SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

This is a summary of the Commission's document ( Public Notice) in PS Docket No. 26-184, DA 26-832, released on August 10, 2026. The full text of this document is available at: docs.fcc.gov/​public/​attachments/​DA-26-832A1.docx.

Permit-but-disclose proceeding. The proceeding this Public Notice initiates shall be treated as a “permit-but-disclose” proceeding in accordance with the Commission's ex parte rules. Persons making ex parte presentations must file a copy of any written presentation or a memorandum summarizing any oral presentation within two business days after the presentation (unless a different deadline applicable to the Sunshine period applies). Persons making oral ex parte presentations are reminded that memoranda summarizing the presentation must (1) list all persons attending or otherwise participating in the meeting at which the ex parte presentation was made, and (2) summarize all data presented and arguments made during the presentation. If the presentation consisted in whole or in part of the presentation of data or arguments already reflected in the presenter's written comments, memoranda or other filings in the proceeding, the presenter ( printed page 54714) may provide citations to such data or arguments in his or her prior comments, memoranda, or other filings (specifying the relevant page and/or paragraph numbers where such data or arguments can be found) in lieu of summarizing them in the memorandum. Documents shown or given to Commission staff during ex parte meetings are deemed to be written ex parte presentations and must be filed consistent with rule 1.1206(b). In proceedings governed by rule 1.49(f) or for which the Commission has made available a method of electronic filing, written ex parte presentations and memoranda summarizing oral ex parte presentations, and all attachments thereto, must be filed through the electronic comment filing system available for that proceeding, and must be filed in their native format ( e.g.,.doc, .xml, .ppt, searchable .pdf). Participants in this proceeding should familiarize themselves with the Commission's ex parte rules.

Synopsis

In October 2025, the Commission adopted the EA Security Second R&O (90 FR 53227) which established a procedure to limit the scope of an existing authorization of covered equipment to prohibit continued importation or marketing of such equipment, without revoking the underlying authorization. The Commission directed PSHSB and OET to “institute proceedings to determine whether to apply these prohibitions to some or all of the equipment currently on the Covered List” and it delegated authority to PSHSB and OET to apply such prohibitions pursuant to the framework and process outlined in the EA Security Second R&O. Under § 2.939(e), PSHSB and OET “may place limitations on an existing authorization for covered equipment authorizations to prohibit continued importation or marketing” of such equipment.

On December 22, 2025, PSHSB added all UAS and UAS critical components produced in a foreign country to the Covered List, and all communications and video surveillance equipment and services listed in section 1709 of the FY2025 NDAA, to the Covered List. These additions were based on a National Security Determination from an Executive Branch interagency body, including several appropriate national security agencies, determining (among other things) that such equipment and services pose an unacceptable risk to the national security of the United States and to the safety and security of United States persons.

On May 8, 2026, the Enforcement Bureau opened an investigation and issued a Letter of Inquiry (LOI) to Anzu, a United States-based UAS company, based on publicly available information that Anzu was producing devices listed in section 1709 of the FY2025 NDAA. On July 9, 2026, Anzu responded to the LOI in a confidential filing. Public sources suggest that Anzu devices are produced by an entity with a technology sharing or licensing agreement with an entity named in section 1709 and thus are considered covered equipment. Anzu's UAS and UAS controllers would also be covered equipment because they are produced in Malaysia, a foreign country.

Pursuant to § 2.939(e), PSHSB and OET propose to prohibit the continued importation and marketing of certain previously-authorized covered equipment referenced above. We tentatively conclude that such equipment is covered equipment. Specifically, we propose to apply these prohibitions to the following covered equipment: communications and video surveillance equipment listed in section 1709 produced by Anzu, including FCC IDs 2BBYS-RAPTOR and 2BBYS-RRC01. As stated above, public reporting indicates that this equipment is listed in section 1709 of the FY2025 NDAA, because it is produced by an entity with a technology licensing or sharing agreement with an entity named in section 1709 and because the equipment is produced in a foreign country.

This proposed prohibition would not apply to any other already-authorized covered equipment. It also would not apply to importation or marketing for federal government use or for commercial testing and product development, and would not affect the continued use or operation of already-purchased equipment.

We seek comment on our tentative conclusions that the above-referenced equipment is covered equipment. We invite commenters to provide specific evidence in response to our tentative conclusions. Below, we provide a brief analysis of the relevant factors that would justify limitation on the authorization of previously authorized “covered” equipment and tentatively conclude that prohibiting the continued importation and marketing of this previously authorized covered equipment serves the public interest.

National security impacts. As the Commission recognized in the EA Security Second R&O, “[i]t is obvious and unarguable that no governmental interest is more compelling than the security of the Nation.” The Commission further stated that older models of covered equipment, which continue to be widely sold in the United States, pose an unacceptable risk to national security when imported or marketed, “not only when such equipment is new to the market.” The Commission agreed with commenters who observed that certain previously authorized devices now categorized as covered equipment “likely remain[ ] marketable in the United States” and “may present continuing national security threats.”

An Executive Branch interagency body with appropriate national security expertise, including appropriate national security agencies, one of whom was the DoW, specifically determined that UAS and UAS critical components produced in foreign countries and communications and video surveillance equipment and services listed in section 1709 of the FY2025 NDAA “pose unacceptable risks to the national security of the United States or the safety and security of United States persons.” This determination of “unacceptable risks” was based on an assessment of “threats from unauthorized surveillance, sensitive data exfiltration, supply chain vulnerabilities, and other potential threats to the homeland.” We believe this determination included all already-authorized covered equipment described in this Public Notice, which are communications and video surveillance equipment and services listed in section 1709 of the FY2025 NDAA. We tentatively accept this determination and “give [it] particular weight,” as the Commission directed.

Therefore, based on the EA Security Second R&O and the December 21, 2025, National Security Determination, we tentatively conclude that prohibiting the continued importation and marketing of this previously communications and video surveillance equipment and services listed in section 1709 of the FY2025 NDAA as described above is necessary to protect national security by mitigating risks to the United States communications sector.

Economic and supply chain impacts. We seek comment on the potential economic and supply chain impacts of prohibiting the continued importation and marketing of the above-referenced already-authorized covered equipment. How would this proposed action affect the financial interests of consumers, providers, and manufacturers in the communications sector? As the Commission noted in the EA Security Second R&O, it may consider “countervailing economic concerns when implementing the prohibitions for ( printed page 54715) already-authorized devices.” What are the economic or supply chain considerations that weigh in favor of or against taking this proposed action? We invite commenters to provide data that we should consider in our analysis.

We tentatively conclude that our proposed action would not have substantial economic and supply chain impacts, especially given that the devices subject to the proposed limitation appear to comprise a very small share of the market. Anzu does not appear in major industry market analyses or rankings. Do commenters agree that economic and supply chain impacts are relatively minor? Could other equipment fill any gaps that may be created by this proposed prohibition? Has the Conditional Approval process provided an adequate source for trusted equipment now or in the future? Would this proposal be cost-effective for the public in terms of obtaining trusted equipment? Would providers' compliance costs decrease as they replace covered equipment with trusted equipment? We strongly encourage commenters to supply data and other specific evidence of economic costs to this prohibition.

We seek comment on any economic benefits that may arise as a result of these prohibitions. Following the initial update to the Covered List, billions of dollars have been raised by domestic UAS producers, creating thousands of United States manufacturing jobs. Billions more have been committed for domestic production of UAS and UAS critical components. These investments include capital from domestic investors as well as foreign investors supporting United States manufacturing. We tentatively conclude that if the proposed prohibitions generated economic harm by noticeably reducing supply, such prohibition would spur investments in domestic production that would generate a countervailing positive economic impact. Do commenters agree? We seek comment on the economic effects of the likely investment in United States production that this proposed prohibition would yield.

Public interest analysis. We tentatively conclude that prohibiting the continued importation and marketing of the previously authorized covered equipment subject to this Public Notice is consistent with the public interest because it protects American communications networks from devices specifically determined by an Executive Branch interagency body to “pose an unacceptable risk to the national security of the United States or the security and safety of United States persons.” We also tentatively conclude that there are no public interest factors that outweigh our tentative conclusion regarding the proposed ban on import and marketing of this previously authorized covered equipment. We seek comment on this analysis. Do commenters agree that the national security benefits outweigh any negative economic or supply chain factors? Are there any other public interest considerations that weigh in favor or against taking this proposed action? We invite commenters to provide any information that would assist the Commission in its balancing of the need to address the national security risks posed by the continued importation and marketing of previously authorized covered equipment in communications networks with the impact of the proposed prohibitions on government partners, consumers, industry, and the public at large.

Existing authorizations. We clarify that, if this prohibition is adopted, the continued use of previously authorized UAS and UAS critical components that are foreign-produced, as well as communications and video surveillance equipment listed in section 1709 of the FY2025 NDAA and addressed in this Public Notice, would remain authorized.

Implementation timeline. We propose that Anzu must cease all importation and marketing activities within 30 days after publication in the Federal Register . We seek comment on the proposed timeline from the responsible parties and relevant manufacturers, importers, distributors, retailers, and other interested entities. Specifically, we request comment on implementation considerations including the quantity of devices already imported into the United States and available for—or being held for—marketing or sale; new or recently updated device models that are en route to the United States or pending shipment; and devices subject to executed distribution, marketing, or sales agreements, but have not yet entered the supply chain.

Authority:47 U.S.C. 151, 154, 229, 301, 302a(b), 303, 1004, 1601-1609; Secure Equipment Act of 2021, Pub. L. 117-55, 135 Stat. 423.

91 FR 54713