SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

This is a summary of the Public Notice released on July 17, 2026 in PS Docket No. 26-184. The full text of this document is available at: https://docs.fcc.gov/​public/​attachments/​DA-26-742A1.docx.

In October 2025, the Commission adopted the EA Security Second R&O (90 FR 53227) which established a procedure to limit the scope of an existing authorization of covered equipment to prohibit continued importation or marketing of such equipment, without revoking the underlying authorization. The Commission directed PSHSB and OET to “institute proceedings to determine whether to apply these prohibitions to some or all of the equipment currently on the Covered List” and it delegated authority to PSHSB and OET to apply such prohibitions pursuant to the framework and process outlined in the EA Security Second R&O. Under section 2.939(e), PSHSB and OET “may place limitations on an existing authorization for covered equipment authorizations to prohibit continued importation or marketing” of such equipment.

On December 22, 2025, PSHSB added all UAS and UAS critical components produced in a foreign country to the Covered List, and all communications and video surveillance equipment and services listed in section 1709 of the FY2025 NDAA, to the Covered List. These additions were based on a National Security Determination from an Executive Branch interagency body, including several appropriate national security agencies, determining (among other things) that such equipment and services pose an unacceptable risk to the national security of the United States and to the safety and security of United States persons.

On March 30, 2026, the Enforcement Bureau (EB) opened an investigation and issued a Letter of Inquiry (LOI) to Xtra Technology LLC (Xtra), based on publicly available information that Xtra was producing hardware copies of certain communications and video surveillance equipment listed in section 1709 of the FY2025 NDAA, and that code from the equipment listed in section 1709 of the FY2025 NDAA was copied and pasted into Xtra devices. On May 8, 2026, EB opened an investigation and issued LOIs to Cogito Tech Company, Limited (Cogito); Fikaxo Technology Inc. (Fikaxo); Lyno Dynamics LLC (Lyno Dynamics); Skyhigh Tech LLC (Skyhigh Tech); Spatial Hover Inc (Spatial Hover); SZ Knowact Robot Technology Co., Ltd. (SZ Knowact); WaveGo Tech LLC (WaveGo), based on publicly available information that such companies produce UAS and UAS critical components that contain hardware copies of communications and video surveillance equipment listed in section 1709 of the FY2025 NDAA. All of these companies failed to respond to EB's March and May 2026 LOIs as directed in violation of Commission rules.

On April 9, 2026, EB issued a Letter of Inquiry to Guangzhou Xaircraft Technology Co. Ltd (XAG), a company that manufactures UAS and UAS critical components in a foreign country, based on XAG's failure to provide updated United States agent for service of process information as required by section 2.929(c) of the Commission's rules. EB granted XAG's request for an extension of time to respond until May 26, 2026. On May 21, 2026, XAG sought an additional 60-day extension, asserting that certain requested information might be subject to export controls under the laws of the People's Republic of China (PRC) and that XAG needed time to obtain an official determination from the PRC Ministry of Commerce regarding whether it could respond to the FCC's inquiries. On July 16, 2026, OET temporarily deferred XAG's grantee code based on XAG's continued failure to provide updated United States agent for service of process information pursuant to section 2.929(c) of the Commission's rules.

Through this Public Notice, pursuant to section 2.939(e), PSHSB and OET propose to prohibit the continued importation and marketing of previously-authorized foreign-produced UAS and UAS critical components, and certain communications and video surveillance equipment listed in section 1709 of the FY2025 NDAA, added to the Covered List in December 2025. This would encompass all covered equipment produced by the following entities and their affiliates, subsidiaries, and other partners: Cogito; Fikaxo; Lyno ( printed page 48110) Dynamics; Skyhigh Tech; Spatial Hover; SZ Knowact; WaveGo; Xtra; and XAG.

We tentatively conclude that such equipment is covered equipment. Specifically, we propose to apply these prohibitions to the following covered equipment:

(1) foreign-produced UAS and UAS critical components and white-labeled devices listed in section 1709 of the FY2025 NDAA produced by the following entities:

• Cogito, including FCC IDs 2BCHV-TQFDUB2, 2BCHV-GL3323, and 2BCHV-TQFDUB1;
• Fikaxo, including FCC IDs 2BRQB-FKABZF and 2BRQB-YZABFI;
• Lyno Dynamics, including FCC IDs 2BQ98-LD2202508, 2BQ98-LD220RC, and 2BQ98-LD220RD;
• Skyhigh Tech, including FCC IDs 2BLZI-T60X2411 and 2BLZI-YKBP22411;
• Spatial Hover, including FCC IDs 2BQAI-S3T and 2BQAI-NRC01;
• SZ Knowact, including FCC IDs 2BMUV-ARDCF25 and 2BMUV-AUDAFV25; and
• WaveGo LLC, including FCC IDs 2BPFE-DD001 and 2BPFE-RC001.

(2) communications and video surveillance equipment listed in section 1709 produced by Xtra, including FCC IDs 2BQH2-XCAMA01, 2BQH2-XCAMB01, 2BQH2-XCAMC01, 2BQH2-XCAMD01, and 2BQH2-XCAME01.

(3) foreign-produced UAS and UAS critical components produced by XAG, including UAS and UAS critical components with FCC IDs beginning with the 2A46G grantee code.

We tentatively conclude that such equipment is covered equipment. As stated above, public reporting indicates that equipment listed in categories (1) and (2) are exact hardware copies of certain communications and video surveillance equipment listed in section 1709 of the FY2025 NDAA. Even if the equipment is not an exact hardware copy, equipment that relies on substantial design, manufacture, assembly, or development by entities listed in section 1709 could still be considered “produced by” such entities. Additionally, as reflected in the materials submitted as part of the application for certification, three companies—Lyno Dynamics, Spatial Hover, and Skyhigh Tech—submitted equipment certification applications that still display branding of or reference companies listed in section 1709. Even if not produced by an entity named in section 1709, the equipment listed in categories (1) and (2) might still be produced by a “partner,” or entity “to which [a] named entity has a technology sharing or licensing agreement,” given the closeness of the designs. Moreover, publicly available equipment authorization records indicate that several of the UAS and UAS critical components in category (1) are in any event produced abroad, rendering them covered equipment even apart from the section 1709 connection. Equipment listed in category 3 is equipment produced in a foreign country. For example, XAG identified in its response to EB's April 9, 2026 LOI that its manufacturing facilities are located in a foreign country.

This proposed prohibition would not apply to any other already-authorized covered equipment, nor to UAS and UAS critical components on the DCMA Blue UAS Cleared List, domestic end products under the Buy American Standard, or devices granted Conditional Approval by the Department of War or Department of Homeland Security. It also would not apply to importation or marketing for federal government use or for commercial testing and product development, and would not affect the continued use or operation of already-purchased equipment.

We seek comment on our tentative conclusions that the above-referenced equipment is covered equipment. We invite commenters to provide specific evidence in response to our tentative conclusions. Below, we provide a brief analysis of the relevant factors that would justify limitation on the authorization of previously authorized “covered” equipment and tentatively conclude that prohibiting the continued importation and marketing of this previously authorized covered equipment serves the public interest.

National security impacts. As the Commission recognized in the EA Security Second R&O, “it is obvious and unarguable that no governmental interest is more compelling than the security of the Nation.” The Commission further stated that older models of covered equipment, which continue to be widely sold in the United States, pose an unacceptable risk to national security when imported or marketed, “not only when such equipment is new to the market.” The Commission agreed with commenters who observed that certain previously authorized devices that are now considered covered equipment “likely remain[ ] marketable in the United States” and “may present continuing national security threats.”

Subject to exceptions, an Executive Branch interagency body with appropriate national security expertise—including participation from appropriate national security agencies, one of which was the Department of War—specifically determined that UAS and UAS critical components produced in foreign countries, as well as communications and video surveillance equipment and services listed in section 1709 of the FY2025 NDAA, “pose unacceptable risks to the national security of the United States or to the safety and security of United States persons.” This determination of “unacceptable risks” was based on an assessment of “threats from unauthorized surveillance, sensitive data exfiltration, supply chain vulnerabilities, and other potential threats to the homeland.” We believe this national security determination to encompass all already-authorized covered equipment addressed in this Public Notice—namely, UAS and UAS critical components produced in foreign countries and/or communications and video surveillance equipment and services listed in section 1709 of the FY2025 NDAA. Consistent with the Commission's direction, we tentatively accept this determination and “give [it] particular weight.” We seek comment on this proposed analysis. We tentatively conclude that prohibiting the continued importation and marketing of previously authorized covered UAS and UAS critical components and communications and video surveillance equipment and services listed in section 1709 of the FY2025 NDAA as described above is necessary to protect national security by mitigating risks to the United States communications sector.

Economic and supply chain impacts. We seek comment on the potential economic and supply chain impacts of prohibiting the continued importation and marketing of already-authorized covered equipment. How would this proposed action affect the financial interests of consumers, providers, and manufacturers in the communications sector? What are the economic or supply chain considerations that weigh in favor of, or against taking this proposed action? We invite commenters to provide data that we should consider in our analysis.

We tentatively conclude that our proposed action would not have substantial economic and supply chain impacts, given that the devices subject to the proposed limitation represent a very small portion of the United States market. None of the companies identified in this Public Notice—Cogito, Fikaxo, Lyno Dynamics, Skyhigh Tech, Spatial Hover, SZ Knowact, WaveGo, XAG, or Xtra—appear in major industry market analyses or rankings. We seek comment on whether this assessment is accurate, whether other equipment ( printed page 48111) could readily substitute for the covered equipment, whether the Conditional Approval process has provided an adequate source of trusted equipment, whether the proposed prohibition would be cost-effective for the public in terms of obtaining trusted equipment, and whether providers' compliance costs would decrease as they replaced covered equipment with trusted equipment. We strongly encourage commenters to submit data or other specific evidence regarding any economic costs.

We also seek comment on potential economic benefits that may result from the proposed prohibitions. Following the initial update to the Covered List, domestic UAS producers have attracted billions of dollars in new investment, supporting thousands of United States manufacturing jobs, and additional billions have been committed to expanding domestic production of UAS and UAS critical components. These investments—supported by both domestic and foreign capital—are expected to generate further economic growth. We tentatively conclude that if the proposed prohibition results in any supply reductions, it may spur additional domestic investment that could offset or outweigh any negative economic effects. We request comment on the economic impacts of the likely investment in United States production driven by this proposed prohibition.

Public interest analysis. We tentatively conclude that prohibiting the continued importation and marketing of the previously authorized covered equipment identified in this Public Notice serves the public interest because it protects United States communications networks from devices that an Executive Branch interagency body has specifically determined to “pose an unacceptable risk to the national security of the United States or the security and safety of United States persons.” We further tentatively conclude that no countervailing public interest factors outweigh this finding with respect to the proposed prohibition. We seek comment on this analysis.

Existing authorizations. We clarify that, if this prohibition is adopted, the continued use or operation of previously authorized UAS and UAS critical components that are foreign-produced, as well as communications and video surveillance equipment listed in section 1709 of the FY2025 NDAA and addressed in this Public Notice, would remain permitted.

Implementation timeline. We propose that all parties must cease all importation and marketing activities within 30 days after publication in the Federal Register . We seek comment on the proposed timeline from the responsible parties and relevant manufacturers, importers, distributors, retailers, and other interested entities. In particular, we request comment on implementation considerations such as the quantity of devices already imported into the United States and available for—or being held for—marketing or sale; new or recently updated device models that are en route to the United States or pending shipment; and devices subject to executed distribution, marketing, or sales agreements that have not yet entered the supply chain.

Permit-but-disclose proceeding. The proceeding this Public Notice initiates shall be treated as a “permit-but-disclose” proceeding in accordance with the Commission's ex parte rules. Persons making ex parte presentations must file a copy of any written presentation or a memorandum summarizing any oral presentation within two business days after the presentation (unless a different deadline applicable to the Sunshine period applies). Persons making oral ex parte presentations are reminded that memoranda summarizing the presentation must (1) list all persons attending or otherwise participating in the meeting at which the ex parte presentation was made, and (2) summarize all data presented and arguments made during the presentation. If the presentation consisted in whole or in part of the presentation of data or arguments already reflected in the presenter's written comments, memoranda or other filings in the proceeding, the presenter may provide citations to such data or arguments in his or her prior comments, memoranda, or other filings (specifying the relevant page and/or paragraph numbers where such data or arguments can be found) in lieu of summarizing them in the memorandum. Documents shown or given to Commission staff during ex parte meetings are deemed to be written ex parte presentations and must be filed consistent with rule 1.1206(b). In proceedings governed by rule 1.49(f) or for which the Commission has made available a method of electronic filing, written ex parte presentations and memoranda summarizing oral ex parte presentations, and all attachments thereto, must be filed through the electronic comment filing system available for that proceeding, and must be filed in their native format ( e.g.,.doc, .xml, .ppt, searchable .pdf). Participants in this proceeding should familiarize themselves with the Commission's ex parte rules.

91 FR 48108