testing is conducted in a manner that is directly observable without the privacy enclosure associated with collecting a urine sample, and therefore precludes potential subversion attempts that can be visually identified.

Currently, under § 26.83(b), licensees and other entities have the option to collect and drug test an oral fluid specimen instead of a urine specimen only when a directly observed collection is required ( i.e., when information suggests a donor may be attempting to subvert a urine drug test). Expanding the collection and drug testing of oral fluid specimens has the potential to significantly improve the deterrent capabilities of the drug testing process, which would improve public health and safety and common defense and security. This proposed rule would also reduce the financial and administrative burdens associated with actions taken in response to subversion attempts that licensees and other entities would no longer encounter.

(c) Blind Performance Testing Submissions

Blind performance test samples (BPTSs) are formulated to verify the accuracy and reliability of each drug and validity test performed by the HHS-certified laboratory that a licensee or other entity uses to perform testing under contract. In each calendar quarter, BPTSs must be submitted to the laboratory for each drug or drug metabolite that must be tested in donor specimens and for each validity test performed to identify subversion attempts. A licensee or other entity must prepare BPTSs to appear as donor specimens to the laboratory, and BPTSs must be submitted along with donor specimens throughout the calendar quarter to evaluate laboratory performance.

Each year, operating experience demonstrates that the BPTS program identifies unsatisfactory performance at HHS-certified laboratories. Given the consolidated use of testing laboratories by industry, an identified performance issue at one laboratory generally impacts numerous licensee and other entity FFD programs. Identified performance issues, for example, have pertained to false negative test results because of laboratory certified scientists failing to adhere to laboratory testing procedures, weaknesses in laboratory standard operating procedures, improperly formulated reagents used in testing, and testing equipment maintenance issues.

The proposed rule would incorporate three effectiveness and efficiency improvements for blind performance testing programs based on industry practice and lessons learned. These improvements would reduce unnecessary regulatory burden for licensees and other entities.

1. Testing During Initial 90 Days

The proposed rule would eliminate the increased number of BPTSs that must be submitted in the initial 90 days of a licensee or other entity initiating a contract with a new HHS-certified laboratory. Under the existing requirements in § 26.168(a), in this initial 90-day period, a minimum of 30 BPTSs must be submitted for testing, whereas in each subsequent calendar quarter, a minimum of 10 BPTSs must be submitted for testing. The increased number of BPTS submissions in the initial 90 days of testing is unnecessary. The NRC has found that the post-initial 90-day period BPTS submission number of 10 BPTSs per calendar quarter is sufficient to identify unsatisfactory laboratory performance. The blind testing program already requires that, if unsatisfactory performance is identified ( e.g., false negative test result for a BPTS formulated to test positive for marijuana), a licensee or other entity must take immediate action to investigate and implement corrective actions under §§ 26.719(c) and 26.167(f). Eliminating the increased number of BPTSs in the initial 90 days of testing would also reduce an unnecessary financial and administrative burden on a licensee or other entity considering changing to another HHS-certified testing laboratory.

2. Fleetwide BPTS Submissions

The proposed rule would revise § 26.168(a) to clarify how a licensee or other entity is to determine how many BPTSs it must submit for testing in each calendar quarter, after the initial 90-day period, to the HHS-certified laboratory that it maintains under contract to perform testing. The current BPTS submission requirements require a minimum of 10 BPTSs to be submitted per quarter, or 1 percent of the donor specimens up to a maximum of 100 BPTSs, whichever is greater. Generally, § 26.168(a) has been applied at the facility level ( e.g., a location with one or more nuclear power reactors), whereby the minimum BPTS submission requirement almost always applies. However, § 26.168(a) could also be interpreted to apply at the fleet level. That is, a utility could calculate the number of BPTSs to submit to its HHS-certified laboratory based on the total number of donor specimens submitted for testing from all its facilities each quarter. This application would result in a reduction in the number of BPTS submissions per quarter compared to treating each of the utility's facilities independently under § 26.168(a). Either application would adequately maintain safety and security because the testing capabilities of the laboratory used by the licensee would be effectively challenged throughout each testing quarter. Current industry practice demonstrates that a small number of HHS-certified laboratories are used by a large number of part 26-regulated entities (regardless of whether the number of BPTS submittals is calculated at the facility or the fleet level), which ensures that the HHS-certified laboratories undergo adequate testing, focusing on those program elements unique to the NRC's FFD framework.

3. Quarterly Drug Testing Submissions

The NRC is proposing to eliminate the BPTS submission requirements in § 26.168(b)(1) and (2) that require a licensee or other entity to submit at least two BPTSs positive for marijuana in each quarter and to replace the BPTS positive for PCP with an additional BPTS positive for cocaine in at least two quarters per year. These prescriptive requirements are unnecessarily restrictive to effectively challenge testing performed at HHS-certified laboratories ( e.g., changing drug use trends may warrant a licensee to adjust which substances it submits to the laboratory, once it meets the minimum required in a quarter). The NRC is also proposing clarifications to § 26.168(d) for false negative challenge BPTSs and § 26.168(f) for negative BPTSs, which require a minimum of 10 percent of BPTSs submitted each quarter to be false negative challenge BPTSs and negative BPTSs, respectively. To conform with § 26.168(e) for validity testing BPTSs, the NRC is proposing to ( printed page 38933) include a statement in each requirement to clarify that either a minimum of one BPTS, or 10 percent of BPTSs submitted each quarter, whichever is greater, must be submitted per quarter.

(d) Escorting Construction Workers

The proposed rule would amend part 26 to permit licensees and other entities to escort construction workers performing activities covered under § 26.4(f) instead of requiring these workers to be subject to an FFD program. This proposed change is based on recent operating experience from implementing subpart K FFD programs at the Vogtle Electric Generating Plant Units 3 and 4. Specifically, the NRC issued an exemption to the Vogtle licensee to permit the escorting of construction workers (84 FR 27364; June 12, 2019). To permit escorting, the proposed rule would amend § 26.5, “Definitions,” to define the word “Escort”; § 26.4(e) to include a new requirement that individuals that serve as an escort must be subject to an FFD program that meets all part 26 requirements, except subparts I, “Managing Fatigue,” K, and M; § 26.4(f) to state that individuals who are escorted and constructing or directing the construction of safety- or security-related structures, systems, and components (SSCs) need not be subject to the licensee's FFD program; § 26.27(c)(5) and § 26.606(b)(7) to require the licensee or other entity to establish, implement, and maintain written procedures for escorting; and § 26.403(a) and (b) to require the licensee or other entity implementing a subpart K FFD program to establish, carry out, and maintain a procedure for escorts and those individuals under escort. These proposed changes would improve regulatory flexibility and potentially reduce costs by enabling licensees and other entities the opportunity to better plan and carry out construction activities with individuals who may be onsite for only short periods of time.

(e) Fitness for Duty Program Refresher Training

The proposed rule would revise § 26.29(c)(2) to change the FFD program refresher training interval from a nominal 12-month frequency to a nominal 24-month frequency. This proposed change would align with the refresher training interval that would apply to future part 53 licensees and other entities that implement § 26.608(b) of subpart M. The proposed rule would maintain the requirement in existing §§ 26.29(c)(2) and 26.608(b) for refresher training to be performed more frequently than the specified interval if the need is indicated, such as when an individual fails to properly implement FFD program procedures, or because of the severity of problems discovered through licensee-performed FFD program audits. This proposed change would reduce unnecessary regulatory burden by providing licensees and other entities with more flexibility on when to perform FFD program refresher training.

(f) Random Testing Rates for Licensee Employees

The proposed rule would revise § 26.31(d)(2)(vii) to reduce the annual random testing rate from 50 percent to 25 percent for most licensee employees ( i.e., those that do not perform critical safety- or security-related activities). This risk-informed proposed change is based on an assessment of approximately 35 years of FFD program performance data annually reported to the NRC by licensees and other entities.

The licensee employee workforce has consistently tested positive at much lower rates on pre-access and random drug and alcohol testing than the contractor/vendor workforce. The data show two to three times higher positive rates for contractor/vendors than licensee employees. In addition, FFD program performance data has consistently demonstrated that the licensee employee worker population has very low subversion rates.

The existing 50 percent annual random testing rate would continue to apply to the small subset of licensee employees that perform critical safety and security-related functions ( i.e., individuals licensed under 10 CFR part 55, “Operators' Licenses,” to operate a power reactor, security personnel under § 26.4(a)(5), FFD program personnel under § 26.4(g), and any supervisory personnel directing the operation or maintenance of safety- or security-related SSCs or directing the performance of security duties under § 26.4(a)(5)).

(g) Random Testing—Use of Consortium/Third-Party Administrators

The proposed rule would amend § 26.31(d)(2)(vii) to incorporate a requirement—similar to that described in § 26.607(b)(2)(vi) of subpart M of 10 CFR part 26—that applies to FFD programs with small staff sizes where random testing cannot be implemented without predictability. Small staff sizes can contribute to increased predictability in random testing, due to the possibility for staff to make inferences based on patterns in testing frequency that are more easily recognizable when there is a smaller pool of employees to choose from. For FFD programs with small staff sizes, the proposed rule—under a new § 26.31(d)(2)(vii)(C)—would require the use of a consortium/third-party administrator (C/TPA) to include the workers from multiple licensees or other entities in a combined random testing pool, from which the C/TPA would make testing selections throughout the year. Use of a C/TPA would significantly improve the effectiveness of the random testing programs of potential future licensee sites that may have small worker populations, and would ensure that individuals at these facilities would not be able to predict whether random testing would be conducted in a given period of time. As discussed in the 2026 part 53 final rule, C/TPAs have been used for many years by other Federally-regulated testing programs implemented by the U.S. Department of Transportation, such as those covering independent owner-operator truck drivers. This proposed aligning change would ensure that effective random testing programs can be implemented at future nuclear power reactor sites under parts 50 and 52 that may be operated by a small number of individuals.

The proposed rule would also include a conforming revision to § 26.607(b)(2)(vi) to ensure that a C/TPA-managed random testing pool for a facility licensed under part 53 meets the same annual random testing rate as that required under § 26.607(b)(2)(v). Without this correction, a C/TPA pool would not have a specified random testing rate.

(h) Licensee Audits of HHS-Certified Laboratories

The proposed rule would eliminate the § 26.41(c)(2) requirement for licensees and other entities to annually audit the HHS-certified laboratories maintained under contract to perform testing. These audits are redundant because HHS's National Laboratory Certification Program (NLCP) uses highly trained technical experts to independently inspect each HHS-certified laboratory twice per year. The NLCP inspection process evaluates the majority of laboratory services and functions provided to licensees and other entities under part 26, and the § 26.168 performance-based blind performance testing program ( i.e., quarterly submission of BPTSs and implementing of corrective actions under §§ 26.719(c) and 26.167(f)) effectively monitors and addresses unsatisfactory performance issues associated with unique testing program attributes specific to NRC programs. As ( printed page 38934) a result of eliminating the annual auditing requirement, the proposed rule would also make conforming changes to § 26.41(a), (c)(1), (g), and (g)(4) and would remove § 26.41(g)(5). These proposed rule changes would reduce unnecessary regulatory burden on licensees and other entities and the HHS-certified laboratories that perform testing for part 26 regulated entities.

(i) HHS-Certified Laboratory Contract Provisions for Subpart M FFD Programs

The proposed rule would revise § 26.607(c)(4), in subpart M of 10 CFR part 26, to align with the requirements of § 26.153(f) that apply to existing licensees and other entities implementing FFD programs under part 26. Paragraph § 26.607(c)(4) requires, in part, that each licensee or other entity establish and maintain a contract with the HHS-certified laboratory relied upon for testing, and that the contract must stipulate that the laboratory is subject to inspection and auditing by the licensee or other entity, and that the laboratory must provide access to records and permit copying and removal of records, if necessary. However, § 26.607(c)(4), as published in the 2026 final rule that created subpart M, did not include other important contractual requirements in § 26.153(f). The proposed rule would address these differences between the commensurate requirements by creating a new § 26.607(c)(5) that would replace the last sentence currently in § 26.607(c)(4).

Specifically, the proposed rule would add the requirements equivalent to those in the existing requirements of § 26.153(f)(1) through (6). These requirements specify that laboratories must comply with applicable provisions of any State licensor; make qualified personnel available to testify at any administrative or disciplinary proceedings against an individual based on a laboratory's test results; and provide a donor with access, upon written request, to all laboratory records associated with testing of the individual's specimen and any relevant records on laboratory certification, review, or revocation-of-certification proceedings. These requirements also include individual privacy requirements pertaining to laboratory records; conflict of interest provisions applicable to a licensee's or other entity's medical review officer (MRO); and the requirement that the NRC and any licensee or other entity using the laboratory's services must be permitted to inspect the laboratory at any time, including unannounced inspections.

Maintaining uniform contractual requirements for HHS-certified laboratories that perform testing for any licensee or other entity FFD program under part 26 would be necessary because the NRC does not regulate HHS-certified laboratories. As such, contractual requirements would ensure that the NRC and its licensees and other entities have adequate access to each laboratory facility, its personnel, and its records, as necessary to conduct quality assurance reviews. Contractual requirements would also ensure that conflicts of interest do not exist between the laboratory and MROs who may review the laboratory's test results for a licensee or other entity.

(j) Maintaining Back-Up HHS-Certified Laboratories Under Contract for Subpart M FFD Programs

The proposed rule would remove the § 26.607(c)(4) requirement that a licensee or other entity maintain a contract with a back-up HHS-certified laboratory for each biological specimen tested. While a contract with a primary laboratory performing testing on all donor specimens for a licensee or other entity is necessary, imposing a requirement that a back-up laboratory also be maintained under contract is unnecessarily restrictive, inconsistent with industry practice, and is not required for current licensees and other entities implementing an FFD program under part 26.

A back-up HHS-certified laboratory typically conducts testing for a licensee or other entity only when a donor is determined to have violated the FFD policy based on a confirmed positive drug test result or a substituted or adulterated validity test result, and the donor requests retesting at a second laboratory to independently verify the accuracy of the initial laboratory's test result. Many current licensees and other entities implementing FFD programs under part 26 do not maintain a contractual relationship with a particular back-up laboratory and instead provide a donor with a list of all HHS-certified laboratories in the United States to choose from with respect to conducting additional testing on their specimen.

Given the limited use of back-up laboratories by existing licensees, the § 26.607(c)(4) contractual requirement would impose an unnecessary additional burden on future part 53 licensees and other entities that implement subpart M FFD programs and is inconsistent with the current HHS-certified laboratory contractual requirements that apply to part 50 and 52 licensees and other entities. The proposed change would reduce unnecessary regulatory burden and afford donors maximum flexibility in choosing the HHS-certified laboratory to perform additional testing on their specimens, in instances where follow-up testing is requested after an FFD policy violation has been determined.

(k) Licensee Testing Facilities

The proposed rule would eliminate subpart F, “Licensee Testing Facilities.” Under subpart F, part 26 currently enables licensees to conduct initial drug and initial validity testing on urine specimens at a licensee testing facility (LTF), typically located at the power reactor site. Any specimen tested by an LTF that does not test negative or has a validity testing issue must be forwarded to an HHS-certified laboratory for additional testing.

Historically, LTF testing was the preferred option for many FFD programs because of the quick turnaround time on negative drug test results, which enabled the timely in-processing of workers during outages. Use of LTFs, however, has steadily declined over time as HHS-certified laboratories have greatly improved the turnaround times for reporting negative test results, and no licensee FFD programs currently use an LTF. Operating experience also demonstrates that future use of LTFs is unlikely given high operating costs, the increasing technical complexity of urine testing ( e.g., drugs tested, cutoff levels used, validity tests performed), and the fact that LTFs can only test urine specimens.

Eliminating the option for LTFs would improve regulatory effectiveness and efficiency by more closely aligning the part 26 drug testing program with the HHS and DOT testing programs, both of which require testing to be performed at HHS-certified laboratories. Eliminating subpart F would also simplify other part 26 requirements beyond subpart F, because numerous sections reference the use of an LTF or describe LTF-specific processes. Eliminating subpart F would also reduce the administrative burden on the NRC to maintain training programs and inspection procedures that accommodate LTF use.

On December 3, 2025 (90 FR 55621), the NRC published a direct final rule to insert a conditional sunset provision into § 26.121, “Purpose,” and certain other regulations in response to E.O. 14270, “Zero-Based Regulatory Budgeting to Unleash American Energy” (90 FR 15643; April 15, 2025). The conditional sunset provision in § 26.121 provides that subpart F of part 26 will cease to have effect on January 8, 2027, unless the NRC, after considering public input on the costs and benefits of the ( printed page 38935) subpart, determines that the cessation deadline should be extended. The NRC is using this proposed rule to accelerate the sunsetting of subpart F by proposing to remove subpart F and make other conforming changes.

(l) Event Notification for Supervisor FFD Policy Violations

The proposed rule would risk-inform the 24-hour reporting requirement in § 26.719(b)(2) to notify the NRC of significant violations of a licensee's or other entity's FFD policy by supervisory personnel. Specifically, the proposed rule would focus this notification requirement on supervisors who direct the operation or maintenance of safety- or security-related SSCs or who direct the performance of security duties as specified in § 26.4(a)(5).

The timely reporting of information to the NRC is necessary to enable prompt regulatory action, if needed. Operating experience demonstrates that 24-hour notification of FFD policy violations for supervisors directing work activity that is not safety- or security-significant is unnecessary. These violations would continue to be captured in the existing annual FFD program performance reporting requirements under §§ 26.717, “Fitness-for-duty program performance data,” and 26.417(b)(2), which ensure that the NRC receives uniform and robust information on all FFD program violations. This risk-informed change would reduce unnecessary burden on licensees, other entities, and the NRC.

(m) Behavioral Observation Program

The proposed rule would apply the same behavioral observation program (BOP) requirement to SAEs that already applies to MROs and MRO staff under § 26.31(b)(1)(v). The change would make SAEs subject to BOP when onsite at a licensee or other entity's facility, removing the current distinction between MROs and MRO staff, who are subject to BOP when onsite, and SAEs, who are currently subject to BOP both onsite and offsite when they are providing services to an FFD program. SAE and MRO functions are typically, although not always, performed by the same medical professional. Under the current requirements, if a medical professional is both an MRO and an SAE for the same FFD program, that professional is not subject to BOP when performing services for the licensee from an offsite location. However, if that same professional only provided SAE services to a licensee, they would be subject to BOP at whatever location they provided services to that licensee's FFD program. This BOP distinction between MROs and SAEs poses an unnecessary burden on licensees and other entities that choose to use medical professionals that only provide SAE services. SAEs also typically provide services to FFD programs from locations other than a licensee's or other entity's facility, communicating with individuals by telephone or by video teleconference methods. Therefore, this change would reduce unnecessary regulatory burden on licensees and other entities that rely on SAEs that do not also provide services as MROs.

(n) Shy-Bladder Evaluation

A shy-bladder evaluation is required under current § 26.119, “Determining `shy' bladder,” if a donor is unable to provide a urine specimen of adequate quantity for drug testing within the 3 hours permitted for a urine collection. A shy-bladder evaluation must be completed within 5 business days of the unsuccessful attempt and performed by a licensed physician that is acceptable to the MRO and has expertise in the medical issues raised by the donor's inability to provide a specimen for testing. The proposed rule would revise § 26.119(a) to extend the deadline to complete a shy-bladder evaluation from 5 business days to 10 business days if a justification acceptable to the MRO is provided by the donor.

The purpose of a timely evaluation is to determine if a medical condition precluded the donor from providing a urine specimen for testing ( e.g., end stage renal failure). If a medical condition is identified, then the MRO could request the collection of an alternative specimen for drug testing. If no medical condition is identified, then the donor is determined to have subverted the testing process by refusing to provide a urine specimen for testing. Under the current requirements, if a donor is unable to obtain a medical evaluation within 5 business days, the licensee would make a subversion attempt determination for a refusal to provide a specimen for testing and the individual would be permanently denied authorization under § 26.75, “Sanctions.” The proposed rule would reduce unnecessary regulatory burden by providing additional flexibility to accommodate for potential challenges a donor may encounter in obtaining an appointment and completing the required shy-bladder evaluation by an appropriately qualified physician within 5 business days from the date of failing to provide a specimen for testing. Based on industry operating experience, the NRC anticipates that licensees would only exercise this flexibility on rare occasions, when necessary to address extenuating circumstances.

(o) Initial Drug Test Requirements

The proposed rule would revise paragraph (1) of § 26.167(d), “Quality control requirements for performing initial drug tests,” in three ways. It would remove “of urine” from the phrase “any initial drug test of urine performed by an HHS-certified laboratory,” to clarify that the initial drug testing requirements apply to any specimen that is tested by an HHS-certified laboratory ( i.e., urine or oral fluid under § 26.83(b)). It would also remove the requirement that HHS-certified laboratories use an immunoassay “that meets the requirements of the Food and Drug Administration for commercial distribution.” Instead, § 26.167(d)(1) would specify that the initial drug test may be an immunoassay or an alternate technology that is permitted for use in Federal workplace drug testing programs to align with changes to Section 11.10 of the HHS Guidelines (82 FR 7920; January 23, 2017). The proposed rule would also remove the prohibition that “non-instrumented immunoassay testing devices that are pending HHS/SAMHSA [Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration] review and approval may not be used for initial drug testing under this part.” This prohibition is unnecessary because the requirements in § 26.167(d)(1) are specific to testing performed at HHS-certified laboratories, which adhere to the testing requirements in the current version of the HHS Guidelines for the specimen(s) to be tested, unless otherwise directed under part 26. Reducing the prescriptive nature of the initial drug testing requirement would reduce unnecessary regulatory burden and ensure that licensees and other entities can benefit from the best testing approaches available at HHS-certified laboratories to identify drugs and drug metabolites. The proposed rule would also make conforming changes to § 26.405(f) in subpart K.

(p) MRO Qualifications

Under paragraph (a) of § 26.183, “Medical review officer,” an MRO must be a physician holding either a Doctor of Medicine or Doctor of Osteopathy degree who is licensed to practice medicine by any State or Territory of the United States, the District of Columbia, or the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. The proposed rule would revise § 26.183(a) to clarify that “an equivalent foreign degree” also would be acceptable. This clarification would ensure that physicians who have received their medical degrees from ( printed page 38936) medical schools outside the United States could still be considered qualified to serve as an MRO under part 26. This change would reduce unnecessary regulatory burden on licensees and other entities by allowing them to consider additional qualified physicians who may be able to provide services as an MRO.

(q) Review of Dilute Specimen Test Results

The proposed rule would address inconsistencies in the requirements that apply to the review of dilute test results to clearly define the activities that must be performed by MROs and that may be performed by MRO staff.

As currently written in § 26.183(c), one of the responsibilities of the MRO is to review and interpret dilute test results, and § 26.185(g)(2) and (4) specify how the MRO is to conduct the reviews of those results. For MRO staff, § 26.183(d)(2)(ii) limits the review of dilute test results to performing administrative functions ( e.g., reviewing custody and control forms for errors). However, under § 26.183(d)(2)(i), MRO staff under the direction of the MRO are permitted to “receive, review, and report negative test results to the licensee's or other entity's designated representative.” As currently written, the MRO must review all dilute test results (both positive and negative), which is inconsistent with the MRO review requirements for dilute test results under § 26.185(g)(2) and (4). Specifically, § 26.185(g)(2) states that MRO review is required for “positive and dilute” specimen test results, and § 26.185(g)(4) states that MRO review is not required for “negative and dilute” specimen test results. A “negative and dilute” test result is not an FFD policy violation and is therefore acceptable for review by MRO staff under § 26.183(d)(2)(i).

The proposed rule would make changes to § 26.183(c) and (c)(1), § 26.183(d)(2)(ii) through (iv), and § 26.185(b) by replacing “dilute” with “positive and dilute.” The proposed rule would also make the conforming change of adding the term “positive and dilute” to § 26.405(g). These changes would reduce unnecessary regulatory burden by addressing internal inconsistencies in the part 26 requirements regarding the review of dilute positive and dilute negative validity test results.

(r) Clinical Evidence of Abuse Before Verifying Positive Results for Using Another Person's Prescription Medication

The proposed rule would enable licensees to more efficiently address the misuse of controlled substances by individuals by allowing licensees to more readily address instances wherein an individual illegally uses a prescription medication that has not been prescribed to them.

Currently, under § 26.185(j)(3), if the MRO determines that a donor has used another individual's prescription medication and no clinical evidence of drug abuse is found during the required clinical examination, the MRO must report that the donor misused a prescription. However, under the current framework, this is not considered a positive test result. The MRO is to report an FFD policy violation for a confirmed positive test result only when clinical evidence of abuse also exists.

Requiring the MRO to confirm a positive test result only if clinical evidence of drug abuse exists, even when the donor admits to using another individual's prescription medication and lacks a legitimate medical explanation, is inconsistent with the HHS Guidelines and DOT requirements. Specifically, under those programs, the MRO is to report a confirmed positive drug test result if a donor admits to unauthorized use of a drug or does not provide a legitimate medical explanation for the test result ( i.e., a valid prescription, as specified in Section 13.5 of the HHS Guidelines for urine and oral fluid testing and in DOT's requirements in 49 CFR 40.137).

The use of another person's prescription medication is prohibited by Federal law and is described in the HHS “Medical Review Officer Manual for Federal Workplace Drug Testing Programs (effective February 1, 2024).” Specifically, the MRO Manual states that—

Under no circumstances can prescriptions be legally transferred from a different individual to a donor in the event the donor exhausts his or her own prescription medication, even if the other individual's medication is identical and prescribed for the same medical condition (Controlled Substances Act Revised 2010, Pharmacist's Manual, Section VIII—Dispensing Requirements—Required Information for Prescription Labels). Federal Food and Drug Administration regulations [found in 21 CFR 290.5] require that the label of any drug listed as a “controlled substance” in Schedules II, III, or IV of the [Controlled Substances Act] must, when dispensed to or for a patient, contain the following warning: “CAUTION: Federal law prohibits the transfer of this drug to any person other than the patient for whom it was prescribed.”

The proposed rule would eliminate the requirement in § 26.185(j)(3) to determine that clinical signs of abuse exist to report a positive test result as an FFD policy violation when a donor admits to using another individual's prescription medication. This proposed rule change would align with other Federal agency testing policies, would improve public health and safety and common defense and security by allowing licensees to more efficiently address known trustworthiness and reliability concerns, and would remove unnecessary regulatory burden, as a positive test result could be reported by an MRO after a discussion with the donor ( i.e., without the need to perform a clinical evaluation).

(s) SAE Credential—State-Licensed or -Certified Marriage and Family Therapists

The proposed rule would add a State-licensed or -certified marriage and family therapist (MFT) to the list of credentials that would qualify individuals to serve as an SAE under § 26.187(b). This action would address the PRM docketed as PRM-26-4.

To be a State-licensed or -certified MFT requires a master's or doctoral degree, supervised clinical experience, and successful completion of the national examination conducted by the American Association for Marriage and Family Therapy Regulatory Board. Many programs accredited by the Commission on Accreditation of Marriage and Family Therapists have “substance abuse” knowledge as part of their core curriculum requirements in their graduate studies. Potential candidates can sit for the examination only after their credentials have been examined and found to meet the education and experience requirements for licensure or certification in their respective States. In 2006, the DOT added State-licensed or -certified MFTs to its list of credentialed professionals eligible to serve as substance abuse professionals under 49 CFR 40.281(a) (71 FR 49382; August 23, 2006).

Updating the § 26.187(b) SAE credential list to include State-licensed or -certified MFTs would be consistent with the approach taken by the NRC when it established the SAE requirements in the 2008 part 26 final rule. In the 2008 part 26 final rule, the NRC stated that it had adapted many of the SAE provisions from the DOT requirements regarding substance abuse professionals under 49 CFR part 40, subpart O. ( printed page 38937)

This proposed change would reduce unnecessary regulatory burden by allowing licensees and other entities to consider additional qualified individuals who may be able to provide SAE services.

(t) SAE Credential—Certified Addiction Specialist by the American Academy of Health Care Providers in Addictive Medicine

The proposed rule would address a PRM (PRM-26-7) that requested that the “Certified Addiction Specialist” (CAS) certification from the American Academy of Health Care Providers in the Addictive Disorders (the Academy) be added to the list of acceptable credentials to serve as an SAE under § 26.187(b)(5). In a supplement to its petition to the NRC dated August 3, 2011 (ML11256A020), the Academy stated that it was in the process of preparing a petition to request that the DOT add the CAS certification to the substance abuse professional credentials in 49 CFR 40.281(a). As of the issuance of this proposed rule, however, the CAS credential does not appear on the DOT's approved credentials list in 49 CFR 40.281(a), and the NRC has not received any additional information to support the Academy's petition. Furthermore, the NRC evaluated publicly available information regarding the CAS credentialling process and determined that, while the training and education requirements are similar to those in place for credentials currently accepted in accordance with NRC requirements, the Academy did not provide adequate information on the examination process associated with the CAS credential. Based on this evaluation, the NRC determined that there is insufficient information available to support adding the CAS certification to the list of acceptable credentials. The proposed rule, therefore, would not incorporate the CAS certification into § 26.187(b)(5).

(u) Face-to-Face for-Cause Determinations of Fitness

The proposed rule would remove the prohibition on the use of electronic means to perform face-to-face for-cause determinations of fitness under § 26.189(c), because video technology has advanced significantly since the creation of the § 26.189(c) requirement in the 2008 part 26 final rule.

Video teleconference technology is already being used by some clinicians to complete other NRC-required evaluations, such as performing psychological assessments under the personnel access authorization requirements in § 73.56(e)(4) or determinations of fitness performed under § 26.189(b) when potentially disqualifying FFD information is discovered about individuals subject to part 26.

The proposed rule would specify that if video teleconference technology is used by a professional to conduct a face-to-face determination of fitness for a for-cause drug and alcohol testing determination under § 26.31(c)(2) or a fatigue assessment performed for cause under § 26.211(a)(1), then the determination must be supported by an individual that is in the room with the person being evaluated. A supporting person would be necessary in these circumstances to ensure that the professional performing the determination of fitness is provided with contemporaneous information that can only be obtained in the location where the person is being assessed ( e.g., sensory information such as the smell of alcohol on an individual's breath or an aspect of the individual's physical condition that is not ascertainable by video teleconference). The proposed rule would specify that the supporting person must have received training on the FFD program under § 26.29, which includes the “ability to observe and detect performance degradation, indications of impairment, or behavioral changes.” All individuals subject to a licensee's or other entity's FFD program must complete this training.

Eliminating the prohibition on the use of electronic communications to perform face-to-face determinations of fitness would reduce unnecessary regulatory burden and could improve the speed at which these determinations are made.

(v) Post-Event Testing Terminology

The proposed rule would make a conforming change to terminology used in § 26.405(c)(3) that applies to FFD programs implemented under subpart K of part 26. Specifically, the proposed rule would replace “post-accident” with “post-event” and “accident” with “event.” The term “post-event” is used in FFD program requirements under subpart M of part 26. The term “post-event” is also used in NRC Forms 890, “Single Positive Test Form,” and 891, “Annual Reporting Form for Drug and Alcohol Tests,” which licensees and other entities have used to submit FFD program performance data to the NRC under § 26.417(b)(2).

(w) Clarification of Subpart K FFD Program Applicability to Individuals Directing the Construction of Safety- or Security-Related SSCs

The proposed rule would clarify the provisions of § 26.419, “Suitability and fitness evaluations,” for individuals who direct the construction of safety- or security-related SSCs in subpart K FFD programs to ensure that licensees are able to assign duties to those individuals in accordance with FFD program requirements.

Section 26.4(f) requires that individuals constructing or directing the construction of safety- or security-related SSCs be subject to a subpart K FFD program (or an FFD program that meets all the requirements of part 26, except for subparts I, K, and M). Furthermore, in the 2008 part 26 final rule, the Commission stated that § 26.419 “requires licensees and other entities who implement FFD programs under subpart K to develop, implement, and maintain procedures for evaluating whether to assign individuals to the duties specified in § 26.4(f).” However, the rule text of § 26.419 only includes provisions for assigning duties to “individuals to construct safety- and security-related SSCs,” but does not currently include such provisions for the individuals directing those activities. As such, the NRC is proposing to include in § 26.419 individuals directing the construction of safety- or security-related SSCs to provide clarity and maintain consistency with § 26.4(f) and the intent of the 2008 part 26 final rule.

(x) Terminology Clarification for Construction FFD Programs

The proposed rule would make a conforming change to the terminology used in § 26.401(b), revising the term “entities” to “licensees and other entities.” This administrative revision would provide consistency in the use of the terminology across part 26, subpart K.

(ii) Fatigue Management

(a) Temporary Relief From Work Hour Controls

The NRC is proposing to add a new exception from the work hour controls in § 26.205(c) and (d) during sequestration events as an alternative to licensees needing to grant waivers. This new exception in § 26.207(e) would address sequestration events during which licensee personnel remain on-site at the facility due to unavoidable external conditions ( e.g., a severe weather event, public health emergency, or failure of local infrastructure) that could affect safe and secure plant operation. Part 26 currently contains exceptions for plant emergencies and other limited circumstances but does not account for conditions in which personnel may be required to remain on ( printed page 38938) site due to unavoidable external circumstances.

Under the proposed rule, during such events, licensees would be able to implement alternative fatigue management controls for up to 60 days, consistent with those authorized by the NRC during the COVID-19 public health emergency ( e.g., NRC Letter, “Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2—Exemption from Select Requirements of 10 CFR part 26 (EPID L-2020-LLE-0018 [COVID-19]),” dated April 8, 2020). If a licensee were to use this exception and need to extend the alternative controls beyond 60 days, the licensee would need to submit an exemption request. The addition of the sequestration exception would provide a less burdensome alternative to waivers or exemption requests during sequestration events.

(b) Annual Fatigue Reporting

The NRC is proposing to eliminate the requirement in § 26.203(e) and § 26.717(b)(9) for licensees to provide annual reports of waivers and fatigue management program information to the NRC. In addition, the NRC is also proposing to eliminate the same requirement for subpart M FFD programs in § 26.202(e). Annually, the FFD performance reports have included limited instances when waivers to the work hour controls were issued, with the trends decreasing in the years since the requirements were first implemented in 2009, demonstrating the successful implementation of the work hour controls to mitigate fatigue. While no longer submitted in an annual report, the associated records would continue to be maintained by licensees in accordance with § 26.203(d) and would be available for NRC inspection or review as needed. The elimination of the reports would reduce burden on licensees and would also save NRC resources associated with the receipt and maintenance of these records.

(c) Expanding the Applicability of Remote Assessments

The NRC is proposing changes to §§ 26.207(a)(1)(ii) and 26.211(b) to allow additional licensees to use electronic communications to perform face-to-face assessments to support the approval of work hour control waivers and to conduct fatigue assessments. Under the current provisions, only licensees and other entities under 10 CFR part 53, as specified in § 26.3(f), can use electronic communications for these purposes. The proposed changes would expand the option of using electronic communications to other types of NRC licensees specified in § 26.3(a), (c), and (d). The provisions would continue to indicate that supervisors may conduct such assessments from a remote location under appropriate circumstances, and that such remotely conducted assessments need to be supported by someone who is present in-person with the individual being assessed and who is trained in accordance with the requirements of either §§ 26.29 and 26.203(c), or §§ 26.608 and 26.202(c).

The reasoning for these changes and the associated need for in-person support to augment electronic communications is addressed further in the discussion of the proposed changes to § 26.189(c) in Section IV.A.(i)(u) of this document.

(iii) Changes to Definitions in Part 26

The proposed rule would add two new definitions, revise five definitions, and remove four definitions in § 26.5. The additions, revisions, and removals would improve the clarity, consistency, and accuracy of the requirements under part 26. Specifically, this proposed rule would add definitions for “Escort” and “Sequestration event.” In conjunction with another proposed rule change to remove subpart F, “Licensee Testing Facilities,” this proposed rule would revise definitions for “Analytical run,” “Cancelled test,” “Cutoff level,” “Positive result,” and “Rejected for testing”; and remove definitions for “Licensee testing facility,” “Questionable validity,” “Validity screening test,” and “Validity screening test lot.”

A definition for “Escort” would be added, defining the term to mean a person who is designated by the licensee or other entity to be responsible for directly observing an individual who has been assigned to perform duties and responsibilities or maintain the type of access described in § 26.4(f) but is not subject to the requirements in part 26.

A definition for “Sequestration event” would be added, defining the term to mean a situation in which personnel remain on-site at a nuclear power reactor due to unavoidable external conditions that pose a risk to the safe, secure, and continuous operation of the facility.

B. Security Requirements for Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations (ISFSIs) (Parts 72 and 73)

An ISFSI is a complex designed for the safe storage of power reactor spent nuclear fuel and certain other radioactive materials. These installations use robust storage systems, such as dry casks, that securely contain and shield the radioactive material until it can be disposed of in the future, allowing licensees to store this material safely on site or at standalone storage locations. The security risk profile of an ISFSI is reduced from that of an operating nuclear power reactor due to the absence of a fueled reactor and the placement of all spent fuel into these robust storage systems. This configuration eliminates reactor-related target sets and significantly lowers the potential consequences of radiological sabotage.

There are two main types of ISFSIs regulated by the NRC: general license ISFSIs and specific license ISFSIs. A general license ISFSI is operated by a nuclear power plant licensee under a general license provided in NRC regulations. Section 72.210, “General license issued,” states that a general license for an ISFSI is issued to persons authorized to possess or operate nuclear power reactors under 10 CFR part 50, part 52, or part 53. A nuclear power plant licensee does not need to apply for a separate, stand-alone license for the ISFSI. In contrast, a specific license ISFSI is authorized through a separate, detailed licensing process that is independent from the nuclear power reactor license. Although both types of ISFSIs must meet NRC safety and security standards, there are differences in the licensing approach and in some of the security requirements that currently apply to each type.

The proposed requirements for ISFSI security would enhance consistency and regulatory clarity between general and specific license ISFSIs. Licensees operating general license ISFSIs that are not collocated with an operating reactor would have the option to provide physical protection under the same requirements that apply to specific license ISFSIs. These changes would provide consistency for similarly situated ISFSIs, while reducing the burden of submitting exemption and alternative measure requests.

Additionally, this proposed rule would extend the time associated with submitting ISFSI security plan changes to the NRC. The frequency required for the submission of security plan changes would be modified to reduce the licensee burden that is associated with security plan revisions.

(i) Security Requirements for ISFSIs Located Outside a Reactor's Protected Area

The proposed rule would include changes addressing security requirements for ISFSIs located either outside the protected area (PA) of an operating reactor or within the PA of a decommissioning reactor for which all ( printed page 38939) spent fuel at the site has been placed in dry storage.

Some ISFSIs are located within the same PA as an operating reactor. Other ISFSIs are located in a separate PA because either the reactor with which an ISFSI was originally collocated has gone into decommissioning or the ISFSI was constructed with a separate PA. The proposed changes to parts 72 and 73 of the NRC's regulations would allow licensees with ISFSIs in this latter category the option to implement security requirements that are designed specifically for ISFSIs. With regards to ISFSIs adjacent to decommissioning reactors, the proposed changes are consistent with those in SECY-24-0011, “Final Rule: Regulatory Improvements for Production and Utilization Facilities Transitioning to Decommissioning,” dated January 31, 2024, which is currently being considered by the Commission.

This proposed rule would revise § 72.212(b)(9) to allow general license ISFSIs the option to develop and implement their physical protection programs in accordance with § 73.51, “Requirements for the physical protection of stored spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste,” instead of § 73.55, “Requirements for physical protection of licensed activities in nuclear power reactors against radiological sabotage.” This change would align the physical protection requirements of general license ISFSIs and specific license ISFSIs for separate protected areas constructed outside the PA of an existing operating reactor, or during decommissioning, once all spent fuel at the site has been placed in dry storage. This change would be appropriate because the security requirements in § 73.51 are designed for and provide security appropriate to the reduced risk level of ISFSIs as compared to nuclear power plants, which are subject to § 73.55. This change would reduce the regulatory burden on current and future licensees by offering the increased flexibility provided under § 73.51. In particular, licensees that choose to transition to § 73.51 would no longer be required to implement protection measures against the design basis threat nor comply with the associated requirements outlined in § 73.55.

The proposed rule also includes conforming changes to §§ 72.13, “Applicability,” and 73.51 to clarify the applicability of the security requirements that are found in part 72, subpart H, “Physical Protection,” to general license ISFSIs. Currently, these licensees need to submit alternative measures or exemption requests from certain § 73.55 requirements to allow for the implementation of security requirements that are consistent with the risk profile for their facilities. The proposed change would eliminate the need to submit alternative measures or exemption requests. Licensees that elect to implement the new proposed regulatory requirements would provide a revised security plan through the process described in paragraph (p)(2) of § 50.54, “Conditions of licenses.”

ISFSIs that are within an operating reactor PA would still be required to implement § 73.55, consistent with the physical protection program for the reactor, with the specific exceptions in § 72.212(b)(9). Additionally, licensee physical protection programs would be required to continue to address the terms of any applicable security-related orders associated with either a general or specific license ISFSI.

(ii) Submittal of Security Plan Changes

The proposed rule would extend the time associated with the requirement to submit ISFSI security plan changes to the NRC under paragraph (e) of § 72.44, “License conditions,” and paragraph (b) of § 72.186, “Change to physical security and safeguards contingency plans.” Instead of submitting to the Commission a report containing a description of each change within two months after the change is made, licensees would have to submit the report within 12 months after the change is made. This revision would reduce the licensee burden that is associated with security plan revisions. The extension would also maintain safety and security because it would be limited to reports of changes that would not decrease the effectiveness of the plans.

C. Physical Security Requirements (Part 73)

Under this proposed rule, the security regulations for the physical protection of plants and materials under 10 CFR part 73, along with their associated guidance documents, would be revised to reduce unnecessary burdens and respond to credible risks—as directed in E.O. 14300, section 5(g)—to support efficiencies in licensing and oversight. Where possible, prescriptive requirements would be replaced with more performance-based requirements to streamline, clarify, and modernize the current regulations, thus increasing flexibility for current and future licensees and facilitating the increased deployment of new civilian nuclear reactor technologies, consistent with section 2(b) of E.O. 14300.

This proposal covers updates across various elements of part 73, including physical protection, security training, access authorization, and cybersecurity for power reactors; transmittal of safeguards information (SGI); special nuclear material security; records; and definitions. This proposal also incorporates changes to part 73 intended to address industry concerns from the 2023 Enhanced Weapons final rule, the consideration of law enforcement support to licensee security programs, and certain aspects of the draft final decommissioning rule in SECY-24-0011.

(i) Power Reactor Physical Protection Program

The proposed changes to § 73.55, as well as appendices B, “General Criteria for Security Personnel,” and C, “Licensee Safeguards Contingency Plans,” to part 73, would support the agency's mission to enable the safe and secure use and deployment of civilian nuclear energy technologies and would reduce unnecessary burden on current and future licensees.

This proposed rule would provide licensees with increased flexibility in implementing their physical protection programs by incorporating performance-based requirements and, where appropriate, allowing for specific alternatives. The proposed alternatives would most likely be available to non-light water reactor designs that incorporate security by design and engineered safety or security features.

For the existing light-water reactor fleet, the proposed revision of the security requirements would eliminate certain prescriptive requirements that are more appropriately addressed in regulatory guidance and in some instances are no longer necessary for the implementation of the physical protection program.

This proposed rule would establish a revised performance objective that applies a risk-informed approach that would continue to provide reasonable assurance that activities involving special nuclear material are not inimical to the common defense and security, and do not pose an unreasonable risk to public health and safety.

Existing licensees that are in compliance with § 73.55 as of the effective date of publication of the final rule, if this proposed change is made effective in a final rule, would also be in compliance with the proposed revisions to the regulations and would not be required to modify their current physical protection programs. However, existing licensees would be able to voluntarily adopt the proposed ( printed page 38940) alternative methods of compliance and take advantage of the increased flexibility in implementing the requirements of § 73.55.

This proposal builds on previous efforts to risk-inform physical security regulations by shifting from prescriptive to performance-based requirements to allow for the use of technology-neutral alternatives ( e.g., security and safety features) in the implementation of § 73.55. The core performance-based criteria for implementing licensees' physical protection programs would remain unchanged because these programs would continue to be required to detect, assess, interdict, and neutralize threats.

The proposed amendments would revise § 73.55 and appendices B and C to 10 CFR part 73 to enhance requirements for physical protection, power reactor security training, and contingency response. Specifically, the proposed revisions should provide increased flexibility in the implementation of security, training, and response measures. This would be accomplished by modifying the performance objective, the use of performance-based requirements, and the use of voluntary alternatives that allow for the use of technology and engineered design features.

The proposed requirements would adopt technology-inclusive approaches to provide the necessary regulatory flexibility for licensing and regulating multiple categories of nuclear reactor technologies and designs. A technology-inclusive approach to security requirements would provide greater flexibility in both the design and implementation of physical protection programs. Licensees and applicants using this approach could integrate security considerations into the safety design process, enabling the effective implementation of security measures through the use of both design-based and engineered security features. This approach could enable safety and security functions to work collaboratively in the implementation of the physical protection program. Additionally, the proposed technology-inclusive approach would allow for the increased use of technology by licensees to implement security measures for the protection of a facility, providing greater operational flexibility.

(a) High Assurance

The general performance objectives throughout part 73 would be revised to reflect the Commission's decision on the concept of “high assurance” as it relates to licensee physical protection programs. In SRM-SECY-16-0073, “Staff Requirements—SECY-16-0073—Options and Recommendations for the Force-on-Force Inspection Program in Response to SRM-SECY-14-0088,” dated October 5, 2016, the Commission determined that the concept of “high assurance” in security regulations is functionally equivalent to “reasonable assurance” used in safety contexts and that security regulations should not be applied using a “zero risk” mentality. Therefore, the proposed rule would revise the regulations in §§ 73.20(a), 73.22(f)(3), 73.51(b)(1), 73.54(a), 73.55(b)(1), and 73.56(c) to use the term “reasonable assurance” in place of “high assurance.”

(b) Significant Core Damage and Spent Fuel Sabotage

The performance objective in § 73.55(b)(3) would be revised from specifically protecting against significant core damage and spent fuel sabotage to a broader goal of preventing a release of radionuclides from any source that exceeds the dose reference values defined in § 50.34(a)(1)(ii)(D)( 1) and ( 2), § 52.79(a)(1)(vi)(A) and (B), or § 53.210, as applicable. This shift would emphasize radiological sabotage in general, rather than focusing solely on core damage or spent fuel scenarios. The existing fleet of light-water reactors would be in compliance with this proposed performance objective by continuing to prevent significant core damage and spent fuel sabotage. The revised objective would be technology-inclusive, providing flexibility to accommodate multiple categories of nuclear reactor technologies and designs, including those that may not have conventional cores.

(c) Achievable Target Sets

This proposed rule would introduce a revised set of requirements in § 73.55(f), “Target sets,” that adopts a risk-informed, technology-inclusive, and graded approach through the identification of achievable target sets. Licensees that voluntarily elect to implement the revised performance objective would need to perform an analysis to identify the necessary plant equipment, operator actions, mitigative measures, detection capabilities, assessment processes, and armed response needed to identify the achievable target sets for the site's physical protection program, which must be designed to prevent a radionuclide release from exceeding the dose reference values specified in § 50.34(a)(1)(ii)(D)( 1) and ( 2), § 52.79(a)(1)(vi)(A) and (B), or § 53.210, as applicable, to protect against the design basis threat of radiological sabotage as stated in § 73.1.

Achievable target sets would be identified through a site-specific analysis. Achievable target sets would include those that are within the capabilities of the design basis threat adversary to compromise, destroy, or render non-functional; cannot be mitigated after adversary interference is precluded and prior to a release of radionuclides exceeding the dose reference values defined in in § 50.34(a)(1)(ii)(D)( 1) and ( 2), § 52.79(a)(1)(vi)(A) and (B), or § 53.210, as applicable; and, if defeated, result irreversibly in exceedance of the dose reference values defined in in § 50.34(a)(1)(ii)(D)( 1) and ( 2), § 52.79(a)(1)(vi)(A) and (B), or § 53.210, as applicable.

Under this framework, licensees would determine the applicability of § 73.55 as follows:

• If a licensee could demonstrate that no achievable target sets exist, and would not credit any active measures (e.g., operator action, mitigative action, detection, assessment, armed response), then the licensee would be exempt from the remaining requirements of § 73.55. The requirements of 10 CFR part 26; 10 CFR part 37, “Physical Protection of Category 1 and Category 2 Quantities of Radioactive Material”; and §§ 73.21, “Protection of Safeguards Information: Performance requirements,” 73.22, “Protection of Safeguards Information: Specific requirements,” 73.23, “Protection of Safeguards Information—Modified Handling: Specific requirements,” 73.54, “Protection of digital computer and communication systems and networks,” 73.56, “Personnel access authorization requirements for nuclear power plants,” and 73.67 would need to be implemented as applicable.
• If a licensee could demonstrate that no achievable target sets exist, and would credit active measures in making that demonstration, then the licensee would be required to implement the applicable requirements of § 73.55 through its physical security plan, training and qualification plan, safeguards contingency plan, and cybersecurity plan. Licensees that would rely on active measures could limit the scope of their physical protection program by ensuring that the credited active measures will be implemented when needed in response to threats.
• If a licensee could demonstrate that achievable target sets exist, then the licensee would be required to implement the requirements of § 73.55 through its physical security plan, ( printed page 38941) training and qualification plan, safeguards contingency plan, and cybersecurity plan.

(d) Prescriptive Requirements Revised to Performance-Based Requirements

The current physical security requirements use a combination of performance criteria ( e.g., protection against the design basis threat for radiological sabotage as stated in § 73.1) and numerous prescriptive requirements to implement a physical protection program to achieve the current performance objective. In this performance-based proposed rule, physical security would be implemented through performance criteria to meet the general performance objective, thus giving the licensee flexibility to determine how to meet the established performance criteria for an effective physical protection program. The proposed rule would remove a number of prescriptive requirements while preserving the effectiveness of the physical protection program framework. Power reactor physical protection programs would continue to address each of the programmatic functions of the overall physical protection program ( e.g., detection and assessment, delay barriers, armed response, etc.) to meet the performance objectives of 10 CFR 73.55 to protect against the design basis threat of radiological sabotage. For new applicants, the NRC would evaluate the measures an applicant proposes to use to meet the performance criteria and the general performance objective through the NRC's review and approval of the physical security plan. For existing licensees who make changes to their physical protection programs based on the revised performance criteria, the NRC would verify the adequacy of the licensee's measures through inspection.

1. Physical Barriers

Prescriptive physical barrier requirements in current § 73.55(e) would be revised to remove the details concerning the specific considerations and criteria for each barrier, including isolation zones. Isolation zones have been removed from the requirements to provide greater flexibility for licensee programs implementing detection measures. In certain conditions, these clear areas are not necessary to meet detection and assessment requirements due to site-specific configurations. Additionally, advancements in detection and assessment technologies have significantly reduced, or eliminated, the need for clear areas to identify unauthorized access into protected areas. The proposed rule would continue to require licensees to detect attempted or actual penetrations using detection and assessment equipment capable of meeting the performance objectives outlined in 10 CFR 73.55(b).

These specifics would be retained in guidance as voluntary considerations for licensee physical protection programs. Licensees would still be required by proposed § 73.55(e)(1) to ensure that physical barriers are sufficient to meet the performance criteria ( e.g., detect, delay, and deter) and performance objective for their intended function.

2. Access Control Measures

Access control measures in current § 73.55(g) would be revised to remove the prescriptive requirements regarding access to different areas of a facility. These specifics would be retained in guidance as voluntary considerations for licensee physical protection programs. Licensees would still be required by proposed § 73.55(g)(1) to ensure that their access control measures meet the performance criteria ( e.g., restricts unauthorized access and implements verification measures) and performance objective.

3. Search

The specific methods for how vehicles, materials, and personnel are searched in current § 73.55(h) would be revised with performance criteria applicable to searches conducted in various areas ( e.g., owner controlled and protected areas) of licensee facilities. Under proposed § 73.55(h), licensees would have the flexibility to determine the search method(s) used to meet the performance criteria for conducting searches.

4. Detection and Assessment

Prescriptive detection and assessment requirements in current § 73.55(i) would be revised to allow licensees the flexibility to use technology for surveillance and illumination to meet the performance criteria to detect and assess at all times. Advanced technology systems provide flexible capabilities to licensees offering superior detection range, accuracy, and reliability compared to human observation under 0.2 foot-candle illumination. Replacing a prescriptive lighting level with a technology-based detection strategy aligns with the performance-based approach. Because modern technologies provide detection and assessment capabilities that meet or exceed those enabled by the historical lighting and surveillance requirements, the overall security posture would continue to satisfy the standard of reasonable assurance of adequate protection against radiological sabotage. This proposed change would support the effective implementation of the licensee's protective strategy by allowing site-specific applications that align with the licensee's facility layout and operational needs.

5. Response Requirements

Current requirements in § 73.55(k) identify the minimum number of ten armed responders to implement a site's protective strategy to meet the performance objective to protect against the design basis threat of radiological sabotage. The proposed rule would remove this prescriptive number, allowing licensees flexibility to determine the minimum number of armed responders necessary to implement the site protective strategy and respond to the design basis threat of radiological sabotage. The proposed requirements would continue to allow licensees to use armed responders and armed security officers to form an armed response team to meet response requirements. The proposed rule would add an alternative in § 73.55(k)(5) for current and future licensees that voluntarily elect to rely partially or solely on law enforcement or other offsite armed response personnel to meet the response requirements for their facilities. Licensees that rely solely on law enforcement or offsite armed responders would be required to obtain prior Commission approval before using these entities to meet the site response requirements.

6. Safety/Security Interface

The NRC proposes to remove § 73.58, “Safety/security interface requirements for nuclear power reactors,” from part 73 to streamline requirements and to eliminate rule text that provides a level of detail more appropriate for guidance. A performance-based requirement for safety/security interface would be added to § 73.55(l)(1). The proposed safety/security interface requirement would require licensees to evaluate and manage changes to safety and security activities to prevent or mitigate potential adverse effects that could impact plant safety or security at power reactors.

The current requirements in § 73.55(l) regarding physical protection for reactor facilities using mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel would be removed. These provisions have never been applied to any applicant or licensee.

7. Security Program Reviews

The prescriptive requirements for conducting a security program review at a periodicity of every 24 months in ( printed page 38942) current § 73.55(m) would be revised to allow a licensee to conduct risk-based security reviews that are commensurate with the importance or significance to the safety of plant operations.

(e) Flexibility in Implementing an Acceptable Physical Protection Program

The proposed rule would revise § 73.55 to be more technology-inclusive. Designed-in features, structures, systems, and components, as well as engineered and administrative controls, could be used to provide flexibility in implementing an acceptable physical protection program for different reactor designs.

(f) Alternatives

In several areas of the proposed requirements, licensees would be provided with voluntary alternatives to existing regulations to achieve the required performance objectives. These alternatives would be technology neutral ( i.e., to address various approaches to plant SSCs, designs, and technology). The voluntary alternatives might not be suitable for a licensee to implement in all cases; therefore, in determining the use of the voluntary alternatives, licensees would be required to complete a site-specific analysis to determine if their plant design and physical protection program would meet the applicable proposed requirements and the overall performance objective of reasonable assurance of adequate protection against threats up to and including the design basis threat of radiological sabotage. The NRC has provided draft regulatory guidance that describes some acceptable methods to meet the proposed alternatives. Voluntary alternatives have been proposed for the security organization, bullet resistant barriers, Performance Evaluation Program, physical barriers, and response requirements. In addition to the alternatives specifically provided for in the regulations, licensees would be able to continue to propose alternative measures under the provisions of § 73.55(r), “Alternative measures.”

Licensees that retain their current physical protection program would be able to elect to change their security plans and implementing procedures to reference the new proposed regulatory requirements through the § 50.54(p) process.

(g) Appendix B to Part 73

The NRC proposes to revise the general criteria for security personnel in 10 CFR part 73, appendix B, to address the minimum age for employment, for the use of a qualified training instructor for the attestation of training documentation, and to provide flexibility for the use of a nationally recognized course of fire for all weapons identified in this appendix. For the security training that is outlined in appendix B, sections I through VI, the majority of prescriptive requirements would be removed. The requirements for suitability would be streamlined for all security personnel that are identified in appendix B to part 73. Also, the NRC proposes changes to the training for power reactor licensees in the implementation of licensee Performance Evaluation Programs. The proposed rule would reduce the required frequency of tactical response drills from four per year to two per year. In addition, the requirement for each member of each shift to participate in one force-on-force exercise annually would be modified to once every three years. The proposed modifications to the performance evaluation program reflect that licensees have mature, established training programs that have consistently demonstrated that licensee security forces maintain the knowledge, skills, and abilities for effective contingency response. Tactical response drills would continue to be based on target set scenarios and would provide a practical demonstration of defense against specific design basis threat attributes. The proposed adjustment to the frequency of participation in the licensee's full-scale force-on-force exercises recognizes that full-scale exercises are the most resource intensive to conduct. While valuable, this activity is only one component of a comprehensive performance evaluation program. This proposed change recognizes that the broader performance evaluation program is sufficiently robust without relying on annual force-on-force participation. On an annual basis, licensees would conduct at least one fully integrated force-on-force exercise to test the protective strategy as a whole. The licensee's performance evaluation program would continue to ensure that any degradation in security force member performance and potential protective strategy deficiencies would be identified and corrected through the corrective action program. Additionally, several prescriptive training requirements would be removed from appendix B to part 73 ( e.g., range activities periodicity, written exams, required courses of fire, and on-the-job training hours). Removing these prescriptive elements would not eliminate these training areas from the licensee's training and qualification program, rather it would provide licensees with increased flexibility to design and implement training that more directly supports their operational needs. In place of the prescribed range activity periodicity and courses of fire, the regulations would require licensees to ensure security officers have the appropriate types of weapons training at frequencies that ensure the proper handling of firearms with the accuracy that is necessary to implement the use of assigned weapons. This approach allows for flexibility in scheduling and allows the licensee to use performance data to determine the appropriate type of training and intervals, thus reducing administrative burden and providing for more efficient allocation of resources. With regard to written exams, such exams are only one method of evaluating security force knowledge. The proposed removal of required written exams would allow licensees the option to use other types of knowledge-based activities or performance-based evaluations to evaluate the knowledge, skills, and abilities of members of the security organization. These changes are being proposed to decrease the burden in implementation of licensee security training programs and allow for increased flexibility, while maintaining safety and security. The requirements that were retained or modified would continue to capture the programmatic areas that licensees must implement to provide the appropriate training for security personnel. Training methods that were previously described in requirements would generally be retained in guidance as one acceptable method of meeting the requirements. Licensees would be required to ensure that the personnel who implement the physical protection program have the appropriate knowledge, skills, and abilities to effectively perform their assigned duties and responsibilities to accomplish the performance objective of protecting public health and safety.

The removal of the prescriptive security equipment lists from appendix B to part 73 would allow licensees to select equipment that best meets their operational needs and integrate new technologies as appropriate. The removal would reduce the need for exemptions or license amendments.

The proposed rule would remove the prescriptive requirements for 40 hours of on-the-job training, and would instead use a performance-based approach that allows a licensee to determine the appropriate number of on-the-job training hours. Modern training methodologies, job-specific competencies, and improved ( printed page 38943) instructional systems design processes enable licensees to tailor training more precisely to the knowledge, skills, and abilities needed for each role. Allowing flexibility in determining the number of on-the-job training hours gives licensees the ability to align training with actual task complexity, prior experience, and demonstrated proficiency, rather than relying on a uniform time-based metric. The regulations would continue to require that on-the-job training is documented and attested by a qualified training instructor or a security supervisor. The licensee would verify that the implemented training approach provides personnel with the capability to effectively execute their responsibilities under the safeguards contingency plan

(h) Appendix C to Part 73

The changes proposed in appendix C to part 73 would remove the prescriptive periodicity associated with the review of safeguards contingency plans to provide licensee flexibility in these types of reviews.

(i) Expand Regulatory Flexibility

The proposed rule would expand the regulatory options for physical security for new applicants under parts 50 and 52. Specifically, applicants would be able to select the most appropriate physical security rule for their design and approach for licensing by complying with either § 73.55 or § 73.100, “Technology-inclusive requirements for physical protection of licensed activities at advanced nuclear plants against radiological sabotage,” which was developed for reactors licensed under part 53. The distinctions between § 73.55 and § 73.100 largely reflect the fact that the existing reactor fleet was built without accounting for security during the initial design phase. The proposed revisions to § 73.55 in this rule would address the current configuration of the operating fleet and, similar to § 73.100, provide increased flexibility to accommodate the wide range of current and future reactor technologies. Currently, applicants under part 53 have the option of complying with either § 73.55 or § 73.100 for physical security. Extending this flexibility to applicants under parts 50 and 52 would ensure that future applicants have appropriate physical security options for licensing when designing their physical protection programs under part 50, 52, or 53. This proposal would include revisions to §§ 50.34, 52.79, and 73.100 to reflect this expanded regulatory flexibility for future applicants.

(ii) Access Authorization

The NRC is proposing revisions to its access authorization requirements under §§ 73.55 and 73.56 to promote program efficiency by providing appropriate flexibilities to licensees and reducing unnecessary program burdens, while maintaining safety and security. The proposed revisions would also provide additional relief from requirements for those licensees and applicants who demonstrate that no achievable target sets exist in accordance with proposed § 73.55(f).

(a) Changes to the Milestone for Program Implementation

The proposed rule includes a risk-informed change that would extend the implementation milestone for when a licensee or other entity must transition from its construction-phase security measures (employed through appropriate site procedures for the control of personnel, access controls, and pre-employment screening during the construction phase) to an operational access authorization program that meets all of the applicable requirements of § 73.56.

Under the existing regulations, § 73.56(a)(3) requires licensees to implement the requirements of § 73.56 before fuel is allowed onsite (in the protected area). The proposed rule would change the milestone for implementation of an access authorization program from before fuel is allowed onsite ( i.e., into the protected area) to before initial fuel load into the reactor.

This proposed milestone change is based on recent operating experience from implementing phased subpart K FFD programs and pre-employment screening at power reactor construction sites. Specifically, the NRC issued an exemption to the licensee for Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 3 and 4, to delay implementing the access authorization program requirements of § 73.56 until initial fuel load (86 FR 67734; November 29, 2021). The NRC has reassessed the risks presented during the construction of nuclear power reactors and has determined that the currently established milestone for transition to an operations-phase access authorization program is not commensurate with current risk insights. The risk associated with unirradiated fuel does not increase when the fuel arrives onsite, because its engineered safety features, storage, and configuration have not changed since the fuel was in transit. (For transit and receipt onsite, physical protection requirements under § 73.67 are applied to protect the fuel.) Safety and security risks associated with unirradiated nuclear fuel only begin to increase once the process of loading the fuel into its operating configuration begins. The operational milestone “before initial fuel load into the reactor” therefore corresponds more closely to the start of NRC-licensed activities that could result in consequences adverse to public health and safety or the common defense and security than does the current milestone of receipt of nuclear fuel onsite.

(b) Revisions To Reduce Unnecessary Burden and Prescriptiveness

The proposed changes to access authorization program requirements would revise and/or eliminate program elements that have been identified as being unnecessarily costly or burdensome and not adding commensurate value to site safety or security. Requirements in § 73.56 would be revised to reflect insights gained from operating experience in the years since the requirements were last revised in the Power Reactor Security Requirements final rule in 2009 (74 FR 13970; March 27, 2009). These changes would promote efficiency and effectiveness for commercial nuclear power plant licensees and applicants, while adequately maintaining safety and security.

Proposed revisions to § 73.56(d)(3) would remove prescriptive requirements for the verification of true identity. Some approved methods for verifying true identity ( e.g., validating a foreign national's claimed non-immigration status using independent sources of reliable information) would be maintained in applicable guidance contained in Regulatory Guide (RG) 5.66, “Access Authorization Program for Nuclear Power Plants.” This change would provide appropriate flexibilities to licensees in implementing identity verification requirements, and the NRC would maintain reasonable assurance regarding the trustworthiness and reliability of personnel unescorted through continued reporting of access authorization information to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Threat Screening Center.

Proposed revisions to § 73.56(i)(1)(v) would remove the requirement to perform a credit history re-evaluation as part of the process for determining the continued trustworthiness and reliability of individuals. Operating experience has shown that, although conducting a credit history evaluation at the time that unescorted access is initially authorized is important towards making an initial determination ( printed page 38944) regarding an individual's trustworthiness and reliability, re-evaluations of credit history add little value. Potential concerns regarding continued trustworthiness and reliability are more effectively identified through the required criminal history update and through licensee behavioral observation programs.

(c) Adjustment to Annual Supervisory Review

The proposed rule would adjust the requirements in § 73.56(i)(1)(iv) regarding supervisory review for personnel who are maintaining unescorted access. As proposed by the NRC, if an individual's supervisor were to interact with that individual with a frequency that allows the supervisor to form an informed and reasonable opinion regarding the individual's behavior, trustworthiness, and reliability, then the supervisor would not be required to conduct an annual supervisory review. Otherwise, the individual would be subject to an annual (within 365 calendar days) supervisory review conducted in accordance with the requirements of the licensee's or applicant's behavioral observation program. This proposed adjustment would reduce the unnecessary redundancy of annual reviews for cases where an individual is already subject to regular review by their supervisor, while still ensuring that individuals would undergo supervisor review in instances where contact is less frequent, ensuring that the objectives of the behavior observation program would be met.

(d) Relaxations for Licensees Who Opt Into a U.S. Government Monitoring and Notification Program

The proposed rule would modernize program requirements by adjusting the frequency of certain requirements ( e.g., criminal history records checks and vital area access list authorization) in a manner that provides additional burden relief to those licensees who opt into a U.S. Government continuous monitoring and notification program—such as the FBI Record of Arrest and Prosecution Background (Rap Back) service—through a Memorandum of Understanding with the NRC.

The FBI Rap Back service is a subscription-based program that provides continuous, automated notifications of new criminal activity associated with individuals who have undergone a fingerprint-based background check. Enrolling in such a service can substantially reduce the need for a licensee to rely on repeated background checks to ensure the continued trustworthiness and reliability of personnel. The proposed rule would reflect these benefits by reducing the frequency of required checks for those licensees enrolled in such a program. This change would help enable licensees to modernize their programs and reduce unnecessary burden, while ensuring that security is adequately maintained through the use of appropriate alternative processes.

(e) Reductions to the Frequency of Audits and Record-Retention Periods

The proposed rule would reduce the frequency of audits required under § 73.56(n), “Audits and corrective action,” by extending audit intervals from 12 months to 24 months for contractors or vendors, and from 24 months to 36 months for licensee and applicant programs. The proposed audit interval for contractors or vendors would be shorter than the interval for licensee and applicant programs because contractor and vendor activities operate outside licensees' routine processes and are less easily observable by licensees. The proposed rule would also reduce the records retention period in § 73.56(o)(2) from 5 years to 3 years. These proposed changes would reduce costs and administrative burdens while enhancing overall efficiency. With these changes, there would still be reasonable assurance that security will continue to be adequately maintained because licensees would still be required to periodically review the effectiveness of their programs, and the NRC would maintain the ability to effectively oversee program effectiveness through its inspection and oversight of licensee performance.

(f) Alternative Requirements for Licensees Who Demonstrate No Achievable Target Sets Exist in Accordance With § 73.55(f)

The proposed rule would provide relief from certain human reliability requirements for licensees and applicants who could demonstrate no achievable target sets exist in accordance with proposed § 73.55(f) and who would not credit any active measures ( e.g., operator action, mitigative action, detection, assessment, armed response) in making that demonstration. Under the proposed rule, such licensees would implement a program that meets the alternative access authorization requirements of § 73.120, “Access authorization program for commercial nuclear plants,” which were originally developed to provide alternative requirements for facilities licensed under 10 CFR part 53 that meet the criteria outlined in § 73.100(a)(1)(i).

Under the requirements of § 73.120, eligible licensee facilities would be relieved from the requirements to perform psychological assessments and reassessments in § 73.56(e), “Psychological assessment,” and to establish a full training program for behavioral observation ( i.e., initial and refresher training including knowledge checks) in § 73.56(f), “Behavioral observation.” Such licensees would have the option to provide minimal guidance to personnel on reporting questionable behavior, similar to the Department of Homeland Security's “If you see something, say something” campaign or a commensurate corporate behavior awareness program. This relief would be commensurate with the lower security risk posed by potential human actions at these facilities.

(iii) Category I Physical Fitness and Performance Evaluation Programs

The proposed changes to § 73.46 would reduce burden on current and future licensees. The proposed changes for facilities licensed to possess or use a Category I quantity of SNM are in the areas of security training, specifically for drills, exercises, and physical fitness requirements. The proposed rule would reduce the required frequency of security training exercises from four to a maximum of three per year. On an annual basis, the licensee would need to ensure that each shift participates in at least two tactical response drills, one of which would test the security response using the response force and a mock adversary team. Additionally, the licensee would need to conduct at least one force-on-force exercise annually and ensure that each shift that implements the safeguards contingency plan protective strategy participates in one force-on-force exercise every three years. Licensees would continue to ensure the effectiveness of their security programs, as security officers would maintain the knowledge, skills, and abilities necessary for contingency response activities through annual recurring training.

The proposed changes for security drills and exercises captured in 10 CFR 73.46(b)(9) and the physical fitness test captured in 10 CFR 73.46(b)(10) would be revised to align with the approach taken for power reactors. These changes are being proposed to decrease the burden in the implementation of licensee security training programs and to allow for increased flexibility, while maintaining safety and security.

These revisions would streamline the current requirements for security drills, exercises, and the physical fitness test to eliminate certain prescriptive ( printed page 38945) requirements, which in some instances are no longer necessary for the implementation of the training program. Existing licensees that are in compliance with § 73.46 as of the effective date of the final rule, if this proposed change is made effective in a final rule, would also be in compliance with the proposed revisions to the regulations and would not be required to modify their current physical fitness and performance evaluation programs.

(iv) Category II and Category III Material Security

(a) Performance-Based Requirements

The NRC proposes to modify § 73.67(d) for physical protection for fixed site facilities for SNM of moderate strategic significance. This proposal would build on previous efforts to risk-inform physical security regulations by shifting from prescriptive to performance-based requirements that would increase flexibility for current and future licensees; reduce unnecessary burden on licensees; and, where appropriate, allow for alternatives. The proposed changes to § 73.67 would support the agency's mission to enable the deployment of nuclear energy technologies ( e.g., the use of high-assay low-enriched uranium fuel supporting new types of reactors).

This proposed rulemaking for Category II quantities of SNM would address regulatory gaps and create a standardized approach for physical security. This would provide a consistent set of requirements for new applicants that use this type of SNM. Additionally, these changes would support efficiencies in the NRC's licensing and oversight programs.

The existing security requirements for possession and use of Category II quantities of SNM were originally established in 1979. Since that time, the NRC and other governmental agencies completed several studies to evaluate the risk and consequences associated with the physical protection of SNM. These studies were performed following the terrorist events of September 11, 2001, in part to evaluate and address changes in the threat environment. These studies and changes in the threat environment identified new vulnerabilities and risks that were not addressed by the then-existing regulations.

Subsequently, the NRC issued orders containing additional security measures to fuel cycle facilities licensed to possess Categories I and III quantities of SNM. At the time these orders were issued, the only facilities licensed to possess a Category II quantity of SNM were non-power reactors. To address the threat at these non-power reactor facilities, in 2002 and 2003, the NRC issued confirmatory action letters documenting the implementation of compensatory measures. However, additional security measures specific to a Category II quantity of SNM were not developed.

The NRC proposes to modify requirements in § 73.67 for Category II quantities of SNM to be largely performance-based, only retaining the prescriptive requirements that would be expected for all licensees subject to the requirements of § 73.67(d). The proposed rule would allow greater flexibility for both material and potential reactor licensees who would utilize these requirements for physical protection. This would permit licensees to adjust their security to better correspond to what is needed to ensure adequate physical protection.

The performance objectives in § 73.67(d)(1)(ii) and (iii) would require licensees to provide prompt detection for Category II quantities of SNM, instead of the early detection standard used in § 73.67(a)(2)(i) and (ii). Additional measures contained in § 73.67(d)(1) would provide requirements to store material in a controlled access area, mitigate and delay the bulk theft of special nuclear material, analyze and identify site-specific conditions that affect the protective strategy, provide defense in depth, coordinate the physical security plan with other onsite plans to avoid conflicts, and manage the potential for adverse effects on safety, security, and material control. These proposed changes would allow licensees possessing Category II quantities of SNM at a fixed site to implement protective strategies that are commensurate to the attractiveness of the material.

Proposed § 73.67(d)(2) would include performance requirements for the physical protection capabilities of detection, assessment, response, communication, and access authorization. Proposed § 73.67(d)(2)(xiii) would add requirements for compensatory measures. This addition would specify performance objectives for compensatory actions that should be taken when an item relied on for security is in a degraded condition. This addition would ensure the effectiveness of the physical protection system under abnormal operating conditions such as inclement weather and equipment malfunctions.

The NRC proposes to remove the current § 73.67(d)(3) and replace it with a new proposed § 73.67(d)(3). The proposed replacement § 73.67(d)(3) would allow the Commission to adjust physical security requirements—either adding or removing measures—based on the specific risk posed by the individual facility and site conditions to ensure adequate protection. The NRC is issuing draft Regulatory Guide (DG)-5088, “Physical Protection of Special Nuclear Material of Moderate or Low Strategic Significance,” proposed Revision 2 to RG 5.59, for public comment with this proposed rule to support implementation of the proposed requirements.

Proposed § 73.67(d)(4), “Alternative measures,” as revised, would provide a regulatory method for licensees who may wish to use different protective measures that are demonstrated to meet the performance objectives and requirements in § 73.67(a) and (b)(1).

Existing licensees that are in compliance with § 73.67 as of the effective date of the final rule, if this proposed change is made effective in a final rule, would be in compliance with the proposed revisions to the regulation and would not be required to modify their current physical protection programs. However, existing licensees would be able to voluntarily adopt certain performance-based alternatives, which would allow for greater flexibility in implementing the requirements of § 73.67.

Licensees that would elect to implement the proposed revised performance objective would be required by proposed § 73.67(d)(1)(vi), (viii), (ix), and (x) to perform an analysis to identify the necessary plant equipment, mitigative measures, detection capabilities, assessment processes, and response needed to ensure the site's physical protection program would be designed to prevent theft and diversion of SNM.

Alternatively, licensees that would elect to retain their existing physical protection programs to protect against theft and diversion of special nuclear material would be in compliance with the proposed performance objectives. All current licensees approved to possess a Category II quantity of SNM have approved security plans that include site-specific, performance-based security requirements that meet the proposed performance objectives, so an analysis of the proposed performance objectives would not be required. These licensees would continue to meet and implement the current requirements as relates to site-specific analysis for their physical protection program.

Licensees that would retain their current physical protection program ( printed page 38946) would be able to elect to change their security plans and implementing procedures to reference the new proposed regulatory requirements using the existing § 70.32(e) process.

(b) Protection of Category II and Category III Special Nuclear Material

The proposed rule would address an identified regulatory gap in the security requirements in § 73.67 for the protection of Category II and Category III special nuclear material among power reactor license holders. Paragraphs 73.67(d) and (f) would be modified to include an exception for part 52 licensees who will use Category II quantities of SNM inside a protected area. This change would align with Commission direction in SRM-SECY-22-0052, “Staff Requirements—SECY-22-0052—Proposed Rule: Alignment of Licensing Processes and Lessons Learned from New Reactor Licensing (RIN 3150-AI66),” dated November 20, 2024, to make security requirements for Category II and Ill quantities of special nuclear material brought on site at nuclear power reactors for new and existing facilities licensed under part 50 consistent with those requirements for facilities licensed under part 52. Under the current regulations, a part 50 licensee is exempt from the regulations, but a part 52 licensee is not. By providing this exemption for part 52 licensees, the proposed rule eliminates the need for part 52 licensees to comply with both § 73.67 and the more stringent § 73.55 requirements when the material is located inside a protected area. The § 73.55 requirements are designed to protect irradiated fuel from sabotage events at nuclear power reactors. Given the relative risks of irradiated and unirradiated fuel, it is acceptable to protect unirradiated reactor fuel and other nonfuel SNM brought onsite at a nuclear power reactor in accordance with § 73.67 until that material is protected in accordance with § 73.55. The change in this proposed rulemaking would reduce unnecessary regulatory burden and provide consistency between parts 50 and 52 applicants by providing the same exception for part 52 licensees. This proposed change is discussed further in Section VIII, “Backfitting and Issue Finality,” in this document.

(v) Electronic Processing of Safeguards Information

Sections 73.22 and 73.23 currently restrict licensees to transmitting SGI using NRC-approved technology and storage on standalone computers, transmitting SGI for voice communications using only technology approved by the NRC, and processing documents only on a standalone computer. Historically, the NRC has expected SGI to be treated more like classified information. These current regulations are very restrictive and not consistent with the threat environment, SGI's status as sensitive unclassified information, and the design basis threat's focus on threats posed by non-state actors.

The NRC is proposing to revise its regulations for the protection of SGI in §§ 73.22 and 73.23 to expand the means through which SGI can be transmitted for voice communications and to provide an option through which SGI can be viewed on networked computer systems. Sections 73.22(f)(3) and 73.23(f)(3) would be revised to allow an individual to transmit SGI for voice communications using commercially available digital technology that uses encryption algorithms that are compliant with or validated against an active and approved version of Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) 140. Additionally, the proposed rule would expand the ability to process SGI on computer systems. Currently, SGI may be stored on only standalone computers. The proposed rule would provide an option in § 73.22(g)(2) to store and process SGI on computer systems that permit viewing of the information on networked computers, using a virtual desktop or thin client architecture, provided that the systems storing the SGI would implement security controls that ensure the information is protected against unauthorized disclosure.

(a) Voice Communications

The proposed rule would expand the means through which SGI could be transmitted for voice communications. The proposed changes in § 73.22(f)(3) would enable licensees to communicate SGI by voice using encryption algorithms that have been approved by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), rather than also requiring that they be submitted to the NRC for review and approval. Draft guidance changes would discuss appropriate measures to protect against spills ( e.g., disabling transcription and recording, use in an area where only SGI authorized personnel are present, etc.).

Current § 73.23(f)(3) requires that SGI be transmitted only by NRC-approved secure electronic devices, encrypted by a method (FIPS 140-2 or later) approved by the NRC. Under the proposed § 73.23(f)(3), SGI would be transmitted only using a commercially available encryption system compliant with an active, approved version of FIPS 140. This change would eliminate the requirement for entities to seek NRC approval prior to using an encryption system, as long as it meets the FIPS 140 standard.

(b) Viewing Safeguards Information on Networked Computer Systems

The proposed rule would provide an option through which SGI could be viewed on networked computer systems. Processing SGI on standalone computers creates a significant burden, particularly for new reactor vendors incorporating security by design principles. Additionally, the cybersecurity field has matured significantly since the SGI regulations were last modified. The proposed changes in § 73.22(g)(2) would give licensees the option to use networked systems that would implement security controls specified by NIST as being appropriate for controlled unclassified information (NIST SP 800-171) using a thin client or virtual desktop architecture that would protect SGI from unauthorized disclosure and from being transmitted or stored on unapproved computers.

(vi) Decommissioning

As discussed in Section IV.B.(i), “Security Requirements for ISFSIs Located Outside a Reactor's Protected Area,” of this document, this proposed rule would streamline and expedite the reduction of resources needed to implement the physical protection program as a site in decommissioning transitions from storing fuel in the spent fuel pool to dry storage. Those proposed changes are consistent with the draft amendments presented to the Commission in SECY-24-0011.

(vii) Addressing Issues Related to the 2023 Enhanced Weapons Final Rule

This proposed rule would revise part 73 definitions, physical security event notification requirements, and suspicious activity reporting requirements to resolve industry concerns and challenges from the 2023 Enhanced Weapons final rule (88 FR 15864; March 14, 2023).

The proposed amendments would modify requirements issued in the 2023 Enhanced Weapons final rule that posed concerns and challenges for industry to effectively and efficiently implement. Industry identified these concerns and challenges to the NRC and requested exemptions from these requirements ( e.g., definitions of specific terms, protocols for contacting local Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) control towers, and the timelines associated with certain notifications). The NRC ( printed page 38947) proposes to clarify or remove other provisions from the 2023 Enhanced Weapons final rule that were identified as imposing unnecessary burdens. The NRC was able to address many of the implementation issues by revising three RGs in 2024 ( i.e., RG 5.62, Revision 3, “Physical Security Event Notifications, Reports, and Records”; RG 5.86, Revision 1, “Preemption Authority, Enhanced Weapons Authority, and Firearms Background Checks”; and RG 5.87, Revision 1, “Suspicious Activity Reports Under 10 CFR part 73”). Other issues that could be resolved only by rulemaking were discussed in a public meeting on July 31, 2025 (“Summary of July 31, 2025, Meeting with External Stakeholders Discussing Perspectives on Recent Security Event Notifications,” dated December 18, 2025). The proposed changes to §§ 73.2, “Definitions,” 73.1200, “Notification of security events,” 73.1205, “Written follow-up reports of security events,” 73.1210, “Recordkeeping of security events,” and 73.1215, “Suspicious activity reports,” in this proposed rule would resolve these issues and are reflected in the proposed revisions to supporting guidance in DG-5089 and DG-5098.

Section 73.1200 would be revised in several locations to increase consistency between facility-based and transportation-based event notifications ( e.g., use of hostile action versus hostile threat, adding notification of thefts of spent nuclear fuel or high-level radioactive waste from facilities). The NRC proposes to clarify language on the elimination of duplication to reduce burden for a single event that had both a physical security component (under part 73) and an information security component (under part 95).

Sections 73.1205 and 73.1210 would be revised to correct unnecessary records retention requirements by replacing the phrase “whichever is later” (which implied an obligation after license termination) with “whichever is earlier.” Section 73.1205 would also be revised to remove the requirement for written follow-up reports subsequent to 15-minute and 8-hour event notifications to reduce industry burden. For events of high security significance requiring notification within 15 minutes ( i.e., actual or expected attacks on a facility or shipment), prompt onsite follow-up by the NRC would occur and would be documented sufficiently by the NRC and the licensee to obviate the need for a licensee's written follow-up report within 60 days. For events of low security significance requiring notification within 8 hours, documented follow-up can occur during the NRC's next routine security inspection.

The NRC would make conforming changes to NRC Form 366, “Licensee Event Reports,” to remove references to § 73.77, “Cybersecurity event notifications,” which would be revised by this rulemaking as discussed in Section IV.C.(x).

Section 73.1215 would be revised to use more generic language for suspicious activity reports to the FAA. Specifically, references to “aircraft” would be revised to “crewed/uncrewed aviation-related assets” and the term “local FAA control tower” would be revised to “applicable FAA facility.” The revised language would provide greater flexibility in implementing the reporting provisions and making these reports while meeting FAA operational (workload and airspace) considerations. The NRC proposes to add language on the elimination of duplication to address suspicious activity reports that would otherwise be required under both § 73.1215 and § 37.57, “Reporting of events” ( e.g., a licensee storing both spent fuel and greater than class C waste at an ISFSI).

(viii) Personnel Identification System

Section 73.70, “Records,” would be revised to add a conforming change to reflect the proposal in § 73.55(g)(6)(ii) to allow licensees to use a personnel identification system, rather than specifically requiring numbered badges. With this change, licensees would have an option for the method of compliance for logging individuals that have been issued identification to enter a protected area. This proposed change could also reduce the cost of providing access to individuals that have access to a protected area.

Under the current § 73.70, certain licensees are required to maintain records of the names, addresses, and badge numbers of all individuals authorized to have access to vital equipment or special nuclear material, and the vital areas and material access areas to which authorization is granted. This proposed change would require licensees who elect to use an alternative personnel identification system to retain the records for individuals enrolled in that system. By adding this option, power reactor licensees would have an option for complying that also reduces the cost of producing badges for personnel that have access to vital areas or special nuclear material.

(ix) Definitions

Section 73.2 would be updated to reflect various regulatory changes in 10 CFR part 73 that affect multiple categories of licensees by revising the definitions of “Physical barrier,” and “Contraband.” A new definition for “Target set” would be added. As it relates to the relevant sections, these proposed changes would enhance clarity and promote consistency.

The definition for “Physical barrier” would be revised to allow for increased flexibility in licensee methods for meeting part 73 requirements. This change would reduce the need for licensees to submit licensing actions to modify their physical barriers in ways that depart from the current, prescriptive requirements. Instead, licensees could adopt a performance-based approach based on the function of the barrier in the physical protection program.

The definition of “Contraband” would be revised to remove reference to “disease causing agents” because the ability to identify these agents would exceed the reasonable capabilities of a licensee's physical protection program. With the removal of “disease causing agents,” the term “dangerous materials” would be redundant to the existing terms in the definition of contraband and therefore would also be removed. Separately, language in the definition of contraband regarding electronic devices would be removed. The existing requirements in 10 CFR part 95, “Facility Security Clearance and Safeguarding National Security Information and Restricted Data,” and 32 CFR part 117, “National Industrial Security Program Operating Manual (NISPOM),” are sufficient to protect classified information from unauthorized electronic devices, which pose an information security concern rather than a physical security concern.

A definition for “Target set” would be added in § 73.2. This term was previously defined in regulatory guidance, including RG 5.81, Revision 1, “Target Set Identification and Development for Nuclear Power Reactors,” ^[2] and NUREG-2203, “Glossary of Security Terms for Nuclear Power Reactors.” The NRC proposes to revise that definition to reflect the dose consequence performance objective of proposed § 73.55.

(x) Cybersecurity

(a) Regulatory Guidance Revisions

The existing regulatory framework for cybersecurity under § 73.54 is ( printed page 38948) performance based and provides reasonable assurance that digital computer and communication systems and networks associated with safety, security, and emergency preparedness (SSEP) functions are adequately protected against cyberattacks up to and including the design basis threat, as defined in § 73.1. Commercial nuclear power plant licensees can choose from approved guidance documents ( e.g., RG 5.71, “Cybersecurity Programs for Nuclear Power Reactors,” and NEI 08-09, “Cyber Security Plan for Nuclear Power Reactors”) for well-established standardized approaches to meet the cybersecurity requirements in § 73.54.

The NRC is proposing to update RG 5.71 to reflect lessons learned from operating experience while ensuring that licensees continue to maintain reasonable assurance of safety and security. The proposed RG 5.71 updates would effectively result in reducing regulatory burden by, for example, focusing on safety and security over general cybersecurity hygiene—cutting approximately 19 percent of controls—and allowing licensees to take credit for cybersecurity best practices already in use (beyond those specified in RG 5.71).

(b) Event Notifications

The requirements for commercial nuclear power plant licensees to notify the NRC of certain cybersecurity-related events that adversely impact or could have impacted SSEP functions are defined in § 73.77, with supporting guidance in RG 5.83, “Cybersecurity Event Notifications.” To date, no licensee has made a notification under these provisions. In lieu of reporting incidents in accordance with the requirements of § 73.77, licensees have used the existing notification processes under §§ 50.72 and 50.73 (for safety-related events) and § 73.1200 (for security-related events). This proposal would simplify the regulation in § 73.77 by eliminating specific event notifications and instead redirect licensees to the aforementioned notification processes ( i.e., a cybersecurity-related event notification would use these safety-related or security-related regulations, based upon the affected function). This approach would allow the NRC to withdraw RG 5.83 and incorporate cybersecurity-related events reporting into the broader, established notification processes under parts 50, 53, and 73.

(c) Expand Regulatory Flexibility

To support innovation and modernization of the existing cybersecurity regulatory framework, this proposed rule would expand the regulatory options for new applicants under parts 50 and 52. Specifically, applicants would be able to select the most appropriate cybersecurity rule for their design and risk profile by complying with either § 73.54 or § 73.110, “Technology-inclusive requirements for protection of digital computer and communication systems and networks,” which was developed for part 53. Differences between the § 73.54 requirements and those in § 73.110 are primarily based on the implementation of a consequence-based approach to cybersecurity in § 73.110 that provides flexibility to accommodate the wide range of reactor technologies to be assessed by the NRC. A graded approach based on consequences would account for the differing risk levels among reactor technologies.

This proposal would include revisions to §§ 73.54, 73.55, 73.77, and 73.110; the companion regulatory guidance for § 73.110, DG-5103 (proposed Revision 1 to RG 5.96), “Establishing Risk-Informed and Technology-Inclusive Cybersecurity Programs for Commercial Nuclear Plants”; and §§ 50.34 and 52.79 to reflect this expanded regulatory flexibility.

This proposal would eliminate the existing introductory paragraph of § 73.54. That statement was originally intended to require that operating nuclear power plants, at the time of rule implementation in 2009, establish, implement, and maintain a cybersecurity program. All currently operating nuclear power plants have fully implemented their cybersecurity plans and will continue to maintain their plans per the requirements of § 73.55 and § 73.54.

The NRC is also proposing revisions to § 73.54(g) as conforming changes to align with the expansion of regulatory options for new applicants. Specifically, the cybersecurity program review requirement would be independent of the physical security program.

(xi) Design Requirements

The NRC is proposing amendments to § 50.34(a)(3)(i) and § 52.79(a)(4)(i) to require that safety and security be considered together in the design process such that, where possible, security issues are effectively resolved through design and engineered security features. This approach, which is consistent with the requirement in § 53.440(f), ensures consideration is given to safety and security together throughout the plant's lifetime, including the design process and prior to implementing changes to plant configurations, to ensure risks are effectively managed. This evaluation helps determine whether enhancements to the design basis or physical protection system are warranted. Incorporating security strategies and design features early in the design process can be significantly more efficient and cost-effective than retrofitting these measures after the plant has been designed or constructed.

D. Facility Security Clearance and Safeguarding of National Security Information and Restricted Data (Part 95)

The proposed rule would revise 10 CFR part 95 to remove requirements that are duplicative and ensure alignment with 32 CFR part 117 by providing references to 32 CFR part 117 where appropriate. Furthermore, specific NRC prescriptive requirements would be eliminated to resolve any conflicting regulations.

Part 95 establishes requirements for licensees, applicants, and other entities that obtain a facility security clearance from the NRC, as well as the requirements for the protection of classified matter. These requirements are based on the National Industrial Security Program Operating Manual (NISPOM), which was codified in regulation in February 2021, at 32 CFR part 117. Part 95 ensures that entities that fall under NRC cognizance meet the requirements of the NISPOM.

The regulations in 32 CFR part 117 establish the NRC as the cognizant security agency for NRC-cleared entities that are issued facility security clearances. Currently, cleared entities under NRC cognizance are subject to both 10 CFR part 95 and 32 CFR part 117, which has resulted in the establishment of duplicative and inconsistent regulatory requirements for cleared entities.

Under this proposed rule, the NRC would revise 10 CFR part 95. The proposed changes would not affect any existing regulatory guidance, but inspection procedures related to part 95 would be updated. The NRC would remove requirements from 10 CFR part 95 that are duplicative or inconsistent with the requirements in 32 CFR part 117. Part 95 would retain only those requirements and processes that are unique to NRC-cleared entities.

Section 95.1, “Purpose,” would be revised to identify that the purpose of part 95 is to implement the National Industrial Security Program, as described in 32 CFR part 117.

Section 95.5 would be revised to remove unused definitions or those definitions that are duplicative to definitions in 32 CFR part 117. ( printed page 38949)

Section 95.11, “Specific exemptions,” would be revised to change the section title to “Specific exemptions and waivers,” to include reference to the NRC's ability to issue waivers in accordance with 32 CFR part 117.

Section 95.17, “Processing facility clearance,” would be renamed “Facility clearance process” for clarity. Requirements unrelated to the facility clearance process that had previously been in § 95.17 were moved to other more relevant sections. Other revisions would clarify that the review referred to in § 95.17 is an operational readiness review (rather than a security review). The NRC would revise § 95.17 to use the definition of “key management personnel” found in 32 CFR part 117.

The NRC proposes to delete §§ 95.18, “Key personnel”; 95.25, “Protection of National Security Information and Restricted Data in storage”; 95.27, “Protection while in use”; 95.29, “Establishment of Restricted or Closed areas”; 95.31, “Protective personnel”; 95.35, “Access to matter classified as National Security Information and Restricted Data”; 95.45, “Changes in classification”; and 95.51, “Retrieval of classified matter following suspension or revocation of access authorization,” because they duplicate provisions in 32 CFR part 117.

Section 95.19, “Changes to security practices and procedures,” would be revised to remove the requirement to resubmit the Standard Practice Procedures Plan every 5 years. This change would result in a reduction in licensee burden.

The NRC proposes to add § 95.24, “Safeguarding National Security Information and Restricted Data,” which would be a new section. This section would retain existing requirements from 95.25, “Protection of National Security Information and Restricted Data in storage,” related to the maintenance of keys and padlocks used to protect classified information. There would be no additional licensee burden associated with this change.

Sections 95.33, “Security education,” 95.34, “Control of visitors,” 95.37, “Classification and preparation of documents,” 95.39, “External transmission of documents and material,” 95.43, “Authority to reproduce,” and 95.47, “Destruction of matter containing classified information,” would be modified to remove specific requirements and instead require that cleared entities conduct these activities in accordance with 32 CFR part 117.

Section 95.49, “Security of automatic data processing (ADP) systems,” would be renamed “Authorization to operate national security systems,” consistent with usage in 32 CFR part 117. Specific requirements would be deleted, and the revised section would require cleared entities to process classified information on information technology or operational technology systems in accordance with 32 CFR part 117.

The NRC would revise § 95.57, “Reports,” to establish reporting requirements consistent with the provisions in 32 CFR part 117 that state that the cognizant security agency (CSA) (in this case, the NRC) will provide guidance on reporting security events. The proposed revision would provide that all actual or suspected losses or compromises of classified information would be reported to the NRC Headquarters Operations Center within one hour of discovery, with a written follow-up submitted within 48 hours. If it is determined that no loss, compromise, or suspected compromise occurred, a written report documenting this determination would be submitted in accordance with § 95.9, “Communications,” within 48 hours of reaching that conclusion. If the NRC is not the CSA, the entity would first report to their applicable CSA and then to the NRC. This revision would also eliminate the previous requirement for monthly logs.

V. Specific Requests for Comments

The NRC is seeking advice and recommendations from the public on the proposed rule. The NRC is particularly interested in comments with supporting rationales from the public on the following questions. In addition to the general discussion in Section IV, additional context is provided for certain questions in order to help the public comment on these issues.

Requirements for Vital Areas

Part 73 establishes requirements for the physical protection of licensed activities and facilities, which includes nuclear power reactors and Category I facilities. Section 73.2 defines vital areas and vital area equipment. The vital area concept focuses protective measures and access controls on locations housing equipment and functions essential to preventing significant radiological consequences from malevolent acts.

The licensees and the NRC have gained additional experience implementing the requirements associated with vital areas. The current approach for power reactors to protect their facilities focuses on the use of target sets (plant equipment and operator actions) that may or may not involve vital equipment. Evolving plant design changes, digital modernization, and operational practices may warrant an assessment of whether the vital area concept remains optimally defined and implemented across 10 CFR part 73 are clear, efficient, and risk-informed.

Question 1: The NRC seeks stakeholder input on whether to revise or remove the term “vital areas” for power reactor facilities. Please explain the basis for your response.

Performance Objective

Under current part 73, licensees subject to § 73.55 must meet the performance objective in § 73.55(b)(3) of protecting against significant core damage and spent fuel sabotage. The NRC is proposing to change the performance objective from protecting against significant core damage and spent fuel sabotage to a broader goal of preventing release of radionuclides from any source that exceeds the dose reference values defined in § 50.34(a)(1)(ii)(D)( 1) and ( 2), § 52.79(a)(1)(vi)(A) and (B), or § 53.210, as applicable, given that the term “core damage” is not necessarily applicable for some reactor technologies and designs.

Question 2: The NRC seeks stakeholder input on the following:

a. How would this change impact the security programs of current licensees?

b. Would changing the performance objective in § 73.55(b)(3) provide any benefit to future licensees given that § 73.100 already offers a flexible, technology-inclusive performance objective for new reactors?

Fitness-for-Duty Program Requirements

Part 26 establishes requirements for FFD programs at NRC-licensed facilities. These requirements have been developed over time to provide, in part, a level of detail needed to support licensee legal considerations ( e.g., related to donor protections, the accuracy and reliability of tests performed, and the defensibility of licensee decisions regarding sanctions imposed on individuals because of FFD program violations). The proposed rule includes several changes to 10 CFR part 26 intended to reduce regulatory burden while increasing program effectiveness, efficiency, and flexibility.

Question 3: Are there additional changes that the NRC should consider to streamline or simplify FFD program requirements for NRC licensees? For example, are there specific requirements in 10 CFR part 26 or other related regulations that could be transitioned to regulatory guidance ( e.g., to reduce prescriptiveness and allow licensees ( printed page 38950) and applicants to propose alternate methodologies in their licensing applications)? Please explain the basis for your response and provide specific recommendations to the extent possible.

Applicability of Changes to New Reactor Licensees and Applicants

The proposed rule includes several changes to prescriptive security and fitness-for-duty requirements that are based on the operating experience and performance history of the operating reactor fleet. Examples of such changes for power reactors include the proposed reduction in the number of required tactical response drills and force-on-force exercises, elimination of the annual reports of waivers and fatigue management program information, and reduction in annual random testing rate for employees that do not perform critical safety- or security-related activities. New reactor licensees and applicants, however, may lack similar operating experience and performance history in these areas.

Question 4: Should the proposed changes to prescriptive security and fitness-for-duty requirements that are based on the operating experience and performance history of the operating reactor fleet be applicable to all licensees and applicants, as currently proposed, or should the NRC develop criteria to limit the applicability of these proposed changes? If the NRC should develop criteria to limit the applicability of these proposed changes, what criteria should the NRC consider? Please provide a basis for your response.

VI. Regulatory Flexibility Certification

As required by the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980, 5 U.S.C. 605(b), the Commission certifies that this rule, if adopted, will not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities. This proposed rule affects only the licensing and operation of nuclear power plants. The companies that own these plants do not fall within the scope of the definition of “small entities” set forth in the Regulatory Flexibility Act or the size standards established by the NRC (10 CFR 2.810).

VII. Regulatory Analysis

The NRC has prepared a draft regulatory analysis on this proposed regulation. The analysis examines the costs and benefits of the alternatives considered by the NRC. The NRC requests public comment on the draft regulatory analysis. The regulatory analysis is available as indicated in the “Availability of Documents” section of this document. Comments on the draft analysis may be submitted to the NRC as indicated under the ADDRESSES caption of this document. As discussed in Section IV.A.(i)(k) of this document, the NRC also requests public input on the costs and benefits of subpart F of 10 CFR part 26.

VIII. Backfitting and Issue Finality

The Commission has completed a backfitting and issue finality assessment for this proposed rule under §§ 50.109, “Backfitting”; 53.1590, “Backfitting”; 70.76, “Backfitting”; and 72.62, “Backfitting,” and the issue finality provisions of part 52 and part 53. Also, a number of the changes in this proposed rule would not be subject to the backfitting and issue finality requirements. This assessment is available as indicated in the “Availability of Documents” section of this document.

One set of changes in this proposed rule would constitute backfitting, as that term is defined in § 50.109 and described in NRC Management Directive 8.4, “Management of Backfitting, Forward Fitting, Issue Finality, and Information Requests.” The proposed changes to §§ 73.67(d) and 73.67(f) to clarify the appropriate security requirements for Category II and III quantities of SNM stored within the owner-controlled area but outside the protected area at 10 CFR part 50 nuclear power reactors could impose a change to those licensees' required physical security programs, thereby meeting the definition of “backfitting” in § 50.109(a)(1). As described in the backfitting assessment, these proposed backfits would be justified on the basis that the proposed changes would be necessary to ensure that these facilities provide adequate protection to the health and safety of the public and are in accord with the common defense and security.

The NRC is issuing fifteen DGs that, if finalized, would provide guidance on the methods acceptable to the NRC for complying with aspects of this proposed rule. As discussed in the DGs, applicants and licensees would not be required to comply with the positions set forth in the DGs. Therefore, issuance of the DGs in final form would not constitute backfitting or forward fitting, as that term is defined and described in Management Directive 8.4, or affect the issue finality of any approval issued under part 52.

IX. Cumulative Effects of Regulation

The NRC seeks to minimize potential negative consequences resulting from the cumulative effects of regulation (CER). The NRC believes that the de-regulatory impacts of this rulemaking activity are unlikely to cause implementation challenges for stakeholders. In addition, during the pendency of this rulemaking, the NRC is deprioritizing issuance of regulatory actions that might influence the implementation date for the new rule requirements ( e.g., orders, generic communications, license amendment requests, and inspection findings of a generic nature).

To fully understand any potential CER implications that could result from this rulemaking, the NRC is asking the following questions. Response to these questions is voluntary and any input will be considered during development of the final rule.

1. The NRC is proposing an effective date that will be 30 days after the date of publication of a final rule. The NRC is proposing a compliance (implementation) date that will be 180 days after the date of publication of the final rule. Does this provide sufficient time to implement the proposed requirements and associated guidance? Please provide a rationale for your response.

2. Are there unintended consequences related to this rulemaking and how should they be addressed? Please provide a rationale for your response.

3. Please comment on the NRC's cost and benefit estimates in the regulatory analysis that supports this proposed rule.

X. Plain Writing

The Plain Writing Act of 2010 (Pub. L. 111-274) requires Federal agencies to write documents in a clear, concise, and well-organized manner. The NRC has written this document to be consistent with the Plain Writing Act as well as the Presidential Memorandum, “Plain Language in Government Writing,” published June 10, 1998 (63 FR 31885). The NRC requests comment on this document with respect to the clarity and effectiveness of the language used.

XI. National Environmental Policy Act

The Commission has determined under the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, as amended, and the Commission's regulations in subpart A, “National Environmental Policy Act—Regulations Implementing Section 102(2),” of part 51, “Environmental Protection Regulations for Domestic Licensing and Related Regulatory Functions,” that this proposed rule, if adopted, would not be a major Federal action significantly affecting the quality of the human environment, and an environmental impact statement would not be required, because ( printed page 38951) implementation of the proposed rule requirements would not have a significant environmental effect. The proposed rulemaking would amend requirements that are administrative in application, are matters of procedure, or provide an equivalent level of safety as existing requirements. Therefore, the environmental impacts from the implementation of this proposed rule would be similar to those occurring under existing requirements.

The preliminary determination of the Commission's environmental assessment and finding of no significant impact is that there would be no significant effect on the quality of the human environment from this rulemaking action. Comments on any aspect of this environmental assessment and finding of no significant impact may be submitted to the NRC as indicated under the ADDRESSES section of this document. The environmental assessment is available as indicated under the “Availability of Documents” section of this document. This environmental assessment and proposed finding of no significant impact can be tracked with identification number NEPA ID EAXX-429-00-000-1771377270. The Commission will consider timely public comments received on the environmental assessment and draft finding of no significant impact in determining whether to issue a final finding of no significant impact for the final rule.

XII. Paperwork Reduction Act

This proposed rule contains new or amended collections of information subject to the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.). This proposed rule has been submitted to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) for review and approval of the information collections.

Type of submission: New.

The title of the information collection: Modernizing Security Requirements.

OMB approval numbers: 3150-0002, 3150-0009, 3150-0011, 3150-0047, 3150-0104, 3150-0132, 3150-0146, and 3150-0151.

The form number if applicable: NRC Forms 366, 891, and 892.

How often the collection is required or requested: Initial submission of revised security or cybersecurity plans in response to regulatory changes are one-time requirements. Notifications and written reports of physical security events, fitness-for-duty policy violations, or suspicious activity, are submitted on occasion and must be submitted promptly after the event occurs ( e.g., within 15 minutes, 1 hour, 4 hours, 8 hours, or 24 hours, depending on the event's significance). Certain collections are required on a quarterly basis, such as the submission of blind performance test samples to HHS-certified laboratories for drug and alcohol testing program oversight. Annual requirements include the collection and reporting of fitness-for-duty program performance data to the NRC. Retention periods for records under the proposed rule vary depending on the type of information collected, from two to three years, until the completion of all related legal proceedings, or until license termination.

Who will be required or asked to respond: Existing and future applicants and licensees under 10 CFR parts 50, 52, and 53.

An estimate of the number of annual responses:10 CFR part 26: -26,077 (−167 reporting responses + -46 recordkeepers + -25,864 third party disclosure responses); 10 CFR part 50: 3.6 (3.6 reporting responses + 0 recordkeepers + 0 third party disclosure responses); 10 CFR part 52: 1 (1 reporting responses + 0 recordkeepers + 0 third party disclosure responses); 10 CFR part 70: 0.3 (0.3 reporting responses + 0 recordkeepers + 0 third party disclosure responses); 10 CFR part 73: -52 (−2 reporting responses + -56 recordkeepers + 6 third party disclosure responses); 10 CFR part 95: -20 (0 reporting responses + -20 recordkeepers + 0 third party disclosure responses).

The estimated number of annual respondents:10 CFR part 26: 25,749 respondents; 10 CFR part 50: 3.6 respondents; 10 CFR part 52: 1 respondent; 10 CFR part 70: 0.3 respondents; 10 CFR part 73: 56 respondents; 10 CFR part 95: 20 respondents.

An estimate of the total number of hours needed annually to comply with the information collection requirement or request:10 CFR part 26: -42,271 (−1,092 reporting + -2,644 recordkeeping + -38,535 third party disclosure); 10 CFR part 50: -788 (−788 reporting + 0 recordkeeping + 0 third party disclosure); 10 CFR part 52: -250 (−250 reporting + 0 recordkeeping + 0 third party disclosure); 10 CFR part 70: -75 (−75 reporting + 0 recordkeeping + 0 third party disclosure); 10 CFR part 73: -25,636 (−1 reporting + -25,659 recordkeeping + 24 third party disclosure); 10 CFR part 95: -2 (0 reporting -2 recordkeeping + 0 third party disclosure).

Abstract: The NRC is proposing to amend its regulations to reduce overly prescriptive requirements and modernize security and fitness-for-duty requirements to enhance efficiency and regulatory flexibility. This effort is consistent with, and implements, the direction in E.O. 14300 which directs the NRC to conduct a comprehensive review and revision of its regulations. The proposed revisions are intended to reduce regulatory burden, where appropriate, while continuing to provide reasonable assurance that safety and security will be adequately maintained at NRC-licensed facilities. The proposed rule covers a wide range of topics, including the following areas that would result in new or revised changes in recordkeeping and reporting requirements:

• FFD Programs. The NRC is proposing effectiveness and efficiency improvements to the drug and alcohol testing and fatigue management requirements based on lessons learned from implementing10 CFR part 26, to align with select changes made by other Federal agency drug testing programs, and to address several petitions for rulemaking.
• Security Requirements for ISFSIs. The proposed rule would revise security requirements for ISFSIs to improve clarity and consistency between the requirements for general license ISFSIs and specific license ISFSIs.
• Physical Security Requirements. The NRC is proposing to modernize and streamline physical security requirements for nuclear power reactors and materials by shifting from prescriptive rules to performance-based, risk-informed criteria.
• Facility Security Clearance and Safeguarding of National Security Information and Restricted Data. The NRC is proposing to revise10 CFR part 95 to remove requirements that are duplicative and to ensure alignment with 32 CFR part 117.

The proposed rule would impose burden associated with new optional information collections in NRC Form 891. NRC Form 366 would be updated to remove a regulatory reference. In addition, if paragraph 26.203(e) were deleted as proposed, the NRC would no longer need NRC Form 892.

The NRC is seeking public comment on the potential impact of the information collection(s) contained in this proposed rule and on the following issues:

1. Is the proposed information collection necessary for the proper performance of the functions of the NRC, including whether the information will have practical utility? Please explain your response.

2. Is the estimate of the burden of the proposed information collection accurate? Please explain your response. ( printed page 38952)

3. Is there a way to enhance the quality, utility, and clarity of the information to be collected? Please explain your response.

4. How can the burden of the proposed information collection on respondents be minimized, including the use of automated collection techniques or other forms of information technology?

A copy of the OMB clearance package and proposed rule are available in the “Availability of Documents” section of this document may be viewed free of charge by contacting the NRC's Public Document Room reference staff at 1-800-397-4209, at 301-415-4737, or by email to PDR.Resource@nrc.gov. You may obtain information and comment on submissions related to the OMB clearance package by searching on www.regulations.gov under Docket ID NRC-2025-1303.

You may submit comments on any aspect of these proposed information collections, including suggestions for reducing the burden and on the above issues, by the following method:

Federal rulemaking website: Go to www.regulations.gov and search for Docket ID NRC-2025-1303.

Submit comments by July 27, 2026. Comments received after this date will be considered if it is practical to do so, but the NRC staff is able to ensure consideration only for comments received on or before this date.

Public Protection Notification

The NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, a collection of information unless the document requesting or requiring the collection displays a currently valid OMB control number.

XIII. Executive Orders

The following are Executive orders that are related to this proposed rule:

A. Executive Order 12866: Regulatory Planning and Review (As Amended by Executive Order 14215, Ensuring Accountability for All Agencies)

The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) has determined that this proposed rule is a significant regulatory action under section 3(f) of E.O. 12866, though not economically significant under section 3(f)(1). Accordingly, the NRC submitted this proposed rule to OIRA for review. The NRC is required to conduct an economic analysis in accordance with section 6(a)(3)(B) of E.O. 12866. More can be found in Section VII of this document, “Regulatory Analysis.”

B. Executive Order 14154: Unleashing American Energy

The NRC has examined this proposed rule and has determined that it is consistent with the policies and directives outlined in E.O. 14154.

C. Executive Order 14192: Unleashing Prosperity Through Deregulation

This action is tentatively determined to be a deregulatory action as defined by E.O. 14192. The NRC estimates that this rule generates $45.2 million in annualized costs savings at a 7 percent discount rate, discounted relative to year 2024, over a perpetual time horizon. Details on the estimated costs of this proposed rule can be found in Section VII of this document.

D. Executive Order 14267: Reducing Anti-Competitive Regulatory Barriers

E.O. 14267 requires the NRC to identify anti-competitive regulations for rescission or modification. The NRC identified several such changes in 10 CFR part 26. The proposed rescission/modification of the regulations supports the objectives of E.O. 14267 by removing regulatory requirements that could create unnecessary barriers to entry for new market entrants.

First, by expanding the acceptable credentials to serve as an SAE to include licensed marriage and family therapists, the proposed rule would allow licensees to consider additional candidates to potentially serve as SAEs. Second, by revising the medical degree requirements for MROs to include medical degrees obtained in foreign countries that are equivalent to a Doctor of Medicine or Doctor of Osteopathy degree obtained in the United States, the proposed rule would expand the potential pool of candidates available to provide MRO services. Finally, proposed changes to the blind performance testing programs would include the removal of the requirement for licensees to submit additional blind performance test samples in the initial 90 days of testing with a new HHS-certified laboratory. This change would enhance competitiveness for new market entrants by removing a potential disincentivizing factor for a licensee that may want to change to another HHS-certified laboratory.

Additionally, the proposed rule would remove outdated provisions no longer in use by industry. These pertain to LTFs and reflect how the free market has driven changes in the drug testing programs under 10 CFR part 26. At the inception of 10 CFR part 26 FFD programs in 1990, many licensees utilized LTFs at their sites to perform initial drug testing. Over time, the advantages of LTF testing decreased as the performance and capabilities at HHS-certified laboratories (price-competitive, private, and for-profit entities), significantly improved. LTFs have not been a viable testing option for licensees because of the increasing sophistication and complexity of drug testing ( e.g., substances, biological specimens) and the financial burden associated with staffing, equipping, and maintaining these facilities. Furthermore, removal of LTF provisions, along with the removal of barriers to licensees contracting with new laboratories as discussed in Section IV.A.(i)(c)1. of this document, would serve to further incentivize new market entrants by removing potential barriers to entry.

E. Executive Order 14270: Zero-Based Regulatory Budgeting To Unleash American Energy

E.O. 14270 requires the NRC to insert a conditional sunset date into all new or amended NRC regulations provided the regulations are (1) promulgated under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (AEA), the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, as amended (ERA), or the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, as amended (NWPA); (2) not statutorily required; and (3) not part of the NRC's permitting regime. The NRC determined that the regulatory changes proposed in this rule are part of the NRC's regulatory permitting scheme authorized by the AEA, ERA, or NWPA. Therefore, the NRC views this rulemaking to be outside the scope of E.O. 14270 and did not insert conditional sunset dates for the regulatory changes in this proposed rule.

XIV. Voluntary Consensus Standards

The National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act of 1995, Public Law 104-113, requires that Federal agencies use technical standards that are developed or adopted by voluntary consensus standards bodies unless the use of such a standard is inconsistent with applicable law or otherwise impractical. In this proposed rule, the NRC would revise the NRC's requirements in 10 CFR parts 26, 72, 73, and 95 to modernize security and FFD programs by updating and clarifying regulatory provisions, streamlining administrative processes, and providing additional compliance flexibilities. These proposed changes are tailored to the unique safety and security needs of NRC licensees and would not create a broadly applicable technical standard suitable for adoption by voluntary ( printed page 38953) consensus standards bodies. This action would not constitute the establishment of a standard that contains generally applicable requirements.

XV. Availability of Guidance

The NRC is issuing draft guidance for public comment, as described in this section, to support implementation of the proposed requirements in this rulemaking. The draft guidance is available at www.regulations.gov by searching for Docket ID NRC-2025-1303. You may submit comments on the draft regulatory guidance using the methods provided in the ADDRESSES section of this document.

Draft Regulatory Guides DG-5087, “Standard Format and Content of Safeguards Contingency Plans for Nuclear Power Plants” (proposed Revision 2 to RG 5.54), and DG-5094, “Physical Protection Programs at Nuclear Power Reactors” (proposed Revision 2 to RG 5.76), contain SGI and are therefore withheld from public disclosure. In accordance with NRC policy, these DGs will be made available only to affected licensees and cleared stakeholders who have an established “need-to-know” and meet the access requirements of § 73.22(b). Because the majority of the changes to these DGs are limited to conforming changes needed to align with this proposed rulemaking, and considering the level of information provided in this notice, the NRC has determined that access to these DGs is not necessary for the general public to offer informed comment on the proposed rule. The publicly available draft guidance documents supporting this rulemaking are:

• DG-5069, “Fitness-For-Duty Programs at New Reactor Construction Sites,” proposed Revision 1 to RG 5.84;
• DG-5085, “Cybersecurity Programs for Nuclear Power Reactors,” proposed Revision 2 to RG 5.71;
• DG-5088, “Physical Protection of Special Nuclear Material of Moderate or Low Strategic Significance,” proposed Revision 2 to RG 5.59;
• DG-5089, “Security Event Notifications, Reports, and Records,” proposed Revision 4 to RG 5.62;
• DG-5090, “Access Authorization Program for Nuclear Power Plants,” proposed Revision 3 to RG 5.66;
• DG-5093, “Training and Qualification of Security Personnel at Nuclear Power Reactor Facilities,” proposed Revision 2 to RG 5.75;
• DG-5095, “Insider Mitigation Program,” proposed Revision 2 to RG 5.77;
• DG-5097, “Preemption Authority, Enhanced Weapons Authority, and Firearms Background Checks,” proposed Revision 2 to RG 5.86;
• DG-5098, “Suspicious Activity Reports Under10 CFR part 73,” proposed Revision 2 to RG 5.87;
• DG-5099, “Fatigue Management for Nuclear Power Plant Personnel,” proposed Revision 1 to RG 5.73;
• DG-5102, “Protection of Safeguards Information,” proposed Revision 1 to RG 5.79;
• DG-5103, “Establishing Risk-Informed and Technology-Inclusive Cybersecurity Programs for Commercial Nuclear Plants,” proposed Revision 1 to RG 5.96; and
• DG-5104, “Access Authorization Program for Commercial Nuclear Plants,” proposed Revision 1 to RG 5.95.

The NRC is proposing to withdraw RG 5.83, “Cybersecurity Event Notifications.” As discussed in Section IV.C.(x), “Cybersecurity,” of this document, the NRC is proposing to eliminate specific cyber event notification requirements under § 73.77 and instead redirect licensees to established notification processes under parts 50, 53, and 73. RG 5.62 would be updated to include cybersecurity event notifications.

The NRC is proposing to withdraw NUREG-1304, “Reporting of Safeguards Events.” NUREG-1304, Revision 0, was temporarily withdrawn following publication of the NRC's final rule on “Enhanced Weapons, Firearms Background Checks, and Security Event Notifications” (88 FR 15864; March 14, 2023). At that time, the NRC indicated its intent to conduct a public workshop after implementation of the new regulations in §§ 73.1200, 73.1205, and 73.1210, and to issue the workshop results as NUREG-1304, Revision 1. In light of the proposed regulatory changes in this rulemaking and the accompanying proposed updates to the associated guidance, the NRC has determined that NUREG-1304 is no longer necessary and proposes to withdraw the NUREG.

XVI. Availability of Documents

The documents identified in the following table are available to interested persons through one or more of the following methods, as indicated.

The NRC may post materials related to this document, including public comments, on the Federal rulemaking website at www.regulations.gov under Docket ID NRC-2025-1303. In addition, the Federal rulemaking website allows members of the public to receive alerts when changes or additions occur in a docket folder. To subscribe: (1) navigate to the docket folder (NRC-2025-1303); (2) click the “Subscribe” button; and (3) enter an email address and click on the “Subscribe” button.

For the reasons set out in the preamble and under the authority of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended; the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, as amended; and 5 U.S.C. 552 and 553, the NRC is proposing to amend 10 CFR parts 26, 50, 52, 72, 73, and 95 as follows:

1. The authority citation for part 26 continues to read as follows:

Authority: Atomic Energy Act of 1954, secs. 53, 103, 104, 107, 161, 223, 234, 1701 (42 U.S.C. 2073, 2133, 2134, 2137, 2201, 2273, 2282, 2297f); Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, secs. 201, 202 (42 U.S.C. 5841, 5842); 44 U.S.C. 3504 note.

2. In § 26.3, revise paragraphs (a) through (b) and the introductory text to (c) to read as follows:

3. In § 26.4:

a. Revise paragraphs (e)(1), (5), and (6)(iv) and (vii);

b. Add paragraph (e)(7);

c. Revise paragraph (f);

The revisions and addition read as follows:

4. In §  26.5:

a. Revise the definitions of “ Analytical run”, “ Cancelled test”, “ Cutoff level”, and “ Directing”;

b. Add the definition for “ Escort”;

c. Remove the definition of “ Licensee testing facility”;

d. Remove the definition of “ Questionable validity”;

e. Revise the definitions of “ Positive result”, and “ Rejected for testing”;

f. Add the definition for “ Sequestration event”; and

g. Remove the definitions of “ Validity screening test”, and “ Validity screening test lot”.

The revisions and additions read as follows:

5. In § 26.8(b), remove the references “26.125, 26.127, 26.129, 26.135, 26.137, 26.139,”.

6. In § 26.27, revise paragraph (c)(4), and add new paragraph (c)(5) to read as follows:

7. In § 26.29, revise the first sentence of paragraph (c)(2) to read as follows:

8. In § 26.31, revise paragraphs (b)(1)(v) and (d)(2)(vii), the introductory text to paragraph (d)(2)(i), and (d)(3)(i); remove paragraph (d)(3)(ii); revise and redesignate paragraph (d)(3)(iii) as paragraph (d)(3)(ii) to read as follows:

9. Revise § 26.33 to read as follows:

10. In § 26.37(e), remove the phrase “C/Vs providing specimen collection services, and licensee testing facility procedures, must” and add in its place the phrase “C/Vs providing specimen collection services must”.

11. In § 26.41, revise and republish paragraphs (a), (c), and (g) to read as follows:

12. In §  26.75, revise paragraph (h) and remove and reserve paragraph (i) to read as follows:

13. In §  26.83, revise paragraph (b) to read as follows:

14. In §  26.109, revise paragraph (a) to read as follows:

15. In §  26.111, revise paragraph (d) to read as follows:

16. In §  26.113, revise paragraph (c) to read as follows:

17. In §  26.117, revise paragraphs (f), (g), (h), (i) and (j) to read as follows:

18. In § 26.119(a), remove the phrase “within 5 business days” and add in its place the phrase “within 5 business days (can be extended to 10 business days if a justification acceptable to the MRO is provided by the donor and documented by the MRO)”.

19. Remove and reserve subpart F.

20. In § 26.153, revise paragraph (f)(2) to read as follows:

21. In § 26.159(b)(1)(ii), remove the last sentence.

22. In § 26.165, revise paragraphs (a), (b)(5), and (f)(2) to read as follows:

23. In § 26.167, revise paragraph (d)(1) to read as follows:

24. In § 26.168, revise paragraphs (a) through (d), (f), and (i)(1) through (3) to read as follows:

25. In § 26.169, revise paragraphs (h)(4) through (7) to read as follows:

26. In § 26.183, revise paragraph (a), revise the introductory text to paragraph (b), and revise paragraphs (c), (d)(2)(ii), (iii), and (iv) to read as follows:

27. In § 26.185, revise paragraphs (b), (j)(3), and (m) to read as follows:

28. In § 26.187, revise paragraph (b)(4); redesignate paragraph (b)(5) as paragraph (b)(6) and add new paragraph (b)(5); and revise the introductory text to paragraph (g)(1) to read as follows:

29. In § 26.189, revise the introductory text to paragraph (c) to read as follows:

30. In § 26.202, remove and reserve paragraph (e).

31. In § 26.203, revise paragraphs (d)(4) and (5), add paragraph (d)(6), remove paragraph (e), and redesignate paragraph (f) as paragraph (e).

The revisions and additions read as follows:

32. In § 26.207, revise the last sentence in paragraph (a)(1)(ii), and add paragraph (e) to read as follows:

33. In § 26.211, revise the last sentence in the introductory text to paragraph (b) to read as follows:

34. In § 26.401, revise paragraph (b) to read as follows:

35. In § 26.403, revise paragraph (a) and add paragraph (b)(4) to read as follows:

36. In § 26.405:

a. Revise the introductory text to paragraph (c)(3);

b. In paragraph (d), remove the phrase “urine are collected” and add in its place the phrase “those collected under § 26.83(b)”; and

d. Revise paragraphs (f) and (g).

The revisions and addition read as follows:

37. Revise § 26.419 to read as follows:

38. In § 26.606:

a. Revise paragraph (b)(6); and

b. Add paragraph (b)(7).

The revision and addition read as follows:

39. In § 26.607, add a last sentence to paragraph (b)(2)(vi) and revise paragraphs (c)(4) and (5) to read as follows:

40. Revise § 26.715 to read as follows:

41. In § 26.717:

a. In paragraph (b)(2) remove the word “dilute”;

b. Revise paragraphs (b)(7) and (8);

c. Remove paragraph (d); and

d. Redesignate paragraphs (e) through (g) as paragraphs (d) through (f).

The revisions to read as follows:

42. In § 26.719, revise the introductory text to paragraphs (b) and (b)(2), and revise paragraph (c) to read as follows:

43. The authority citation for part 50 continues to read as follows:

Authority: Atomic Energy Act of 1954, secs. 11, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 108, 122, 147, 149, 161, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187, 189, 223, 234 (42 U.S.C. 2014, 2131, 2132, 2133, 2134, 2135, 2138, 2152, 2167, 2169, 2201, 2231, 2232, 2233, 2234, 2235, 2236, 2237, 2239, 2273, 2282); Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, secs. 201, 202, 206, 211 (42 U.S.C. 5841, 5842, 5846, 5851); Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, sec. 306 (42 U.S.C. 10226); National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (42 U.S.C. 4332); 44 U.S.C. 3504 note.

44. In § 50.34, revise paragraphs (a)(3)(i) and (ii), (c)(2), (d)(2), (e), and (f)(2)(xxviii) to read as follows:

45. The authority citation for part 52 is revised to read as follows:

Authority: Atomic Energy Act of 1954, secs. 103, 104, 147, 149, 161, 181, 182, 183, 185, 186, 189, 223, 234 (42 U.S.C. 2133, 2134, 2167, 2169, 2201, 2231, 2232, 2233, 2235, 2236, 2239, 2273, 2282); Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, secs. 201, 202, 206, 211 (42 U.S.C. 5841, 5842, 5846, 5851); 44 U.S.C. 3504 note.

46. In § 52.79:

a. Revise paragraphs (a)(4)(i) and (ii) and (a)(36)(ii) through (v); and

b. In footnote 8, add the phrase “or § 73.100” after the phrase “§ 75.55”.

The revisions read as follows:

47. The authority citation for part 72 continues to read as follows:

Authority: Atomic Energy Act of 1954, secs. 51, 53, 57, 62, 63, 65, 69, 81, 161, 182, 183, 184, 186, 187, 189, 223, 234, 274 (42 U.S.C. 2071, 2073, 2077, 2092, 2093, 2095, 2099, 2111, 2201, 2210e, 2232, 2233, 2234, 2236, 2237, 2238, 2273, 2282, 2021); Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, secs. 201, 202, 206, 211 (42 U.S.C. 5841, 5842, 5846, 5851); National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (42 U.S.C. 4332); Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, secs. 117(a), 132, 133, 134, 135, 137, 141, 145(g), 148, 218(a) (42 U.S.C. 10137(a), 10152, 10153, 10154, 10155, 10157, 10161, 10165(g), 10168, 10198(a)); 44 U.S.C. 3504 note.

48. In § 72.13, add paragraph (e) to read as follows:

49. In § 72.32, in paragraphs (a)(8) and (b)(8), remove the phrase “NRC operations center” and add in its place the phrase “NRC Headquarters Operations Center”.

50. In § 72.44, in the last sentence of paragraph (e), remove the time period “two months” and add in its place the phrase “12 months”.

51. In § 72.186, in the second sentence of paragraph (b), remove the time period “two months” and add in its place the phrase “12 months”.

52. In § 72.212, revise paragraph (b)(9) to read as follows:

53. The authority citation for part 73 continues to read as follows:

Authority: Atomic Energy Act of 1954, secs. 53, 147, 149, 161, 161A, 170D, 170E, 170H, 170I, 223, 229, 234, 1701 (42 U.S.C. 2073, 2167, 2169, 2201, 2201a, 2210d, 2210e, 2210h, 2210i, 2273, 2278a, 2282, 2297f); Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, secs. 201, 202 (42 U.S.C. 5841, 5842); Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, secs. 135, 141 (42 U.S.C. 10155, 10161); 44 U.S.C. 3504 note.

Section 73.37(b)(2) also issued under Sec. 301, Public Law 96-295, 94 Stat. 789 (42 U.S.C. 5841 note).

54. In part 73, wherever it may appear, the term or phrase in the left column in the following table is removed and the term or phrase in the right column is added in its place. ( printed page 38965)

55. In § 73.2:

a. Revise the definitions of “ Contraband ”, “ DOE and Department of Energy ”, “ Physical barrier ”, and “ Security Storage Container ”; and

b. Add, in alphabetical order, the definition for “ Target set ” to read as follows:

56. In § 73.8, in paragraph (b), remove the reference “73.58,”.

57. In § 73.15:

a. In paragraphs (e)(6) and (r)(1) and (2), remove the phrase “§ 50.90, § 70.34, or § 72.56 of this chapter” and add in its place the phrase “§ 50.90, § 53.1510, § 70.34, or § 72.56 of this chapter”; and

b. Revise paragraphs (b)(2) and (s)(3) and the introductory text of paragraph (s)(4) to read as follows:

58. In § 73.17:

a. In paragraph (b)(4)(ii), remove the word “personal” and add in its place the word “personnel”; and

b. In paragraph (r), add a comma after the date “April 13, 2023”.

59. In § 73.20, revise paragraph (a) to read as follows:

60. In § 73.22, revise paragraph (f)(3) and (g) to read as follows:

61. In § 73.23, revise paragraph (f)(3) and in paragraph (g)(2), remove the phrase “to Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) 140-2 or later” and add in its place the phrase “to an active, approved version of the Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) 140 standard”.

The revision to read as follows:

62. In § 73.46:

a. Revise paragraph (b).

b. In paragraph (h)(3) remove the word “availabiliy” and add in its place the word “availability”; and

c. Remove paragraph (i).

The revision reads as follows:

63. In § 73.51:

a. Revise paragraphs (a) and (b)(1);

b. In paragraph (d)(1), remove the phrase “, typically 20 feet wide each, on both sides of this barrier,”;

c. In paragraph (d)(3), in the last sentence, remove the word “redundant” and add in its place the word “additional”;

d. In paragraph (d)(11), remove the phrase “of the” in the last sentence; and

e. In paragraph (d)(12), in the first sentence, remove the number “24” and add in its place the number “36”.

The revisions read as follows:

64. Revise § 73.54 to read as follows:

65. Revise § 73.55 to read as follows:

66. Amend § 73.56 as follows:

a. Revise the section heading;

b. Revise paragraph (a)(1);

c. Remove and reserve paragraphs (a)(2) and (3);

d. Revise paragraphs (c) and (d)(3);

e. In paragraph (f)(3), remove the phase “re-evaluation or ”;

f. In the heading for paragraph (h)(4)(ii)(A), remove the word “Update” and add in its place the word “Reinstatements”;

g. Revise paragraph (h)(4)(ii)(B);

h. Revise paragraphs (i)(1)(iv) and (i)(1)(v)(A), the introductory text to paragraphs (i)(1)(v)(B) and (i)(1)(v)(B)( 4), and paragraph (j);

i. In paragraph (n)(1), remove the number “24” wherever it may appear and add in its place the number “36”; and in paragraph (n)(2), remove the number “12” wherever it may appear and add in its place the number “24”;

j. In paragraph (n)(6), remove the reference “§ 73.55(b)(10)” and add in its place the reference “§ 73.55(b)(9)”; and

k. In paragraphs (o)(2), remove the number “5” wherever it may appear and add in its place the number “3”.

The revisions and additions to read as follows:

67. In § 73.57, revise paragraph (b)(2)(v) to read as follows:

68. Remove and reserve § 73.58.

69. In § 73.59, revise paragraph (j) to read as follows:

70. In § 73.61(h), remove the phase “engaged in activities associated with the U.S./IAEA Safeguards Agreement”.

71. In § 73.67, revise paragraphs (b)(1)(i), (d), and the introductory text of paragraph (f) to read as follows:

72. In § 73.70, in paragraph (b), remove the phrase “and badge numbers” and add in its place the phrase “badge numbers or a personnel identification system”; and in paragraph (d), remove the phrase “badge number” and add in its place the phrase “badge number or personnel identification system”.

73. Revise § 73.77 to read as follows:

74. In § 73.100, revise paragraph (a)(1) to read as follows:

75. In § 73.110, revise paragraph (a) and the introductory text to paragraph (b) to read as follows:

76. In § 73.120, revise paragraph (a) to read as follows:

77. Amend § 73.1200 as follows:

a. Revise the section heading;

b. Revise paragraph (b)(3)(ii);

c. Revise and republish paragraph (c)(1)(i);

d. Revise paragraphs (e)(1)(iv) and (v), (e)(2), and (e)(3)(i), (g)(1), the introductory text to paragraphs (m)(1) and (n)(1), and paragraph (o)(3);

e. Redesignate paragraph (q)(2) as paragraph (q)(3) and add new paragraph (q)(2); and

f. Revise paragraphs (s) and (t).

The revisions and additions to read as follows:

78. In § 73.1205, revise the section heading and paragraphs (a)(2) and (e) to read as follows:

79. In § 73.1210, revise the section heading, paragraphs (b)(2) and (3)(iii), and paragraph (e) to read as follows:

80. In § 73.1215:

a. Revise paragraphs (a) and (c);

b. In paragraph (d)(1)(v), remove the phrase “aircraft activities” and add in its place the phrase “crewed/uncrewed aviation-related assets engaging in overflight activities”.

The revisions read as follows:

81. In appendix A to part 73, revise and republish table 1 and table 2 to read as follows:

Appendix A to Part 73—U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Offices and Classified Mailing Addresses

( printed page 38981)

82. Revise and republish Appendix B to part 73 to read as follows:

Appendix B to Part 73—General Criteria for Security Personnel

Table of Contents

Introduction.

Definitions.

Criteria.

I. Employment suitability and qualification.

A. Suitability.

B. Physical and mental qualifications.

C. Medical examination and physical fitness qualifications.

D. Contract security personnel.

E. Physical and medical requalification.

F. Documentation.

II. Training and qualifications.

A. Training requirements.

B. Qualification requirements.

C. Contract personnel.

D. Security knowledge, skills, and abilities.

E. Requalification.

III. Weapons training and qualification.

IV. Weapons qualification and requalification program.

V. Guard, armed response personnel, and armed escort equipment.

VI. Nuclear Power Reactor Training and Qualification Plan for Personnel Performing Security Program Duties.

A. General Requirements and Introduction.

B. Employment Suitability and Qualification.

C. Duty Training.

D. Duty Qualification and Requalification.

E. Weapons Training.

F. Weapons Qualification and Requalification Program.

G. Weapons Maintenance.

H. Records.

I. Reviews.

J. Definitions.

Introduction

Applicants and power reactor licensees subject to the requirements of § 73.55 shall comply with the requirements of section I, “Employment Suitability and Qualification,” paragraphs I.A, I.B.1.a., I.B.1.b.(1),(a)-(b), I.B.1.b.(2),(a)-(c) and section VI of this appendix for armed and unarmed individuals who are assigned security duties. All other licensees, applicants, or certificate holders shall comply only with sections I through V of this appendix.

Security personnel who are responsible for the protection of special nuclear material on site or in transit and for the protection of the facility or shipment vehicle against radiological sabotage should, like other elements of the physical security system, be required to meet minimum criteria to ensure that they will effectively perform their assigned security-related job duties. In order to ensure that those individuals responsible for security are properly equipped and qualified to execute the job duties prescribed for them, the NRC has developed general criteria that specify security personnel qualification requirements.

These general criteria establish requirements for the selection, training, equipping, testing, and qualification of individuals who will be responsible for protecting special nuclear materials, nuclear facilities, and nuclear shipments.

When required to have security personnel that have been trained, equipped, and qualified to perform assigned security job duties in accordance with the criteria in this appendix, the licensee must establish, maintain, and follow a plan that shows how the criteria will be met. The plan must be submitted to the NRC for approval and must be implemented within 30 days after approval by the NRC unless otherwise specified by the NRC in writing.

Definitions

Terms defined in parts 50, 53, 70, and 73 of this chapter have the same meaning when used in this appendix.

Criteria

I. Employment Suitability and Qualification

A. Suitability.1. Before employment, or assignment to the security organization, an individual shall:

a. Possess a high school diploma or pass an equivalent performance examination designed to measure basic mathematical, language, and reasoning skills, abilities, and knowledge required to perform security duties and responsibilities;

b. Have attained the age of 18 for an unarmed capacity; or have attained the age of 18 or the minimum age required by applicable State law for an armed capacity, whichever is older;

c. Not have any felony convictions that reflect on the individual's reliability; and

d. Not be disqualified, in accordance with applicable state or Federal law from possessing or using firearms or ammunition.

(1) Licensees may use the information that has been obtained during the completion of the individual's background investigation for unescorted access to determine suitability; or

(2) Licensees may use the satisfactory completion of a firearms background check for the individual under § 73.17 of this part to also fulfill this requirement.2. The qualification of each individual to perform assigned duties and responsibilities must be documented.

B. Physical and mental qualifications.

1. Physical qualifications:

a. Individuals whose security tasks and job duties are directly associated with the effective implementation of the licensee physical security and contingency plans shall have no physical weaknesses or abnormalities that would adversely affect their performance of assigned security job duties.

b. In addition to a. above, guards, armed response personnel, armed escorts, and central alarm station operators shall successfully pass a physical examination administered by a licensed physician. The examination shall be designed to measure the individual's physical ability to perform assigned security job duties as identified in the licensee physical security and contingency plans. Armed personnel shall meet the following additional physical requirements:

(1) Vision:

(a) For each individual, distant visual acuity in each eye shall be correctable to 20/30 (Snellen or equivalent) in the better eye and 20/40 in the other eye with eyeglasses or contact lenses. If uncorrected distance vision is not at least 20/40 in the better eye, the individual shall carry an extra pair of corrective lenses. Near visual acuity, corrected or uncorrected, shall be at least 20/40 in the better eye. Field of vision must be at least 70° horizontal meridian in each eye. The ability to distinguish red, green, and yellow colors is required. Loss of vision in one eye is disqualifying. Glaucoma shall be disqualifying, unless controlled by acceptable medical or surgical means, provided such medications as may be used for controlling glaucoma do not cause undesirable side effects which adversely affect the individual's ability to perform assigned security job duties, and provided the visual acuity and field of vision requirements stated above are met. On-the-job evaluation shall be used for individuals who exhibit a mild color vision defect.

(b) The use of corrective eyeglasses or contact lenses shall not interfere with an individual's ability to effectively perform assigned security job duties during normal or emergency operations.

(2) Hearing:

(a) Individuals shall have no hearing loss in the better ear greater than 30 decibels average at 500 Hz, 1,000 Hz, and 2,000 Hz with no level greater that 40 decibels at any one frequency (by ISO 389 “Standard Reference Zero for the Calibration of Puritone Audiometer” (1975) or ANSI S3.6-1969 (R. 1973) “Specifications for Audiometers”). ISO 389 and ANSI S3.6-1969 have been approved for incorporation by reference by the Director of the Federal Register. A copy of each ( printed page 38982) standard is available for inspection at the NRC Library, 11545 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland 20852-2738.

(b) A hearing aid is acceptable provided suitable testing procedures demonstrate auditory acuity equivalent to the above stated requirement.

(c) The use of a hearing aid shall not decrease the effective performance of the individual's assigned security job duties during normal or emergency operations.

(3) Diseases—Individuals shall have no established medical history or medical diagnosis of epilepsy or diabetes, or, where such a condition exists, the individual shall provide medical evidence that the condition can be controlled with proper medication so that the individual will not lapse into a coma or unconscious state while performing assigned security job duties.

(4) Addiction—Individuals shall have no established medical history or medical diagnosis of habitual alcoholism or drug addiction, or, where such a condition has existed, the individual shall provide certified documentation of having completed a rehabilitation program which would give a reasonable degree of confidence that the individual would be capable of performing assigned security job duties.

(5) Other physical requirements—An individual who has been incapacitated due to a serious illness, injury, disease, or operation, which could interfere with the effective performance of assigned security job duties shall, prior to resumption of such duties, provide medical evidence of recovery and ability to perform such security job duties.2. Mental qualifications: a. Individuals whose security tasks and job duties are directly associated with the effective implementation of the licensee physical security and contingency plans shall demonstrate mental alertness and the capability to exercise good judgment, implement instructions, assimilate assigned security tasks, and possess the acuity of senses and ability of expression sufficient to permit accurate communication by written, spoken, audible, visible, or other signals required by assigned job duties.

b. Armed individuals, and central alarm station operators, in addition to meeting the requirement stated in paragraph a. above, shall have no emotional instability that would interfere with the effective performance of assigned security job duties. The determination shall be made by a licensed psychologist or psychiatrist, or physician, or other person professionally trained to identify emotional instability.

c. The licensee shall arrange for continued observation of security personnel and for appropriate corrective measures by responsible supervisors for indications of emotional instability of individuals in the course of performing assigned security job duties. Identification of emotional instability by responsible supervisors shall be subject to verification by a licensed, trained person.

C. Medical examinations and physical fitness qualifications—Guards, armed response personnel, armed escorts and other armed security force members shall be given a medical examination including a determination and written certification by a licensed physician that there are no medical contraindications as disclosed by the medical examination to participation by the individual in physical fitness tests. Subsequent to this medical examination, guards, armed response personnel, armed escorts and other armed security force members shall demonstrate physical fitness for assigned security job duties by performing a practical physical exercise program within a specific time period. The exercise program performance objectives shall be described in the license training and qualifications plan and shall consider job-related functions such as strenuous activity, physical exertion, levels of stress, and exposure to the elements as they pertain to each individual's assigned security job duties for both normal and emergency operations. The physical fitness qualification of each guard, armed response person, armed escort, and other security force member shall be documented by a licensee security supervisor or a qualified training instructor. The licensee shall retain this documentation as a record for three years from the date of each qualification.

D. Contract security personnel—Contract security personnel shall be required to meet the suitability, physical, and mental requirements as appropriate to their assigned security job duties in accordance with section I of this appendix.

E. Physical requalification—At least every 12 months, central alarm station operators shall be required to meet the physical requirements of B.1.b of this section, and guards, armed response personnel, and armed escorts shall be required to meet the physical requirements of paragraphs B.1.b (1) and (2), and C of this section. The licensee shall document each individual's physical requalification and shall retain this documentation of requalification as a record for three years from the date of each requalification.

F. Documentation—The results of suitability, physical, and mental qualifications data and test results must be documented by the licensee or the licensee's agent. The licensee or the agent shall retain this documentation as a record for three years from the date of obtaining and recording these results.

G. Nothing herein authorizes or requires a licensee to investigate into or judge the reading habits, political or religious beliefs, or attitudes on social, economic, or political issues of any person.

II. Training and Qualifications

A. Training requirements—Each individual who requires training to perform assigned security-related job tasks or job duties as identified in the licensee physical security or contingency plans shall, prior to assignment, be trained to perform these tasks and duties in accordance with the licensee or the licensee's agent's documented training and qualifications plan. The licensee or the agent shall maintain documentation of the current plan and retain this documentation of the plan as a record for three years after the close of period for which the licensee possesses the special nuclear material under each license for which the plan was developed and, if any portion of the plan is superseded, retain the material that is superseded for three years after each change.

B. Qualification requirements—Each person who performs security-related job tasks or job duties required to implement the licensee physical security or contingency plan shall, prior to being assigned to these tasks or duties, be qualified in accordance with the licensee's NRC-approved training and qualifications plan. The qualifications of each individual must be documented by a qualified training instructor or a security supervisor. The licensee shall retain this documentation of each individual's qualifications as a record for three years after the employee ends employment in the security-related capacity and for three years after the close of period for which the licensee possesses the special nuclear material under each license, and superseded material for three years after each change.

C. Contract personnel—Contract personnel shall be trained, equipped, and qualified as appropriate to their assigned security-related job tasks or job duties, in accordance with sections II, III, IV, and V of this appendix. The qualifications of each individual must be documented by a qualified training instructor or a licensee security supervisor. The licensee shall retain this documentation of each individual's qualifications as a record for three years after the employee ends employment in the security-related capacity and for three years after the close of period for which the licensee possesses the special nuclear material under each license, and superseded material for three years after each change.

D. Security knowledge, skills, and abilities—Each individual assigned to perform the security related task identified in the licensee physical security or contingency plan shall demonstrate the required knowledge, skill, and ability in accordance with the specified standards for each task as stated in the NRC approved licensee training and qualifications plan.

E. Requalification—Security personnel shall be requalified at least every 12 months to perform assigned security-related job tasks and duties for both normal and contingency operations. Requalification shall be in accordance with the NRC-approved licensee training and qualifications plan. The results of requalification must be documented and attested by a licensee security supervisor or a qualified training instructor. The licensee shall retain this documentation of each individual's requalification as a record for three years from the date of each requalification.

III. Weapons Training

A. Guards, armed response personnel and armed escorts requiring weapons training to perform assigned security related job tasks or job duties shall be trained in accordance with the licensees' documented weapons training programs. Each individual shall be proficient in the use of their assigned weapon(s) and shall meet licensee-prescribed standards for firearms handling and functionality.

IV. Weapons Qualification and Requalification Program

Qualification firing for the handgun and the rifle must be for daylight firing, and each individual shall perform night firing for ( printed page 38983) familiarization with assigned weapon(s). The results of weapons qualification and requalification must be documented by the licensee or the licensee's agent. Each individual shall be requalified at least every 12 months. The licensee shall retain this documentation of each qualification and requalification as a record for three years from the date of the qualification or requalification, as appropriate.

A. Individuals shall qualify with all assigned firearms through completion of a law enforcement course or an equivalent nationally recognized course of fire.

B. Qualifying score must be an accumulated total of 70 percent with handgun and shotgun, and 80 percent with semiautomatic rifle and/or enhanced weapons, of the maximum obtainable target score.

C. Enhanced weapons—Armed members of the security organization, assigned duties and responsibilities involving the use of enhanced weapons, authorized under § 73.15 of this part, must qualify in accordance with the licensee's NRC-approved training and qualification plan as specified under the provisions of § 73.15(f)(3) and (h) of this part.

D. Requalification—Individuals shall be weapons requalified at least every 12 months in accordance with the NRC approved licensee training and qualifications plan, and in accordance with the requirements stated in A, B, and C of this section.

V. Guard, Armed Response Personnel, and Armed Escort Equipment

Fixed site guards, fixed site armed response personnel, and transportation armed escorts shall either be equipped with or have available the following security equipment appropriate to the individual's assigned contingency security related tasks or job duties as described in the licensee physical security and contingency plans:

A. Automatic or semiautomatic rifles.

B. 12 gauge shotguns.

C. Semiautomatic pistols or revolvers.

D. Short-barreled rifles.

E. Ammunition.

1. Each individual assigned contingency security job duties must maintain an adequate and readily available supply of ammunition for assigned weapons as determined by security job duties and responsibilities, as described in the licensee physical security and contingency plans.

2. The quantity of ammunition available for fixed sites must be maintained at a level sufficient to ensure the effective implementation of the Commission-approved security plans.

F. The licensee shall ensure that each individual is equipped or has readily available personal equipment or devices required for the effective implementation of the Commission-approved security plans.

G. Escort vehicles must be bullet resisting and equipped with communications systems or any other equipment as needed for the effective implementation of the Commission-approved security plans.

VI. Nuclear Power Reactor Training and Qualification Plan for Personnel Performing Security Program Duties

A. General Requirements and Introduction

1. The licensee must ensure that all individuals who are assigned duties and responsibilities required to implement the Commission-approved security plans, licensee response strategy, and implementing procedures, meet minimum training and qualification requirements to ensure each individual possesses the knowledge, skills, and abilities required to effectively perform the assigned duties and responsibilities.

2. Licensee physical protection programs that meet the requirements of 10 CFR 73.55(b)(3)(iii) must establish and maintain a training and qualification program that ensures personnel who are responsible for implementation of the physical protection of the facility against radiological sabotage are trained and qualified with the applicable portions of this section to effectively perform their assigned security-related job duties. The training and qualification program must be described in the Commission-approved training and qualification plan.

3. The licensee may not allow any individual to perform any security function, assume any security duties or responsibilities, or return to security duty, until that individual satisfies the training and qualification requirements of this appendix and the Commission-approved training and qualification plan, unless specifically authorized by the Commission.

4. Annual requirements must be scheduled at a nominal 12-month periodicity. Annual requirements may be completed up to 3 months before or 3 months after the scheduled date. However, the next annual training must be scheduled 12 months from the previously scheduled date rather than the date the training was actually completed.

B. Employment Suitability and Qualification

1. Suitability.

(a) Before employment, or assignment to the security organization, an individual serving in an armed capacity must not be disqualified from possessing or using firearms or ammunition in accordance with applicable state or Federal law, to include 18 U.S.C. 922. Licensees must use information that has been obtained during the completion of the individual's background investigation for unescorted access to determine suitability.

(b) The qualification of each individual to perform assigned duties and responsibilities must be documented and attested by a qualified training instructor or a security supervisor.

2. Physical qualifications.

(a) General physical qualifications.

(1) Individuals whose duties and responsibilities are directly associated with the effective implementation of the Commission-approved security plans, licensee protective strategy, and implementing procedures, may not have any physical conditions that would adversely affect their performance of assigned security duties and responsibilities.

(2) Armed and unarmed individuals assigned security duties and responsibilities must be subject to a physical examination designed to measure the individual's physical ability to perform assigned duties and responsibilities as identified in the Commission-approved security plans, licensee protective strategy, and implementing procedures.

(3) This physical examination must be administered by a licensed health professional with the final determination being made by a licensed physician to verify the individual's physical capability to perform assigned duties and responsibilities.

(4) The licensee must ensure that both armed and unarmed individuals who are assigned security duties and responsibilities identified in the Commission-approved security plans, the licensee protective strategy, and implementing procedures, meet the following minimum physical requirements, as required to effectively perform their assigned duties.

(b) Existing medical conditions.

(1) Individuals may not have an established medical history or medical diagnosis of existing medical conditions which could interfere with or prevent the individual from effectively performing assigned duties and responsibilities.

(2) If a medical condition exists, the individual must provide medical evidence that the condition can be controlled with medical treatment in a manner which does not adversely affect the individual's fitness-for-duty, mental alertness, physical condition, or capability to otherwise effectively perform assigned duties and responsibilities.

(c) Addiction. Individuals may not have any established medical history or medical diagnosis of habitual alcoholism or drug addiction, or, where this type of condition has existed, the individual must provide certified documentation of having completed a rehabilitation program which would give a reasonable degree of confidence that the individual would be capable of effectively performing assigned duties and responsibilities.

(d) Other physical requirements. An individual who has been incapacitated due to a serious illness, injury, disease, or operation, which could interfere with the effective performance of assigned duties and responsibilities must, before resumption of assigned duties and responsibilities, provide medical evidence of recovery and ability to perform these duties and responsibilities.

3. Psychological qualifications.

(a) Armed and unarmed individuals must demonstrate the ability to apply good judgment, mental alertness, the capability to implement instructions and assigned tasks, and possess the acuity of senses and ability of expression sufficient to permit accurate communication by written, spoken, audible, visible, or other signals required by assigned duties and responsibilities.

(b) A licensed psychologist, psychiatrist, or physician trained in part to identify emotional instability must determine whether armed members of the security organization and alarm station operators in addition to meeting the requirement stated in paragraph (a) of this section, have no emotional instability that would interfere ( printed page 38984) with the effective performance of assigned duties and responsibilities.

(c) A person professionally trained to identify emotional instability must determine whether unarmed individuals in addition to meeting the requirement stated in paragraph (a) of this section, have no emotional instability that would interfere with the effective performance of assigned duties and responsibilities.

4. Medical examinations and physical fitness qualifications.

(a) Armed members of the security organization must be subject to a medical examination by a licensed physician, to determine the individual's fitness to participate in physical fitness tests.

(1) The licensee must obtain and retain a written certification from the licensed physician that no medical conditions were disclosed by the medical examination that would preclude the individual's ability to participate in the physical fitness tests or meet the physical fitness attributes or objectives associated with assigned duties.

(2) [Reserved]

(b) Before assignment, armed members of the security organization must demonstrate physical fitness for assigned duties and responsibilities by performing a practical physical fitness test.

(1) The physical fitness test must include physical attributes and performance objectives that demonstrate the strength, endurance, and agility, consistent with assigned duties in the Commission-approved security plans, licensee protective strategy, and implementing procedures during normal and emergency conditions.

(2) The licensee must describe the physical fitness test in the Commission-approved training and qualification plan.

(3) The physical fitness qualification of each armed member of the security organization must be documented and attested by a qualified training instructor or a security supervisor.

5. Physical requalification.

(a) At least annually, armed and unarmed individuals must be required to demonstrate the capability to meet the physical requirements of this appendix and the licensee training and qualification plan.

(b) The physical requalification of each armed and unarmed individual must be documented and attested by a qualified training instructor or a security supervisor.

C. Duty Training

1. On-the-job training.

(a) The licensee training and qualification program must include on-the-job training performance standards and criteria to ensure that each individual demonstrates the requisite knowledge, skills, and abilities needed to effectively carry-out assigned duties and responsibilities in accordance with the Commission-approved security plans, licensee protective strategy, and implementing procedures, before the individual is assigned the duty or responsibility.

(b) In addition to meeting the requirement stated in paragraph C.1.(a) of this appendix, before assignment, individuals ( e.g., response team leaders, alarm station operators, armed responders, and armed security officers designated as a component of the protective strategy) assigned duties and responsibilities to implement the Safeguards Contingency Plan must complete on-the-job training to demonstrate their ability to effectively apply the knowledge, skills, and abilities required to effectively perform assigned contingency duties and responsibilities in accordance with the approved safeguards contingency plan, other security plans, licensee protective strategy, and implementing procedures. On-the-job training must be documented and attested by a qualified training instructor or a security supervisor.

2. Performance Evaluation Program.

(a) Licensees must develop, implement and maintain a Performance Evaluation Program that is documented in procedures which describes how the licensee will demonstrate and assess the effectiveness of their onsite physical protection program and protective strategy, including the capability of the armed response team to carry out their assigned duties and responsibilities during safeguards contingency events. The Performance Evaluation Program and procedures must be referenced in the licensee's Training and Qualifications Plan.

(b) The Performance Evaluation Program must include procedures for the conduct of tactical response drills and force-on-force exercises designed to demonstrate and assess the effectiveness of the licensee's physical protection program, protective strategy and contingency event response by all individuals with responsibilities for implementing the safeguards contingency plan.

(c) The licensee must conduct tactical response drills and force-on-force exercises in accordance with Commission-approved security plans, licensee protective strategy, and implementing procedures.

(d) Tactical response drills and force-on-force exercises must be designed to challenge the site protective strategy against elements of the design basis threat and ensure each participant assigned security duties and responsibilities identified in the Commission-approved security plans, the licensee protective strategy, and implementing procedures demonstrate the requisite knowledge, skills, and abilities.

(e) Tactical response drills, force-on-force exercises, and associated contingency response training must be conducted under conditions that simulate, as closely as practicable, the site-specific conditions under which each member will, or may be, required to perform assigned duties and responsibilities.

(f) The scope of tactical response drills conducted for training purposes must be determined by the licensee and must address site-specific, individual or programmatic elements, and may be limited to specific portions of the site protective strategy.

(g) Each tactical response drill and force-on-force exercise must include a documented post-exercise critique in which participants identify failures, deficiencies or other findings in performance, plans, equipment or strategies.

(h) Licensees must document scenarios and participants for all tactical response drills and annual force-on-force exercises conducted.

(i) Findings, deficiencies and failures identified during tactical response drills and force-on-force exercises that adversely affect or decrease the effectiveness of the protective strategy and physical protection program must be addressed to ensure that timely corrections are made to the appropriate program areas.

(j) Findings, deficiencies and failures associated with the onsite physical protection program and protective strategy must be protected as necessary in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 73.21.

(k) For the purpose of tactical response drills and force-on-force exercises, licensees must:

(1) Use no more than the total number of armed responders and armed security officers documented in the security plans.

(2) Minimize the number and effects of artificialities associated with tactical response drills and force-on-force exercises.

(3) Implement the use of systems or methodologies that simulate the realities of armed engagement through visual and audible means or other technologies and reflect the capabilities of armed personnel to neutralize a target through the use of firearms.

(4) Ensure that each scenario used provides a credible, realistic challenge to the protective strategy and the capabilities of the security response organization.

(l) The Performance Evaluation Program must be designed to ensure that:

(1) Each member of each shift who is assigned duties and responsibilities required to implement the safeguards contingency plan and licensee protective strategy must participate in security drills and exercises.

(i) The licensee must conduct at least one fully integrated Force-on-Force exercise on an annual basis.

(ii) Each member of each shift must participate in one fully integrated Force-on-Force exercise every 3 years.

(iii) Each member of each shift must participate in two tactical response drills, one of which must be a limited scope tactical response drill, on an annual basis.

(A) Participation in a fully integrated Force-on-Force exercise or NRC triennial evaluation would count as credit for the limited scope tactical response drill. The NRC triennial evaluation can be used to satisfy the annual fully integrated Force-on-Force exercise.

(B) [Reserved].

(2) The mock adversary force replicates, as closely as possible, adversary characteristics and capabilities of the design basis threat described in 10 CFR 73.1(a)(1), and is capable of exploiting and challenging the licensee's protective strategy, personnel, command and control, and implementing procedures.

(3) Protective strategies can be evaluated and challenged through the conduct of tactical response tabletop demonstrations.

(4) Drill and exercise controllers are trained and qualified to ensure that each controller has the requisite knowledge and experience to control and evaluate exercises.

(5) Tactical response drills and force-on-force exercises are conducted safely and in accordance with site safety plans. ( printed page 38985)

(m) Scenarios.

(1) Licensees must develop and document multiple scenarios for use in conducting tactical response drills and force-on-force exercises.

(2) Licensee scenarios must be designed to test and challenge any components or combination of components, of the onsite physical protection program and protective strategy.

(3) Each scenario must use a unique target set or target sets to ensure that the combination of all scenarios challenges every component of the onsite physical protection program and protective strategy to include, but not limited to, equipment, implementing procedures, and personnel.

D. Duty Qualification and Requalification

1. Qualification demonstration.

(a) Armed and unarmed individuals must demonstrate the required knowledge, skills, and abilities to carry out assigned duties and responsibilities as stated in the Commission-approved security plans, licensee protective strategy, and implementing procedures.

(b) [Reserved].

2. Requalification.

(a) Armed and unarmed individuals must be requalified at least annually in accordance with the requirements of this appendix and the Commission-approved training and qualification plan.

(b) The results of requalification must be documented and attested by a qualified training instructor or a security supervisor.

E. Weapons Training

1. General firearms training.

(a) Armed members of the security organization must be trained and qualified in accordance with the requirements of this appendix and the Commission-approved training and qualification plan.

(b) Firearms instructors must maintain a certification for each weapon type from a national or state recognized entity.

(c) The Commission-approved training and qualification plan must describe training on firearms handling and functionality.

(d) The licensee must ensure that each armed member of the security organization is instructed on the use of deadly force as authorized by applicable State law.

F. Weapons Qualification and Requalification Program

1. General weapons qualification requirements.

(a) Qualification firing must be accomplished in accordance with Commission requirements and the Commission-approved training and qualification plan for assigned weapons.

(b) The results of weapons qualification and requalification must be documented and retained as a record.

2. Tactical weapons qualification. The licensee Training and Qualification Plan must describe the firearms used, the firearms qualification program, and other tactical training required to implement the Commission-approved security plans, licensee protective strategy, and implementing procedures. Licensee developed tactical qualification and requalification courses must describe the performance criteria needed to include the site specific conditions (such as lighting, elevation, fields-of-fire) under which assigned personnel must be required to carry-out their assigned duties.

3. Firearms qualification courses. The licensee must conduct the following qualification courses for each weapon used.

(a) Annual daylight qualification course. Qualifying score must be an accumulated total of 70 percent with handgun and shotgun, and 80 percent with semiautomatic rifle and/or enhanced weapons, of the maximum obtainable target score.

(b) Annual night fire qualification course. Qualifying score must be an accumulated total of 70 percent with handgun and shotgun, and 80 percent with semiautomatic rifle and/or enhanced weapons, of the maximum obtainable target score.

(c) Annual tactical qualification course. Qualifying score must be an accumulated total of 80 percent of the maximum obtainable score.

(d) Individuals shall qualify with all assigned firearms through completion of a law enforcement course or an equivalent nationally recognized course of fire.

(e) Enhanced weapons. Armed members of the security organization, assigned duties and responsibilities involving the use of any weapon or weapons not described previously, must qualify in accordance with applicable standards established by a law enforcement course or an equivalent nationally recognized course for these weapons.

4. Firearms requalification.

(a) Armed members of the security organization must be requalified for each assigned weapon at least annually in accordance with Commission requirements and the Commission-approved training and qualification plan, and the results documented and retained as a record.

(b) Firearms requalification must be conducted using the courses of fire outlined in paragraphs F.2 and F.3 of this section.

G. Weapons Maintenance

1. Firearms maintenance program. Each licensee must implement a firearms maintenance and accountability program in accordance with the Commission regulations and the Commission-approved training and qualification plan. The program must include:

(a) Semiannual test firing for accuracy and functionality.

(b) Firearms maintenance procedures that include cleaning schedules and cleaning requirements.

(c) Program activity documentation.

(d) Control and accountability (weapons and ammunition).

(e) Firearm storage requirements.

(f) Armorer certification.

2. [Reserved].

H. Records

1. The licensee must retain all reports, records, or other documentation required by this appendix in accordance with the requirements of § 73.55(q).

2. The licensee must retain each individual's initial qualification record for three (3) years after termination of the individual's employment and must retain each requalification record for three (3) years after it is superseded.

3. The licensee must document data and test results from each individual's suitability, physical, and psychological qualification and must retain this documentation as a record for three (3) years from the date of obtaining and recording these results.

I. Reviews

The licensee must review the Commission-approved training and qualification program in accordance with the requirements of § 73.55(m).

J. Definitions

Terms defined in parts 50, 70, and 73 of this chapter have the same meaning when used in this appendix.

83. Revise and republish appendix C to part 73 to read as follows:

Appendix C to Part 73—Licensee Safeguards Contingency Plans

I. Safeguards Contingency Plan

Licensees, applicants, and certificate holders, with the exception of those who are subject to the requirements of § 73.55 or 73.100, must comply with the requirements of section I of this appendix.

A. Introduction

A licensee safeguards contingency plan is a documented plan to give guidance to licensee personnel in order to accomplish specific defined objectives in the event of threats, thefts, or radiological sabotage relating to special nuclear material or nuclear facilities licensed under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended. An acceptable safeguards contingency plan must contain:

1. A predetermined set of decisions and actions to satisfy stated objectives;

2. An identification of the data, criteria, procedures, and mechanisms necessary to efficiently implement the decisions; and

3. A stipulation of the individual, group, or organizational entity responsible for each decision and action.

The goals of licensee safeguards contingency plans for responding to threats, thefts, and radiological sabotage are:

1. To organize the response effort at the licensee level;

2. To provide predetermined, structured responses by licensees to safeguards contingencies;

3. To ensure the integration of the licensee response with the responses by other entities; and

4. To achieve a measurable performance in response capability.

Licensee safeguards contingency planning should result in organizing the licensee's resources in such a way that the participants will be identified, their several responsibilities specified, and the responses coordinated. The responses should be timely.

It is important to note that a licensee's safeguards contingency plan is intended to be complementary to any onsite emergency plans. ( printed page 38986)

B. Contents of the Plan

Each licensee safeguards contingency plan must include five categories of information:

1. Background

2. Generic Planning Base

3. Licensee Planning Base

4. Responsibility Matrix

5. Implementing Procedures

Although the implementing procedures (the fifth category of Plan information) are the culmination of the planning process, and therefore are an integral and important part of the safeguards contingency plan, they entail operating details subject to frequent changes. They need not be submitted to the Commission for approval, but will be inspected by NRC staff on a periodic basis. The licensee is responsible for ensuring that the implementing procedures reflect the information in the Responsibility Matrix, appropriately summarized and suitably presented for effective use by the responding entities.

The following paragraphs describe the contents of the safeguards contingency plan.

1. Background. Under the following topics, this category of information must identify and define the perceived dangers and incidents with which the plan will deal and the general way it will handle these:

a. Perceived Danger—A statement of the perceived danger to the security of special nuclear material, licensee personnel, and licensee property, including covert diversion of special nuclear material, radiological sabotage, and overt attacks. The statement of perceived danger should conform with that promulgated by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. (The statement contained in 10 CFR 73.1 or subsequent Commission statements will suffice.)

b. Purpose of the Plan—A discussion of the general aims and operational concepts underlying implementation of the plan.

c. Scope of the Plan—A delineation of the types of incidents covered in the plan.

d. Definitions—A list of terms and their definitions used in describing operational and technical aspects of the plan.

2. Generic Planning Base. Under the following topics, this category of information must define the criteria for initiation and termination of responses to safeguards contingencies together with the specific decisions, actions, and supporting information needed to bring about such responses:

a. Identification of those events that will be used for signaling the beginning or aggravation of a safeguards contingency according to how they are perceived initially by licensee's personnel. Such events may include alarms or other indications signaling penetration of a protected area, vital area, or material access area; material control or material accounting indications of material missing or unaccounted for; or threat indications—either verbal, such as telephoned threats, or implied, such as escalating civil disturbances.

b. Definition of the specific objective to be accomplished relative to each identified event. The objective may be to obtain a level of awareness about the nature and severity of the safeguards contingency in order to prepare for further responses; to establish a level of response preparedness; or to successfully nullify or reduce any adverse safeguards consequences arising from the contingency.

3. Licensee Planning Base. This category of information must include the factors affecting contingency planning that are specific for each facility or means of transportation. To the extent that the topics are treated in adequate detail in the licensee's approved physical security plan, they are not necessary to be repeated in this plan. The following topics should be addressed:

a. Licensee's Organizational Structure for Contingency Responses—A delineation of the organization's chain of command and delegation of authority as these apply to safeguards contingencies.

b. Physical Layout—(i) Fixed Sites—A description of the physical structures and their location on the site, and a description of the site in relation to nearby town, roads, and other environmental features important to the effective coordination of response operations. Particular emphasis should be placed on main and alternate entry routes for law-enforcement assistance forces and the location of control points for marshalling and coordinating response activities.

(ii) Transportation—A description of the vehicles, shipping routes, preplanned alternate routes, and related features.

c. Safeguards Systems Hardware—A description of the physical security and accounting system hardware that influence how the licensee will respond to an event. Examples of systems to be discussed are communications, alarms, locks, seals, area access, armaments, and surveillance.

d. Law Enforcement Assistance—A listing of available local law enforcement agencies and a description of their response capabilities and their criteria for response; and a discussion of working agreements or arrangements for communicating with these agencies.

e. Policy Constraints and Assumptions—A discussion of State laws, local ordinances, and company policies and practices that govern licensee response to incidents. Examples that may be discussed include:

(i) Use of deadly force;

(ii) Use of employee property;

(iii) Use of off-duty employees; and

(iv) Site security jurisdictional boundaries.

f. Administrative and Logistical Considerations—Descriptions of licensee practices that may have an influence on the response to safeguards contingency events. The considerations must include a description of the procedures that will be used for ensuring that all equipment needed to effect a successful response to a safeguards contingency will be easily accessible, in good working order, and in sufficient supply to provide redundancy in case of equipment failure.

4. Responsibility Matrix. This category of information consists of detailed identification of the organizational entities responsible for each decision and action associated with specific responses to safeguards contingencies. For each initiating event, a tabulation must be made for each response entity depicting the assignment of responsibilities for all decisions and actions to be taken in response to the initiating event. (Not all entities will have assigned responsibilities for any given initiating event.) The tabulations in the Responsibility Matrix must provide an overall picture of the response actions and their interrelationships. Safeguards responsibilities must be assigned in a manner that precludes conflict in duties or responsibilities that would prevent the execution of the plan in any safeguards contingency.5. Procedures. In order to aid execution of the detailed plan as developed in the Responsibility Matrix, this category of information must detail the actions to be taken and decisions to be made by each member or unit of the organization as planned in the Responsibility Matrix.

C. Audit and Review

1. For nuclear facilities subject to the requirements of § 73.46, the licensee must provide for a review of the safeguards contingency plan at intervals not to exceed 24 months.

2. A licensee subject to the requirements of § 73.46 must ensure that the review of the safeguards contingency plan is by individuals independent of both security program management and personnel who have direct responsibility for implementation of the security program. The review must include an audit of safeguards contingency procedures and practices, and an audit of commitments established for response by local law enforcement authorities.

3. The licensee must document the results and the recommendations of the safeguards contingency plan review, management findings on whether the safeguards contingency plan is currently effective, and any actions taken as a result of recommendations from prior reviews in a report to the licensee's plant manager and to corporate management at least one level higher than that having responsibility for the day-to-day plant operation. The report must be maintained in an auditable form, available for inspection for a period of 3 years.

II. Nuclear Power Plant Safeguards Contingency Plans

A. Introduction

The safeguards contingency plan is a documented plan that describes how licensee personnel implement their physical protection program to defend against threats to their facility, up to and including the design basis threat of radiological sabotage.

Licensee safeguards contingency planning should result in organizing the licensee's resources in such a way that the participants will be identified, their responsibilities specified, and the responses coordinated. The responses should be timely and include personnel who are trained and qualified to respond in accordance with a documented training and qualification program.

The evaluation, validation, and testing of this portion of the program must be conducted in accordance with appendix B, section VI of this part, Nuclear Power Reactor Training and Qualification Plan for Personnel Performing Security Program Duties. The licensee's safeguards contingency plan is intended to maintain effectiveness during the implementation of onsite emergency plans. ( printed page 38987)

B. Contents of the Plan

Each safeguards contingency plan must include five (5) categories of information:

(1) Background.

(2) Generic planning base.

(3) Licensee planning base.

(4) Responsibility matrix.

(5) Implementing procedures.

Although the implementing procedures (the fifth category of plan information) are the culmination of the planning process, and are an integral and important part of the safeguards contingency plan, they entail operating details subject to frequent changes. They need not be submitted to the Commission for approval, but are subject to inspection by NRC staff on a periodic basis.

1. Background. This category of information must identify the perceived dangers and incidents that the plan will address and a general description of how the response is organized.

a. Perceived Danger—Consistent with the design basis threat specified in § 73.1(a)(1), licensees must identify and describe the perceived dangers, threats, and incidents against which the safeguards contingency plan is designed to protect.

b. Purpose of the Plan—Licensees must describe the general goals, objectives and operational concepts underlying the implementation of the approved safeguards contingency plan.

c. Scope of the Plan—A delineation of the types of incidents covered by the plan.

(i) How the onsite or offsite response effort is organized and coordinated to effectively respond to a safeguards contingency event.

(ii) How the onsite or offsite response for safeguards contingency events has been integrated in other site emergency response procedures.

d. Definitions—A list of terms and their definitions used in describing operational and technical aspects of the approved safeguards contingency plan.

2. Generic Planning Base. Licensees must define the criteria for initiation and termination of responses to security events to include the specific decisions, actions, and supporting information needed to respond to each type of incident covered by the approved safeguards contingency plan. To achieve this result the generic planning base must:

a. Identify those events that will be used for signaling the beginning or aggravation of a safeguards contingency event according to how they are perceived initially by licensee's personnel. Licensees must ensure detection of unauthorized activities and must respond to all alarms or other indications signaling a security event, such as penetration of a protected area, vital area, or unauthorized barrier penetration (vehicle or personnel); tampering, bomb threats, or other threat warnings—either verbal, such as telephoned threats, or implied, such as escalating civil disturbances.

b. Define the specific objective to be accomplished relative to each identified safeguards contingency event. The objective may be to obtain a level of awareness about the nature and severity of the safeguards contingency to prepare for further responses; to establish a level of response preparedness; or to successfully nullify or reduce any adverse safeguards consequences arising from the contingency.

c. Identify the data, criteria, procedures, mechanisms and logistical support necessary to achieve the objectives identified.

3. Licensee Planning Base. This category of information must include factors affecting safeguards contingency planning that are specific for each facility. To the extent that the topics are treated in adequate detail in the licensee's approved physical security plan, they may be incorporated by reference in the Safeguards Contingency Plan. The following topics must be addressed:

a. Organizational Structure. The safeguards contingency plan must describe the organization's chain of command and delegation of authority during safeguards contingency events, to include a general description of how command and control functions will be coordinated and maintained.

b. Physical Layout. The safeguards contingency plan must include a site map depicting the physical structures located on the site, including onsite independent spent fuel storage installations, and a description of the structures depicted on the map. Plans must also include a description and map of the site in relation to nearby towns, transportation routes ( e.g., rail, water, and roads), pipelines, airports, hazardous material facilities, and pertinent environmental features that may have an effect upon coordination of response activities. Descriptions and maps must indicate main and alternate entry routes for law enforcement or other offsite response and support agencies and the location for marshaling and coordinating response activities.

c. Safeguards Systems. The safeguards contingency plan must include a description of the physical security systems that support and influence how the licensee will respond to an event in accordance with the design basis threat described in § 73.1(a). The licensee's description must begin with onsite physical protection measures implemented at the outermost facility perimeter, and must move inward through those measures implemented to protect target set equipment.

(i) Physical security systems and security systems hardware to be discussed include security systems and measures that provide defense-in-depth, such as physical barriers, alarm systems, locks, area access, armaments, surveillance, and communications systems.

(ii) The specific structure of the security response organization to include the total number of armed responders and armed security officers documented in the approved security plans as a component of the protective strategy and a general description of response capabilities must also be included in the safeguards contingency plan.

(iii) Armed responders must be available to respond from designated areas inside the protected area at all times and may not be assigned any other duties or responsibilities that could interfere with assigned armed response team duties and responsibilities.

(iv) Licensees must develop, implement, and maintain a written protective strategy to be documented in procedures that describe in detail the physical protection measures, security systems and deployment of the armed response team relative to site specific conditions, to include but not be limited to, facility layout, and the location of target set equipment and elements. The protective strategy should support the general goals, operational concepts, and performance objectives identified in the licensee's safeguards contingency plan. The protective strategy must:

(1) Be designed to meet the performance requirements and objectives of § 73.55(a) through (k) or 73.100(a) through (j), as applicable.

(2) Identify predetermined actions, areas of responsibility and timelines for the deployment of armed personnel.

(3) Contain measures that limit the exposure of security personnel to possible attack, including incorporation of bullet resisting protected positions.

(4) Contain a description of the physical security systems and measures that provide defense-in-depth, such as physical barriers, alarm systems, locks, area access, armaments, surveillance, and communications systems.

(5) Describe the specific structure and responsibilities of the armed response organization to include:

(i) The authorized minimum number of armed responders, available at all times inside the protected area.

(ii) The authorized minimum number of armed security officers, available onsite at all times.

(iii) The total number of armed responders and armed security officers documented in the approved security plans as a component of the protective strategy.

(6) Provide a command and control structure, to include response by off-site law enforcement agencies, which ensures that decisions and actions are coordinated and communicated in a timely manner to facilitate response.

d. Law Enforcement Assistance. Provide a listing of available law enforcement agencies and a general description of their response capabilities and their criteria for response and a discussion of working agreements or arrangements for communicating with these agencies.

e. Policy Constraints and Assumptions. The safeguards contingency plan must contain a discussion of State laws, local ordinances, and company policies and practices that govern licensee response to incidents and must include, but is not limited to, the following.

(i) Use of deadly force.

(ii) Recall of off-duty employees.

(iii) Site jurisdictional boundaries.

(iv) Use of enhanced weapons, if applicable.

f. Administrative and Logistical Considerations. Descriptions of licensee practices which influence how the security organization responds to a safeguards contingency event to include, but not limited to, a description of the procedures that will be used for ensuring that equipment needed to facilitate response will be readily accessible, in good working order, and in sufficient supply.

4. Responsibility Matrix. This category of information consists of the detailed ( printed page 38988) identification of responsibilities and specific actions to be taken by licensee organizations and/or personnel in response to safeguards contingency events.

a. Licensees must develop site procedures that consist of matrixes detailing the organization and/or personnel responsible for decisions and actions associated with specific responses to safeguards contingency events. The responsibility matrix and procedures must be referenced in the licensee's safeguards contingency plan.

b. Responsibility matrix procedures must be based on the events outlined in the licensee's Generic Planning Base and must include the definition of the specific objective to be accomplished relative to each identified safeguards contingency event. The objective may be to obtain a level of awareness about the nature and severity of the safeguards contingency to prepare for further responses, to establish a level of response preparedness, or to successfully nullify or reduce any adverse safeguards consequences arising from the contingency.

c. Responsibilities must be assigned in a manner that precludes conflict of duties and responsibilities that would prevent the execution of the safeguards contingency plan and emergency response plans.

d. Licensees must ensure that predetermined actions can be completed under the postulated conditions.

5. Implementing Procedures. Licensees must establish and maintain written implementing procedures that provide specific guidance and operating details that identify the actions to be taken and decisions to be made by each member of the security organization who is assigned duties and responsibilities required for the effective implementation of the security plans and the site protective strategy.

C. Records and Reviews

1. Licensees must review the safeguards contingency plan in accordance with the requirements of § 73.55(m) or 73.100(f).

2. The safeguards contingency plan audit must include a review of applicable elements of the Physical Security Plan, Training and Qualification Plan, implementing procedures and practices, the site protective strategy, and response agreements made by local, State, and Federal law enforcement authorities.

3. Licensees must retain all reports, records, or other documentation required by this appendix in accordance with the requirements of § 73.55(q) or 73.100(j).

84. The authority citation for part 95 continues to read as follows:

Authority: Atomic Energy Act of 1954, secs. 145, 161, 223, 234 (42 U.S.C. 2165, 2201, 2273, 2282); Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, sec. 201 (42 U.S.C. 5841); 44 U.S.C. 3504 note; E.O. 10865, as amended, 25 FR 1583, 3 CFR, 1959-1963 Comp., p. 398; E.O. 12829, 58 FR 3479, 3 CFR, 1993 Comp., p. 570; E.O. 12968, 60 FR 40245, 3 CFR, 1995 Comp., p. 391; E.O. 13526, 75 FR 707, 3 CFR, 2009 Comp., p. 298.

85. Revise § 95.1 to read as follows:

86. In § 95.5:

a. In the definition “ Cognizant Security Agency (CSA)”, remove the phrase “department of Energy” and add in its place the phrase “Department of Energy”; and

b. Add introductory text and remove the definitions of “ Combination lock ”, “ Need to know ”, “ Protective personnel ”, “ Restricted area ”, “ Security area ”, and “ Security container ”.

The additions read as follows:

87. In § 95.8, in paragraph (b):

a. Remove the references “95.18,” “95.25,” and “95.45,”; and

b. Add the reference “95.24,” in numerical order.

88. In § 95.11, revise the section heading and introductory text to read as follows:

89. In § 95.17, revise the section heading and revise paragraph (a) to read as follows:

90. Remove and reserve § 95.18.

91. In § 95.19, remove paragraph (c).

92. Add § 95.24 to read as follows:

93. Remove and reserve § 95.25.

94. Remove and reserve § 95.27.

95. Remove and reserve § 95.29.

96. Remove and reserve § 95.31.

97. Revise § 95.33 to read as follows:

98. Revise § 95.34 to read as follows:

99. Remove and reserve § 95.35.

100. Revise § 95.37 to read as follows:

101. Revise § 95.39 to read as follows:

102. Revise § 95.43 to read as follows:

103. Remove and reserve § 95.45.

104. Revise § 95.47 to read as follows:

105. Revise § 95.49, to read as follows:

106. Remove and reserve § 95.51.

107. Revise § 95.57 to read as follows:

91 FR 38928