80_FR_57237 80 FR 57055 - Statement of Enforcement Principles Regarding “Unfair Methods of Competition” Under Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act

80 FR 57055 - Statement of Enforcement Principles Regarding “Unfair Methods of Competition” Under Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act

FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION

Federal Register Volume 80, Issue 182 (September 21, 2015)

Page Range57055-57059
FR Document2015-23498

The Federal Trade Commission has issued a Statement of Enforcement Principles Regarding ``Unfair Methods of Competition'' Under Section 5 of the FTC Act. The Statement describes the underlying antitrust principles that guide the Commission's application of its statutory authority to take action against ``unfair methods of competition'' prohibited by Section 5 of the FTC Act but not necessarily by the Sherman Act or the Clayton Act.

Federal Register, Volume 80 Issue 182 (Monday, September 21, 2015)
[Federal Register Volume 80, Number 182 (Monday, September 21, 2015)]
[Notices]
[Pages 57055-57059]
From the Federal Register Online  [www.thefederalregister.org]
[FR Doc No: 2015-23498]



[[Page 57055]]

Vol. 80

Monday,

No. 182

September 21, 2015

Part II





Federal Trade Commission





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Statement of Enforcement Principles Regarding ``Unfair Methods of 
Competition'' Under Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act; 
Commission Policy Statement; Notice

Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 182 / Monday, September 21, 2015 / 
Notices

[[Page 57056]]


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FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION


Statement of Enforcement Principles Regarding ``Unfair Methods of 
Competition'' Under Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act

AGENCY: Federal Trade Commission.

ACTION: Commission policy statement.

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SUMMARY: The Federal Trade Commission has issued a Statement of 
Enforcement Principles Regarding ``Unfair Methods of Competition'' 
Under Section 5 of the FTC Act. The Statement describes the underlying 
antitrust principles that guide the Commission's application of its 
statutory authority to take action against ``unfair methods of 
competition'' prohibited by Section 5 of the FTC Act but not 
necessarily by the Sherman Act or the Clayton Act.

DATES: The Commission announced the issuance of the Statement on August 
13, 2015.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Donald S. Clark, Secretary, (202-326-
2514), 600 Pennsylvania Avenue NW., Washington, DC 20580.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Statement of Enforcement Principles Regarding ``Unfair Methods of 
Competition'' Under Section 5 of the FTC Act

    Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act declares ``unfair 
methods of competition in or affecting commerce'' to be unlawful. 15 
U.S.C. 45(a)(1). Section 5's ban on unfair methods of competition 
encompasses not only those acts and practices that violate the Sherman 
or Clayton Act but also those that contravene the spirit of the 
antitrust laws and those that, if allowed to mature or complete, could 
violate the Sherman or Clayton Act.
    Congress chose not to define the specific acts and practices that 
constitute unfair methods of competition in violation of Section 5, 
recognizing that application of the statute would need to evolve with 
changing markets and business practices. Instead, it left the 
development of Section 5 to the Federal Trade Commission as an expert 
administrative body, which would apply the statute on a flexible case-
by-case basis, subject to judicial review. This statement is intended 
to provide a framework for the Commission's exercise of its 
``standalone'' Section 5 authority to address acts or practices that 
are anticompetitive but may not fall within the scope of the Sherman or 
Clayton Act.
    In deciding whether to challenge an act or practice as an unfair 
method of competition in violation of Section 5 on a standalone basis, 
the Commission adheres to the following principles:
     The Commission will be guided by the public policy 
underlying the antitrust laws, namely, the promotion of consumer 
welfare;
     the act or practice will be evaluated under a framework 
similar to the rule of reason, that is, an act or practice challenged 
by the Commission must cause, or be likely to cause, harm to 
competition or the competitive process, taking into account any 
associated cognizable efficiencies and business justifications; and
     the Commission is less likely to challenge an act or 
practice as an unfair method of competition on a standalone basis if 
enforcement of the Sherman or Clayton Act is sufficient to address the 
competitive harm arising from the act or practice.

    By direction of the Commission, with Chairwoman Ramirez and 
Commissioner Brill, Commissioner Wright, and Commissioner McSweeny 
voting in the affirmative, and Commissioner Ohlhausen dissenting.
Donald S. Clark,
Secretary.

Statement of the Federal Trade Commission \1\ on the Issuance of 
Enforcement Principles Regarding ``Unfair Methods of Competition '' 
Under Section 5 of the FTC Act
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    \1\ This statement reflects the views of Chairwoman Ramirez and 
Commissioners Brill, Wright, and McSweeny.
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    The Federal Trade Commission was created in 1914 and vested with 
enforcement authority over ``unfair methods of competition'' under 
Section 5 of the FTC Act.\2\ The Commission has issued a policy 
statement describing the enforcement principles that guide the exercise 
of our ``standalone'' Section 5 authority to address anticompetitive 
acts or practices that fall outside the scope of the Sherman and 
Clayton Acts.
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    \2\ 15 U.S.C. 45(a)(1). All references in this statement to 
``Section 5'' relate to its prohibition of ``unfair methods of 
competition'' and not to its prohibition of ``unfair or deceptive 
acts or practices.''
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    In describing the principles and overarching analytical framework 
that guide the Commission's application of Section 5, our statement 
affirms that Section 5 is aligned with the other antitrust laws, which 
have evolved over time and are guided by the goal of promoting consumer 
welfare and informed by economic analysis. The result of this evolution 
is the modern ``rule of reason.'' \3\ Our statement makes clear that 
the Commission will rely on the accumulated knowledge and experience 
embedded within the ``rule of reason'' framework developed under the 
antitrust laws over the past 125 years--a framework well understood by 
courts, competition agencies, the business community, and 
practitioners. These principles also retain for the Commission the 
flexibility to apply its authority in a manner similar to the case-by-
case development of the other antitrust laws. Finally, we confirm that 
the Commission will continue to rely, when sufficient and appropriate, 
on the Sherman and Clayton Acts as its primary enforcement tools for 
protecting competition and promoting consumer welfare.
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    \3\ The ``rule of reason'' is the cornerstone of modern 
antitrust analysis. As the leading treatise on antitrust law 
explains,
    In antitrust jurisprudence, ``reasonableness'' sums up the 
judgment that behavior is consistent with the antitrust laws. A 
monopolist acting reasonably does not violate Sherman Act Sec.  2. 
Reasonable collaboration among competitors does not violate Sherman 
Act Sec.  1. Although reasonableness is usually judged case by case, 
it is sometimes made for a class of conduct, such as price fixing, 
which is then said to be intrinsically or ``per se'' unlawful. Thus, 
per se rules also derive from judgments about reasonableness, albeit 
for a type of behavior rather than for a particular case. Even under 
the Clayton Act, where decisions about tying, exclusive dealing, and 
mergers are seldom phrased in reasonableness terms, the application 
of those statutes depends on the same elements that define 
``reasonableness.''
    VII Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law ] 1500 
(3d ed. 2010).
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    There has been much thoughtful dialogue inside and outside of the 
agency over the course of the last century about the precise contours 
of Section 5's prohibition against unfair methods of competition.\4\ We 
have benefited greatly from this ongoing dialogue and from judicial 
insights through the process of judicial review, and we believe that 
the principles we have set forth in our Section 5 statement are ones on 
which there is broad consensus.\5\
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    \4\ See Public Workshop Concerning the Prohibition of Unfair 
Methods of Competition in Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission 
Act, 73 FR 50,818 (Aug. 28, 2008), available at http://www.thefederalregister.org/fdsys/pkg/FR-2008-08-28/pdf/E8-20008.pdf and at https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_events/section-5-ftc-act-competition-statute/p083900section5.pdf; Section 5 of the FTC Act as 
a Competition Statute, Fed. Trade Comm'n (Oct. 17, 2008), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/events-calendar/2008/10/section-5-ftc-act-competition-statute.
    \5\ Like the Commission's policy statements on unfairness and 
deception, no public comment was sought here. The purpose of each of 
these policy statements is similar, which is to provide the 
Commission's view on how it approaches the use of its statutory 
authority. See FTC Policy Statement on Unfairness, Letter from the 
Federal Trade Commission to Senator Wendell H. Ford, Chairman, 
Consumer Subcommittee, Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and 
Transportation, and Senator John C. Danforth, Ranking Minority 
Member, Consumer Subcommittee, Senate Committee on Commerce, 
Science, and Transportation (Dec. 17, 1980), appended to Int'l 
Harvester Co., 104 F.T.C. 949, 1070 (1984), and available at https://www.ftc.gov/public-statements/1980/12/ftc-policy-statement-unfairness; FTC Policy Statement on Deception, Letter from James C. 
Miller III, Chairman, Federal Trade Commission, to Representative 
John D. Dingell, Chairman, House Committee on Energy and Commerce 
(Oct. 14, 1983), appended to Cliff Assocs., Inc., 103 F.T.C. 110, 
174 (1984), and available at https://www.ftc.gov/public-statements/1983/10/ftc-policy-statement-deception.

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[[Page 57057]]

Dissenting Statement of Commissioner Maureen K. Ohlhausen: FTC Act 
Section 5 Policy Statement

    I appreciate the effort to issue some form of guidance on the scope 
of Section 5 of the FTC Act's prohibition of ``unfair methods of 
competition'' (UMC).\1\ However, I voted against the issuance of this 
policy statement in this manner. The approach of my colleagues to this 
important issue of competition policy is too abbreviated in substance 
and process for me to support. Moreover, what substance the statement 
does offer ultimately provides more questions than answers, undermining 
its value as guidance. In addition, the Commission's failure to seek 
public input has deprived us of guidance from key stakeholders on this 
particular interpretation of Section 5. Finally, the Commission's 
official embrace of such an unbounded interpretation of UMC is almost 
certain to encourage more frequent exploration of this authority in 
conduct and merger investigations and standalone Section 5 enforcement 
by the Commission.
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    \1\ Like many interested parties, I have called for Section 5 
guidance on several occasions during my time on the Commission. See, 
e.g., In re Motorola Mobility LLC & Google Inc., FTC File No. 121-
0120, Dissenting Statement of Commissioner Maureen K. Ohlhausen 
(Jan. 3, 2013), available at https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2013/01/130103googlemotorolaohlhausenstmt.pdf; 
In re Robert Bosch GmbH, FTC File No. 121-0081, Statement of 
Commissioner Maureen K. Ohlhausen (Nov. 26, 2012), available at 
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2012/11/121126boschohlhausenstatement.pdf.
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    First, the content of today's policy statement is seriously 
lacking. Unlike the detailed analysis in our policy statements on 
Section 5's prohibition of ``unfair or deceptive acts or practices,'' 
\2\ this Section 5 statement does not mention, much less grapple with, 
the existing case law. While the majority might like to sweep that 
unfortunate history under the rug, the fact is that the FTC was 
repeatedly rebuffed by the courts when it last tried to reach well 
beyond settled principles of antitrust law in asserting its Section 5 
authority.\3\ Instead, the Commission acts as if it is writing on a 
clean slate for UMC. Further, and again in contrast to the consumer 
protection policy statements, this statement includes no examples of 
either lawful or unlawful conduct to provide practical guidance on how 
the Commission will implement this open-ended enforcement policy.\4\
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    \2\ See Fed. Trade Comm'n, Commission Statement of Policy on the 
Scope of the Consumer Unfairness Jurisdiction, 104 F.T.C. 1070, 1071 
(1984) (appended to In re Int'l Harvester Co., 104 F.T.C. 949 
(1984)) [hereinafter Unfairness Statement], available at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/policystmt/ad-unfair.htm; Fed. Trade Comm'n, Policy 
Statement on Deception (appended to In re Cliffdale Assocs., Inc., 
103 F.T.C. 110, 174 (1984)), available at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/policystmt/ad-decept.htm. See also J. Howard Beales, Brightening the 
Lines: The Use of Policy Statements at the Federal Trade Commission, 
72 Antitrust L.J. 1057, 1058 (2005) (``Each policy statement 
clarified and refined the legal standards that the Commission would 
apply, and each narrowed the range of the Commission's discretion. 
In their own ways, each statement has had a substantial impact on 
the development of the law.'').
    \3\ See, e.g., E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. FTC, 729 F.2d 
128, 139 (2d Cir. 1984) (Ethyl); Boise Cascade Corp. v. FTC, 637 
F.2d 573, 582 (9th Cir. 1980); Official Airline Guides, Inc. v. FTC, 
630 F.2d 920, 927 (2d Cir. 1980) (OAG).
    \4\ See, e.g., William Blumenthal, Clear Agency Guidelines: 
Lessons from 1982, 68 Antitrust L.J. 5, 25 (2000) (``Good guidance 
goes beyond commonplace knowledge to offer specifics, to bridge 
gaps, to resolve ambiguities. It has an edginess; and because it 
provides details, it limits agency discretion.'').
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    To understand the impact of these deficiencies, it is instructive 
to consider, for example, the basic facts in the Commission's 1980 
defeat in Official Airline Guides and how such facts could be analyzed 
under this new rubric. Requiring a monopolist provider of flight 
information to publish additional information on commuter airlines, as 
the Commission attempted to do, would undoubtedly benefit consumers in 
the ancillary market for commuter airline services. That would seem 
sufficient to satisfy the majority's ``consumer welfare'' requirement. 
It would also enhance competition in the market for air travel, a 
market in which the monopolist at issue in the case did not actually 
participate. That would not seem to be a bar to UMC liability, however, 
because competition would be enhanced somewhere and that ought to 
suffice under the second prong of the majority's statement. Finally, 
traditional antitrust laws do not provide the remedy the Commission 
sought to impose in OAG; however, pursuing such remedy likely would not 
be precluded by the statement's third prong.\5\ Similarly, incidents of 
simple oligopolistic interdependence, like the kind seen in Ethyl \6\ 
or Boise Cascade,\7\ are now arguably fair game under this framework. 
Because the policy statement fails to address past case law or give 
examples of lawful and unlawful conduct, however, the business 
community and other agency stakeholders are left guessing whether these 
previous theories of liability are now revived.
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    \5\ See OAG, 630 F.2d 920.
    \6\ See Ethyl, 729 F.2d 128 (challenging unilateral pricing 
practices in oligopolistic industry).
    \7\ See Boise Cascade Corp., 637 F.2d 573 (challenging use of 
base point pricing system as incipient threat to competition).
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    Turning to the substance of the brief statement, if the Commission 
is going to issue a policy statement in this controversial area, it 
should provide meaningful guidance to those subject to our 
jurisdiction. This statement, however, provides no such guidance. 
Although no policy statement can anticipate all issues or questions 
that are likely to arise in the enforcement of a statute, this 
statement raises many more questions than it answers.
    For example, to what extent will the Commission be ``guided by the 
public policy underlying the antitrust laws''? In what way does ``a 
framework similar to the rule of reason'' differ from a traditional 
rule of reason analysis? Does ``taking into account any associated 
cognizable efficiencies'' mean the Commission will actually balance any 
such efficiencies against the alleged harms, or is there some other 
formula anticipated by the majority? Further, given the statement's 
embrace of incipiency as a guiding principle, at what point are harms 
or efficiencies measured? At what market share should a firm without 
monopoly power be concerned about triggering an incipient violation 
through its otherwise lawful conduct? What factors will the Commission 
consider in deciding whether to pursue under Section 5 conduct that it 
considers insufficiently addressed by the antitrust laws? \8\
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    \8\ The brief majority statement that accompanies the policy 
statement does not meaningfully add to its contents. For example, 
how will the Commission determine that the antitrust laws are not 
``sufficient'' or ``appropriate''? When will the Commission use a 
traditional rule of reason analysis, and when will it use Section 5 
``in a manner similar to the case-by-case development of the other 
antitrust laws''?
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    Although short on details and constraints, one of the few guiding 
principles included in the statement is the pronouncement that Section 
5 covers conduct that ``contravenes the spirit of the antitrust laws'' 
or which, ``if allowed to mature or complete, could violate'' the 
antitrust laws. These two extremely broad characterizations of the 
scope of Section 5 contribute to the vagueness of this statement.
    The statement also explicitly permits the Commission to pursue 
conduct under Section 5 in the absence of substantial harm to 
competition.\9\ A

[[Page 57058]]

substantial harm requirement, however, is found in our Unfairness 
Statement,\10\ and thoughtful commentary from leading antitrust 
scholars has suggested that such a requirement be included in any UMC 
statement.\11\ In any case, the fact that this policy statement 
requires some harm to competition does little to constrain the 
Commission, as every Section 5 theory pursued in the last 45 years, no 
matter how controversial or convoluted, can be and has been couched in 
terms of protecting competition and/or consumers.\12\
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    \9\ The statement may very well constrain the Commission from 
pursuing Section 5 to its broadest possible extent to reach conduct 
that is in bad faith, fraudulent, or oppressive without any possible 
relation to competition. See, e.g., FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 
405 U.S. 233, 242 (1972). In practice, however, the Commission has 
not relied solely on such a rationale to support a UMC violation for 
several decades. Thus, in practice the statement constrains very 
little, if anything, in this regard.
    \10\ See Unfairness Statement, supra note 2, at 1073 (``First of 
all, the injury must be substantial. The Commission is not concerned 
with trivial or merely speculative harms.'').
    \11\ See, e.g., Section of Antitrust Law, Presidential 
Transition Report: The State of Antitrust Enforcement 2012 20 (2013) 
(``Standalone Section 5 enforcement should be used, if at all, only 
when the conduct involves substantial competitive harm.''); 
Transcript of Fed. Trade Comm'n Workshop, Section 5 of the FTC Act 
as a Competition Statute at 130 (Oct. 17, 2008) [hereinafter Section 
5 Workshop], available at https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_events/section-5-ftc-act-competition-statute/transcript.pdf (``[M]y proposal was for where the practice causes 
very substantial harm, the remedy does not affect efficiencies or 
other good business reasons, and a clear line can be developed that 
allows predictability.'') (Robert Pitofsky). See also Herbert 
Hovenkamp, The Federal Trade Commission and the Sherman Act, 62 Fla. 
L. Rev. 871, 878-79 (2010) (``[T]he practices that [the FTC] 
condemns must really be `anticompetitive' in a meaningful sense. 
That is, there must be a basis for thinking that the practice either 
does or will lead to reduced output and higher consumer prices or 
lower quality in the affected market.'').
    \12\ See, e.g., In re Negotiated Data Solutions LLC, FTC File 
No. 051-0094, Statement of the Federal Trade Commission, at 2 & n.5 
(Jan. 23, 2008), available at https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2008/01/080122statement.pdf (stating that 
Section 5 reaches conduct that is ``oppressive and coercive'' but 
also stating: ``The process of establishing a standard displaces 
competition; therefore, bad faith or deceptive behavior that 
undermines the process may also undermine competition . . . .''); In 
re Intel Corp., FTC File No. 061-0247, Statement of Chairman 
Leibowitz and Commissioner Rosch, at 2 (Dec. 16, 2009), available at 
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/568601/091216intelchairstatement.pdf (``We take seriously our mandate to 
find a violation of Section 5 only when it is proven that the 
conduct at issue has not only been unfair to rivals in the market 
but, more important, is likely to harm consumers, taking into 
account any efficiency justifications for the conduct in 
question.'').
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    Thus, the possibilities for expansive use of Section 5 under this 
policy statement appear vast. The majority's reading of Section 5 could 
easily accommodate a host of controversial theories pursued or 
considered by the Commission over the past four decades, including 
breach of standard-setting commitments, loyalty discounts, facilitating 
practices, conscious parallelism, business torts, incipient violations 
of the antitrust laws, and unfair competition through violation of 
various laws outside the antitrust context.\13\
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    \13\ My colleagues have not ruled out any of these theories in 
their policy and majority statements.
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    To provide certainty regarding future enforcement under Section 5, 
a Commission policy statement must constrain the agency in some 
meaningful way. In truth, the open-ended ``similar to the rule of 
reason'' framework--to the extent I understand how it may be applied--
does not seem to differ meaningfully from the existing case-by-case 
approach heretofore favored by a majority of the Commission. Indeed, my 
experience as a Commissioner leads me to believe that my colleagues, 
who have diverse views about antitrust law, would apply this policy 
statement to reflect these significant differences. No interpretation 
of the policy statement by a single Commissioner, no matter how 
thoughtful, will bind this or any future Commission to greater limits 
on Section 5 UMC enforcement than what is in this exceedingly brief, 
highly general statement.
    Although some may argue that the courts will be an adequate check 
on this authority, many commenters have raised concerns about how 
frequently the FTC settles Section 5 cases and how infrequently courts 
review our UMC enforcement.\14\ I see no reason why this policy 
statement will change the incentives for settlement on either side or 
affect the infrequency of judicial scrutiny of FTC enforcement under 
Section 5.
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    \14\ See, e.g., William E. Kovacic & Marc Winerman, Competition 
Policy and the Application of Section 5 of the Federal Trade 
Commission Act, 76 Antitrust L.J. 929, 941 (2010) (``As influences 
on doctrine and firm behavior, though, settlements are weak 
substitutes for decisions by the appellate courts that affirm FTC 
rulings based on Section 5. One can have confidence in a theory's 
power and durability only when it has been tested in adversarial 
proceedings and endorsed by reviewing courts . . . .''); James 
Campbell Cooper, The Perils of Excessive Discretion: The Elusive 
Meaning of Unfairness in Section 5 of the FTC Act, 3 J. Antitrust 
Enforcement 87, 95 (2015) (``Even if the courts are the de jure 
arbiters of what constitutes an unfair method of competition, as 
long as the Commission avoids litigation, it becomes the de facto 
decider. This state of affairs calls into question the legitimacy of 
the FTC's modern Section 5 cases. As long as the FTC's theories 
remain untested in an adversarial proceeding, and unratified by 
appellate decisions, uncertainty will remain about the true reach of 
Section 5.'').
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    The effect of this expansive policy statement also raises issues 
for our dual antitrust enforcement framework. Principles of fairness 
and predictability require that divergence in liability standards 
between the two agencies resulting from enforcement of Section 5 be 
minimal.\15\ Otherwise, firms may face liability (or not), depending 
solely on which agency reviews their conduct. One can only imagine how 
this policy statement will affect the clearance process under which the 
agencies allocate matters, which is now primarily based on industry 
expertise. Even worse from a fairness standpoint is the prospect of the 
Commission leveraging its expansive Section 5 authority to pursue 
conduct by a firm whose time-sensitive merger happens to be under 
review by the Commission.\16\
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    \15\ See, e.g., Antitrust Modernization Comm'n, Report and 
Recommendations 139 (2007) (addressing merger context and 
concluding: ``So long as both agencies retain authority to enforce 
the antitrust laws, such divergence should be minimized or 
eliminated.'').
    \16\ See, e.g., In re Robert Bosch GmbH, FTC File No. 121-0081, 
Decision and Order (Nov. 26, 2012), available at https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2013/04/130424robertboschdo.pdf (consent order settling simultaneous merger 
and standalone Section 5 investigations). Indeed, concerns about the 
FTC having additional leverage over merging parties as compared to 
the DOJ have led to proposed legislation to strip the FTC of its 
ability to challenge an unconsummated merger in administrative 
litigation. See H.R. 5402, 113th Cong. (2014); Hearing on The 
``Standard Merger and Acquisition Reviews Through Equal Rules 
(SMARTER) Act of 2014, Before the Subcomm. on Regulatory Reform, 
Commercial and Antitrust Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th 
Cong. 2 (2014) (statement of Deborah A. Garza, former Chair, 
Antitrust Modernization Commission) (raising concerns about the 
FTC's ``potentially enormous advantage vis-[agrave]-vis DOJ and 
leverage over the parties with respect to the mergers it chooses to 
challenge''). The effect of today's policy statement may well be to 
increase that perceived leverage.
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    In addition, the lack of internal deliberation and consultation 
surrounding this policy statement--as opposed to the topic of Section 5 
more generally--is unfortunate.\17\ Many, including former Chairman 
Pitofsky, have urged the Commission to seek public comment on any 
proposed Section 5 policy statement before adopting it.\18\ Doing so 
here would have

[[Page 57059]]

allowed the Commission to receive input from key stakeholders, 
including Congress, the Department of Justice (DOJ) Antitrust Division, 
the business community, and the antitrust bar on this particular policy 
formulation.\19\ Such input would have helped ensure that the 
Commission is offering durable and practical guidance around the 
fundamental question of whether and when this agency will reach beyond 
well-settled principles of antitrust law to impose new varieties of UMC 
liability.\20\ It would also have allowed more careful consideration of 
how this expansive policy may be viewed by other antitrust regimes 
around the world.\21\
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    \17\ The majority cites to a 2008 workshop to claim adequate 
discussion of our enforcement authority under Section 5. That 
workshop took place seven years ago, before any sitting member of 
the Commission was in office.
    \18\ See, e.g., Section 5 Workshop, supra note 11, at 67 (``If 
the FTC, by the way, is going to publish a rule along this line or 
any line, it should be put out for public comment so that people can 
react to it.'') (Robert Pitofsky); U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Unfair 
Methods of Competition under Section 5 of the FTC Act: Does the U.S. 
Need Rules ``Above and Beyond Antitrust''?, CPI Antitrust Chronicle 
8-9 (Sept. 2009) (``Any additional movement toward the use of 
Section 5 should be preceded by hearings and substantial time for 
debate among the antitrust community to ensure appropriate notice 
and guidance is provided to the business community and other 
interested constituents.'').
    \19\ I also objected to the Commission's withdrawal, without any 
public input, of its policy statement on pursuing disgorgement in 
competition matters in 2012. See Statement of Commissioner Maureen 
K. Ohlhausen Dissenting from the Commission's Decision to Withdraw 
its Policy Statement on Monetary Equitable Remedies in Competition 
Cases (July 31, 2012), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2012/07/120731ohlhausenstatement.pdf.
    \20\ Such consultation is especially warranted given the serious 
debate about the need to reach beyond the antitrust laws at all. 
See, e.g., II Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law ] 
302h, at 31 (4th ed. 2014) (``Apart from possible historical 
anachronisms in the application of those statutes, the Sherman and 
Clayton Acts are broad enough to cover any anticompetitive agreement 
or monopolistic situation that ought to be attacked whether 
`completely full blown or not.' Nothing prevents those statutes from 
working their own condemnation of practices violating their basic 
policies.''); In re Negotiated Data Solutions LLC, FTC File No. 051-
0094, Dissenting Statement of Chairman Majoras, at 2-3 (Jan. 23, 
2008), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0510094/080122majoras.pdf (``Although Section 5 enables the Commission to 
reach conduct that is not actionable under the Sherman or Clayton 
Acts, we have largely limited ourselves to matters in which 
respondents took actions short of a fully consummated Section 1 
violation (but with clear potential to harm competition), such as 
invitations to collude. This limitation is partly self-imposed, 
reflecting the Commission's recognition of the scholarly consensus 
that finds the Sherman and Clayton Acts, as currently interpreted, 
to be sufficiently encompassing to address nearly all matters that 
properly warrant competition policy enforcement.'') (footnotes 
omitted).
    \21\ See, e.g., James J. O'Connell, Section 5, 1914, and the FTC 
at 100, 29 Antitrust 5, 6 (Fall 2014) (``[T]he FTC does not operate 
in a vacuum but rather as part of an international enforcement 
community, the newer members of which study very closely the 
practices and policies of more experienced agencies. . . . [I]n the 
absence of clear limiting principles the FTC runs the risk of its 
[standalone Section 5] enforcement being seen by newer agencies as 
following a kind of `We know it when we see it' approach, one which 
translates into other languages and cultures all too easily as a 
kind of implicit endorsement of arbitrary exercises of agency 
power.'').
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    Finally, I disagree with the view that having an expansive UMC 
policy statement is better than having no statement at all. Arming the 
FTC staff with this sweeping new policy statement is likely to embolden 
them to explore the limits of UMC in conduct and merger investigations. 
The majority is also likely to pursue new UMC enforcement, else why 
bother to put out a statement with so little internal deliberation and 
no provision for public input? I fear that this will ultimately lead to 
more, not less, uncertainty and burdens for the business community.
    I would prefer that any Section 5 policy statement be put out for 
public comment before adoption and include, among other things: (1) A 
substantial harm requirement; (2) a disproportionate harm test; (3) a 
stricter standard for pursuing conduct already addressed by the 
antitrust laws; (4) a commitment to minimize FTC-DOJ conflict; (5) 
reliance on robust economic evidence on the practice at issue and 
exploration of available non-enforcement tools prior to taking any 
enforcement action; and (6) a commitment generally to avoid pursuing 
the same conduct as both an unfair method of competition and an unfair 
or deceptive act or practice.\22\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \22\ For a detailed discussion of factors that I believe should 
be included in a Section 5 statement, see Maureen K. Ohlhausen, 
Section 5 of the FTC Act: Principles of Navigation, 2 J. Antitrust 
Enforcement 1 (2014).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    For all of these reasons, I dissent from the issuance of this 
policy statement.

[FR Doc. 2015-23498 Filed 9-18-15; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6750-01-P



                                                                                                    Vol. 80                           Monday,
                                                                                                    No. 182                           September 21, 2015




                                                                                                    Part II


                                                                                                    Federal Trade Commission
                                                                                                    Statement of Enforcement Principles Regarding ‘‘Unfair Methods of
                                                                                                    Competition’’ Under Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act;
                                                                                                    Commission Policy Statement; Notice
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                                               57056                     Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 182 / Monday, September 21, 2015 / Notices

                                               FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION                                competition in violation of Section 5 on                  clear that the Commission will rely on
                                                                                                       a standalone basis, the Commission                        the accumulated knowledge and
                                               Statement of Enforcement Principles                     adheres to the following principles:                      experience embedded within the ‘‘rule
                                               Regarding ‘‘Unfair Methods of                              • The Commission will be guided by                     of reason’’ framework developed under
                                               Competition’’ Under Section 5 of the                    the public policy underlying the                          the antitrust laws over the past 125
                                               Federal Trade Commission Act                            antitrust laws, namely, the promotion of                  years—a framework well understood by
                                                                                                       consumer welfare;                                         courts, competition agencies, the
                                               AGENCY:    Federal Trade Commission.                       • the act or practice will be evaluated                business community, and practitioners.
                                               ACTION:   Commission policy statement.                  under a framework similar to the rule of                  These principles also retain for the
                                               SUMMARY:   The Federal Trade                            reason, that is, an act or practice                       Commission the flexibility to apply its
                                               Commission has issued a Statement of                    challenged by the Commission must                         authority in a manner similar to the
                                               Enforcement Principles Regarding                        cause, or be likely to cause, harm to                     case-by-case development of the other
                                               ‘‘Unfair Methods of Competition’’ Under                 competition or the competitive process,                   antitrust laws. Finally, we confirm that
                                                                                                       taking into account any associated                        the Commission will continue to rely,
                                               Section 5 of the FTC Act. The Statement
                                                                                                       cognizable efficiencies and business                      when sufficient and appropriate, on the
                                               describes the underlying antitrust
                                                                                                       justifications; and                                       Sherman and Clayton Acts as its
                                               principles that guide the Commission’s                     • the Commission is less likely to
                                               application of its statutory authority to                                                                         primary enforcement tools for protecting
                                                                                                       challenge an act or practice as an unfair                 competition and promoting consumer
                                               take action against ‘‘unfair methods of                 method of competition on a standalone
                                               competition’’ prohibited by Section 5 of                                                                          welfare.
                                                                                                       basis if enforcement of the Sherman or                      There has been much thoughtful
                                               the FTC Act but not necessarily by the                  Clayton Act is sufficient to address the
                                               Sherman Act or the Clayton Act.                                                                                   dialogue inside and outside of the
                                                                                                       competitive harm arising from the act or                  agency over the course of the last
                                               DATES: The Commission announced the                     practice.                                                 century about the precise contours of
                                               issuance of the Statement on August 13,                                                                           Section 5’s prohibition against unfair
                                                                                                          By direction of the Commission, with
                                               2015.                                                   Chairwoman Ramirez and Commissioner                       methods of competition.4 We have
                                               FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:                        Brill, Commissioner Wright, and                           benefited greatly from this ongoing
                                               Donald S. Clark, Secretary, (202–326–                   Commissioner McSweeny voting in the                       dialogue and from judicial insights
                                               2514), 600 Pennsylvania Avenue NW.,                     affirmative, and Commissioner Ohlhausen                   through the process of judicial review,
                                               Washington, DC 20580.                                   dissenting.
                                                                                                                                                                 and we believe that the principles we
                                               SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:                              Donald S. Clark,                                          have set forth in our Section 5 statement
                                                                                                       Secretary.                                                are ones on which there is broad
                                               Statement of Enforcement Principles
                                               Regarding ‘‘Unfair Methods of                           Statement of the Federal Trade                            consensus.5
                                               Competition’’ Under Section 5 of the                    Commission 1 on the Issuance of
                                                                                                       Enforcement Principles Regarding                             In antitrust jurisprudence, ‘‘reasonableness’’ sums
                                               FTC Act                                                                                                           up the judgment that behavior is consistent with the
                                                                                                       ‘‘Unfair Methods of Competition ’’                        antitrust laws. A monopolist acting reasonably does
                                                  Section 5 of the Federal Trade
                                                                                                       Under Section 5 of the FTC Act                            not violate Sherman Act § 2. Reasonable
                                               Commission Act declares ‘‘unfair                                                                                  collaboration among competitors does not violate
                                               methods of competition in or affecting                     The Federal Trade Commission was                       Sherman Act § 1. Although reasonableness is
                                               commerce’’ to be unlawful. 15 U.S.C.                    created in 1914 and vested with                           usually judged case by case, it is sometimes made
                                               45(a)(1). Section 5’s ban on unfair                     enforcement authority over ‘‘unfair                       for a class of conduct, such as price fixing, which
                                                                                                       methods of competition’’ under Section                    is then said to be intrinsically or ‘‘per se’’ unlawful.
                                               methods of competition encompasses                                                                                Thus, per se rules also derive from judgments about
                                               not only those acts and practices that                  5 of the FTC Act.2 The Commission has                     reasonableness, albeit for a type of behavior rather
                                               violate the Sherman or Clayton Act but                  issued a policy statement describing the                  than for a particular case. Even under the Clayton
                                               also those that contravene the spirit of                enforcement principles that guide the                     Act, where decisions about tying, exclusive dealing,
                                                                                                       exercise of our ‘‘standalone’’ Section 5                  and mergers are seldom phrased in reasonableness
                                               the antitrust laws and those that, if                                                                             terms, the application of those statutes depends on
                                               allowed to mature or complete, could                    authority to address anticompetitive                      the same elements that define ‘‘reasonableness.’’
                                               violate the Sherman or Clayton Act.                     acts or practices that fall outside the                      VII Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp,
                                                  Congress chose not to define the                     scope of the Sherman and Clayton Acts.                    Antitrust Law ¶ 1500 (3d ed. 2010).
                                               specific acts and practices that                           In describing the principles and                          4 See Public Workshop Concerning the

                                                                                                       overarching analytical framework that                     Prohibition of Unfair Methods of Competition in
                                               constitute unfair methods of                                                                                      Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 73
                                               competition in violation of Section 5,                  guide the Commission’s application of                     FR 50,818 (Aug. 28, 2008), available at http://
                                               recognizing that application of the                     Section 5, our statement affirms that                     www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2008-08-28/pdf/E8-
                                               statute would need to evolve with                       Section 5 is aligned with the other                       20008.pdf and at https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/
                                                                                                       antitrust laws, which have evolved over                   files/documents/public_events/section-5-ftc-act-
                                               changing markets and business                                                                                     competition-statute/p083900section5.pdf; Section 5
                                               practices. Instead, it left the                         time and are guided by the goal of                        of the FTC Act as a Competition Statute, Fed. Trade
                                               development of Section 5 to the Federal                 promoting consumer welfare and                            Comm’n (Oct. 17, 2008), https://www.ftc.gov/news-
                                               Trade Commission as an expert                           informed by economic analysis. The                        events/events-calendar/2008/10/section-5-ftc-act-
                                                                                                       result of this evolution is the modern                    competition-statute.
                                               administrative body, which would                                                                                     5 Like the Commission’s policy statements on
                                               apply the statute on a flexible case-by-                ‘‘rule of reason.’’ 3 Our statement makes
                                                                                                                                                                 unfairness and deception, no public comment was
                                               case basis, subject to judicial review.                                                                           sought here. The purpose of each of these policy
                                                                                                          1 This statement reflects the views of Chairwoman
                                               This statement is intended to provide a                                                                           statements is similar, which is to provide the
                                                                                                       Ramirez and Commissioners Brill, Wright, and              Commission’s view on how it approaches the use
                                               framework for the Commission’s
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                                                                                                       McSweeny.                                                 of its statutory authority. See FTC Policy Statement
                                               exercise of its ‘‘standalone’’ Section 5                   2 15 U.S.C. 45(a)(1). All references in this
                                                                                                                                                                 on Unfairness, Letter from the Federal Trade
                                               authority to address acts or practices                  statement to ‘‘Section 5’’ relate to its prohibition of   Commission to Senator Wendell H. Ford, Chairman,
                                               that are anticompetitive but may not fall               ‘‘unfair methods of competition’’ and not to its          Consumer Subcommittee, Senate Committee on
                                                                                                       prohibition of ‘‘unfair or deceptive acts or              Commerce, Science, and Transportation, and
                                               within the scope of the Sherman or                      practices.’’                                              Senator John C. Danforth, Ranking Minority
                                               Clayton Act.                                               3 The ‘‘rule of reason’’ is the cornerstone of         Member, Consumer Subcommittee, Senate
                                                  In deciding whether to challenge an                  modern antitrust analysis. As the leading treatise on     Committee on Commerce, Science, and
                                               act or practice as an unfair method of                  antitrust law explains,                                   Transportation (Dec. 17, 1980), appended to Int’l



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                                                                         Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 182 / Monday, September 21, 2015 / Notices                                                        57057

                                               Dissenting Statement of Commissioner                    this Section 5 statement does not                       or give examples of lawful and unlawful
                                               Maureen K. Ohlhausen: FTC Act                           mention, much less grapple with, the                    conduct, however, the business
                                               Section 5 Policy Statement                              existing case law. While the majority                   community and other agency
                                                  I appreciate the effort to issue some                might like to sweep that unfortunate                    stakeholders are left guessing whether
                                               form of guidance on the scope of                        history under the rug, the fact is that the             these previous theories of liability are
                                               Section 5 of the FTC Act’s prohibition                  FTC was repeatedly rebuffed by the                      now revived.
                                               of ‘‘unfair methods of competition’’                    courts when it last tried to reach well                    Turning to the substance of the brief
                                               (UMC).1 However, I voted against the                    beyond settled principles of antitrust                  statement, if the Commission is going to
                                               issuance of this policy statement in this               law in asserting its Section 5 authority.3              issue a policy statement in this
                                               manner. The approach of my colleagues                   Instead, the Commission acts as if it is                controversial area, it should provide
                                               to this important issue of competition                  writing on a clean slate for UMC.                       meaningful guidance to those subject to
                                               policy is too abbreviated in substance                  Further, and again in contrast to the                   our jurisdiction. This statement,
                                               and process for me to support.                          consumer protection policy statements,                  however, provides no such guidance.
                                               Moreover, what substance the statement                  this statement includes no examples of                  Although no policy statement can
                                               does offer ultimately provides more                     either lawful or unlawful conduct to                    anticipate all issues or questions that are
                                               questions than answers, undermining its                 provide practical guidance on how the                   likely to arise in the enforcement of a
                                               value as guidance. In addition, the                     Commission will implement this open-                    statute, this statement raises many more
                                               Commission’s failure to seek public                     ended enforcement policy.4                              questions than it answers.
                                               input has deprived us of guidance from                     To understand the impact of these                       For example, to what extent will the
                                               key stakeholders on this particular                     deficiencies, it is instructive to consider,            Commission be ‘‘guided by the public
                                               interpretation of Section 5. Finally, the               for example, the basic facts in the                     policy underlying the antitrust laws’’?
                                               Commission’s official embrace of such                   Commission’s 1980 defeat in Official                    In what way does ‘‘a framework similar
                                               an unbounded interpretation of UMC is                   Airline Guides and how such facts could                 to the rule of reason’’ differ from a
                                               almost certain to encourage more                        be analyzed under this new rubric.                      traditional rule of reason analysis? Does
                                               frequent exploration of this authority in               Requiring a monopolist provider of                      ‘‘taking into account any associated
                                               conduct and merger investigations and                   flight information to publish additional                cognizable efficiencies’’ mean the
                                               standalone Section 5 enforcement by the                 information on commuter airlines, as                    Commission will actually balance any
                                               Commission.                                             the Commission attempted to do, would                   such efficiencies against the alleged
                                                  First, the content of today’s policy                 undoubtedly benefit consumers in the                    harms, or is there some other formula
                                               statement is seriously lacking. Unlike                  ancillary market for commuter airline                   anticipated by the majority? Further,
                                               the detailed analysis in our policy                     services. That would seem sufficient to                 given the statement’s embrace of
                                               statements on Section 5’s prohibition of                satisfy the majority’s ‘‘consumer                       incipiency as a guiding principle, at
                                               ‘‘unfair or deceptive acts or practices,’’ 2            welfare’’ requirement. It would also                    what point are harms or efficiencies
                                                                                                       enhance competition in the market for                   measured? At what market share should
                                               Harvester Co., 104 F.T.C. 949, 1070 (1984), and         air travel, a market in which the                       a firm without monopoly power be
                                               available at https://www.ftc.gov/public-statements/     monopolist at issue in the case did not                 concerned about triggering an incipient
                                               1980/12/ftc-policy-statement-unfairness; FTC            actually participate. That would not                    violation through its otherwise lawful
                                               Policy Statement on Deception, Letter from James        seem to be a bar to UMC liability,
                                               C. Miller III, Chairman, Federal Trade Commission,                                                              conduct? What factors will the
                                               to Representative John D. Dingell, Chairman, House      however, because competition would be                   Commission consider in deciding
                                               Committee on Energy and Commerce (Oct. 14,              enhanced somewhere and that ought to                    whether to pursue under Section 5
                                               1983), appended to Cliff Assocs., Inc., 103 F.T.C.      suffice under the second prong of the
                                               110, 174 (1984), and available at https://
                                                                                                                                                               conduct that it considers insufficiently
                                               www.ftc.gov/public-statements/1983/10/ftc-policy-
                                                                                                       majority’s statement. Finally, traditional              addressed by the antitrust laws? 8
                                               statement-deception.                                    antitrust laws do not provide the                          Although short on details and
                                                  1 Like many interested parties, I have called for    remedy the Commission sought to                         constraints, one of the few guiding
                                               Section 5 guidance on several occasions during my       impose in OAG; however, pursuing                        principles included in the statement is
                                               time on the Commission. See, e.g., In re Motorola       such remedy likely would not be
                                               Mobility LLC & Google Inc., FTC File No. 121–0120,                                                              the pronouncement that Section 5
                                               Dissenting Statement of Commissioner Maureen K.         precluded by the statement’s third                      covers conduct that ‘‘contravenes the
                                               Ohlhausen (Jan. 3, 2013), available at https://         prong.5 Similarly, incidents of simple                  spirit of the antitrust laws’’ or which, ‘‘if
                                               www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/        oligopolistic interdependence, like the                 allowed to mature or complete, could
                                               2013/01/130103googlemotorolaohlhausenstmt.pdf;          kind seen in Ethyl 6 or Boise Cascade,7
                                               In re Robert Bosch GmbH, FTC File No. 121–0081,                                                                 violate’’ the antitrust laws. These two
                                               Statement of Commissioner Maureen K. Ohlhausen          are now arguably fair game under this                   extremely broad characterizations of the
                                               (Nov. 26, 2012), available at https://www.ftc.gov/      framework. Because the policy                           scope of Section 5 contribute to the
                                               sites/default/files/documents/cases/2012/11/            statement fails to address past case law                vagueness of this statement.
                                               121126boschohlhausenstatement.pdf.
                                                  2 See Fed. Trade Comm’n, Commission Statement                                                                   The statement also explicitly permits
                                                                                                         3 See, e.g., E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. FTC,
                                               of Policy on the Scope of the Consumer Unfairness                                                               the Commission to pursue conduct
                                                                                                       729 F.2d 128, 139 (2d Cir. 1984) (Ethyl); Boise
                                               Jurisdiction, 104 F.T.C. 1070, 1071 (1984)
                                                                                                       Cascade Corp. v. FTC, 637 F.2d 573, 582 (9th Cir.       under Section 5 in the absence of
                                               (appended to In re Int’l Harvester Co., 104 F.T.C.                                                              substantial harm to competition.9 A
                                                                                                       1980); Official Airline Guides, Inc. v. FTC, 630 F.2d
                                               949 (1984)) [hereinafter Unfairness Statement],
                                                                                                       920, 927 (2d Cir. 1980) (OAG).
                                               available at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/policystmt/ad-        4 See, e.g., William Blumenthal, Clear Agency            8 The brief majority statement that accompanies
                                               unfair.htm; Fed. Trade Comm’n, Policy Statement
                                               on Deception (appended to In re Cliffdale Assocs.,      Guidelines: Lessons from 1982, 68 Antitrust L.J. 5,     the policy statement does not meaningfully add to
                                               Inc., 103 F.T.C. 110, 174 (1984)), available at         25 (2000) (‘‘Good guidance goes beyond                  its contents. For example, how will the Commission
                                               http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/policystmt/ad-decept.htm.        commonplace knowledge to offer specifics, to            determine that the antitrust laws are not
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                                               See also J. Howard Beales, Brightening the Lines:       bridge gaps, to resolve ambiguities. It has an          ‘‘sufficient’’ or ‘‘appropriate’’? When will the
                                               The Use of Policy Statements at the Federal Trade       edginess; and because it provides details, it limits    Commission use a traditional rule of reason
                                               Commission, 72 Antitrust L.J. 1057, 1058 (2005)         agency discretion.’’).                                  analysis, and when will it use Section 5 ‘‘in a
                                                                                                         5 See OAG, 630 F.2d 920.
                                               (‘‘Each policy statement clarified and refined the                                                              manner similar to the case-by-case development of
                                               legal standards that the Commission would apply,          6 See Ethyl, 729 F.2d 128 (challenging unilateral     the other antitrust laws’’?
                                               and each narrowed the range of the Commission’s         pricing practices in oligopolistic industry).              9 The statement may very well constrain the

                                               discretion. In their own ways, each statement has         7 See Boise Cascade Corp., 637 F.2d 573               Commission from pursuing Section 5 to its broadest
                                               had a substantial impact on the development of the      (challenging use of base point pricing system as        possible extent to reach conduct that is in bad faith,
                                               law.’’).                                                incipient threat to competition).                                                                   Continued




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                                               57058                       Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 182 / Monday, September 21, 2015 / Notices

                                               substantial harm requirement, however,                    including breach of standard-setting                       Principles of fairness and predictability
                                               is found in our Unfairness Statement,10                   commitments, loyalty discounts,                            require that divergence in liability
                                               and thoughtful commentary from                            facilitating practices, conscious                          standards between the two agencies
                                               leading antitrust scholars has suggested                  parallelism, business torts, incipient                     resulting from enforcement of Section 5
                                               that such a requirement be included in                    violations of the antitrust laws, and                      be minimal.15 Otherwise, firms may face
                                               any UMC statement.11 In any case, the                     unfair competition through violation of                    liability (or not), depending solely on
                                               fact that this policy statement requires                  various laws outside the antitrust                         which agency reviews their conduct.
                                               some harm to competition does little to                   context.13                                                 One can only imagine how this policy
                                               constrain the Commission, as every                           To provide certainty regarding future                   statement will affect the clearance
                                               Section 5 theory pursued in the last 45                   enforcement under Section 5, a                             process under which the agencies
                                               years, no matter how controversial or                     Commission policy statement must                           allocate matters, which is now primarily
                                               convoluted, can be and has been                           constrain the agency in some                               based on industry expertise. Even worse
                                               couched in terms of protecting                            meaningful way. In truth, the open-                        from a fairness standpoint is the
                                               competition and/or consumers.12                           ended ‘‘similar to the rule of reason’’                    prospect of the Commission leveraging
                                                  Thus, the possibilities for expansive                  framework—to the extent I understand                       its expansive Section 5 authority to
                                               use of Section 5 under this policy                        how it may be applied—does not seem                        pursue conduct by a firm whose time-
                                               statement appear vast. The majority’s                     to differ meaningfully from the existing                   sensitive merger happens to be under
                                               reading of Section 5 could easily                         case-by-case approach heretofore                           review by the Commission.16
                                               accommodate a host of controversial                       favored by a majority of the                                  In addition, the lack of internal
                                               theories pursued or considered by the                     Commission. Indeed, my experience as                       deliberation and consultation
                                               Commission over the past four decades,                    a Commissioner leads me to believe that                    surrounding this policy statement—as
                                                                                                         my colleagues, who have diverse views                      opposed to the topic of Section 5 more
                                               fraudulent, or oppressive without any possible            about antitrust law, would apply this                      generally—is unfortunate.17 Many,
                                               relation to competition. See, e.g., FTC v. Sperry &                                                                  including former Chairman Pitofsky,
                                               Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 242 (1972). In              policy statement to reflect these
                                               practice, however, the Commission has not relied          significant differences. No interpretation                 have urged the Commission to seek
                                               solely on such a rationale to support a UMC               of the policy statement by a single                        public comment on any proposed
                                               violation for several decades. Thus, in practice the
                                                                                                         Commissioner, no matter how                                Section 5 policy statement before
                                               statement constrains very little, if anything, in this                                                               adopting it.18 Doing so here would have
                                               regard.                                                   thoughtful, will bind this or any future
                                                  10 See Unfairness Statement, supra note 2, at 1073     Commission to greater limits on Section                       15 See, e.g., Antitrust Modernization Comm’n,
                                               (‘‘First of all, the injury must be substantial. The      5 UMC enforcement than what is in this                     Report and Recommendations 139 (2007)
                                               Commission is not concerned with trivial or merely        exceedingly brief, highly general
                                               speculative harms.’’).                                                                                               (addressing merger context and concluding: ‘‘So
                                                  11 See, e.g., Section of Antitrust Law, Presidential   statement.                                                 long as both agencies retain authority to enforce the
                                                                                                            Although some may argue that the                        antitrust laws, such divergence should be
                                               Transition Report: The State of Antitrust
                                                                                                                                                                    minimized or eliminated.’’).
                                               Enforcement 2012 20 (2013) (‘‘Standalone Section          courts will be an adequate check on this                      16 See, e.g., In re Robert Bosch GmbH, FTC File
                                               5 enforcement should be used, if at all, only when        authority, many commenters have
                                               the conduct involves substantial competitive                                                                         No. 121–0081, Decision and Order (Nov. 26, 2012),
                                               harm.’’); Transcript of Fed. Trade Comm’n                 raised concerns about how frequently                       available at https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/
                                               Workshop, Section 5 of the FTC Act as a                   the FTC settles Section 5 cases and how                    documents/cases/2013/04/
                                                                                                                                                                    130424robertboschdo.pdf (consent order settling
                                               Competition Statute at 130 (Oct. 17, 2008)                infrequently courts review our UMC                         simultaneous merger and standalone Section 5
                                               [hereinafter Section 5 Workshop], available at            enforcement.14 I see no reason why this
                                               https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/                                                                   investigations). Indeed, concerns about the FTC
                                               public_events/section-5-ftc-act-competition-statute/      policy statement will change the                           having additional leverage over merging parties as
                                               transcript.pdf (‘‘[M]y proposal was for where the         incentives for settlement on either side                   compared to the DOJ have led to proposed
                                               practice causes very substantial harm, the remedy                                                                    legislation to strip the FTC of its ability to challenge
                                                                                                         or affect the infrequency of judicial                      an unconsummated merger in administrative
                                               does not affect efficiencies or other good business
                                               reasons, and a clear line can be developed that
                                                                                                         scrutiny of FTC enforcement under                          litigation. See H.R. 5402, 113th Cong. (2014);
                                               allows predictability.’’) (Robert Pitofsky). See also     Section 5.                                                 Hearing on The ‘‘Standard Merger and Acquisition
                                               Herbert Hovenkamp, The Federal Trade                         The effect of this expansive policy                     Reviews Through Equal Rules (SMARTER) Act of
                                               Commission and the Sherman Act, 62 Fla. L. Rev.                                                                      2014, Before the Subcomm. on Regulatory Reform,
                                                                                                         statement also raises issues for our dual                  Commercial and Antitrust Law of the H. Comm. on
                                               871, 878–79 (2010) (‘‘[T]he practices that [the FTC]
                                               condemns must really be ‘anticompetitive’ in a
                                                                                                         antitrust enforcement framework.                           the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 2 (2014) (statement of
                                               meaningful sense. That is, there must be a basis for                                                                 Deborah A. Garza, former Chair, Antitrust
                                               thinking that the practice either does or will lead         13 My colleagues have not ruled out any of these         Modernization Commission) (raising concerns
                                               to reduced output and higher consumer prices or           theories in their policy and majority statements.          about the FTC’s ‘‘potentially enormous advantage
                                               lower quality in the affected market.’’).                   14 See, e.g., William E. Kovacic & Marc                  vis-à-vis DOJ and leverage over the parties with
                                                  12 See, e.g., In re Negotiated Data Solutions LLC,     Winerman, Competition Policy and the Application           respect to the mergers it chooses to challenge’’). The
                                               FTC File No. 051–0094, Statement of the Federal           of Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act,          effect of today’s policy statement may well be to
                                               Trade Commission, at 2 & n.5 (Jan. 23, 2008),             76 Antitrust L.J. 929, 941 (2010) (‘‘As influences on      increase that perceived leverage.
                                                                                                                                                                       17 The majority cites to a 2008 workshop to claim
                                               available at https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/     doctrine and firm behavior, though, settlements are
                                               documents/cases/2008/01/080122statement.pdf               weak substitutes for decisions by the appellate            adequate discussion of our enforcement authority
                                               (stating that Section 5 reaches conduct that is           courts that affirm FTC rulings based on Section 5.         under Section 5. That workshop took place seven
                                               ‘‘oppressive and coercive’’ but also stating: ‘‘The       One can have confidence in a theory’s power and            years ago, before any sitting member of the
                                               process of establishing a standard displaces              durability only when it has been tested in                 Commission was in office.
                                               competition; therefore, bad faith or deceptive            adversarial proceedings and endorsed by reviewing             18 See, e.g., Section 5 Workshop, supra note 11,

                                               behavior that undermines the process may also             courts . . . .’’); James Campbell Cooper, The Perils       at 67 (‘‘If the FTC, by the way, is going to publish
                                               undermine competition . . . .’’); In re Intel Corp.,      of Excessive Discretion: The Elusive Meaning of            a rule along this line or any line, it should be put
                                               FTC File No. 061–0247, Statement of Chairman              Unfairness in Section 5 of the FTC Act, 3 J.               out for public comment so that people can react to
                                               Leibowitz and Commissioner Rosch, at 2 (Dec. 16,          Antitrust Enforcement 87, 95 (2015) (‘‘Even if the         it.’’) (Robert Pitofsky); U.S. Chamber of Commerce,
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                                               2009), available at https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/     courts are the de jure arbiters of what constitutes        Unfair Methods of Competition under Section 5 of
                                               documents/public_statements/568601/                       an unfair method of competition, as long as the            the FTC Act: Does the U.S. Need Rules ‘‘Above and
                                               091216intelchairstatement.pdf (‘‘We take seriously        Commission avoids litigation, it becomes the de            Beyond Antitrust’’?, CPI Antitrust Chronicle 8–9
                                               our mandate to find a violation of Section 5 only         facto decider. This state of affairs calls into question   (Sept. 2009) (‘‘Any additional movement toward the
                                               when it is proven that the conduct at issue has not       the legitimacy of the FTC’s modern Section 5 cases.        use of Section 5 should be preceded by hearings
                                               only been unfair to rivals in the market but, more        As long as the FTC’s theories remain untested in an        and substantial time for debate among the antitrust
                                               important, is likely to harm consumers, taking into       adversarial proceeding, and unratified by appellate        community to ensure appropriate notice and
                                               account any efficiency justifications for the conduct     decisions, uncertainty will remain about the true          guidance is provided to the business community
                                               in question.’’).                                          reach of Section 5.’’).                                    and other interested constituents.’’).



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                                                                           Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 182 / Monday, September 21, 2015 / Notices                                                      57059

                                               allowed the Commission to receive                         more careful consideration of how this                  is also likely to pursue new UMC
                                               input from key stakeholders, including                    expansive policy may be viewed by                       enforcement, else why bother to put out
                                               Congress, the Department of Justice                       other antitrust regimes around the                      a statement with so little internal
                                               (DOJ) Antitrust Division, the business                    world.21                                                deliberation and no provision for public
                                               community, and the antitrust bar on this                    Finally, I disagree with the view that                input? I fear that this will ultimately
                                               particular policy formulation.19 Such                     having an expansive UMC policy                          lead to more, not less, uncertainty and
                                               input would have helped ensure that                       statement is better than having no                      burdens for the business community.
                                               the Commission is offering durable and                    statement at all. Arming the FTC staff                     I would prefer that any Section 5
                                               practical guidance around the                             with this sweeping new policy                           policy statement be put out for public
                                               fundamental question of whether and                       statement is likely to embolden them to                 comment before adoption and include,
                                               when this agency will reach beyond                        explore the limits of UMC in conduct                    among other things: (1) A substantial
                                               well-settled principles of antitrust law                  and merger investigations. The majority                 harm requirement; (2) a
                                               to impose new varieties of UMC                                                                                    disproportionate harm test; (3) a stricter
                                               liability.20 It would also have allowed                   080122majoras.pdf (‘‘Although Section 5 enables
                                                                                                         the Commission to reach conduct that is not             standard for pursuing conduct already
                                                  19 I also objected to the Commission’s withdrawal,
                                                                                                         actionable under the Sherman or Clayton Acts, we        addressed by the antitrust laws; (4) a
                                                                                                         have largely limited ourselves to matters in which      commitment to minimize FTC–DOJ
                                               without any public input, of its policy statement on      respondents took actions short of a fully
                                               pursuing disgorgement in competition matters in           consummated Section 1 violation (but with clear         conflict; (5) reliance on robust economic
                                               2012. See Statement of Commissioner Maureen K.            potential to harm competition), such as invitations     evidence on the practice at issue and
                                               Ohlhausen Dissenting from the Commission’s                to collude. This limitation is partly self-imposed,     exploration of available non-
                                               Decision to Withdraw its Policy Statement on              reflecting the Commission’s recognition of the
                                               Monetary Equitable Remedies in Competition Cases                                                                  enforcement tools prior to taking any
                                                                                                         scholarly consensus that finds the Sherman and
                                               (July 31, 2012), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/      Clayton Acts, as currently interpreted, to be           enforcement action; and (6) a
                                               2012/07/120731ohlhausenstatement.pdf.                     sufficiently encompassing to address nearly all         commitment generally to avoid
                                                  20 Such consultation is especially warranted
                                                                                                         matters that properly warrant competition policy        pursuing the same conduct as both an
                                               given the serious debate about the need to reach          enforcement.’’) (footnotes omitted).
                                               beyond the antitrust laws at all. See, e.g., II Phillip      21 See, e.g., James J. O’Connell, Section 5, 1914,
                                                                                                                                                                 unfair method of competition and an
                                               E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law              and the FTC at 100, 29 Antitrust 5, 6 (Fall 2014)       unfair or deceptive act or practice.22
                                               ¶ 302h, at 31 (4th ed. 2014) (‘‘Apart from possible       (‘‘[T]he FTC does not operate in a vacuum but              For all of these reasons, I dissent from
                                               historical anachronisms in the application of those       rather as part of an international enforcement
                                               statutes, the Sherman and Clayton Acts are broad          community, the newer members of which study
                                                                                                                                                                 the issuance of this policy statement.
                                               enough to cover any anticompetitive agreement or          very closely the practices and policies of more         [FR Doc. 2015–23498 Filed 9–18–15; 8:45 am]
                                               monopolistic situation that ought to be attacked          experienced agencies. . . . [I]n the absence of clear
                                                                                                                                                                 BILLING CODE 6750–01–P
                                               whether ‘completely full blown or not.’ Nothing           limiting principles the FTC runs the risk of its
                                               prevents those statutes from working their own            [standalone Section 5] enforcement being seen by
                                               condemnation of practices violating their basic                                                                     22 For a detailed discussion of factors that I
                                                                                                         newer agencies as following a kind of ‘We know it
                                               policies.’’); In re Negotiated Data Solutions LLC,        when we see it’ approach, one which translates into     believe should be included in a Section 5 statement,
                                               FTC File No. 051–0094, Dissenting Statement of            other languages and cultures all too easily as a kind   see Maureen K. Ohlhausen, Section 5 of the FTC
                                               Chairman Majoras, at 2–3 (Jan. 23, 2008), available       of implicit endorsement of arbitrary exercises of       Act: Principles of Navigation, 2 J. Antitrust
                                               at http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0510094/                agency power.’’).                                       Enforcement 1 (2014).
rmajette on DSK7SPTVN1PROD with NOTICES




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Document Created: 2015-12-15 09:38:32
Document Modified: 2015-12-15 09:38:32
CategoryRegulatory Information
CollectionFederal Register
sudoc ClassAE 2.7:
GS 4.107:
AE 2.106:
PublisherOffice of the Federal Register, National Archives and Records Administration
SectionNotices
ActionCommission policy statement.
DatesThe Commission announced the issuance of the Statement on August 13, 2015.
ContactDonald S. Clark, Secretary, (202-326- 2514), 600 Pennsylvania Avenue NW., Washington, DC 20580.
FR Citation80 FR 57055 

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