80 FR 15979 - Order Temporarily Denying Export Privileges; Flider Electronics, LLC, Pavel Semenovich Flider, Gennadiy Semenovich Flider, et al.

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
Bureau of Industry and Security

Federal Register Volume 80, Issue 58 (March 26, 2015)

Page Range		15979-15981
FR Document		2015-06894
Federal Register, Volume 80 Issue 58 (Thursday, March 26, 2015)
[Federal Register Volume 80, Number 58 (Thursday, March 26, 2015)]
[Notices]
[Pages 15979-15981]
From the Federal Register Online  [www.thefederalregister.org]
[FR Doc No: 2015-06894]


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Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 58 / Thursday, March 26, 2015 / 
Notices

[[Page 15979]]



 DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

Bureau of Industry and Security


Order Temporarily Denying Export Privileges; Flider Electronics, 
LLC, Pavel Semenovich Flider, Gennadiy Semenovich Flider, et al.

Flider Electronics, LLC, a/k/a Flider Electronics, d/b/a Trident 
International Corporation, d/b/a Trident International, d/b/a 
Trident International Corporation, LLC, 837 Turk Street, San 
Francisco, California 94102
    and
Pavel Semenovich Flider, a/k/a Pavel Flider, 21 Eye Street, San 
Rafael, California 94901
    and
Gennadiy Semenovich Flider, a/k/a Gennadiy Flider, 699 36th Avenue 
#203, San Francisco, California 94121

    Pursuant to Section 766.24 of the Export Administration Regulations 
(the ``Regulations'' or ``EAR''),\1\ the Bureau of Industry and 
Security (``BIS''), U.S. Department of Commerce, through its Office of 
Export Enforcement (``OEE''), has requested that I issue an Order 
temporarily denying, for a period of 180 days, the export privileges of 
Flider Electronics, LLC, also known as Flider Electronics, and doing 
business as Trident International Corporation, Trident International, 
and Trident International Corporation, LLC. Flider Electronics, LLC is 
a California limited liability company based in San Francisco, 
California. It is operated, at least in substantial part, for the 
purpose of procuring and exporting U.S.-origin electronic components. 
California State Corporation Number C1908339 has been used in 
connection with the doing business names of Trident International 
Corporation, Trident International, and Trident International 
Corporation, LLC, but that number is associated with Flider 
Electronics, LLC and the address used in connection with those doing 
business as names is the same address as Flider Electronics, LLC. Pavel 
Semenovich Flider, also known as Pavel Flider, is the president and 
owner of Flider Electronics/Trident International (``Trident''). His 
brother Gennadiy Semenovich Flider, also known as Gennadiy Flider, has 
identified himself as Trident's office manager, since 2003, and his 
duties include the purchase of items from U.S. distributors, the 
shipment of those items abroad, and related filings with U.S. 
Government agencies.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \1\ The Regulations are currently codified at 15 CFR parts 730-
774 (2014). The EAR issued under the Export Administration Act of 
1979, as amended (50 U.S.C. app. Sec. Sec.  2401-2420 (2000)) 
(``EAA''). Since August 21, 2001, the Act has been in lapse and the 
President, through Executive Order 13222 of August 17, 2001 (3 CFR, 
2001 Comp. 783 (2002)), which has been extended by successive 
Presidential Notices, the most recent being that of August 7, 2014 
(79 FR 46959 (Aug. 11, 2014)), has continued the Regulations in 
effect under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 
U.S.C. 1701, et seq.) (2006 & Supp. IV 2010).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Pursuant to Section 766.24, BIS may issue an order temporarily 
denying a respondent's export privileges upon a showing that the order 
is necessary in the public interest to prevent an ``imminent 
violation'' of the Regulations. 15 CFR 766.24(b)(1) and 776.24(d). ``A 
violation may be `imminent' either in time or degree of likelihood.'' 
15 CFR 766.24(b)(3). BIS may show ``either that a violation is about to 
occur, or that the general circumstances of the matter under 
investigation or case under criminal or administrative charges 
demonstrate a likelihood of future violations.'' Id. As to the 
likelihood of future violations, BIS may show that the violation under 
investigation or charge ``is significant, deliberate, covert and/or 
likely to occur again, rather than technical or negligent [.]'' Id. A 
``lack of information establishing the precise time a violation may 
occur does not preclude a finding that a violation is imminent, so long 
as there is sufficient reason to believe the likelihood of a 
violation.'' Id.
    In its request, OEE has presented evidence that it has reason to 
believe that Trident engaged in conduct prohibited by the Regulations 
by exporting items subject to the EAR to Russia via transshipment 
through third countries. In Automated Export System (``AES'') filings 
it made, Trident identified as ``ultimate consignees'' companies in 
Estonia and Finland that BIS has reason to believe were operating as 
freight forwarders and not end users of the U.S.-origin items. OEE's 
presentation also indicates that at least two of these transactions are 
known to have involved items that are listed on the Commerce Control 
List and that a search of BIS's licensing database reveals no licensing 
history of controlled U.S.-origin electronics to Russia for the company 
and individuals captioned in this case. Based on, inter alia, the 
transshipment of the items, the misrepresentations made on the AES 
filings, and information obtained pursuant to a Mutual Legal Assistance 
Treaty (``MLAT'') request, OEE indicates that it has reason to believe 
that these exports required a license.

A. Detained Shipments on April 6, 2013

    On or about April 6, 2013, the U.S. Customs and Border Protection 
(``CBP'') detained two outbound shipments at San Francisco 
International Airport. CBP ultimately allowed one of these exports to 
proceed, but the other attempted export was not and the items were 
ultimately seized. The manifest and the AES filing for the seized 
shipment described the items as ``power supplies,'' but the shipment 
actually contained, among other items, 15 Xilinx field programmable 
gate array (FPGA) circuits that were controlled under Export Control 
Classification Number (ECCN) 3A001.a.2.c for national security reasons 
and generally required a license for Russia. The shipping documentation 
also listed Logilane Oy Ltd. in Finland (``Logilane'') as the ultimate 
consignee. Open source information confirmed that Logilane was a 
freight forwarder and thus unlikely to be the end user for the items 
contained in the shipment. When questioned about the shipment, Pavel 
Flider requested that the ultimate consignee be changed to Adimir OU 
(``Adimir'') in Estonia, which itself also proved to be a freight 
forwarder as discussed further below.

B. Interviews of Pavel Flider and Gennadiy Flider

    On or about April 19, 2013, OEE interviewed Trident office manager 
Gennadiy Flider, who identified his responsibilities as handling the 
procurement and shipment of items, including for export. He stated 
Trident had been doing business with Adimir for many years and that it 
was the only customer that his company had. He also indicated that 
Trident at times shipped

[[Page 15980]]

items intended for its Estonian customer to Finland, claiming this was 
because it was cheaper.
    Similarly, in an August 5, 2013 interview, Trident's president and 
owner Pavel Flider stated that Adimir was Trident's one and only 
customer and that at times Adimir requested that items be shipped to a 
freight forwarder in Finland. Both Gennadiy Flider and Pavel Flider 
denied shipping to Russia.

C. July 2013 Detention and Subsequent Seizure

    On or about July 20, 2013, the U.S. Government detained a Trident 
shipment bound for Adimir in Estonia. In addition to Adimir being 
identified as the ultimate consignee on the AES filing, the items were 
identified as ``Electronic Equipment.'' A review of the invoice showed 
six Xilinx FPGAs, items which were controlled under ECCN 3A001.a.2.c 
for national security reasons and generally required a license for 
Russia. Moreover, an inspection of the shipment uncovered 51 controlled 
Xilinx chips, rather than just the six that had been declared. CBP 
ultimately seized the shipment on or about October 18, 2013.

D. Information Concerning Purported Estonian End User Obtained via an 
MLAT Request

    Based on information obtained in 2014 via a late 2013 MLAT request 
sent to Estonia relating to Adimir, BIS has reason to believe that 
Adimir was not an end user. During an interview, an Adimir corporate 
officer admitted to transshipping Trident shipments to Russia at the 
request of Pavel Flider. Adimir subsequently ceased operating.

E. Changes in the Scheme

    Following the detention and seizures, the MLAT request, and the 
Adimir interview, Trident began exporting directly to Russia, claiming 
that the controlled circuits were for use in railroads. This assertion 
sought to track a note to ECCN 3A001.a.2, which indicates that the ECCN 
does not apply to integrated circuits for civil automotive or railway 
train applications. Pavel Flider reported to the U.S. distributor that 
Trident had been ``referred'' Russian customers by Adimir, which was 
going out of business. After being made aware that the items actually 
were intended for export to Russia, the U.S. distributor requested that 
Trident sign a Form BIS-711 ``Statement by Ultimate Consignee and 
Purchaser,'' which includes an end use statement and must be signed by 
the purchaser and the ultimate consignee.
    From on or about January 23, 2014, to on or about April 16, 2014, 
Trident began listing in its AES filings OOO Elkomtex (``Elkomtex'') in 
St. Petersburg, Russia, as the ultimate consignee. On or about July 17, 
2014, the Elkomtex employees admitted that the company was not an end 
user but a distributor of electronics, acting as a broker between an 
exporter and an end use company.
    Beginning with an export on or about May 6, 2014, Trident again 
changed its export route and began exporting to a purported ultimate 
consignee named Logimix Ltd., in Vantaa, Finland (``Logimix''). Between 
on or about May 6, 2014, to on or about March 12, 2015, AES filings 
indicate that Trident has made 33 exports with Logimix listed as the 
ultimate consignee. Based on Logimix's Web site and other open source 
Internet information, however, OEE's presentation indicates that it has 
reason to believe that Logimix is a freight forwarder and not an end 
user. Moreover, given the violations, deceptive actions, and other 
evidence involving Trident, including those admitted by the Fliders, 
OEE also indicates that it has reason to believe that Trident has been 
making transshipments to Russia.
    OEE has further indicated that in February 2014, Trident ordered an 
additional 195 integrated circuits controlled under ECCN 3A001.a.2.c 
from a U.S. distributor and that those items would be available by in 
or around April 2015. In addition, Trident and Pavel and Gennadiy 
Flider have been indicted for smuggling and money laundering, including 
in connection with some of the transactions discussed above.

F. Findings

    I find that the evidence presented by BIS demonstrates that a 
violation of the Regulations is imminent in both time and degree of 
likelihood. Trident has engaged in some known violations of the 
Regulations and its actions, including changes in how it structures its 
export transactions and routes its shipments, appear designed to 
camouflage the actual destinations, end uses, and/or end users of the 
U.S.-origin items it has been and continues to export, including items 
on the Commerce Control List that are subject to national security-
based license requirements. Moreover, when interviewed in 2013, the 
Fliders could not provide a reasonable explanation for the purported 
exports to Estonia and Finland. When for a time Trident began direct 
exports to Russia, the entity listed as the ultimate consignee admitted 
that it was not an end user and instead acting as a broker.
    In sum, the fact and circumstances taken as a whole provide strong 
indicators that future violations are likely absent the issuance of a 
TDO. As such, a TDO is needed to give notice to persons and companies 
in the United States and abroad that they should cease dealing with 
Trident in export transactions involving items subject to the EAR. Such 
a TDO is consistent with the public interest to preclude future 
violations of the EAR.
    Additionally, Section 766.23 of the Regulations provides that 
``[i]n order to prevent evasion, certain types of orders under this 
part may be made applicable not only to the respondent, but also to 
other persons then or thereafter related to the respondent by 
ownership, control, position of responsibility, affiliation, or other 
connection in the conduct of trade or business. Orders that may be made 
applicable to related persons include those that deny or affect export 
privileges, including temporary denial orders . . .'' 15 CFR Sec.  
766.23(a). As stated above, Pavel Flider is the president and owner of 
Trident. Gennadiy Flider also is a Trident office manager, with 
responsibilities relating directly to the procurement and export 
activities at issue. As such, I find that Pavel Semenovich Flider and 
Gennadiy Semenovich Flider are related persons to Trident based on 
their positions of responsibility and that their additions to the order 
is necessary to prevent evasion.
    Accordingly, I find that an order denying the export privileges of 
Trident, Pavel Flider, and Gennadiy Flider is necessary, in the public 
interest, to prevent an imminent violation of the EAR.
    This Order is being issued on an ex parte basis without a hearing 
based upon BIS's showing of an imminent violation in accordance with 
Section 766.24 of the Regulations.
    It is therefore ordered:
    First, that Flider Electronics, LLC, a/k/a Flider Electronics, d/b/
a Trident International Corporation, d/b/a Trident International, d/b/a 
Trident International Corporation, LLC, 837 Turk Street, San Francisco, 
California 94102; Pavel Semenovich Flider, a/k/a Pavel Flider, 21 Eye 
Street, San Rafael, California 94901; and Gennadiy Semenovich Flider, 
a/k/a Gennadiy Flider, 699 36th Avenue #203, San Francisco, California 
94121, and when acting for or on their behalf, any successors or 
assigns, agents, or employees (each a ``Denied Person'' and 
collectively the ``Denied Persons'') may not, directly or indirectly, 
participate in

[[Page 15981]]

any way in any transaction involving any commodity, software or 
technology (hereinafter collectively referred to as ``item'') exported 
or to be exported from the United States that is subject to the Export 
Administration Regulations (``EAR''), or in any other activity subject 
to the EAR including, but not limited to:
    A. Applying for, obtaining, or using any license, License 
Exception, or export control document;
    B. Carrying on negotiations concerning, or ordering, buying, 
receiving, using, selling, delivering, storing, disposing of, 
forwarding, transporting, financing, or otherwise servicing in any way, 
any transaction involving any item exported or to be exported from the 
United States that is subject to the EAR, or in any other activity 
subject to the EAR; or
    C. Benefitting in any way from any transaction involving any item 
exported or to be exported from the United States that is subject to 
the EAR, or in any other activity subject to the EAR.
    Second, that no person may, directly or indirectly, do any of the 
following:
    A. Export or reexport to or on behalf of a Denied Person any item 
subject to the EAR;
    B. Take any action that facilitates the acquisition or attempted 
acquisition by a Denied Person of the ownership, possession, or control 
of any item subject to the EAR that has been or will be exported from 
the United States, including financing or other support activities 
related to a transaction whereby a Denied Person acquires or attempts 
to acquire such ownership, possession or control;
    C. Take any action to acquire from or to facilitate the acquisition 
or attempted acquisition from a Denied Person of any item subject to 
the EAR that has been exported from the United States;
    D. Obtain from a Denied Person in the United States any item 
subject to the EAR with knowledge or reason to know that the item will 
be, or is intended to be, exported from the United States; or
    E. Engage in any transaction to service any item subject to the EAR 
that has been or will be exported from the United States and which is 
owned, possessed or controlled by a Denied Person, or service any item, 
of whatever origin, that is owned, possessed or controlled by a Denied 
Person if such service involves the use of any item subject to the EAR 
that has been or will be exported from the United States. For purposes 
of this paragraph, servicing means installation, maintenance, repair, 
modification or testing.
    Third, that, after notice and opportunity for comment as provided 
in Section 766.23 of the EAR, any other person, firm, corporation, or 
business organization related to a Denied Person by ownership, control, 
position of responsibility, affiliation, or other connection in the 
conduct of trade or business may also be made subject to the provisions 
of this Order.
    In accordance with the provisions of Section 766.24(e) of the EAR, 
Flider Electronics, LLC d/b/a Trident International Corporation, may, 
at any time, appeal this Order by filing a full written statement in 
support of the appeal with the Office of the Administrative Law Judge, 
U.S. Coast Guard ALJ Docketing Center, 40 South Gay Street, Baltimore, 
Maryland 21202-4022. In accordance with the provisions of Sections 
766.23(c)(2) and 766.24(e)(3) of the EAR, Pavel Semenovich Flider and 
Gennadiy Semenovich Flider may, at any time, appeal their inclusion as 
a related person by filing a full written statement in support of the 
appeal with the Office of the Administrative Law Judge, U.S. Coast 
Guard ALJ Docketing Center, 40 South Gay Street, Baltimore, Maryland 
21202-4022.
    In accordance with the provisions of Section 766.24(d) of the EAR, 
BIS may seek renewal of this Order by filing a written request not 
later than 20 days before the expiration date. Flider Electronics, LLC 
d/b/a Trident International Corporation may oppose a request to renew 
this Order by filing a written submission with the Assistant Secretary 
for Export Enforcement, which must be received not later than seven 
days before the expiration date of the Order.
    A copy of this Order shall be sent to Flider Electronics LLC d/b/a 
Trident International Corporation and each related person, and shall be 
published in the Federal Register.
    This Order is effective upon issuance and shall remain in effect 
for 180 days.

    Dated: March 19, 2015.
David W. Mills,
Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Export Enforcement.
[FR Doc. 2015-06894 Filed 3-25-15; 8:45 am]
 BILLING CODE P
15980 Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 58 / Thursday, March 26, 2015 / Notices

items intended for its Estonian customer From on or about January 23, 2014, to it was not an end user and instead
to Finland, claiming this was because it on or about April 16, 2014, Trident acting as a broker.
was cheaper. began listing in its AES filings OOO In sum, the fact and circumstances
Similarly, in an August 5, 2013 Elkomtex (‘‘Elkomtex’’) in St. taken as a whole provide strong
interview, Trident’s president and Petersburg, Russia, as the ultimate indicators that future violations are
owner Pavel Flider stated that Adimir consignee. On or about July 17, 2014, likely absent the issuance of a TDO. As
was Trident’s one and only customer the Elkomtex employees admitted that such, a TDO is needed to give notice to
and that at times Adimir requested that the company was not an end user but a persons and companies in the United
items be shipped to a freight forwarder distributor of electronics, acting as a States and abroad that they should cease
in Finland. Both Gennadiy Flider and broker between an exporter and an end dealing with Trident in export
Pavel Flider denied shipping to Russia. use company. transactions involving items subject to
Beginning with an export on or about the EAR. Such a TDO is consistent with
C. July 2013 Detention and Subsequent May 6, 2014, Trident again changed its the public interest to preclude future
Seizure export route and began exporting to a violations of the EAR.
On or about July 20, 2013, the U.S. purported ultimate consignee named Additionally, Section 766.23 of the
Logimix Ltd., in Vantaa, Finland Regulations provides that ‘‘[i]n order to
Government detained a Trident
(‘‘Logimix’’). Between on or about May prevent evasion, certain types of orders
shipment bound for Adimir in Estonia.
6, 2014, to on or about March 12, 2015, under this part may be made applicable
In addition to Adimir being identified as
AES filings indicate that Trident has not only to the respondent, but also to
the ultimate consignee on the AES
made 33 exports with Logimix listed as other persons then or thereafter related
filing, the items were identified as
the ultimate consignee. Based on to the respondent by ownership,
‘‘Electronic Equipment.’’ A review of
Logimix’s Web site and other open control, position of responsibility,
the invoice showed six Xilinx FPGAs,
source Internet information, however, affiliation, or other connection in the
items which were controlled under
OEE’s presentation indicates that it has conduct of trade or business. Orders that
ECCN 3A001.a.2.c for national security
reason to believe that Logimix is a may be made applicable to related
reasons and generally required a license persons include those that deny or affect
freight forwarder and not an end user.
for Russia. Moreover, an inspection of export privileges, including temporary
Moreover, given the violations,
the shipment uncovered 51 controlled denial orders . . .’’ 15 CFR § 766.23(a).
deceptive actions, and other evidence
Xilinx chips, rather than just the six that As stated above, Pavel Flider is the
involving Trident, including those
had been declared. CBP ultimately president and owner of Trident.
admitted by the Fliders, OEE also
seized the shipment on or about October Gennadiy Flider also is a Trident office
indicates that it has reason to believe
18, 2013. manager, with responsibilities relating
that Trident has been making
D. Information Concerning Purported transshipments to Russia. directly to the procurement and export
Estonian End User Obtained via an OEE has further indicated that in activities at issue. As such, I find that
MLAT Request February 2014, Trident ordered an Pavel Semenovich Flider and Gennadiy
additional 195 integrated circuits Semenovich Flider are related persons
Based on information obtained in controlled under ECCN 3A001.a.2.c to Trident based on their positions of
2014 via a late 2013 MLAT request sent from a U.S. distributor and that those responsibility and that their additions to
to Estonia relating to Adimir, BIS has items would be available by in or the order is necessary to prevent
reason to believe that Adimir was not an around April 2015. In addition, Trident evasion.
end user. During an interview, an and Pavel and Gennadiy Flider have Accordingly, I find that an order
Adimir corporate officer admitted to been indicted for smuggling and money denying the export privileges of Trident,
transshipping Trident shipments to laundering, including in connection Pavel Flider, and Gennadiy Flider is
Russia at the request of Pavel Flider. with some of the transactions discussed necessary, in the public interest, to
Adimir subsequently ceased operating. above. prevent an imminent violation of the
E. Changes in the Scheme EAR.
F. Findings
This Order is being issued on an ex
Following the detention and seizures, I find that the evidence presented by parte basis without a hearing based
the MLAT request, and the Adimir BIS demonstrates that a violation of the upon BIS’s showing of an imminent
interview, Trident began exporting Regulations is imminent in both time violation in accordance with Section
directly to Russia, claiming that the and degree of likelihood. Trident has 766.24 of the Regulations.
controlled circuits were for use in engaged in some known violations of It is therefore ordered:
railroads. This assertion sought to track the Regulations and its actions, First, that Flider Electronics, LLC,
a note to ECCN 3A001.a.2, which including changes in how it structures a/k/a Flider Electronics, d/b/a Trident
indicates that the ECCN does not apply its export transactions and routes its International Corporation, d/b/a Trident
to integrated circuits for civil shipments, appear designed to International, d/b/a Trident
automotive or railway train camouflage the actual destinations, end International Corporation, LLC, 837
applications. Pavel Flider reported to uses, and/or end users of the U.S.-origin Turk Street, San Francisco, California
the U.S. distributor that Trident had items it has been and continues to 94102; Pavel Semenovich Flider, a/k/a
been ‘‘referred’’ Russian customers by export, including items on the Pavel Flider, 21 Eye Street, San Rafael,
Adimir, which was going out of Commerce Control List that are subject California 94901; and Gennadiy
mstockstill on DSK4VPTVN1PROD with NOTICES

business. After being made aware that to national security-based license Semenovich Flider, a/k/a Gennadiy
the items actually were intended for requirements. Moreover, when Flider, 699 36th Avenue #203, San
export to Russia, the U.S. distributor interviewed in 2013, the Fliders could Francisco, California 94121, and when
requested that Trident sign a Form BIS– not provide a reasonable explanation for acting for or on their behalf, any
711 ‘‘Statement by Ultimate Consignee the purported exports to Estonia and successors or assigns, agents, or
and Purchaser,’’ which includes an end Finland. When for a time Trident began employees (each a ‘‘Denied Person’’ and
use statement and must be signed by the direct exports to Russia, the entity listed collectively the ‘‘Denied Persons’’) may
purchaser and the ultimate consignee. as the ultimate consignee admitted that not, directly or indirectly, participate in

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Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 58 / Thursday, March 26, 2015 / Notices 15981

any way in any transaction involving person, firm, corporation, or business DATES: Effective Date: March 26, 2015.
any commodity, software or technology organization related to a Denied Person FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
(hereinafter collectively referred to as by ownership, control, position of Joshua Morris or Shane Subler, AD/CVD
‘‘item’’) exported or to be exported from responsibility, affiliation, or other Operations, Office I, Enforcement and
the United States that is subject to the connection in the conduct of trade or Compliance, International Trade
Export Administration Regulations business may also be made subject to Administration, U.S. Department of
(‘‘EAR’’), or in any other activity subject the provisions of this Order. Commerce, 14th Street and Constitution
to the EAR including, but not limited to: In accordance with the provisions of Avenue NW., Washington, DC 20230;
A. Applying for, obtaining, or using Section 766.24(e) of the EAR, Flider telephone: (202) 482–1779 or (202) 482–
any license, License Exception, or Electronics, LLC d/b/a Trident 0189, respectively.
export control document; International Corporation, may, at any SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
B. Carrying on negotiations time, appeal this Order by filing a full
concerning, or ordering, buying, written statement in support of the The Petition
receiving, using, selling, delivering, appeal with the Office of the On February 26, 2015, the Department
storing, disposing of, forwarding, Administrative Law Judge, U.S. Coast of Commerce (the Department) received
transporting, financing, or otherwise Guard ALJ Docketing Center, 40 South a countervailing duty (CVD) petition 1
servicing in any way, any transaction Gay Street, Baltimore, Maryland 21202– concerning imports of supercalendered
involving any item exported or to be 4022. In accordance with the provisions paper (SC paper) from Canada, filed in
exported from the United States that is of Sections 766.23(c)(2) and 766.24(e)(3) proper form on behalf of the Coalition
subject to the EAR, or in any other of the EAR, Pavel Semenovich Flider for Fair Paper Imports (the petitioner).2
activity subject to the EAR; or and Gennadiy Semenovich Flider may, The petitioner is an ad hoc association
C. Benefitting in any way from any at any time, appeal their inclusion as a of domestic producers of SC paper.
transaction involving any item exported related person by filing a full written On March 3 and 13, 2015, we
or to be exported from the United States statement in support of the appeal with requested information and clarification
that is subject to the EAR, or in any the Office of the Administrative Law for certain areas of the Petition.3 The
other activity subject to the EAR. Judge, U.S. Coast Guard ALJ Docketing petitioner responded to these requests
Second, that no person may, directly Center, 40 South Gay Street, Baltimore, on March 9 and 16, 2015.4
or indirectly, do any of the following: Maryland 21202–4022. In accordance with section 702(b)(1)
A. Export or reexport to or on behalf In accordance with the provisions of of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended
of a Denied Person any item subject to Section 766.24(d) of the EAR, BIS may (the Act), the petitioner alleges that the
the EAR; seek renewal of this Order by filing a Government of Canada (the GOC) and
B. Take any action that facilitates the
written request not later than 20 days certain Canadian provinces are
acquisition or attempted acquisition by
before the expiration date. Flider providing countervailable subsidies,
a Denied Person of the ownership,
Electronics, LLC d/b/a Trident within the meaning of sections 701 and
possession, or control of any item
International Corporation may oppose a 771(5) of the Act, to imports of SC paper
subject to the EAR that has been or will
request to renew this Order by filing a from Canada, and that such imports are
be exported from the United States,
written submission with the Assistant materially injuring, or are threatening
including financing or other support
Secretary for Export Enforcement, material injury to, the domestic industry
activities related to a transaction
which must be received not later than in the United States pursuant to section
whereby a Denied Person acquires or
seven days before the expiration date of 701 of the Act. Consistent with section
attempts to acquire such ownership,
the Order. 702(b)(1) of the Act, the Petition is
possession or control;
C. Take any action to acquire from or A copy of this Order shall be sent to accompanied by information reasonably
to facilitate the acquisition or attempted Flider Electronics LLC d/b/a Trident available to petitioner supporting its
acquisition from a Denied Person of any International Corporation and each allegations.
related person, and shall be published The Department finds that the
item subject to the EAR that has been
in the Federal Register. petitioner filed the Petition on behalf of
exported from the United States;
D. Obtain from a Denied Person in the This Order is effective upon issuance the domestic industry because the
United States any item subject to the and shall remain in effect for 180 days. petitioner is an interested party as
EAR with knowledge or reason to know Dated: March 19, 2015. defined in section 771(9)(F) of the Act,
that the item will be, or is intended to and that the petitioner has demonstrated
David W. Mills,
be, exported from the United States; or Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Export 1 See Petition for the Imposition of Countervailing
E. Engage in any transaction to service Enforcement. Duties on Supercalendered Paper from Canada
any item subject to the EAR that has [FR Doc. 2015–06894 Filed 3–25–15; 8:45 am] (February 26, 2015) (Petition).
been or will be exported from the BILLING CODE P
2 The Coalition for Fair Paper Imports consists of

United States and which is owned, Madison Paper Industries and Verso Corporation.
3 See Letters from the Department, ‘‘Petition For
possessed or controlled by a Denied
The Imposition Of Countervailing Duties on
Person, or service any item, of whatever DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE Imports of Supercalendered Paper from Canada:
origin, that is owned, possessed or Supplemental Questions’’ (March 3, 2015) and
controlled by a Denied Person if such International Trade Administration ‘‘Petition For The Imposition Of Countervailing
service involves the use of any item Duties on Imports of Supercalendered Paper from
[C–122–854] Canada: Additional Supplemental Question’’
mstockstill on DSK4VPTVN1PROD with NOTICES

subject to the EAR that has been or will (March 13, 2015).
be exported from the United States. For Supercalendered Paper From Canada: 4 See Letters from the petitioner,
purposes of this paragraph, servicing Initiation of Countervailing Duty ‘‘Supercalendered Paper From Canada/Petitioner’s
means installation, maintenance, repair, Investigation Response To The Department’s Questions
modification or testing. Regarding The Petition’’ (March 9, 2015) (Petition
Supplement) and ‘‘Supercalendered Paper From
Third, that, after notice and AGENCY: Enforcement and Compliance, Canada/Response to the March 13, 2015 Additional
opportunity for comment as provided in International Trade Administration, Supplemental Question for Volume II of the
Section 766.23 of the EAR, any other Department of Commerce. Petition’’ (March 16, 2015).

VerDate Sep<11>2014 18:55 Mar 25, 2015 Jkt 235001 PO 00000 Frm 00003 Fmt 4703 Sfmt 4703 E:\FR\FM\26MRN1.SGM 26MRN1
Document Created: 2015-12-18 11:47:03
Document Modified: 2015-12-18 11:47:03
Category		Regulatory Information
Collection		Federal Register
sudoc Class		AE 2.7: GS 4.107: AE 2.106:
Publisher		Office of the Federal Register, National Archives and Records Administration
Section		Notices
FR Citation		80 FR 15979
80 FR 15979 - Order Temporarily Denying Export Privileges; Flider Electronics, LLC, Pavel Semenovich Flider, Gennadiy Semenovich Flider, et al.

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCEBureau of Industry and Security

Federal Register Volume 80, Issue 58 (March 26, 2015)

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
Bureau of Industry and Security
