80 FR 16579 - Hazardous Materials: Spare Fuel Cell Cartridges Containing Flammable Gas Transported by Aircraft in Passenger and Crew Member Checked Baggage
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration Federal Register Volume 80, Issue 60 (March 30, 2015)
Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration
Federal Register Volume 80, Issue 60 (March 30, 2015)
| Page Range | 16579-16583 | |
| FR Document | 2015-07109 |
[Federal Register Volume 80, Number 60 (Monday, March 30, 2015)] [Rules and Regulations] [Pages 16579-16583] From the Federal Register Online [www.thefederalregister.org] [FR Doc No: 2015-07109] ======================================================================= ----------------------------------------------------------------------- DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration 49 CFR Part 175 [Docket No. PHMSA-2009-0126, Notice No. 15-3] Hazardous Materials: Spare Fuel Cell Cartridges Containing Flammable Gas Transported by Aircraft in Passenger and Crew Member Checked Baggage AGENCY: Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), DOT. [[Page 16580]] ACTION: Notification of a More Definitive Statement. ----------------------------------------------------------------------- SUMMARY: PHMSA issued a 2011 final rule in which we did not harmonize with international regulations regarding the carriage of spare fuel cell cartridges in passenger and crew member checked baggage. Lilliputian Systems, Inc. (Lilliputian) contested this final rule, first by filing an administrative appeal, then challenging the final rule in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. On January 31, 2014, the Court remanded the rule and ordered PHMSA to provide further explanation for the prohibition on airline passengers and crew carrying flammable gas fuel cell cartridges in their checked baggage, including its response to Lilliputian's comments. 741 F.3d 1309, 1314 (D.C. Cir. 2014). As a result, we are issuing this document which provides a more thorough explanation and substantial evidence to support PHMSA's decision to prohibit the carriage of spare fuel cell cartridges in passenger and crew member checked baggage. DATES: March 30, 2015. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Michael Stevens, Transportation Specialist (Regulations), Standards and Rulemaking Division, Office of Hazardous Materials Safety, Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration, U.S. Department of Transportation, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, DC 20590, Telephone: (202) 366-8553 or, via email: [email protected] or Shawn Wolsey, Senior Attorney, Office of the Chief Counsel, Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration, U.S. Department of Transportation, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, DC 20590, (202) 366-4400 or, via email: [email protected]. SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Background In 2009, the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) voted and reissued its Technical Instructions for the Safe Transport of Dangerous Goods by Air (ICAO Technical Instructions), which lifted the previous restriction of spare fuel cell cartridges for all but Division 4.3 chemistries from passenger and crew member checked baggage. In response, on August 24, 2010, the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) issued a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) to harmonize U.S. Hazardous Materials Regulations (HMR; 49 CFR parts 171-180) with updated international standards. These changes included updates to packaging, labeling, and testing requirements to increase harmony with the international rules and promote the flow of goods (75 FR 52070, HM-215K, 8/24/2010). PHMSA stated its goal was ``. . . to harmonize without diminishing the level of safety currently provided by the HMR and without imposing undue burdens on the regulated public'' and that we ``. . . evaluate[d] each amendment on its own merit.'' [75 FR 52071] Ultimately, PHMSA did not adopt every provision of every set of the international regulations. In the final rule published January 19, 2011 [76 FR 3308], PHMSA revised the 49 CFR 175.10 passenger exceptions to allow passengers and crew members to place certain spare fuel cell cartridges containing a flammable liquid (Class 3) or corrosive material (Class 8) in checked baggage. PHMSA stated, ``fuel cell cartridges themselves are subject to much more stringent construction, testing, and packaging requirements than for similar articles (e.g., aerosols).'' However, PHMSA limited the scope of spare fuel cell cartridge chemistries allowed in checked baggage by excluding fuel cell cartridges containing Division 2.1 (flammable gas) and Division 4.3 (dangerous when wet) material. In the interest of safety, PHMSA elected to continue the longstanding limitations in the HMR for Division 2.1 (flammable gas) on passenger-carrying aircraft and thus maintained the existing prohibition on the transport of spare fuel cells containing Division 2.1 (flammable gas) in checked baggage. PHMSA and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) explained their expressed concern ``due to the questionable integrity of [fuel cells] when packed in a passenger's checked baggage'' [76 FR 3337]. As a result of PHMSA's rulemaking, Lilliputian filed an administrative appeal in accordance with 49 CFR 106.110. It requested PHMSA to revise 49 CFR 175.10(a)(19) to align with the ICAO Technical Instructions and allow spare fuel cell cartridges containing Division 2.1 (flammable gas) to be carried in checked baggage. PHMSA granted the administrative appeal by providing Lilliputian and the public additional opportunity for comment in a May 25, 2012 NPRM [77 FR 31274]. The subsequent final rule issued on January 7, 2013 [78 FR 1101] denied the placement of spare Division 2.1 fuel cell cartridges in checked baggage but continued to allow two spare Division 2.1 fuel cell cartridges in carry-on baggage. Lilliputian filed a Petition for Review of the Final Order in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit on March 8, 2013. In a January 31, 2014, (731 F.3d 1309) decision, the Court remanded the rule and ordered PHMSA to ``provide further explanation for the prohibition on airline passengers and crew carrying flammable-gas fuel cell cartridges in their checked baggage, including its response to Lilliputian's comments.'' \1\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\ 741 F.3d 1314. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Justification for Denial of the Administrative Appeal When PHMSA decides whether to allow an item on a passenger-carrying aircraft, the Department only tolerates extraordinarily low levels of risk. For example, when failure of a component in an airplane could interfere with continued flight and safe landing, the risk of failure must be less than one billion to one.\2\ This low level of tolerance for risk makes sense because, due to the high volume of air transport, even a very improbable event may eventually occur, and with catastrophic results. Additionally, PHMSA is required by 49 U.S.C. 5108(b) to pursue the ``highest degree of safety in pipeline transportation and hazardous materials transportation.'' \3\ Under 49 U.S.C. 5103(b), PHMSA is authorized to issue regulations for the safe and secure transportation of hazardous materials in commerce, including transportation by air. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \2\ http://www.faa.gov/documentLibrary/media/Advisory_Circular/AC25.1309-1A.pdf. \3\ PHMSA's Administrator is charged with carrying out all duties and powers vested in the Secretary of Transportation under chapter 51 of Title 49 of the U.S. Code, which governs the transportation of hazardous materials. 49 U.S.C. 108(f)(1). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The risks presented by flammable gas on airplanes are clear. Flammable gases will burn if mixed with an appropriate amount of air, and an ignition source is present, and confined burning of a flammable gas can lead to detonation. As a result, PHMSA remains concerned with the hazards posed by flammable gases (such as the butane contained in some fuel cells) contributing to a fire in the cargo compartment of a passenger-carrying aircraft. This concern is particularly relevant to carriage in checked baggage, where damage to the fuel cell cartridge and the release of a flammable gas may occur if the baggage is mishandled. PHMSA denied Lilliputian's appeal due to the uncertainty of the safety risks posed when combining (1) the uncertainty of how the baggage handling would affect the durability and stability [[Page 16581]] of these products, (2) the possible over-sight of hazmat communication and packaging requirements because the regulations do not apply to passengers, and (3) the limitations of aircraft's fire suppression systems. PHMSA was particularly concerned by the allowance for passengers to transport flammable-gas fuel cells because passengers ``are not trained to recognize potential hazards'' and ``are unlikely to be aware of the safety implications'' of improper packaging or handling. Considering those factors combined with the limitations of the aircraft's suppression system, (fire suppression systems ``do not prevent fires'' and are not ``designed to completely extinguish fires'') the safety risks were too great to authorize this exemption. PHMSA further explained that the authorization of any additional flammable gas on an airplane, in addition to the gases contained in the toiletry and medicinal items already allowed, would need to take into account ``the cumulative risk of the new authorization combined with existing authorizations.'' [78 FR 1104] PHMSA expressed willingness, however, to consider allowing certain fuel cells models on a case-by- case basis. For example, portable oxygen concentrators may be allowed at some point in the future, when experience and testing prove that safe designs exist. Because of the risks presented by flammable gases, a number of safety requirements apply to shipments of flammable gas on passenger- carrying aircraft. PHMSA believes there is sufficient basis for its decision because, as previously stated, in the area of aviation safety, there is a very low tolerance for risk. In its decision, PHMSA considered the known risks of flammable gases, coupled with the uncertainties relating to the safety of new fuel cell technology, added to the already high volume of air travel and the catastrophic consequences of any failure. Cumulative Risk PHMSA's approach to aviation safety is not to permit items merely because they are similar to items already permitted. The authorization of any additional flammable gas on an aircraft, in addition to the toiletry and medicinal items already allowed, needs to take into account the cumulative risk of the new authorization combined with existing authorizations. A limited exception has existed since 1972 for small quantities of such gases in personal medicinal and toiletry items, such as the butane used as a propellant in a small aerosol can or a butane-powered curling iron (49 CFR 175.10(a)(1)(i). However, most Division 2.1 (flammable gas) substances and articles are forbidden from transportation as cargo aboard passenger-carrying aircraft, and thus prohibiting the carriage of spare fuel cell cartridges containing flammable gas in checked baggage is consistent with the agency's longstanding position with regard to flammable gases. Checked Baggage The exceptions in 49 CFR 175.10 have not been expanded to permit additional flammable gases in checked baggage. As previously noted, allowing transportation of flammable gas in airline passengers' checked baggage would be inconsistent with the exceptions in 49 CFR 175.10. Airline passengers do not comply with the important packaging, labeling, and hazard communication requirements when they put items in their checked baggage, and they may not even be aware of such requirements. Without hazard communication and other notifications to handlers that the passenger's baggage contains flammable gas, checked baggage could be mishandled, damaging the integrity of an improperly packaged container of flammable gas. Negligent packing and excessive handling increases the potential that a container of flammable gas in checked baggage could rupture, creating conditions for an explosion. 76 FR 3337. Beginning in 2009, the ICAO began considering whether to change its regulations to allow transport of fuel cells in checked baggage. Prior to that time, fuel cells had been allowed only in carry-on baggage or on one's person, in order to mitigate the risk of the fuel cell cartridge inadvertently coming into contact with an ignition source.\4\ Although members of the ICAO Dangerous Goods Panel were generally supportive of permitting most fuel cells containing flammable liquids in checked baggage, ``many were wary of permitting fuel cartridges containing substances of other classes.'' In particular, ``[s]ome felt further consideration was needed with respect to fuel cell cartridges containing flammable gases.'' Some participants suggested that changes not be adopted to allow these new technologies until ``experience based on a longer timeframe could be demonstrated.'' \5\ In the end, ICAO included in its Technical Instructions a provision to allow two spare fuel cell cartridges containing flammable gas in checked baggage. It should be noted that the ICAO Dangerous Goods Panel does not operate solely on a consensus basis and that some delegates, including the U.S. Panel Member, were not in agreement with this decision. The U.S. Panel member spoke against the adoption of this provision when the amendment was discussed and agreed to by majority vote during the Dangerous Goods Panel's 22nd meeting (held in Montreal, Canada from October 5-16, 2009).\6\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \4\ With regard to the allowance of fuel cell cartridges in carry-on baggage or on one's person, the risk is mitigated because the fuel cells are contained in a supervised environment. Thus, a flight attendant would be able to extinguish any fires that might occur in a carry-on bag in the event of a fuel cell cartridge inadvertently coming into contact with an ignition source. \5\ http://www.icao.int/safety/DangerousGoods/DGP%2022%20Working%20Papers/DGP.22.WP.100.en.pdf at 2.9.4. \6\ http://www.icao.int/safety/DangerousGoods/DGP%2022%20Working%20Papers/DGP.22.WP.100.en.pdf. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- FAA Technical Report In Lilliputian's comments posted to the docket of the August 24, 2010 NPRM (PHMSA-2009-0126-2027), they posed five recommendations for conducting a proper risk analysis:Any analysis should begin with the risk of ignition or sparking. The analysis should examine the risk of catching fire as a result of an external fire. The analysis should examine whether a fuel cell fire, once ignited, can be effectively extinguished in a timely manner. The analysis should look to any experience involving similar materials. The analysis should evaluate whether the volume of the material is relevant in terms of the risk and managing that risk. We believe that the Preliminary Investigation of the Fire Hazard Inherent in Micro Fuel Cell Cartridges (Final Report) \7\ prepared by the FAA Technical Center did address these recommendations posed by Lilliputian. The report examined the fire risk presented by fuel cells, including cells powered by flammable solids, liquids, and gas, including a test that exposed single, small fuel cells of various types to a low-intensity flame in a controlled environment. Only a few varieties of fuel cells were tested, because the technology was still developing; however, one of the fuel cells tested was a butane fuel cell manufactured by Lilliputian. The test results showed that, of the fuel types tested, ``[b]utane produced the most vigorous fire.'' The plastic cartridge used by Lilliputian was breached only 45 seconds after exposure [[Page 16582]] to flame and the ``butane ignition was rapid, almost explosive'' \8\ (emphasis added). It produced an approximately 1,000-degree Fahrenheit flame, by far the hottest flame produced by any of the materials in the study. While some of the other fuel cell fires were ``easily extinguished using Halon 1211,'' a fire suppression system commonly used in an aircraft, the butane fire burned so rapidly that the fire suppression system did not activate until after all the butane fuel had been consumed by the fire. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \7\ See Document PHMSA-2009-0126-2366 in this docket. \8\ See Document PHMSA-2009-0126-2366 in this docket. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- A Halon 1211 system is not designed to detect fires. The pilot must first see that there is an alert from the fire detection system. Once that happens, the pilot will engage the Halon 1211 system, which will attempt to suppress, but not extinguish, the fire. While airplanes are equipped with fire detection systems, such as Halon 1211, there are no systems on board to detect a gas leak. Thus, if a fuel cell cartridge placed in checked baggage is damaged and allows butane gas to leak into the cargo compartment, there is no way for the pilot to be aware of this. The accumulation of the butane gas, if exposed to a spark, would then cause an explosion and would lead to a catastrophic failure of the airplane. The FAA Technical Center tests were designed to determine the flammability characteristics of fuel cell cartridges. The tests were conducted on single cartridges exposed to a controlled fire. The tests did not take into account the interaction of one or more cartridges and any adjacent combustible material (i.e., clothing, electronic devices, etc.) or the effect of fuel cell cartridges in propagating a fire. We do know from the test results that butane produced the most vigorous fire, the cartridge provided the least amount of protection from an external fire and, once penetrated, the liquid butane burned rapidly and filled the test chamber with fire. The butane fire also registered the highest temperature (1000 degrees Fahrenheit) and heat flux measurements of all tests conducted. The plastic cartridge used by Lilliputian was breached only 45 seconds after exposure to flame, and the butane ignition was rapid, almost explosive. Thus, the test results from the Final Report support our concern that the inherent hazards of compressed flammable gases, as demonstrated by exposure to a fire involving a fuel cell cartridge containing an estimated volume of only 50 cc or less of butane, would pose an unacceptable risk in air transportation. As PHMSA stated in the preamble to the January 19, 2011 final rule, Federal hazmat law (49 U.S.C. 5101 et seq.) and policy encourages the harmonization of domestic and international standards for hazardous materials transportation to the extent practicable, but the law also permits PHMSA to depart from international standards in order to promote public safety. When considering the adoption of international standards under the HMR, PHMSA reviews and evaluates each amendment on its own merit, on the basis of its overall impact on transportation safety, and on the economic implications associated with its adoption. Our goal is to harmonize without diminishing the level of safety and without imposing undue burdens on the regulated public. In this instance, we believe that restricting the carriage of flammable gas fuel cell cartridges to be a necessary variation to the ICAO Technical Instructions that enhances the safety of aircraft passengers without imposing an unreasonable regulatory burden. Under Federal hazmat law, we are tasked with balancing the needs of public safety with economic burdens when considering harmonization with international standards. Consequently, because we elected not to revise the HMR to align with the ICAO Technical Instructions, we believe we did strike a balance by continuing to permit flammable gas fuel cell cartridges in carry-on baggage. Disparate Treatment of Aerosols and Butane-Powered Articles The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit also was concerned that PHMSA did not provide a reasoned explanation and substantial evidence for the disparate treatment of fuel cell cartridges as opposed to other products, particularly medicinal and toiletry items that contain flammable gases (i.e. aerosols). Aerosols In order to determine if a hazardous material is permitted in checked baggage, PHMSA must take into account the cumulative risk of any new authorizations combined with any existing authorizations. Under certain conditions, 49 CFR 175.10 permits the carriage of aerosols in checked baggage on a passenger-carrying aircraft. This limited exception has existed since 1972 for aerosol containers in small quantities in personal medicinal and toiletry items. Such items include hair spray, deodorant, and certain medicinal products. To comply with the ban on chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) that became effective January 1, 1994, \9\ the aerosol industry changed the type of propellant used in their products. Unfortunately, this new type of propellant is flammable and, because of its widespread use, there was concern of a risk-risk tradeoff (ozone layer damage versus cargo compartment safety on passenger-carrying aircraft). PHMSA and FAA were concerned that static electricity inherent in cargo compartments could ignite a leaking flammable aerosol container in passenger baggage. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \9\ http://www.epa.gov/ozone/snap/aerosol/qa.html. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Based on its concerns, PHMSA reviewed incident reports in the Hazardous Materials Identification System (HMIS) database and specific incidents that occurred during baggage handling provided by the FAA. Accordingly, PHMSA and FAA agreed to work together in certain areas to improve the safe transportation of flammable aerosols by adopting regulatory and non-regulatory solutions. For example, each agency agreed to: (1) Actively participate in the ICAO Dangerous Goods Panel that reviews the items that passengers are permitted to carry in the cabin and in checked baggage; (2) partner with the Consumer Specialty Products Association to enhance the design of aerosol products; and (3) amend the HMR to require or clarify that any release of hazmat in passenger baggage must be reported. Further, in a final rule published on December 20, 2004, PHMSA amended the HMR by requiring that release devices on aerosols be protected by a cap or other suitable means to prevent the inadvertent release of contents when placed in passenger or crew member baggage. [69 FR 76179; (HM-215G)] Because of the prevalence of aerosols in everyday travel, these adopted safety measures were deemed sufficient while not being overly burdensome to the traveling public. However, PHMSA continues to monitor this issue very closely and will respond to any negative trends accordingly. While PHMSA and FAA adopted safety measures to address the risks associated with permitting aerosols in checked baggage, the amount of butane in a fuel cartridge (200 mL) is approximately twice as much as the amount utilized in a typical 16 ounce aerosol can. Given the amount of electronic devices that passengers typically travel with, the cumulative volume of butane from fuel cell cartridges that passengers could bring aboard an aircraft is a concern. As a result, PHMSA has determined there is too much risk in allowing fuel cell [[Page 16583]] cartridges in checked baggage in addition to the currently authorized flammable aerosols when stowed in inaccessible cargo compartments on passenger-carrying aircraft. Butane-Powered Curling Iron Articles As previously stated, 49 CFR 175.10 prescribes certain conditional exceptions to the HMR for passengers, crewmembers, and air operators for hazardous materials contained in their carry-on (including on one's person) and checked baggage. In paragraph (a)(6), hair curlers (curling irons), containing a hydrocarbon gas such as butane, are excepted from the requirements of the HMR in checked baggage. Flammable gas refills for such curlers are not permitted in carry-on or checked baggage. (emphasis added). In an NPRM published January 23, 2015 (80 FR 3836; [HM-218H]), PHMSA is considering prohibiting butane-powered curling iron articles in checked baggage. We believe the risk posed by flammable gases in an inaccessible compartment on a passenger-carrying aircraft is clear. Flammable gases will burn if mixed with an appropriate amount of air and confined burning of a flammable gas can lead to detonation. As a result, we remain concerned with the flammability hazard posed by butane and other flammable gases and the ability of such gases to propagate or contribute to a fire in the cargo compartment of an aircraft. This concern is particularly relevant to carriage in checked baggage, where damage to the curling iron and the subsequent release of a flammable gas may occur if the baggage is mishandled or the article itself is compromised. Conclusion Because of the risks posed by flammable gas, a number of safety requirements apply to cargo shipments of flammable gas on passenger- carrying aircraft. As previously stated, most Division 2.1 (flammable gas) substances and articles are generally forbidden from transportation as cargo aboard passenger-carrying aircraft, and PHMSA's proposal to prohibit the carriage of butane-powered curling irons in checked baggage is consistent with this provision. In the area of aviation safety, where the high volume of travel and the catastrophic consequences of failure lead to a very low tolerance for risk, we firmly believe the known risks of flammable gas are sufficient basis for our decision. We remain concerned with the flammability hazard posed by butane and other flammable gases and the ability of such gases to propagate or contribute to a fire in an inaccessible cargo compartment of a passenger-carrying aircraft. Moreover, in light of the well-established risks related to flammable gas and the long-standing prohibition of most flammable gas on passenger-carrying aircraft, PHMSA will continue to prohibit fuel cell cartridges that contain a class 2.1 flammable gas from being placed in checked baggage. Magdy El-Sibaie, Associate Administrator for Hazardous Materials Safety. [FR Doc. 2015-07109 Filed 3-27-15; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 4910-60-P
![Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 60 / Monday, March 30, 2015 / Rules and Regulations 16579
CAPTA Amendments of 1996, section implement a grant program made specified in the law. The required
107 of CAPTA authorized funding for available through the Child Abuse review of the regulations and policies to
two State grant programs: (1) To assist Amendments of 1984 (Pub. L. 98–457). determine their effect on family well-
States to develop, strengthen and carry This grant program is no longer in effect being has been completed, and this rule
out child abuse and neglect prevention as it was at the time the appendix was will have a neutral impact on family
and treatment programs; and (2) to assist added (Child Abuse Prevention and well-being as defined in the legislation.
States in responding to reports of Treatment Act Amendments of 1996
Executive Order 13132
medical neglect (including the (Pub. L. 104–235)).
withholding of medically indicated Executive Order 13132 prohibits an
Paperwork Reduction Act agency from publishing any rule that
treatment from disabled infants with
life-threatening conditions), and Under the Paperwork Reduction Act has federalism implications if the rule
improving the provision of services to (Pub. L. 104–13), all Departments are either imposes substantial direct
disabled infants with life-threatening required to submit to OMB for review compliance costs on State and local
conditions and their families. Sections and approval any reporting or governments and is not required by
1340.10 through 1340.14 applied to the recordkeeping requirements inherent in statute, or the rule preempts State law,
former and 1340.15 to the latter and are a proposed or final rule. There are no unless the agency meets the
not applicable to the current CAPTA new requirements as a result of this consultation and funding requirements
State grant program in section 106. regulation. of section 6 of the Executive Order. The
The CAPTA Amendments of 1996 and regulation has no federalism impact as
Regulatory Flexibility Analysis
later amendments significantly revised defined in the Executive Order.
the State grant requirements in law prior The Secretary certifies, under 5 U.S.C.
605(b), and enacted by the Regulatory List of Subjects in 45 CFR Part 1340
to 1996. Now, States must submit a
State plan in order to be eligible to Flexibility Act (Pub. L. 96–354), that Child welfare, Grant programs—
receive a grant, including extensive this regulation will not result in a health, Grant programs—social
State plan assurances. There is no significant impact on a substantial programs, Individuals with disabilities,
longer the grant application and number of small entities. Reporting and recordkeeping
approval process specified in the requirements, Research, Technical
Regulatory Impact Analysis assistance, Youth.
regulations and States now provide
Executive Orders 12866 and 13563
assurances in their State plans that Dated: August 18, 2014.
direct agencies to assess all costs and
certain activities will be carried out Mark Greenberg,
benefits of available regulatory
using the grant funds to achieve the Acting Assistant Secretary for Children and
alternatives and, if the regulation is
objectives of the law. Families.
The protections for disabled infants necessary, to select regulatory
Approved: February 27, 2015.
(commonly known as ‘‘Baby Doe’’) are approaches that maximize net benefits
(including potential economic, Sylvia M. Burwell,
now included in the statute in the form Secretary.
of a State plan assurance. Specifically, environmental, public health and safety
States are required under section effects, distributive impacts, and Editorial note: This document was
106(b)(2)(C) of CAPTA to have equity.) Executive Order 13563 received for publication by the Office of
procedures to respond to reports of emphasizes the importance of Federal Register on March 25, 2015.
withholding medically indicated quantifying both costs and benefits, of Subchapter E—[Removed and Reserved]
treatment from disabled infants with reducing costs, harmonizing rules, and
of promoting flexibility. The regulations ■ For the reasons discussed above,
life-threatening conditions. In addition under the authority at 42 U.S.C. 5101 et
‘‘withholding of medically indicated we are removing are obsolete and no
longer applicable to the current law. By seq. the Administration for Children
treatment’’ is defined in section 111 of and Families amends Title 45, Subtitle
CAPTA. No longer is there a specific removing these outdated regulations, we
are ending potential confusion in regard B, Chapter XIII, by removing and
State grant program and funding for reserving Subchapter E, consisting of
improving the provision of services to to the status of the regulations among
states, grantees and other affected part 1340.
disabled infants with life-threatening
conditions and their families. groups seeking information on the [FR Doc. 2015–07238 Filed 3–27–15; 8:45 am]
CAPTA program rules. There are no BILLING CODE P
Subpart C—Discretionary Grants and budget implications associated with
Contracts removing the CAPTA regulations from
Section 1340.20 Confidentiality the Code of Federal Regulations. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
We are deleting section 1340.20 Congressional Review
Pipeline and Hazardous Materials
because section 106 of CAPTA This final rule is not a major rule as Safety Administration
addresses requirements for state defined in 5 U.S.C. Chapter 8.
grantees for confidentiality of records, 49 CFR Part 175
Assessment of Federal Regulation and
and confidentiality requirements for
Policies on Families [Docket No. PHMSA–2009–0126, Notice No.
other grantees can be addressed in the
Section 654 of the Treasury and 15–3]
terms and conditions of the grant.
asabaliauskas on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with RULES
General Government Appropriations
Appendix to Part 1340—Interpretive Hazardous Materials: Spare Fuel Cell
Act of 1999 requires Federal agencies to
Guidelines Regarding CFR 1340.15— Cartridges Containing Flammable Gas
determine whether a policy or
Services and Treatment for Disabled Transported by Aircraft in Passenger
regulation may negatively affect family
Infants and Crew Member Checked Baggage
well-being. If the agency’s
We are deleting the appendix to Part determination is affirmative, then the AGENCY: Pipeline and Hazardous
1340. The appendix was added through agency must prepare an impact Materials Safety Administration
a Final Rule (50 FR 14878) in 1985 to assessment addressing seven criteria (PHMSA), DOT.
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![16580 Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 60 / Monday, March 30, 2015 / Rules and Regulations
ACTION:Notification of a More Definitive standards. These changes included Lilliputian filed a Petition for Review
Statement. updates to packaging, labeling, and of the Final Order in the United States
testing requirements to increase Court of Appeals for the District of
SUMMARY: PHMSA issued a 2011 final harmony with the international rules Columbia Circuit on March 8, 2013. In
rule in which we did not harmonize and promote the flow of goods (75 FR a January 31, 2014, (731 F.3d 1309)
with international regulations regarding 52070, HM–215K, 8/24/2010). PHMSA decision, the Court remanded the rule
the carriage of spare fuel cell cartridges stated its goal was ‘‘. . . to harmonize and ordered PHMSA to ‘‘provide further
in passenger and crew member checked without diminishing the level of safety explanation for the prohibition on
baggage. Lilliputian Systems, Inc. currently provided by the HMR and airline passengers and crew carrying
(Lilliputian) contested this final rule, without imposing undue burdens on the flammable-gas fuel cell cartridges in
first by filing an administrative appeal, regulated public’’ and that we ‘‘. . . their checked baggage, including its
then challenging the final rule in the evaluate[d] each amendment on its own response to Lilliputian’s comments.’’ 1
United States Court of Appeals for the merit.’’ [75 FR 52071]
District of Columbia Circuit. On January Justification for Denial of the
Ultimately, PHMSA did not adopt Administrative Appeal
31, 2014, the Court remanded the rule every provision of every set of the
and ordered PHMSA to provide further international regulations. In the final When PHMSA decides whether to
explanation for the prohibition on rule published January 19, 2011 [76 FR allow an item on a passenger-carrying
airline passengers and crew carrying 3308], PHMSA revised the 49 CFR aircraft, the Department only tolerates
flammable gas fuel cell cartridges in 175.10 passenger exceptions to allow extraordinarily low levels of risk. For
their checked baggage, including its passengers and crew members to place example, when failure of a component
response to Lilliputian’s comments. 741 certain spare fuel cell cartridges in an airplane could interfere with
F.3d 1309, 1314 (D.C. Cir. 2014). As a containing a flammable liquid (Class 3) continued flight and safe landing, the
result, we are issuing this document or corrosive material (Class 8) in risk of failure must be less than one
which provides a more thorough checked baggage. PHMSA stated, ‘‘fuel billion to one.2 This low level of
explanation and substantial evidence to cell cartridges themselves are subject to tolerance for risk makes sense because,
support PHMSA’s decision to prohibit much more stringent construction, due to the high volume of air transport,
the carriage of spare fuel cell cartridges testing, and packaging requirements even a very improbable event may
in passenger and crew member checked than for similar articles (e.g., aerosols).’’ eventually occur, and with catastrophic
baggage. However, PHMSA limited the scope of results. Additionally, PHMSA is
DATES: March 30, 2015. spare fuel cell cartridge chemistries required by 49 U.S.C. 5108(b) to pursue
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: allowed in checked baggage by the ‘‘highest degree of safety in pipeline
Michael Stevens, Transportation excluding fuel cell cartridges containing transportation and hazardous materials
Specialist (Regulations), Standards and Division 2.1 (flammable gas) and transportation.’’ 3 Under 49 U.S.C.
Rulemaking Division, Office of Division 4.3 (dangerous when wet) 5103(b), PHMSA is authorized to issue
Hazardous Materials Safety, Pipeline material. In the interest of safety, regulations for the safe and secure
and Hazardous Materials Safety PHMSA elected to continue the transportation of hazardous materials in
Administration, U.S. Department of longstanding limitations in the HMR for commerce, including transportation by
Transportation, 1200 New Jersey Division 2.1 (flammable gas) on air.
Avenue SE., Washington, DC 20590, passenger-carrying aircraft and thus The risks presented by flammable gas
Telephone: (202) 366–8553 or, via maintained the existing prohibition on on airplanes are clear. Flammable gases
email: michael.stevens@dot.gov or the transport of spare fuel cells will burn if mixed with an appropriate
Shawn Wolsey, Senior Attorney, Office containing Division 2.1 (flammable gas) amount of air, and an ignition source is
of the Chief Counsel, Pipeline and in checked baggage. PHMSA and the present, and confined burning of a
Hazardous Materials Safety Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) flammable gas can lead to detonation.
Administration, U.S. Department of explained their expressed concern ‘‘due As a result, PHMSA remains concerned
Transportation, 1200 New Jersey to the questionable integrity of [fuel with the hazards posed by flammable
Avenue SE., Washington, DC 20590, cells] when packed in a passenger’s gases (such as the butane contained in
(202) 366–4400 or, via email: checked baggage’’ [76 FR 3337]. some fuel cells) contributing to a fire in
shawn.wolsey@dot.gov. the cargo compartment of a passenger-
As a result of PHMSA’s rulemaking,
carrying aircraft. This concern is
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Lilliputian filed an administrative
particularly relevant to carriage in
appeal in accordance with 49 CFR
Background checked baggage, where damage to the
106.110. It requested PHMSA to revise
fuel cell cartridge and the release of a
In 2009, the International Civil 49 CFR 175.10(a)(19) to align with the
flammable gas may occur if the baggage
Aviation Organization (ICAO) voted and ICAO Technical Instructions and allow
is mishandled.
reissued its Technical Instructions for spare fuel cell cartridges containing
PHMSA denied Lilliputian’s appeal
the Safe Transport of Dangerous Goods Division 2.1 (flammable gas) to be
due to the uncertainty of the safety risks
by Air (ICAO Technical Instructions), carried in checked baggage. PHMSA
posed when combining (1) the
which lifted the previous restriction of granted the administrative appeal by
uncertainty of how the baggage handling
spare fuel cell cartridges for all but providing Lilliputian and the public
would affect the durability and stability
Division 4.3 chemistries from passenger additional opportunity for comment in
asabaliauskas on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with RULES
and crew member checked baggage. In a May 25, 2012 NPRM [77 FR 31274]. 1 741 F.3d 1314.
response, on August 24, 2010, the The subsequent final rule issued on 2 http://www.faa.gov/documentLibrary/media/
Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety January 7, 2013 [78 FR 1101] denied the Advisory_Circular/AC25.1309-1A.pdf.
Administration (PHMSA) issued a placement of spare Division 2.1 fuel cell 3 PHMSA’s Administrator is charged with
notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) cartridges in checked baggage but carrying out all duties and powers vested in the
Secretary of Transportation under chapter 51 of
to harmonize U.S. Hazardous Materials continued to allow two spare Division Title 49 of the U.S. Code, which governs the
Regulations (HMR; 49 CFR parts 171– 2.1 fuel cell cartridges in carry-on transportation of hazardous materials. 49 U.S.C.
180) with updated international baggage. 108(f)(1).
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![Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 60 / Monday, March 30, 2015 / Rules and Regulations 16581
of these products, (2) the possible over- 175.10(a)(1)(i). However, most Division timeframe could be demonstrated.’’ 5 In
sight of hazmat communication and 2.1 (flammable gas) substances and the end, ICAO included in its Technical
packaging requirements because the articles are forbidden from Instructions a provision to allow two
regulations do not apply to passengers, transportation as cargo aboard spare fuel cell cartridges containing
and (3) the limitations of aircraft’s fire passenger-carrying aircraft, and thus flammable gas in checked baggage. It
suppression systems. PHMSA was prohibiting the carriage of spare fuel cell should be noted that the ICAO
particularly concerned by the allowance cartridges containing flammable gas in Dangerous Goods Panel does not operate
for passengers to transport flammable- checked baggage is consistent with the solely on a consensus basis and that
gas fuel cells because passengers ‘‘are agency’s longstanding position with some delegates, including the U.S. Panel
not trained to recognize potential regard to flammable gases. Member, were not in agreement with
hazards’’ and ‘‘are unlikely to be aware this decision. The U.S. Panel member
Checked Baggage
of the safety implications’’ of improper spoke against the adoption of this
packaging or handling. Considering The exceptions in 49 CFR 175.10 have provision when the amendment was
those factors combined with the not been expanded to permit additional discussed and agreed to by majority vote
limitations of the aircraft’s suppression flammable gases in checked baggage. As during the Dangerous Goods Panel’s
system, (fire suppression systems ‘‘do previously noted, allowing 22nd meeting (held in Montreal, Canada
not prevent fires’’ and are not ‘‘designed transportation of flammable gas in from October 5–16, 2009).6
to completely extinguish fires’’) the airline passengers’ checked baggage
safety risks were too great to authorize would be inconsistent with the FAA Technical Report
this exemption. PHMSA further exceptions in 49 CFR 175.10. Airline In Lilliputian’s comments posted to
explained that the authorization of any passengers do not comply with the the docket of the August 24, 2010 NPRM
additional flammable gas on an important packaging, labeling, and (PHMSA–2009–0126–2027), they posed
airplane, in addition to the gases hazard communication requirements five recommendations for conducting a
contained in the toiletry and medicinal when they put items in their checked proper risk analysis:
items already allowed, would need to baggage, and they may not even be • Any analysis should begin with the
take into account ‘‘the cumulative risk aware of such requirements. Without risk of ignition or sparking.
of the new authorization combined with hazard communication and other • The analysis should examine the
existing authorizations.’’ [78 FR 1104] notifications to handlers that the risk of catching fire as a result of an
PHMSA expressed willingness, passenger’s baggage contains flammable external fire.
however, to consider allowing certain gas, checked baggage could be • The analysis should examine
fuel cells models on a case-by-case mishandled, damaging the integrity of whether a fuel cell fire, once ignited,
basis. For example, portable oxygen an improperly packaged container of can be effectively extinguished in a
concentrators may be allowed at some flammable gas. Negligent packing and timely manner.
point in the future, when experience excessive handling increases the • The analysis should look to any
and testing prove that safe designs exist. potential that a container of flammable experience involving similar materials.
Because of the risks presented by gas in checked baggage could rupture, • The analysis should evaluate
flammable gases, a number of safety creating conditions for an explosion. 76 whether the volume of the material is
requirements apply to shipments of FR 3337. relevant in terms of the risk and
flammable gas on passenger-carrying Beginning in 2009, the ICAO began managing that risk.
aircraft. PHMSA believes there is considering whether to change its We believe that the Preliminary
sufficient basis for its decision because, regulations to allow transport of fuel Investigation of the Fire Hazard
as previously stated, in the area of cells in checked baggage. Prior to that Inherent in Micro Fuel Cell Cartridges
aviation safety, there is a very low time, fuel cells had been allowed only (Final Report) 7 prepared by the FAA
tolerance for risk. In its decision, in carry-on baggage or on one’s person, Technical Center did address these
PHMSA considered the known risks of in order to mitigate the risk of the fuel recommendations posed by Lilliputian.
flammable gases, coupled with the cell cartridge inadvertently coming into The report examined the fire risk
uncertainties relating to the safety of contact with an ignition source.4 presented by fuel cells, including cells
new fuel cell technology, added to the Although members of the ICAO powered by flammable solids, liquids,
already high volume of air travel and Dangerous Goods Panel were generally and gas, including a test that exposed
the catastrophic consequences of any supportive of permitting most fuel cells single, small fuel cells of various types
failure. containing flammable liquids in to a low-intensity flame in a controlled
checked baggage, ‘‘many were wary of environment. Only a few varieties of
Cumulative Risk
permitting fuel cartridges containing fuel cells were tested, because the
PHMSA’s approach to aviation safety substances of other classes.’’ In technology was still developing;
is not to permit items merely because particular, ‘‘[s]ome felt further however, one of the fuel cells tested was
they are similar to items already consideration was needed with respect a butane fuel cell manufactured by
permitted. The authorization of any to fuel cell cartridges containing Lilliputian. The test results showed that,
additional flammable gas on an aircraft, flammable gases.’’ Some participants of the fuel types tested, ‘‘[b]utane
in addition to the toiletry and medicinal suggested that changes not be adopted produced the most vigorous fire.’’ The
items already allowed, needs to take to allow these new technologies until plastic cartridge used by Lilliputian was
into account the cumulative risk of the ‘‘experience based on a longer breached only 45 seconds after exposure
asabaliauskas on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with RULES
new authorization combined with
existing authorizations. A limited 4 With regard to the allowance of fuel cell 5 http://www.icao.int/safety/DangerousGoods/
exception has existed since 1972 for cartridges in carry-on baggage or on one’s person, DGP%2022%20Working%20Papers/DGP.22.WP.
small quantities of such gases in the risk is mitigated because the fuel cells are 100.en.pdf at 2.9.4.
6 http://www.icao.int/safety/DangerousGoods/
personal medicinal and toiletry items, contained in a supervised environment. Thus, a
flight attendant would be able to extinguish any DGP%2022%20Working%20Papers/DGP.22.WP.
such as the butane used as a propellant fires that might occur in a carry-on bag in the event 100.en.pdf.
in a small aerosol can or a butane- of a fuel cell cartridge inadvertently coming into 7 See Document PHMSA–2009–0126–2366 in this
powered curling iron (49 CFR contact with an ignition source. docket.
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![16582 Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 60 / Monday, March 30, 2015 / Rules and Regulations
to flame and the ‘‘butane ignition was As PHMSA stated in the preamble to effective January 1, 1994, 9 the aerosol
rapid, almost explosive’’ 8 (emphasis the January 19, 2011 final rule, Federal industry changed the type of propellant
added). It produced an approximately hazmat law (49 U.S.C. 5101 et seq.) and used in their products. Unfortunately,
1,000-degree Fahrenheit flame, by far policy encourages the harmonization of this new type of propellant is flammable
the hottest flame produced by any of the domestic and international standards for and, because of its widespread use,
materials in the study. While some of hazardous materials transportation to there was concern of a risk-risk tradeoff
the other fuel cell fires were ‘‘easily the extent practicable, but the law also (ozone layer damage versus cargo
extinguished using Halon 1211,’’ a fire permits PHMSA to depart from compartment safety on passenger-
suppression system commonly used in international standards in order to carrying aircraft). PHMSA and FAA
an aircraft, the butane fire burned so promote public safety. When were concerned that static electricity
rapidly that the fire suppression system considering the adoption of inherent in cargo compartments could
did not activate until after all the butane international standards under the HMR, ignite a leaking flammable aerosol
fuel had been consumed by the fire. PHMSA reviews and evaluates each container in passenger baggage.
A Halon 1211 system is not designed amendment on its own merit, on the Based on its concerns, PHMSA
to detect fires. The pilot must first see basis of its overall impact on reviewed incident reports in the
that there is an alert from the fire transportation safety, and on the Hazardous Materials Identification
detection system. Once that happens, economic implications associated with System (HMIS) database and specific
the pilot will engage the Halon 1211 its adoption. Our goal is to harmonize incidents that occurred during baggage
system, which will attempt to suppress, without diminishing the level of safety handling provided by the FAA.
but not extinguish, the fire. While and without imposing undue burdens Accordingly, PHMSA and FAA agreed
airplanes are equipped with fire on the regulated public. In this instance, to work together in certain areas to
detection systems, such as Halon 1211, we believe that restricting the carriage of improve the safe transportation of
there are no systems on board to detect flammable gas fuel cell cartridges to be flammable aerosols by adopting
a gas leak. Thus, if a fuel cell cartridge a necessary variation to the ICAO regulatory and non-regulatory solutions.
Technical Instructions that enhances the For example, each agency agreed to: (1)
placed in checked baggage is damaged
safety of aircraft passengers without Actively participate in the ICAO
and allows butane gas to leak into the
imposing an unreasonable regulatory Dangerous Goods Panel that reviews the
cargo compartment, there is no way for
burden. Under Federal hazmat law, we items that passengers are permitted to
the pilot to be aware of this. The
are tasked with balancing the needs of carry in the cabin and in checked
accumulation of the butane gas, if
public safety with economic burdens baggage; (2) partner with the Consumer
exposed to a spark, would then cause an
when considering harmonization with Specialty Products Association to
explosion and would lead to a
international standards. Consequently, enhance the design of aerosol products;
catastrophic failure of the airplane.
because we elected not to revise the and (3) amend the HMR to require or
The FAA Technical Center tests were HMR to align with the ICAO Technical clarify that any release of hazmat in
designed to determine the flammability Instructions, we believe we did strike a passenger baggage must be reported.
characteristics of fuel cell cartridges. balance by continuing to permit Further, in a final rule published on
The tests were conducted on single flammable gas fuel cell cartridges in December 20, 2004, PHMSA amended
cartridges exposed to a controlled fire. carry-on baggage. the HMR by requiring that release
The tests did not take into account the devices on aerosols be protected by a
interaction of one or more cartridges Disparate Treatment of Aerosols and cap or other suitable means to prevent
and any adjacent combustible material Butane-Powered Articles the inadvertent release of contents when
(i.e., clothing, electronic devices, etc.) or The Court of Appeals for the District placed in passenger or crew member
the effect of fuel cell cartridges in of Columbia Circuit also was concerned baggage. [69 FR 76179; (HM–215G)]
propagating a fire. We do know from the that PHMSA did not provide a reasoned Because of the prevalence of aerosols in
test results that butane produced the explanation and substantial evidence for everyday travel, these adopted safety
most vigorous fire, the cartridge the disparate treatment of fuel cell measures were deemed sufficient while
provided the least amount of protection cartridges as opposed to other products, not being overly burdensome to the
from an external fire and, once particularly medicinal and toiletry items traveling public. However, PHMSA
penetrated, the liquid butane burned that contain flammable gases (i.e. continues to monitor this issue very
rapidly and filled the test chamber with aerosols). closely and will respond to any negative
fire. The butane fire also registered the trends accordingly.
highest temperature (1000 degrees Aerosols
While PHMSA and FAA adopted
Fahrenheit) and heat flux measurements In order to determine if a hazardous safety measures to address the risks
of all tests conducted. The plastic material is permitted in checked associated with permitting aerosols in
cartridge used by Lilliputian was baggage, PHMSA must take into account checked baggage, the amount of butane
breached only 45 seconds after exposure the cumulative risk of any new in a fuel cartridge (200 mL) is
to flame, and the butane ignition was authorizations combined with any approximately twice as much as the
rapid, almost explosive. Thus, the test existing authorizations. Under certain amount utilized in a typical 16 ounce
results from the Final Report support conditions, 49 CFR 175.10 permits the aerosol can. Given the amount of
our concern that the inherent hazards of carriage of aerosols in checked baggage electronic devices that passengers
compressed flammable gases, as on a passenger-carrying aircraft. This typically travel with, the cumulative
asabaliauskas on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with RULES
demonstrated by exposure to a fire limited exception has existed since 1972 volume of butane from fuel cell
involving a fuel cell cartridge containing for aerosol containers in small cartridges that passengers could bring
an estimated volume of only 50 cc or quantities in personal medicinal and aboard an aircraft is a concern. As a
less of butane, would pose an toiletry items. Such items include hair result, PHMSA has determined there is
unacceptable risk in air transportation. spray, deodorant, and certain medicinal too much risk in allowing fuel cell
products.
8 See Document PHMSA–2009–0126–2366 in this To comply with the ban on 9 http://www.epa.gov/ozone/snap/aerosol/
docket. chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) that became qa.html.
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![Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 60 / Monday, March 30, 2015 / Rules and Regulations 16583
cartridges in checked baggage in We remain concerned with the ADDRESSES: Electronic copies of
addition to the currently authorized flammability hazard posed by butane Amendment 32, which includes an
flammable aerosols when stowed in and other flammable gases and the environmental assessment, a Regulatory
inaccessible cargo compartments on ability of such gases to propagate or Flexibility Act (RFA) analysis, and a
passenger-carrying aircraft. contribute to a fire in an inaccessible regulatory impact review, may be
cargo compartment of a passenger- obtained from the Southeast Regional
Butane-Powered Curling Iron Articles carrying aircraft. Moreover, in light of Office Web site at http://sero.nmfs.noaa
As previously stated, 49 CFR 175.10 the well-established risks related to .gov/sustainable_fisheries/s_atl/sg/
prescribes certain conditional flammable gas and the long-standing 2014/am32/index.html.
exceptions to the HMR for passengers, prohibition of most flammable gas on
passenger-carrying aircraft, PHMSA will FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Rick
crewmembers, and air operators for
continue to prohibit fuel cell cartridges DeVictor, telephone: 727–824–5305, or
hazardous materials contained in their
that contain a class 2.1 flammable gas email: rick.devictor@noaa.gov.
carry-on (including on one’s person)
and checked baggage. In paragraph from being placed in checked baggage.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The
(a)(6), hair curlers (curling irons), Magdy El-Sibaie, blueline tilefish is a species included in
containing a hydrocarbon gas such as Associate Administrator for Hazardous the snapper-grouper fishery of the South
butane, are excepted from the Materials Safety. Atlantic, and the fishery is managed
requirements of the HMR in checked [FR Doc. 2015–07109 Filed 3–27–15; 8:45 am] under the FMP. The FMP was prepared
baggage. Flammable gas refills for such BILLING CODE 4910–60–P by the Council and is implemented
curlers are not permitted in carry-on or through regulations at 50 CFR part 622
checked baggage. (emphasis added). under the authority of the Magnuson-
In an NPRM published January 23, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE Stevens Fishery Conservation and
2015 (80 FR 3836; [HM–218H]), PHMSA Management Act (Magnuson-Stevens
is considering prohibiting butane- National Oceanic and Atmospheric Act).
powered curling iron articles in checked Administration On December 19, 2014, NMFS
baggage. We believe the risk posed by published a notice of availability for
flammable gases in an inaccessible 50 CFR Part 622
Amendment 32 and requested public
compartment on a passenger-carrying comment (79 FR 75780). On January 22,
[Docket No. 140501394–5279–02]
aircraft is clear. Flammable gases will 2015, NMFS published a proposed rule
burn if mixed with an appropriate RIN 0648–BE20 for Amendment 32 and requested public
amount of air and confined burning of
Fisheries of the Caribbean, Gulf of comment (80 FR 3207). The proposed
a flammable gas can lead to detonation.
Mexico, and South Atlantic; Snapper- rule and Amendment 32 outline the
As a result, we remain concerned with
Grouper Fishery Off the Southern rationale for the actions contained in
the flammability hazard posed by
Atlantic States; Amendment 32 this final rule. A summary of the actions
butane and other flammable gases and
implemented by Amendment 32 and
the ability of such gases to propagate or AGENCY: National Marine Fisheries this final rule is provided below.
contribute to a fire in the cargo Service (NMFS), National Oceanic and
compartment of an aircraft. This Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), A benchmark assessment for the
concern is particularly relevant to Commerce. blueline tilefish stock in the South
carriage in checked baggage, where Atlantic was conducted through the
ACTION: Final rule.
damage to the curling iron and the Southeast, Data, Assessment, and
subsequent release of a flammable gas SUMMARY: NMFS issues regulations to Review (SEDAR) process in 2013
may occur if the baggage is mishandled implement Amendment 32 to the (SEDAR 32). The assessment
or the article itself is compromised. Fishery Management Plan for the determined that the blueline tilefish
Snapper-Grouper Fishery of the South stock is undergoing overfishing in the
Conclusion
Atlantic Region (FMP), as prepared by South Atlantic. NMFS published an
Because of the risks posed by the South Atlantic Fishery Management emergency rule on April 17, 2014 (79 FR
flammable gas, a number of safety Council (Council). This rule removes 21636), that implemented temporary
requirements apply to cargo shipments blueline tilefish from the deep-water measures to reduce overfishing of
of flammable gas on passenger-carrying complex; establishes blueline tilefish blueline tilefish while Amendment 32
aircraft. As previously stated, most commercial and recreational sector was under development. Those
Division 2.1 (flammable gas) substances annual catch limits (ACLs) and measures were extended through a
and articles are generally forbidden accountability measures (AMs); revises temporary rule (79 FR 61262, October
from transportation as cargo aboard the deep-water complex ACLs and AMs; 10, 2014), and are effective through
passenger-carrying aircraft, and establishes a blueline tilefish April 18, 2015. The temporary measures
PHMSA’s proposal to prohibit the commercial trip limit; and revises the of the emergency action include the
carriage of butane-powered curling irons blueline tilefish recreational bag limit. following: Removal of blueline tilefish
in checked baggage is consistent with The purpose of this rule is to specify from the deep-water complex,
ACLs and AMs for blueline tilefish to
asabaliauskas on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with RULES
this provision. In the area of aviation specification of sector ACLs and AMs
safety, where the high volume of travel end overfishing of the stock and for blueline tilefish, and revision to the
and the catastrophic consequences of maintain catch levels consistent with deep-water complex ACL to reflect the
failure lead to a very low tolerance for achieving optimum yield (OY) for the removal of blueline tilefish from the
risk, we firmly believe the known risks blueline tilefish resource. complex. Unless otherwise noted, all
of flammable gas are sufficient basis for DATES: This rule is effective March 30, weights in this rule are expressed in
our decision. 2015. round weight.
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Document Created: 2015-12-18 11:33:04
Document Modified: 2015-12-18 11:33:04
| Category | Regulatory Information | |
| Collection | Federal Register | |
| sudoc Class | AE 2.7: GS 4.107: AE 2.106: | |
| Publisher | Office of the Federal Register, National Archives and Records Administration | |
| Section | Rules and Regulations | |
| Action | Notification of a More Definitive Statement. | |
| Dates | March 30, 2015. | |
| Contact | Michael Stevens, Transportation Specialist (Regulations), Standards and Rulemaking Division, Office of Hazardous Materials Safety, Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration, U.S. Department of Transportation, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, DC 20590, Telephone: (202) 366-8553 or, via email: [email protected] or Shawn Wolsey, Senior Attorney, Office of the Chief Counsel, Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration, U.S. Department of Transportation, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, DC 20590, (202) 366-4400 or, via email: [email protected] | |
| FR Citation | 80 FR 16579 |
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