80 FR 45578 - Denial of Motor Vehicle Defect Petition
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration Federal Register Volume 80, Issue 146 (July 30, 2015)
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
Federal Register Volume 80, Issue 146 (July 30, 2015)
| Page Range | 45578-45585 | |
| FR Document | 2015-18672 |
[Federal Register Volume 80, Number 146 (Thursday, July 30, 2015)] [Notices] [Pages 45578-45585] From the Federal Register Online [www.thefederalregister.org] [FR Doc No: 2015-18672] ----------------------------------------------------------------------- DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION National Highway Traffic Safety Administration Denial of Motor Vehicle Defect Petition AGENCY: National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, (NHTSA), DOT. ACTION: Denial of a petition for a defect investigation. ----------------------------------------------------------------------- SUMMARY: This notice sets forth the reasons for the denial of a petition, DP14-004, submitted by the Center for Auto Safety (the petitioner) to the Administrator of NHTSA by a letter dated August 21, 2014, under 49 CFR part 552. The petition requests the agency to initiate a safety defect investigation into alleged failures of Totally Integrated Power Modules (TIPMs) installed in sport utility vehicles, trucks, and vans built by Chrysler FCA (Chrysler) beginning in the 2007 model year. The petitioner alleges that TIPM defects may result in the following safety defect conditions: Engine stall, airbag non- deployment, failure of fuel pump shutoff resulting in unintended acceleration, and fire. After conducting a technical review of: (1) Consumer complaints and other material submitted by the petitioner; (2) information provided by Chrysler in response to information requests regarding TIPM design, TIPM implementation and the complaints submitted by the petitioner; and (3) Chrysler safety recalls 14V-530 and 15V-115 addressing a fuel pump relay defect condition that may result in engine stall while driving in certain vehicles equipped with TIPM body control modules; and the likelihood that additional investigations would result in a finding that a defect related to motor vehicle safety exists, NHTSA has concluded that further investigation of the issues raised by the petition is not warranted. The agency, accordingly, has denied the petition. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Mr. Kareem Habib, Vehicle Control Division, Office of Defects Investigation, NHTSA, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, DC 20590. Telephone 202-366-8703. Email [email protected]. SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: I. Introduction Interested persons may petition NHTSA requesting that the agency initiate an investigation to determine whether a motor vehicle or item of replacement equipment does not comply with an applicable motor vehicle safety standard or contains a defect that relates to motor vehicle safety. 49 CFR 552.1. Upon receipt of a properly filed petition, the agency conducts a technical review of the petition, material submitted with the petition, and any additional information. Sec. 552.6. After considering the technical review and taking into account appropriate factors, which may include, among others, allocation of agency resources, agency priorities, and [[Page 45579]] the likelihood of success in litigation that might arise from a determination of a noncompliance or a defect related to motor vehicle safety, the agency will grant or deny the petition. Sec. 552.8. II. Defect Petition Background Information By a letter dated August 21, 2014, the Center for Auto Safety (CAS) submitted a petition to NHTSA under 49 U.S.C. 30162 requesting ``a safety defect investigation into failures associated with the Totally Integrated Power Module (TIPM) installed in Chrysler SUV's, trucks, and vans beginning in the 2007 model year.'' On August 27, 2014, CAS sent NHTSA a supplemental letter identifying 24 fatal crashes from Chrysler Early Warning Reporting (EWR) submissions that CAS alleged may be related to TIPM failures (Supplement I). On September 8, 2014, CAS sent another supplemental letter to NHTSA with 35 additional complaints allegedly related to TIPM failures (Supplement II). On September 25, 2014, NHTSA's Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) opened DP14-004 to evaluate the petition for a grant or deny decision. In a September 29, 2014 letter to CAS, ODI acknowledged receipt of the petition and requested additional information from CAS in support of its allegations that TIPM malfunctions may result in airbag non-deployment or unintended acceleration caused by the fuel pump failing to shutoff. After opening DP14-004, ODI received four additional CAS complaint supplements on September 30, 2014 (Supplement III), November 13, 2014 (Supplement IV), January 14, 2015 (Supplement V), and April 1, 2015 (Supplement VI). The CAS petition provided the following broad allegation of defect conditions in TIPM modules: Chrysler TIPM failures result in a variety of safety-related issues in multiple vehicle components, many of which have the potential for destructive results. Not only do Chrysler's faulty TIPMs result in vehicle stalling, they have also been implicated in airbag non-deployment, random horn, headlight, taillight, door lock, instrument panel and windshield wiper activity, power windows going up and down on their own, failure of fuel pump shutoff resulting in unintended acceleration, and fires. In the interim, these owners remain at the mercy of a defect which many have likened to the vehicle being possessed and uncontrollable. A look at consumer complaints filed with CAS suggests a better name for the TIPM-- Totally Inept Power Module. Additionally, CAS referenced a recent filing of a class action lawsuit in the United States District Court, Central District of California, Velasco et al vs. Chrysler LLC, Case No. CV13-08080-DDP- VBKx affecting fifteen different Chrysler models and cited recalls 07V- 291 and 13V-282. According to CAS, ``neither of these recalls was sufficient to address the TIPM problem throughout Chrysler's fleet, instead focusing on a highly limited set of vehicles and circumstances. Given the number and range of complaints related to Chrysler TIPMs, it is time for NHTSA to formally investigate TIPM failures across the board in 2007 and later models''. III. Summary of the Petition The petitioner requests that NHTSA formally investigate TIPM failures across the board in 2007 and later models and cites the following allegations: 1. Vehicle Stall CAS stated in the defect petition letter and complaint Supplements III and IV that: TIPM failure contributes to a range of problems in vehicle electric components, the safety issue which continues to present itself in complaints is stalling, often in traffic where the dangers are obvious. The most often cited TIPM failure is a loss of vehicle power that can create a dangerous stall condition at any speed. Additionally, a survey of complaints related to Chrysler TIPMs suggests that a stall/no-start condition is most reported outcome of TIPM failure, leaving drivers without power in traffic and stranded for unknown periods of time before the vehicle regains the capacity to be started. 2. Airbag Non-Deployment According to CAS defect petition letter and complaint Supplement IV, ``Not only do Chrysler's faulty TIPMs result in vehicle stalling, they have also been implicated in airbag non-deployment. As NHTSA knows from the GM ignition switch mass defect, it is virtually impossible to be sure that an airbag will deploy until there is a crash. Complaints directly citing airbag system warnings can be found in the complaints received by CAS''. 3. Unintended Acceleration CAS uses the term ``unintended acceleration'' in complaint letter Supplement IV dated November 13, 2014, ``to indicate reports where the vehicle continued to move or accelerate when the operator did not want this to happen. TIPM issues related to acceleration appear to arise from lack of fuel pump shut-off as well as problems with gear shift, throttle, and cruise control. Consumer problems related to acceleration, gear and/or throttle control may be found in CAS complaints.'' 4. Fire and Other Symptoms According to CAS defect petition letter and complaint Supplement IV, ``Chrysler's faulty TIPMs have also been implicated in fires. Additionally, there are numerous complaints alleging bizarre and unexplained headlight and taillight failure, windshield wiper activity, instrument panel failure, and door lock problems.'' 5. EWR Fatalities CAS included as Attachment A to Supplement I what it believes to be EWR information for all fatal crashes involving TIPM failure. CAS claims that ``[s]ince the TIPM functions as the central gateway for all vehicle electronics, there are multiple EWR component codes that could point to the defect. There are 24 such crashes involving 28 deaths that the agency must consider in reviewing our petition, at least twelve of which have been the subject of DI requests. There are also a large number of injury crashes reported to EWR that involve these components.'' 6. Class Action Lawsuit The petition references a class action lawsuit as evidence of the breadth and scope of ``the actual TIPM problem.'' \1\ The class action cited by the petition was originally filed on November 1, 2013. The plaintiffs in the original complaint, which were not limited to TIPM equipped vehicles, included 2 MY 2011 Jeep Grand Cherokee owners, a MY 2011 Dodge Grand Caravan owner and a MY 2008 Chrysler 300 owner.\2\ The lawsuit provided the following description of the alleged defect and affected vehicles: --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\ The petition references Velasco et al vs Chrysler LLC, Case No. 13-cv-08080-DDP-VBK, in the United States District Court for the Central District of California as ``incorporated herein by reference, covering fifteen different Chrysler models over a number of model years.'' \2\ The MY 2008 Chrysler 300 is not equipped with a TIPM body control module. Plaintiffs and the Class members they propose to represent purchased or leased 2008 model year Chrysler 300 and 2011-2012 model year Jeep Grand Cherokees, Dodge Durangos, and Dodge Grand Caravans equipped with defective Totally Integrated Power Modules, also known as TIPMs. The TIPM controls and distributes power to all of the electrical functions of the vehicle, including the vehicle safety and ignition systems. Vehicles equipped with defective TIPMs progress through a succession of symptoms that begin with an inability to reliably start the vehicle and lead to, among other things, the vehicle not starting, the fuel pump not turning off and --------------------------------------------------------------------------- the engine stalling while driving. A second amended complaint for the class action was filed on May 5, 2014, [[Page 45580]] listing seven plaintiffs and redefining the scope of vehicles as all Chrysler vehicles equipped with TIPM-7 modules. The plaintiffs in the amended complaint consist of 6 MY 2011 Jeep Grand Cherokee owners and 1 MY 2011 Dodge Durango owner. The plaintiffs all alleged experiencing ``no-start'' concerns, with one also alleging a fuel pump run-on condition and another reporting a single incident of engine stall while driving. The amended complaint continued to focus on problems with starting, engine stall while driving and fuel pumps that do not turn off, while adding ``headlights and taillights shutting off'' and ``random and uncontrollable activity of the horn, windshield wipers, and alarm system'' to the claimed TIPM deficiencies. The class action does not include airbag non-deployment, unintended acceleration or fire among the alleged consequences of the claimed TIPM defect. 7. Petition Issues ODI identified several issues with the scope and supporting evidence for defect allegations in the petition submitted by CAS. The petition was unnecessarily broad in scope and included several alleged defects that had no factual basis. After failing to identify any clear basis for several of the petition allegations, ODI included a request for supporting information for claims regarding airbag non-deployment and unintended acceleration in its September 29, 2014 petition acknowledgement letter. The CAS response, provided in a November 13, 2014 letter, did not provide any technical basis for claims of airbag non-deployment and appeared to equate any illumination of the airbag warning lamp with TIPM failure, even when the complaint clearly cited other causes for the airbag system fault (e.g, ``faulty wiring in passenger front seat causing airbag failure warning to illuminate'' \3\ and ``open circuit in drivers [sic] seat airbag'' \4\). Several other complaints cited by CAS do not allege any airbag failures but, in apparent reference to CAS petition claims, state that TIPM failure ``can cause the airbags to not deploy.'' --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \3\ Identified by CAS as complaint number 62. \4\ Identified by CAS as complaint number 146. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- With regard to the basis for its claims that TIPM failures can result in unintended acceleration, CAS repeated its allegation that such failures are associated with fuel pump shut-off failures,\5\ even while acknowledging that none of the reports that it provided actually involved instances where fuel pumps failing to shut off resulted in unintended acceleration.\6\ ODI notes that claims that unintended acceleration is caused by, or related to, a ``lack of fuel pump shut- off'' are not supported by any known incidents. Moreover, any allegation that a running fuel pump can, absent extremely idiosyncratic failures of many other systems, cause a vehicle to accelerate on its own demonstrates a fundamental misunderstanding of basic automotive engineering. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \5\ The CAS November 13, 2014 letter states that, ``TIPM issues related to acceleration appear to arise from lack of fuel pump shut- off as well as problems with gear shift, throttle, and cruise control.'' \6\ The CAS November 13, 2014 letter states that, ``There are quite a few consumer complaints in both CAS and NHTSA databases citing lack of fuel pump shutoff that result in stalling and/or nonstart condition but do not produce uncontrolled acceleration.'' This statement, which also misstates the effects of fuel pump shutoff failure, acknowledges the absence of any related complaints of unintended acceleration. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- IV. ODI Analysis A. Scope Analysis The CAS petition requests investigation of alleged failures of TIPM modules in Chrysler light vehicles, with no reference to the automotive industry body control technology implementations or architecture functionality distinctions: ``The CAS hereby petitions the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) to initiate a safety defect investigation into failures associated with the Totally Integrated Power Module (TIPM) installed in Chrysler SUV's, trucks, and vans beginning in the 2007 model year''. Interpreted broadly, the CAS petition potentially affects approximately 10 million \7\ vehicles equipped with TIPM-6 or TIPM-7 modules. The petition scope does not appear to recognize the functional distinctions between TIPM-6 and TIPM-7. The petition also does not distinguish between the significant electronics technology differences between the relay based TIPM-7 and an all solid-state Field Effect Transistors (FET) TIPM-6. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \7\ Chrysler SUV's, trucks, and vans equipped with TIMP-7 and TIPM-6 beginning MY 2007. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- TIPM-7 vehicle function outputs (such as fuel pump control, wiper/ washer control. . .etc.) are a mix of electro-mechanical relays and solid state FET devices equipped with digital Serial Peripheral Interface (SPI) communication ports while TIPM-6 vehicle function outputs are strictly solid state SPI-based FET devices with no electro- mechanical relays. Relays are electro-mechanical devices with specific inherent break down mechanisms including, but not limited to, the degradation of the mechanically coupled moving contact spring arm and contact resistance; \8\ both are design elements that do not exist in silicon only devices associated with TIPM-6. Similarly, TIPM-7 implementations include a fuse for overcurrent protection while the TIPM-6 system design uses an integrated silicon overcurrent protection feature specific to solid state devices. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \8\ Fuel pump relays were tested in simulated vehicle environments incorporating variable factors such as relay type; relay manufacture, simulated fuel pump current and inductance levels of representative TIPM-7 vehicles. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- ODI is interpreting the petition as a request for investigation of only vehicles equipped with the TIPM-7 (subject vehicles) for the following reasons: (1) The petition refers to TIPM installed in Chrysler vehicles ``beginning in the 2007 model year'' and TIPM-7 was introduced in the 2007 model year; (2) the affected models listed in the petition and in the class action lawsuit referenced by the petition are all TIPM-7 vehicles; \9\ (3) approximately 93 percent \10\ of the complaints submitted by CAS involve vehicles equipped with TIPM-7; (4) only 3 percent of CAS complaints are related to vehicles equipped with TIPM-6 and ODI's review of these complaints did not identify any safety defect trends; \11\ and (5) the significant technical differences between the TIPM-6 and TIPM-7 modules as described above. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \9\ The CAS petition references a recent filing of a class action lawsuit in US District Court, Velasco et al. vs. Chrysler LLC affecting fifteen different Chrysler models in which CAS cited the same fifteen vehicle models in the defect petition dated August 21, 2014. The Court order referenced by CAS specifically cited TIPM-7 in Case No. CV 13-08080 DDP, Dkt. No. 42, ``Plaintiffs allege that the TIPM with which the Class Vehicles are equipped, referred to as TIPM 7.'' \10\ Percentage based on CAS complaints through Supplement V. \11\ The remaining CAS complaints are associated with vehicles equipped with Front Control Module and Body Control Modules. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The TIPM-7 population includes approximately 4.7 million Chrysler sport utility vehicles, trucks, and vans across 11 vehicle platforms beginning in model year 2007 (Table 1). ODI conducted a detailed review of complaint narratives submitted by CAS and consumers including careful analysis of vehicle repair histories, warranty claims obtained from the manufacturer and any available Customer Assistance Inquiry reports (CAIR). In total, there were 296 complaints submitted by the petitioner in the original petition and five supplements, including 271 complaints related to the subject vehicles equipped with TIPM-7. ODI's complaint analysis focused on vehicles equipped with TIPM-7. [[Page 45581]] Table 1--TIPM-7 Population ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Models (platforms) Model years Population ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Chrysler Town and Country/Dodge Grand 2008-14 1,632,250 Caravan (RT)........................... Jeep Wrangler (JK)...................... 2007-14 962,098 Ram 1500/2500/3500/4500and5500 (DS/DJ/DD/ 2009-12 929,036 DP).................................... Jeep Grand Cherokee/Dodge Durango (WK/ 2011-13 526,939 WD).................................... Jeep Liberty (KK)....................... 2008-12 331,717 Dodge Nitro (KA)........................ 2007-11 198,581 Dodge Journey (JC)...................... 2009-10 156,537 ------------------------------- Total TIPM-7........................ 2007-14 4,737,158 ------------------------------------------------------------------------ B. TIPM Function TIPM-7 is a controller area network (CAN) based body controller integrated with an electrical power distribution center; and is designed to support centralized and distributed vehicle control functions. The TIPM-7 electrical architecture features three levels of functional interactions with other vehicle systems: (1) Power only interaction- circuits that only pass through the integrated fuse box (e.g. occupant restraint controller); (2) power and data transfer interaction for circuits that pass through the power distribution center with no TIPM control function (e.g. powertrain controller and transmission controller); and (3) power and control interaction for circuits that pass through the power distribution center and are directly controlled by the TIPM. The latter include power and control logic for exterior lighting, windshield wiper/washer, door lock, and horn. A distinguishing feature of the TIPM-7 from other Chrysler body controllers is the integration of the fuel pump relay. C. Fuel Pump Relay Defect In a September 3, 2014 letter to NHTSA, Chrysler submitted a Defect Information Report (DIR) identifying a defect in the fuel pump relay (FPR) within the TIPM-7 which can result in a no start or stall condition in approximately 188,723 model year (MY) 2011 Jeep Grand Cherokee (WK) and Dodge Durango (WD) vehicles manufactured from January 5, 2010 through July 20, 2011 (14V-530). In a February 24, 2015 letter, Chrysler submitted a second DIR expanding the scope of the FPR defect condition to include an additional 338,216 MY 2012 through 2013 Jeep Grand Cherokee vehicles manufactured from September 17, 2010 through August 19, 2013 and MY 2012 through 2013 Dodge Durango vehicles manufactured from January 18, 2011 through August 19, 2013 (15V-115). Chrysler identified the root cause as deformation of the relay contact spring due to the heat caused by contact power, ambient temperature around the fuel pump relay, and battery voltage. These factors, present in combination and in high amounts, led to premature fuel pump relay failures, which usually resulted in a no-start concern. When the fuel pump relay fails while driving, the fuel pump will cease to function and the engine will shut off or ``stall.'' In the case of a stall, the vehicle maintains power and functionality for certain features, such as hazard indicators, seat belt pre-tensioners and airbags. Chrysler's recall remedy involved installing a new, more robust fuel pump relay, external to the TIPM. Detailed analysis of relay material composition, lab reports and fuel pump system design reviews performed by Chrysler and Continental that ODI reviewed in examining the petition identified the root cause of the premature relay failure to be contact erosion and the deformation of the contact spring due to under-hood temperatures around the fuel pump relay, current draws, and fuel pump inductance levels specific to Delphi fuel pumps installed on MY 2011-2013 Jeep Grand Cherokee and Dodge Durango vehicles. Vehicle fuel pump system measurements indicated that WK/WD vehicles have the highest current draw and inductance while RT minivans have the lowest current draw coupled with lower fuel pump inductance. Relay durability test data provided by Chrysler indicated that other TIPM-7 vehicle platform relays substantially outlasted relays tested in a simulated WK/WD environment. NHTSA believes that because the current draw is lower for other vehicles equipped with the TIPM-7 than for the WK/WD vehicles, the risk of fuel pump relay deformation for these other vehicles is lower than for the WK/WD vehicles. On October 20, 2014, ODI sent an Information Request (IR) letter to Chrysler requesting production, complaint, and warranty claim data related to the complaints provided by CAS and ODI complaints involving stall while driving allegations potentially related to TIPM faults. The IR letter also requested information related to the fuel pump relay root cause analysis and technical data regarding TIPM design and construction. Analysis of the field data submitted indicated that the WK/WD vehicles exhibited significantly higher complaint rates related to FPR failures than other subject vehicles (Table 2). The data show that the primary failure mode of the fuel pump relay is a no-start condition, with no-starts and starts followed immediately by stall accounting for approximately 68% of the complaints for both the recalled WK/WD vehicles and the non-recalled subject vehicles. Table 2--Fuel Pump Relay Complaint Analysis, by Total Failure Rate \12\ [All rates are in complaints per 100,000 vehicles] -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- TIPM-7 vehicles Fuel pump relay failure mode -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Stall while Start with No-start Pump run-on Total driving immediate stall ----------------------------------------------------- Fuel pump relay recalls Platforms ------------------------------------ No. Rate No. Rate No. Rate No. Rate No. Rate -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Recalled............................. WK/WD.................. 37 7.0 4 0.8 82 15.6 3 0.6 126 23.9 Non-recalled......................... JC..................... 2 1.3 0 0.0 3 1.9 0 0.0 5 3.2 [[Page 45582]] KA..................... 1 0.5 0 0.0 2 1.0 0 0.0 3 1.5 RT..................... 1 0.1 1 0.1 4 0.2 1 0.1 7 0.4 JK..................... 1 0.1 0 0.0 3 0.3 0 0.0 4 0.4 Ram.................... 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 KK..................... 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 Total............... 5 0.1 1 0.0 12 0.3 1 0.0 19 0.5 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Grand Total TIPM-7............... ....................... 42 0.9 5 0.1 94 2.0 4 0.1 145 3.1 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ODI's analysis of all confirmed FPR failures identified a total of 145 complaints, including 42 resulting in at least one incident of stall while driving. The recalled WK/WD vehicles, which comprise only 11 percent of the subject vehicle population, account for 126 of the total FPR related complaints (87 percent) and 37 of those involving stall while driving (88 percent). This analysis combined with overall warranty claim data analysis and vehicle test data related to FPR root cause analysis indicate that, based on currently available information, the scope of recalls 14V-530 and 15V-115 adequately address the FPR defect condition. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \12\ Complaint data in Table 2 is limited to CAS complaints and ODI VOQ's potentially related to stall while driving that were identified prior to ODI's information request letter to Chrysler for DP14-004. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- D. Other Stall While Driving Defects In addition to the analysis of complaints related to confirmed FPR failures to assess the scope of Chrysler recalls 14V-530 and 15V-115, ODI also examined all stall while driving complaints allegedly related to TIPM failures in the subject vehicles to assess whether any other engine stall related defect conditions may exist in the subject vehicles that are not already addressed by a safety recall. ODI's analysis did not identify any specific TIPM faults resulting in incidents of stall while driving that are not already addressed by safety recalls \13\ and analysis of complaints did not identify any additional defect trends associated with potentially TIPM-related stall while driving that warrant additional investigation. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \13\ In addition to FPR recalls 14V-530 and 15V-115, Chrysler previously initiated recall 07V-291 to address a defect condition in approximately 81,000 MY 2007 JK and KA vehicles associated with the PCM momentarily shutting the engine down due to a prolonged (75ms) TIPM microprocessor reset triggered by a vehicle-wide CAN bus error event. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- ODI's analysis identified a total of 131 complaints alleging TIPM related stall while driving incidents. Fifty-five (55) of the complaints were found to be unrelated to TIPM failures, including 10 associated with a defect condition addressed by alternator replacement recall 14V-634.\14\ A total of 76 complaints were identified that were either confirmed to be related to a TIPM fault condition (49) or where either the FPR or other, unspecified, TIPM fault condition may have been the cause (27).\15\ Table 3 shows the failure rates for potentially TIPM related stall while driving incidents for the recalled WK/WD vehicles and for each of the non-recalled platforms. These data do not indicate a stall while driving defect trend outside of the recall population. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \14\ For recall 14V-634, vehicles equipped with the 3.6L engine and 160 Amp Alternator may experience a rapid alternator failure having limited or no detection, which can result in vehicle shutdown/shut off and/or fire. \15\ Unknown/possible TIPM's include several for which the condition could not be duplicated by the servicing dealer. Table 3--Stall While Driving Analysis, All Causes \17\ -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- TIPM-7 vehicles Not related to TIPM Potentially TIPM related -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Alternator Fuel pump relay recalls Platforms recall 14V- Other non- Total Fuel pump Possible Total Total rate 634 TIPM \16\ relay TIPM (C/100k) -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Recalled............................ WK/WD.................. 10 17 27 40 14 54 10.2 Non-recalled........................ KA..................... 0 5 5 1 3 4 2.0 JC..................... 0 1 1 2 1 3 1.9 RT..................... 0 9 9 4 6 10 0.6 Ram.................... 0 5 5 1 2 3 0.3 JK..................... 0 6 6 1 1 2 0.2 KK..................... 0 2 2 0 0 0 0.0 Total............... 0 28 28 9 13 22 0.5 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ Grand Total TIPM-7.............. ....................... 10 45 55 49 27 76 1.6 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- [[Page 45583]] Additionally, the recalled WK/WD vehicles and other TIPM-7 platforms differ significantly when age and exposure are considered. The subject vehicles range from less than 1 year to up to 9 years of service exposure, while the recalled WK/WD vehicles range in age from 2 to 5 years of service. Most of the WK/WD complaints involved the MY 2011 vehicles recalled under 14V-530, which account for 98 (78%) of the total WK/WD FPR complaints shown in Table 2 and 48 (89%) of the potentially TIPM related WK/WD stall complaints shown in Table 3. Table 4 shows complaint data related to FPR failures resulting in stall while driving for the subject vehicles for just MY 2011 vehicles. The recalled MY 2011 WK/WD vehicles account for 25 percent of production, 88 percent of confirmed FPR stall while driving incidents and 81 percent of all potentially TIPM related stall while driving incidents in MY 2011 subject vehicles. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \16\ Faults reported in repair histories included WIN control module faults, PCM faults, engine misfire and other engine compartment components and harness issues. \17\ Table 3 includes all CAS (through Supplement VI) and ODI complaints related to allegations of SWD. Table 4--Stall While Driving Analysis, Potentially TIPM Related, MY 2011 Only -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- MY 2011 TIPM-7 vehicles Potentially TIPM related -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Verified TIPM Total rate (C/ Fuel pump relay recalls Platforms Population (FPR) Possible TIPM Total 100k) -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Recalled.................................. WK/WD....................... 188,723 36 12 48 25.4 Non-recalled.............................. JC.......................... 0 0 0 0 0.0 KA.......................... 35,609 0 0 0 0.0 RT.......................... 137,740 4 4 8 5.8 JK.......................... 103,881 0 0 0 0.0 Ram......................... 242,676 1 2 3 1.2 KK.......................... 56,939 0 0 0 0.0 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Total................................. ............................ 576,845 5 6 11 1.9 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Grand Total MY 2011................... ............................ 765,568 41 18 59 7.7 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- E. Airbag Non-Deployment The CAS petition alleges that TIPM failures are responsible for airbag non-deployments. ODI examined this contention and finds it has no merit. First, ODI's analysis of the airbag system architecture in the subject vehicles indicates that airbag control is performed by the Occupant Restraint Control (ORC) module in the Chrysler vehicles and the TIPM-7 functions only to provide power to the ORC and does not contain any logic for airbag deployment control or crash event discrimination. Second, the TIPM supplies power to the ORC through two independent fused power feeds providing an extra level of redundancy and safety to the airbag system in the subject vehicles.\18\ Third, ODI did not identify any mechanisms for TIPM failure or power disruptions in a crash event. Fourth, any interruption in power resulting from such a failure would not interfere with the ORC deployment decision or prevent it from operating on reserve power.\19\ Lastly, the complaint data offered by the petitioner, analysis of ODI complaint data, and analysis of EWR death and injury claims cited by the petitioner that were related to airbag deployment also failed to support a finding that TIPM failures have caused any incidents of airbag non-deployment (see Section F. EWR Fatalities). ODI's review of CAS and ODI complaints related to airbags and TIPM did not identify any incidents where a TIPM failure was followed by a crash event or any non-deployment incidents in which the airbags would have been expected to deploy or were associated with evidence of TIPM malfunction. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \18\ The use of independent power feeds is a level of functional safety that makes the power delivery for the ORC module in the subject vehicles fairly robust in comparison to the airbag ECU's in many peer designs reviewed by ODI. \19\ There is a minimum of 150ms of back-up power internal to the ORC that is available as reserve power in the event of power interruption during a crash event. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The Run-Start and Run-Only relays are integral to the TIPM and provide power to multiple circuits including the ORC. The Run-Start relay is powered during engine crank and both the Run-Start and Run- Only relays are powered when the ignition is in RUN mode. Examination of the airbag system architecture for the subject vehicles shows that power flows in the Run-Only and Run-Start condition through the TIPM-7 to the ORC through two independent and redundant fused power feeds. The ORC dual feed safety strategy is designed so that each power feed alone is capable of providing the necessary power to deploy all required restraints. According to Chrysler's IR response, the loss of power from one ORC power feed will result in an Airbag Warning Lamp (ABWL), but will not affect deployment capability. The ORC is still able to evaluate sensor inputs, determine if a deployment is required, and deploy airbags as needed. In the event of a loss of a single power feed, whether the IGN_RS or the IGN_RO feed, the ORC will set a specific fault code and turn on the ABWL. If for any reason the ORC loses both power feeds while the vehicle remains powered, the instrument cluster will set a fault and activate the ABWL. None of the CAS or ODI complaints reviewed by ODI contained evidence that either a single or dual power loss to the ORC occurred. Simultaneous power loss on both ORC feeds could result from a complete TIPM failure. However, in the event of a complete TIPM failure, the vehicle will lose power to multiple other systems with instrument cluster lights indicating faults in systems powered through the TIPM. None of the repair history records provided by Chrysler included any evidence of faults indicating a loss of power to the ORC or other vehicle systems resulting from a failure of the power feed from the TIPM. Complaints reporting active ABWL were either related to internal ORC malfunctions or other SRS (Supplemental Restraint System) component failures such as seat harness or clock spring shorting conditions. The petitioner identified complaints citing airbag system warnings as evidence of TIPM failures resulting in possible airbag non- deployments. These [[Page 45584]] complaints, once analyzed, were found to be either related to specific airbag system component malfunctions (such as seat harness, clock spring failures . . . etc.), or occurred in vehicles subject to previous TIPM-7 recalls, ORC recalls (13V-282),\20\ or inadvertent ignition key (WIN/FOBIK) displacement recalls (11V-139 and 14V-373). None of the incidents reported by the petitioner, ODI complaints or EWR claims cited by the petitioner can be traced to a TIPM fault that resulted in a loss of power to the ORC. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \20\ For recall 13V-282, Occupant Restraint Control (ORC) module resistor may fail from electrical overstress (EOS), resulting in airbag light and loss of head restraint function. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- F. Unintended Acceleration ODI finds no basis for CAS claims that TIPM failures have resulted in incidents of unintended acceleration, either based on a technical review of the vehicle powertrain control function area or analysis of complaints. The Powertrain Control Module (PCM) performs all engine and transmission management control functions in the Chrysler vehicles and the TIPM functions only to provide power to the PCM and does not contain any torque management control logic. ODI reviewed each complaint submitted by CAS and consumers and did not identify any evidence of TIPM, or any other vehicle component, failures resulting in unintended acceleration. The petitioner's allegations of UA resulting from the fuel pump failing to shut-off after ``key-off'' vehicle shutdown are premised on an incorrect belief that continued fuel pump operation and presence of fuel line pressure would somehow translate into un-commanded acceleration. The fuel pump only makes fuel available to the engine; actual use of that fuel is controlled by the PCM through the fuel injectors, not the pump. Moreover, once fuel is fed to the engine cylinders by the fuel injectors, it must have both a stoichiometric air mass from the throttle and be ignited by a spark, which are also controlled by the PCM. When the ignition has been turned ``Off'', power is removed from the PCM, the electronic throttle is disabled and the ignition system no longer provides a spark. If a TIPM failure resulted in the fuel pump continuing to run after the key is turned off, the most likely harmful result would be a dead battery. Analyses of the UA incidents alleged to have occurred by the petitioner do not support a finding of any TIPM failure or any other vehicle malfunction. For example, CAS cited an incident involving a MY 2013 Dodge Challenger. According to CAS Supplement IV, ``You will find attached to this letter an accident report from a May 2014 crash involving unintended acceleration in Vancouver, WA. The vehicle involved, a 2013 Dodge Challenger, is not a model included in the CAS petition, but does contain a TIPM that is the alleged source of the acceleration event''. The referenced attachment provided a 42-page police report and photographs. According to the police report, the Challenger passed directly in front of a patrol car within approximately 20-30 feet. The report specifically indicates that the operator's head position appeared to be downward with chin resting against the chest. The crash occurred when the operator did not make any attempts to slow or steer the vehicle to negotiate a roundabout. The PAR report made no reference to unintended acceleration or any attempts by the driver to slow down the vehicle or avoid property damage. Finally, ODI notes that the 2013 Challenger is not equipped with a TIPM. G. Fire and Other Symptoms ODI finds no basis for CAS claims that TIPM failures have resulted in vehicle fires or any other failure modes representing potential safety hazards. Vehicle inspection reports of the alleged fires in the petition letter and supplemental submissions lack any evidence of a safety related defect or a trend of such defects in the subject vehicles. Allegations reporting fire or smoke are either related to external aftermarket vehicle body builder up-fitter integration \21\ or thermal damage in the alternator diode with no damage beyond the alternator assembly, recall 14V-634. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \21\ Inspection and assessment confirmed that the cause of this incident was improper installation of aftermarket equipment. There are two aftermarket wire bundles extending from the B+ cable, which are secured using a non OEM aftermarket nut. There was significant aftermarket wiring throughout the vehicle that was not installed, or connected in accordance with the Chrysler provided Ram Body Builders Guide. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Additionally, ODI carefully analyzed the petitioner data related to headlight and taillight failure, windshield wiper activity, instrument panel failure, and door lock problems. Vehicle functions related to TIPM-7 EX-2 relays typically fail in an active state \22\ with no loss of system functionality. ODI's analysis of complaints provided by CAS and received by the agency did not identify any patterns or trends related to loss of headlights or taillights while driving or to driver distraction from unexpected activation of windshield wipers/washers, horn or car alarm while driving due to TIPM malfunction.\23\ No safety related defect or a trend of such defects in the subject vehicles is observed. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \22\ Active state typically involves a powered relay. \23\ Repair records indicated malfunctions outside of TIPM, e.g. wiper stalk. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- H. EWR Fatalities ODI's analysis of 24 EWR death claims identified by CAS in Supplement I as potentially related to TIPM failures,\24\ did not identify any evidence that TIPM faults caused or contributed to any of the incidents. None of the reports cited by the petitioner alleged loss of control or airbag non-deployment due to loss of power from the TIPM module. The petitioner posits that there was a loss of power to the ORC and other vehicle systems in the referenced crash and non-deployment events that led to the death and injury. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \24\ According to CAS Supplement I: ``Since the TIPM functions as the central gateway for all vehicle electronics, there are multiple EWR component codes that could point to the defect. These codes include airbags, electrical system, engine and engine cooling, exterior lighting, fire related, powertrain, service brake, speed control, and unknown''. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Sixteen (16) of the reports cited by CAS are related to TIPM-7 equipped vehicles and included 6 death and injury incidents in which a frontal airbag, side airbag, or pre-tensioner successfully deployed, demonstrating the integrity of power delivery from the TIPM was not compromised before or during the collision event. Of the remaining reports, two reports did not involve any claims relating to loss of control or airbag non-deployment, or any other vehicle defect.\25\ The remaining claims were related to an unpowered rollaway due to documented incorrect gear selection, an alleged sudden acceleration with no evidence of any throttle control or brake system faults, a brake failure claim, 3 airbag non-deployments with crash dynamics that did not warrant deployment, and 2 non-deployment where the non- deployment may have involved inadvertent ignition key (WIN/FOBIK) displacement.\26\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \25\ The ``claims'' were simply requests for assistance with downloading EDR data for the crash event. \26\ Both vehicles were 2008 Chrysler Town and Country minivans that were in the scope of WIN/FOB recall 14V-373. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- V. Conclusion ODI's analysis of the CAS allegations of TIPM defects resulting in stall while driving, airbag non-deployment, unintended acceleration, fire and other faults identified a single defect condition related to 1 of over 60 different circuits in the TIPM assembly. The most common effect of this defect [[Page 45585]] condition, related to the fuel pump relay, was a no-start concern, but it could also result in stall while driving. This fuel pump relay defect was limited to approximately 11 percent of the 4.7 million subject vehicles equipped with TIPM-7 and has been addressed by safety recalls 14V-530 and 15V-115. No valid evidence was presented in support of claims related to airbag non-deployment, unintended acceleration or fire resulting from TIPM faults and these claims were found to be wholly without merit based on review of the field data and design of the relevant systems and components. Except insofar as the petitioner's contentions relate to the defect condition addressed by the Chrysler recalls, the factual bases of the petitioner's contentions that any further investigation is necessary are unsupported. In our view, additional investigation is unlikely to result in a finding that a defect related to motor vehicle safety exists or a NHTSA order for the notification and remedy of a safety- related defect as alleged by the petitioner at the conclusion of the requested investigation. Therefore, the petition is denied. This action does not constitute a finding by NHTSA that a safety-related defect does not exist. The agency will take further action if warranted by future circumstances. Authority: 49 U.S.C. 30162(d); delegations of authority at CFR 1.95. Frank S. Borris II, Acting Associate Administrator for Enforcement, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, U.S. Department of Transportation. [FR Doc. 2015-18672 Filed 7-29-15; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 4910-59-P
![45578 Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 146 / Thursday, July 30, 2015 / Notices
review and comment. The ICR describes should be present. The research allowed SUMMARY: This notice sets forth the
the nature of the information collections NHTSA to refine messaging to enhance reasons for the denial of a petition,
and their expected burden. The Federal comprehension and usefulness and help DP14–004, submitted by the Center for
Register Notice with a 60-day comment guide the development of an effective Auto Safety (the petitioner) to the
period was published on January 2, communications plan. The consumer Administrator of NHTSA by a letter
2015 [80 FR 99]. market research informed NHTSA that dated August 21, 2014, under 49 CFR
DATES: Comments must be submitted on digital assets would be the best format part 552. The petition requests the
or before August 31, 2015. and distribution through web and agency to initiate a safety defect
ADDRESSES: Send comments, within 30 mobile channels would be the best investigation into alleged failures of
days, to the Office of Information and media. The assets being tested during Totally Integrated Power Modules
Regulatory Affairs, Office of this quantitative study are a result from (TIPMs) installed in sport utility
Management and Budget, 725 17th the qualitative focus groups, and vehicles, trucks, and vans built by
Street NW., Washington, DC 20503, include an animated infographic, video, Chrysler FCA (Chrysler) beginning in
Attention NHTSA Desk Officer. and fact sheets. the 2007 model year. The petitioner
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Kil- Affected Public: Passenger vehicle alleges that TIPM defects may result in
Jae Hong, NHTSA, 1200 New Jersey consumers. the following safety defect conditions:
Avenue SE., W52–232, NPO–520, Estimated Total Annual Burden: Engine stall, airbag non-deployment,
Washington, DC 20590. Ms. Hong’s 666.67 hours. failure of fuel pump shutoff resulting in
telephone number is (202) 493–0524 Number of Respondents: 2,000. unintended acceleration, and fire.
and email address is kil-jae.hong@ The estimated annual burden hour for After conducting a technical review
dot.gov. the online survey is 666.67 hours. Based of: (1) Consumer complaints and other
on the Bureau of Labor and Statistics’ material submitted by the petitioner; (2)
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: In median hourly wage (all occupations) in information provided by Chrysler in
compliance with the Paperwork the May 2013 National Occupational response to information requests
Reduction Act of 1995, NHTSA Employment and Wage Estimates, regarding TIPM design, TIPM
conducted a qualitative phase of NHTSA estimates that it would cost an implementation and the complaints
Consumer Research which included average of $16.87 per hour if all submitted by the petitioner; and (3)
Focus Groups. Based upon the respondents were interviewed on the Chrysler safety recalls 14V–530 and
qualitative phase research results, job. Therefore, the agency estimates that 15V–115 addressing a fuel pump relay
NHTSA developed the communications the cost associated with the burden defect condition that may result in
materials its Fuel Economy Consumer hours is $11,247 ($16.87 per hour x engine stall while driving in certain
Education Program. This notice 666.67 interviewing hours). vehicles equipped with TIPM body
announces that the ICR for a Comments are invited on: Whether control modules; and the likelihood that
quantitative study of the the proposed collection of information additional investigations would result
communications materials, abstracted is necessary for the proper performance in a finding that a defect related to
below, has been forwarded to OMB of the functions of the Department, motor vehicle safety exists, NHTSA has
requesting review and comment. The including whether the information will concluded that further investigation of
ICR describes the nature of the have practical utility; the accuracy of the issues raised by the petition is not
information collection and its expected the Departments estimate of the burden warranted. The agency, accordingly, has
burden. This is a request for new of the proposed information collection; denied the petition.
collection. ways to enhance the quality, utility and FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Mr.
Title: 49 CFR 575—Consumer clarity of the information to be
Information Regulations (sections 103 Kareem Habib, Vehicle Control
collected; and ways to minimize the Division, Office of Defects Investigation,
and 105) Quantitative Research. burden of the collection of information
OMB Number: Not Assigned. NHTSA, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE.,
on respondents, including the use of Washington, DC 20590. Telephone 202–
Type of Request: New collection.
Abstract: The Energy Independence automated collection techniques or 366–8703. Email Kareem.Habib@
and Security Act of 2007 (EISA), other forms of information technology. dot.gov.
enacted in December 2007, included a Comment to OMB is most effective if
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
requirement that the National Highway OMB receives it within 30 days of
Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) publication. I. Introduction
develop a consumer information and Colleen Coggins, Interested persons may petition
education campaign to improve Acting Senior Associate Administrator, Policy NHTSA requesting that the agency
consumer understanding of automobile and Operations. initiate an investigation to determine
performance with regard to fuel [FR Doc. 2015–18648 Filed 7–29–15; 8:45 am] whether a motor vehicle or item of
economy, Greenhouse Gases (GHG) BILLING CODE 4910–59–P replacement equipment does not
emissions and other pollutant comply with an applicable motor
emissions; of automobile use of vehicle safety standard or contains a
alternative fuels; and of thermal DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION defect that relates to motor vehicle
management technologies used on safety. 49 CFR 552.1. Upon receipt of a
automobiles to save fuel. A critical step National Highway Traffic Safety properly filed petition, the agency
in developing the consumer information Administration conducts a technical review of the
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program was to conduct proper market petition, material submitted with the
research to understand consumers’ Denial of Motor Vehicle Defect Petition petition, and any additional
knowledge surrounding these issues, AGENCY: National Highway Traffic information. § 552.6. After considering
evaluate potential consumer-facing Safety Administration, (NHTSA), DOT. the technical review and taking into
messages in terms of clarity and account appropriate factors, which may
ACTION: Denial of a petition for a defect
understand the communications include, among others, allocation of
investigation.
channels in which these messages agency resources, agency priorities, and
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![Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 146 / Thursday, July 30, 2015 / Notices 45579
the likelihood of success in litigation DDP–VBKx affecting fifteen different 4. Fire and Other Symptoms
that might arise from a determination of Chrysler models and cited recalls 07V– According to CAS defect petition
a noncompliance or a defect related to 291 and 13V–282. According to CAS, letter and complaint Supplement IV,
motor vehicle safety, the agency will ‘‘neither of these recalls was sufficient ‘‘Chrysler’s faulty TIPMs have also been
grant or deny the petition. § 552.8. to address the TIPM problem implicated in fires. Additionally, there
II. Defect Petition Background throughout Chrysler’s fleet, instead are numerous complaints alleging
Information focusing on a highly limited set of bizarre and unexplained headlight and
vehicles and circumstances. Given the taillight failure, windshield wiper
By a letter dated August 21, 2014, the number and range of complaints related activity, instrument panel failure, and
Center for Auto Safety (CAS) submitted to Chrysler TIPMs, it is time for NHTSA door lock problems.’’
a petition to NHTSA under 49 U.S.C. to formally investigate TIPM failures
30162 requesting ‘‘a safety defect across the board in 2007 and later 5. EWR Fatalities
investigation into failures associated models’’. CAS included as Attachment A to
with the Totally Integrated Power Supplement I what it believes to be
Module (TIPM) installed in Chrysler III. Summary of the Petition
EWR information for all fatal crashes
SUV’s, trucks, and vans beginning in the The petitioner requests that NHTSA involving TIPM failure. CAS claims that
2007 model year.’’ On August 27, 2014, formally investigate TIPM failures ‘‘[s]ince the TIPM functions as the
CAS sent NHTSA a supplemental letter across the board in 2007 and later central gateway for all vehicle
identifying 24 fatal crashes from models and cites the following electronics, there are multiple EWR
Chrysler Early Warning Reporting allegations: component codes that could point to the
(EWR) submissions that CAS alleged defect. There are 24 such crashes
may be related to TIPM failures 1. Vehicle Stall
involving 28 deaths that the agency
(Supplement I). On September 8, 2014, CAS stated in the defect petition letter must consider in reviewing our petition,
CAS sent another supplemental letter to and complaint Supplements III and IV at least twelve of which have been the
NHTSA with 35 additional complaints that: subject of DI requests. There are also a
allegedly related to TIPM failures large number of injury crashes reported
TIPM failure contributes to a range of
(Supplement II). On September 25, problems in vehicle electric components, the to EWR that involve these components.’’
2014, NHTSA’s Office of Defects safety issue which continues to present itself
Investigation (ODI) opened DP14–004 to in complaints is stalling, often in traffic 6. Class Action Lawsuit
evaluate the petition for a grant or deny where the dangers are obvious. The most The petition references a class action
decision. In a September 29, 2014 letter often cited TIPM failure is a loss of vehicle lawsuit as evidence of the breadth and
to CAS, ODI acknowledged receipt of power that can create a dangerous stall scope of ‘‘the actual TIPM problem.’’ 1
the petition and requested additional condition at any speed. Additionally, a The class action cited by the petition
information from CAS in support of its survey of complaints related to Chrysler
TIPMs suggests that a stall/no-start condition
was originally filed on November 1,
allegations that TIPM malfunctions may 2013. The plaintiffs in the original
is most reported outcome of TIPM failure,
result in airbag non-deployment or leaving drivers without power in traffic and complaint, which were not limited to
unintended acceleration caused by the stranded for unknown periods of time before TIPM equipped vehicles, included 2 MY
fuel pump failing to shutoff. After the vehicle regains the capacity to be started. 2011 Jeep Grand Cherokee owners, a
opening DP14–004, ODI received four MY 2011 Dodge Grand Caravan owner
additional CAS complaint supplements 2. Airbag Non-Deployment and a MY 2008 Chrysler 300 owner.2
on September 30, 2014 (Supplement III), The lawsuit provided the following
According to CAS defect petition
November 13, 2014 (Supplement IV), description of the alleged defect and
letter and complaint Supplement IV,
January 14, 2015 (Supplement V), and affected vehicles:
‘‘Not only do Chrysler’s faulty TIPMs
April 1, 2015 (Supplement VI). Plaintiffs and the Class members they
The CAS petition provided the result in vehicle stalling, they have also
been implicated in airbag non- propose to represent purchased or leased
following broad allegation of defect 2008 model year Chrysler 300 and 2011–2012
conditions in TIPM modules: deployment. As NHTSA knows from the
model year Jeep Grand Cherokees, Dodge
GM ignition switch mass defect, it is Durangos, and Dodge Grand Caravans
Chrysler TIPM failures result in a variety virtually impossible to be sure that an
of safety-related issues in multiple vehicle equipped with defective Totally Integrated
components, many of which have the
airbag will deploy until there is a crash. Power Modules, also known as TIPMs. The
potential for destructive results. Not only do Complaints directly citing airbag system TIPM controls and distributes power to all of
Chrysler’s faulty TIPMs result in vehicle warnings can be found in the the electrical functions of the vehicle,
stalling, they have also been implicated in complaints received by CAS’’. including the vehicle safety and ignition
airbag non-deployment, random horn, systems. Vehicles equipped with defective
headlight, taillight, door lock, instrument 3. Unintended Acceleration TIPMs progress through a succession of
panel and windshield wiper activity, power symptoms that begin with an inability to
CAS uses the term ‘‘unintended reliably start the vehicle and lead to, among
windows going up and down on their own, acceleration’’ in complaint letter
failure of fuel pump shutoff resulting in other things, the vehicle not starting, the fuel
unintended acceleration, and fires. In the
Supplement IV dated November 13, pump not turning off and the engine stalling
interim, these owners remain at the mercy of 2014, ‘‘to indicate reports where the while driving.
a defect which many have likened to the vehicle continued to move or accelerate A second amended complaint for the
vehicle being possessed and uncontrollable. when the operator did not want this to class action was filed on May 5, 2014,
A look at consumer complaints filed with happen. TIPM issues related to
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CAS suggests a better name for the TIPM— acceleration appear to arise from lack of 1 The petition references Velasco et al vs Chrysler
Totally Inept Power Module. fuel pump shut-off as well as problems LLC, Case No. 13-cv-08080–DDP–VBK, in the
Additionally, CAS referenced a recent with gear shift, throttle, and cruise United States District Court for the Central District
filing of a class action lawsuit in the control. Consumer problems related to of California as ‘‘incorporated herein by reference,
covering fifteen different Chrysler models over a
United States District Court, Central acceleration, gear and/or throttle number of model years.’’
District of California, Velasco et al vs. control may be found in CAS 2 The MY 2008 Chrysler 300 is not equipped with
Chrysler LLC, Case No. CV13–08080– complaints.’’ a TIPM body control module.
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![45580 Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 146 / Thursday, July 30, 2015 / Notices
listing seven plaintiffs and redefining that none of the reports that it provided coupled moving contact spring arm and
the scope of vehicles as all Chrysler actually involved instances where fuel contact resistance; 8 both are design
vehicles equipped with TIPM–7 pumps failing to shut off resulted in elements that do not exist in silicon
modules. The plaintiffs in the amended unintended acceleration.6 ODI notes only devices associated with TIPM–6.
complaint consist of 6 MY 2011 Jeep that claims that unintended acceleration Similarly, TIPM–7 implementations
Grand Cherokee owners and 1 MY 2011 is caused by, or related to, a ‘‘lack of include a fuse for overcurrent protection
Dodge Durango owner. The plaintiffs all fuel pump shut-off’’ are not supported while the TIPM–6 system design uses an
alleged experiencing ‘‘no-start’’ by any known incidents. Moreover, any integrated silicon overcurrent protection
concerns, with one also alleging a fuel allegation that a running fuel pump can, feature specific to solid state devices.
pump run-on condition and another absent extremely idiosyncratic failures ODI is interpreting the petition as a
reporting a single incident of engine of many other systems, cause a vehicle request for investigation of only vehicles
stall while driving. The amended to accelerate on its own demonstrates a equipped with the TIPM–7 (subject
complaint continued to focus on fundamental misunderstanding of basic vehicles) for the following reasons: (1)
problems with starting, engine stall automotive engineering. The petition refers to TIPM installed in
while driving and fuel pumps that do Chrysler vehicles ‘‘beginning in the
IV. ODI Analysis
not turn off, while adding ‘‘headlights 2007 model year’’ and TIPM–7 was
and taillights shutting off’’ and ‘‘random A. Scope Analysis introduced in the 2007 model year; (2)
and uncontrollable activity of the horn, The CAS petition requests the affected models listed in the petition
windshield wipers, and alarm system’’ investigation of alleged failures of TIPM and in the class action lawsuit
to the claimed TIPM deficiencies. The modules in Chrysler light vehicles, with referenced by the petition are all TIPM–
class action does not include airbag no reference to the automotive industry 7 vehicles; 9 (3) approximately 93
non-deployment, unintended body control technology percent 10 of the complaints submitted
acceleration or fire among the alleged implementations or architecture by CAS involve vehicles equipped with
consequences of the claimed TIPM functionality distinctions: ‘‘The CAS TIPM–7; (4) only 3 percent of CAS
defect. hereby petitions the National Highway complaints are related to vehicles
Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) equipped with TIPM–6 and ODI’s
7. Petition Issues review of these complaints did not
to initiate a safety defect investigation
ODI identified several issues with the into failures associated with the Totally identify any safety defect trends; 11 and
scope and supporting evidence for Integrated Power Module (TIPM) (5) the significant technical differences
defect allegations in the petition installed in Chrysler SUV’s, trucks, and between the TIPM–6 and TIPM–7
submitted by CAS. The petition was vans beginning in the 2007 model year’’. modules as described above.
unnecessarily broad in scope and Interpreted broadly, the CAS petition The TIPM–7 population includes
included several alleged defects that potentially affects approximately 10 approximately 4.7 million Chrysler
had no factual basis. After failing to million 7 vehicles equipped with TIPM– sport utility vehicles, trucks, and vans
identify any clear basis for several of the 6 or TIPM–7 modules. The petition across 11 vehicle platforms beginning in
petition allegations, ODI included a scope does not appear to recognize the model year 2007 (Table 1). ODI
request for supporting information for functional distinctions between TIPM–6 conducted a detailed review of
claims regarding airbag non-deployment and TIPM–7. The petition also does not complaint narratives submitted by CAS
and unintended acceleration in its distinguish between the significant and consumers including careful
September 29, 2014 petition electronics technology differences analysis of vehicle repair histories,
acknowledgement letter. The CAS between the relay based TIPM–7 and an warranty claims obtained from the
response, provided in a November 13, all solid-state Field Effect Transistors manufacturer and any available
2014 letter, did not provide any (FET) TIPM–6. Customer Assistance Inquiry reports
technical basis for claims of airbag non- TIPM–7 vehicle function outputs (CAIR). In total, there were 296
deployment and appeared to equate any (such as fuel pump control, wiper/ complaints submitted by the petitioner
illumination of the airbag warning lamp washer control. . .etc.) are a mix of in the original petition and five
with TIPM failure, even when the electro-mechanical relays and solid state supplements, including 271 complaints
complaint clearly cited other causes for FET devices equipped with digital related to the subject vehicles equipped
the airbag system fault (e.g, ‘‘faulty Serial Peripheral Interface (SPI) with TIPM–7. ODI’s complaint analysis
wiring in passenger front seat causing communication ports while TIPM–6 focused on vehicles equipped with
airbag failure warning to illuminate’’ 3 vehicle function outputs are strictly TIPM–7.
and ‘‘open circuit in drivers [sic] seat solid state SPI-based FET devices with
airbag’’ 4). Several other complaints no electro-mechanical relays. Relays are 8 Fuel pump relays were tested in simulated
cited by CAS do not allege any airbag electro-mechanical devices with specific vehicle environments incorporating variable factors
such as relay type; relay manufacture, simulated
failures but, in apparent reference to inherent break down mechanisms fuel pump current and inductance levels of
CAS petition claims, state that TIPM including, but not limited to, the representative TIPM–7 vehicles.
failure ‘‘can cause the airbags to not degradation of the mechanically 9 The CAS petition references a recent filing of a
deploy.’’ class action lawsuit in US District Court, Velasco
With regard to the basis for its claims from lack of fuel pump shut-off as well as problems et al. vs. Chrysler LLC affecting fifteen different
with gear shift, throttle, and cruise control.’’ Chrysler models in which CAS cited the same
that TIPM failures can result in 6 The CAS November 13, 2014 letter states that, fifteen vehicle models in the defect petition dated
unintended acceleration, CAS repeated ‘‘There are quite a few consumer complaints in both August 21, 2014. The Court order referenced by
its allegation that such failures are CAS specifically cited TIPM–7 in Case No. CV 13–
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CAS and NHTSA databases citing lack of fuel pump
associated with fuel pump shut-off shutoff that result in stalling and/or nonstart 08080 DDP, Dkt. No. 42, ‘‘Plaintiffs allege that the
condition but do not produce uncontrolled TIPM with which the Class Vehicles are equipped,
failures,5 even while acknowledging referred to as TIPM 7.’’
acceleration.’’ This statement, which also misstates
10 Percentage based on CAS complaints through
the effects of fuel pump shutoff failure,
3 Identifiedby CAS as complaint number 62. acknowledges the absence of any related complaints Supplement V.
4 Identifiedby CAS as complaint number 146. of unintended acceleration. 11 The remaining CAS complaints are associated
5 The CAS November 13, 2014 letter states that, 7 Chrysler SUV’s, trucks, and vans equipped with with vehicles equipped with Front Control Module
‘‘TIPM issues related to acceleration appear to arise TIMP–7 and TIPM–6 beginning MY 2007. and Body Control Modules.
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TABLE 1—TIPM–7 POPULATION
Models (platforms) Model years Population
Chrysler Town and Country/Dodge Grand Caravan (RT) ....................................................................................... 2008–14 1,632,250
Jeep Wrangler (JK) .................................................................................................................................................. 2007–14 962,098
Ram 1500/2500/3500/4500and5500 (DS/DJ/DD/DP) ............................................................................................. 2009–12 929,036
Jeep Grand Cherokee/Dodge Durango (WK/WD) .................................................................................................. 2011–13 526,939
Jeep Liberty (KK) ..................................................................................................................................................... 2008–12 331,717
Dodge Nitro (KA) ..................................................................................................................................................... 2007–11 198,581
Dodge Journey (JC) ................................................................................................................................................ 2009–10 156,537
Total TIPM–7 .................................................................................................................................................... 2007–14 4,737,158
B. TIPM Function submitted a second DIR expanding the vehicles. Vehicle fuel pump system
TIPM–7 is a controller area network scope of the FPR defect condition to measurements indicated that WK/WD
(CAN) based body controller integrated include an additional 338,216 MY 2012 vehicles have the highest current draw
with an electrical power distribution through 2013 Jeep Grand Cherokee and inductance while RT minivans have
center; and is designed to support vehicles manufactured from September the lowest current draw coupled with
centralized and distributed vehicle 17, 2010 through August 19, 2013 and lower fuel pump inductance. Relay
control functions. The TIPM–7 electrical MY 2012 through 2013 Dodge Durango durability test data provided by Chrysler
architecture features three levels of vehicles manufactured from January 18, indicated that other TIPM–7 vehicle
functional interactions with other 2011 through August 19, 2013 (15V– platform relays substantially outlasted
vehicle systems: (1) Power only 115). Chrysler identified the root cause relays tested in a simulated WK/WD
interaction- circuits that only pass as deformation of the relay contact environment. NHTSA believes that
through the integrated fuse box (e.g. spring due to the heat caused by contact because the current draw is lower for
occupant restraint controller); (2) power power, ambient temperature around the other vehicles equipped with the TIPM–
and data transfer interaction for circuits fuel pump relay, and battery voltage. 7 than for the WK/WD vehicles, the risk
that pass through the power distribution These factors, present in combination of fuel pump relay deformation for these
center with no TIPM control function and in high amounts, led to premature other vehicles is lower than for the WK/
(e.g. powertrain controller and fuel pump relay failures, which usually WD vehicles.
transmission controller); and (3) power resulted in a no-start concern. When the
fuel pump relay fails while driving, the On October 20, 2014, ODI sent an
and control interaction for circuits that Information Request (IR) letter to
pass through the power distribution fuel pump will cease to function and the
engine will shut off or ‘‘stall.’’ In the Chrysler requesting production,
center and are directly controlled by the complaint, and warranty claim data
TIPM. The latter include power and case of a stall, the vehicle maintains
power and functionality for certain related to the complaints provided by
control logic for exterior lighting,
features, such as hazard indicators, seat CAS and ODI complaints involving stall
windshield wiper/washer, door lock,
belt pre-tensioners and airbags. while driving allegations potentially
and horn. A distinguishing feature of
Chrysler’s recall remedy involved related to TIPM faults. The IR letter also
the TIPM–7 from other Chrysler body
installing a new, more robust fuel pump requested information related to the fuel
controllers is the integration of the fuel
pump relay. relay, external to the TIPM. pump relay root cause analysis and
Detailed analysis of relay material technical data regarding TIPM design
C. Fuel Pump Relay Defect composition, lab reports and fuel pump and construction. Analysis of the field
In a September 3, 2014 letter to system design reviews performed by data submitted indicated that the WK/
NHTSA, Chrysler submitted a Defect Chrysler and Continental that ODI WD vehicles exhibited significantly
Information Report (DIR) identifying a reviewed in examining the petition higher complaint rates related to FPR
defect in the fuel pump relay (FPR) identified the root cause of the failures than other subject vehicles
within the TIPM–7 which can result in premature relay failure to be contact (Table 2). The data show that the
a no start or stall condition in erosion and the deformation of the primary failure mode of the fuel pump
approximately 188,723 model year (MY) contact spring due to under-hood relay is a no-start condition, with no-
2011 Jeep Grand Cherokee (WK) and temperatures around the fuel pump starts and starts followed immediately
Dodge Durango (WD) vehicles relay, current draws, and fuel pump by stall accounting for approximately
manufactured from January 5, 2010 inductance levels specific to Delphi fuel 68% of the complaints for both the
through July 20, 2011 (14V–530). In a pumps installed on MY 2011–2013 Jeep recalled WK/WD vehicles and the non-
February 24, 2015 letter, Chrysler Grand Cherokee and Dodge Durango recalled subject vehicles.
TABLE 2—FUEL PUMP RELAY COMPLAINT ANALYSIS, BY TOTAL FAILURE RATE 12
[All rates are in complaints per 100,000 vehicles]
TIPM–7 vehicles Fuel pump relay failure mode
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Start with
Stall while driving No-start Pump run-on Total
immediate stall
Fuel pump relay recalls Platforms
No. Rate No. Rate No. Rate No. Rate No. Rate
Recalled ................................ WK/WD ......... 37 7.0 4 0.8 82 15.6 3 0.6 126 23.9
Non-recalled ......................... JC .................. 2 1.3 0 0.0 3 1.9 0 0.0 5 3.2
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![45582 Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 146 / Thursday, July 30, 2015 / Notices
TABLE 2—FUEL PUMP RELAY COMPLAINT ANALYSIS, BY TOTAL FAILURE RATE 12—Continued
[All rates are in complaints per 100,000 vehicles]
TIPM–7 vehicles Fuel pump relay failure mode
Start with
Stall while driving No-start Pump run-on Total
immediate stall
Fuel pump relay recalls Platforms
No. Rate No. Rate No. Rate No. Rate No. Rate
KA ................. 1 0.5 0 0.0 2 1.0 0 0.0 3 1.5
RT ................. 1 0.1 1 0.1 4 0.2 1 0.1 7 0.4
JK .................. 1 0.1 0 0.0 3 0.3 0 0.0 4 0.4
Ram ............... 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0
KK ................. 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0
Total ....... 5 0.1 1 0.0 12 0.3 1 0.0 19 0.5
Grand Total TIPM–7 ...... ....................... 42 0.9 5 0.1 94 2.0 4 0.1 145 3.1
ODI’s analysis of all confirmed FPR D. Other Stall While Driving Defects ODI’s analysis identified a total of 131
failures identified a total of 145 In addition to the analysis of complaints alleging TIPM related stall
complaints, including 42 resulting in at complaints related to confirmed FPR while driving incidents. Fifty-five (55)
least one incident of stall while driving. failures to assess the scope of Chrysler of the complaints were found to be
The recalled WK/WD vehicles, which recalls 14V–530 and 15V–115, ODI also unrelated to TIPM failures, including 10
comprise only 11 percent of the subject examined all stall while driving associated with a defect condition
vehicle population, account for 126 of complaints allegedly related to TIPM addressed by alternator replacement
the total FPR related complaints (87 failures in the subject vehicles to assess recall 14V–634.14 A total of 76
percent) and 37 of those involving stall whether any other engine stall related complaints were identified that were
while driving (88 percent). This analysis defect conditions may exist in the either confirmed to be related to a TIPM
combined with overall warranty claim subject vehicles that are not already fault condition (49) or where either the
data analysis and vehicle test data addressed by a safety recall. ODI’s FPR or other, unspecified, TIPM fault
related to FPR root cause analysis analysis did not identify any specific condition may have been the cause
indicate that, based on currently TIPM faults resulting in incidents of (27).15 Table 3 shows the failure rates
available information, the scope of stall while driving that are not already for potentially TIPM related stall while
recalls 14V–530 and 15V–115 addressed by safety recalls 13 and driving incidents for the recalled WK/
adequately address the FPR defect analysis of complaints did not identify WD vehicles and for each of the non-
condition. any additional defect trends associated recalled platforms. These data do not
with potentially TIPM-related stall indicate a stall while driving defect
while driving that warrant additional trend outside of the recall population.
investigation.
TABLE 3—STALL WHILE DRIVING ANALYSIS, ALL CAUSES 17
TIPM–7 vehicles Not related to TIPM Potentially TIPM related
Alternator Other non- Fuel pump Possible Total rate
Fuel pump relay recalls Platforms recall Total Total
TIPM 16 relay TIPM (C/100k)
14V–634
Recalled ........................... WK/WD ...... 10 17 27 40 14 54 10.2
Non-recalled .................... KA .............. 0 5 5 1 3 4 2.0
JC ............... 0 1 1 2 1 3 1.9
RT .............. 0 9 9 4 6 10 0.6
Ram ............ 0 5 5 1 2 3 0.3
JK ............... 0 6 6 1 1 2 0.2
KK .............. 0 2 2 0 0 0 0.0
Total .... 0 28 28 9 13 22 0.5
Grand Total TIPM–7 .................... 10 45 55 49 27 76 1.6
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12 Complaint data in Table 2 is limited to CAS address a defect condition in approximately 81,000 experience a rapid alternator failure having limited
complaints and ODI VOQ’s potentially related to MY 2007 JK and KA vehicles associated with the or no detection, which can result in vehicle
stall while driving that were identified prior to PCM momentarily shutting the engine down due to shutdown/shut off and/or fire.
ODI’s information request letter to Chrysler for a prolonged (75ms) TIPM microprocessor reset 15 Unknown/possible TIPM’s include several for
DP14–004. triggered by a vehicle-wide CAN bus error event. which the condition could not be duplicated by the
13 In addition to FPR recalls 14V–530 and 15V– 14 For recall 14V–634, vehicles equipped with the servicing dealer.
115, Chrysler previously initiated recall 07V–291 to 3.6L engine and 160 Amp Alternator may
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![Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 146 / Thursday, July 30, 2015 / Notices 45585
condition, related to the fuel pump Federal agencies must solicit public SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Under the
relay, was a no-start concern, but it comment on proposed collections of Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995,
could also result in stall while driving. information, including extensions and before an agency submits a proposed
This fuel pump relay defect was limited reinstatement of previously approved collection of information to OMB for
to approximately 11 percent of the 4.7 collections. approval, it must first publish a
million subject vehicles equipped with This document describes one document in the Federal Register
TIPM–7 and has been addressed by collection of information for which providing a 60-day comment period and
safety recalls 14V–530 and 15V–115. No NHTSA intends to seek OMB approval. otherwise consult with members of the
valid evidence was presented in support DATES: Comments must be received on public and affected agencies concerning
of claims related to airbag non- or before September 28, 2015. each proposed collection of information.
deployment, unintended acceleration or ADDRESSES: You may submit comments The OMB has promulgated regulations
fire resulting from TIPM faults and these [identified by DOT Docket No. NHTSA– describing what must be included in
claims were found to be wholly without 2015–0071] by any of the following such a document. Under OMB’s
merit based on review of the field data methods: regulation (at 5 CFR 1320.8(d), an
and design of the relevant systems and • Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to agency must ask for public comment on
components. http://www.regulations.gov. Follow the the following:
Except insofar as the petitioner’s (i) Whether the proposed collection of
online instructions for submitting
contentions relate to the defect information is necessary for the proper
comments.
condition addressed by the Chrysler performance of the functions of the
• Mail: Docket Management Facility:
recalls, the factual bases of the agency, including whether the
U.S. Department of Transportation, 1200
petitioner’s contentions that any further information will have practical utility;
New Jersey Avenue SE., West Building
investigation is necessary are (ii) the accuracy of the agency’s
Ground Floor, Room W12–140,
unsupported. In our view, additional estimate of the burden of the proposed
Washington, DC 20590–0001.
investigation is unlikely to result in a collection of information, including the
• Hand Delivery or Courier: West
finding that a defect related to motor validity of the methodology and
Building Ground Floor, Room W12–140,
vehicle safety exists or a NHTSA order assumptions used;
1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., between
for the notification and remedy of a (iii) how to enhance the quality,
9 a.m. and 5 p.m. ET, Monday through
safety-related defect as alleged by the utility, and clarity of the information to
Friday, except Federal holidays.
petitioner at the conclusion of the be collected;
Telephone: 1–800–647–5527.
requested investigation. Therefore, the (iv) how to minimize the burden of
• Fax: 202–493–2251.
petition is denied. This action does not the collection of information on those
Instructions: All submissions must
constitute a finding by NHTSA that a who are to respond, including the use
include the agency name and docket
safety-related defect does not exist. The of appropriate automated, electronic,
number for this proposed collection of
agency will take further action if mechanical, or other technological
information. Note that all comments
warranted by future circumstances. collection techniques or other forms of
received will be posted without change
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 30162(d); delegations to http://www.regulations.gov, including information technology, e.g. permitting
of authority at CFR 1.95. any personal information provided. electronic submission of responses.
Please see the Privacy Act heading In compliance with these
Frank S. Borris II, requirements, NHTSA asks for public
Acting Associate Administrator for below.
Privacy Act: Anyone is able to search comments on the following proposed
Enforcement, National Highway Traffic Safety collections of information:
Administration, U.S. Department of the electronic form of all comments
Title: The National Survey on the Use
Transportation. received into any of our dockets by the
of Booster Seats.
[FR Doc. 2015–18672 Filed 7–29–15; 8:45 am] name of the individual submitting the OMB Control Number: 2127–0644.
BILLING CODE 4910–59–P comment (or signing the comment, if Affected Public: Motorists in
submitted on behalf of an association, passenger vehicles at gas stations, fast
business, labor union, etc.). You may food restaurants, and other types of sites
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION review DOT’s complete Privacy Act frequented by children during the time
Statement in the Federal Register in which the survey is conducted.
National Highway Traffic Safety published on April 11, 2000 (65 FR Form Number: NHTSA Form 1010.
Administration 19477–78) or you may visit http://
[U.S. DOT Docket Number NHTSA–2015– DocketInfo.dot.gov. Abstract
0071] Docket: For access to the docket to The National Survey of the Use of
read background documents or Booster Seats is being conducted to
Reports, Forms, and Recordkeeping comments received, go to http:// respond to the Section 14(i) of the
Requirements www.regulations.gov. or the street Transportation Recall Enhancement,
AGENCY: National Highway Traffic address listed above. Follow the online Accountability, and Documentation
Safety Administration (NHTSA), instructions for accessing the dockets. (TREAD) Act of 2000. The act directs
Department of Transportation. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: the Department of Transportation to
ACTION: Request for public comment on Complete copies of each request for reduce the deaths and injuries among
proposed collection of information. collection of information may be children in the 4 to 8 year old age group
obtained at no charge from Timothy M. that are caused by failure to use a
Lhorne on DSK7TPTVN1PROD with NOTICES
SUMMARY: Before a Federal agency can Pickrell, NHTSA,1200 New Jersey booster seat by 25%. Conducting the
collect certain information from the Avenue SE., W55–320, NVS–421, National Survey of the Use of Booster
public, it must receive approval from Washington, DC 20590. Mr. Pickrell’s Seats provides the Department with
the Office of Management and Budget telephone number is (202) 366–2903. invaluable information on who is and is
(OMB). Under procedures established Please identify the relevant collection of not using booster seats, helping the
by the Paperwork Reduction Act of information by referring to its OMB Department better direct its outreach
1995, before seeking OMB approval, Control Number. programs to ensure that children are
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Document Created: 2018-02-23 09:30:04
Document Modified: 2018-02-23 09:30:04
| Category | Regulatory Information | |
| Collection | Federal Register | |
| sudoc Class | AE 2.7: GS 4.107: AE 2.106: | |
| Publisher | Office of the Federal Register, National Archives and Records Administration | |
| Section | Notices | |
| Action | Denial of a petition for a defect investigation. | |
| Contact | Mr. Kareem Habib, Vehicle Control Division, Office of Defects Investigation, NHTSA, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, DC 20590. Telephone 202-366-8703. Email [email protected] | |
| FR Citation | 80 FR 45578 |
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