80 FR 55527 - Airworthiness Directives; The Boeing Company Airplanes

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration

Federal Register Volume 80, Issue 179 (September 16, 2015)

Page Range		55527-55535
FR Document		2015-23117

We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all The Boeing Company Model 737-600, -700, -700C, -800, -900, and -900ER series airplanes. This AD was prompted by reports of latently failed fuel shutoff valves discovered during fuel filter replacement. This AD requires revising the maintenance or inspection program to include new airworthiness limitations. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct latent failures of the fuel shutoff valve to the engine, which could result in the inability to shut off fuel to the engine and, in case of certain engine fires, an uncontrollable fire that could lead to wing failure.

Federal Register, Volume 80 Issue 179 (Wednesday, September 16, 2015)

[Federal Register Volume 80, Number 179 (Wednesday, September 16, 2015)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 55527-55535]
From the Federal Register Online [www.thefederalregister.org]
[FR Doc No: 2015-23117]

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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. FAA-2014-0194; Directorate Identifier 2014-NM-022-AD;
Amendment 39-18266; AD 2015-19-03]
RIN 2120-AA64

Airworthiness Directives; The Boeing Company Airplanes

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

ACTION: Final rule.

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SUMMARY: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all The
Boeing Company Model 737-600, -700, -700C, -800, -900, and -900ER
series airplanes. This AD was prompted by reports of latently failed
fuel shutoff valves discovered during fuel filter replacement. This AD
requires revising the maintenance or inspection program to include new
airworthiness limitations. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct
latent failures of the fuel shutoff valve to the engine, which

[[Page 55528]]

could result in the inability to shut off fuel to the engine and, in
case of certain engine fires, an uncontrollable fire that could lead to
wing failure.

DATES: This AD is effective October 21, 2015.

Examining the AD Docket

You may examine the AD docket on the Internet at http://www.regulations.gov by searching for and locating Docket No. FAA-2014-
0194; or in person at the Docket Management Facility between 9 a.m. and
5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. The AD docket
contains this AD, the regulatory evaluation, any comments received, and
other information. The address for the Docket Office (phone: 800-647-
5527) is Docket Management Facility, U.S. Department of Transportation,
Docket Operations, M-30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140, 1200
New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, DC 20590.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Rebel Nichols, Aerospace Engineer,
Propulsion Branch, ANM-140S, FAA, Seattle Aircraft Certification
Office, 1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, WA 98057-3356; phone: 425-917-
6509; fax: 425-917-6590; email: rebel.nichols@faa.gov.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Discussion

We issued a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) to amend 14 CFR
part 39 by adding an AD that would apply to all The Boeing Company
Model 737-600, -700, -700C, -800, -900, and -900ER series airplanes.
The NPRM published in the Federal Register on April 14, 2014 (79 FR
20834). The NPRM was prompted by reports of latently failed fuel
shutoff valves discovered during fuel filter replacement. The NPRM
proposed to require revising the maintenance or inspection program to
include new airworthiness limitations. We are issuing this AD to detect
and correct latent failures of the fuel shutoff valve to the engine,
which could result in the inability to shut off fuel to the engine and,
in case of certain engine fires, an uncontrollable fire that could lead
to wing failure.

Record of Ex Parte Communication

In preparation of AD actions such as NPRMs and immediately adopted
rules, it is the practice of the FAA to obtain technical information
and information on operational and economic impacts from design
approval holders and aircraft operators. We discussed certain comments
addressed in this final rule in a teleconference with Airlines for
America (A4A) and other members of the aviation industry. All of the
comments discussed during this teleconference are addressed in this
final rule in response to comments submitted by other commenters. A
discussion of this contact can be found in the rulemaking docket at
http://www.regulations.gov by searching for and locating Docket No.
FAA-2014-0194.

Clarification of Certain Terminology

Throughout the preamble of this final rule, commenters may have
used the terms ``fuel shutoff valve'' and ``fuel spar valve''
interchangeably. Both terms refer to the same part. In our responses to
comments, we have used the term ``fuel shutoff valve.'' The term ``fuel
spar valve'' is more commonly used in airplane maintenance
documentation and, therefore, we have used that term in figure 1 to
paragraph (g) of this AD.

Comments

We gave the public the opportunity to participate in developing
this AD. The following presents the comments received on the NPRM (79
FR 20834, April 14, 2014) and the FAA's response to each comment.

Request To Withdraw the NPRM (79 FR 20834, April 14, 2014)

American Airlines (AA) requested that no further regulatory action
be taken. AA stated that it has experienced only a small number of fuel
shutoff valve actuator failures. AA stated that the combination of
failures necessary to produce the catastrophic event described in the
NPRM (79 FR 20834, April 14, 2014) includes fuel shutoff valve actuator
failure, an erroneous position indication, and a fire in the engine
compartment. AA also stated that risk analysis shows the probability of
this combination occurring is in the improbable range of ``10E-11 to
10E-16.''
We disagree with commenter's request. We have determined that an
unsafe condition exists that warrants an interim action until the
manufacturer finishes developing a modification that will address the
identified unsafe condition. We have determined that, without the
required interim action, a significant number of flights with a fuel
shutoff valve actuator that is failed in the open valve position will
occur during the affected fleet life. If certain engine fire conditions
were to occur, or if extreme engine damage were to occur, or if an
engine separation event were to occur during flight, the crew
procedures for such an event would not stop the fuel flow to the engine
strut and nacelle. The continued flow of fuel could cause an
uncontrolled fire or lead to a fuel exhaustion event.
The FAA regulations require all transport airplanes to be fail safe
with respect to engine fire events, and the risk due to severe engine
damage events to be minimized. Therefore, we require, for each flight,
sufficiently operative fire safety systems so that fires can be
detected and contained, and that fuel to the engine strut and nacelle
can be shut off in the event of an engine fire or severe damage.
The FAA airworthiness standards require remotely controlled
powerplant valves to provide indications that the valves are in the
commanded position. These indications allow the prompt detection and
correction of valve failures. We do not allow dispatch with a known
inoperative fuel shutoff valve. Therefore, we are proceeding with this
final rule--not because of the higher-than-typical failure rate of the
particular valve actuator involved, but instead because the fuel
shutoff valve actuator can fail in a manner that also defeats the
required valve position indication feature. That failure can lead to a
large number of flights occurring on an airplane with a fuel shutoff
valve actuator failed in the open position without the operator being
aware of the failure. An airworthiness limitation containing required
inspections is intended to limit the number of flights following latent
failure of the fuel shutoff valve. We have not changed this AD in this
regard.

Request for Inspection Relief

AirDo, AA, All Nippon Airlines (ANA), Delta Airlines (DAL),
Southwest Airlines (SWA), Transavia, and United Airlines (UAL)
requested clarification of the daily check requirement. The commenters
stated that the check applies to airplanes that are in operational
revenue status. The commenters stated that the proposed AD (79 FR
20834, April 14, 2014) does not account for airplanes in routine
maintenance or for an out-of-service condition.
We infer the commenters are requesting inspection relief for
airplanes that are not in service. We agree with the commenters'
request. It would be unnecessarily burdensome to require the
inspections on airplanes that are not being used. We agree with
limiting inspections to days when the airplane is in revenue service.
In the Interval column of figure 1 to paragraph (g) of this AD, we have
added a note to clarify that the operational check is not

[[Page 55529]]

required on days when the airplane is not used in revenue service, but
that the check must be done before further flight once the airplane is
returned to revenue service.

Request To Limit the Applicability

UAL requested that we revise the proposed AD (79 FR 20834, April
14, 2014) to limit the applicability specified in figure 1 to paragraph
(g) of the proposed AD to airplanes with the valve actuators that have
the identified unsafe condition. UAL stated the applicability applies
to valve actuators having part number (P/N) MA30A1001. UAL stated that
the problem does not apply to other existing actuator designs, and will
not apply to future designs.
We agree with the commenter's request. It would be unnecessarily
burdensome to require the inspections on airplanes that do not have any
of the susceptible valves installed. We have added a note to the
Applicability column in figure 1 to paragraph (g) of this AD to clarify
that the limitations apply to Model 737-600, -700, -700C, -800, -900,
and -900ER airplanes having actuator P/N MA20A2027 (Boeing P/N
S343T003-56) or P/N MA30A1001 (Boeing P/N S343T003-66) installed at the
engine fuel spar valve positions.

Request To Follow the Master Minimum Equipment List (MMEL) in Lieu of
the Daily Check

AA and Qantas Airways stated that if the master minimum equipment
list (MMEL) is being used, then the daily check should be not required.
AA stated that the Boeing Model 737 MMEL item 28-22, ``Fuel/Spar
Valve Closed Lights,'' allows for the lights to be inoperative,
provided the associated valve is verified to operate normally and the
crossfeed VALVE OPEN light operates normally. AA stated that this item
allows the lights to be inoperative for up to 10 days, and it requested
that a provision be added to state that if this MMEL is being used, the
daily check is not required.
Qantas Airways stated that if an airplane is dispatched under the
MMEL for inoperative SPAR VALVE CLOSED light(s), then it is not
possible to accomplish the proposed checks.
We partially agree with the commenters' request. We disagree with
providing MMEL relief for an inoperative fuel shutoff valve indication
because such relief could potentially allow the fuel shutoff valve to
be inoperative for up to 10 days of revenue operation. However, we do
agree to provide flexibility regarding verification that the fuel
shutoff valve is operational. We have added item D. to figure 1 to
paragraph (g) of this AD to specify a fourth option to perform daily
inspections to verify that the fuel shutoff valve is closing.

Request To Clarify Recording Requirements

Air Do, Ryanair, SWA, Transavia, UAL, and Darryl Voss requested
that the FAA provide a more complete explanation of the requirements
with regard to recording compliance.
Air Do stated that if the flightcrew performed the operational
check, a maintenance record is usually not created. The commenter
questioned whether this is acceptable, or whether the flightcrew should
record it in the flight log.
Ryanair requested that the FAA explicitly state in the AD that the
proposed actions may be performed by maintenance and/or flight
operations checklists, and that the AD will not require the retention
of maintenance or flight operations records to show compliance. Ryanair
stated that due to the high frequency of the actions in the NPRM (79 FR
20834, April 14, 2014) and the large number of affected airplanes in
its fleet (approximately 300), the creation, retention, and
reforecasting of individual records for this activity is not practical.
Because of the high frequency of checks resulting from the proposed
AD (79 FR 20834, April 14, 2014), compounded with the creation,
distribution, and retention of the documentation of the checks, SWA
requested that the FAA specifically state in the AD that when the daily
check is performed successfully by flightcrews, no documentation is
required. SWA also requested that the FAA specifically state in the AD
that documentation (i.e., logbook entry or other type of defect report)
is required only when a failure is detected by the flightcrew, or when
the check is performed by maintenance personnel.
Transavia requested that, if the daily check remains, we revise the
proposed AD (79 FR 20834, April 14, 2014) to state that the inclusion
of the daily check requirement into a checklist is sufficient to show
AD compliance and prevent unwanted paperwork, and that the daily check
can be performed by either maintenance personnel or the flightcrew.
UAL asked whether the flightcrews will be required to record
compliance of the operational checks and document each inspection.
Darryl Voss requested that we revise the proposed AD (79 FR 20834,
April 14, 2014) to remove the option to allow flightcrews to perform
operational checks for maintenance. Mr. Voss stated that showing
compliance with ADs is almost exclusively a maintenance function and
should remain a maintenance function to provide compliance continuity.
We agree that clarification is necessary. This AD requires
including the information in figure 1 of paragraph (g) of this AD in
the maintenance or inspection program. However, this AD does not
require accomplishing the actions specified in figure 1 of paragraph
(g) of this AD. The actions specified in the figure in this AD are
done, and remain enforceable, as part of the airworthiness limitations
of the instructions for continued airworthiness (ICA). Section 14 CFR
43.11(a) of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 43.11(a)) requires
maintenance record entries for maintenance actions such as the required
checks. If an operator elects to have a flightcrew member do the check
in accordance with the applicable airworthiness limitation, that same
action would be considered an operational task (not maintenance), and
therefore 14 CFR 43.11(a) would not apply. In that case, operators
should follow their normal processes for operational activities,
including necessary Principal Operations Inspector (POI) involvement.
We have not changed this AD in this regard.

Request To Clarify Inspection Procedures for Operational Checks

Boeing requested to add a flightcrew inspection procedure during
engine start and engine shutdown. Boeing stated that this will provide
common flight procedures and eliminate each operator creating its own
test.
DAL requested that the preamble of the NPRM (79 FR 20834, April 14,
2014) be revised to match the rest of the requirements in the NPRM. DAL
stated that if POI approval is required for flightcrews to accomplish
operational checks, then the preamble should identify that flightcrews
can only accomplish operational checks approved by the inspector. DAL
stated that the preamble should not associate the operational check
without engine start to only maintenance crews, and the operational
checks while starting the engine or shutting down the engine to only
flightcrews.
UAL requested that standardized procedures be established by the
FAA aircraft certification office for the POI to approve on behalf of
all affected operators.
We disagree with the commenter's request to add to this AD a method
describing how maintenance actions and operations actions should be

[[Page 55530]]

coordinated. The operational requirements are specified in figure 1 to
paragraph (g) of this AD; how these requirements are captured in the
operations processes to ensure that the maintenance action has been
completed is likely different for each operator. As the commenter
stated, flightcrews can only accomplish operational checks approved by
the inspector. No change has been made to the final rule in this
regard.

Request To Provide an Alternative to the Maintenance or Inspection
Program Revision in Operational Documents

DAL requested that the proposed AD (79 FR 20834, April 14, 2014) be
revised to provide an option for revising the Boeing Model 737
``Airplane Normal Checklist'' to specify accomplishment of one of the
required operational checks (operational check during engine start,
operational check during engine shutdown, or operational check without
engine operations) as a ``FIRST FLIGHT OF THE DAY'' requirement as an
alternative to the maintenance or inspection program revision specified
in paragraph (g) of the proposed rule. DAL stated that this option
would ensure that operational aircraft are inspected daily, provide
clear responsibility to the flightcrew to accomplish the operational
checks, and remove concern for accomplishing the actions during times
when the airplane is not in service. DAL stated that incorporating this
change to the ``Airplane Normal Checklist'' will simplify compliance
procedures while satisfying the requirements of the proposed rule.
JAL requested that the FAA coordinate with Boeing to revise the
flightcrew operations manual (FCOM) to provide the check of the fuel
spar valve as a normal procedure. JAL stated that if an operational
check by the flightcrew is allowed, the FCOM should be revised to
provide the normal procedure to perform the fuel spar valve check
during engine start or shutdown.
Qantas Airways suggested that a revision to the Boeing Model 737
Airplane Flight Manual (AFM), Section 1 ``Certificate Limitations,'' or
Section 3 ``Normal Procedures,'' might be a more appropriate location
to allow the flightcrew to monitor valve operations during engine start
and/or engine shutdown.
We find that clarification is necessary. Changing these documents
presupposes that every operator will have flightcrews perform this
task. It is not our intention to require flightcrews to perform this
task. Individual operators can modify their normal operating procedures
to add this requirement.

Request To Clarify the Operational Check During Engine Start

Qantas stated that it does not believe that paragraph B. of the
Description column of figure 1 to paragraph (g) of the proposed AD (79
FR 20834, April 14, 2014), which specifies to do an operational check
during engine start, achieves the desired failure detection. Qantas
stated that if the test fails (i.e., bright light fails to illuminate),
the valve has failed to open; this is different than a valve that has
failed to close. Qantas stated that the test should identify the failed
actuator in the failure mode, which results in an unsafe condition.
We infer that Qantas is requesting we clarify the operational check
during engine start. We find that clarification is necessary. The check
procedure is designed to make sure the fuel shutoff valve actuator
moves to the open position from the closed position. However, if the
fuel shutoff valve actuator had previously failed open, the actuator
would not move the valve and this check would fail. If this check
fails, the fuel shutoff valve actuator is either failed in the closed
position or has failed previously in the open position. Either way, the
failed fuel shutoff valve actuator must be replaced. We have not
changed this AD in this regard.

Request To Add Requirement To Provide Electrical Power Before the
Maintenance Check

UAL requested we add a requirement to provide electrical power
before accomplishment of the maintenance check specified by the
proposed AD (79 FR 20834, April 14, 2014).
We agree with the commenter's request because electrical power is
required. In item C.1. of figure 1 to paragraph (g) of this AD, we have
added an instruction to supply electrical power to the airplane using
standard practices when performing the operational check.

Request To Reference the Fault Isolation Manual

Boeing requested that figure 1 to paragraph (g) of the proposed AD
(79 FR 20834, April 14, 2014) be revised in order to reference the
Fault Isolation Manual (FIM), instead of the Boeing Model 737 Aircraft
Maintenance Manual (AMM), should the operational check fail. Boeing
stated that the faults are isolated to failed components using the FIM.
The AMM provides instructions for removing and replacing identified
failed components. Boeing stated that the light could fail to
illuminate for reasons other than actuator failure.
We disagree with the commenter's request to reference the FIM
instead of the AMM. If an operational check fails, the failed component
must be replaced. As Boeing stated, the AMM provides instructions for
replacing failed components. The FIM also refers to the AMM for
replacement of the fuel shutoff valve actuator after doing some
preliminary testing. Operators may consult the FIM for guidance in
troubleshooting other reasons the light could fail to illuminate. We
have not changed this AD in this regard.

Request To Extend the Repetitive Interval for the Operational Checks

ANA requested that the repetitive interval be revised from daily to
15,000 flight hours or 6,000 flight hours, or a weekly interval. ANA
stated that Boeing has included these repetitive intervals in certain
maintenance documents. ANA commented that it has 38 airplanes in
operation and it has never experienced a latent failure of the MOV
actuator. ANA also stated that the possibility of the unsafe condition
happening is very low. ANA stated that a daily interval is a burden to
operators.
DAL requested that the operational checks be required at intervals
not to exceed 90 days or 1,400 flight cycles or 1,800 flight hours; DAL
stated that this is similar to what is proposed by the original
equipment manufacturer. DAL stated that Airworthiness Limitation Task
28-AWL-MOV, ``Engine Fuel Shut-Off Valve (Fuel Spar Valve) Position
Indication Operational Check,'' which was introduced by the proposed AD
(79 FR 20834, April 14, 2014), would require daily operational checks
of the engine fuel shutoff valve. DAL stated that it finds this will be
an onerous operational requirement as it does not have maintenance
personnel in all locations where the affected airplanes are operated.
DAL stated that for this reason, it will be necessary for its
flightcrews to accomplish the operational checks in order to comply
with the daily requirement specified by the proposed AD.
DAL also stated that the proposed AD (79 FR 20834, April 14, 2014)
does not provide significant information as to how the daily check
requirement was determined or why it differs so significantly from the
compliance recommendation established by Boeing. DAL stated that
lacking specific details of the methodology used by the FAA and the
assumptions made to arrive at a daily check interval hinders the
operator's ability to provide comments on the appropriateness of this
interval. DAL stated that Boeing has indicated that its numeric safety
analysis supports

[[Page 55531]]

a compliance period of 3,000 flight hours for the operational checks.
DAL also stated that based on current DAL utilization, accomplishment
of daily checks equates to accomplishing the check approximately 300
times more frequently than the interval supported by the Boeing safety
analysis.
JAL requested that the FAA extend the inspection interval to a
heavy maintenance opportunity. For Model 737-800 airplanes, JAL stated
to set the heavy maintenance opportunity (such as ``C-Check'' and ``K-
Check'') at approximately 2-year intervals to efficiently accomplish
the maintenance program.
Qantas Airways requested an interval that can be effectively
scheduled in aircraft maintenance control programs, such as a 7-day
interval.
Jim Way requested a monthly interval for the operational checks.
Mr. Way stated that a daily check is too restrictive.
Bradley Most requested that the daily inspection interval be
revised to every 2 calendar days to accommodate ``international
operations, out of station, overnight, etc.'' Mr. Most stated that the
interval of daily lacks a clear definition.
We disagree with the requests to extend the inspection interval. An
increase in the inspection interval from daily to every other day, to
weekly, or to 90 days, would result in 2, 7, or 90 times as many
flights at risk in the event of an engine fire. The daily inspection
has been deemed practical because, in practice, it will mean the
flightcrew will need to watch a light as they start or shut down the
engine using normal procedures. An increased interval to 6,000 flight
hours would have no real effect on the unsafe condition since the fuel
filter replacement currently detects the problem every 6,000 flight
hours. In addition, an increased interval of 15,000 flight hours, or 24
months, would similarly not improve safety. We have not changed this AD
in this regard.

Request To Revise the Proposed Compliance Time for Revising the
Maintenance or Inspection Program

Mr. Most requested that the compliance time to revise the
maintenance or inspection program be changed to 120 days after the
effective date of this AD. Mr. Most stated that FAA offices are
typically requesting 60 days to review an airplane maintenance or
inspection program revision that is submitted for approval and, in many
cases, are taking longer. Mr. Most stated that the current inspection
interval would not allow operators enough time to revise the airplane
maintenance or inspection program, submit it to FAA for approval, and
implement the revised airplane maintenance or inspection program within
30 days of the effective date.
Jim Way requested that operators be given 90 days after the
effective date of the proposed AD (79 FR 20834, April 14, 2014) to
incorporate the actions specified in figure 1 to paragraph (g) of the
proposed AD into the maintenance program. Mr. Way stated that single
aircraft operators use a vendor to provide support for the inspection
program revisions. Mr. Way stated that a 30-day compliance time after
the effective date of the proposed AD is not enough time to properly
make and submit the changes to the FAA's principal maintenance
inspector for approval and implementation.
We do not agree to revise the compliance time for revising the
maintenance or inspection program beyond 30 days. The 30-day compliance
time specified in paragraph (g) of this AD is consistent with other
regulatory actions for other affected models in similar ADs. However,
under the provisions of paragraph (i)(1) of this AD, we might consider
requests for adjustments to the compliance time if data are submitted
to substantiate that such an adjustment would provide an acceptable
level of safety.

Request To Change the Initial Compliance Time for the Operational Check

AA requested that 30 days be provided for the initial operational
check after the airworthiness limitation (AWL) has been incorporated
into its maintenance program. AA stated that this will allow for
publishing the new criteria.
We partially agree with AA's request concerning the compliance time
for the initial operational check. We have changed the initial
compliance time specified in paragraph (g) of this AD for accomplishing
the actions specified in figure 1 to paragraph (g) of this AD from 7 to
10 days. The compliance time of 10 days is consistent with other
regulatory actions for other affected models in similar ADs. We have
determined that 10 days for the initial inspection represents an
appropriate time in which the required actions can be performed in a
timely manner within the affected fleet, while still maintaining an
adequate level of safety.

Request To Clarify Who Must Accomplish the Maintenance or Inspection
Program Revision

DAL requested that paragraph (g) of the proposed AD (79 FR 20834,
April 14, 2014) be revised because it is not clear who must accomplish
the action in this paragraph. DAL stated that operators do not control
the AWL section of the ICA and, therefore, could not comply with the
requirement. DAL stated that on Boeing Model 737NG airplanes, the AWLs
are incorporated into Section 9 of the Maintenance Planning Document
(MPD) by Boeing. DAL stated that the action in the NPRM would be one
for the original equipment manufacturer to accomplish with a revision
to the MPD, which would then be incorporated by the operators. DAL also
stated that operators have control of their continuous airworthiness
maintenance program (CAMP). DAL stated that in the NPRM, it is the
intent of the operators to incorporate the AWL into their CAMP.
We find that clarification is necessary. The requirement in
paragraph (g) of this AD is to change the Airworthiness Limitations of
the ICA for each affected airplane. Once that change is complete,
operators will be compelled to change their maintenance program to
include the new requirements of the revised Airworthiness Limitations.
For Part 121 operators, changes to the CAMP will become necessary; but
for other operators, the maintenance program may take a different form.
We have not changed the AD in this regard.

Request To Remove Redundant Language

DAL requested that certain language be removed from the proposed AD
(79 FR 20834, April 14, 2014) because it is redundant. DAL stated that
paragraph (h) of the proposed AD can be excluded because it states that
no alternative actions or intervals can be used unless approved as an
alternative method of compliance (AMOC) in accordance with the
procedures specified in paragraph (i)(1) of the proposed AD. (Paragraph
(i) of the proposed AD specifies the procedures and requirements for an
AMOC.)
We disagree with the commenter's request. It is necessary to
include paragraph (h) of this AD (``No Alternative Actions or
Intervals'') because it ensures that changes made after accomplishment
of the maintenance or inspection program revision, e.g., using new
versions of the maintenance or inspection program, are done only when
approval of an AMOC is obtained from the FAA. We have not changed this
AD in this regard.

Request To Revise the Costs of Compliance Paragraph

DAL stated that the cost estimate provided in the NPRM (79 FR
20834, April 14, 2014) is inaccurate. DAL

[[Page 55532]]

stated that the cost reflected in the NPRM is for incorporating the
proposed program change into the operator's program only as a revision
of the maintenance or inspection program.'' DAL stated the cost
estimate presented is flawed in two aspects: It does not properly
account for the cost operators will take on in implementing the program
changes, and it does not account for the cost of actually performing
the inspections specified by the proposed maintenance or inspection
program changes.
We infer that DAL is requesting we revise the Costs of Compliance
paragraph. We acknowledge the commenter's concern. In this AD, the
required action is to revise the maintenance or inspection program, as
applicable, to include a new airworthiness limitation. The added
airworthiness limitation requires an inspection of the position of the
MOV actuator daily. However, these repetitive inspections, which are
expected to take a few seconds to complete, are required by section
91.403(c) of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 91.403(c)) once
incorporated into the maintenance or inspection program.
The cost analysis in AD rulemaking actions typically includes only
the costs associated with complying with the AD. In this AD, the
required action is the maintenance or inspection program revision, as
applicable, to include the new airworthiness limitation. Accomplishing
repetitive actions that are specified in the airworthiness limitation
are not directly required by this AD. The FAA, as a matter of practice,
does not include a cost estimate for these repetitive actions in an AD
because these actions are required as part of the operating rules.
Therefore, we have made no change to this AD in this regard.

Request To Clarify Wording for Operational Check Without Engine
Operation

UAL requested we revise the wording of the operational check
without engine operation. UAL stated that in item C.3.a. and item
C.4.a. in the Description column of figure 1 to paragraph (g) of this
AD, either a tolerance should be added to the wording, or the word
``approximately'' should be added before the phrase ``10 seconds.''
We agree with the commenter's request. In item C.4.a. and item
C.5.a. (which correspond to items C.3.a. and C.4.a. of the NPRM (79 FR
20834, April 14, 2014)) in the Description column of figure 1 to
paragraph (g) of this AD, we have added wording that indicates to wait
``approximately'' 10 seconds after moving the ENG 1 and ENG 2 START
LEVER on the CONTROL STAND to the IDLE position. We find that this
change will allow flexibility during the operational check, while still
maintaining an adequate level of safety.

Request To Correct Typographical Errors

Boeing and DAL requested that we correct a typographical error in
the proposed AD (79 FR 20834, April 14, 2014). Boeing and DAL stated
that item A.1. in the Description column of figure 1 to paragraph (g)
of the proposed AD, which states to ``do all operational checks . .
.,'' the word ``all'' should be removed because the operational check
is a singular check.
We agree with the commenters' request. We have revised item A.1. in
the Description column of figure 1 to paragraph (g) of this AD
accordingly.
Boeing also requested that certain other typographical errors in
the proposed AD (79 FR 20834, April 14, 2014) be corrected to reduce
the possibility of confusion regarding the requirements. Boeing stated
that the Description column in figure 1 to paragraph (g) of the
proposed AD should be revised as follows:
Step B.2. has been skipped, and needs to be renumbered.
In step B.1.a., the text ``START LEVEL STAND'' should be
changed to ``START LEVER ON CONTROL STAND.''
Steps C.2. and C.3. should be combined and renumbered.
In step C.5.a., the text ``ENG @'' should be changed to
``ENG 2.''
We disagree with the comment. The stated typographical errors for
step B.1.a., step B.2., and step C.5.a., do not exist in the regulatory
text of the NPRM (79 FR 20834, April 14, 2014), as published. We
disagree with combining steps C.2. and C.3 because the engine fire
switches represent separate actions for the aft electronic panel and
the forward overhead panel. We have not changed this AD in this regard.

Effect of Winglets on This AD

Aviation Partners Boeing stated that the installation of winglets
per Supplemental Type Certificate (STC) ST00830SE (http://rgl.faa.gov/
Regulatory_and_Guidance_Library/rgstc.nsf/0/
3ed73703f205e3b386257e2f0064f3b1/$FILE/ST00830SE.pdf) does not affect
the accomplishment of the manufacturer's service instructions.

Conclusion

We reviewed the relevant data, considered the comments received,
and determined that air safety and the public interest require adopting
this AD with the changes described previously and minor editorial
changes. We have determined that these minor changes:
Are consistent with the intent that was proposed in the
NPRM (79 FR 20834, April 14, 2014) for correcting the unsafe condition;
and
Do not add any additional burden upon the public than was
already proposed in the NPRM (79 FR 20834, April 14, 2014).
We also determined that these changes will not increase the
economic burden on any operator or increase the scope of this AD.

Interim Action

We consider this AD interim action. The manufacturer is currently
developing a modification that will address the unsafe condition
identified in this AD. Once this modification is developed, approved,
and available, we might consider additional rulemaking.

Costs of Compliance

We estimate that this AD affects 1,244 airplanes of U.S. registry.
We estimate the following costs to comply with this AD:

Estimated Costs
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Cost per Cost on U.S.
Action Labor cost Parts cost product operators
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Incorporating Airworthiness 1 work-hour x $85 per $0 $85 $105,740
Limitation. hour = $85.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

[[Page 55533]]

Authority for This Rulemaking

Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA's authority to
issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, section 106, describes the
authority of the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII: Aviation Programs,
describes in more detail the scope of the Agency's authority.
We are issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in
Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: ``General
requirements.'' Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with
promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing
regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator
finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within
the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition
that is likely to exist or develop on products identified in this
rulemaking action.

Regulatory Findings

This AD will not have federalism implications under Executive Order
13132. This AD will not have a substantial direct effect on the States,
on the relationship between the national government and the States, or
on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various
levels of government.
For the reasons discussed above, I certify that this AD:
(1) Is not a ``significant regulatory action'' under Executive
Order 12866,
(2) Is not a ``significant rule'' under DOT Regulatory Policies and
Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979),
(3) Will not affect intrastate aviation in Alaska, and
(4) Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or
negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria
of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39

Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by
reference, Safety.

Adoption of the Amendment

Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the
Administrator, the FAA amends 14 CFR part 39 as follows:

PART 39--AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES

0
1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.

Sec. 39.13 [Amended]

0
2. The FAA amends Sec. 39.13 by adding the following new airworthiness
directive (AD):

2015-19-03 The Boeing Company: Amendment 39-18266; Docket No. FAA-
2014-0194; Directorate Identifier 2014-NM-022-AD.

(a) Effective Date

This AD is effective October 21, 2015.

(b) Affected ADs

None.

This AD applies to all The Boeing Company Model 737-600, -700, -
700C, -800, -900, and -900ER series airplanes, certificated in any
category.

(d) Subject

Joint Aircraft System Component (JASC) Code 2823, Fuel Selector/
Shutoff Valve.

(e) Unsafe Condition

This AD was prompted by reports of latently failed fuel shutoff
valves discovered during fuel filter replacement. We are issuing
this AD to detect and correct latent failures of the fuel shutoff
valve to the engine, which could result in the inability to shut off
fuel to the engine and, in case of certain engine fires, an
uncontrollable fire that could lead to wing failure.

(f) Compliance

Comply with this AD within the compliance times specified,
unless already done.

(g) Revision of Maintenance or Inspection Program

Within 30 days after the effective date of this AD, revise the
maintenance or inspection program, as applicable, to add
airworthiness limitation number 28-AWL-MOV, ``Engine Fuel Shutoff
Valve (Fuel Spar Valve) Position Indication Operational Check,'' by
incorporating the information specified in figure 1 to paragraph (g)
of this AD into the Airworthiness Limitations Section of the
Instructions for Continued Airworthiness. The initial compliance
time for accomplishing the actions specified in 28-AWL-MOV is within
10 days after accomplishing the maintenance or inspection program
revision required by this paragraph.

Figure 1 to Paragraph (g) of This AD--Engine Fuel Shutoff Valve (Fuel Spar Valve) Position Indication
Operational Check
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
AWL No. Task Interval Applicability Description
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
28-AWL-MOV.................. ALI DAILY............... 737-600, -700, - Engine Fuel Shutoff
INTERVAL NOTE: The 700C, -800, -900, Valve (Fuel Spar Valve)
operational check and -900ER series Position Indication
is not required on airplanes. Operational Check.
days when the APPLICABILITY NOTE: Concern: The fuel spar
airplane is not Only applies to valve actuator design
used in revenue airplanes with a can result in airplanes
service. The check fuel spar valve operating with a failed
must be done before actuator having fuel spar valve
further flight once part number actuator that is not
the airplane is MA20A2027 reported. A latently
returned to revenue (S343T003-56) or failed fuel spar valve
service.. MA30A1001 actuator could prevent
(S343T003-66) fuel shutoff to an
installed at the engine. In the event of
engine fuel spar certain engine fires,
valve positions.. the potential exists
for an engine fire to
be uncontrollable.
Perform one of the
following checks of the
engine fuel spar valve
position (unless
checked by the
flightcrew in a manner
approved by the
principal operations
inspector):
A. Operational Check
during engine shutdown.
1. Do an operational
check of the left
engine fuel spar valve
actuator.
a. As the ENG 1 START
LEVER on the CONTROL
STAND is moved to the
CUTOFF position, verify
the SPAR VALVE CLOSED
indication light on the
OVERHEAD PANEL for No.1
Engine changes from OFF
to BRIGHT then DIM.
b. If the test fails
(bright light fails to
illuminate), before
further flight, repair
faults as required
(refer to Boeing
Aircraft Maintenance
Manual (AMM) 28-22-11).

[[Page 55534]]

2. Do an operational
check of the right
engine fuel spar valve
actuator.
a. As the ENG 2 START
LEVER on the CONTROL
STAND is moved to the
CUTOFF position, verify
the SPAR VALVE CLOSED
indication light on the
OVERHEAD PANEL for No.
2 Engine changes from
OFF to BRIGHT then DIM.
b. If the test fails
(bright light fails to
illuminate), before
further flight, repair
faults as required
(refer to Boeing AMM 28-
22-11).
B. Operational check
during engine start.
1. Do an operational
check of the left
engine fuel spar valve
actuator.
a. As the ENG 1 START
LEVER on the CONTROL
STAND is moved to the
IDLE position, verify
the SPAR VALVE CLOSED
indication light on the
OVERHEAD PANEL for No.
1 Engine changes from
DIM to BRIGHT then OFF.
b. If the test fails
(bright light fails to
illuminate), before
further flight, repair
faults as required
(refer to Boeing AMM 28-
22-11).
2. Do an operational
check of the right
engine fuel spar valve
actuator.
a. As the ENG 2 START
LEVER on the CONTROL
STAND is moved to the
IDLE position, verify
the SPAR VALVE CLOSED
indication light on the
OVERHEAD PANEL for No.
2 Engine changes from
DIM to BRIGHT then OFF.
b. If the test fails
(bright light fails to
illuminate), before
further flight, repair
faults as required
(refer to Boeing AMM 28-
22-11).
C. Operational check
without engine
operation.
1. Supply electrical
power to airplane using
standard practices.
2. Make sure No. 1 and
No. 2 Engine FIRE
switches on the Aft
Electronic Panel are in
the NORMAL (IN)
position.
3. Make sure No. 1 and
No. 2 Engine Start
Switches on the Forward
Overhead Panel are in
the OFF or AUTO
position.
4. Do an operational
check to the left
engine fuel spar valve
actuator.
a. Move ENG 1 START
LEVER on the CONTROL
STAND to the IDLE
position and wait
approximately 10
seconds.
NOTE: It is normal under
this test condition for
the ENG VALVE CLOSED
indication light on the
OVERHEAD PANEL to
transition from DIM to
BRIGHT and stay BRIGHT.
b. Move ENG 1 START
LEVER on the CONTROL
STAND to the CUTOFF
position.
c. Verify the SPAR VALVE
CLOSED indication light
on the OVERHEAD PANEL
for No. 1 Engine
changes from OFF to
BRIGHT then DIM.
d. If the test fails
(bright light fails to
illuminate), before
further flight, repair
faults as required
(refer to Boeing AMM 28-
22-11).
5. Do an operational
check of the right
engine fuel spar valve
actuator.
a. Move ENG 2 START
LEVER on the CONTROL
STAND to the IDLE
position and wait
approximately 10
seconds.
NOTE: It is normal under
this test condition for
the ENG VALVE CLOSED
indication light on the
OVERHEAD PANEL to
transition from DIM to
BRIGHT and stay BRIGHT.
b. Move ENG 2 START
LEVER on the CONTROL
STAND to the CUTOFF
position.

[[Page 55535]]

c. Verify the SPAR VALVE
CLOSED indication light
on the OVERHEAD PANEL
for No. 2 Engine
changes from OFF to
BRIGHT then DIM.
d. If the test fails
(bright light fails to
illuminate), before
further flight, repair
faults as required
(refer to Boeing AMM 28-
22-11).
D. Perform an inspection
of the engine fuel spar
valve actuator
position.
NOTE: This inspection
may be used whenever
the SPAR VALVE light
does not function
properly.
1. Make sure the L FUEL
CONTROL switch on the
quadrant control stand
is in the CUTOFF
position.
NOTE: It is not
necessary to cycle the
FUEL CONTROL switch to
do this inspection.
2. Inspect the left
engine fuel spar valve
actuator located in the
left rear spar.
NOTE: The left engine
fuel spar valve
actuator is on the left
wing front spar
outboard of the engine
strut. Access is
through access panel
521BB on the left wing
leading edge.
a. Verify the manual
override handle on the
engine fuel spar valve
actuator is in the
CLOSED position.
b. Repair or replace any
engine fuel spar valve
actuator that is not in
the CLOSED position
(refer to Boeing AMM 28-
22-11).
3. Make sure the R FUEL
CONTROL switch on the
quadrant control stand
is in the CUTOFF
position.
NOTE: It is not
necessary to cycle the
FUEL CONTROL switch to
do this inspection.
4. Inspect the right
engine fuel spar valve
actuator located in the
right rear spar.
NOTE: The right engine
fuel spar valve
actuator is on the
right wing front spar
outboard of the engine
strut. Access is
through access panel
621BB on the right wing
leading edge.
a. Verify the manual
override handle on the
engine fuel spar valve
actuator is in the
CLOSED position.
b. Repair or replace any
engine fuel spar valve
actuator that is not in
the CLOSED position
(refer to Boeing AMM 28-
22-11).
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

(h) No Alternative Actions or Intervals

After accomplishment of the maintenance or inspection program
revision required by paragraph (g) of this AD, no alternative
actions (e.g., inspections) or intervals may be used unless the
actions or intervals are approved as an alternative method of
compliance (AMOC) in accordance with the procedures specified in
paragraph (i)(1) of this AD.

(i) Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs)

(1) The Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office (ACO)
FAA, has the authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if requested
using the procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19. In accordance with 14
CFR 39.19, send your request to your principal inspector or local
Flight Standards District Office, as appropriate. If sending
information directly to the manager of the ACO, send it to the
attention of the person identified in paragraph (j) of this AD.
Information may be emailed to: 9-ANM-Seattle-ACO-AMOC-Requests@faa.gov.
(2) Before using any approved AMOC, notify your appropriate
principal inspector, or lacking a principal inspector, the manager
of the local flight standards district office/certificate holding
district office.

(j) Related Information

For more information about this AD, contact Rebel Nichols,
Aerospace Engineer, Propulsion Branch, ANM-140S, FAA, Seattle
Aircraft Certification Office, 1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, WA
98057-3356; phone: 425-917-6509; fax: 425-917-6590; email:
rebel.nichols@faa.gov.

(k) Material Incorporated by Reference

None.

Issued in Renton, Washington, on September 7, 2015.
Jeffrey E. Duven,
Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification
Service.

[FR Doc. 2015-23117 Filed 9-15-15; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-P

55528 Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 179 / Wednesday, September 16, 2015 / Rules and Regulations

could result in the inability to shut off comments addressed in this final rule in for such an event would not stop the
fuel to the engine and, in case of certain a teleconference with Airlines for fuel flow to the engine strut and nacelle.
engine fires, an uncontrollable fire that America (A4A) and other members of The continued flow of fuel could cause
could lead to wing failure. the aviation industry. All of the an uncontrolled fire or lead to a fuel
DATES: This AD is effective October 21, comments discussed during this exhaustion event.
2015. teleconference are addressed in this The FAA regulations require all
final rule in response to comments transport airplanes to be fail safe with
Examining the AD Docket submitted by other commenters. A respect to engine fire events, and the
You may examine the AD docket on discussion of this contact can be found risk due to severe engine damage events
the Internet at http:// in the rulemaking docket at http:// to be minimized. Therefore, we require,
www.regulations.gov by searching for www.regulations.gov by searching for for each flight, sufficiently operative fire
and locating Docket No. FAA–2014– and locating Docket No. FAA–2014– safety systems so that fires can be
0194; or in person at the Docket 0194. detected and contained, and that fuel to
Management Facility between 9 a.m. the engine strut and nacelle can be shut
Clarification of Certain Terminology off in the event of an engine fire or
and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday,
except Federal holidays. The AD docket Throughout the preamble of this final severe damage.
contains this AD, the regulatory rule, commenters may have used the The FAA airworthiness standards
evaluation, any comments received, and terms ‘‘fuel shutoff valve’’ and ‘‘fuel require remotely controlled powerplant
other information. The address for the spar valve’’ interchangeably. Both terms valves to provide indications that the
Docket Office (phone: 800–647–5527) is refer to the same part. In our responses valves are in the commanded position.
Docket Management Facility, U.S. to comments, we have used the term These indications allow the prompt
Department of Transportation, Docket ‘‘fuel shutoff valve.’’ The term ‘‘fuel spar detection and correction of valve
Operations, M–30, West Building valve’’ is more commonly used in failures. We do not allow dispatch with
Ground Floor, Room W12–140, 1200 airplane maintenance documentation a known inoperative fuel shutoff valve.
New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, and, therefore, we have used that term Therefore, we are proceeding with this
DC 20590. in figure 1 to paragraph (g) of this AD. final rule—not because of the higher-
than-typical failure rate of the particular
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Comments valve actuator involved, but instead
Rebel Nichols, Aerospace Engineer, We gave the public the opportunity to because the fuel shutoff valve actuator
Propulsion Branch, ANM–140S, FAA, participate in developing this AD. The can fail in a manner that also defeats the
Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, following presents the comments required valve position indication
1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, WA received on the NPRM (79 FR 20834, feature. That failure can lead to a large
98057–3356; phone: 425–917–6509; fax: April 14, 2014) and the FAA’s response number of flights occurring on an
425–917–6590; email: rebel.nichols@ to each comment. airplane with a fuel shutoff valve
faa.gov. actuator failed in the open position
Request To Withdraw the NPRM (79 FR
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: without the operator being aware of the
20834, April 14, 2014)
failure. An airworthiness limitation
Discussion American Airlines (AA) requested containing required inspections is
We issued a notice of proposed that no further regulatory action be intended to limit the number of flights
rulemaking (NPRM) to amend 14 CFR taken. AA stated that it has experienced following latent failure of the fuel
part 39 by adding an AD that would only a small number of fuel shutoff shutoff valve. We have not changed this
apply to all The Boeing Company Model valve actuator failures. AA stated that AD in this regard.
737–600, –700, –700C, –800, –900, and the combination of failures necessary to
–900ER series airplanes. The NPRM produce the catastrophic event Request for Inspection Relief
published in the Federal Register on described in the NPRM (79 FR 20834, AirDo, AA, All Nippon Airlines
April 14, 2014 (79 FR 20834). The April 14, 2014) includes fuel shutoff (ANA), Delta Airlines (DAL), Southwest
NPRM was prompted by reports of valve actuator failure, an erroneous Airlines (SWA), Transavia, and United
latently failed fuel shutoff valves position indication, and a fire in the Airlines (UAL) requested clarification of
discovered during fuel filter engine compartment. AA also stated the daily check requirement. The
replacement. The NPRM proposed to that risk analysis shows the probability commenters stated that the check
require revising the maintenance or of this combination occurring is in the applies to airplanes that are in
inspection program to include new improbable range of ‘‘10E–11 to 10E– operational revenue status. The
airworthiness limitations. We are 16.’’ commenters stated that the proposed
issuing this AD to detect and correct We disagree with commenter’s AD (79 FR 20834, April 14, 2014) does
latent failures of the fuel shutoff valve request. We have determined that an not account for airplanes in routine
to the engine, which could result in the unsafe condition exists that warrants an maintenance or for an out-of-service
inability to shut off fuel to the engine interim action until the manufacturer condition.
and, in case of certain engine fires, an finishes developing a modification that We infer the commenters are
uncontrollable fire that could lead to will address the identified unsafe requesting inspection relief for airplanes
wing failure. condition. We have determined that, that are not in service. We agree with
without the required interim action, a the commenters’ request. It would be
Record of Ex Parte Communication significant number of flights with a fuel unnecessarily burdensome to require
In preparation of AD actions such as shutoff valve actuator that is failed in the inspections on airplanes that are not
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NPRMs and immediately adopted rules, the open valve position will occur being used. We agree with limiting
it is the practice of the FAA to obtain during the affected fleet life. If certain inspections to days when the airplane is
technical information and information engine fire conditions were to occur, or in revenue service. In the Interval
on operational and economic impacts if extreme engine damage were to occur, column of figure 1 to paragraph (g) of
from design approval holders and or if an engine separation event were to this AD, we have added a note to clarify
aircraft operators. We discussed certain occur during flight, the crew procedures that the operational check is not

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Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 179 / Wednesday, September 16, 2015 / Rules and Regulations 55529

required on days when the airplane is We have added item D. to figure 1 to operational checks for maintenance. Mr.
not used in revenue service, but that the paragraph (g) of this AD to specify a Voss stated that showing compliance
check must be done before further flight fourth option to perform daily with ADs is almost exclusively a
once the airplane is returned to revenue inspections to verify that the fuel maintenance function and should
service. shutoff valve is closing. remain a maintenance function to
provide compliance continuity.
Request To Limit the Applicability Request To Clarify Recording We agree that clarification is
UAL requested that we revise the Requirements necessary. This AD requires including
proposed AD (79 FR 20834, April 14, Air Do, Ryanair, SWA, Transavia, the information in figure 1 of paragraph
2014) to limit the applicability specified UAL, and Darryl Voss requested that the (g) of this AD in the maintenance or
in figure 1 to paragraph (g) of the FAA provide a more complete inspection program. However, this AD
proposed AD to airplanes with the valve explanation of the requirements with does not require accomplishing the
actuators that have the identified unsafe regard to recording compliance. actions specified in figure 1 of
condition. UAL stated the applicability Air Do stated that if the flightcrew paragraph (g) of this AD. The actions
applies to valve actuators having part performed the operational check, a specified in the figure in this AD are
number (P/N) MA30A1001. UAL stated maintenance record is usually not done, and remain enforceable, as part of
that the problem does not apply to other created. The commenter questioned the airworthiness limitations of the
existing actuator designs, and will not whether this is acceptable, or whether instructions for continued airworthiness
apply to future designs. the flightcrew should record it in the (ICA). Section 14 CFR 43.11(a) of the
We agree with the commenter’s flight log. Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR
request. It would be unnecessarily Ryanair requested that the FAA 43.11(a)) requires maintenance record
burdensome to require the inspections explicitly state in the AD that the entries for maintenance actions such as
on airplanes that do not have any of the proposed actions may be performed by the required checks. If an operator elects
susceptible valves installed. We have maintenance and/or flight operations to have a flightcrew member do the
added a note to the Applicability checklists, and that the AD will not check in accordance with the applicable
column in figure 1 to paragraph (g) of require the retention of maintenance or airworthiness limitation, that same
this AD to clarify that the limitations flight operations records to show action would be considered an
apply to Model 737–600, –700, –700C, compliance. Ryanair stated that due to operational task (not maintenance), and
–800, –900, and –900ER airplanes the high frequency of the actions in the therefore 14 CFR 43.11(a) would not
having actuator P/N MA20A2027 NPRM (79 FR 20834, April 14, 2014) apply. In that case, operators should
(Boeing P/N S343T003–56) or P/N and the large number of affected follow their normal processes for
MA30A1001 (Boeing P/N S343T003–66) airplanes in its fleet (approximately operational activities, including
installed at the engine fuel spar valve 300), the creation, retention, and necessary Principal Operations
positions. reforecasting of individual records for Inspector (POI) involvement. We have
this activity is not practical. not changed this AD in this regard.
Request To Follow the Master Because of the high frequency of
Minimum Equipment List (MMEL) in checks resulting from the proposed AD Request To Clarify Inspection
Lieu of the Daily Check (79 FR 20834, April 14, 2014), Procedures for Operational Checks
AA and Qantas Airways stated that if compounded with the creation, Boeing requested to add a flightcrew
the master minimum equipment list distribution, and retention of the inspection procedure during engine
(MMEL) is being used, then the daily documentation of the checks, SWA start and engine shutdown. Boeing
check should be not required. requested that the FAA specifically state stated that this will provide common
AA stated that the Boeing Model 737 in the AD that when the daily check is flight procedures and eliminate each
MMEL item 28–22, ‘‘Fuel/Spar Valve performed successfully by flightcrews, operator creating its own test.
Closed Lights,’’ allows for the lights to no documentation is required. SWA also DAL requested that the preamble of
be inoperative, provided the associated requested that the FAA specifically state the NPRM (79 FR 20834, April 14, 2014)
valve is verified to operate normally and in the AD that documentation (i.e., be revised to match the rest of the
the crossfeed VALVE OPEN light logbook entry or other type of defect requirements in the NPRM. DAL stated
operates normally. AA stated that this report) is required only when a failure that if POI approval is required for
item allows the lights to be inoperative is detected by the flightcrew, or when flightcrews to accomplish operational
for up to 10 days, and it requested that the check is performed by maintenance checks, then the preamble should
a provision be added to state that if this personnel. identify that flightcrews can only
MMEL is being used, the daily check is Transavia requested that, if the daily accomplish operational checks
not required. check remains, we revise the proposed approved by the inspector. DAL stated
Qantas Airways stated that if an AD (79 FR 20834, April 14, 2014) to that the preamble should not associate
airplane is dispatched under the MMEL state that the inclusion of the daily the operational check without engine
for inoperative SPAR VALVE CLOSED check requirement into a checklist is start to only maintenance crews, and the
light(s), then it is not possible to sufficient to show AD compliance and operational checks while starting the
accomplish the proposed checks. prevent unwanted paperwork, and that engine or shutting down the engine to
We partially agree with the the daily check can be performed by only flightcrews.
commenters’ request. We disagree with either maintenance personnel or the UAL requested that standardized
providing MMEL relief for an flightcrew. procedures be established by the FAA
inoperative fuel shutoff valve indication UAL asked whether the flightcrews aircraft certification office for the POI to
Lhorne on DSK5TPTVN1PROD with RULES

because such relief could potentially will be required to record compliance of approve on behalf of all affected
allow the fuel shutoff valve to be the operational checks and document operators.
inoperative for up to 10 days of revenue each inspection. Darryl Voss requested We disagree with the commenter’s
operation. However, we do agree to that we revise the proposed AD (79 FR request to add to this AD a method
provide flexibility regarding verification 20834, April 14, 2014) to remove the describing how maintenance actions
that the fuel shutoff valve is operational. option to allow flightcrews to perform and operations actions should be

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55532 Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 179 / Wednesday, September 16, 2015 / Rules and Regulations

stated that the cost reflected in the this AD, either a tolerance should be exist in the regulatory text of the NPRM
NPRM is for incorporating the proposed added to the wording, or the word (79 FR 20834, April 14, 2014), as
program change into the operator’s ‘‘approximately’’ should be added published. We disagree with combining
program only as a revision of the before the phrase ‘‘10 seconds.’’ steps C.2. and C.3 because the engine
maintenance or inspection program.’’ We agree with the commenter’s fire switches represent separate actions
DAL stated the cost estimate presented request. In item C.4.a. and item C.5.a. for the aft electronic panel and the
is flawed in two aspects: It does not (which correspond to items C.3.a. and forward overhead panel. We have not
properly account for the cost operators C.4.a. of the NPRM (79 FR 20834, April changed this AD in this regard.
will take on in implementing the 14, 2014)) in the Description column of
program changes, and it does not Effect of Winglets on This AD
figure 1 to paragraph (g) of this AD, we
account for the cost of actually have added wording that indicates to Aviation Partners Boeing stated that
performing the inspections specified by wait ‘‘approximately’’ 10 seconds after the installation of winglets per
the proposed maintenance or inspection moving the ENG 1 and ENG 2 START Supplemental Type Certificate (STC)
program changes. LEVER on the CONTROL STAND to the ST00830SE (http://rgl.faa.gov/
We infer that DAL is requesting we IDLE position. We find that this change Regulatory_and_Guidance_Library/
revise the Costs of Compliance will allow flexibility during the rgstc.nsf/0/
paragraph. We acknowledge the operational check, while still 3ed73703f205e3b386257e2f0064f3b1/
commenter’s concern. In this AD, the maintaining an adequate level of safety. $FILE/ST00830SE.pdf) does not affect
required action is to revise the the accomplishment of the
maintenance or inspection program, as Request To Correct Typographical
Errors manufacturer’s service instructions.
applicable, to include a new
airworthiness limitation. The added Boeing and DAL requested that we Conclusion
airworthiness limitation requires an correct a typographical error in the We reviewed the relevant data,
inspection of the position of the MOV proposed AD (79 FR 20834, April 14, considered the comments received, and
actuator daily. However, these repetitive 2014). Boeing and DAL stated that item determined that air safety and the
inspections, which are expected to take A.1. in the Description column of figure public interest require adopting this AD
a few seconds to complete, are required 1 to paragraph (g) of the proposed AD, with the changes described previously
by section 91.403(c) of the Federal which states to ‘‘do all operational and minor editorial changes. We have
Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 91.403(c)) checks . . .,’’ the word ‘‘all’’ should be determined that these minor changes:
once incorporated into the maintenance removed because the operational check • Are consistent with the intent that
or inspection program. is a singular check. was proposed in the NPRM (79 FR
The cost analysis in AD rulemaking We agree with the commenters’ 20834, April 14, 2014) for correcting the
actions typically includes only the costs request. We have revised item A.1. in unsafe condition; and
associated with complying with the AD. the Description column of figure 1 to
In this AD, the required action is the • Do not add any additional burden
paragraph (g) of this AD accordingly.
maintenance or inspection program upon the public than was already
Boeing also requested that certain
revision, as applicable, to include the proposed in the NPRM (79 FR 20834,
other typographical errors in the
new airworthiness limitation. April 14, 2014).
proposed AD (79 FR 20834, April 14,
Accomplishing repetitive actions that 2014) be corrected to reduce the We also determined that these
are specified in the airworthiness possibility of confusion regarding the changes will not increase the economic
limitation are not directly required by requirements. Boeing stated that the burden on any operator or increase the
this AD. The FAA, as a matter of Description column in figure 1 to scope of this AD.
practice, does not include a cost paragraph (g) of the proposed AD Interim Action
estimate for these repetitive actions in should be revised as follows:
an AD because these actions are • Step B.2. has been skipped, and We consider this AD interim action.
required as part of the operating rules. needs to be renumbered. The manufacturer is currently
Therefore, we have made no change to • In step B.1.a., the text ‘‘START developing a modification that will
this AD in this regard. LEVEL STAND’’ should be changed to address the unsafe condition identified
‘‘START LEVER ON CONTROL in this AD. Once this modification is
Request To Clarify Wording for developed, approved, and available, we
STAND.’’
Operational Check Without Engine • Steps C.2. and C.3. should be might consider additional rulemaking.
Operation combined and renumbered. Costs of Compliance
UAL requested we revise the wording • In step C.5.a., the text ‘‘ENG @’’
of the operational check without engine should be changed to ‘‘ENG 2.’’ We estimate that this AD affects 1,244
operation. UAL stated that in item C.3.a. We disagree with the comment. The airplanes of U.S. registry.
and item C.4.a. in the Description stated typographical errors for step We estimate the following costs to
column of figure 1 to paragraph (g) of B.1.a., step B.2., and step C.5.a., do not comply with this AD:

ESTIMATED COSTS
Cost per Cost on
Action Labor cost Parts cost product U.S. operators
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Incorporating Airworthiness Limitation ............ 1 work-hour × $85 per hour = $85 ................. $0 $85 $105,740

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Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 179 / Wednesday, September 16, 2015 / Rules and Regulations 55533

Authority for This Rulemaking (2) Is not a ‘‘significant rule’’ under (c) Applicability
DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures This AD applies to all The Boeing
Title 49 of the United States Code (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979), Company Model 737–600, –700, –700C,
specifies the FAA’s authority to issue (3) Will not affect intrastate aviation –800, –900, and –900ER series airplanes,
rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, in Alaska, and certificated in any category.
section 106, describes the authority of (4) Will not have a significant
the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII: economic impact, positive or negative, (d) Subject
Aviation Programs, describes in more on a substantial number of small entities Joint Aircraft System Component (JASC)
detail the scope of the Agency’s under the criteria of the Regulatory Code 2823, Fuel Selector/Shutoff Valve.
authority. Flexibility Act.
(e) Unsafe Condition
We are issuing this rulemaking under List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39 This AD was prompted by reports of
the authority described in Subtitle VII,
Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation latently failed fuel shutoff valves discovered
Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: during fuel filter replacement. We are issuing
safety, Incorporation by reference,
‘‘General requirements.’’ Under that this AD to detect and correct latent failures
Safety.
section, Congress charges the FAA with of the fuel shutoff valve to the engine, which
promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in Adoption of the Amendment could result in the inability to shut off fuel
air commerce by prescribing regulations Accordingly, under the authority to the engine and, in case of certain engine
for practices, methods, and procedures delegated to me by the Administrator, fires, an uncontrollable fire that could lead to
the Administrator finds necessary for the FAA amends 14 CFR part 39 as wing failure.
safety in air commerce. This regulation follows:
is within the scope of that authority (f) Compliance
because it addresses an unsafe condition PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS Comply with this AD within the
that is likely to exist or develop on DIRECTIVES compliance times specified, unless already
products identified in this rulemaking done.
action. ■ 1. The authority citation for part 39
(g) Revision of Maintenance or Inspection
continues to read as follows:
Regulatory Findings Program
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.
Within 30 days after the effective date of
This AD will not have federalism § 39.13 [Amended] this AD, revise the maintenance or inspection
implications under Executive Order program, as applicable, to add airworthiness
13132. This AD will not have a ■ 2. The FAA amends § 39.13 by adding
limitation number 28–AWL–MOV, ‘‘Engine
substantial direct effect on the States, on the following new airworthiness Fuel Shutoff Valve (Fuel Spar Valve) Position
the relationship between the national directive (AD): Indication Operational Check,’’ by
government and the States, or on the 2015–19–03 The Boeing Company: incorporating the information specified in
distribution of power and Amendment 39–18266; Docket No. figure 1 to paragraph (g) of this AD into the
responsibilities among the various FAA–2014–0194; Directorate Identifier Airworthiness Limitations Section of the
2014–NM–022–AD. Instructions for Continued Airworthiness.
levels of government.
(a) Effective Date The initial compliance time for
For the reasons discussed above, I accomplishing the actions specified in 28–
certify that this AD: This AD is effective October 21, 2015.
AWL–MOV is within 10 days after
(1) Is not a ‘‘significant regulatory (b) Affected ADs accomplishing the maintenance or inspection
action’’ under Executive Order 12866, None. program revision required by this paragraph.

FIGURE 1 TO PARAGRAPH (g) OF THIS AD—ENGINE FUEL SHUTOFF VALVE (FUEL SPAR VALVE) POSITION INDICATION
OPERATIONAL CHECK
AWL No. Task Interval Applicability Description

28–AWL–MOV ...... ALI DAILY ................................ 737–600, –700, –700C, Engine Fuel Shutoff Valve (Fuel Spar Valve) Position
INTERVAL NOTE: The –800, –900, and –900ER Indication Operational Check.
operational check is not series airplanes. Concern: The fuel spar valve actuator design can re-
required on days when APPLICABILITY NOTE: sult in airplanes operating with a failed fuel spar
the airplane is not used Only applies to airplanes valve actuator that is not reported. A latently failed
in revenue service. The with a fuel spar valve ac- fuel spar valve actuator could prevent fuel shutoff to
check must be done be- tuator having part num- an engine. In the event of certain engine fires, the
fore further flight once ber MA20A2027 potential exists for an engine fire to be uncontrol-
the airplane is returned (S343T003–56) or lable.
to revenue service. MA30A1001 Perform one of the following checks of the engine fuel
(S343T003–66) installed spar valve position (unless checked by the
at the engine fuel spar flightcrew in a manner approved by the principal op-
valve positions. erations inspector):
A. Operational Check during engine shutdown.
1. Do an operational check of the left engine fuel spar
valve actuator.
a. As the ENG 1 START LEVER on the CONTROL
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STAND is moved to the CUTOFF position, verify the
SPAR VALVE CLOSED indication light on the
OVERHEAD PANEL for No.1 Engine changes from
OFF to BRIGHT then DIM.
b. If the test fails (bright light fails to illuminate), before
further flight, repair faults as required (refer to Boe-
ing Aircraft Maintenance Manual (AMM) 28–22–11).

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55534 Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 179 / Wednesday, September 16, 2015 / Rules and Regulations

FIGURE 1 TO PARAGRAPH (g) OF THIS AD—ENGINE FUEL SHUTOFF VALVE (FUEL SPAR VALVE) POSITION INDICATION
OPERATIONAL CHECK—Continued
AWL No. Task Interval Applicability Description

2. Do an operational check of the right engine fuel
spar valve actuator.
a. As the ENG 2 START LEVER on the CONTROL
STAND is moved to the CUTOFF position, verify the
SPAR VALVE CLOSED indication light on the
OVERHEAD PANEL for No. 2 Engine changes from
OFF to BRIGHT then DIM.
b. If the test fails (bright light fails to illuminate), before
further flight, repair faults as required (refer to Boe-
ing AMM 28–22–11).
B. Operational check during engine start.
1. Do an operational check of the left engine fuel spar
valve actuator.
a. As the ENG 1 START LEVER on the CONTROL
STAND is moved to the IDLE position, verify the
SPAR VALVE CLOSED indication light on the
OVERHEAD PANEL for No. 1 Engine changes from
DIM to BRIGHT then OFF.
b. If the test fails (bright light fails to illuminate), before
further flight, repair faults as required (refer to Boe-
ing AMM 28–22–11).
2. Do an operational check of the right engine fuel
spar valve actuator.
a. As the ENG 2 START LEVER on the CONTROL
STAND is moved to the IDLE position, verify the
SPAR VALVE CLOSED indication light on the
OVERHEAD PANEL for No. 2 Engine changes from
DIM to BRIGHT then OFF.
b. If the test fails (bright light fails to illuminate), before
further flight, repair faults as required (refer to Boe-
ing AMM 28–22–11).
C. Operational check without engine operation.
1. Supply electrical power to airplane using standard
practices.
2. Make sure No. 1 and No. 2 Engine FIRE switches
on the Aft Electronic Panel are in the NORMAL (IN)
position.
3. Make sure No. 1 and No. 2 Engine Start Switches
on the Forward Overhead Panel are in the OFF or
AUTO position.
4. Do an operational check to the left engine fuel spar
valve actuator.
a. Move ENG 1 START LEVER on the CONTROL
STAND to the IDLE position and wait approximately
10 seconds.
NOTE: It is normal under this test condition for the
ENG VALVE CLOSED indication light on the OVER-
HEAD PANEL to transition from DIM to BRIGHT
and stay BRIGHT.
b. Move ENG 1 START LEVER on the CONTROL
STAND to the CUTOFF position.
c. Verify the SPAR VALVE CLOSED indication light
on the OVERHEAD PANEL for No. 1 Engine
changes from OFF to BRIGHT then DIM.
d. If the test fails (bright light fails to illuminate), before
further flight, repair faults as required (refer to Boe-
ing AMM 28–22–11).
5. Do an operational check of the right engine fuel
spar valve actuator.
a. Move ENG 2 START LEVER on the CONTROL
STAND to the IDLE position and wait approximately
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10 seconds.
NOTE: It is normal under this test condition for the
ENG VALVE CLOSED indication light on the OVER-
HEAD PANEL to transition from DIM to BRIGHT
and stay BRIGHT.
b. Move ENG 2 START LEVER on the CONTROL
STAND to the CUTOFF position.

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Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 179 / Wednesday, September 16, 2015 / Rules and Regulations 55535

FIGURE 1 TO PARAGRAPH (g) OF THIS AD—ENGINE FUEL SHUTOFF VALVE (FUEL SPAR VALVE) POSITION INDICATION
OPERATIONAL CHECK—Continued
AWL No. Task Interval Applicability Description

c. Verify the SPAR VALVE CLOSED indication light
on the OVERHEAD PANEL for No. 2 Engine
changes from OFF to BRIGHT then DIM.
d. If the test fails (bright light fails to illuminate), before
further flight, repair faults as required (refer to Boe-
ing AMM 28–22–11).
D. Perform an inspection of the engine fuel spar valve
actuator position.
NOTE: This inspection may be used whenever the
SPAR VALVE light does not function properly.
1. Make sure the L FUEL CONTROL switch on the
quadrant control stand is in the CUTOFF position.
NOTE: It is not necessary to cycle the FUEL CON-
TROL switch to do this inspection.
2. Inspect the left engine fuel spar valve actuator lo-
cated in the left rear spar.
NOTE: The left engine fuel spar valve actuator is on
the left wing front spar outboard of the engine strut.
Access is through access panel 521BB on the left
wing leading edge.
a. Verify the manual override handle on the engine
fuel spar valve actuator is in the CLOSED position.
b. Repair or replace any engine fuel spar valve actu-
ator that is not in the CLOSED position (refer to
Boeing AMM 28–22–11).
3. Make sure the R FUEL CONTROL switch on the
quadrant control stand is in the CUTOFF position.
NOTE: It is not necessary to cycle the FUEL CON-
TROL switch to do this inspection.
4. Inspect the right engine fuel spar valve actuator lo-
cated in the right rear spar.
NOTE: The right engine fuel spar valve actuator is on
the right wing front spar outboard of the engine
strut. Access is through access panel 621BB on the
right wing leading edge.
a. Verify the manual override handle on the engine
fuel spar valve actuator is in the CLOSED position.
b. Repair or replace any engine fuel spar valve actu-
ator that is not in the CLOSED position (refer to
Boeing AMM 28–22–11).

(h) No Alternative Actions or Intervals or lacking a principal inspector, the manager DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
After accomplishment of the maintenance of the local flight standards district office/
or inspection program revision required by certificate holding district office. Federal Aviation Administration
paragraph (g) of this AD, no alternative
actions (e.g., inspections) or intervals may be (j) Related Information
14 CFR Part 95
used unless the actions or intervals are For more information about this AD,
approved as an alternative method of contact Rebel Nichols, Aerospace Engineer, [Docket No. 31039; Amdt. No. 522]
compliance (AMOC) in accordance with the Propulsion Branch, ANM–140S, FAA, Seattle
procedures specified in paragraph (i)(1) of Aircraft Certification Office, 1601 Lind IFR Altitudes; Miscellaneous
this AD. Amendments
Avenue SW., Renton, WA 98057–3356;
(i) Alternative Methods of Compliance phone: 425–917–6509; fax: 425–917–6590;
(AMOCs) email: rebel.nichols@faa.gov.
AGENCY: Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA), DOT.
(1) The Manager, Seattle Aircraft (k) Material Incorporated by Reference
Certification Office (ACO) FAA, has the ACTION: Final rule
authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if None.
requested using the procedures found in 14 SUMMARY: This amendment adopts
Issued in Renton, Washington, on miscellaneous amendments to the
CFR 39.19. In accordance with 14 CFR 39.19,
send your request to your principal inspector September 7, 2015. required IFR (instrument flight rules)
or local Flight Standards District Office, as Jeffrey E. Duven, altitudes and changeover points for
appropriate. If sending information directly Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, certain Federal airways, jet routes, or
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to the manager of the ACO, send it to the Aircraft Certification Service. direct routes for which a minimum or
attention of the person identified in
paragraph (j) of this AD. Information may be [FR Doc. 2015–23117 Filed 9–15–15; 8:45 am] maximum en route authorized IFR
emailed to: 9-ANM-Seattle-ACO-AMOC- altitude is prescribed. This regulatory
BILLING CODE 4910–13–P
Requests@faa.gov. action is needed because of changes
(2) Before using any approved AMOC, occurring in the National Airspace
notify your appropriate principal inspector, System. These changes are designed to

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Document Created: 2018-02-26 10:16:38
Document Modified: 2018-02-26 10:16:38

Category		Regulatory Information
Collection		Federal Register
sudoc Class		AE 2.7: GS 4.107: AE 2.106:
Publisher		Office of the Federal Register, National Archives and Records Administration
Section		Rules and Regulations
Action		Final rule.
Dates		This AD is effective October 21, 2015.
Contact		Rebel Nichols, Aerospace Engineer, Propulsion Branch, ANM-140S, FAA, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, 1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, WA 98057-3356; phone: 425-917- 6509; fax: 425-917-6590; email: [email protected]
FR Citation		80 FR 55527
RIN Number		2120-AA64
CFR Associated		Air Transportation; Aircraft; Aviation Safety; Incorporation by Reference and Safety

80 FR 55527 - Airworthiness Directives; The Boeing Company Airplanes

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATIONFederal Aviation Administration

Federal Register Volume 80, Issue 179 (September 16, 2015)

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration