80 FR 10328 - Special Conditions: Boeing Model 767-2C Series Airplanes; Airplane Electronic-System Security Protection From Unauthorized External Access
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration Federal Register Volume 80, Issue 38 (February 26, 2015)
Federal Aviation Administration
Federal Register Volume 80, Issue 38 (February 26, 2015)
| Page Range | 10328-10330 | |
| FR Document | 2015-03970 |
[Federal Register Volume 80, Number 38 (Thursday, February 26, 2015)] [Rules and Regulations] [Pages 10328-10330] From the Federal Register Online [www.thefederalregister.org] [FR Doc No: 2015-03970] ----------------------------------------------------------------------- DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION Federal Aviation Administration 14 CFR Part 25 [Docket No. FAA-2014-0711; Special Conditions No. 25-575-SC] Special Conditions: Boeing Model 767-2C Series Airplanes; Airplane Electronic-System Security Protection From Unauthorized External Access AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT. ACTION: Final special conditions; request for comments. ----------------------------------------------------------------------- SUMMARY: These special conditions are issued for Boeing Model 767-2C series airplanes. These airplanes, as modified by The Boeing Company, will have a novel or unusual design feature associated with airplane electronic-system security protection or isolation from unauthorized external access. The applicable airworthiness regulations do not contain adequate or appropriate safety standards for this design feature. These special conditions contain the additional safety standards that the Administrator considers necessary to establish a level of safety equivalent to that established by the existing airworthiness standards. DATES: This action is effective on The Boeing Company on February 26, 2015. We must receive your comments by April 13, 2015. ADDRESSES: Send comments identified by docket number FAA-2014-0711 using any of the following methods: Federal eRegulations Portal: Go to http://www.regulations.gov/ and follow the online instructions for sending your comments electronically. Mail: Send comments to Docket Operations, M-30, U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT), 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., Room W12-140, West Building Ground Floor, Washington, DC 20590-0001. Hand Delivery or Courier: Take comments to Docket Operations in [[Page 10329]] Room W12-140 of the West Building Ground Floor at 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, DC between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. Fax: Fax comments to Docket Operations at 202-493-2251. Privacy: The FAA will post all comments it receives, without change, to http://www.regulations.gov/, including any personal information the commenter provides. Using the search function of the docket Web site, anyone can find and read the electronic form of all comments received into any FAA docket, including the name of the individual sending the comment (or signing the comment for an association, business, labor union, etc.). DOT's complete Privacy Act Statement can be found in the Federal Register, published on April 11, 2000 (65 FR 19477-19478), as well as at http://DocketsInfo.dot.gov/. Docket: Background documents or comments received may be read at http://www.regulations.gov/ at any time. Follow the online instructions for accessing the docket or go to Docket Operations in Room W12-140 of the West Building Ground Floor at 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, DC, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Varun Khanna, FAA, Airplane and Flightcrew Interface Branch, ANM-111, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service, 1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, Washington 98057-3356; telephone (425) 227-1298; facsimile (425) 227- 1320. SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The FAA has determined that notice of, and opportunity for prior public comment on, these special conditions is impracticable because these procedures would significantly delay issuance of the design approval and thus delivery of the affected airplane. In addition, the substance of these special conditions has been subject to the public-comment process in several prior instances with no substantive comments received. The FAA therefore finds that good cause exists for making these special conditions effective upon publication in the Federal Register. Comments Invited We invite interested people to take part in this rulemaking by sending written comments, data, or views. The most helpful comments reference a specific portion of the special conditions, explain the reason for any recommended change, and include supporting data. We will consider all comments we receive on or before the closing date for comments. We may change these special conditions based on the comments we receive. Background On January 18, 2010, Boeing applied for an amendment to Type Certificate No. A1NM to include a new Model 767-2CX series airplane, a derivative of the 767-200, which later was renamed 767-2C. Later, Boeing requested, and the FAA approved, an extension to the date of application for FAA amended type certification to December 22, 2010. The Model 767-2C is a freighter airplane equipped with Pratt & Whitney PW4062 engines. This freighter has a maximum takeoff weight of 415,000 pounds and can be configured to carry up to 11 supernumeraries (see Exemption No. 10691). Type-Certification Basis The regulations listed in the type certificate are commonly referred to as the ``original type-certification basis.'' The regulations to be listed in A1NM are as follows: Under the provisions of Title 14, Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR) 21.101, Boeing must show that the Boeing Model 767-2C series airplane meets the applicable provisions of part 25, as amended by Amendments 25-1 through 25-130, and 14 CFR 25.1316 at Amendment 25-134, except for earlier amendments as agreed upon by the FAA. These regulations will be listed in Type Certificate No. A1NM after type- certification approval of the 767-2C. 14 CFR part 26 as amended by Amendments 26-1 through 26-6, and any later amendments in existence at the time of certification per 14 CFR 26.5. For any future part 26 Amendments, the holder of this type certificate must demonstrate compliance with the applicable sections. 14 CFR part 34 as amended by Amendments 34-1 through 34-5A, and any later amendments in existence at the time of certification. 14 CFR part 36 as amended by Amendments 36-1 through 36-29, and any later amendments in existence at the time of certification. The certification basis also includes certain special conditions, exemptions, or later amended sections of the applicable part that are not relevant to these special conditions. If the Administrator finds that the applicable airworthiness regulations (i.e., 14 CFR part 25) do not contain adequate or appropriate safety standards for the Model 767-2C series airplane because of a novel or unusual design feature, special conditions are prescribed under Sec. 21.16. Special conditions are initially applicable to the model for which they are issued. Should the type certificate for that model be amended later to include any other model that incorporates the same novel or unusual design feature, or should any other model already included on the same type certificate be modified to incorporate the same novel or unusual design feature, these special conditions would also apply to the other model under Sec. 21.101. In addition to the applicable airworthiness regulations and special conditions, the Model 767-2C series airplane must comply with the fuel- vent and exhaust-emission requirements of 14 CFR part 34, and the noise-certification requirements of 14 CFR part 36. The FAA must issue a finding of regulatory adequacy under Sec. 611 of Public Law 92-574, the ``Noise Control Act of 1972.'' The FAA issues special conditions, as defined in 14 CFR 11.19, under Sec. 11.38, and they become part of the type-certification basis under Sec. 21.101. Novel or Unusual Design Feature The Boeing Model 767-2C series airplane will incorporate the following novel or unusual design feature: The electronic-system network architecture for the Model 767-2C series airplane introduces potential security risks and vulnerabilities not addressed in current regulations and airplane-level or system-level safety-assessment methods. This network architecture allows connection to airplane electronic systems and networks, and access from airplane external sources (e.g., operator networks, wireless devices, Internet connectivity, service-provider satellite communications, electronic flight bags, etc.), to the previously isolated airplane electronic assets. Airplane electronic assets include electronic equipment and systems, instruments, networks, servers, software and electronic components, field-loadable software and hardware applications, and databases. Discussion The Boeing Model 767-2C series airplane design introduces the potential for unauthorized persons to access airplane-control domain and operator-information-services domain in the passenger-services domain. The 767-2C design further introduces the potential for security vulnerabilities related to the introduction of viruses, worms, user mistakes, and intentional sabotage of airplane networks, systems, and [[Page 10330]] databases. As such, these special conditions address these vulnerabilities. The digital systems architecture for the Boeing Model 767-2C series airplanes is composed of several connected networks. This network architecture is used for a diverse set of functions providing data connectivity between systems, including: 1. Airplane control, communication, display, monitoring and navigation systems, 2. operator business and administrative support systems, 3. passenger entertainment systems, and 4. access by systems external to the airplane. The Model 767-2C series airplane electronic-system network architecture allows connection to airplane electronic systems and networks, and access from airplane external sources (e.g., operator networks, wireless devices, Internet connectivity, service-provider satellite communications, electronic flight bags, etc.) to the previously isolated airplane electronic assets. This design may result in network-security vulnerabilities from intentional or unintentional corruption of data and systems required for the safety, operations, and maintenance of the airplane. The existing regulations and guidance material did not anticipate this type of system architecture, or external wired and wireless electronic access to airplane electronic systems. Furthermore, regulations, and current system safety-assessment policy and techniques, do not address potential security vulnerabilities, which could be caused by unauthorized access to airplane electronic systems and networks. Special conditions have been applied on past airplane programs to require consideration of related security vulnerabilities. These special conditions are similar to those previously applied, except that the scope has been adjusted to be consistent with those features unique to the Model 767-2C series airplane. Applicability As discussed above, these special conditions apply to Boeing Model 767-2C series airplanes. Should Boeing apply later for a change to the type certificate to include another model incorporating the same novel or unusual design feature, the special conditions would apply to that model as well. Conclusion This action affects only certain novel or unusual design features on one model series of airplane. It is not a rule of general applicability. The substance of these special conditions has been subjected to the notice and comment period in several prior instances, and has been derived without substantive change from those previously issued. It is unlikely that prior public comment would result in a significant change from the substance contained herein. Therefore, because a delay would significantly affect the certification of the airplane, the FAA has determined that prior public notice and comment are unnecessary and impracticable, and good cause exists for adopting these special conditions upon publication in the Federal Register. The FAA is requesting comments to allow interested persons to submit views that may not have been submitted in response to the prior opportunities for comment described above. List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 25 Aircraft, Aviation safety, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements. The authority citation for these special conditions is as follows: Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701, 44702, 44704. The Special Conditions Accordingly, pursuant to the authority delegated to me by the Administrator, the following special conditions are issued as part of the type-certification basis for Boeing Model 767-2C series airplanes. 1. The applicant must ensure airplane electronic-system security protection from access by unauthorized sources external to the airplane, including those possibly caused by maintenance activity. 2. The applicant must ensure that electronic-system security threats are identified and assessed, and that effective electronic- system security protection strategies are implemented to protect the airplane from all adverse impacts on safety, functionality, and continued airworthiness. 3. The applicant must establish appropriate procedures to allow the operator to ensure that continued airworthiness of the airplane is maintained, including all post type-certification modifications that may have an impact on the approved electronic-system security safeguards. Issued in Renton, Washington, on February 19, 2015. John J. Piccola, Jr., Acting Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service. [FR Doc. 2015-03970 Filed 2-25-15; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 4910-13-P
![10328 Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 38 / Thursday, February 26, 2015 / Rules and Regulations
The electronic-system network unique to the Model 767–2C series airworthiness of the airplane is
architecture for the Model 767–2C series airplane. maintained, including all post-type-
airplane introduces potential security certification modifications that may
Applicability
risks and vulnerabilities not addressed have an impact on the approved
in current regulations and airplane-level As discussed above, these special electronic-system security safeguards.
or system-level safety-assessment conditions apply to Boeing Model 767–
Issued in Renton, Washington, on February
methods. 2C series airplanes. Should Boeing 19, 2015.
This network architecture allows apply later for a change to the type
John J. Piccola, Jr.,
connection to previously isolated data certificate to include another model
incorporating the same novel or unusual Acting Manager, Transport Airplane
networks connected to systems that Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service.
perform functions required for the safe design feature, the special conditions
[FR Doc. 2015–03969 Filed 2–25–15; 8:45 am]
operation of the airplane. This data would apply to that model as well.
BILLING CODE 4910–13–P
network and design integration may Conclusion
result in security vulnerabilities from
intentional or unintentional internal- This action affects only certain novel
or unusual design features on one model DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
connection corruption of data and
systems critical to the safety and series of airplane. It is not a rule of
Federal Aviation Administration
maintenance of the airplane. general applicability.
The substance of these special
Discussion conditions has been subjected to the 14 CFR Part 25
notice and comment period in several [Docket No. FAA–2014–0711; Special
The Boeing Model 767–2C series
prior instances, and has been derived Conditions No. 25–575–SC]
airplane design introduces the potential
without substantive change from those
for unauthorized persons to access, from Special Conditions: Boeing Model 767–
previously issued. It is unlikely that
internal connection, airplane-control 2C Series Airplanes; Airplane
prior public comment would result in a
domain and operator-information- Electronic-System Security Protection
significant change from the substance
services domain in the passenger- From Unauthorized External Access
contained herein. Therefore, because a
services domain. The Model 767–2C
delay would significantly affect the AGENCY: Federal Aviation
design further introduces the potential
certification of the airplane, the FAA Administration (FAA), DOT.
for security vulnerabilities related to the
has determined that prior public notice
introduction of viruses, worms, user ACTION: Final special conditions; request
and comment are unnecessary and
mistakes, and intentional sabotage of for comments.
impracticable, and good cause exists for
airplane networks, systems, and
adopting these special conditions upon SUMMARY: These special conditions are
databases. As such, these special
publication in the Federal Register. issued for Boeing Model 767–2C series
conditions address these vulnerabilities.
The FAA is requesting comments to airplanes. These airplanes, as modified
The digital systems architecture for allow interested persons to submit
the Boeing Model 767–2C series by The Boeing Company, will have a
views that may not have been submitted novel or unusual design feature
airplanes is composed of several in response to the prior opportunities
connected networks. This network associated with airplane electronic-
for comment described above. system security protection or isolation
architecture is used for a diverse set of
functions, including: List of Subjects in 14 CFR part 25 from unauthorized external access. The
1. Flight-safety related control and Aircraft, Aviation safety, Reporting applicable airworthiness regulations do
navigation systems, and recordkeeping requirements. not contain adequate or appropriate
2. operator business and safety standards for this design feature.
The authority citation for these These special conditions contain the
administrative support, and special conditions is as follows:
3. passenger entertainment. additional safety standards that the
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701, Administrator considers necessary to
The existing regulations and guidance 44702, 44704.
material did not anticipate this type of establish a level of safety equivalent to
system architecture or electronic access The Special Conditions that established by the existing
to airplane systems. Furthermore, airworthiness standards.
Accordingly, pursuant to the
regulations, and current system safety- authority delegated to me by the DATES: This action is effective on The
assessment policy and techniques, do Administrator, the following special Boeing Company on February 26, 2015.
not address potential security conditions are issued as part of the type- We must receive your comments by
vulnerabilities, which could be caused certification basis for Boeing Model April 13, 2015.
by unauthorized access to airplane data 767–2C series airplanes. ADDRESSES: Send comments identified
buses and servers. These special 1. The applicant must ensure that the by docket number FAA–2014–0711
conditions are meant to ensure that design provides isolation from, or using any of the following methods:
security, integrity, and availability of airplane electronic-system security Federal eRegulations Portal: Go to
airplane systems are not compromised protection against, access by http://www.regulations.gov/ and follow
by certain wired or wireless electronic unauthorized sources internal to the the online instructions for sending your
connections between airplane data airplane. The design must prevent comments electronically.
busses and networks. inadvertent and malicious changes to, Mail: Send comments to Docket
Special conditions have been applied Operations, M–30, U.S. Department of
rmajette on DSK2VPTVN1PROD with RULES
and all adverse impacts upon, airplane
on past airplane programs to require equipment, systems, networks, or other Transportation (DOT), 1200 New Jersey
consideration of related security assets required for safe flight and Avenue SE., Room W12–140, West
vulnerabilities. These special conditions operations. Building Ground Floor, Washington, DC
are similar to those previously applied, 2. The applicant must establish 20590–0001.
except that the scope has been adjusted appropriate procedures to allow the Hand Delivery or Courier: Take
to be consistent with those features operator to ensure that continued comments to Docket Operations in
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![10330 Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 38 / Thursday, February 26, 2015 / Rules and Regulations
databases. As such, these special series of airplane. It is not a rule of DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND
conditions address these vulnerabilities. general applicability. HUMAN SERVICES
The digital systems architecture for The substance of these special
the Boeing Model 767–2C series conditions has been subjected to the Food and Drug Administration
airplanes is composed of several notice and comment period in several
connected networks. This network prior instances, and has been derived 21 CFR Part 884
architecture is used for a diverse set of without substantive change from those [Docket No. FDA–2014–M–1957]
functions providing data connectivity previously issued. It is unlikely that
between systems, including: prior public comment would result in a Medical Devices; Obstetrical and
1. Airplane control, communication, significant change from the substance Gynecological Devices; Classification
display, monitoring and navigation contained herein. Therefore, because a of the Assisted Reproduction Embryo
systems, delay would significantly affect the Image Assessment System
2. operator business and certification of the airplane, the FAA
has determined that prior public notice AGENCY: Food and Drug Administration,
administrative support systems, HHS.
3. passenger entertainment systems, and comment are unnecessary and
impracticable, and good cause exists for ACTION: Final order.
and
4. access by systems external to the adopting these special conditions upon SUMMARY: The Food and Drug
airplane. publication in the Federal Register. Administration (FDA) is classifying the
The Model 767–2C series airplane The FAA is requesting comments to Assisted Reproduction Embryo Image
electronic-system network architecture allow interested persons to submit Assessment System into class II (special
allows connection to airplane electronic views that may not have been submitted controls). The special controls that will
systems and networks, and access from in response to the prior opportunities apply to the device are identified in this
airplane external sources (e.g., operator for comment described above. order, and will be part of the codified
networks, wireless devices, Internet List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 25 language for the Assisted Reproduction
connectivity, service-provider satellite Embryo Image Assessment System
Aircraft, Aviation safety, Reporting
communications, electronic flight bags, classification. The Agency is classifying
and recordkeeping requirements.
etc.) to the previously isolated airplane the device into class II (special controls)
electronic assets. The authority citation for these in order to provide a reasonable
This design may result in network- special conditions is as follows: assurance of safety and effectiveness of
security vulnerabilities from intentional Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701, the device.
or unintentional corruption of data and 44702, 44704. DATES: This order is effective February
systems required for the safety, The Special Conditions 26, 2015. The classification was
operations, and maintenance of the applicable June 6, 2014.
airplane. The existing regulations and Accordingly, pursuant to the
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
guidance material did not anticipate this authority delegated to me by the
Michael Bailey, Center for Devices and
type of system architecture, or external Administrator, the following special
Radiological Health, Food and Drug
wired and wireless electronic access to conditions are issued as part of the type-
Administration, 10903 New Hampshire
airplane electronic systems. certification basis for Boeing Model
Ave., Bldg. 66, Rm. G120, Silver Spring,
Furthermore, regulations, and current 767–2C series airplanes.
MD 20993–0002, 301–796–6530.
1. The applicant must ensure airplane
system safety-assessment policy and SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
electronic-system security protection
techniques, do not address potential
from access by unauthorized sources I. Background
security vulnerabilities, which could be
external to the airplane, including those In accordance with section 513(f)(1) of
caused by unauthorized access to
possibly caused by maintenance the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
airplane electronic systems and
activity. Act (the FD&C Act) (21 U.S.C.
networks.
2. The applicant must ensure that
Special conditions have been applied 360c(f)(1)), devices that were not in
electronic-system security threats are
on past airplane programs to require commercial distribution before May 28,
identified and assessed, and that
consideration of related security 1976 (the date of enactment of the
effective electronic-system security Medical Device Amendments of 1976),
vulnerabilities. These special conditions protection strategies are implemented to
are similar to those previously applied, generally referred to as postamendments
protect the airplane from all adverse devices, are classified automatically by
except that the scope has been adjusted impacts on safety, functionality, and
to be consistent with those features statute into class III without any FDA
continued airworthiness. rulemaking process. These devices
unique to the Model 767–2C series 3. The applicant must establish
airplane. remain in class III and require
appropriate procedures to allow the
premarket approval, unless and until
Applicability operator to ensure that continued
the device is classified or reclassified
airworthiness of the airplane is
As discussed above, these special into class I or II, or FDA issues an order
maintained, including all post type-
conditions apply to Boeing Model 767– finding the device to be substantially
certification modifications that may
2C series airplanes. Should Boeing equivalent, in accordance with section
have an impact on the approved
apply later for a change to the type 513(i), to a predicate device that does
electronic-system security safeguards.
certificate to include another model not require premarket approval. The
Issued in Renton, Washington, on February Agency determines whether new
rmajette on DSK2VPTVN1PROD with RULES
incorporating the same novel or unusual
design feature, the special conditions 19, 2015. devices are substantially equivalent to
would apply to that model as well. John J. Piccola, Jr., predicate devices by means of
Acting Manager, Transport Airplane premarket notification procedures in
Conclusion Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service. section 510(k) of the FD&C Act (21
This action affects only certain novel [FR Doc. 2015–03970 Filed 2–25–15; 8:45 am] U.S.C. 360(k)) and part 807 (21 CFR part
or unusual design features on one model BILLING CODE 4910–13–P 807) of the regulations.
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Document Created: 2015-12-18 13:05:41
Document Modified: 2015-12-18 13:05:41
| Category | Regulatory Information | |
| Collection | Federal Register | |
| sudoc Class | AE 2.7: GS 4.107: AE 2.106: | |
| Publisher | Office of the Federal Register, National Archives and Records Administration | |
| Section | Rules and Regulations | |
| Action | Final special conditions; request for comments. | |
| Dates | This action is effective on The Boeing Company on February 26, 2015. We must receive your comments by April 13, 2015. | |
| Contact | Varun Khanna, FAA, Airplane and Flightcrew Interface Branch, ANM-111, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service, 1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, Washington 98057-3356; telephone (425) 227-1298; facsimile (425) 227- 1320. | |
| FR Citation | 80 FR 10328 | |
| CFR Associated | Aircraft; Aviation Safety and Reporting and Recordkeeping Requirements |
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