80 FR 10326 - Special Conditions: Boeing Model 767-2C Series Airplanes; Isolation or Protection of Airplane Electronic-System Security From Unauthorized Internal Access
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration Federal Register Volume 80, Issue 38 (February 26, 2015)
Federal Aviation Administration
Federal Register Volume 80, Issue 38 (February 26, 2015)
| Page Range | 10326-10328 | |
| FR Document | 2015-03969 |
[Federal Register Volume 80, Number 38 (Thursday, February 26, 2015)] [Rules and Regulations] [Pages 10326-10328] From the Federal Register Online [www.thefederalregister.org] [FR Doc No: 2015-03969] ======================================================================= ----------------------------------------------------------------------- DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION Federal Aviation Administration 14 CFR Part 25 [Docket No. FAA-2014-0710; Special Conditions No. 25-574-SC Special Conditions: Boeing Model 767-2C Series Airplanes; Isolation or Protection of Airplane Electronic-System Security From Unauthorized Internal Access AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT. ACTION: Final special conditions; request for comments. ----------------------------------------------------------------------- SUMMARY: These special conditions are issued for Boeing Model 767-2C series [[Page 10327]] airplanes. These airplanes, as modified by The Boeing Company, will have a novel or unusual design feature associated with airplane electronic-system security protection or isolation from unauthorized internal access. The applicable airworthiness regulations do not contain adequate or appropriate safety standards for this design feature. These special conditions contain the additional safety standards that the Administrator considers necessary to establish a level of safety equivalent to that established by the existing airworthiness standards. DATES: This action is effective on The Boeing Company on February 26, 2015. We must receive your comments by April 13, 2015. ADDRESSES: Send comments identified by docket number FAA-2014-0710 using any of the following methods: Federal eRegulations Portal: Go to http://www.regulations.gov/ and follow the online instructions for sending your comments electronically. Mail: Send comments to Docket Operations, M-30, U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT), 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., Room W12-140, West Building Ground Floor, Washington, DC, 20590-0001. Hand Delivery or Courier: Take comments to Docket Operations in Room W12-140 of the West Building Ground Floor at 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, DC, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. Fax: Fax comments to Docket Operations at 202-493-2251. Privacy: The FAA will post all comments it receives, without change, to http://www.regulations.gov/, including any personal information the commenter provides. Using the search function of the docket Web site, anyone can find and read the electronic form of all comments received into any FAA docket, including the name of the individual sending the comment (or signing the comment for an association, business, labor union, etc.). DOT's complete Privacy Act Statement can be found in the Federal Register, published on April 11, 2000 (65 FR 19477-19478), as well as at http://DocketsInfo.dot.gov/. Docket: Background documents or comments received may be read at http://www.regulations.gov/ at any time. Follow the online instructions for accessing the docket or go to Docket Operations in Room W12-140 of the West Building Ground Floor at 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, DC, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Varun Khanna, FAA, Airplane and Flightcrew Interface Branch, ANM-111, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service, 1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, Washington 98057-3356; telephone (425) 227-1298; facsimile (425) 227- 1320. SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The FAA has determined that notice of, and opportunity for prior public comment on, these special conditions is impracticable because these procedures would significantly delay issuance of the design approval and thus delivery of the affected airplane. In addition, the substance of these special conditions has been subject to the public-comment process in several prior instances with no substantive comments received. The FAA therefore finds that good cause exists for making these special conditions effective upon publication in the Federal Register. Comments Invited We invite interested people to take part in this rulemaking by sending written comments, data, or views. The most helpful comments reference a specific portion of the special conditions, explain the reason for any recommended change, and include supporting data. We will consider all comments we receive on or before the closing date for comments. We may change these special conditions based on the comments we receive. Background On January 18, 2010, Boeing applied for an amendment to Type Certificate No. A1NM to include a new Model 767-2CX series airplane, a derivative of the 767-200, which later was renamed 767-2C. Later, Boeing requested, and the FAA approved, an extension to the date of application for FAA amended type certification to December 22, 2010. The Model 767-2C is a freighter airplane equipped with Pratt & Whitney PW4062 engines. This freighter has a maximum takeoff weight of 415,000 pounds and can be configured to carry up to 11 supernumeraries (see Exemption No. 10691). Type-Certification Basis The regulations listed in the type certificate are commonly referred to as the ``original type-certification basis.'' The regulations to be listed in A1NM are as follows: Under the provisions of Title 14, Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR) 21.101, Boeing must show that the Boeing Model 767-2C series airplane meets the applicable provisions of part 25, as amended by Amendments 25-1 through 25-130, and 14 CFR 25.1316 at Amendment 25-134, except for earlier amendments as agreed upon by the FAA. These regulations will be listed in Type Certificate No. A1NM after type- certification approval of the 767-2C. 14 CFR part 26 as amended by Amendments 26-1 through 26-6, and any later amendments in existence at the time of certification per 14 CFR 26.5. For any future part 26 Amendments, the holder of this type certificate must demonstrate compliance with the applicable sections. 14 CFR part 34 as amended by Amendments 34-1 through 34-5A, and any later amendments in existence at the time of certification. 14 CFR part 36 as amended by Amendments 36-1 through 36-29, and any later amendments in existence at the time of certification. The certification basis also includes certain special conditions, exemptions, or later amended sections of the applicable part that are not relevant to these special conditions. If the Administrator finds that the applicable airworthiness regulations (i.e., 14 CFR part 25) do not contain adequate or appropriate safety standards for the Model 767-2C series airplane because of a novel or unusual design feature, special conditions are prescribed under Sec. 21.16. Special conditions are initially applicable to the model for which they are issued. Should the type certificate for that model be amended later to include any other model that incorporates the same novel or unusual design feature, or should any other model already included on the same type certificate be modified to incorporate the same novel or unusual design feature, these special conditions would also apply to the other model under Sec. 21.101. In addition to the applicable airworthiness regulations and special conditions, the Model 767-2C series airplane must comply with the fuel- vent and exhaust-emission requirements of 14 CFR part 34, and the noise-certification requirements of 14 CFR part 36. The FAA must issue a finding of regulatory adequacy under Sec. 611 of Public Law 92-574, the ``Noise Control Act of 1972.'' The FAA issues special conditions, as defined in 14 CFR 11.19, under Sec. 11.38, and they become part of the type-certification basis under Sec. 21.101. Novel or Unusual Design Feature The Boeing Model 767-2C series airplane will incorporate the following novel or unusual design feature: [[Page 10328]] The electronic-system network architecture for the Model 767-2C series airplane introduces potential security risks and vulnerabilities not addressed in current regulations and airplane-level or system-level safety-assessment methods. This network architecture allows connection to previously isolated data networks connected to systems that perform functions required for the safe operation of the airplane. This data network and design integration may result in security vulnerabilities from intentional or unintentional internal-connection corruption of data and systems critical to the safety and maintenance of the airplane. Discussion The Boeing Model 767-2C series airplane design introduces the potential for unauthorized persons to access, from internal connection, airplane-control domain and operator-information-services domain in the passenger-services domain. The Model 767-2C design further introduces the potential for security vulnerabilities related to the introduction of viruses, worms, user mistakes, and intentional sabotage of airplane networks, systems, and databases. As such, these special conditions address these vulnerabilities. The digital systems architecture for the Boeing Model 767-2C series airplanes is composed of several connected networks. This network architecture is used for a diverse set of functions, including: 1. Flight-safety related control and navigation systems, 2. operator business and administrative support, and 3. passenger entertainment. The existing regulations and guidance material did not anticipate this type of system architecture or electronic access to airplane systems. Furthermore, regulations, and current system safety-assessment policy and techniques, do not address potential security vulnerabilities, which could be caused by unauthorized access to airplane data buses and servers. These special conditions are meant to ensure that security, integrity, and availability of airplane systems are not compromised by certain wired or wireless electronic connections between airplane data busses and networks. Special conditions have been applied on past airplane programs to require consideration of related security vulnerabilities. These special conditions are similar to those previously applied, except that the scope has been adjusted to be consistent with those features unique to the Model 767-2C series airplane. Applicability As discussed above, these special conditions apply to Boeing Model 767-2C series airplanes. Should Boeing apply later for a change to the type certificate to include another model incorporating the same novel or unusual design feature, the special conditions would apply to that model as well. Conclusion This action affects only certain novel or unusual design features on one model series of airplane. It is not a rule of general applicability. The substance of these special conditions has been subjected to the notice and comment period in several prior instances, and has been derived without substantive change from those previously issued. It is unlikely that prior public comment would result in a significant change from the substance contained herein. Therefore, because a delay would significantly affect the certification of the airplane, the FAA has determined that prior public notice and comment are unnecessary and impracticable, and good cause exists for adopting these special conditions upon publication in the Federal Register. The FAA is requesting comments to allow interested persons to submit views that may not have been submitted in response to the prior opportunities for comment described above. List of Subjects in 14 CFR part 25 Aircraft, Aviation safety, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements. The authority citation for these special conditions is as follows: Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701, 44702, 44704. The Special Conditions Accordingly, pursuant to the authority delegated to me by the Administrator, the following special conditions are issued as part of the type-certification basis for Boeing Model 767-2C series airplanes. 1. The applicant must ensure that the design provides isolation from, or airplane electronic-system security protection against, access by unauthorized sources internal to the airplane. The design must prevent inadvertent and malicious changes to, and all adverse impacts upon, airplane equipment, systems, networks, or other assets required for safe flight and operations. 2. The applicant must establish appropriate procedures to allow the operator to ensure that continued airworthiness of the airplane is maintained, including all post-type-certification modifications that may have an impact on the approved electronic-system security safeguards. Issued in Renton, Washington, on February 19, 2015. John J. Piccola, Jr., Acting Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service. [FR Doc. 2015-03969 Filed 2-25-15; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 4910-13-P
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who are not senior officers and who our proposed rule in their comment PART 620—DISCLOSURE TO
would not otherwise be considered letters. Furthermore, they expressed that SHAREHOLDERS
‘‘highly compensated employees’’ but our proposal improves the disclosure
for payments related to or change(s) in language and aligns it with the intended ■ 1. The authority citation for part 620
the value of the employee’s qualified purpose. The FCB also offered two continues to read as follows:
pension plan. Also, the qualified plan constructive suggestions. The first Authority: Secs. 4.3, 4.3A, 4.19, 5.9, 5.19
must have been available to all suggestion was to allow System of the Farm Credit Act (12 U.S.C. 2154,
employees on the same basis at the time institutions affected by our proposed 2154a, 2207, 2243, 2252, 2254); sec. 424 of
the employee joined the plan. Thus, the rule to disclose in a note to the Table Pub. L. 100–233, 101 Stat. 1568, 1656, sec.
proposed rule did not seek to change the 514 of Pub. L. 102–552, 106 Stat. 4102.
that the calculation formula changed
current reporting requirement regarding and describe the reason for the change ■ 2. Section 620.6(c)(2)(i) is revised to
payments such as those concerning the and its effects. Also, because data is read as follows:
ICBA. Rather, if any such payout to the
reported in the Table for 3 years, the
employee or change(s) in value to their § 620.6 Disclosures in the annual report to
FCB’s second suggestion was that each shareholders relating to directors and
plan is due to a benefit plan that is not
System institution be allowed to choose senior officers.
a qualified plan and the plan was not
offered to all employees on the same the method of compliance that works * * * * *
basis when the employee joined the best for that institution’s situation. We (c) * * *
plan, then the payout or change(s) in agree with the suggestion regarding (2) * * *
value would be included in determining explanatory notes, but do not believe a (i) If applicable, when any employee
whether the employee’s compensation change to our proposal is necessary. who is not a senior officer has annual
reached the five highest paid threshold. Such disclosure is not prohibited so compensation at a level that is among
Thus, we believe that the proposed rule long as the disclosure is not misleading, the five highest paid by the institution
increases the effectiveness and incomplete or inaccurate. Whether a during the reporting period, include the
transparency of the disclosure and System institution opts to restate one or highly compensated employee(s) in the
better achieves the original intent of the all of the prior years’ disclosures or to aggregate number and amount of
rule, which we did not change. report the data prospectively beginning compensation reported in the
The ICBA also expressed concern that for fiscal year ending 2015, we would Compensation Table. However, exclude
large one-time lump sum payments expect that any change in the method of any such employee from the
made to numerous employees at the calculations versus prior years’ Compensation Table if the employee
same time from a qualified pension plan disclosures be described in a footnote to would be considered highly
that was available to all employees on the Table to the extent needed so that compensated solely because of
the same basis at the time they joined the reported data will not be misleading payments related to or change(s) in
the plan could represent significant cash or incomplete. Therefore, we agree with value of the employee’s qualified
outlays for the institution during a the FCB’s suggestion to the extent that pension plan provided that the plan was
reporting period. The ICBA believes that the 3-year reporting period raises issues available to all similarly situated
System institution owners should be for affected institutions, but we do not employees on the same basis at the time
made aware of these payouts. We agree believe that a change to the regulation the employee joined the plan.
with the ICBA and would expect that language is necessary. We have * * * * *
such payouts be included in the addressed this issue in the compliance
financial statements or notes thereto or Dated: February 19, 2015.
date information.
discussed in the management’s Mary Alice Donner,
discussion and analysis section of the IV. Regulatory Flexibility Act Acting Secretary, Farm Credit Administration
annual report if material to the Board.
institution’s financial condition and Pursuant to section 605(b) of the [FR Doc. 2015–04023 Filed 2–25–15; 8:45 am]
results of operations. As discussed Regulatory Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C. 601 BILLING CODE 6705–01–P
above, the intent of this specific et seq.), the FCA hereby certifies that the
disclosure item was not and is not to final rule would not have a significant
include such payments in the economic impact on a substantial DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
calculation of the top five highest paid number of small entities. Each of the
employees. banks in the Farm Credit System, Federal Aviation Administration
In its comment letter, the ICBA also considered together with its affiliated
makes a number of recommendations, associations, has assets and annual 14 CFR Part 25
such as to disclose all employees’ income in excess of the amounts that
[Docket No. FAA–2014–0710; Special
compensation if that compensation would qualify them as small entities.
Conditions No. 25–574–SC
exceeds the average income of the Therefore, Farm Credit System
citizens in the surrounding geographic institutions are not ‘‘small entities’’ as Special Conditions: Boeing Model 767–
area, or to disclose the compensation for defined in the Regulatory Flexibility 2C Series Airplanes; Isolation or
the twenty-five (25) highest paid Act. Protection of Airplane Electronic-
employees for larger System System Security From Unauthorized
institutions. We believe these List of Subjects in 12 CFR Part 620
Internal Access
recommendations go beyond the scope Accounting, Agriculture, Banks,
rmajette on DSK2VPTVN1PROD with RULES
of the proposed rule and cannot be AGENCY: Federal Aviation
banking, Reporting and recordkeeping
addressed in this rulemaking. Administration (FAA), DOT.
requirements, Rural areas.
ACTION: Final special conditions; request
B. Explanatory Notes and Method of For the reasons stated in the
Compliance for comments.
preamble, part 620 of chapter VI, title 12
The FCB, the Farm Credit Council, of the Code of Federal Regulations is SUMMARY: These special conditions are
and the System association supported amended as follows: issued for Boeing Model 767–2C series
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The electronic-system network unique to the Model 767–2C series airworthiness of the airplane is
architecture for the Model 767–2C series airplane. maintained, including all post-type-
airplane introduces potential security certification modifications that may
Applicability
risks and vulnerabilities not addressed have an impact on the approved
in current regulations and airplane-level As discussed above, these special electronic-system security safeguards.
or system-level safety-assessment conditions apply to Boeing Model 767–
Issued in Renton, Washington, on February
methods. 2C series airplanes. Should Boeing 19, 2015.
This network architecture allows apply later for a change to the type
John J. Piccola, Jr.,
connection to previously isolated data certificate to include another model
incorporating the same novel or unusual Acting Manager, Transport Airplane
networks connected to systems that Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service.
perform functions required for the safe design feature, the special conditions
[FR Doc. 2015–03969 Filed 2–25–15; 8:45 am]
operation of the airplane. This data would apply to that model as well.
BILLING CODE 4910–13–P
network and design integration may Conclusion
result in security vulnerabilities from
intentional or unintentional internal- This action affects only certain novel
or unusual design features on one model DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
connection corruption of data and
systems critical to the safety and series of airplane. It is not a rule of
Federal Aviation Administration
maintenance of the airplane. general applicability.
The substance of these special
Discussion conditions has been subjected to the 14 CFR Part 25
notice and comment period in several [Docket No. FAA–2014–0711; Special
The Boeing Model 767–2C series
prior instances, and has been derived Conditions No. 25–575–SC]
airplane design introduces the potential
without substantive change from those
for unauthorized persons to access, from Special Conditions: Boeing Model 767–
previously issued. It is unlikely that
internal connection, airplane-control 2C Series Airplanes; Airplane
prior public comment would result in a
domain and operator-information- Electronic-System Security Protection
significant change from the substance
services domain in the passenger- From Unauthorized External Access
contained herein. Therefore, because a
services domain. The Model 767–2C
delay would significantly affect the AGENCY: Federal Aviation
design further introduces the potential
certification of the airplane, the FAA Administration (FAA), DOT.
for security vulnerabilities related to the
has determined that prior public notice
introduction of viruses, worms, user ACTION: Final special conditions; request
and comment are unnecessary and
mistakes, and intentional sabotage of for comments.
impracticable, and good cause exists for
airplane networks, systems, and
adopting these special conditions upon SUMMARY: These special conditions are
databases. As such, these special
publication in the Federal Register. issued for Boeing Model 767–2C series
conditions address these vulnerabilities.
The FAA is requesting comments to airplanes. These airplanes, as modified
The digital systems architecture for allow interested persons to submit
the Boeing Model 767–2C series by The Boeing Company, will have a
views that may not have been submitted novel or unusual design feature
airplanes is composed of several in response to the prior opportunities
connected networks. This network associated with airplane electronic-
for comment described above. system security protection or isolation
architecture is used for a diverse set of
functions, including: List of Subjects in 14 CFR part 25 from unauthorized external access. The
1. Flight-safety related control and Aircraft, Aviation safety, Reporting applicable airworthiness regulations do
navigation systems, and recordkeeping requirements. not contain adequate or appropriate
2. operator business and safety standards for this design feature.
The authority citation for these These special conditions contain the
administrative support, and special conditions is as follows:
3. passenger entertainment. additional safety standards that the
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701, Administrator considers necessary to
The existing regulations and guidance 44702, 44704.
material did not anticipate this type of establish a level of safety equivalent to
system architecture or electronic access The Special Conditions that established by the existing
to airplane systems. Furthermore, airworthiness standards.
Accordingly, pursuant to the
regulations, and current system safety- authority delegated to me by the DATES: This action is effective on The
assessment policy and techniques, do Administrator, the following special Boeing Company on February 26, 2015.
not address potential security conditions are issued as part of the type- We must receive your comments by
vulnerabilities, which could be caused certification basis for Boeing Model April 13, 2015.
by unauthorized access to airplane data 767–2C series airplanes. ADDRESSES: Send comments identified
buses and servers. These special 1. The applicant must ensure that the by docket number FAA–2014–0711
conditions are meant to ensure that design provides isolation from, or using any of the following methods:
security, integrity, and availability of airplane electronic-system security Federal eRegulations Portal: Go to
airplane systems are not compromised protection against, access by http://www.regulations.gov/ and follow
by certain wired or wireless electronic unauthorized sources internal to the the online instructions for sending your
connections between airplane data airplane. The design must prevent comments electronically.
busses and networks. inadvertent and malicious changes to, Mail: Send comments to Docket
Special conditions have been applied Operations, M–30, U.S. Department of
rmajette on DSK2VPTVN1PROD with RULES
and all adverse impacts upon, airplane
on past airplane programs to require equipment, systems, networks, or other Transportation (DOT), 1200 New Jersey
consideration of related security assets required for safe flight and Avenue SE., Room W12–140, West
vulnerabilities. These special conditions operations. Building Ground Floor, Washington, DC
are similar to those previously applied, 2. The applicant must establish 20590–0001.
except that the scope has been adjusted appropriate procedures to allow the Hand Delivery or Courier: Take
to be consistent with those features operator to ensure that continued comments to Docket Operations in
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Document Created: 2015-12-18 13:05:00
Document Modified: 2015-12-18 13:05:00
| Category | Regulatory Information | |
| Collection | Federal Register | |
| sudoc Class | AE 2.7: GS 4.107: AE 2.106: | |
| Publisher | Office of the Federal Register, National Archives and Records Administration | |
| Section | Rules and Regulations | |
| Action | Final special conditions; request for comments. | |
| Dates | This action is effective on The Boeing Company on February 26, 2015. We must receive your comments by April 13, 2015. | |
| Contact | Varun Khanna, FAA, Airplane and Flightcrew Interface Branch, ANM-111, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service, 1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, Washington 98057-3356; telephone (425) 227-1298; facsimile (425) 227- 1320. | |
| FR Citation | 80 FR 10326 | |
| CFR Associated | Aircraft; Aviation Safety and Reporting and Recordkeeping Requirements |
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