SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

I. Executive Summary

FAA proposes to revise its regulations to add subpart I to 14 CFR part 93 to implement Special Air Traffic Rules (SATR) ^[1] in the vicinity of President Donald J. Trump International Airport (DJT Special Flight Rules Area (SFRA) or DJT SFRA).^[2] These SATR are necessary according to U.S. Secret Service (USSS) to protect the President, to secure the non-Governmental property in accordance with the Presidential Protection Assistance Act of 1976, and for USSS to exercise its authority under 18 U.S.C. 3056 and 3056A.^[3]

Specifically, the SATR would restrict aircraft operations in the area defined in the proposed § 93.109, Description of area, unless certain conditions are met. The proposed DJT SFRA would have a one nautical mile (NM) radius from latitude 26°40′37″ N, longitude 080°02′16″ W, surface up to and including 2,000 feet mean sea level (MSL). Proposed § 93.111, General Operating Procedures, would set forth the operating rules under which a person may operate an aircraft in the DJT SFRA. Specifically, any person operating an aircraft in the DJT SFRA would be required to meet the requirements in § 93.111(a)(1) or (a)(2), respectively:

• When there is an active temporary flight restriction (TFR) issued pursuant to § 91.141 for the DJT SFRA, the operation must comply with the requirements and restrictions contained in the associated Notice to Airmen (NOTAM).
• When there is not an active TFR in place:
  • For aircraft departing or arriving at President Donald J. Trump International Airport (DJT), the aircraft may transit the DJT SFRA if it is on an active instrument flight rules (IFR) or visual flight rules (VFR) flight plan with an approved instrument approach procedure (IAP), or an air traffic control (ATC) assigned departure procedure (DP), or radar vector for departure. It must remain in two-way radio communication with ATC; receive an ATC authorization to enter the airspace; and transmit a discrete transponder code assigned by ATC.
  • For military aircraft directly supporting USSS or the Office of the President, active law enforcement flights, active firefighting flights, active air ambulance flights, or flights otherwise authorized by ATC for safety of flight or safety of persons and property on the ground. The aircraft ( printed page 56381) may transit the DJT SFRA if it remains in two-way radio communication with ATC; has received an ATC authorization to enter the airspace; and transmits a discrete transponder code assigned by ATC.

II. Authority for This Rulemaking

FAA's authority to issue rules regarding aviation safety is found 49 U.S.C. 106, describes the authority of the FAA Administrator. The scope of FAA's authority is further described in 49 U.S.C. Subtitle VII, Aviation Programs, describes in more detail the scope of the agency's authority. This rulemaking is promulgated under the authority described in 49 U.S.C. 40103. Under that section, FAA is charged with prescribing regulations to assign the use of airspace necessary to ensure the safety of aircraft and the efficient use of airspace, as well as protecting individuals and property on the ground. In addition, 49 U.S.C. 44701(a)(5) charges FAA with promoting safe flight of civil aircraft by prescribing regulations and minimum standards for cybersecurity and other practices, methods, and procedures FAA finds necessary for safety in air commerce and national security.

III. Background and Discussion of the Proposed Rule

In September 2025, FAA began restricting access to the airspace in the vicinity of Palm Beach, Florida, at USSS's request through TFRs pursuant to 14 CFR 91.141, Flight restrictions in the proximity of the Presidential and other parties, via NOTAM. A § 91.141 TFR may be requested for the protection of the President, Vice President, or other public figures. When the President travels in the vicinity of Palm Beach, Florida, the TFR has an inner ring with a 10 NM radius extending from the surface up to and including 17,999 feet MSL. The outer ring has a 30 NM radius extending from the surface up to and including 17,999 feet MSL. When in effect, only certain types of operations are permitted within the inner ring of these TFRs (such operations are those that are approved law enforcement, military aircraft directly supporting USSS and the Office of the President, approved air ambulance, and regularly scheduled commercial passenger and all cargo carriers arriving or departing from a 14 CFR part 139 airport). A person may operate an aircraft in the outer rings if they are arriving or departing from DJT or, where ATC can accommodate them, transitioning through the airspace.

On September 16, 2025, in a letter to FAA, USSS requested FAA establish a permanent flight restriction within one NM of Mar-A-Lago Club from the surface up to 1,000 feet AGL “to ensure the safety and security” of President Trump in the interest of national security. USSS also stated “[t]hese restrictions are requested due to adverse threat intelligence and the ongoing protective mission of USSS. In addition, these would greatly increase the ability to mitigate the persistent risks posed by unauthorized aircraft and unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) operating in proximity to sensitive areas.” ^[4] The President has designated Mar-A-Lago Club as a non-Governmental property under the Presidential Protection Act of 1976. USSS is responsible for ensuring a non-Governmental property is fully secured. Moreover, USSS is authorized to protect the President and other protectees under 18 U.S.C. 3056 and 3056A. USSS also requested the restriction be published in the Federal Register and charted to ensure compliance.

On October 18, 2025, as an interim measure, FAA issued a special security instruction (SSI) flight restriction pursuant to 14 CFR 99.7 via NOTAM FDC 5/2809 ^[5] restricting the operation of aircraft in the vicinity of Palm Beach, Florida. The SSI flight restriction became effective October 20, 2025 and ends October 20, 2026. The restriction is centered on the Palm Beach VORTAC 097 degree radial at 2.6 NM, with a radius of one NM, from the surface up to and including 2,000 feet AGL. Although the September 16, 2025 letter from USSS requested 1,000 feet AGL as the ceiling, USSS and FAA agreed to a 2,000 feet AGL altitude ceiling. A ceiling of 2,000 feet AGL would allow more time to respond to any threats in the area. In addition, FAA determined that setting the ceiling of the SSI flight restriction at 2,000 feet AGL as opposed to 1,000 feet AGL would not impact any additional operations. Any flights previously in that one NM area would have been under 1,000 feet AGL on approach to or departure from DJT.

Under the SSI flight restriction only those aircraft authorized by ATC are permitted to operate in the airspace. Those aircraft must also (1) be on an active IFR flight plan with an approved IAP or ATC assigned radar vector for departures and (2) transmit a discrete transponder code assigned by an ATC facility. When the President, Vice President, or other public figures travel to Palm Beach, FAA layers the § 91.141 TFR over the SSI flight restriction.

The FC 5/2809 SSI flight restriction is an interim solution that would be replaced by the SFRA in which FAA implements the SATR proposed in this rule. Under 49 U.S.C. 40103(b) and in compliance with the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 551, et seq., FAA can designate airspace through a rulemaking. In addition, FAA charts permanent flight restrictions established through rulemaking, providing enhanced public awareness, which in turn provides a higher level of security as compared to temporary SSI flight restrictions, which are not charted.

To restrict access permanently, FAA could establish a prohibited area under 14 CFR part 73 or create a special air traffic rules area under 14 CFR part 93. With a prohibited area, under 14 CFR 73.85, aircraft would not be permitted to enter the area unless they obtain permission from the using agency.^[6] The using agency is typically the military or security agency that requested the prohibited area. Though 14 CFR 73.83 retains the possibility that an aircraft can enter a prohibited area with permission from the using agency, prohibited areas are not designed for regular use or a large volume of traffic. With a prohibited area, the default posture is that flight is not authorized through the area. Any aircraft obtaining permission from the using agency and entering a prohibited area is an exception to the rule. Regular traffic or a large volume of traffic cannot be accommodated solely through exceptions.

FAA has prohibited the operation of aircraft in the vicinity of seven presidential and vice presidential residences in the interest of national security by establishing a prohibited area pursuant to 14 CFR part 73. Prohibited areas are designated when necessary to prohibit all flight within an area, except in very limited circumstances, in the interest of national security. No person may conduct operations within a prohibited area without the permission of the using agency. FAA has established prohibited areas in the vicinity of the following former presidential and vice presidential residences:

• On February 18, 1969, FAA established P-29 in the vicinity of Key Biscayne, Florida.^[7] USSS had requested ( printed page 56382) FAA establish the prohibited area for the security of President Nixon, who had a residence in Key Biscayne. One concern was that public interest in the President may attract numerous aircraft over the residence for sightseeing and photographic purposes. The prohibited area provided for the protection of the President and property on the ground. FAA prohibited operations within a one NM radius from the surface up to 18,000 feet MSL. FAA was the using agency. FAA revoked the prohibited area on September 3, 1974, shortly after President Nixon left office because the conditions that had prompted the prohibited area no longer existed.^[8]
• On June 23, 1969, FAA established P-25 in the vicinity of San Mateo, California to provide adequate safeguards for the protection of President Nixon and persons or property on the ground.^[9] The prohibited area was established for the security of the President and because the public interest in the President might attract numerous aircraft over the Presidential residence for sightseeing and photographic purposes. FAA prohibited operations within a one NM radius from the surface to 4,000 feet MSL. FAA was the using agency. FAA revoked the prohibited area on September 3, 1974, shortly after President Nixon left office because the conditions that had prompted the prohibited area no longer existed.^[10]
• On February 18, 1977, FAA established P-77 in the vicinity of Plains, Georgia.^[11] The prohibited area was established due to the interest that President Carter's residence may have attracted for sightseeing and photographic purposes. To provide adequate safeguards for the President and persons or property on the ground, FAA prohibited operations within one NM radius from the surface up to 1,500 feet MSL. FAA was the using agency. FAA revoked the prohibited area effective May 5, 1988, after President Carter left office because USSS had notified FAA that national welfare and security no longer required the prohibited area.^[12]
• On January 20, 1981, FAA established P-65 in the vicinity of Pacific Palisades, California, and P-66 in the vicinity of Rancho del Cielo, California based on USSS's request.^[13] FAA prohibited operations within a one NM radius from the surface to 1,000 feet AGL in both areas. The purpose of the prohibited areas was to enhance the level of security for President Reagan by prohibiting unauthorized flights of aircraft over and in the immediate vicinity of presidential residences. The vertical and lateral limits of the areas were designed to impose the minimum burden upon the public while still providing acceptable security restraints. FAA was the using agency. On July 27, 1981, FAA revoked P-65 because USSS determined a prohibited area was no longer required.^[14] Effective October 23, 1986, P-66 was expanded laterally and vertically due to USSS's determination that this expansion was necessary to enhance the level of security provided to the President.^[15] The area was subdivided into P-66A and P-66B as follows: P-66A from the surface to 4,000 feet MSL and P-66B from 4,000 feet MSL up to but not including 5,000 feet MSL. P-66B was activated by NOTAM. FAA revoked the prohibited areas on June 1, 1989, shortly after President Reagan left office.^[16] FAA's revocation was based on USSS's indication that the prohibition was no longer required for national welfare or security purposes.^[17]
• On November 26, 1981, FAA established P-67 in the vicinity of Kennebunkport, Maine. FAA prohibited operations within one NM radius from the surface to 1,000 feet MSL.^[18] The establishment of P-67 was based on USSS's request to prohibit the unauthorized flight of aircraft in the immediate vicinity of the Vice President's residence. The using agency was FAA. P-67 is still in effect at the time of the publication of this proposed rule.
• On May 17, 2001, FAA established P-49 in the vicinity of Crawford, Texas, in response to a USSS request.^[19] The purpose of the prohibited area was to enhance the level of security provided to President Bush, who had a residence in that area. FAA prohibited operations within a three NM radius from the surface up to 5,000 feet MSL. USSS was the using agency. Effective February 16, 2010, FAA reduced the boundary and altitude dimensions of the prohibited area from a three NM radius to a two NM radius and from 5,000 feet MSL to 2,000 feet MSL.^[20] USSS determined the larger restriction was no longer necessary.

In contrast to part 73 prohibited areas, part 93 establishes special air traffic rules operators must comply with to transit a certain area. Special air traffic rules are non-standard rules applicable to aircraft operating within the boundaries of certain airspace. Aircraft are not outright prohibited from transiting the area but must comply with certain rules when operating in the area. For example, a special air traffic rules area might include a requirement to operate via IFR at a certain altitude,^[21] maintain two-way radio communication with the applicable air traffic control facility,^[22] or conform to the flow of traffic depicted on the appropriate aeronautical charts.^[23] As discussed in more detail below, FAA considered whether to establish a prohibited area related to this location consistent with past practice but concluded that a prohibited area would preclude a substantial number of flights arriving and departing from DJT.

If this rule is finalized as proposed, FAA, in coordination with USSS as needed for security purposes, would have the flexibility to allow operations meeting certain criteria as described in the proposed rule, to transit through the area and to continue to use Runway 28R/10L. This proposed part 93 SFRA protects the President and ensures USSS can secure Mar-A-Lago Club while at the same time minimizing the impact to aircraft arriving and departing President Donald J. Trump International Airport (DJT) and essential safety and security services.

Therefore, in the interest of national security and the public right of transit, FAA proposes to add subpart I to part 93 to establish SATR in the vicinity of Palm Beach, Florida.

A. Special Flight Rules Area Applicability and Description of Area

FAA proposes adding a new subpart I, Special Flight Rules in the Vicinity of President Donald J. Trump International Airport, to 14 CFR part 93 (consisting of §§ 93.107, 93.109, and 93.111) that would codify the current configuration of the SSI flight restriction in effect in the vicinity of Palm Beach, Florida. This rule would apply to all persons seeking to operate in the area defined in § 93.109. The breadth of applicability is necessary in the interest of national security and to ensure USSS' ability to secure the non-Governmental property. ( printed page 56383)

Proposed § 93.109 would establish a flight restriction from the surface to 2,000 feet MSL within a one NM radius of Mar-A-Lago Club, latitude 26°40′37″ N, longitude 80°02′16″ W. The proposed vertical and lateral dimensions of the flight restrictions align with the current § 99.7 SSI flight restriction in effect, with a slight difference in that the proposed rule uses 2,000 feet MSL instead of 2,000 feet AGL. Usage of 2,000 feet MSL as opposed to 2,000 feet AGL results in the ceiling of the one NM area being about 20 feet lower at approximately 1,980 feet AGL.^[24] FAA selected MSL for the proposed rule to be consistent with other part 93 rules and prohibited areas. FAA considers restricting airspace to be a remedy to be applied only when necessary. As such, the specified dimensions of the proposed SFRA would only cover the area necessary to mitigate the risk posed by aircraft flying over Mar-A-Lago Club.

FAA selected vertical and lateral limits that impose the minimum burden on the public while still providing security mitigations acceptable to USSS. The proposed limits would allow the continued use of all runways at DJT.

B. SFRA General Operating Procedures

A prohibited area would mean that aircraft could not cross into the one NM area without permission from the using agency each time. Permission to enter a prohibited area would likely only happen in very limited circumstances, such as emergency response. Based on the impact a flight prohibition would have on aircraft departing or arriving at DJT, FAA is proposing a SFRA in which it implements operating rules in lieu of a prohibited area and is proposing to permit the continuation of certain operations that comply with the requirements of proposed 14 CFR 93.111(a)(1) and (a)(2). Moreover, due to the SFRA's proximity to the town of Palm Beach and nearby bodies of water, and the continued access to the Mar-A-Lago Club by members, guests, and staff, FAA recognizes the need to permit emergency services operations within the SFRA (such emergency services operations are active law enforcement, active firefighting, active air ambulance, and flights otherwise authorized by ATC for safety of flight and the safety of persons and property on the ground). Moreover, due to USSS's mandate to secure the Mar-A-Lago Club and ensure the safety of its protectees, military aircraft directly supporting USSS or the Office of the President need to be able to access the DJT SFRA. To preserve access to Runway 28R/10L, FAA proposes allowing operations through the DJT SFRA if they comply with the requirements in 14 CFR 93.111(a)(1) and (a)(2).

Mar-A-Lago Club is located in close proximity to DJT. DJT has three runways: 28R/10L, 28L/10R and 14/32. Runway 28R/10L is an east/west configuration and is the primary runway for commercial aircraft operations. To land or depart safely on Runway 28R/10L, aircraft need to enter the area covered by the one NM radius SFRA. Under the current SSI flight restriction, instrument approach and departure procedures place aircraft at about the 0.85 NM mark. This proposed rule would allow for the same or similar instrument approach procedures as are in effect now at DJT. If FAA established a prohibited area, aircraft would not be able to arrive at or depart DJT from Runway 28R/10L without entering the one NM area because the turns and climb gradient required to avoid the area would exceed the performance characteristics of some aircraft. In addition, aircraft would need to be airborne at an earlier point on the runway to begin the climb in time to avoid the prohibited area, leaving less usable runway length for departures. Aircraft would essentially be unable to use Runway 28R/10L if FAA established a prohibited area rather than a part 93 SFRA. Though Runway 14/32 is available, it is approximately 3,000 feet shorter than the primary runway and would limit commercial traffic if Runway 28R/10L were unavailable. Runway 28L/10R is a 3,200 foot runway available to Aircraft Design Group (ADG) I aircraft only. Establishing a flight prohibition over Mar-A-Lago Club would severely restrict access to DJT.

Due to the location of the proposed SFRA, FAA recognizes the need to allow continued access to aircraft providing emergency and lifesaving services. The continued access to this airspace in these situations would be permitted because the most direct course possible is critical for these operations, and necessary to respond to an emergency within the SFRA. These critical or time-sensitive safety or security operations should be exceedingly rare. Active law enforcement flights would include those operations involving aviation responses to ongoing crime or criminal activity. Active firefighting flights would include those that involve aviation responses to aid the suppression, control, or extinguishment of a fire. Active air ambulance flights would include those where a medically equipped aircraft is engaged in transporting a patient or responding to an emergency call. Flights otherwise authorized by ATC for safety of flight would include operations for which force majeure requires the aircraft to transit the DJT SFRA for the safety of the aircraft. This may include situations in which weather forces aircraft to enter the airspace to arrive or depart from DJT that are not on an active VFR or IFR flight plan. Finally, this rule would permit operations otherwise authorized by ATC necessary for the safety of persons and property on the ground. These permitted operations are intended to include aircraft directly involved in saving lives and providing disaster/hazard relief. For purposes of this rule, these other permitted operations are narrow in scope, intended to enhance safety, and provide for critical services that must occur in the SFRA or require transit through the SFRA.

For all the permitted operations discussed above, the proposed rule would also require those aircraft to (1) remain in two-way radio communication with ATC, (2) have received an ATC authorization to enter the DJT SFRA, and (3) continuously transmit (“squawk”) a discrete transponder code assigned by ATC. The purpose of these requirements is to ensure only permitted aircraft enter the airspace and ATC, along with USSS, retain situational awareness of when and where these operations are occurring for national security purposes. These requirements allow for easier identification and tracking of the aircraft within the DJT SFRA helping ensure security in the SFRA by enabling FAA and its security partners to better differentiate aircraft that may pose a security threat. Aircraft authorized by air traffic control to operate through the proposed SFRA would be mandated to comply with strict requirements. This would ensure risk mitigation is not diminished while at the same time allowing safe, orderly air traffic operations.

When the President, Vice President, or other public figures travel in the vicinity of Palm Beach, Florida, FAA will continue issuing a § 91.141 TFR that would cover the DJT SFRA. The DJT SFRA would lie within the inner 10 NM rings of the § 91.141 TFR. The requirements and restrictions on operations under the § 91.141 TFR are more restrictive than the proposed SATR because of the need to protect the non-Governmental property as well as the President and other public figures. To achieve the necessary security goals and to avoid confusion for operators, when a § 91.141 TFR is issued for the ( printed page 56384) DJT SFRA the requirements and restrictions for the § 91.141 TFR contained in the associated NOTAM would be controlling.

IV. Regulatory Notices and Analyses

A. Regulatory Impact Analysis

Executive Order (E.O.) 12866 (“Regulatory Planning and Review”) and E.O. 13563 (“Improving Regulation and Regulatory Review”) require agencies to regulate in the “most cost-effective manner,” to make a “reasoned determination that the benefits of the intended regulation justify its costs,” and to develop regulations that “impose the least burden on society.” The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has determined this proposed rule is not a significant regulatory action as defined in section (3)(f) of E.O. 12866.

1. Baseline for the Analysis

In accordance with OMB Circular A-4, the baseline represents the best assessment of conditions in the absence of the proposed regulatory action. For this primary analysis, the baseline is the continuation of the existing SSI flight restriction that is currently in effect in the vicinity of Palm Beach, Florida until October 20, 2026. The restriction ensures security for the President and the non-Governmental property at Mar-A-Lago Club. The affected area is centered on the Palm Beach VORTAC 097 degree radial at 2.6 NM, with a radius of one NM, from the surface up to and including 2,000 feet AGL. Aircraft departing or arriving DJT airport can only enter the affected airspace if they adhere to specific security criteria: the aircraft must be arriving or departing DJT on an IFR Flight Plan or on a VFR flight plan, use an approved approach or ATC-assigned departure route, have a unique ATC-assigned beacon code at all times, stay in two-way radio contact with ATC, and get ATC clearance to enter the DJT SFRA.

2. Need for Regulation

To address presidential safety and security concerns on a permanent basis, USSS has requested that FAA establish a permanent flight restriction within one NM of Mar-A-Lago Club from the surface up to 1,000 feet. Historically, when USSS has identified a security need for airspace restrictions near presidential or vice-presidential residences, FAA has established a permanent restriction in the form of a prohibited area under part 73 to maintain national security. However, designating this specific airspace a permanent part 73 prohibited area would severely limit routine operations at the DJT airport and restrict access by emergency and security operators unless approved by the using agency.

DJT has three runways: 28R/10L, 28L/10R, and 14/32. Runway 28R/10L is the primary commercial runway and averaged approximately 86 air carrier operations per day in 2025.^[25] Safe arrival and departure from this runway require aircraft to enter the airspace covered by the SSI flight restriction. Because the turn and climb gradient needed to avoid the one NM area exceeds the performance capabilities of many commercial aircraft, a part 73 prohibited area would make the primary runway unusable if aircraft were not authorized to traverse the one NM zone. Although Runway 14/32 is an alternative, it is approximately 3,000 feet shorter in length and cannot support heavy commercial traffic. Moreover, establishing a part 73 prohibited area would limit commercial traffic to operating from one runway, creating the need for a permanent regulatory alternative that maintains national security while preserving airport capacity.

3. Benefits

The proposed rule would establish a part 93 SFRA in which SATRs would be implemented, replacing the temporary SSI flight restriction with a permanent regulatory framework. The SATR would permit most operations currently authorized by ATC under the current SSI flight restriction with the exception of adding VFR flight plan arrivals and removing the “unless otherwise authorized” language contained in the SSI flight restriction, except when superseded by FAA's issuance of a flight restriction under § 91.141. Instead, in § 93.111(a)(2), FAA would identify specific types of operations that are permissible so long as they adhere to the requirements in § 93.111(b) and (c). By enabling routine air carrier and emergency operations to transit the SFRA under ATC control if they adhere to the specific security criteria, the proposed rule would preserve operational capacity at DJT while meeting the permanent security needs requested by USSS.

4. Costs

The specific security criteria for aircraft departing from or arriving at DJT include an active VFR or IFR flight plan, two-way radio communication, ATC authorization, and transmitting a discrete transponder code assigned by ATC. Since these criteria are already part of normal operating procedures at DJT under the current SSI flight restriction, the proposed rule results in no additional costs to operators.

5. Summary

The proposed SATR would establish a permanent restriction that maintains the existing security requirements under the current SSI flight restriction, while ensuring little to no impact on the daily flow of traffic at DJT airport. In addition, the proposed rule would allow certain emergency security and safety operations as specified in proposed § 93.111(b) to transit the SFRA with ATC authorization, resulting in no increased costs to those operators. FAA would also make clear in § 93.111(a) only those operations in compliance with the requirements and restrictions of a flight restriction issued under § 91.141 would be permitted in the SFRA when the TFR is active. Overall, the proposed rule would achieve the national security objectives with no incremental cost relative to current operating conditions for operators.

6. Alternative Baseline

FAA also evaluated the costs and benefits of the proposed rule against an alternative baseline in which the temporary SSI flight restriction expires without being replaced or renewed. Under this unrestricted airspace baseline, the proposed rule would impose costly operational requirements on operators at DJT airport—specifically maintaining two-way radio communication, transmitting discrete transponder codes, and obtaining ATC authorization.

However, extending the temporary SSI flight restriction represents the most likely future scenario in the absence of the proposed action. The incremental impact is then expected to be minimal because most operators using DJT airport are already required to communicate with and receive authorization from ATC based on the airspace classification near the airport. Furthermore, operators have also adapted to these requirements through the current temporary restriction. Moreover, the proposed rule would achieve national security objectives with minimal incremental costs to operators.

B. Regulatory Flexibility Act

The Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA) of 1980 (Pub. L. 96-354), (5 U.S.C. 601-612), as amended by the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996 (Pub. L. 104-121,) and the Small ( printed page 56385) Business Jobs Act of 2010 (Pub. L. 111-240), requires Federal agencies to consider the effects of the regulatory action on small business and other small entities and to minimize any significant economic impact. The term “small entities” comprises small businesses and not-for-profit organizations that are independently owned and operated and are not dominant in their fields, and governmental jurisdictions with populations of less than 50,000.

Commercial and general aviation operators departing and arriving at DJT airport would be affected by this proposed rule. Based on the Small Business Administration (SBA) size standard (Table 1), FAA has identified several small operators at DJT airport.

However, FAA anticipates no incremental costs to these operators, as the proposed security requirements align with existing standard operating procedures currently in effect at DJT. Therefore, as provided in section 605(b), the head of FAA certifies that this rulemaking will not result in a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities. FAA welcomes comments on the basis for this certification.

C. International Trade Impact Assessment

The Trade Agreements Act of 1979 (Pub. L. 96-39), as amended by the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (Pub. L. 103-465), prohibits Federal agencies from establishing standards or engaging in related activities that create unnecessary obstacles to the foreign commerce of the United States. Pursuant to these Acts, the establishment of standards is not considered an unnecessary obstacle to the foreign commerce of the United States, so long as the standard has a legitimate domestic objective, such as the protection of safety, and does not operate in a manner that excludes imports that meet this objective. The statute also requires consideration of international standards and, where appropriate, that they be the basis for U.S. standards.

FAA has assessed the potential effect of this proposed rule and determined it ensures the safety of the American public and does not exclude imports that meet this objective. As a result, FAA does not consider this proposed rule as creating an unnecessary obstacle to foreign commerce.

D. Unfunded Mandates Assessment

The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (2 U.S.C. 1531-1538) governs the issuance of Federal regulations that require unfunded mandates. An unfunded mandate is a regulation that requires a State, local, or Tribal Government or the private sector to incur direct costs without the Federal Government having first provided the funds to pay those costs. FAA determined the proposed rule would not result in the expenditure of $193,000,000 or more ($100,000,000 adjusted for inflation using the most current Implicit Price Deflator for the Gross Domestic Product) by State, local, or Tribal governments, in the aggregate, or the private sector, in any one year.

E. Paperwork Reduction Act

The Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3507(d)) requires FAA to consider the impact of paperwork and other information collection burdens imposed on the public. FAA has determined there would be no new requirement for information collection associated with this proposed rule.

F. International Compatibility

In keeping with U.S. obligations under the Convention on International Civil Aviation, it is FAA policy to conform to International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Standards and Recommended Practices to the maximum extent practicable. FAA has determined there are no ICAO Standards and Recommended Practices that correspond to these proposed regulations.

G. Environmental Analysis

FAA has preliminarily analyzed the environmental impacts of this proposed rule pursuant to the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA) (42 U.S.C. 4321, et seq. ). FAA has determined the action described in this NPRM is categorically excluded pursuant to Paragraph B-2.6(f) of Appendix B to FAA Order 1050.1G, FAA National Environmental Policy Act Implementing Procedures.^[26] Categorical exclusions are categories of actions that the agency has determined normally do not significantly affect the quality of the human environment and therefore do not require either an environmental assessment (EA) or environmental impact statement (EIS). In analyzing the applicability of a categorical exclusion, the agency must also consider whether extraordinary circumstances are present that warrant ^[27] the preparation of an EA or EIS. The action described in this NPRM, which proposes to establish the President Donald J. Trump International Airport (DJT) Special Flight Rules Area, is categorically excluded pursuant to Paragraph B-2.6(f) of FAA Order 1050.1G: “Regulations, standards, and exemptions (excluding those that if implemented may cause a significant impact on the human environment).” FAA does not anticipate any significant environmental impacts, and has not identified any extraordinary circumstances present in connection with the action described in this NPRM.

V. Executive Order Determinations

A. E.O. 13132, Federalism

FAA has analyzed this proposed rule under the principles and criteria of E.O. 13132, Federalism.^[28] FAA has determined this action would not have a substantial direct effect on the States, or the relationship between the Federal Government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government, and, therefore, would not have federalism implications.

B. E.O. 13175, Consultation and Coordination With Indian Tribal Governments

Consistent with E.O. 13175, Consultation and Coordination with Indian Tribal Governments,^[29] and FAA Order 1210.20, American Indian and Alaska Native Tribal Consultation Policy and Procedures,^[30] FAA ensures Federally Recognized Tribes (Tribes) are given the opportunity to provide meaningful and timely input regarding proposed Federal actions that have the potential to affect uniquely or significantly their respective Tribes. At this point, FAA has not identified any unique or significant effects, ( printed page 56386) environmental or otherwise, on Tribes resulting from this proposed rule.

C. E.O. 13211, Regulations That Significantly Affect Energy Supply, Distribution, or Use

FAA analyzed this proposed rule under E.O. 13211, Actions Concerning Regulations that Significantly Affect Energy Supply, Distribution, or Use.^[31] FAA has determined it would not be a “significant energy action” under E.O. 13211 and would not be likely to have a significant adverse effect on the supply, distribution, or use of energy.

D. E.O. 13609, Promoting International Regulatory Cooperation

E.O. 13609, Promoting International Regulatory Cooperation, promotes international regulatory cooperation to (1) meet shared challenges involving health, safety, labor, security, environmental, and other issues and to reduce, eliminate, or (2) prevent unnecessary differences in regulatory requirements.^[32] FAA has analyzed this action under the policies and agency responsibilities of E.O. 13609 and has determined this action would have no effect on international regulatory cooperation.

E. E.O. 14192, Unleashing Prosperity Through Deregulation

This proposed rule is not expected to be an E.O. 14192 regulatory action because this proposed rule is not significant under E.O. 12866.^[33]

VI. Additional Information

A. Comments Invited

FAA invites interested persons to participate in this rulemaking by submitting written comments, data, or views. FAA also invites comments relating to the economic, environmental, energy, or federalism impacts that might result from adopting the proposals in this document. The most helpful comments reference a specific portion of the proposal, explain the reason for any recommended change, and include supporting data. To ensure the docket does not contain duplicate comments, commenters should submit only one time if comments are filed electronically, or commenters should send only one copy of written comments if comments are filed in writing.

FAA will file in the docket all comments it receives, as well as a report summarizing each substantive public contact with FAA personnel concerning this proposed rule. Before finalizing this proposed rule, FAA will consider all comments it receives on or before the closing date for comments. FAA may change this proposed rule in light of the comments received.

Privacy: In accordance with 5 U.S.C. 553(c), FAA solicits comments from the public to inform its rulemaking process better. FAA posts these comments, without edit, including any personal information the commenter provides, to www.regulations.gov, as described in the system of records notice (DOT/ALL-14 FDMS), which can be reviewed at www.dot.gov/​privacy.

B. Confidential Business Information

Confidential Business Information (CBI) is commercial or financial information that is both customarily and actually treated as private by its owner. Under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) (5 U.S.C. 552), CBI is exempt from public disclosure. If your comments responsive to this proposed rule contain commercial or financial information that is customarily treated as private, that you actually treat as private, and is relevant or responsive to this proposed rule, it is important you clearly designate the submitted comments as CBI. Please mark each page of your submission containing CBI as “PROPIN.” FAA will treat such marked submissions as confidential under the FOIA, and they will not be placed in the public docket of this proposed rule. Submissions containing CBI should be sent to the person in the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT section of this document. Any commentary FAA receives that is not specifically designated as CBI will be placed in the public docket for this rulemaking.

C. Electronic Access and Filing

A copy of this proposed rule, all comments received, and all background material may be viewed online at www.regulations.gov using the docket number listed above. Electronic retrieval help and guidelines are available on the website. It is available 24 hours each day, 365 days each year. An electronic copy of this document may also be downloaded from the Office of the Federal Register's website at www.federalregister.gov and the Government Publishing Office's website at www.govinfo.gov. A copy may also be found at FAA's Regulations and Policies website at www.faa.gov/​regulations_​policies.

Copies may also be obtained by sending a request to the Federal Aviation Administration, Office of Rulemaking, ARM-1, 800 Independence Avenue SW, Washington, DC 20591, or by calling (202) 267-9677. Commenters must identify the docket or amendment number of this rulemaking.

All documents FAA considered in developing this proposed rule, including economic analyses and technical reports, may be accessed in the electronic docket for this rulemaking.

D. Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act

The Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act (SBREFA) of 1996 requires FAA to comply with small entity requests for information or advice about compliance with statutes and regulations within its jurisdiction. A small entity with questions regarding this document may contact its local FAA official or the person listed under the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT heading at the beginning of the preamble. To find out more about SBREFA on the internet, visit www.faa.gov/​regulations_​policies/​rulemaking/​sbre_​act/​.

The Proposed Rule

For reasons discussed in the preamble, the Federal Aviation Administration proposes to amend chapter I of title 14, Code of Federal Regulations, as follows:

1. The authority citation for part 93 continues to read as follows:

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(f), 40103, 40106, 40109, 40113, 44502, 44514, 44701, 44715, 44719, 46301.

2. Add subpart I to part 93 to read as follows:

91 FR 56380