80 FR 16632 - Amended Order Temporarily Denying Export Privileges

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
Bureau of Industry and Security

Federal Register Volume 80, Issue 60 (March 30, 2015)

Page Range		16632-16634
FR Document		2015-07181
Federal Register, Volume 80 Issue 60 (Monday, March 30, 2015)
[Federal Register Volume 80, Number 60 (Monday, March 30, 2015)]
[Notices]
[Pages 16632-16634]
From the Federal Register Online  [www.thefederalregister.org]
[FR Doc No: 2015-07181]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

Bureau of Industry and Security


Amended Order Temporarily Denying Export Privileges

    Flider Electronics, LLC a/k/a Flider Electronics d/b/a Trident 
International Corporation d/b/a Trident International d/b/a Trident 
International Corporation, LLC, 837 Turk Street, San Francisco, 
California 94102

and

    Pavel Semenovich Flider a/k/a Pavel Flider, 21 Eye Street, San 
Rafael, California 94901

and

    Gennadiy Semenovich Flider a/k/a Gennadiy Flider, 699 36th 
Avenue #203, San Francisco, California 94121

    Pursuant to Section 766.24 of the Export Administration Regulations 
(the ``Regulations'' or ``EAR''),\1\ the Bureau of Industry and 
Security (``BIS''), U.S. Department of Commerce, through its Office of 
Export Enforcement (``OEE''), has requested that I issue an Order 
temporarily denying, for a period of 180 days, the export privileges of 
Flider Electronics, LLC, also known as Flider Electronics, and doing 
business as Trident International Corporation, Trident International, 
and Trident International Corporation, LLC. Flider Electronics, LLC is 
a California limited liability company based in San Francisco, 
California. It is operated, at least in substantial part, for the 
purpose of procuring and exporting U.S.-origin electronic components. 
California State Corporation Number C1908339 has been used in 
connection with the doing business names of Trident International 
Corporation, Trident International, and Trident International 
Corporation, LLC, but that number is associated with Flider 
Electronics, LLC and the address used in connection with those doing 
business as names is the same address as Flider Electronics, LLC. Pavel 
Semenovich Flider, also known as Pavel Flider, is the president and 
owner of Flider Electronics/Trident International (``Trident''). His 
brother Gennadiy Semenovich Flider, also known as Gennadiy Flider, has 
identified himself as Trident's office manager, since 2003, and his 
duties include the purchase of items from U.S. distributors, the 
shipment of those items abroad, and related filings with U.S. 
Government agencies.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \1\ The Regulations are currently codified at 15 CFR parts 730-
774 (2014). The EAR issued under the Export Administration Act of 
1979, as amended (50 U.S.C. app. Sec. Sec.  2401-2420 (2000)) 
(``EAA''). Since August 21, 2001, the Act has been in lapse and the 
President, through Executive Order 13222 of August 17, 2001 (3 CFR, 
2001 Comp. 783 (2002)), which has been extended by successive 
Presidential Notices, the most recent being that of August 7, 2014 
(79 FR 46959 (Aug. 11, 2014)), has continued the Regulations in 
effect under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 
U.S.C. 1701, et seq.) (2006 & Supp. IV 2010).
    \2\ I approved OEE's request and issued a temporary denial order 
against Trident on March 19, 2015. Pavel Flider and Gennadiy Flider 
were added to that order, as issued, as related persons to Trident. 
This amended order makes limited revision to page 6 of the March 19, 
2015 order, and does not change my findings or the terms of the 
order issued on March 19, 2015. See pp. 6-11, infra.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Pursuant to Section 766.24, BIS may issue an order temporarily 
denying a respondent's export privileges upon a showing that the order 
is necessary in the public interest to prevent an ``imminent 
violation'' of the Regulations. 15 CFR 766.24(b)(1) and 776.24(d). ``A 
violation may be `imminent' either in time or degree of likelihood.'' 
15 CFR 766.24(b)(3). BIS may show ``either that a violation is about to 
occur, or that the general circumstances of the matter under 
investigation or case under criminal or administrative charges 
demonstrate a likelihood of future violations.'' Id. As to the 
likelihood of future violations, BIS may show that the violation under 
investigation or charge ``is significant, deliberate, covert and/or 
likely to occur again, rather than technical or negligent [.]'' Id. A 
``lack of information establishing the precise time a violation may 
occur does not preclude a finding that a violation is imminent, so long 
as there is sufficient reason to believe the likelihood of a 
violation.'' Id.
    In its request, OEE has presented evidence that it has reason to 
believe that Trident engaged in conduct prohibited by the Regulations 
by exporting items subject to the EAR to Russia via transshipment 
through third countries. In Automated Export System (``AES'') filings 
it made, Trident identified as ``ultimate consignees'' companies in 
Estonia and Finland that BIS has reason to believe were operating as 
freight forwarders and not end users of the U.S.-origin items. OEE's 
presentation also indicates that at least two of these transactions are 
known to have involved items that are listed on the Commerce Control 
List and that a search of BIS's licensing database reveals no licensing 
history of controlled U.S.-origin electronics to Russia for the company 
and individuals captioned in this case. Based on, inter alia, the 
transshipment of the items, the misrepresentations made on the AES 
filings, and information obtained pursuant to a Mutual Legal Assistance 
Treaty (``MLAT'') request, OEE indicates that it has reason to believe 
that these exports required a license.

[[Page 16633]]

A. Detained Shipments on April 6, 2013

    On or about April 6, 2013, the U.S. Customs and Border Protection 
(``CBP'') detained two outbound shipments at San Francisco 
International Airport. CBP ultimately allowed one of these exports to 
proceed, but the other attempted export was not and the items were 
ultimately seized. The manifest and the AES filing for the seized 
shipment described the items as ``power supplies,'' but the shipment 
actually contained, among other items, 15 Xilinx field programmable 
gate array (FPGA) circuits that were controlled under Export Control 
Classification Number (ECCN) 3A001.a.2.c for national security reasons 
and generally required a license for Russia. The shipping documentation 
also listed Logilane Oy Ltd. in Finland (``Logilane'') as the ultimate 
consignee. Open source information confirmed that Logilane was a 
freight forwarder and thus unlikely to be the end user for the items 
contained in the shipment. When questioned about the shipment, Pavel 
Flider requested that the ultimate consignee be changed to Adimir OU 
(``Adimir'') in Estonia, which itself also proved to be a freight 
forwarder as discussed further below.

B. Interviews of Pavel Flider and Gennadiy Flider

    On or about April 19, 2013, OEE interviewed Trident office manager 
Gennadiy Flider, who identified his responsibilities as handling the 
procurement and shipment of items, including for export. He stated 
Trident had been doing business with Adimir for many years and that it 
was the only customer that his company had. He also indicated that 
Trident at times shipped items intended for its Estonian customer to 
Finland, claiming this was because it was cheaper.
    Similarly, in an August 5, 2013 interview, Trident's president and 
owner Pavel Flider stated that Adimir was Trident's one and only 
customer and that at times Adimir requested that items be shipped to a 
freight forwarder in Finland. Both Gennadiy Flider and Pavel Flider 
denied shipping to Russia.

C. July 2013 Detention and Subsequent Seizure

    On or about July 20, 2013, the U.S. Government detained a Trident 
shipment bound for Adimir in Estonia. In addition to Adimir being 
identified as the ultimate consignee on the AES filing, the items were 
identified as ``Electronic Equipment.'' A review of the invoice showed 
six Xilinx FPGAs, items which were controlled under ECCN 3A001.a.2.c 
for national security reasons and generally required a license for 
Russia. Moreover, an inspection of the shipment uncovered 51 controlled 
Xilinx chips, rather than just the six that had been declared. CBP 
ultimately seized the shipment on or about October 18, 2013.

D. Information Concerning Purported Estonian End User Obtained via an 
MLAT Request

    Based on information obtained in 2014 via a late 2013 MLAT request 
sent to Estonia relating to Adimir, BIS has reason to believe that 
Adimir was not an end user. During an interview, an Adimir corporate 
officer admitted to transshipping Trident shipments to Russia at the 
request of Pavel Flider. Adimir subsequently ceased operating.

E. Changes in the Scheme

    Following the detention and seizures, the MLAT request, and the 
Adimir interview, Trident began exporting directly to Russia, claiming 
that the controlled circuits were for use in railroads. This assertion 
sought to track a note to ECCN 3A001.a.2, which indicates that the ECCN 
does not apply to integrated circuits for civil automotive or railway 
train applications. Pavel Flider reported to the U.S. distributor that 
Trident had been ``referred'' Russian customers by Adimir, which was 
going out of business. After being made aware that the items actually 
were intended for export to Russia, the U.S. distributor requested that 
Trident sign a Form BIS-711 ``Statement by Ultimate Consignee and 
Purchaser,'' which includes an end use statement and must be signed by 
the purchaser and the ultimate consignee.
    From on or about January 23, 2014, to on or about April 16, 2014, 
Trident began listing in its AES filings OOO Elkomtex (``Elkomtex'') in 
St. Petersburg, Russia, as the ultimate consignee. On or about July 17, 
2014, the Elkomtex employees admitted that the company was not an end 
user but a distributor of electronics, acting as a broker between an 
exporter and an end use company.
    Beginning with an export on or about May 6, 2014, Trident again 
changed its export route and began exporting to a purported ultimate 
consignee named Logimix Ltd., in Vantaa, Finland (``Logimix''). Between 
on or about May 6, 2014, to on or about March 12, 2015, AES filings 
indicate that Trident has made 33 exports with Logimix listed as the 
ultimate consignee. Based on Logimix's Web site and other open source 
Internet information, however, OEE's presentation indicates that it has 
reason to believe that Logimix is a freight forwarder and not an end 
user. Moreover, given the violations, deceptive actions, and other 
evidence involving Trident, including those admitted by the Fliders, 
OEE also indicates that it has reason to believe that Trident have been 
making transshipments to Russia.
    OEE has further indicated that in February 2014, Trident ordered an 
additional 195 integrated circuits controlled under ECCN 3A001.a.2.c 
from a U.S. distributor and that those items would be available by in 
or around April 2015. In addition, Trident and Pavel Flider have been 
indicted for smuggling and money laundering, including in connection 
with some of the transactions discussed above. The U.S. Government also 
seized multiple accounts in which Trident had an interest.

F. Findings

    I find that the evidence presented by BIS demonstrates that a 
violation of the Regulations is imminent in both time and degree of 
likelihood. Trident has engaged in some known violations of the 
Regulations and its actions, including changes in how it structures its 
export transactions and routes its shipments, appear designed to 
camouflage the actual destinations, end uses, and/or end users of the 
U.S.-origin items it has been and continues to export, including items 
on the Commerce Control List that are subject to national security-
based license requirements. Moreover, when interviewed in 2013, the 
Fliders could not provide a reasonable explanation for the purported 
exports to Estonia and Finland. When for a time Trident began direct 
exports to Russia, the entity listed as the ultimate consignee admitted 
that it was not an end user and instead acting as a broker.
    In sum, the fact and circumstances taken as a whole provide strong 
indicators that future violations are likely absent the issuance of a 
TDO. As such, a TDO is needed to give notice to persons and companies 
in the United States and abroad that they should cease dealing with 
Trident in export transactions involving items subject to the EAR. Such 
a TDO is consistent with the public interest to preclude future 
violations of the EAR.
    Additionally, Section 766.23 of the Regulations provides that 
``[i]n order to prevent evasion, certain types of orders under this 
part may be made applicable not only to the respondent, but also to 
other persons then or thereafter related to the respondent by 
ownership, control, position of responsibility, affiliation, or other 
connection in the

[[Page 16634]]

conduct of trade or business. Orders that may be made applicable to 
related persons include those that deny or affect export privileges, 
including temporary denial orders. . . .'' 15 CFR 766.23(a). As stated 
above, Pavel Flider is the president and owner of Trident. Gennadiy 
Flider also is a Trident office manager, with responsibilities relating 
directly to the procurement and export activities at issue. As such, I 
find that Pavel Semenovich Flider and Gennadiy Semenovich Flider are 
related persons to Trident based on their positions of responsibility 
and that their additions to the order is necessary to prevent evasion.
    Accordingly, I find that an order denying the export privileges of 
Trident, Pavel Flider, and Gennadiy Flider is necessary, in the public 
interest, to prevent an imminent violation of the EAR.
    This Order is being issued on an ex parte basis without a hearing 
based upon BIS's showing of an imminent violation in accordance with 
Section 766.24 of the Regulations.
    It is therefore ordered:
    First, that FLIDER ELECTRONICS, LLC, a/k/a FLIDER ELECTRONICS, d/b/
a TRIDENT INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION, d/b/a TRIDENT INTERNATIONAL d/b/a 
TRIDENT INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION, LLC, 837 Turk Street, San Francisco, 
California 94102; PAVEL SEMENOVICH FLIDER, a/k/a PAVEL FLIDER, 21 Eye 
Street, San Rafael, California 94901; and GENNADIY SEMENOVICH FLIDER, 
a/k/a GENNADIY FLIDER, 699 36th Avenue #203, San Francisco, California 
94121, and when acting for or on their behalf, any successors or 
assigns, agents, or employees (each a ``Denied Person'' and 
collectively the ``Denied Persons'') may not, directly or indirectly, 
participate in any way in any transaction involving any commodity, 
software or technology (hereinafter collectively referred to as 
``item'') exported or to be exported from the United States that is 
subject to the Export Administration Regulations (``EAR''), or in any 
other activity subject to the EAR including, but not limited to:
    A. Applying for, obtaining, or using any license, License 
Exception, or export control document;
    B. Carrying on negotiations concerning, or ordering, buying, 
receiving, using, selling, delivering, storing, disposing of, 
forwarding, transporting, financing, or otherwise servicing in any way, 
any transaction involving any item exported or to be exported from the 
United States that is subject to the EAR, or in any other activity 
subject to the EAR; or
    C. Benefitting in any way from any transaction involving any item 
exported or to be exported from the United States that is subject to 
the EAR, or in any other activity subject to the EAR.
    Second, that no person may, directly or indirectly, do any of the 
following:
    A. Export or reexport to or on behalf of a Denied Person any item 
subject to the EAR;
    B. Take any action that facilitates the acquisition or attempted 
acquisition by a Denied Person of the ownership, possession, or control 
of any item subject to the EAR that has been or will be exported from 
the United States, including financing or other support activities 
related to a transaction whereby a Denied Person acquires or attempts 
to acquire such ownership, possession or control;
    C. Take any action to acquire from or to facilitate the acquisition 
or attempted acquisition from a Denied Person of any item subject to 
the EAR that has been exported from the United States;
    D. Obtain from a Denied Person in the United States any item 
subject to the EAR with knowledge or reason to know that the item will 
be, or is intended to be, exported from the United States; or
    E. Engage in any transaction to service any item subject to the EAR 
that has been or will be exported from the United States and which is 
owned, possessed or controlled by a Denied Person, or service any item, 
of whatever origin, that is owned, possessed or controlled by a Denied 
Person if such service involves the use of any item subject to the EAR 
that has been or will be exported from the United States. For purposes 
of this paragraph, servicing means installation, maintenance, repair, 
modification or testing.
    Third, that, after notice and opportunity for comment as provided 
in Section 766.23 of the EAR, any other person, firm, corporation, or 
business organization related to a Denied Person by ownership, control, 
position of responsibility, affiliation, or other connection in the 
conduct of trade or business may also be made subject to the provisions 
of this Order.
    In accordance with the provisions of Section 766.24(e) of the EAR, 
Flider Electronics, LLC d/b/a Trident International Corporation, may, 
at any time, appeal this Order by filing a full written statement in 
support of the appeal with the Office of the Administrative Law Judge, 
U.S. Coast Guard ALJ Docketing Center, 40 South Gay Street, Baltimore, 
Maryland 21202-4022. In accordance with the provisions of Sections 
766.23(c)(2) and 766.24(e)(3) of the EAR, Pavel Semenovich Flider and 
Gennadiy Semenovich Flider may, at any time, appeal their inclusion as 
a related person by filing a full written statement in support of the 
appeal with the Office of the Administrative Law Judge, U.S. Coast 
Guard ALJ Docketing Center, 40 South Gay Street, Baltimore, Maryland 
21202-4022.
    In accordance with the provisions of Section 766.24(d) of the EAR, 
BIS may seek renewal of this Order by filing a written request not 
later than 20 days before the expiration date. Flider Electronics, LLC 
d/b/a Trident International Corporation may oppose a request to renew 
this Order by filing a written submission with the Assistant Secretary 
for Export Enforcement, which must be received not later than seven 
days before the expiration date of the Order.
    A copy of this Order shall be sent to Flider Electronics LLC d/b/a 
Trident International Corporation and each related person, and shall be 
published in the Federal Register.
    This Order is effective upon issuance and shall remain in effect 
until September 14, 2015.

    Dated: March 23, 2015.
David W. Mills,
Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Export Enforcement.
[FR Doc. 2015-07181 Filed 3-27-15; 8:45 am]
 BILLING CODE P
Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 60 / Monday, March 30, 2015 / Notices 16633

A. Detained Shipments on April 6, 2013 reasons and generally required a license freight forwarder and not an end user.
On or about April 6, 2013, the U.S. for Russia. Moreover, an inspection of Moreover, given the violations,
Customs and Border Protection (‘‘CBP’’) the shipment uncovered 51 controlled deceptive actions, and other evidence
detained two outbound shipments at Xilinx chips, rather than just the six that involving Trident, including those
San Francisco International Airport. had been declared. CBP ultimately admitted by the Fliders, OEE also
seized the shipment on or about October indicates that it has reason to believe
CBP ultimately allowed one of these
18, 2013. that Trident have been making
exports to proceed, but the other
transshipments to Russia.
attempted export was not and the items D. Information Concerning Purported OEE has further indicated that in
were ultimately seized. The manifest Estonian End User Obtained via an February 2014, Trident ordered an
and the AES filing for the seized MLAT Request additional 195 integrated circuits
shipment described the items as ‘‘power Based on information obtained in controlled under ECCN 3A001.a.2.c
supplies,’’ but the shipment actually 2014 via a late 2013 MLAT request sent from a U.S. distributor and that those
contained, among other items, 15 Xilinx to Estonia relating to Adimir, BIS has items would be available by in or
field programmable gate array (FPGA) reason to believe that Adimir was not an around April 2015. In addition, Trident
circuits that were controlled under end user. During an interview, an and Pavel Flider have been indicted for
Export Control Classification Number Adimir corporate officer admitted to smuggling and money laundering,
(ECCN) 3A001.a.2.c for national security transshipping Trident shipments to including in connection with some of
reasons and generally required a license Russia at the request of Pavel Flider. the transactions discussed above. The
for Russia. The shipping documentation Adimir subsequently ceased operating. U.S. Government also seized multiple
also listed Logilane Oy Ltd. in Finland accounts in which Trident had an
(‘‘Logilane’’) as the ultimate consignee. E. Changes in the Scheme
interest.
Open source information confirmed that Following the detention and seizures,
Logilane was a freight forwarder and the MLAT request, and the Adimir F. Findings
thus unlikely to be the end user for the interview, Trident began exporting I find that the evidence presented by
items contained in the shipment. When directly to Russia, claiming that the BIS demonstrates that a violation of the
questioned about the shipment, Pavel controlled circuits were for use in Regulations is imminent in both time
Flider requested that the ultimate railroads. This assertion sought to track and degree of likelihood. Trident has
consignee be changed to Adimir OU a note to ECCN 3A001.a.2, which engaged in some known violations of
(‘‘Adimir’’) in Estonia, which itself also indicates that the ECCN does not apply the Regulations and its actions,
proved to be a freight forwarder as to integrated circuits for civil including changes in how it structures
discussed further below. automotive or railway train its export transactions and routes its
applications. Pavel Flider reported to shipments, appear designed to
B. Interviews of Pavel Flider and
the U.S. distributor that Trident had camouflage the actual destinations, end
Gennadiy Flider
been ‘‘referred’’ Russian customers by uses, and/or end users of the U.S.-origin
On or about April 19, 2013, OEE Adimir, which was going out of items it has been and continues to
interviewed Trident office manager business. After being made aware that export, including items on the
Gennadiy Flider, who identified his the items actually were intended for Commerce Control List that are subject
responsibilities as handling the export to Russia, the U.S. distributor to national security-based license
procurement and shipment of items, requested that Trident sign a Form BIS– requirements. Moreover, when
including for export. He stated Trident 711 ‘‘Statement by Ultimate Consignee interviewed in 2013, the Fliders could
had been doing business with Adimir and Purchaser,’’ which includes an end not provide a reasonable explanation for
for many years and that it was the only use statement and must be signed by the the purported exports to Estonia and
customer that his company had. He also purchaser and the ultimate consignee. Finland. When for a time Trident began
indicated that Trident at times shipped From on or about January 23, 2014, to direct exports to Russia, the entity listed
items intended for its Estonian customer on or about April 16, 2014, Trident as the ultimate consignee admitted that
to Finland, claiming this was because it began listing in its AES filings OOO it was not an end user and instead
was cheaper. Elkomtex (‘‘Elkomtex’’) in St. acting as a broker.
Similarly, in an August 5, 2013 Petersburg, Russia, as the ultimate In sum, the fact and circumstances
interview, Trident’s president and consignee. On or about July 17, 2014, taken as a whole provide strong
owner Pavel Flider stated that Adimir the Elkomtex employees admitted that indicators that future violations are
was Trident’s one and only customer the company was not an end user but a likely absent the issuance of a TDO. As
and that at times Adimir requested that distributor of electronics, acting as a such, a TDO is needed to give notice to
items be shipped to a freight forwarder broker between an exporter and an end persons and companies in the United
in Finland. Both Gennadiy Flider and use company. States and abroad that they should cease
Pavel Flider denied shipping to Russia. Beginning with an export on or about dealing with Trident in export
May 6, 2014, Trident again changed its transactions involving items subject to
C. July 2013 Detention and Subsequent export route and began exporting to a the EAR. Such a TDO is consistent with
Seizure purported ultimate consignee named the public interest to preclude future
On or about July 20, 2013, the U.S. Logimix Ltd., in Vantaa, Finland violations of the EAR.
Government detained a Trident (‘‘Logimix’’). Between on or about May Additionally, Section 766.23 of the
mstockstill on DSK4VPTVN1PROD with NOTICES

shipment bound for Adimir in Estonia. 6, 2014, to on or about March 12, 2015, Regulations provides that ‘‘[i]n order to
In addition to Adimir being identified as AES filings indicate that Trident has prevent evasion, certain types of orders
the ultimate consignee on the AES made 33 exports with Logimix listed as under this part may be made applicable
filing, the items were identified as the ultimate consignee. Based on not only to the respondent, but also to
‘‘Electronic Equipment.’’ A review of Logimix’s Web site and other open other persons then or thereafter related
the invoice showed six Xilinx FPGAs, source Internet information, however, to the respondent by ownership,
items which were controlled under OEE’s presentation indicates that it has control, position of responsibility,
ECCN 3A001.a.2.c for national security reason to believe that Logimix is a affiliation, or other connection in the

VerDate Sep<11>2014 19:57 Mar 27, 2015 Jkt 235001 PO 00000 Frm 00018 Fmt 4703 Sfmt 4703 E:\FR\FM\30MRN1.SGM 30MRN1
16634 Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 60 / Monday, March 30, 2015 / Notices

conduct of trade or business. Orders that C. Benefitting in any way from any at any time, appeal their inclusion as a
may be made applicable to related transaction involving any item exported related person by filing a full written
persons include those that deny or affect or to be exported from the United States statement in support of the appeal with
export privileges, including temporary that is subject to the EAR, or in any the Office of the Administrative Law
denial orders. . . .’’ 15 CFR 766.23(a). other activity subject to the EAR. Judge, U.S. Coast Guard ALJ Docketing
As stated above, Pavel Flider is the Second, that no person may, directly Center, 40 South Gay Street, Baltimore,
president and owner of Trident. or indirectly, do any of the following: Maryland 21202–4022.
Gennadiy Flider also is a Trident office A. Export or reexport to or on behalf In accordance with the provisions of
manager, with responsibilities relating of a Denied Person any item subject to Section 766.24(d) of the EAR, BIS may
directly to the procurement and export the EAR; seek renewal of this Order by filing a
activities at issue. As such, I find that B. Take any action that facilitates the written request not later than 20 days
Pavel Semenovich Flider and Gennadiy acquisition or attempted acquisition by before the expiration date. Flider
Semenovich Flider are related persons a Denied Person of the ownership, Electronics, LLC d/b/a Trident
to Trident based on their positions of possession, or control of any item International Corporation may oppose a
responsibility and that their additions to subject to the EAR that has been or will request to renew this Order by filing a
the order is necessary to prevent be exported from the United States, written submission with the Assistant
evasion. including financing or other support Secretary for Export Enforcement,
Accordingly, I find that an order activities related to a transaction which must be received not later than
denying the export privileges of Trident, whereby a Denied Person acquires or seven days before the expiration date of
Pavel Flider, and Gennadiy Flider is attempts to acquire such ownership, the Order.
necessary, in the public interest, to possession or control; A copy of this Order shall be sent to
prevent an imminent violation of the C. Take any action to acquire from or Flider Electronics LLC d/b/a Trident
EAR. to facilitate the acquisition or attempted International Corporation and each
This Order is being issued on an ex acquisition from a Denied Person of any related person, and shall be published
parte basis without a hearing based item subject to the EAR that has been in the Federal Register.
upon BIS’s showing of an imminent exported from the United States; This Order is effective upon issuance
violation in accordance with Section D. Obtain from a Denied Person in the and shall remain in effect until
766.24 of the Regulations. United States any item subject to the September 14, 2015.
It is therefore ordered: EAR with knowledge or reason to know
First, that FLIDER ELECTRONICS, that the item will be, or is intended to Dated: March 23, 2015.
LLC, a/k/a FLIDER ELECTRONICS, be, exported from the United States; or David W. Mills,
d/b/a TRIDENT INTERNATIONAL E. Engage in any transaction to service Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Export
CORPORATION, d/b/a TRIDENT any item subject to the EAR that has Enforcement.
INTERNATIONAL d/b/a TRIDENT been or will be exported from the [FR Doc. 2015–07181 Filed 3–27–15; 8:45 am]
INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION, United States and which is owned, BILLING CODE P
LLC, 837 Turk Street, San Francisco, possessed or controlled by a Denied
California 94102; PAVEL SEMENOVICH Person, or service any item, of whatever
FLIDER, a/k/a PAVEL FLIDER, 21 Eye origin, that is owned, possessed or DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
Street, San Rafael, California 94901; and controlled by a Denied Person if such
GENNADIY SEMENOVICH FLIDER, service involves the use of any item International Trade Administration
a/k/a GENNADIY FLIDER, 699 36th subject to the EAR that has been or will [A–533–840, A–549–822]
Avenue #203, San Francisco, California be exported from the United States. For
94121, and when acting for or on their purposes of this paragraph, servicing Certain Frozen Warmwater Shrimp
behalf, any successors or assigns, agents, means installation, maintenance, repair, From India and Thailand: Notice of
or employees (each a ‘‘Denied Person’’ modification or testing. Initiation of Antidumping Duty
and collectively the ‘‘Denied Persons’’) Third, that, after notice and Administrative Reviews
may not, directly or indirectly, opportunity for comment as provided in
AGENCY: Enforcement and Compliance,
participate in any way in any Section 766.23 of the EAR, any other
International Trade Administration,
transaction involving any commodity, person, firm, corporation, or business
Department of Commerce.
software or technology (hereinafter organization related to a Denied Person
by ownership, control, position of SUMMARY: The Department of Commerce
collectively referred to as ‘‘item’’)
exported or to be exported from the responsibility, affiliation, or other (the Department) received requests to
United States that is subject to the connection in the conduct of trade or conduct administrative reviews of the
Export Administration Regulations business may also be made subject to antidumping duty (AD) orders on
(‘‘EAR’’), or in any other activity subject the provisions of this Order. certain frozen warmwater shrimp
to the EAR including, but not limited to: In accordance with the provisions of (shrimp) from India and Thailand for
A. Applying for, obtaining, or using Section 766.24(e) of the EAR, Flider the period February 1, 2014 through
any license, License Exception, or Electronics, LLC d/b/a Trident January 31, 2015. The anniversary
export control document; International Corporation, may, at any month of these orders is February. In
B. Carrying on negotiations time, appeal this Order by filing a full accordance with the Department’s
concerning, or ordering, buying, written statement in support of the regulations, we are initiating these
administrative reviews. The Department
mstockstill on DSK4VPTVN1PROD with NOTICES

receiving, using, selling, delivering, appeal with the Office of the
storing, disposing of, forwarding, Administrative Law Judge, U.S. Coast also received a request to defer the
transporting, financing, or otherwise Guard ALJ Docketing Center, 40 South initiation of the administrative review
servicing in any way, any transaction Gay Street, Baltimore, Maryland 21202– for the order on shrimp from Thailand
involving any item exported or to be 4022. In accordance with the provisions with respect to various Thai companies.
exported from the United States that is of Sections 766.23(c)(2) and 766.24(e)(3) DATES: Effective Date: March 30, 2015.
subject to the EAR, or in any other of the EAR, Pavel Semenovich Flider FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
activity subject to the EAR; or and Gennadiy Semenovich Flider may, Blaine Wiltse at (202) 482–6345 (India)

VerDate Sep<11>2014 19:57 Mar 27, 2015 Jkt 235001 PO 00000 Frm 00019 Fmt 4703 Sfmt 4703 E:\FR\FM\30MRN1.SGM 30MRN1
Document Created: 2015-12-18 11:32:32
Document Modified: 2015-12-18 11:32:32
Category		Regulatory Information
Collection		Federal Register
sudoc Class		AE 2.7: GS 4.107: AE 2.106:
Publisher		Office of the Federal Register, National Archives and Records Administration
Section		Notices
FR Citation		80 FR 16632
80 FR 16632 - Amended Order Temporarily Denying Export Privileges

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCEBureau of Industry and Security

Federal Register Volume 80, Issue 60 (March 30, 2015)

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
Bureau of Industry and Security
