SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Background

Generally, under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. 1101 et. seq., aliens seeking admission to the United States, including nonimmigrants visiting temporarily for business or pleasure, must obtain a visa before traveling to the United States. See section 212(a)(7)(B)(i) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(7)(B)(i). In 2008, Congress enacted the Consolidated Natural Resources Act of 2008 (CNRA), Public Law 110-229, 122 Stat. 754, which generally applied the INA, including the standard visa requirements, to Guam and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI). See48 U.S.C. 1806(a); sections 212 and 214 of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1182 and 1184. Under the standard visa application process, nonimmigrant visitors must complete an application, submit fingerprints and certain biometrics, and participate in an interview at a U.S. Consulate or Embassy, subject to certain exceptions. See section 222 of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1202; 8 CFR 103.2; 22 CFR part 42.

As a part of the CNRA, however, Congress also authorized the creation of a specific visa waiver program for travel specific to Guam and the CNMI.^[1] Section 212(l) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1182(l), as amended by the CNRA, sets forth the general parameters of this specific visa waiver authority. The ( printed page 67596) statute authorizes the Secretary of Homeland Security (the Secretary), in consultation with the Secretary of the Interior and the Secretary of State, to designate countries whose nationals can seek admission to Guam or the CNMI as nonimmigrant visitors for business or pleasure for a period up to 45 days without first obtaining a nonimmigrant visa if certain conditions are met. See section 212(l)(1) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1182(l)(1). The statute also provides for a consultation process that allows the Governors of Guam and the CNMI to request that certain countries be added to the list of countries whose nationals are eligible for admission without a visa. See section 212(l)(6) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1182(l)(6).

Importantly, section 212(l)(5) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1182(l)(5), directs the Secretary to monitor the admission of nonimmigrant visitors admitted under the Guam-CNMI Visa Waiver Program (G-CNMI VWP), and mandates suspension of participation, on a country-by-country basis, if admissions lead to an unacceptable number of visitors from a country remaining unlawfully in Guam or the CNMI, unlawfully obtaining entry to other parts of the United States or seeking asylum or withholding of removal, or such visitors pose a risk to U.S. security, law enforcement, or immigration enforcement interests. Additionally, the statute further authorizes the Secretary to suspend the program at any time, on a country-by-country basis, for other good cause. See section 212(l)(5) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1182(l)(5). And it also provides that the Secretary, after consultation with the Secretary of the Interior and the Secretary of State, may discontinue the G-CNMI VWP on a country-by-country basis entirely after considering relevant factors. See section 212(l)(3), (4) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1182(l)(3), (4).

As required by statute, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has issued a series of regulations and regulatory actions to create and implement the G-CNMI VWP and the above discussed statutory framework. See section 212(l)(3), 8 U.S.C. 1182(l)(3) (directing DHS to issue “all necessary regulations” to implement the G-CNMI visa waiver authority); 8 CFR 212.1(q), (r). In January 2009, DHS issued an interim final rule (IFR) amending DHS regulations to, among other things, set forth the requirements and procedures for an authorized country's nationals to participate in G-CNMI VWP. See74 FR 2824 (Jan. 16, 2009) (2009 IFR). The 2009 IFR also codified in DHS's regulations the Secretary's authority to suspend or terminate that participation on a country-by-country basis. See74 FR 2825-29.

At the time, the 2009 IFR announced the Secretary's determination, after appropriate consultations, that the nationals of several countries were eligible for participation in the G-CNMI VWP. 74 FR 2827; see also8 CFR 212.1(q)(2)(ii). DHS determined that PRC nationals would not be eligible to participate in the G-CNMI VWP due to political and security concerns. 74 FR 2826-27. However, in recognition of the economic significance of visitors from the PRC to the CNMI, the then-Secretary also announced that U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) would favorably consider eligible PRC nationals for parole into the United States, on a case-by-case basis, pursuant to INA 212(d)(5), 8 U.S.C. 1182(d)(5), rather than requiring these individuals to obtain nonimmigrant visas. See89 FR 3299, 3302.

In 2024, DHS published an IFR updating the G-CNMI-VWP, requiring, among other things, that nationals from authorized countries must seek electronic travel authorization under the G-CNMI VWP, and creating a restricted sub-program for PRC nationals seeking visa-exempt travel to the CNMI only. 89 FR 3299 (Jan. 18, 2024) (2024 IFR). This sub-program is known as the CNMI EVS-TAP. EVS-TAP regulations, codified at 8 CFR 212.1(r), were developed following consultations between the Federal Government of the United States and the Government of the CNMI, and were structured to balance the importance of the PRC tourism industry to the CNMI with national security, public safety, and immigration concerns related to PRC nationals traveling visa-exempt to the CNMI. See89 FR 3302-3304, 3306. To that end, EVS-TAP regulations include additional restrictions that do not currently pertain to the rest of the G-CNMI VWP. For example, under EVS-TAP, travel authorizations are granted for a period of one year; travelers from the PRC are allowed to enter only the CNMI without a visa, are not permitted to enter Guam, the mainland, or any other U.S. location, and are generally authorized to remain in the CNMI for a maximum of 14 days per visit. See8 CFR 212.1(r)(2), (9). In creating this regulatory program, DHS also explicitly preserved the Secretary's broad statutory authority in section 212(l)(5) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1182(l)(5), to suspend EVS-TAP. The applicable DHS regulation, 8 CFR 212.1(r)(3)(i), authorizes the Secretary to suspend EVS-TAP for good cause, including where the admission of PRC national visitors to the CNMI under EVS-TAP creates unacceptable risks to U.S. security interests, law enforcement, or immigration interests.

At the time these programs were established, to fully integrate the two automated systems in an efficient and cost-effective manner, DHS determined that EVS-TAP should be implemented after the system for G-CNMI VWP automation became fully operational. See89 FR 3303, 3310 and 8 CFR 212.1(r)(11). The G-CNMI VWP automation became fully operational in November 2024 after a transition period provided by the IFR. See90 FR 658, 659 (Jan. 6, 2025). On January 6, 2025, DHS published the required notice in the Federal Register , 90 FR 658, announcing implementation of EVS-TAP with an effective date of February 20, 2025.^[2] Concurrently, the previous parole policy for PRC nationals seeking to enter the CNMI was discontinued on February 20, 2025. See id.

Suspension of EVS-TAP

After careful consideration, and consistent with the authorities provided under section 212(l)(5) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1182(l)(5), and the CNRA, as well as the DHS regulations at 8 CFR 212.1(r) establishing EVS-TAP and giving the Secretary broad authority to suspend the program, see8 CFR 212.1(r)(3), the Secretary has determined there is good cause to suspend the EVS-TAP. This suspension is effective at 1400 EDT on October 30, 2026 for potential new applicants to EVS-TAP as well as previously approved travelers with an existing EVS-TAP travel authorization.^[3] PRC nationals already admitted under EVS-TAP and legally present in the CNMI on the effective date of this notice will be permitted to remain for their current authorized period of stay, however, these travelers will need to ( printed page 67597) obtain a visa for any future travel to the CNMI.

The Secretary has found good cause for the suspension because the United States is facing evolving and sophisticated threats which, combined with a significant number of PRC nationals entering the CNMI under EVS-TAP, creates a significant risk to the security and law enforcement interests of the United States. In Fiscal Year (FY) 2025, more than 3,000 PRC nationals utilized EVS-TAP to enter the CNMI under the streamlined travel authorization process.^[4] These PRC nationals are vetted through CBP instead of by a State Department consular officer. While the program was intended to facilitate economic travel and enhance security over the prior parole policy, this volume of visa-exempt entries presents unacceptable security and law enforcement risks. DHS judges that PRC nationals are almost certainly exploiting EVS-TAP. Prior incidents involving PRC nationals who used the former parole process or other streamlined travel to the CNMI demonstrate an enduring vulnerability involving unauthorized onward travel and activity near sensitive military installations. EVS-TAP continued to permit travel without the additional screening associated with a nonimmigrant visa and therefore did not eliminate this underlying vulnerability.

One significant national security concern is that EVS-TAP may be exploited to facilitate PRC espionage and intelligence collection directed against sensitive U.S. defense infrastructure in the region. The Indo-Pacific region and the security of Guam and the CNMI are of vital strategic importance to the United States. In the CNMI, the Department of War (DOW) is restoring the Tinian Air Base to support U.S. military strategic interests in the Indo-Pacific. Additionally, neighboring Guam is also home to several DOW military installations critical to homeland defense and U.S. military interests. Despite the strict regulatory prohibition against PRC nationals traveling beyond the CNMI, PRC nationals have the ability to illegally travel from the CNMI to Guam aboard smuggling vessels.

For example, prior to the implementation of EVS-TAP, in March 2024, the United States Attorney for the Districts of Guam and the Northern Mariana Islands, announced sentencing of a PRC national for conspiring to transport illegal aliens. In this case, the PRC national smuggler was engaged in smuggling nine other PRC nationals from CNMI to Guam.^[5] Similarly, in February 2025, the United States Attorney for the Districts of Guam and the Northern Mariana Islands in Saipan and Guam announced sentencing of a PRC national who had engaged in conspiracy to transport illegal aliens, by smuggling seven other PRC nationals from CNMI to Guam. Most of these PRC nationals were later encountered in or near sensitive military installations. As the United States Attorney at the time stated, these aliens “took advantage of unique federal immigration regulations that permit certain foreign nationals to visit the CNMI as tourists. Any local economic benefits from these provisions are lost when those persons later attempt to unlawfully enter another part of the United States” and linger around sensitive military installations.^[6] DHS believes that circumventing onward travel restrictions, potentially exposing critical U.S. military installations, present unacceptable risks to U.S. national security interests, which DHS must take action to prevent.

In addition to espionage, EVS-TAP may create immigration enforcement challenges by aliens who seek to exploit EVS-TAP to engage in birth tourism and secure U.S. citizenship for children with no lasting ties to the United States. While birth tourism has long been an issue in the CNMI, the availability of visa-exempt travel and reduced vetting under EVS-TAP may lower barriers to this practice. Birth tourism can strain medical infrastructure in the CNMI and harm local citizens. Additionally, birth tourism may also be utilized to facilitate long-term intelligence or espionage activities. Suspending EVS-TAP allows DHS to evaluate measures to mitigate this threat.

Furthermore, the CNMI's history of PRC-linked criminal activity demonstrates the risks that must be considered when assessing streamlined, visa-exempt travel under EVS-TAP. The CNMI has previously experienced criminal activity, including significant money laundering and labor abuses from enterprises operated by PRC-linked entities, most notably the development of a casino gaming operation in Saipan. While a permanent casino was under construction, a PRC company opened a temporary casino that was linked to money laundering and labor abuses. This temporary facility, located in a former shopping mall, reported more than $2 billion monthly in VIP bets, rivaling Macau.^[7] Meanwhile, the construction of the permanent facility was plagued by labor violations resulting in millions of dollars in fines. The executives of the operating company were eventually indicted on Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act charges.^[8] Yet, open-source reporting indicates that individuals linked to the prior operators have since purchased and resumed construction on the permanent casino.^[9] Given these developments, DHS believes that facilitating visa-exempt access to the CNMI for PRC nationals contributes to an unacceptable risk of fueling organized criminal networks, financial crimes, and labor abuses in the CNMI.

Consideration of Potential Reliance Interests

Section 212(l)(5) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1182(l)(5), and 8 CFR 212.1(r)(3)(i) authorize suspension for good cause based on risks to national security, law enforcement, and immigration enforcement. These provisions do not require the Secretary to balance national security or law enforcement interests, including immigration, against any economic or other reliance interests that may be impacted by a suspension. Rather, the statute and regulation commit the evaluation of good cause to the broad and sole discretion of the Secretary, focusing squarely on whether the admission of PRC nationals threatens the security and law enforcement interests of the United States and its territories, including the CNMI.

Although the suspension standard does not prescribe a separate economic balancing test, the Secretary has considered the potential reliance interests of CNMI businesses and affected travelers. DHS acknowledges that certain businesses in the CNMI may have developed business plans based on tourism and commercial travel from EVS-TAP or the prior parole policy that ( printed page 67598) EVS-TAP replaced. Similarly, DHS recognizes that prospective travelers from the PRC may be inconvenienced or face financial loss from this suspension and revocation of travel authorizations. DHS believes, however, that any such impacts are mitigated by the fact that bona fide visitors for business or pleasure from the PRC remain able to obtain a nonimmigrant visa to travel to the CNMI. See8 CFR 212.1(r)(9)(vi)(B). In any event, DHS has determined that the identified acute risks to the national security, immigration, and law enforcement interests of the United States outweigh any countervailing personal or economic interests.

Notice of Suspension of EVS-TAP

For the above discussed reasons, and in accordance with section 212(l)(5) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1182(l)(5), and 8 CFR 212.1(r)(3), the Secretary is suspending EVS-TAP, which includes both future applicants for EVS-TAP travel authorization as well as any currently active EVS-TAP travel authorizations, except that PRC nationals already admitted under EVS-TAP and legally present in the CNMI on the effective date of this notice will be permitted to remain for their authorized period of stay. This suspension is effective at 1400 EDT on October 30, 2026.

As of 1400 EDT on October 30, 2026, PRC nationals seeking to travel to the CNMI for a temporary visit for business or pleasure must obtain an appropriate nonimmigrant visa before traveling to the CNMI unless another lawful exception applies. This suspension does not reinstate the prior parole policy for PRC nationals seeking to enter the CNMI, which was discontinued on February 20, 2025. See90 FR 658.

91 FR 67595