80 FR 61476 - Biweekly Notice: Applications and Amendments to Facility Operating Licenses and Combined Licenses Involving No Significant Hazards Considerations
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Federal Register Volume 80, Issue 197 (October 13, 2015)
Federal Register Volume 80, Issue 197 (October 13, 2015)
| Page Range | 61476-61492 | |
| FR Document | 2015-25860 |
[Federal Register Volume 80, Number 197 (Tuesday, October 13, 2015)] [Notices] [Pages 61476-61492] From the Federal Register Online [www.thefederalregister.org] [FR Doc No: 2015-25860] ----------------------------------------------------------------------- NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION [NRC-2015-0236] Biweekly Notice: Applications and Amendments to Facility Operating Licenses and Combined Licenses Involving No Significant Hazards Considerations AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission. ACTION: Biweekly notice. ----------------------------------------------------------------------- SUMMARY: Pursuant to Section 189a.(2) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is publishing this regular biweekly notice. The Act requires the Commission to publish notice of any amendments issued, or proposed to be issued, and grants the Commission the authority to issue and make immediately effective any amendment to an operating license or combined license, as applicable, upon a determination by the Commission that such amendment involves no significant hazards consideration, notwithstanding the pendency before the Commission of a request for a hearing from any person. This biweekly notice includes all notices of amendments issued, or proposed to be issued from September 15 to September 28, 2015. The last biweekly notice was published on September 29, 2015. DATES: Comments must be filed by November 12, 2015. A request for a hearing must be filed by December 14, 2015. ADDRESSES: You may submit comments by any of the following methods (unless this document describes a different [[Page 61477]] method for submitting comments on a specific subject):Federal Rulemaking Web site: Go to http://www.regulations.gov and search for Docket ID NRC-2015-0236. Address questions about NRC dockets to Carol Gallagher; telephone: 301-415- 3463; email: [email protected]. Mail comments to: Cindy Bladey, Office of Administration, Mail Stop: OWFN-12-H08, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001. For additional direction on obtaining information and submitting comments, see ``Obtaining Information and Submitting Comments'' in the SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION section of this document. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Janet Burkhardt, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington DC 20555-0001; telephone: 301-415-1384, email: [email protected]. SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: I. Obtaining Information and Submitting Comments A. Obtaining Information Please refer to Docket ID NRC-2015-0236 when contacting the NRC about the availability of information for this action. You may obtain publicly-available information related to this action by any of the following methods: Federal Rulemaking Web site: Go to http://www.regulations.gov and search for Docket ID NRC-2015-0236. NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS): You may obtain publicly-available documents online in the ADAMS Public Documents collection at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. To begin the search, select ``ADAMS Public Documents`` and then select ``Begin Web-based ADAMS Search.'' For problems with ADAMS, please contact the NRC's Public Document Room (PDR) reference staff at 1-800-397-4209, 301-415-4737, or by email to [email protected]. The ADAMS accession number for each document referenced (if it is available in ADAMS) is provided the first time that it is mentioned in the SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION section NRC's PDR: You may examine and purchase copies of public documents at the NRC's PDR, Room O1-F21, One White Flint North, 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland 20852. B. Submitting Comments Please include Docket ID NRC-2015-0236, facility name, unit number(s), application date, and subject in your comment submission. The NRC cautions you not to include identifying or contact information that you do not want to be publicly disclosed in your comment submission. The NRC posts all comment submissions at http://www.regulations.gov as well as entering the comment submissions into ADAMS. The NRC does not routinely edit comment submissions to remove identifying or contact information. If you are requesting or aggregating comments from other persons for submission to the NRC, then you should inform those persons not to include identifying or contact information that they do not want to be publicly disclosed in their comment submission. Your request should state that the NRC does not routinely edit comment submissions to remove such information before making the comment submissions available to the public or entering the comment submissions into ADAMS. II. Notice of Consideration of Issuance of Amendments to Facility Operating Licenses and Combined Licenses and Proposed No Significant Hazards Consideration Determination The Commission has made a proposed determination that the following amendment requests involve no significant hazards consideration. Under the Commission's regulations in Sec. 50.92 of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR), this means that operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not (1) involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated, or (2) create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; or (3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. The basis for this proposed determination for each amendment request is shown below. The Commission is seeking public comments on this proposed determination. Any comments received within 30 days after the date of publication of this notice will be considered in making any final determination. Normally, the Commission will not issue the amendment until the expiration of 60 days after the date of publication of this notice. The Commission may issue the license amendment before expiration of the 60- day period provided that its final determination is that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration. In addition, the Commission may issue the amendment prior to the expiration of the 30- day comment period should circumstances change during the 30-day comment period such that failure to act in a timely way would result, for example in derating or shutdown of the facility. Should the Commission take action prior to the expiration of either the comment period or the notice period, it will publish in the Federal Register a notice of issuance. Should the Commission make a final No Significant Hazards Consideration Determination, any hearing will take place after issuance. The Commission expects that the need to take this action will occur very infrequently. A. Opportunity To Request a Hearing and Petition for Leave To Intervene Within 60 days after the date of publication of this notice, any person(s) whose interest may be affected by this action may file a request for a hearing and a petition to intervene with respect to issuance of the amendment to the subject facility operating license or combined license. Requests for a hearing and a petition for leave to intervene shall be filed in accordance with the Commission's ``Agency Rules of Practice and Procedure'' in 10 CFR part 2. Interested person(s) should consult a current copy of 10 CFR 2.309, which is available at the NRC's PDR, located at One White Flint North, Room O1- F21, 11555 Rockville Pike (first floor), Rockville, Maryland 20852. The NRC's regulations are accessible electronically from the NRC Library on the NRC's Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/cfr/. If a request for a hearing or petition for leave to intervene is filed by the above date, the Commission or a presiding officer designated by the Commission or by the Chief Administrative Judge of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel, will rule on the request and/or petition; and the Secretary or the Chief Administrative Judge of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board will issue a notice of a hearing or an appropriate order. As required by 10 CFR 2.309, a petition for leave to intervene shall set forth with particularity the interest of the petitioner in the proceeding, and how that interest may be affected by the results of the proceeding. The petition should specifically explain the reasons why intervention should be permitted with particular reference to the following general requirements: (1) The name, address, and telephone number of the requestor or petitioner; (2) the nature of the requestor's/petitioner's [[Page 61478]] right under the Act to be made a party to the proceeding; (3) the nature and extent of the requestor's/petitioner's property, financial, or other interest in the proceeding; and (4) the possible effect of any decision or order which may be entered in the proceeding on the requestor's/petitioner's interest. The petition must also identify the specific contentions which the requestor/petitioner seeks to have litigated at the proceeding. Each contention must consist of a specific statement of the issue of law or fact to be raised or controverted. In addition, the requestor/petitioner shall provide a brief explanation of the bases for the contention and a concise statement of the alleged facts or expert opinion which support the contention and on which the requestor/ petitioner intends to rely in proving the contention at the hearing. The requestor/petitioner must also provide references to those specific sources and documents of which the petitioner is aware and on which the requestor/petitioner intends to rely to establish those facts or expert opinion. The petition must include sufficient information to show that a genuine dispute exists with the applicant on a material issue of law or fact. Contentions shall be limited to matters within the scope of the amendment under consideration. The contention must be one which, if proven, would entitle the requestor/petitioner to relief. A requestor/ petitioner who fails to satisfy these requirements with respect to at least one contention will not be permitted to participate as a party. Those permitted to intervene become parties to the proceeding, subject to any limitations in the order granting leave to intervene, and have the opportunity to participate fully in the conduct of the hearing. If a hearing is requested, the Commission will make a final determination on the issue of no significant hazards consideration. The final determination will serve to decide when the hearing is held. If the final determination is that the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration, the Commission may issue the amendment and make it immediately effective, notwithstanding the request for a hearing. Any hearing held would take place after issuance of the amendment. If the final determination is that the amendment request involves a significant hazards consideration, then any hearing held would take place before the issuance of any amendment unless the Commission finds an imminent danger to the health or safety of the public, in which case it will issue an appropriate order or rule under 10 CFR part 2. B. Electronic Submissions (E-Filing) Petitions for leave to intervene must be filed no later than 60 days from the date of publication of this notice. Requests for hearing, petitions for leave to intervene, and motions for leave to file new or amended contentions that are filed after the 60-day deadline will not be entertained absent a determination by the presiding officer that the filing demonstrates good cause by satisfying the three factors in 10 CFR 2.309(c)(1)(i)-(iii). For further details with respect to these license amendment applications, see the application for amendment which is available for public inspection in ADAMS and at the NRC's PDR. For additional direction on accessing information related to this document, see the ``Obtaining Information and Submitting Comments'' section of this document. Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc., Docket Nos. 50-336 and 50-423, Millstone Power Station, Unit Nos. 2 and 3 (MPS2 and MPS3), New London County, Connecticut Date of amendment request: June 30, 2015. A publicly-available version is in ADAMS under Accession No. ML15183A022. Description of amendment request: The amendments would revise the MPS2 and MPS3 Final Safety Analysis Reports (FSARs) to: (1) Delete the information pertaining to the severe line outage detection (SLOD) special protection system; (2) update the description of the tower structures associated with the four offsite transmission lines feeding Millstone Power Station; and (3) describe how the current offsite power source configuration and design satisfies the requirements of General Design Criteria (GDC)-17, ``Electric Power Systems,'' and GDC-5, ``Sharing of Structures, Systems, and Components.'' The amendments also request NRC approval of a new Technical Requirements Manual (TRM) requirement, ``Offsite Line Power Sources,'' for MPS2 and MPS3. With one offsite transmission line nonfunctional, the TRM requirement would allow 72 hours to restore the nonfunctional line with a provision to allow up to 14 days if specific TRM action requirements are met. Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented below: 1. Does the proposed amendment involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of any accident previously evaluated? Response: No. The post-modification configuration of the offsite 345 [kilovolt (kV)] transmission system (four lines separately supported and SLOD disabled) improves overall grid reliability and continues to meet the requirements for two independent sources of offsite power (GDC- 17). Therefore, the post-modification configuration does not significantly increase the probability or consequences of a loss of offsite power event. Likewise, the associated proposed changes to the MPS2 and MPS3 FSARs to document the revised 345 kV transmission line tower design and disabling of SLOD, do not increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated in the FSARs. The grid (offsite power) is by design, the preferred power source for the affected units. The grid provides a reliable source of power to MPS2 and MPS3 while the units are at power, in the event of unit trips, and when the units are shut down for maintenance. New TRM requirements are proposed that will maintain adequate defense in depth to ensure grid reliability and stability are preserved. A loss of offsite power event is an anticipated operational occurrence. The proposed changes do not significantly increase the probability of this event. Additionally, as described in Chapter 14 (MPS2) and Chapter 15 (MPS3), several events are assumed to occur coincident with a loss of offsite power. Sufficient onsite power sources are available to mitigate these events and ensure the consequences of the existing analyses for these events remain bounding. The proposed new TRM requirements for offsite line power sources will not change the plant design or design requirements. The design criteria for the offsite power system remain unchanged. Therefore, the safety analyses as documented in the MPS2 and MPS3 FSARs remain unchanged. Temporary reductions in the number of offsite lines from four to three, in accordance with the proposed TRM action requirements, will not adversely affect offsite power system availability in the event of a loss of either MPS2, MPS3, the largest other unit on the grid, or the most critical transmission line. Use of the proposed TRM requirements will not cause an accident to occur and will not change how accident mitigation equipment is operated. Allowing one offsite line to be nonfunctional for up to 14 days does not increase the probability of any previously evaluated accidents. Therefore, the proposed changes to the offsite 345 kV transmission system (four lines separately supported and SLOD disabled) and proposed new TRM requirements does not significantly increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated. [[Page 61479]] 2. Does the proposed amendment create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated? Response: No. The proposed amendments do not change the design function or operation of the offsite power system and do not affect the offsite power systems ability to perform its design function. The proposed amendments do not conflict with the design criteria, codes, or standards committed to in the licensing basis. The existing codes and standards, as they apply to the onsite emergency power systems, remain unchanged. The design criteria for the offsite power system remain unchanged. Therefore, the safety analyses as documented in the MPS2 and MPS3 FSARs remain unchanged. No credible new failure mechanisms, malfunctions, or accident initiators not considered in the design and licensing basis are created by the proposed amendment. The offsite power system is assumed to be available during several FSAR Chapter 14 (MPS2) and Chapter 15 (MPS3) events. The new TRM requirements would allow 72 hours to restore a nonfunctional line, and up to 14 days to restore a nonfunctional line if specific TRM action requirements are met. Use of these TRM requirements does not impact offsite power availability and does not create the possibility for a new or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated. Temporary reductions in the number of offsite lines from four to three, in accordance with the proposed TRM requirements, will continue to ensure offsite power system availability in the event of a loss of either MPS2, MPS3, the largest other unit on the grid, or the most critical transmission line. The proposed amendments have no adverse effect on plant operation or accident mitigation equipment. The response of the plants and the operators following a design basis accident will not be different. In addition, the proposed amendments do not create the possibility of a new failure mode associated with any equipment or personnel failures. Therefore, the proposed amendments will not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated. 3. Does the proposed amendment involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety? Response: No. The post-modification configuration of the offsite 345 kV transmission system (four lines separately supported and SLOD disabled) improves overall grid reliability and continues to meet the requirements for two independent sources of offsite power (GDC- 17). Likewise, the addition of TRM requirements that limit the unavailability of offsite lines provides acceptable assurance that line outages will not result in a significant reduction to grid stability and hence also to the margin of safety. The offsite power systems are assumed to be available during several FSAR Chapter 14 (MPS2) and Chapter 15 (MPS3) events. The loss of the offsite power system is an anticipated operational occurrence. Additionally, as described in Chapter 14 (MPS2) and Chapter 15 (MPS3), several events are assumed to occur coincident with a loss of offsite power. Sufficient onsite power sources are available to mitigate these events and ensure the consequences of the existing analyses for these events remain bounding. The proposed amendments do not affect the assumptions in the safety analyses or the ability to safely shutdown the reactors and mitigate accident conditions. Station structures, systems, and components will continue to be able to mitigate the design basis accidents as assumed in the safety analyses and ensure proper operation of accident mitigation equipment. In addition, the proposed amendment will not affect equipment design or operation of station structures, systems, and components and there are no changes being made to the safety limits or safety system settings required by technical specifications. Therefore, the proposed amendments will not result in a significant reduction in a margin of safety. The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration. Attorney for licensee: Lillian M. Cuoco, Senior Counsel, Dominion Resources Services, Inc., 120 Tredegar Street, RS-2, Richmond, VA 23219. NRC Branch Chief: Benjamin Beasley. Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC, Docket Nos. 50-369 and 50-370, McGuire Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2, Mecklenburg County, North Carolina Date of amendment request: July 9, 2015. A publicly-available version is in ADAMS under Accession No. ML15198A151. Description of amendment request: The amendments would change the reactor coolant pump (RCP) under-frequency trip setpoint Allowable Value (AV) and add footnotes. The proposed license amendment request affects Technical Specification (TS) 3.3.1, ``Reactor Trip System Instrumentation,'' for McGuire Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2. Basis for proposed no significant hazards determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented below: 1. Does the proposed amendment involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated? Response: No. The proposed TS changes involve lowering the existing RCP under- voltage ALLOWABLE VALUE and adopting [Technical Specification Task Force (TSTF)-493] provisions for as-found and as-left calibration tolerances. The proposed TS changes serve to further ensure the Reactor Trip RCP under-frequency and under-voltage trip instrumentation will properly function as credited in the safety analyses. The proposed changes do not alter any assumptions previously made in the radiological consequences evaluations nor do they affect mitigation of the radiological consequences of an accident previously evaluated. The proposed TS changes do not affect the probability of accident initiation. In summary, the proposed changes will not involve any increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated 2. Does the proposed amendment create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated? Response: No. The proposed TS changes involve lowering the existing RCP under- voltage ALLOWABLE VALUE and adopting TSTF-493 provisions for as- found and as-left calibration tolerances. No new accident scenarios, failure mechanisms, or single failures are introduced as a result of any of the proposed changes. The Reactor Trip System is not an accident initiator. No changes to the overall manner in which the plant is operated are being proposed. Therefore, the proposed changes will not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated. 3. Does the proposed amendment involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety? Response: No. Margin of safety is related to the confidence in the ability of the fission product barriers to perform their intended functions. These barriers include the fuel cladding, the reactor coolant system pressure boundary, and the containment barriers. The proposed TS changes serve to ensure proper operation of the Reactor Trip RCP under-frequency and under-voltage trip instrumentation and that the instrumentation will properly function as credited in the safety analyses. The proposed TS changes will not have any effect on the margin of safety of fission product barriers. No accident mitigating equipment will be adversely impacted as a result of the modification. Therefore, existing safety margins will be preserved. None of the proposed changes will involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration. Attorney for licensee: Lara S. Nichols, Associate General Counsel, Duke Energy Corporation, 526 South Church Street--EC07H, Charlotte, NC 28202. NRC Branch Chief: Robert J. Pascarelli. [[Page 61480]] Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC, Docket Nos. 50-413 and 50-414, Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2, York County, South Carolina; Docket Nos. 50-369 and 50-370, McGuire Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2, Mecklenburg County, North Carolina; and Docket Nos. 50-269, 50-270, and 50-287, Oconee Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2, and 3, Oconee County, South Carolina Date of amendment request: July 15, 2015. A publicly-available version is available at ADAMS Accession No. ML15196A093. Description of amendment request: The proposed amendments would revise the facilities Updated Final Safety Analysis Reports (UFSARs) to provide gap release fractions for high-burnup fuel rods that exceed the linear heat generation rate limit detailed in Table 3 of Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.183, ``Alternative Radiological Source Terms for Evaluating Design Basis Accidents at Nuclear Power Reactors,'' July 2000 (ADAMS Accession No. ML003716792). Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented below: 1. Does the proposed amendment involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated? Response: No. The proposed change involves using gap release fractions for high-burnup fuel rods (i.e., greater than 54 [gigawatt days per metric ton unit (GWD/MTU)] that exceed the 6.3 [kiloWatt per foot (kW/ft)] linear heat generation rate (LHGR) limit detailed in Table 3, Footnote 11 of RG 1.183. Increased gap release fractions were determined and accounted for in the dose analysis for Catawba Nuclear Station (CNS), Units 1 and 2; McGuire Nuclear Station (MNS), Units 1 and 2; and Oconee Nuclear Station (ONS), Units 1, 2, and 3. The dose consequence reported in each site's Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) were reanalyzed for fuel handling-type accidents only. Dose consequences were not reanalyzed for other non- fuel-handling accidents since no fuel rod that is predicted to enter departure from nuclear boiling (DNB) will be permitted to operate beyond the limits of RG 1.183, Table 3, Footnote 11. The current NRC requirements, as described in 10 CFR 50.67, specifies dose acceptance criteria in terms of Total Effective Dose Equivalent (TEDE). The revised dose consequence analysis for fuel handling-type events at CNS, MNS, and ONS meet the applicable TEDE dose acceptance criteria (specified also in RG 1.183). A slight increase in dose consequences is exhibited. However, the increase is not significant and the new TEDE results are below regulatory acceptance criteria. The changes proposed do not affect the precursors for fuel handling-type accidents analyzed in Chapter 15 of the CNS, MNS, or ONS UFSARs. The probability remains unchanged since the accident analyses performed and discussed in the basis for the UFSAR changes, involve no change to a system, structure, or component that affects initiating events for any UFSAR Chapter 15 accident evaluated. Therefore, the proposed amendment does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously analyzed. 2. Does the proposed amendment create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated? Response: No. The proposed change involves using gap release fractions for high-burnup fuel rods (i.e., greater than 54 GWD/MTU) that exceed the 6.3 kW/ft LHGR limit detailed in Table 3, Footnote 11 of RG 1.183. Increased gap release fractions were determined and accounted for in the dose analysis for CNS, MNS, and ONS. The dose consequences reported in each site's UFSAR were reanalyzed for fuel handling-type accidents only. Dose consequences were not reanalyzed for other non-fuel-handling accidents since no fuel rod that is predicted to enter departure from nucleate boiling (DNB) will be permitted to operate beyond the limits of RG 1.183, Table 3, Footnote 11. The proposed change does not involve the addition or modification of any plant equipment. The proposed change has the potential to affect future core designs for CNS, MNS, and ONS. However, the impact will not be beyond the standard function capabilities of the equipment. The proposed change involves using gap release fractions that would allow high-burnup fuel rods (i.e., greater than 54 GWD/MTU) to exceed the 6.3 kW/ft LHGR limit detailed in Table 3, Footnote 11 of RG 1.183. Accounting for these new gap release fractions in the dose analysis for CNS, MNS, and ONS does not create the possibility of a new accident. Therefore, the proposed change does no create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated. 3. Does the proposed amendment involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety? Response: No. The proposed change involves using gap release fractions for high-burnup fuel rods (i.e., greater than 54 GWD/MTU) that exceed the 6.3 kW/ft LHGR limit detailed in Table 3, Footnote 11 of RG 1.183. Increased gap release fractions were determined and accounted for in the dose analysis for CNS, MNS, and ONS. The dose consequences reported in each site's UFSAR were reanalyzed for fuel handling-type accidents only. Dose consequences were not reanalyzed for other non-fuel-handling accidents since no fuel rod that is predicted to enter departure from nucleate boiling (DNB) will be permitted to operate beyond the limits of RG 1.183, Table 3, Footnote 11. The proposed change has the potential for an increased postulated accident dose at CNS, MNS or ONS. However, the analysis demonstrates that the resultant doses are within the appropriate acceptance criteria. The margin of safety, as described by 10 CFR 50.67 and Regulatory Guide 1.183, has been maintained. Furthermore, the assumptions and input used in the gap release and dose consequences calculations are conservative. These conservative assumptions ensure that the radiation doses calculated pursuant to Regulatory Guide 1.183 and cited in this license amendment requires are the upper bounds to radiological consequences of the fuel handling-type accidents analyzed. The analysis shows that with increased gap release fractions accounted for in the dose consequences calculations there is margin between the offsite radiation doses calculated and the dose limits of 10 CFR 50.67 and acceptance criteria of Regulatory Guide 1.183. The proposed change will not degrade the plant protective boundaries, will not cause a release of fission products to the public and will not degrade the performance of any structures, systems and components important to safety. Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration. Attorney for licensee: Lara S. Nichols, Associate General Counsel, Duke Energy Corporation, 526 South Church Street--EC07H, Charlotte, NC 28202. NRC Branch Chief: Robert J. Pascarelli. Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc., Docket No. 50-333, James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant (JAF), Oswego County, New York Date of amendment request: August 20, 2015. A publicly-available version is in ADAMS under Accession No. ML15232A761. Description of amendment request: The amendment would revise Technical Specification (TS) 5.5.6, ``Primary Containment Leak Rate Testing Program,'' to allow permanent extension of the Type A Primary Containment Integrated Leak Rate Test (ILRT) interval to 15 years and to allow extension of Type C Local Leak Rate Test (LLRT) testing interval up to 75 months. Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented below: 1. Does the proposed amendment involve a significant increase in the probability or [[Page 61481]] consequences of an accident previously evaluated? Response: No. The proposed amendment to the TS involves the extension of the JAF Type A containment test interval to 15 years and the extension of the Type C test interval to 75 months. The current Type A test interval of 120 months (10 years) would be extended on a permanent basis to no longer than 15 years from the last Type A test. The current Type C test interval of 60 months for selected components would be extended on a performance basis to no longer than 75 months. Extensions of up to nine months (total maximum interval of 84 months for Type C tests) are permissible only for non-routine emergent conditions. The proposed extension does not involve either a physical change to the plant or a change in the manner in which the plant is operated or controlled. The containment is designed to provide an essentially leak tight barrier against the uncontrolled release of radioactivity to the environment for postulated accidents. As such, the containment and the testing requirements invoked to periodically demonstrate the integrity of the containment exist to ensure the plant's ability to mitigate the consequences of an accident, and do not involve the prevention or identification of any precursors of an accident. The change in dose risk for changing the Type A test frequency from three-per-ten years to once-per- fifteen-years, measured as an increase to the total integrated plant risk for those accident sequences influenced by Type A testing, is 0.0087 person-[roentgen equivalent man (rem)]/year. [Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI)] Report No. 1009325, Revision 2-A states that a very small population dose is defined as an increase of <= 1.0 person-rem per year, or <= 1% of the total population dose, whichever is less restrictive for the risk impact assessment of the extended ILRT intervals. The results of the risk assessment for this amendment meet these criteria. Moreover, the risk impact for the ILRT extension when compared to other severe accident risks is negligible. Therefore, this proposed extension does not involve a significant increase in the probability of an accident previously evaluated. As documented in NUREG-1493 [``Performance Based Containment Leak-Test Program''], Type B and C tests have identified a very large percentage of containment leakage paths, and the percentage of containment leakage paths that are detected only by Type A testing is very small. The JAF Type A test history supports this conclusion. The integrity of the containment is subject to two types of failure mechanisms that can be categorized as: (1) Activity based, and; (2) time based. Activity based failure mechanisms are defined as degradation due to system and/or component modifications or maintenance. Local leak rate test requirements and administrative controls such as configuration management and procedural requirements for system restoration ensure that containment integrity is not degraded by plant modifications or maintenance activities. The design and construction requirements of the containment combined with the containment inspections performed in accordance with [American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code] Section XI, the Maintenance Rule, and TS requirements serve to provide a high degree of assurance that the containment would not degrade in a manner that is detectable only by a Type A test. Based on the above, the proposed extensions do not significantly increase the consequences of an accident previously evaluated. The proposed amendment also deletes exceptions previously granted to allow one-time extensions of the ILRT test frequency for JAF. These exceptions were for activities that would have already taken place by the time this amendment is approved; therefore, their deletion is solely an administrative action that has no effect on any component and no impact on how the unit is operated. Therefore, the proposed change does not result in a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated. 2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated? Response: No. The proposed amendment to the TS involves the extension of the JAF Type A containment test interval to 15 years and the extension of the Type C test interval to 75 months. The containment and the testing requirements to periodically demonstrate the integrity of the containment exist to ensure the plant's ability to mitigate the consequences of an accident do not involve any accident precursors or initiators. The proposed change does not involve a physical change to the plant (i.e., no new or different type of equipment will be installed) or a change to the manner in which the plant is operated or controlled. The proposed amendment also deletes exceptions previously granted to allow one-time extensions of the ILRT test frequency for JAF. These exceptions were for activities that would have already taken place by the time this amendment is approved; therefore, their deletion is solely an administrative action that does not result in any change in how the unit is operated. Therefore, the proposed change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated. 3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety? Response: No. The proposed amendment to TS 5.5.6 involves the extension of the JAF Type A containment test interval to 15 years and the extension of the Type C test interval to 75 months for selected components. This amendment does not alter the manner in which safety limits, limiting safety system set points, or limiting conditions for operation are determined. The specific requirements and conditions of the TS Containment Leak Rate Testing Program exist to ensure that the degree of containment structural integrity and leak-tightness that is considered in the plant safety analysis is maintained. The overall containment leak rate limit specified by TS is maintained. The proposed change involves only the extension of the interval between Type A containment leak rate tests and Type C tests for JAF. The proposed surveillance interval extension is bounded by the 15- year ILRT Interval and the 75-month Type C test interval currently authorized within [Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 94-01, Revision 3- A [``Industry Guideline for Implementing Performance-Based Option of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix J,'' July 2012 (ADAMS Accession No. ML12221A202)]. Industry experience supports the conclusion that Type B and C testing detects a large percentage of containment leakage paths and that the percentage of containment leakage paths that are detected only by Type A testing is small. The containment inspections performed in accordance with ASME Section Xl, TS and the Maintenance Rule serve to provide a high degree of assurance that the containment would not degrade in a manner that is detectable only by Type A testing. The combination of these factors ensures that the margin of safety in the plant safety analysis is maintained. The design, operation, testing methods and acceptance criteria for Type A, B, and C containment leakage tests specified in applicable codes and standards would continue to be met, with the acceptance of this proposed change, since these are not affected by changes to the Type A and Type C test intervals. The proposed amendment also deletes exceptions previously granted to allow one time extensions of the ILRT test frequency for JAF. These exceptions were for activities that would have already taken place by the time this amendment is approved; therefore, their deletion is solely an administrative action and does not change how the unit is operated and maintained. Thus, there is no reduction in any margin of safety. Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration. Attorney for licensee: Ms. Jeanne Cho, Assistant General Counsel, Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc., 440 Hamilton Avenue, White Plains, NY 10601. NRC Branch Chief: Benjamin G. Beasley. Entergy Operations, Inc.; System Energy Resources, Inc.; South Mississippi Electric Power Association; and Entergy Mississippi, Inc., Docket No. 50-416, Grand Gulf Nuclear Station, Unit 1 (GGNS), Claiborne County, Mississippi Date of amendment request: June 29, 2015. A publicly-available version is in ADAMS under Accession No. ML15180A376. Description of amendment request: The amendment proposes a change to [[Page 61482]] the GGNS Cyber Security Plan (CSP) Milestone 8 full implementation date as set forth in the CSP Implementation Schedule. Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented below: 1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated? Response: No. The proposed change to the CSP Implementation Schedule is administrative in nature. This change does not alter accident analysis assumptions, add any initiators, or affect the function of plant systems or the manner in which systems are operated, maintained, modified, tested, or inspected. The proposed change does not require any plant modifications which affect the performance capability of the structures, systems and components relied upon to mitigate the consequences of postulated accidents and has no impact on the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated. Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated. 2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated? Response: No. The proposed change to the CSP Implementation Schedule is administrative in nature. This proposed change does not alter accident analysis assumptions, add any initiators or affect the function of plant systems or the manner in which systems are operated, maintained, modified, tested, or inspected. The proposed change does not require any plant modifications which affect the performance capability of the structures, systems, and components relied upon to mitigate the consequences of postulated accidents and does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated. Therefore, the proposed change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated. 3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety? Response: No. Plant safety margins are established through limiting conditions for operation, limiting safety system settings, and safety limits specified in the technical specifications. The proposed change to the CSP Implementation Schedule is administrative in nature. In addition, the milestone date delay for full implementation of the CSP has no substantive impact because other measures have been taken which provide adequate protection during this period of time. Because there is no change to established safety margins as a result of this change, the proposed change does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration. Attorney for licensee: Joseph A. Aluise, Associate General Counsel--Legal, Nuclear and Environmental, Entergy Services, Inc., 639 Loyola Avenue, New Orleans, LA 70113. NRC Branch Chief: Meena K. Khanna. Exelon Generation Company, LLC, Docket No. 50-244, R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant (Ginna), Wayne County, New York Date of amendment request: June 4, 2015. A publicly-available version is in ADAMS under Accession No. ML15166A075. Description of amendment request: The amendment would modify Ginna's technical specifications (TS) by relocating specific surveillance frequencies to a licensee-controlled program with the implementation of Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 04-10, [Rev. 1, ``Risk-Informed Technical Specifications Initiative 5b, Risk-Informed Method for Control of Surveillance Frequencies,'' April 2007 (ADAMS Accession No. ML071360456)]. Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented below: 1. Do the proposed changes involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of any accident previously evaluated? Response: No. The proposed changes relocate the specified frequencies for periodic surveillance requirements to licensee control under a new Surveillance Frequency Control Program [SFCP]. Surveillance frequencies are not an initiator to any accident previously evaluated. As a result, the probability of any accident previously evaluated is not significantly increased. The systems and components required by the technical specifications for which the surveillance frequencies are relocated are still required to be operable, meet the acceptance criteria for the surveillance requirements, and be capable of performing any mitigation function assumed in the accident analysis. As a result, the consequences of any accident previously evaluated are not significantly increased. Therefore, the proposed changes do not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated. 2. Do the proposed changes create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated? Response: No. No new or different accidents result from utilizing the proposed changes. The changes do not involve a physical alteration of the plant (i.e., no new or different type of equipment will be installed) or a change in the methods governing normal plant operation. In addition, the changes do not impose any new or different requirements. The changes do not alter assumptions made in the safety analysis. The proposed changes are consistent with the safety analysis assumptions and current plant operating practice. Therefore, the proposed changes do not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated. 3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety? Response: No. The design, operation, testing methods, and acceptance criteria for systems, structures, and components, specified in applicable codes and standards (or alternatives approved for use by the NRC) will continue to be met as described in the plant licensing basis (including the final safety analysis report and bases to TS), since these are not affected by changes to the surveillance frequencies. Similarly, there is no impact to safety analysis acceptance criteria as described in the plant licensing basis. To evaluate a change in the relocated surveillance frequency, Exelon will perform a probabilistic risk evaluation using the guidance contained in NRC approved NEI 04-10, Rev. 1, in accordance with the TS SFCP. NEI 04- 10, Rev. 1, methodology provides reasonable acceptance guidelines and methods for evaluating the risk increase of proposed changes to surveillance frequencies consistent with Regulatory Guide 1.177 [``An Approach for Plant-Specific, Risk-Informed Decisionmaking: Technical Specifications'']. Therefore, the proposed changes do not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration. Attorney for licensee: J. Bradley Fewell, Senior Vice President, Regulatory Affairs, Nuclear, and General Counsel, Exelon Generation Company, LLC, 4300 Winfield Road, Warrenville, IL 60555. NRC Branch Chief: Benjamin G. Beasley. [[Page 61483]] Florida Power & Light Company, et al., Docket Nos. 50-335 and 50-389, St. Lucie Plant, Unit Nos. 1 and 2 (SL-1 and 2), St. Lucie County, Florida Date of amendment request: March 10, 2015. A publicly-available version is in ADAMS under Accession No. ML15084A141. Description of amendment request: The amendments would remove Technical Specification (TS) Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3/ 4.9.5, ``Communications,'' from the SL-1 and 2 TSs; remove LCO 3/4.9.6, ``Manipulator Crane Operability,'' from the SL-1 TSs; and remove LCO 3/ 4.9.6, ``Manipulator Crane,'' from the SL-2 TSs. Each of these TS requirements will be relocated to the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) for SL-1 and 2. Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented below: 1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated? Response: No. The proposed changes act to remove the current necessity of establishing and maintaining communications between the control room and the refueling station and the minimum load capacities and load limit controls required for the manipulator crane limits and relocate the requirements to the UFSAR, which will have no impact on any safety related structures, systems or components. Once relocated to the UFSAR, changes to establishing and maintaining communications between the control room and the refueling station and the minimum load capacities and load limit controls required for the manipulator crane limits will be controlled in accordance with 10 CFR 50.59. The probability of occurrence of a previously evaluated accident is not increased because these changes do not introduce any new potential accident initiating conditions. The consequences of accidents previously evaluated in the UFSAR are not affected because the ability of the components to perform their required functions is not affected. Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated. 2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated? Response: No. The proposed changes act to remove the current necessity of establishing and maintaining communications between the control room and the refueling station and the minimum load capacities and load limit controls required for the manipulator crane limits and relocate the requirements to the UFSAR, which will have no impact on any safety related structures, systems or components. Once relocated to the UFSAR, changes to establishing and maintaining communications between the control room and the refueling station and the minimum load capacities and load limit controls required for the manipulator crane limits will be controlled in accordance with 10 CFR 50.59. The proposed changes do not introduce new modes of plant operation and do not involve physical modifications to the plant (no new or different type of equipment will be installed). There are no changes in the method by which any safety related plant structure, system, or component (SSC) performs its specified safety function. As such, the plant conditions for which the design basis accident analyses were performed remain valid. No new accident scenarios, transient precursors, failure mechanisms, or limiting single failures will be introduced as a result of the proposed changes. There will be no adverse effect or challenges imposed on any SSC as a result of the proposed changes. Therefore, the proposed changes do not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated. 3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety? Response: No. Margin of safety is related to confidence in the ability of the fission product barriers to perform their accident mitigation functions. The proposed changes act to remove the current necessity of establishing and maintaining communications between the control room and the refueling station and the minimum load capacities and load limit controls required for the manipulator crane limits and relocate the requirements to the UFSAR, which will have no impact on any safety related structures, systems or components. Once relocated to the UFSAR, changes to establishing and maintaining communications between the control room and the refueling station and the minimum load capacities and load limit controls required for the manipulator crane limits will be controlled in accordance with 10 CFR 50.59. The proposed changes do not physically alter any SSC. There will be no effect on those SSCs necessary to assure the accomplishment of protection functions. There will be no impact on the overpower limit, departure from nucleate boiling ratio (DNBR) limits, loss of cooling accident peak cladding temperature (LOCA PCT), or any other margin of safety. The applicable radiological dose consequence acceptance criteria will continue to be met. Therefore, the proposed changes do not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration. Attorney for licensee: William S. Blair, Managing Attorney-- Nuclear, Florida Power & Light Company, 700 Universe Blvd., MS LAW/JB, Juno Beach, FL 33408-0420. NRC Branch Chief: Shana R. Helton. Northern States Power Company--Minnesota Docket No. 50-263, Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant, Wright County, Minnesota Date of amendment request: September 2, 2015. A publicly-available version is in ADAMS under Accession No. ML15246A530. Description of amendment request: The proposed amendment would revise Technical Specification (TS) 3.5.1, ``ECCS [Emergency Core Cooling System]--Operating,'' to correct the current non-conservative value specified for minimum Alternate Nitrogen System pressure. The proposed change would revise the TS surveillance requirement (SR) 3.5.1.3.b pressure limit for determining operability of the Alternate Nitrogen System from greater than or equal to (>=) 410 pounds per square inch gauge (psig) to a corrected value of >=1060 psig. Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is provided below: 1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated? Response: No. The proposed change revises the TS SR for the purpose of restoring a value to be consistent with the licensing basis. The proposed TS change does not introduce new equipment or new equipment operating modes, nor does the proposed change alter existing system relationships. The proposed change does not affect plant operation[.] Further, the proposed change does not increase the likelihood of the malfunction of any SSC [structure, system or component] or impact any analyzed accident. Consequently, the probability of an accident previously evaluated is not affected and there is no significant increase in the consequences of any accident previously evaluated. Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated. 2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated? Response: No. The proposed change revises the TS SR for the purpose of restoring a value to be consistent with the licensing basis. The [[Page 61484]] change does not involve a physical alteration to the plant (i.e., no new or different type of equipment will be installed) or a change in the methods governing normal plant operations. The proposed change does not alter assumptions made in the safety analysis for the components supplied by the Alternate Nitrogen System. Further, the proposed change does not introduce new accident initiators. Therefore, the proposed change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated. 3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety? Response: No. The proposed change revises the TS SR for the purpose of restoring a value to be consistent with the licensing basis. The proposed change does not alter the manner in which safety limits, limiting safety system settings, or limiting conditions for operation are determined. The safety analysis assumptions and acceptance criteria are not affected by this change. Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety. The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration. Attorney for licensee: Peter M. Glass, Assistant General Counsel, Xcel Energy Services, Inc., 414 Nicollet Mall, Minneapolis, MN 55401. NRC Branch Chief: David L. Pelton. Northern States Power Company--Minnesota, Docket No. 50-263, Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant, Wright County, Minnesota Date of amendment request: July 15, 2015. A publicly-available version is in ADAMS under Accession No. ML15196A576. Description of amendment request: The proposed amendment would revise or add technical specification (TS) surveillance requirements (SRs) that require verification that the Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS), the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) System/Shutdown Cooling (SDC) System, the Containment Spray (CS) System, and the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) System are not rendered inoperable due to gas accumulation and to provide allowances which permit performance of the revised verification. The changes are being made to address the concerns discussed in NRC Generic Letter 2008-01, ``Managing Gas Accumulation in Emergency Core Cooling, Decay Heat Removal, and Containment Spray Systems.'' The proposed changes are based on Revision 2 of NRC-approved Technical Specification Task Force (TSTF) Traveler TSTF-523, ``Generic Letter 2008-01, Managing Gas Accumulation,'' dated February 21, 2013 (ADAMS Accession No. ML13053A075). The NRC staff issued a Notice of Availability for TSTF-523, Revision 2, for plant- specific adoption using the consolidated line item improvement process, in the Federal Register on January 15, 2014 (79 FR 2700). Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is provided below: 1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated? Response: No. The proposed change revises or adds Surveillance Requirements (SRs) that require verification that the Emergency Core Cooling Systems (ECCS), the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) System/Shutdown Cooling (SDC) System, the Containment Spray (CS) System, and the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) System are not rendered inoperable due to accumulated gas and to provide allowances which permit performance of the revised verification. Gas accumulation in the subject systems is not an initiator of any accident previously evaluated. As a result, the probability of any accident previously evaluated is not significantly increased. The proposed SRs ensure that the subject systems continue to be capable to perform their assumed safety function and are not rendered inoperable due to gas accumulation. Thus, the consequences of any accident previously evaluated are not significantly increased. Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated. 2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated? Response: No. The proposed change revises or adds SRs that require verification that the ECCS, the RHR/SDC System, the CS System, and the RCIC System are not rendered inoperable due to accumulated gas and to provide allowances which permit performance of the revised verification. The proposed change does not involve a physical alteration of the plant (i.e., no new or different type of equipment will be installed) or a change in the methods governing normal plant operation. In addition, the proposed change does not impose any new or different requirements that could initiate an accident. The proposed change does not alter assumptions made in the safety analysis and is consistent with the safety analysis assumptions. Therefore, the proposed change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated. 3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety? Response: No. The proposed change revises or adds SRs that require verification that the ECCS, the RHR/SDC System, the CS System, and the RCIC System are not rendered inoperable due to accumulated gas and to provide allowances which permit performance of the revised verification. The proposed change clarifies requirements for management of gas accumulation in order to ensure the subject systems are capable of performing their assumed safety functions. The proposed SRs are more comprehensive than the current SRs and will ensure that the assumptions of the safety analysis are protected. The proposed change does not adversely affect any current plant safety margins or the reliability of the equipment assumed in the safety analysis. Therefore, there are no changes being made to any safety analysis assumptions, safety limits or limiting safety system settings that would adversely affect plant safety as a result of the proposed change. Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration. Attorney for licensee: Peter M. Glass, Assistant General Counsel, Xcel Energy Services, Inc., 414 Nicollet Mall, Minneapolis, MN 55401. NRC Branch Chief: David L. Pelton. Northern States Power Company--Minnesota, Docket Nos. 50-282 and 50- 306, Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2, Goodhue County, Minnesota Date of amendment request: June 29, 2015. A publicly-available version is in ADAMS under Accession No. ML15187A259. Description of amendment request: The proposed amendment would revise or add technical specification (TS) surveillance requirements (SRs) that require verification that the Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS), the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) System, and the Containment Spray (CS) System are not rendered inoperable due to gas accumulation and to provide allowances which permit performance of the revised verification. The changes are being made to address the concerns discussed in NRC Generic Letter 2008-01, ``Managing Gas Accumulation in Emergency Core Cooling, Decay Heat Removal, and Containment Spray Systems.'' The proposed changes are [[Page 61485]] based on Revision 2 of NRC-approved Technical Specification Task Force (TSTF) Traveler TSTF-523, ``Generic Letter 2008-01, Managing Gas Accumulation,'' dated February 21, 2013 (ADAMS Accession No. ML13053A075). The NRC staff issued a Notice of Availability for TSTF- 523, Revision 2, for plant-specific adoption using the consolidated line item improvement process, in the Federal Register on January 15, 2014 (79 FR 2700). Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is provided below: 1. Does the proposed amendment involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated? Response: No. The proposed change revises or adds Surveillance Requirements (SRs) that require verification that the Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS), the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) System, and the Containment Spray (CS) System are not rendered inoperable due to accumulated gas and to provide allowances which permit performance of the revised verification. Gas accumulation in the subject systems is not an initiator of any accident previously evaluated. As a result, the probability of any accident previously evaluated is not significantly increased. The proposed SRs ensure that the subject systems continue to be capable to perform their assumed safety function and are not rendered inoperable due to gas accumulation. Thus, the consequences of any accident previously evaluated are not significantly increased. Therefore, the proposed licensing basis change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated. 2. Does the proposed amendment create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated? Response: No. The proposed change [revises or] adds SRs that require verification that the ECCS, the RHR System, and the CS System are not rendered inoperable due to accumulated gas and to provide allowances which permit performance of the revised verification. The proposed change does not involve a physical alteration of the plant (i.e., no new or different type of equipment will be installed) or a change in the methods governing normal plant operation. In addition, the proposed change does not impose any new or different requirements that could initiate an accident. The proposed change does not alter assumptions made in the safety analysis and is consistent with the safety analysis assumptions. Therefore, the proposed licensing basis change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated. 3. Does the proposed amendment involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety? Response: No. The proposed change [revises or] adds SRs that require verification that the ECCS, the RHR System, and the CS System are not rendered inoperable due to accumulated gas and to provide allowances which permit performance of the revised verification. The proposed change adds new requirements to manage gas accumulation in order to ensure the subject systems are capable of performing their assumed safety functions. The proposed SRs will ensure that the assumptions of the safety analysis are protected. The proposed change does not adversely affect any current plant safety margins or the reliability of the equipment assumed in the safety analysis. Therefore, there are no changes being made to any safety analysis assumptions, safety limits[,] or limiting safety system settings that would adversely affect plant safety as a result of the proposed change. Therefore, the proposed licensing basis change does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration. Attorney for licensee: Peter M. Glass, Assistant General Counsel, Xcel Energy Services, Inc., 414 Nicollet Mall, Minneapolis, MN 55401. NRC Branch Chief: David L. Pelton. Omaha Public Power District, Docket No. 50-285, Fort Calhoun Station, Unit No. 1, Washington County, Nebraska Date of amendment request: July 24, 2015. A publicly-available version is in ADAMS under Accession No. ML15205A276. Description of amendment request: The amendment would revise the Technical Specification (TS) Surveillance Requirements (SRs), which currently require operating ventilation systems with charcoal filters for a 10-hour period at a monthly frequency. The SRs would be revised to require operation of the systems for 15 continuous minutes at a monthly frequency. The proposed amendment is consistent with NRC- approved Technical Specifications Task Force (TSTF) Traveler TSTF-522, Revision 0, ``Revise Ventilation System Surveillance Requirements to Operate for 10 hours per Month,'' as published in the Federal Register on September 20, 2012 (77 FR 58428), with variations due to plant- specific nomenclature. The changes would revise TS 3.2, Table 3-5; SR Items 10a.3.a, ``Control Room Air Filtration System (CRAFS)''; 10b.3.a, ``Spent Fuel Pool Storage Area Filtration System (SFPSAFS)''; and 10c.3.a, ``Safety Injection Pump Room Air Filtration System (SIPRAFS),'' and TS 3.6(3)c, ``Containment Recirculating Air Cooling and Filtering System,'' also known as the Containment Air Cooling and Filtering System (CACFS). Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented below: 1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated? Response: No. The proposed change replaces an existing SR to operate the CRAFS for ten (10) continuous hours every month with heaters operating with a requirement to operate the system for 15 continuous minutes every month with heaters operating. The proposed change also replaces existing SRs to operate the SFPSAFS, the SIPRAFS, and the CACFS for ten (10) hours every month with a requirement to operate these systems for 15 continuous minutes every month. These systems are not accident initiators and therefore, these changes do not involve a significant increase in the probability of an accident. The proposed system and filter testing changes are consistent with current regulatory guidance for these systems. The proposed changes continue to ensure that these systems perform their design function, which may include mitigating accidents. Thus, the change does not involve a significant increase in the consequences of an accident. Therefore, it is concluded that this change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated. 2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated? Response: No. The proposed change replaces an existing SR to operate the CRAFS for ten (10) continuous hours every month with heaters operating with a requirement to operate the system for 15 continuous minutes every month with heaters operating. The proposed change also replaces existing SRs to operate the SFPSAFS, the SIPRAFS, and the CACFS for ten (10) hours every month with a requirement to operate these systems for 15 continuous minutes every month. The change proposed for these ventilation systems does not change any system operations or maintenance activities. Testing requirements will be revised and will continue to demonstrate that the Limiting Conditions for Operation are met and/or the system components are capable of performing their intended safety functions. The change does not create new failure modes or mechanisms and no new accident precursors are generated. Therefore, it is concluded that this change does not create the possibility of a new or [[Page 61486]] different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated. 3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety? Response: No. The proposed change replaces an existing SR to operate the CRAFS for ten (10) continuous hours every month with heaters operating with a requirement to operate the system for 15 continuous minutes every month with heaters operating. The proposed change also replaces existing SRs to operate the SFPSAFS, the SIPRAFS, and the CACFS for ten (10) hours every month with a requirement to operate these systems for 15 continuous minutes every month. The design basis for the CRAFS heaters is to heat the incoming air, which reduces the relative humidity. The heater testing change proposed for the CRAFS will continue to demonstrate that the heaters are capable of heating the air and will perform their design function. The SFPSAFS, and the SIPRAFS are tested for adsorption at a relative humidity of [95 percent (%)] in accordance with RG [Regulatory Guide] 1.52, Revision 3, and do not require heaters for these systems to perform their specified safety function. The CACFS does not need to be tested similarly because the CACFS charcoal filters are not credited for the removal of radioiodines. The proposed change is consistent with regulatory guidance. Therefore, it is concluded that this change does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration. Attorney for licensee: David A. Repka, Esq., Winston & Strawn, 1700 K Street, NW., Washington, DC 20006-3817. NRC Branch Chief: Michael T. Markley. Omaha Public Power District, Docket No. 50-285, Fort Calhoun Station, Unit No. 1, Washington County, Nebraska Date of amendment request: August 20, 2015. A publicly-available version is in ADAMS under Accession No. ML15233A494. Description of amendment request: The amendment would make administrative changes to update personnel and committee titles in the Technical Specifications (TSs), delete outdated or completed additional actions contained in Appendix B of the license, and relocate the definition of Process Control Program from the TSs to the Updated Safety Analysis Report (USAR). The changes are proposed by the licensee to use consistent terminology with Exelon Generation Company as part of their Operating Services Agreement. Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented below: 1. Does the proposed amendment involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated? Response: No. The proposed changes are administrative in nature, involving changes to personnel and committee titles, deletion and or re- location of requirements redundant to regulations, and deletion of conditions controlling the first performance of testing that has since been completed. The proposed changes do not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated because: (1) the proposed amendment does not represent a change to the system design, (2) the proposed amendment does not alter, degrade, or prevent action described or assumed in any accident in the USAR from being performed, (3) the proposed amendment does not alter any assumptions previously made in evaluating radiological consequences, and [(4)] the proposed amendment does not affect the integrity of any fission product barrier. No other safety related equipment is affected by the proposed change. Therefore, the proposed changes do not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated. 2. Does the proposed amendment create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated? Response: No. The proposed changes do not alter the physical design, safety limits, or safety analysis assumptions associated with the operation of the plant. Hence, the proposed changes do not introduce any new accident initiators, nor do these changes reduce or adversely affect the capabilities of any plant structure or system in the performance of their safety function. Therefore, the proposed changes do not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated. 3. Does the proposed amendment involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety? Response: No. The proposed changes do not alter the manner in which safety limits or limiting safety system settings are determined. The safety analysis acceptance criteria are not affected by these proposed changes. Further, the proposed changes do not change the design function of any equipment assumed to operate in the event of an accident. Therefore, the proposed changes do not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration. Attorney for licensee: David A. Repka, Esq., Winston & Strawn, 1700 K Street NW., Washington, DC 20006-3817. NRC Branch Chief: Michael T. Markley. Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E), Docket Nos. 50-275 and 50-323, Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant (DCPP), Unit Nos. 1 and 2, San Luis Obispo County, California Date of amendment request: June 17, 2015, as supplemented by letter dated August 31, 2015. Publicly-available versions are in ADAMS under Accession Nos. ML15176A539 and ML15243A363, respectively. Description of amendment request: The amendments would revise the licensing bases to adopt the alternative source term (AST) as allowed by 10 CFR 50.67, ``Accident source term.'' The AST methodology, as established in NRC Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.183, ``Alternative Radiological Source Terms for Evaluating Design Basis Accidents at Nuclear Power Reactors,'' July 2000 (ADAMS Accession No. ML003716792), is used to calculate the offsite and control room radiological consequences of postulated accidents for DCPP, Unit Nos. 1 and 2. Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented below: 1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated? Response: No. This license amendment does not physically impact any system, structure, or component (SSC) that is a potential initiator of an accident. Therefore, implementation of AST, the AST assumptions and inputs, the proposed [Technical Specification (TS)] changes, and new [chi]/Q values have no impact on the probability for initiation of any design basis accident. Once the occurrence of an accident has been postulated, the new accident source term and [atmospheric dispersion factors ([chi]/Q)] values are inputs to analyses that evaluate the radiological consequences of the postulated events. Reactor coolant specific activity, testing criteria of charcoal filters, and the accident induced primary-to-secondary system leakage performance criterion are not initiators for any accident previously evaluated. The proposed change to require the 48-inch containment purge valves to be sealed closed during operating MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 is not an accident initiator for any [[Page 61487]] accident previously evaluated. The change in the classifications of a portion of the 40-inch Containment Penetration Area Ventilation line and a portion of the 2-inch gaseous radwaste system line is also not an accident initiator for any accident previously evaluated. Thus, the proposed TS changes and AST implementation will not increase the probability of an accident. The change to the decay time prior to fuel movement is not an accident initiator. Decay time is used to determine the source term for the dose consequence calculation following a potential [fuel handling accident (FHA)] and has no effect on the probability of the accident. Likewise, the change to the Control Room radiation monitors setpoint cannot cause an accident and the operation of containment spray during the recirculation phase is used for mitigation of a [loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA)], and thus not an accident initiator. As a result, there are no proposed changes to the parameters or conditions that could contribute to the initiation of an accident previously evaluated in Chapter 15 of the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR). As such, the AST cannot affect the probability of an accident previously evaluated. Regarding accident consequences, equipment and components affected by the proposed changes are mitigative in nature and relied upon once the accident has been postulated. The license amendment implements a new calculation methodology for determining accident consequences and does not adversely affect any plant component or system that is credited to mitigate fuel damage. Subsequently, no conditions have been created that could significantly increase the consequences of any accidents previously evaluated. Requiring that the 48-inch containment purge supply and exhaust valves be sealed closed during operating MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 eliminates a potential path for radiological release following events that result in radioactive material releases to the containment, thus reducing potential consequences of the event. The steam generator tube inspection testing criterion for accident induced leakage is being changed, resulting in lower leakage rates, and thus less potential releases due to primary-to-secondary leakage. The auxiliary building ventilation system allowable methyl iodide penetration limit is being changed, which results in more stringent testing requirements, and thus higher filter efficiencies for reducing potential releases. Changes to the operation of the containment spray system to require operation during the recirculation mode are also mitigative in nature. While the plant design basis has always included the ability to implement containment spray during recirculation, this license amendment now requires operation of containment spray in the recirculation mode for dose mitigation. DCPP is designed and licensed to operate using containment spray in the recirculation mode. As such, operation of containment spray in the recirculation mode has already been analyzed, evaluated, and is currently controlled by Emergency Operating Procedures. Usage of recirculation spray reduces the consequence of the postulated event. Likewise, the additional shielding to the Control Room and the addition of a [high-efficiency particulate air (HEPA)] filter to the [Technical Support Center (TSC)] ventilation system reduces the consequences of the postulated event to the Control Room and TSC personnel. Lowering the limit for [Dose Equivalent XE-133 (DEX)] lowers potential releases. By reclassifying a portion of the 40-inch Containment Penetration Area Ventilation line and a portion of the 2-inch gaseous radwaste system line to PG&E Design Class I, these lines will be seismically qualified, thus assuring that post-LOCA release points are the same as those used for determining [chi]/Q values. The change to the decay time from 100 hours to 72 hours prior to fuel movement is an input to the FHA. Although less decay will result in higher released activity, the results of the FHA dose consequence analysis remain within the dose acceptance criteria of the event. Also, the radiation levels to an operator from a raised fuel assembly may increase due to a lower decay time, however, any exposure will continue to be maintained under 10 CFR 20 limits by the plant Radiation Protection Program. Plant-specific radiological analyses have been performed using the AST methodology, assumption and inputs, as well as new [chi]/Q values. The results of the dose consequences analyses demonstrate that the regulatory acceptance criteria are met for each analyzed event. Implementing the AST involves no facility equipment, procedure, or process changes that could significantly affect the radioactive material actually released during an event. Subsequently, no conditions have been created that could significantly increase the consequences of any of the events being evaluated. Based on the above discussion, the proposed changes do not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated. 2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or different accident from any accident previously evaluated? Response: No. This license amendment does not alter or place any SSC in a configuration outside its design or analysis limits and does not create any new accident scenarios. The AST methodology is not an accident initiator, as it is a method used to estimate resulting postulated design basis accident doses. The proposed TS changes reflect the plant configuration that supports implementation of the new methodology and supports reduction in dose consequences. DCPP is designed and licensed to operate using containment spray in the recirculation mode. This change will not affect any operational aspect of the system or any other system, thus no new modes of operation are introduced by the proposed change. The function of the radiation monitors has not changed; only the setpoint has changed as a result of an assessment of all potential release pathways. The continued operation of containment spray and the radiation monitor setpoint change do not create any new failure modes, alter the nature of events postulated in the UFSAR, nor introduce any unique precursor mechanism. Requiring the 48-inch containment purge valves to be sealed closed during operating MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 does not introduce any new accident precursor. This change only eliminates a potential release path for radionuclides following a LOCA. The proposed TS testing criteria for the auxiliary building ventilation system charcoal filters and the proposed performance criteria for steam generator tube integrity also cannot create an accident, but results in requiring more efficient filtration of potentially released iodine and less allowable primary-to-secondary leakage. The proposed changes to the DEX activity limit, the TS terminology, and the decay time of the fuel before movement are also unrelated to accident initiators. The only physical changes to the plant being made in support of AST is the addition of Control Room shielding in an area previously modified, the addition of a HEPA filter at the intake of the TSC normal ventilation system, and the upgrade to the damper actuators, pressure switches, and damper solenoid valves to support reclassifying a portion of the Containment Penetration Area Ventilation line to PG&E Design Class I. Both Control Room shielding and HEPA filtration are mitigative in nature and do not have any impact on plant operation or system response following an accident. The Control Room modification for adding the shielding will meet applicable loading limits, so the addition of the shielding cannot initiate a failure. Upgrading damper actuators, pressure switches, and damper solenoid valves involve replacing existing components with components that are PG&E Design Class I. Therefore, the addition of shielding, a HEPA filter, and upgrading components cannot create a new or different kind of accident. Since the function of the SSCs has not changed for AST implementation, no new failure modes are created by this proposed change. The AST change itself does not have the capability to initiate accidents. Therefore, the proposed change does not create the possibility of a new or different type of accident from any accident previously evaluated. 3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety? Response: No. Implementing the AST is relevant only to calculated dose consequences of potential design basis accidents evaluated in Chapter 15 of the UFSAR. The changes proposed in this license amendment involve the use of a new analysis methodology and related regulatory acceptance criteria. New atmospheric dispersion factors, which are based on site specific meteorological data, were calculated in accordance with regulatory guidelines. The proposed TS, TS Bases, and UFSAR changes reflect the plant configuration that will support implementation of the new methodology and result in operation in accordance with regulatory guidelines that support the revisions to the radiological analyses of the limiting design basis accidents. Conservative [[Page 61488]] methodologies, per the guidance of RG 1.183, have been used in performing the accident analyses. The radiological consequences of these accidents are all within the regulatory acceptance criteria associated with the use of AST methodology. The change to the minimum decay time prior to fuel movement results in higher fission product releases after a FHA. However, the results of the FHA dose consequence analysis remain within the dose acceptance criteria of the event. The proposed changes continue to ensure that the dose consequences of design basis accidents at the exclusion area, low population zone boundaries, in the TSC, and in the Control Room are within the corresponding acceptance criteria presented in RG 1.183 and 10 CFR 50.67. The margin of safety for the radiological consequences of these accidents is provided by meeting the applicable regulatory limits, which are set at or below the 10 CFR 50.67 limits. An acceptable margin of safety is inherent in these limits. Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the amendment requests involve no significant hazards consideration. Attorney for licensee: Jennifer Post, Esq., Pacific Gas and Electric Company, P.O. Box 7442, San Francisco, California 94120. NRC Branch Chief: Michael T. Markley. South Carolina Electric & Gas Company, Docket Nos. 52-027 and 52-028, Virgil C. Summer Units 2 and 3, Fairfield County, South Carolina Date of amendment request: June 30, 2015. A publicly-available version is in ADAMS under Accession No. ML15181A470. Description of amendment request: The amendment request proposes changes to the Main Control Room Emergency Habitability System (VES) configuration and equipment safety designation. Because, this proposed change requires a departure from Tier 1 information in the Westinghouse Advanced Passive 1000 Design Control Document (DCD), the licensee also requested an exemption from the requirements of the Generic DCD Tier 1 in accordance with 10 CFR 52.63(b)(1). Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented below: 1. Does the proposed amendment involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated? Response: No. The design functions of the VES for the main control room (MCR) are to provide breathable air, maintain positive pressurization relative to the outside, provide cooling of MCR equipment and facilities, and provide passive air filtration within the MCR boundary. The VES is designed to satisfy these functions for up to 72 hours following a design basis accident. The proposed changes to the ASME [American Society of Mechanical Engineers] safety classification of components, equipment orientation and configuration, addition and deletion of components, and correction to the number of emergency air storage tanks would not adversely affect any design function. The proposed changes maintain the design function of the VES with safety-related equipment and system configuration consistent with the descriptions in UFSAR [Updated Final Safety Analysis Report] Subsection 6.4.2. The proposed changes do not affect the support or operation of mechanical and fluid systems. There is no change to the response of systems to postulated accident conditions. There is no change to the predicted radioactive releases due to postulated accident conditions. The plant response to previously evaluated accidents or external events is not adversely affected, nor do the proposed changes described create any new accident precursors. Therefore, the proposed amendment does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated. 2. Does the proposed amendment create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated? Response: No. The proposed changes to revise the VES design related to the ASME safety classification, equipment orientation and configuration, addition and deletion of components, and correction to the number of emergency air storage tanks maintains consistency with the design function information in the USFAR. The proposed changes do not create a new fault or sequence of events that could result in a radioactive release. The proposed changes would not affect any safety-related accident mitigating function. Therefore, the proposed changes do not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated. 3. Does the proposed amendment involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety? Response: No. The proposed changes do not affect the ability of the VES to maintain the safety-related functions to the MCR. The VES continues to meet the requirements for which it was designed and continues to meet the regulations. No safety analysis or design basis acceptance limit/criterion is challenged or exceeded by the proposed changes, and no margin of safety is reduced. Therefore, the proposed changes do not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration. Attorney for licensee: Ms. Kathryn M. Sutton, Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLC, 1111 Pennsylvania Avenue NW., Washington, DC 20004-2514. NRC Branch Chief: Lawrence J. Burkhart. III. Previously Published Notices of Consideration of Issuance of Amendments to Facility Operating Licenses and Combined Licenses, Proposed No Significant Hazards Consideration Determination, and Opportunity for a Hearing The following notices were previously published as separate individual notices. The notice content was the same as above. They were published as individual notices either because time did not allow the Commission to wait for this biweekly notice or because the action involved exigent circumstances. They are repeated here because the biweekly notice lists all amendments issued or proposed to be issued involving no significant hazards consideration. For details, see the individual notice in the Federal Register on the day and page cited. This notice does not extend the notice period of the original notice. Tennessee Valley Authority, Docket No. 50-390, Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Unit 1, Rhea County, Tennessee Date of amendment request: June 17, 2015, as supplemented by letters dated July 14, August 28, and September 3, 2015. Publicly- available versions are in ADAMS under Accession Nos. ML15170A474, ML15197A357, ML15243A044, and ML15246A638, respectively. Brief description of amendment request: The amendment would modify the technical specifications to define support systems needed in the first 48 hours after a unit shutdown when steam generators are not available for heat removal. The amendment would also make changes consistent with Technical Specification Task Force Traveler-273-A, Revision 2, to provide clarifications related to the requirements of the Safety Function Determination Program. Date of publication of individual notice in Federal Register: September 15, 2015 (80 FR 55383). [[Page 61489]] Expiration date of individual notice: October 15, 2015 (public comments); November 16, 2015 (hearing requests). Tennessee Valley Authority, Docket No. 50-390, Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Unit 1, Rhea County, Tennessee Date of amendment request: August 13, 2015. A publicly-available version is in ADAMS under Accession No. ML15225A344. Brief description of amendment request: To revise a current License Condition (Section 2.F) regarding the Fire Protection Program and propose a new License Condition regarding a fire protection requirement. Date of publication of individual notice in Federal Register: September 4, 2015 (80 FR 53581). Expiration date of individual notice: October 5, 2015 (public comments); November 3, 2015 (hearing requests). IV. Notice of Issuance of Amendments to Facility Operating Licenses and Combined Licenses During the period since publication of the last biweekly notice, the Commission has issued the following amendments. The Commission has determined for each of these amendments that the application complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations. The Commission has made appropriate findings as required by the Act and the Commission's rules and regulations in 10 CFR Chapter I, which are set forth in the license amendment. A notice of consideration of issuance of amendment to facility operating license or combined license, as applicable, proposed no significant hazards consideration determination, and opportunity for a hearing in connection with these actions, was published in the Federal Register as indicated. Unless otherwise indicated, the Commission has determined that these amendments satisfy the criteria for categorical exclusion in accordance with 10 CFR 51.22. Therefore, pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared for these amendments. If the Commission has prepared an environmental assessment under the special circumstances provision in 10 CFR 51.22(b) and has made a determination based on that assessment, it is so indicated. For further details with respect to the action see (1) the applications for amendment, (2) the amendment, and (3) the Commission's related letter, Safety Evaluation and/or Environmental Assessment as indicated. All of these items can be accessed as described in the ``Obtaining Information and Submitting Comments'' section of this document. Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC, Docket Nos. 50-269, 50-270, and 50-287, Oconee Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2, and 3, Oconee County, South Carolina Date of application of amendments: June 30, 2014, as supplemented by letter dated June 8, 2015. Brief description of amendments: The amendments revised the Technical Specifications related to Technical Specification 3.5.2 by reducing the allowed maximum Rated Thermal Power at which each unit can operate when select High Pressure Injection system equipment is inoperable. Date of Issuance: September 24, 2015. Effective date: As of the date of issuance and shall be implemented within 120 days from the date of issuance. Amendment Nos.: 395, 397 and 396. A publicly-available version is in ADAMS under Accession No. ML15166A387; documents related to these amendments are listed in the Safety Evaluation enclosure with the amendments. Renewed Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-38, DPR-47, and DPR-55: Amendments revised the licenses and the technical specifications. Date of initial notice in Federal Register: September 16, 2014 (79 FR 55510). The supplement dated June 8, 2015, provided additional information that clarified the application, did not expand the scope of the application as originally noticed, and did not change the staff's original proposed no significant hazards consideration determination. The Commission's related evaluation of the amendments is contained in a Safety Evaluation dated September 24, 2015. No significant hazards consideration comments received: No. Duke Energy Progress, Docket No. 50-261, H. B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant, Unit No. 2, Hartsville, South Carolina Date of amendment request: February 10, 2014, as supplemented by letters dated April 4, 2014, August 28, 2014, and September 4, 2015. Brief description of amendment: The amendment revised Technical Specification (TS) 3.3.1 for the Reactor Protection System Instrumentation Turbine Trip function on Low Auto Stop Oil Pressure to a Turbine Trip function on Low Electro-Hydraulic (EH) Fluid Oil Pressure. The amendment revised the Allowable Value and Nominal Trip Setpoint and revised the TS by applying additional testing requirements listed in Technical Specification Task Force (TSTF) Traveler TSTF-493- A, Revision 4, ``Clarify Application of Setpoint Methodologies for Limiting Safety System Setting Functions,'' for Low EH Fluid Oil Pressure trip. Date of issuance: September 22, 2015. Effective date: As of the date of issuance and shall be implemented within 120 days of completion of the modification during Refueling Outage 31 in fall of 2018. Amendment No.: 243. A publicly-available version is in ADAMS under Accession No. ML15040A073; documents related to this amendment are listed in the Safety Evaluation enclosed with the amendment. Renewed Facility Operating License No. DPR-23: Amendment revised the Facility Operating License and Technical Specifications. Date of initial notice in Federal Register: July 22, 2014 (79 FR 42542). The supplemental letters dated August 28, 2014, and September 4, 2015, provided additional information that clarified the application, did not expand the scope of the application as originally noticed, and did not change the staff's original proposed no significant hazards consideration determination as published in the Federal Register. The Commission's related evaluation of the amendment is contained in a Safety Evaluation dated September 22, 2015. No significant hazards consideration comments received: No. Entergy Gulf States Louisiana, LLC, and Entergy Operations, Inc., Docket No. 50-458, River Bend Station, Unit 1, West Feliciana Parish, Louisiana Date of amendment request: September 2, 2014, as supplemented by letters dated April 23 and August 20, 2015. Brief description of amendment: The amendment revised the Surveillance Requirements (SRs) related to gas accumulation for the emergency core cooling system and reactor core isolation cooling system. The amendment also adds new SRs related to gas accumulation for the residual heat removal and shutdown cooling systems. The NRC staff has concluded that the Technical Specification (TS) changes are consistent with NRC-approved Technical Specification Task Force (TSTF) Traveler TSTF-523, Revision 2, ``Generic Letter 2008-01, Managing Gas [[Page 61490]] Accumulation,'' dated February 21, 2013, as part of the consolidated line item improvement process. The TS Bases associated with these SRs were also changed. Date of issuance: September 21, 2015. Effective date: As of the date of issuance and shall be implemented within 60 days from the date of issuance. Amendment No.: 188. A publicly-available version is in ADAMS under Accession No. ML15195A061; documents related to this amendment are listed in the Safety Evaluation enclosed with the amendment. Facility Operating License No. NPF-47: The amendment revised the Facility Operating License and Technical Specifications. Date of initial notice in Federal Register: January 6, 2015 (80 FR 522). The supplements dated April 23 and August 20, 2015, provided additional information that clarified the application, did not expand the scope of the application as originally noticed, and did not change the staff's original proposed no significant hazards consideration determination as published in the Federal Register on January 6, 2015 (80 FR 522). The Commission's related evaluation of the amendment is contained in a Safety Evaluation dated September 21, 2015. No significant hazards consideration comments received: No. Exelon Generation Company, LLC, Docket Nos. 50-352 and 50-353, Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 and 2, Montgomery County, Pennsylvania Date of amendment request: November 3, 2014, as supplemented by letter dated April 14, 2015. Brief description of amendments: The amendments added new Limiting Conditions for Operation (LCOs) 3.0.5 and 3.0.6 to the Applicability section of the Technical Specifications (TSs). LCO 3.0.5 establishes an allowance for restoring equipment to service under administrative controls when the equipment has been removed from service or declared inoperable to comply with TS Action requirements. LCO 3.0.6 provides actions to be taken when the inoperability of a support system results in the inoperability of the related supported systems. In addition, the amendments added the Safety Function Determination Program to the Administrative Controls section of the TSs. This program is intended to ensure that a loss of safety function is detected and appropriate actions are taken when LCO 3.0.6 is entered. Date of issuance: September 15, 2015. Effective date: As of the date of issuance and shall be implemented within 120 days of issuance. Amendment Nos.: 219 (Unit 1) and 181 (Unit 2). A publicly-available version is in ADAMS under Accession No. ML15218A501; documents related to these amendments are listed in the Safety Evaluation enclosed with the amendments. Renewed Facility Operating License Nos. NPF-39 and NPF-85: Amendments revised the Renewed Facility Operating Licenses and TSs. Date of initial notice in Federal Register: December 23, 2014 (79 FR 77046). The supplemental letter dated April 14, 2015, provided additional information that clarified the application, did not expand the scope of the application as originally noticed, and did not change the staff's original proposed no significant hazards consideration determination as published in the Federal Register. The Commission's related evaluation of the amendments is contained in a Safety Evaluation dated September 15, 2015. No significant hazards consideration comments received: No. National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), Docket No. 50- 184, Center for Neutron Research, National Bureau of Standards Test Reactor (NBSR), Montgomery County, Maryland Date of amendment request: June 23, 2014, as supplemented on August 20, 2014, February 26, 2015, and June 12, 2015. Brief description of amendment: The amendment revised the NIST NBSR's Technical Specifications Section 3.6 and Surveillance Requirement 4.6, pertaining to the NIST reactor emergency power system, which adds specifications and testing requirements for the new valve- regulated lead acid batteries of the new uninterruptable power supplies. Date of issuance: September 10, 2015. Effective date: As of the date of issuance. Amendment No.: 10. A publicly-available version is in ADAMS under Accession No. ML15237A146; documents related to this amendment are listed in the Safety Evaluation enclosed with the amendment. Facility Operating License No. TR-5: Amendment revised the Facility Operating License and Technical Specifications. Date of initial notice in Federal Register: July 7, 2015 (80 FR 38760). The supplemental letters dated February 26, 2015, and June 12, 2015, provided additional information that clarified the application, did not expand the scope of the application as originally noticed, and did not change the staff's original proposed no significant hazards consideration determination as published in the Federal Register. The Commission's related evaluation of the amendment is contained in a Safety Evaluation dated September 10, 2015. No significant hazards consideration comments received: No. STP Nuclear Operating Company, Docket Nos. 50-498 and 50-499, South Texas Project, Units 1 and 2, Matagorda County, Texas Date of amendment request: April 29, 2015. Brief description of amendment: The amendments revised the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) Table 15.6-17 to correct errors introduced in UFSAR Revisions 16 and 17. Date of issuance: September 22, 2015. Effective date: As of the date of issuance and shall be implemented within 90 days of issuance. Amendment Nos.: Unit 1-207; Unit 2-195. A publicly-available version is in ADAMS under Accession No. ML15209A641; documents related to these amendments are listed in the Safety Evaluation enclosed with the amendments. Facility Operating License Nos. NPF-76 and NPF-80: The amendments revised the Facility Operating Licenses. Date of initial notice in Federal Register: July 21, 2015 (80 FR 43130). The Commission's related evaluation of the amendments is contained in a Safety Evaluation dated September 22, 2015. No significant hazards consideration comments received: No. Tennessee Valley Authority, Docket No. 50-390, Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Unit 1, Rhea County, Tennessee Date of amendment request: April 6, 2015, as supplemented by letter dated July 15, 2015. Brief description of amendment: The amendment revised the Technical Specifications by modifying the acceptance criteria for the emergency diesel generator steady-state frequency range in associated surveillance requirements. Date of issuance: September 17, 2015. Effective date: As of the date of issuance and shall be implemented after the issuance of the Facility Operating License for Unit 2. Amendment No.: 102. A publicly-available version is in ADAMS under Accession No. ML15230A155; [[Page 61491]] documents related to this amendment are listed in the Safety Evaluation enclosed with the amendment. Facility Operating License No. NFP-90: Amendment revised the Facility Operating License and Technical Specifications. Date of initial notice in Federal Register: May 26, 2015 (80 FR 30103). The supplemental letter dated July 15, 2015, provided additional information that clarified the application, did not expand the scope of the application as originally noticed, and did not change the staff's original proposed no significant hazards consideration determination as published in the Federal Register. The Commission's related evaluation of the amendments is contained in a Safety Evaluation dated September 17, 2015. No significant hazards consideration determination comments received: No. V. Notice of Issuance of Amendments to Facility Operating Licenses and Combined Licenses and Final Determination of No Significant Hazards Consideration and Opportunity for a Hearing (Exigent Public Announcement or Emergency Circumstances) During the period since publication of the last biweekly notice, the Commission has issued the following amendments. The Commission has determined for each of these amendments that the application for the amendment complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations. The Commission has made appropriate findings as required by the Act and the Commission's rules and regulations in 10 CFR Chapter I, which are set forth in the license amendment. Because of exigent or emergency circumstances associated with the date the amendment was needed, there was not time for the Commission to publish, for public comment before issuance, its usual notice of consideration of issuance of amendment, proposed no significant hazards consideration determination, and opportunity for a hearing. For exigent circumstances, the Commission has either issued a Federal Register notice providing opportunity for public comment or has used local media to provide notice to the public in the area surrounding a licensee's facility of the licensee's application and of the Commission's proposed determination of no significant hazards consideration. The Commission has provided a reasonable opportunity for the public to comment, using its best efforts to make available to the public means of communication for the public to respond quickly, and in the case of telephone comments, the comments have been recorded or transcribed as appropriate and the licensee has been informed of the public comments. In circumstances where failure to act in a timely way would have resulted, for example, in derating or shutdown of a nuclear power plant or in prevention of either resumption of operation or of increase in power output up to the plant's licensed power level, the Commission may not have had an opportunity to provide for public comment on its no significant hazards consideration determination. In such case, the license amendment has been issued without opportunity for comment. If there has been some time for public comment but less than 30 days, the Commission may provide an opportunity for public comment. If comments have been requested, it is so stated. In either event, the State has been consulted by telephone whenever possible. Under its regulations, the Commission may issue and make an amendment immediately effective, notwithstanding the pendency before it of a request for a hearing from any person, in advance of the holding and completion of any required hearing, where it has determined that no significant hazards consideration is involved. The Commission has applied the standards of 10 CFR 50.92 and has made a final determination that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration. The basis for this determination is contained in the documents related to this action. Accordingly, the amendments have been issued and made effective as indicated. Unless otherwise indicated, the Commission has determined that these amendments satisfy the criteria for categorical exclusion in accordance with 10 CFR 51.22. Therefore, pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared for these amendments. If the Commission has prepared an environmental assessment under the special circumstances provision in 10 CFR 51.12(b) and has made a determination based on that assessment, it is so indicated. For further details with respect to the action see (1) the application for amendment, (2) the amendment to Facility Operating License or Combined License, as applicable, and (3) the Commission's related letter, Safety Evaluation and/or Environmental Assessment, as indicated. All of these items can be accessed as described in the ``Obtaining Information and Submitting Comments'' section of this document. A. Opportunity To Request a Hearing and Petition for Leave To Intervene The Commission is also offering an opportunity for a hearing with respect to the issuance of the amendment. Within 60 days after the date of publication of this notice, any person(s) whose interest may be affected by this action may file a request for a hearing and a petition to intervene with respect to issuance of the amendment to the subject facility operating license or combined license. Requests for a hearing and a petition for leave to intervene shall be filed in accordance with the Commission's ``Agency Rules of Practice and Procedure'' in 10 CFR part 2. Interested person(s) should consult a current copy of 10 CFR 2.309, which is available at the NRC's PDR, located at One White Flint North, Room O1-F21, 11555 Rockville Pike (first floor), Rockville, Maryland 20852, and electronically on the Internet at the NRC's Web site, http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/cfr/. If there are problems in accessing the document, contact the PDR's Reference staff at 1-800-397-4209, 301-415-4737, or by email to [email protected]. If a request for a hearing or petition for leave to intervene is filed by the above date, the Commission or a presiding officer designated by the Commission or by the Chief Administrative Judge of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel, will rule on the request and/or petition; and the Secretary or the Chief Administrative Judge of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board will issue a notice of a hearing or an appropriate order. As required by 10 CFR 2.309, a petition for leave to intervene shall set forth with particularity the interest of the petitioner in the proceeding, and how that interest may be affected by the results of the proceeding. The petition should specifically explain the reasons why intervention should be permitted with particular reference to the following general requirements: (1) The name, address, and telephone number of the requestor or petitioner; (2) the nature of the requestor's/petitioner's right under the Act to be made a party to the proceeding; (3) the nature and extent of the requestor's/petitioner's property, financial, or other interest in the proceeding; and (4) the possible effect of any decision or order which may be entered in the proceeding on the [[Page 61492]] requestor's/petitioner's interest. The petition must also identify the specific contentions which the requestor/petitioner seeks to have litigated at the proceeding. Each contention must consist of a specific statement of the issue of law or fact to be raised or controverted. In addition, the requestor/petitioner shall provide a brief explanation of the bases for the contention and a concise statement of the alleged facts or expert opinion which support the contention and on which the petitioner intends to rely in proving the contention at the hearing. The petitioner must also provide references to those specific sources and documents of which the petitioner is aware and on which the petitioner intends to rely to establish those facts or expert opinion. The petition must include sufficient information to show that a genuine dispute exists with the applicant on a material issue of law or fact. Contentions shall be limited to matters within the scope of the amendment under consideration. The contention must be one which, if proven, would entitle the petitioner to relief. A requestor/petitioner who fails to satisfy these requirements with respect to at least one contention will not be permitted to participate as a party. Those permitted to intervene become parties to the proceeding, subject to any limitations in the order granting leave to intervene, and have the opportunity to participate fully in the conduct of the hearing. Since the Commission has made a final determination that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration, if a hearing is requested, it will not stay the effectiveness of the amendment. Any hearing held would take place while the amendment is in effect. Arizona Public Service Company, Docket No. 50-529, Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 2, Maricopa County, Arizona Date of amendment request: September 4, 2015, as supplemented by letter dated September 15, 2015. Description of amendment request: The amendment added a Note to Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement (SR) 3.1.5.3, Control Element Assembly (CEA) freedom of movement surveillance, such that Unit 2, CEA 88 may be excluded from the remaining quarterly performance of the SR in Unit 2, Cycle 19 due to a degraded upper gripper coil. The amendment allows the licensee to delay exercising CEA 88 until after repairs can be made during the upcoming fall 2015 outage. Date of issuance: September 25, 2015. Effective date: This license amendment is effective as of the date of issuance and shall be implemented prior to the SR 3.1.5.3 performance due date for CEA 88 in Unit 2, Cycle 19. Amendment No.: 196. A publicly-available version is in ADAMS under Accession No. ML15266A005; documents related to this amendment are listed in the Safety Evaluation enclosed with the amendment. Renewed Facility Operating License No. NPF-51: Amendment revised the Operating License and Technical Specifications. Public comments requested as to proposed no significant hazards consideration (NSHC): Yes. Public notice of the proposed amendment was published in the Arizona Republic, located in Phoenix, Arizona, from September 21 through September 22, 2015. The notice provided an opportunity to submit comments on the Commission's proposed NSHC determination. No comments were received. The supplemental letter dated September 15, 2015, provided additional information that clarified the application, did not expand the scope of the application as originally noticed, and did not change the staff's original proposed NSHC determination as published in the Arizona Republic. The Commission's related evaluation of the amendment, finding of exigent circumstances, state consultation, and final NSHC determination are contained in a Safety Evaluation dated September 25, 2015. Attorney for licensee: William A. Horin, Esq., Winston & Strawn, 1700 K Street NW., Washington, DC 20006-3817. NRC Branch Chief: Michael T. Markley. Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 1st day of October 2015. For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Anne T. Boland, Director, Division of Operating Reactor Licensing, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation. [FR Doc. 2015-25860 Filed 10-9-15; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 7590-01-P
![61476 Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 197 / Tuesday, October 13, 2015 / Notices
questions about NRC dockets to Carol violated 10 CFR 50.59, ‘‘Changes, tests, subpart,’’ of the Commission’s
Gallagher; telephone: 301–415–3463; and experiments,’’ when the SGs for regulations.
email: Carol.Gallagher@nrc.gov. For SONGS, Units 2 and 3, were replaced in The NRC will file a copy of the DD
technical questions, contact the 2010 and 2011 without a license with the Secretary of the Commission
individual listed in the FOR FURTHER amendment request. for the Commission’s review in
INFORMATION CONTACT section of this The NRC sent a copy of the proposed accordance with 10 CFR 2.206. As
document. DD to the petitioner and the licensee for provided by this regulation, the revised
• NRC’s Agencywide Documents comment on February 27, 2015 DD will constitute the final action of the
Access and Management System (ADAMS Accession Nos. ML15020A121 Commission 25 days after the date of the
(ADAMS): You may obtain publicly- and ML15020A165, respectively). The decision unless the Commission, on its
available documents online in the petitioner and the licensee were asked own motion, institutes a review of the
ADAMS Public Documents collection at to provide comments within 30 days on DD in that time.
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/ any part of the proposed DD that was Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 2nd day
adams.html. To begin the search, select considered to be erroneous or any issues of October 2015.
‘‘ADAMS Public Documents’’ and then in the petition that were not addressed. For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
select ‘‘Begin Web-based ADAMS Comments were received from the William M. Dean,
Search.’’ For problems with ADAMS, petitioner and were addressed in an Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor
please contact the NRC’s Public attachment to the final DD. The licensee Regulation.
Document Room (PDR) reference staff at had no comments on the proposed DD; [FR Doc. 2015–25856 Filed 10–9–15; 8:45 am]
1–800–397–4209, 301–415–4737, or by however, the licensee did provide a
BILLING CODE 7590–01–P
email to pdr.resource@nrc.gov. The response to the petitioner’s comments.
ADAMS accession number for each The NRC staff reviewed the response
document referenced (if that document from the licensee and determined that NUCLEAR REGULATORY
is available in ADAMS) is provided the because the licensee’s comments are COMMISSION
first time that a document is referenced. direct rebuttals to the petitioner’s
• NRC’s PDR: You may examine and comments and raised no concerns with [NRC–2015–0236]
purchase copies of public documents at the proposed DD, that no changes to the
the NRC’s PDR, Room O1–F21, One final DD were required as a result of the Biweekly Notice: Applications and
White Flint North, 11555 Rockville licensee’s comments. Amendments to Facility Operating
Pike, Rockville, Maryland 20852. On July 28, 2015, the NRC issued a Licenses and Combined Licenses
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: DD regarding this matter. Subsequently, Involving No Significant Hazards
Thomas Wengert, Office of Nuclear the NRC identified portions of this DD Considerations
Reactor Regulation, U.S. Nuclear that required clarification regarding the
Regulatory Commission, Washington, scope of the petition and the decision. AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory
DC 20555–0001; telephone: 301–415– Accordingly, Section I of the DD is Commission.
4037, email: Thomas.Wengert@nrc.gov. revised to clarify that the scope of the ACTION: Biweekly notice.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Notice is petition, which was referred by the
Commission to the NRC staff in SUMMARY: Pursuant to Section 189a.(2)
hereby given that the Director, Office of
Memorandum and Order CLI–12–20, of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as
Nuclear Reactor Regulation, has issued
includes the underlying question of amended (the Act), the U.S. Nuclear
a revision to a DD dated July 28, 2015
whether the licensee violated 10 CFR Regulatory Commission (NRC) is
(ADAMS Accession No. ML15183A164),
50.59 when it replaced the SGs at publishing this regular biweekly notice.
on a portion of an intervention and
SONGS, Units 2 and 3, without first The Act requires the Commission to
hearing request petition filed by the
obtaining a license amendment. Section publish notice of any amendments
petitioner on June 18, 2012 (ADAMS
II addresses the NRC staff’s resolution of issued, or proposed to be issued, and
Accession No. ML12171A409), that was
this underlying question; and the grants the Commission the authority to
referred to the NRC’s Office of the
conclusion in Section III is updated to issue and make immediately effective
Executive Director for Operations by the
reflect the resolution of this underlying any amendment to an operating license
Commission in its November 8, 2013,
question. Section II is also revised to or combined license, as applicable,
Memorandum and Order CLI–12–20
clarify additional NRC staff activities upon a determination by the
(ADAMS Accession No. ML12313A118),
associated with the SONGS SG event Commission that such amendment
for consideration as a petition under
that support the conclusion regarding involves no significant hazards
section 2.206 of Title 10 of the Code of
whether the licensee violated 10 CFR consideration, notwithstanding the
Federal Regulations (10 CFR), ‘‘Request
50.59 by replacing the SGs without a pendency before the Commission of a
for action under this part.’’ The petition
license amendment. request for a hearing from any person.
was supplemented on November 16,
As stated in the DD, the Director of This biweekly notice includes all
2012; January 16, 2013; and February 6,
the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation notices of amendments issued, or
2013 (ADAMS Accession Nos.
has determined that the requests for the proposed to be issued from September
ML12325A748, ML13029A643, and
NRC to order the licensee to submit a 15 to September 28, 2015. The last
ML13109A075, respectively).
The petitioner requested that the NRC license amendment application for the biweekly notice was published on
September 29, 2015.
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order SCE to submit a license design and installation of the SONGS,
amendment application for the design Units 2 and 3, replacement SGs and to DATES: Comments must be filed by
and installation of the SONGS, Units 2 suspend SCE’s licenses until they are November 12, 2015. A request for a
and 3, replacement steam generators amended be denied. The reasons for this hearing must be filed by December 14,
(SGs) and to suspend SCE’s licenses decision are explained in the DD (DD– 2015.
until they are amended. 15–07; ADAMS Accession No. ADDRESSES: You may submit comments
As the basis of the request, the ML15267A158) pursuant to 10 CFR by any of the following methods (unless
petitioner asserted that the licensee 2.206, ‘‘Requests for action under this this document describes a different
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![61478 Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 197 / Tuesday, October 13, 2015 / Notices
right under the Act to be made a party will issue an appropriate order or rule consideration, which is presented
to the proceeding; (3) the nature and under 10 CFR part 2. below:
extent of the requestor’s/petitioner’s 1. Does the proposed amendment involve
B. Electronic Submissions (E-Filing)
property, financial, or other interest in a significant increase in the probability or
the proceeding; and (4) the possible Petitions for leave to intervene must consequences of any accident previously
effect of any decision or order which be filed no later than 60 days from the evaluated?
may be entered in the proceeding on the date of publication of this notice. Response: No.
requestor’s/petitioner’s interest. The Requests for hearing, petitions for leave The post-modification configuration of the
petition must also identify the specific to intervene, and motions for leave to offsite 345 [kilovolt (kV)] transmission
contentions which the requestor/ file new or amended contentions that system (four lines separately supported and
petitioner seeks to have litigated at the are filed after the 60-day deadline will SLOD disabled) improves overall grid
proceeding. not be entertained absent a reliability and continues to meet the
Each contention must consist of a determination by the presiding officer requirements for two independent sources of
specific statement of the issue of law or that the filing demonstrates good cause offsite power (GDC–17). Therefore, the post-
by satisfying the three factors in 10 CFR modification configuration does not
fact to be raised or controverted. In
2.309(c)(1)(i)–(iii). significantly increase the probability or
addition, the requestor/petitioner shall consequences of a loss of offsite power event.
provide a brief explanation of the bases For further details with respect to
Likewise, the associated proposed changes to
for the contention and a concise these license amendment applications,
the MPS2 and MPS3 FSARs to document the
statement of the alleged facts or expert see the application for amendment revised 345 kV transmission line tower
opinion which support the contention which is available for public inspection design and disabling of SLOD, do not
and on which the requestor/petitioner in ADAMS and at the NRC’s PDR. For increase the probability or consequences of
intends to rely in proving the contention additional direction on accessing an accident previously evaluated in the
at the hearing. The requestor/petitioner information related to this document, FSARs.
must also provide references to those see the ‘‘Obtaining Information and The grid (offsite power) is by design, the
specific sources and documents of Submitting Comments’’ section of this preferred power source for the affected units.
which the petitioner is aware and on document. The grid provides a reliable source of power
which the requestor/petitioner intends to MPS2 and MPS3 while the units are at
Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc., power, in the event of unit trips, and when
to rely to establish those facts or expert Docket Nos. 50–336 and 50–423, the units are shut down for maintenance.
opinion. The petition must include Millstone Power Station, Unit Nos. 2 New TRM requirements are proposed that
sufficient information to show that a and 3 (MPS2 and MPS3), New London will maintain adequate defense in depth to
genuine dispute exists with the County, Connecticut ensure grid reliability and stability are
applicant on a material issue of law or preserved.
fact. Contentions shall be limited to Date of amendment request: June 30, A loss of offsite power event is an
matters within the scope of the 2015. A publicly-available version is in anticipated operational occurrence. The
amendment under consideration. The ADAMS under Accession No. proposed changes do not significantly
contention must be one which, if ML15183A022. increase the probability of this event.
proven, would entitle the requestor/ Description of amendment request: Additionally, as described in Chapter 14
petitioner to relief. A requestor/ The amendments would revise the (MPS2) and Chapter 15 (MPS3), several
petitioner who fails to satisfy these MPS2 and MPS3 Final Safety Analysis events are assumed to occur coincident with
Reports (FSARs) to: (1) Delete the a loss of offsite power. Sufficient onsite
requirements with respect to at least one power sources are available to mitigate these
contention will not be permitted to information pertaining to the severe line
outage detection (SLOD) special events and ensure the consequences of the
participate as a party. existing analyses for these events remain
Those permitted to intervene become protection system; (2) update the bounding.
parties to the proceeding, subject to any description of the tower structures The proposed new TRM requirements for
limitations in the order granting leave to associated with the four offsite offsite line power sources will not change the
intervene, and have the opportunity to transmission lines feeding Millstone plant design or design requirements. The
participate fully in the conduct of the Power Station; and (3) describe how the design criteria for the offsite power system
hearing. current offsite power source remain unchanged. Therefore, the safety
If a hearing is requested, the configuration and design satisfies the analyses as documented in the MPS2 and
Commission will make a final requirements of General Design Criteria MPS3 FSARs remain unchanged. Temporary
determination on the issue of no (GDC)–17, ‘‘Electric Power Systems,’’ reductions in the number of offsite lines from
significant hazards consideration. The and GDC–5, ‘‘Sharing of Structures, four to three, in accordance with the
proposed TRM action requirements, will not
final determination will serve to decide Systems, and Components.’’ The adversely affect offsite power system
when the hearing is held. If the final amendments also request NRC approval availability in the event of a loss of either
determination is that the amendment of a new Technical Requirements MPS2, MPS3, the largest other unit on the
request involves no significant hazards Manual (TRM) requirement, ‘‘Offsite grid, or the most critical transmission line.
consideration, the Commission may Line Power Sources,’’ for MPS2 and Use of the proposed TRM requirements will
issue the amendment and make it MPS3. With one offsite transmission not cause an accident to occur and will not
immediately effective, notwithstanding line nonfunctional, the TRM change how accident mitigation equipment is
the request for a hearing. Any hearing requirement would allow 72 hours to operated. Allowing one offsite line to be
held would take place after issuance of restore the nonfunctional line with a nonfunctional for up to 14 days does not
increase the probability of any previously
mstockstill on DSK4VPTVN1PROD with NOTICES
the amendment. If the final provision to allow up to 14 days if
determination is that the amendment evaluated accidents.
specific TRM action requirements are
Therefore, the proposed changes to the
request involves a significant hazards met. offsite 345 kV transmission system (four lines
consideration, then any hearing held Basis for proposed no significant separately supported and SLOD disabled)
would take place before the issuance of hazards consideration determination: and proposed new TRM requirements does
any amendment unless the Commission As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the not significantly increase the probability or
finds an imminent danger to the health licensee has provided its analysis of the consequences of an accident previously
or safety of the public, in which case it issue of no significant hazards evaluated.
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![Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 197 / Tuesday, October 13, 2015 / Notices 61479
2. Does the proposed amendment create events are assumed to occur coincident with provisions for as-found and as-left calibration
the possibility of a new or different kind of a loss of offsite power. Sufficient onsite tolerances. The proposed TS changes serve to
accident from any previously evaluated? power sources are available to mitigate these further ensure the Reactor Trip RCP under-
Response: No. events and ensure the consequences of the frequency and under-voltage trip
The proposed amendments do not change existing analyses for these events remain instrumentation will properly function as
the design function or operation of the offsite bounding. credited in the safety analyses. The proposed
power system and do not affect the offsite The proposed amendments do not affect changes do not alter any assumptions
power systems ability to perform its design the assumptions in the safety analyses or the previously made in the radiological
function. The proposed amendments do not ability to safely shutdown the reactors and consequences evaluations nor do they affect
conflict with the design criteria, codes, or mitigate accident conditions. Station mitigation of the radiological consequences
standards committed to in the licensing structures, systems, and components will of an accident previously evaluated. The
basis. The existing codes and standards, as continue to be able to mitigate the design proposed TS changes do not affect the
they apply to the onsite emergency power basis accidents as assumed in the safety probability of accident initiation.
systems, remain unchanged. The design analyses and ensure proper operation of In summary, the proposed changes will not
criteria for the offsite power system remain accident mitigation equipment. In addition, involve any increase in the probability or
unchanged. Therefore, the safety analyses as the proposed amendment will not affect consequences of an accident previously
documented in the MPS2 and MPS3 FSARs equipment design or operation of station evaluated
remain unchanged. structures, systems, and components and 2. Does the proposed amendment create
No credible new failure mechanisms, there are no changes being made to the safety the possibility of a new or different kind of
malfunctions, or accident initiators not limits or safety system settings required by accident from any accident previously
considered in the design and licensing basis technical specifications. evaluated?
are created by the proposed amendment. The Response: No.
Therefore, the proposed amendments will
offsite power system is assumed to be The proposed TS changes involve lowering
not result in a significant reduction in a
available during several FSAR Chapter 14 the existing RCP under-voltage ALLOWABLE
margin of safety.
(MPS2) and Chapter 15 (MPS3) events. The VALUE and adopting TSTF–493 provisions
new TRM requirements would allow 72 The NRC staff has reviewed the for as-found and as-left calibration
hours to restore a nonfunctional line, and up licensee’s analysis and, based on this tolerances. No new accident scenarios,
to 14 days to restore a nonfunctional line if review, it appears that the three failure mechanisms, or single failures are
specific TRM action requirements are met. introduced as a result of any of the proposed
standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are
Use of these TRM requirements does not changes.
impact offsite power availability and does satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff The Reactor Trip System is not an accident
not create the possibility for a new or proposes to determine that the initiator. No changes to the overall manner in
different kind of accident from any amendment request involves no which the plant is operated are being
previously evaluated. Temporary reductions significant hazards consideration. proposed.
in the number of offsite lines from four to Attorney for licensee: Lillian M. Therefore, the proposed changes will not
three, in accordance with the proposed TRM Cuoco, Senior Counsel, Dominion create the possibility of a new or different
requirements, will continue to ensure offsite Resources Services, Inc., 120 Tredegar kind of accident from any accident
power system availability in the event of a previously evaluated.
Street, RS–2, Richmond, VA 23219.
loss of either MPS2, MPS3, the largest other 3. Does the proposed amendment involve
unit on the grid, or the most critical NRC Branch Chief: Benjamin Beasley.
a significant reduction in a margin of safety?
transmission line. Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC, Docket Response: No.
The proposed amendments have no Nos. 50–369 and 50–370, McGuire Margin of safety is related to the
adverse effect on plant operation or accident confidence in the ability of the fission
mitigation equipment. The response of the
Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2,
product barriers to perform their intended
plants and the operators following a design Mecklenburg County, North Carolina functions. These barriers include the fuel
basis accident will not be different. In Date of amendment request: July 9, cladding, the reactor coolant system pressure
addition, the proposed amendments do not 2015. A publicly-available version is in boundary, and the containment barriers. The
create the possibility of a new failure mode ADAMS under Accession No. proposed TS changes serve to ensure proper
associated with any equipment or personnel operation of the Reactor Trip RCP under-
failures.
ML15198A151.
frequency and under-voltage trip
Therefore, the proposed amendments will Description of amendment request: instrumentation and that the instrumentation
not create the possibility of a new or different The amendments would change the will properly function as credited in the
kind of accident from any accident reactor coolant pump (RCP) under- safety analyses. The proposed TS changes
previously evaluated. frequency trip setpoint Allowable Value will not have any effect on the margin of
3. Does the proposed amendment involve (AV) and add footnotes. The proposed safety of fission product barriers. No accident
a significant reduction in the margin of license amendment request affects mitigating equipment will be adversely
safety? Technical Specification (TS) 3.3.1, impacted as a result of the modification.
Response: No. Therefore, existing safety margins will be
The post-modification configuration of the
‘‘Reactor Trip System Instrumentation,’’
preserved. None of the proposed changes will
offsite 345 kV transmission system (four lines for McGuire Nuclear Station, Units 1 involve a significant reduction in a margin of
separately supported and SLOD disabled) and 2. safety.
improves overall grid reliability and Basis for proposed no significant
continues to meet the requirements for two hazards determination: As required by The NRC staff has reviewed the
independent sources of offsite power (GDC– 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has licensee’s analysis and, based on this
17). Likewise, the addition of TRM provided its analysis of the issue of no review, it appears that the three
requirements that limit the unavailability of significant hazards consideration, which standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are
offsite lines provides acceptable assurance
is presented below: satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff
that line outages will not result in a proposes to determine that the
significant reduction to grid stability and 1. Does the proposed amendment involve
mstockstill on DSK4VPTVN1PROD with NOTICES
amendment request involves no
hence also to the margin of safety. a significant increase in the probability or
consequences of an accident previously
significant hazards consideration.
The offsite power systems are assumed to
evaluated?
Attorney for licensee: Lara S. Nichols,
be available during several FSAR Chapter 14
(MPS2) and Chapter 15 (MPS3) events. The Response: No. Associate General Counsel, Duke Energy
loss of the offsite power system is an The proposed TS changes involve lowering Corporation, 526 South Church Street—
anticipated operational occurrence. the existing RCP under-voltage ALLOWABLE EC07H, Charlotte, NC 28202.
Additionally, as described in Chapter 14 VALUE and adopting [Technical NRC Branch Chief: Robert J.
(MPS2) and Chapter 15 (MPS3), several Specification Task Force (TSTF)–493] Pascarelli.
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![61480 Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 197 / Tuesday, October 13, 2015 / Notices
Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC, Docket The changes proposed do not affect the CNS, MNS or ONS. However, the analysis
Nos. 50–413 and 50–414, Catawba precursors for fuel handling-type accidents demonstrates that the resultant doses are
Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2, York analyzed in Chapter 15 of the CNS, MNS, or within the appropriate acceptance criteria.
ONS UFSARs. The probability remains The margin of safety, as described by 10 CFR
County, South Carolina; Docket Nos.
unchanged since the accident analyses 50.67 and Regulatory Guide 1.183, has been
50–369 and 50–370, McGuire Nuclear performed and discussed in the basis for the maintained. Furthermore, the assumptions
Station, Units 1 and 2, Mecklenburg UFSAR changes, involve no change to a and input used in the gap release and dose
County, North Carolina; and Docket system, structure, or component that affects consequences calculations are conservative.
Nos. 50–269, 50–270, and 50–287, initiating events for any UFSAR Chapter 15 These conservative assumptions ensure that
Oconee Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2, and accident evaluated. the radiation doses calculated pursuant to
3, Oconee County, South Carolina Therefore, the proposed amendment does Regulatory Guide 1.183 and cited in this
not involve a significant increase in the license amendment requires are the upper
Date of amendment request: July 15, probability or consequences of an accident bounds to radiological consequences of the
2015. A publicly-available version is previously analyzed. fuel handling-type accidents analyzed. The
available at ADAMS Accession No. 2. Does the proposed amendment create analysis shows that with increased gap
ML15196A093. the possibility of a new or different kind of release fractions accounted for in the dose
accident from any accident previously consequences calculations there is margin
Description of amendment request:
evaluated? between the offsite radiation doses calculated
The proposed amendments would Response: No. and the dose limits of 10 CFR 50.67 and
revise the facilities Updated Final Safety The proposed change involves using gap acceptance criteria of Regulatory Guide
Analysis Reports (UFSARs) to provide release fractions for high-burnup fuel rods 1.183. The proposed change will not degrade
gap release fractions for high-burnup (i.e., greater than 54 GWD/MTU) that exceed the plant protective boundaries, will not
fuel rods that exceed the linear heat the 6.3 kW/ft LHGR limit detailed in Table cause a release of fission products to the
generation rate limit detailed in Table 3 3, Footnote 11 of RG 1.183. Increased gap public and will not degrade the performance
of Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.183, release fractions were determined and of any structures, systems and components
‘‘Alternative Radiological Source Terms accounted for in the dose analysis for CNS, important to safety.
MNS, and ONS. The dose consequences Therefore, the proposed change does not
for Evaluating Design Basis Accidents at
reported in each site’s UFSAR were involve a significant reduction in a margin of
Nuclear Power Reactors,’’ July 2000 reanalyzed for fuel handling-type accidents safety.
(ADAMS Accession No. ML003716792). only. Dose consequences were not reanalyzed
Basis for proposed no significant for other non-fuel-handling accidents since The NRC staff has reviewed the
hazards consideration determination: no fuel rod that is predicted to enter licensee’s analysis and, based on this
As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the departure from nucleate boiling (DNB) will review, it appears that the three
licensee has provided its analysis of the be permitted to operate beyond the limits of standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are
issue of no significant hazards RG 1.183, Table 3, Footnote 11. satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff
The proposed change does not involve the proposes to determine that the
consideration, which is presented
addition or modification of any plant amendment request involves no
below: equipment. The proposed change has the
significant hazards consideration.
1. Does the proposed amendment involve potential to affect future core designs for
a significant increase in the probability or CNS, MNS, and ONS. However, the impact
Attorney for licensee: Lara S. Nichols,
consequences of an accident previously will not be beyond the standard function Associate General Counsel, Duke Energy
evaluated? capabilities of the equipment. The proposed Corporation, 526 South Church Street—
Response: No. change involves using gap release fractions EC07H, Charlotte, NC 28202.
The proposed change involves using gap that would allow high-burnup fuel rods (i.e., NRC Branch Chief: Robert J.
release fractions for high-burnup fuel rods greater than 54 GWD/MTU) to exceed the 6.3 Pascarelli.
(i.e., greater than 54 [gigawatt days per metric kW/ft LHGR limit detailed in Table 3,
ton unit (GWD/MTU)] that exceed the 6.3 Footnote 11 of RG 1.183. Accounting for Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc.,
[kiloWatt per foot (kW/ft)] linear heat these new gap release fractions in the dose Docket No. 50–333, James A. FitzPatrick
generation rate (LHGR) limit detailed in analysis for CNS, MNS, and ONS does not Nuclear Power Plant (JAF), Oswego
Table 3, Footnote 11 of RG 1.183. Increased create the possibility of a new accident. County, New York
gap release fractions were determined and Therefore, the proposed change does no
Date of amendment request: August
accounted for in the dose analysis for create the possibility of a new or different
Catawba Nuclear Station (CNS), Units 1 and kind of accident from any accident 20, 2015. A publicly-available version is
2; McGuire Nuclear Station (MNS), Units 1 previously evaluated. in ADAMS under Accession No.
and 2; and Oconee Nuclear Station (ONS), 3. Does the proposed amendment involve ML15232A761.
Units 1, 2, and 3. The dose consequence a significant reduction in the margin of Description of amendment request:
reported in each site’s Updated Final Safety safety? The amendment would revise Technical
Analysis Report (UFSAR) were reanalyzed Response: No. Specification (TS) 5.5.6, ‘‘Primary
for fuel handling-type accidents only. Dose The proposed change involves using gap Containment Leak Rate Testing
consequences were not reanalyzed for other release fractions for high-burnup fuel rods Program,’’ to allow permanent extension
non-fuel-handling accidents since no fuel rod (i.e., greater than 54 GWD/MTU) that exceed of the Type A Primary Containment
that is predicted to enter departure from the 6.3 kW/ft LHGR limit detailed in Table
nuclear boiling (DNB) will be permitted to 3, Footnote 11 of RG 1.183. Increased gap
Integrated Leak Rate Test (ILRT) interval
operate beyond the limits of RG 1.183, Table release fractions were determined and to 15 years and to allow extension of
3, Footnote 11. The current NRC accounted for in the dose analysis for CNS, Type C Local Leak Rate Test (LLRT)
requirements, as described in 10 CFR 50.67, MNS, and ONS. The dose consequences testing interval up to 75 months.
specifies dose acceptance criteria in terms of reported in each site’s UFSAR were Basis for proposed no significant
Total Effective Dose Equivalent (TEDE). The reanalyzed for fuel handling-type accidents hazards consideration determination:
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revised dose consequence analysis for fuel only. Dose consequences were not reanalyzed As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the
handling-type events at CNS, MNS, and ONS for other non-fuel-handling accidents since licensee has provided its analysis of the
meet the applicable TEDE dose acceptance no fuel rod that is predicted to enter issue of no significant hazards
criteria (specified also in RG 1.183). A slight departure from nucleate boiling (DNB) will
consideration, which is presented
increase in dose consequences is exhibited. be permitted to operate beyond the limits of
However, the increase is not significant and RG 1.183, Table 3, Footnote 11. below:
the new TEDE results are below regulatory The proposed change has the potential for 1. Does the proposed amendment involve
acceptance criteria. an increased postulated accident dose at a significant increase in the probability or
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![Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 197 / Tuesday, October 13, 2015 / Notices 61481
consequences of an accident previously containment combined with the containment The proposed change involves only the
evaluated? inspections performed in accordance with extension of the interval between Type A
Response: No. [American Society of Mechanical Engineers containment leak rate tests and Type C tests
The proposed amendment to the TS (ASME) Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code] for JAF. The proposed surveillance interval
involves the extension of the JAF Type A Section XI, the Maintenance Rule, and TS extension is bounded by the 15-year ILRT
containment test interval to 15 years and the requirements serve to provide a high degree Interval and the 75-month Type C test
extension of the Type C test interval to 75 of assurance that the containment would not interval currently authorized within [Nuclear
months. The current Type A test interval of degrade in a manner that is detectable only Energy Institute (NEI) 94–01, Revision 3–A
120 months (10 years) would be extended on by a Type A test. Based on the above, the [‘‘Industry Guideline for Implementing
a permanent basis to no longer than 15 years proposed extensions do not significantly Performance-Based Option of 10 CFR Part 50,
from the last Type A test. The current Type increase the consequences of an accident Appendix J,’’ July 2012 (ADAMS Accession
C test interval of 60 months for selected previously evaluated. No. ML12221A202)]. Industry experience
components would be extended on a The proposed amendment also deletes supports the conclusion that Type B and C
performance basis to no longer than 75 exceptions previously granted to allow one- testing detects a large percentage of
months. Extensions of up to nine months time extensions of the ILRT test frequency for containment leakage paths and that the
(total maximum interval of 84 months for JAF. These exceptions were for activities that percentage of containment leakage paths that
Type C tests) are permissible only for non- would have already taken place by the time are detected only by Type A testing is small.
routine emergent conditions. The proposed this amendment is approved; therefore, their The containment inspections performed in
extension does not involve either a physical deletion is solely an administrative action accordance with ASME Section Xl, TS and
change to the plant or a change in the manner that has no effect on any component and no the Maintenance Rule serve to provide a high
in which the plant is operated or controlled. impact on how the unit is operated. degree of assurance that the containment
The containment is designed to provide an Therefore, the proposed change does not would not degrade in a manner that is
essentially leak tight barrier against the result in a significant increase in the detectable only by Type A testing. The
uncontrolled release of radioactivity to the probability or consequences of an accident combination of these factors ensures that the
environment for postulated accidents. As previously evaluated. margin of safety in the plant safety analysis
such, the containment and the testing 2. Does the proposed change create the is maintained. The design, operation, testing
requirements invoked to periodically possibility of a new or different kind of methods and acceptance criteria for Type A,
demonstrate the integrity of the containment accident from any accident previously
B, and C containment leakage tests specified
exist to ensure the plant’s ability to mitigate evaluated?
in applicable codes and standards would
the consequences of an accident, and do not Response: No.
continue to be met, with the acceptance of
involve the prevention or identification of The proposed amendment to the TS
this proposed change, since these are not
involves the extension of the JAF Type A
any precursors of an accident. The change in affected by changes to the Type A and Type
containment test interval to 15 years and the
dose risk for changing the Type A test C test intervals.
extension of the Type C test interval to 75
frequency from three-per-ten years to once- The proposed amendment also deletes
months. The containment and the testing
per-fifteen-years, measured as an increase to exceptions previously granted to allow one
requirements to periodically demonstrate the
the total integrated plant risk for those integrity of the containment exist to ensure time extensions of the ILRT test frequency for
accident sequences influenced by Type A the plant’s ability to mitigate the JAF. These exceptions were for activities that
testing, is 0.0087 person-[roentgen equivalent consequences of an accident do not involve would have already taken place by the time
man (rem)]/year. [Electric Power Research any accident precursors or initiators. The this amendment is approved; therefore, their
Institute (EPRI)] Report No. 1009325, proposed change does not involve a physical deletion is solely an administrative action
Revision 2-A states that a very small change to the plant (i.e., no new or different and does not change how the unit is operated
population dose is defined as an increase of type of equipment will be installed) or a and maintained. Thus, there is no reduction
≤ 1.0 person-rem per year, or ≤ 1% of the change to the manner in which the plant is in any margin of safety.
total population dose, whichever is less operated or controlled. Therefore, the proposed change does not
restrictive for the risk impact assessment of The proposed amendment also deletes involve a significant reduction in a margin of
the extended ILRT intervals. The results of exceptions previously granted to allow one- safety.
the risk assessment for this amendment meet time extensions of the ILRT test frequency for
these criteria. Moreover, the risk impact for The NRC staff has reviewed the
JAF. These exceptions were for activities that licensee’s analysis and, based on this
the ILRT extension when compared to other would have already taken place by the time
severe accident risks is negligible. Therefore, this amendment is approved; therefore, their
review, it appears that the three
this proposed extension does not involve a deletion is solely an administrative action standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are
significant increase in the probability of an that does not result in any change in how the satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff
accident previously evaluated. unit is operated. proposes to determine that the
As documented in NUREG–1493 Therefore, the proposed change does not amendment request involves no
[‘‘Performance Based Containment Leak-Test create the possibility of a new or different significant hazards consideration.
Program’’], Type B and C tests have kind of accident from any previously Attorney for licensee: Ms. Jeanne Cho,
identified a very large percentage of evaluated. Assistant General Counsel, Entergy
containment leakage paths, and the 3. Does the proposed change involve a
percentage of containment leakage paths that Nuclear Operations, Inc., 440 Hamilton
significant reduction in a margin of safety?
are detected only by Type A testing is very Response: No.
Avenue, White Plains, NY 10601.
small. The JAF Type A test history supports The proposed amendment to TS 5.5.6 NRC Branch Chief: Benjamin G.
this conclusion. involves the extension of the JAF Type A Beasley.
The integrity of the containment is subject containment test interval to 15 years and the
to two types of failure mechanisms that can
Entergy Operations, Inc.; System Energy
extension of the Type C test interval to 75
be categorized as: (1) Activity based, and; (2) months for selected components. This
Resources, Inc.; South Mississippi
time based. Activity based failure amendment does not alter the manner in Electric Power Association; and Entergy
mechanisms are defined as degradation due which safety limits, limiting safety system set Mississippi, Inc., Docket No. 50–416,
to system and/or component modifications or points, or limiting conditions for operation Grand Gulf Nuclear Station, Unit 1
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maintenance. Local leak rate test are determined. The specific requirements (GGNS), Claiborne County, Mississippi
requirements and administrative controls and conditions of the TS Containment Leak
such as configuration management and Rate Testing Program exist to ensure that the
Date of amendment request: June 29,
procedural requirements for system degree of containment structural integrity 2015. A publicly-available version is in
restoration ensure that containment integrity and leak-tightness that is considered in the ADAMS under Accession No.
is not degraded by plant modifications or plant safety analysis is maintained. The ML15180A376.
maintenance activities. The design and overall containment leak rate limit specified Description of amendment request:
construction requirements of the by TS is maintained. The amendment proposes a change to
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![61482 Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 197 / Tuesday, October 13, 2015 / Notices
the GGNS Cyber Security Plan (CSP) change, the proposed change does not previously evaluated are not significantly
Milestone 8 full implementation date as involve a significant reduction in a margin of increased.
set forth in the CSP Implementation safety. Therefore, the proposed changes do not
Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant increase in the
Schedule. involve a significant reduction in a margin of probability or consequences of an accident
Basis for proposed no significant safety. previously evaluated.
hazards consideration determination: 2. Do the proposed changes create the
As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the The NRC staff has reviewed the
possibility of a new or different kind of
licensee has provided its analysis of the licensee’s analysis and, based on this accident from any accident previously
issue of no significant hazards review, it appears that the three evaluated?
consideration, which is presented standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are Response: No.
below: satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff No new or different accidents result from
proposes to determine that the utilizing the proposed changes. The changes
1. Does the proposed change involve a do not involve a physical alteration of the
significant increase in the probability or
amendment request involves no
significant hazards consideration. plant (i.e., no new or different type of
consequences of an accident previously equipment will be installed) or a change in
evaluated? Attorney for licensee: Joseph A.
the methods governing normal plant
Response: No. Aluise, Associate General Counsel— operation. In addition, the changes do not
The proposed change to the CSP Legal, Nuclear and Environmental, impose any new or different requirements.
Implementation Schedule is administrative Entergy Services, Inc., 639 Loyola The changes do not alter assumptions made
in nature. This change does not alter accident Avenue, New Orleans, LA 70113. in the safety analysis. The proposed changes
analysis assumptions, add any initiators, or NRC Branch Chief: Meena K. Khanna. are consistent with the safety analysis
affect the function of plant systems or the assumptions and current plant operating
manner in which systems are operated, Exelon Generation Company, LLC, practice.
maintained, modified, tested, or inspected. Docket No. 50–244, R.E. Ginna Nuclear Therefore, the proposed changes do not
The proposed change does not require any Power Plant (Ginna), Wayne County, create the possibility of a new or different
plant modifications which affect the New York kind of accident from any accident
performance capability of the structures,
Date of amendment request: June 4, previously evaluated.
systems and components relied upon to
2015. A publicly-available version is in 3. Does the proposed change involve a
mitigate the consequences of postulated
significant reduction in a margin of safety?
accidents and has no impact on the ADAMS under Accession No. Response: No.
probability or consequences of an accident ML15166A075. The design, operation, testing methods,
previously evaluated. Description of amendment request:
Therefore, the proposed change does not and acceptance criteria for systems,
The amendment would modify Ginna’s structures, and components, specified in
involve a significant increase in the
technical specifications (TS) by applicable codes and standards (or
probability or consequences of an accident
previously evaluated. relocating specific surveillance alternatives approved for use by the NRC)
2. Does the proposed change create the frequencies to a licensee-controlled will continue to be met as described in the
possibility of a new or different kind of program with the implementation of plant licensing basis (including the final
accident from any accident previously Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 04–10, safety analysis report and bases to TS), since
evaluated? these are not affected by changes to the
[Rev. 1, ‘‘Risk-Informed Technical
Response: No. surveillance frequencies. Similarly, there is
Specifications Initiative 5b, Risk- no impact to safety analysis acceptance
The proposed change to the CSP Informed Method for Control of
Implementation Schedule is administrative criteria as described in the plant licensing
Surveillance Frequencies,’’ April 2007 basis. To evaluate a change in the relocated
in nature. This proposed change does not
alter accident analysis assumptions, add any (ADAMS Accession No. surveillance frequency, Exelon will perform
initiators or affect the function of plant ML071360456)]. a probabilistic risk evaluation using the
systems or the manner in which systems are Basis for proposed no significant guidance contained in NRC approved NEI 04-
operated, maintained, modified, tested, or hazards consideration determination: 10, Rev. 1, in accordance with the TS SFCP.
inspected. The proposed change does not As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the NEI 04–10, Rev. 1, methodology provides
require any plant modifications which affect licensee has provided its analysis of the reasonable acceptance guidelines and
the performance capability of the structures, methods for evaluating the risk increase of
issue of no significant hazards
systems, and components relied upon to proposed changes to surveillance frequencies
consideration, which is presented consistent with Regulatory Guide 1.177 [‘‘An
mitigate the consequences of postulated
accidents and does not create the possibility
below: Approach for Plant-Specific, Risk-Informed
of a new or different kind of accident from 1. Do the proposed changes involve a Decisionmaking: Technical Specifications’’].
any accident previously evaluated. significant increase in the probability or Therefore, the proposed changes do not
Therefore, the proposed change does not consequences of any accident previously involve a significant reduction in a margin of
create the possibility of a new or different evaluated? safety.
kind of accident from any accident Response: No. The NRC staff has reviewed the
previously evaluated. The proposed changes relocate the
specified frequencies for periodic
licensee’s analysis and, based on this
3. Does the proposed change involve a
significant reduction in a margin of safety? surveillance requirements to licensee control review, it appears that the three
Response: No. under a new Surveillance Frequency Control standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are
Plant safety margins are established Program [SFCP]. Surveillance frequencies are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff
through limiting conditions for operation, not an initiator to any accident previously proposes to determine that the
limiting safety system settings, and safety evaluated. As a result, the probability of any amendment request involves no
limits specified in the technical accident previously evaluated is not significant hazards consideration.
specifications. The proposed change to the significantly increased. The systems and
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Attorney for licensee: J. Bradley
CSP Implementation Schedule is components required by the technical Fewell, Senior Vice President,
administrative in nature. In addition, the specifications for which the surveillance
frequencies are relocated are still required to
Regulatory Affairs, Nuclear, and General
milestone date delay for full implementation
of the CSP has no substantive impact because be operable, meet the acceptance criteria for Counsel, Exelon Generation Company,
other measures have been taken which the surveillance requirements, and be LLC, 4300 Winfield Road, Warrenville,
provide adequate protection during this capable of performing any mitigation IL 60555.
period of time. Because there is no change to function assumed in the accident analysis. NRC Branch Chief: Benjamin G.
established safety margins as a result of this As a result, the consequences of any accident Beasley.
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Florida Power & Light Company, et al., the minimum load capacities and load limit proposes to determine that the
Docket Nos. 50–335 and 50–389, St. controls required for the manipulator crane amendment request involves no
Lucie Plant, Unit Nos. 1 and 2 (SL–1 limits and relocate the requirements to the significant hazards consideration.
UFSAR, which will have no impact on any Attorney for licensee: William S.
and 2), St. Lucie County, Florida
safety related structures, systems or
Date of amendment request: March components. Once relocated to the UFSAR,
Blair, Managing Attorney—Nuclear,
10, 2015. A publicly-available version is changes to establishing and maintaining Florida Power & Light Company, 700
in ADAMS under Accession No. communications between the control room Universe Blvd., MS LAW/JB, Juno
ML15084A141. and the refueling station and the minimum Beach, FL 33408–0420.
Description of amendment request: load capacities and load limit controls NRC Branch Chief: Shana R. Helton.
required for the manipulator crane limits will
The amendments would remove be controlled in accordance with 10 CFR Northern States Power Company—
Technical Specification (TS) Limiting 50.59. Minnesota Docket No. 50–263,
Condition for Operation (LCO) 3/4.9.5, The proposed changes do not introduce Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant,
‘‘Communications,’’ from the SL–1 and new modes of plant operation and do not Wright County, Minnesota
2 TSs; remove LCO 3/4.9.6, involve physical modifications to the plant Date of amendment request:
‘‘Manipulator Crane Operability,’’ from (no new or different type of equipment will
be installed). There are no changes in the
September 2, 2015. A publicly-available
the SL–1 TSs; and remove LCO 3/4.9.6, version is in ADAMS under Accession
‘‘Manipulator Crane,’’ from the SL–2 method by which any safety related plant
structure, system, or component (SSC) No. ML15246A530.
TSs. Each of these TS requirements will Description of amendment request:
performs its specified safety function. As
be relocated to the Updated Final Safety such, the plant conditions for which the The proposed amendment would revise
Analysis Report (UFSAR) for SL–1 and design basis accident analyses were Technical Specification (TS) 3.5.1,
2. performed remain valid. ‘‘ECCS [Emergency Core Cooling
Basis for proposed no significant No new accident scenarios, transient System]—Operating,’’ to correct the
hazards consideration determination: precursors, failure mechanisms, or limiting current non-conservative value
As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the single failures will be introduced as a result specified for minimum Alternate
licensee has provided its analysis of the of the proposed changes. There will be no
adverse effect or challenges imposed on any
Nitrogen System pressure. The proposed
issue of no significant hazards change would revise the TS surveillance
consideration, which is presented SSC as a result of the proposed changes.
Therefore, the proposed changes do not requirement (SR) 3.5.1.3.b pressure limit
below: for determining operability of the
create the possibility of a new or different
1. Does the proposed change involve a kind of accident from any previously Alternate Nitrogen System from greater
significant increase in the probability or evaluated. than or equal to (≥) 410 pounds per
consequences of an accident previously 3. Does the proposed change involve a square inch gauge (psig) to a corrected
evaluated? significant reduction in a margin of safety? value of ≥1060 psig.
Response: No. Response: No. Basis for proposed no significant
The proposed changes act to remove the Margin of safety is related to confidence in
current necessity of establishing and
hazards consideration determination:
the ability of the fission product barriers to
maintaining communications between the perform their accident mitigation functions. As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the
control room and the refueling station and The proposed changes act to remove the licensee has provided its analysis of the
the minimum load capacities and load limit current necessity of establishing and issue of no significant hazards
controls required for the manipulator crane maintaining communications between the consideration, which is provided below:
limits and relocate the requirements to the control room and the refueling station and 1. Does the proposed change involve a
UFSAR, which will have no impact on any the minimum load capacities and load limit significant increase in the probability or
safety related structures, systems or controls required for the manipulator crane consequences of an accident previously
components. Once relocated to the UFSAR, limits and relocate the requirements to the evaluated?
changes to establishing and maintaining UFSAR, which will have no impact on any Response: No.
communications between the control room safety related structures, systems or The proposed change revises the TS SR for
and the refueling station and the minimum components. Once relocated to the UFSAR, the purpose of restoring a value to be
load capacities and load limit controls changes to establishing and maintaining consistent with the licensing basis. The
required for the manipulator crane limits will communications between the control room proposed TS change does not introduce new
be controlled in accordance with 10 CFR and the refueling station and the minimum equipment or new equipment operating
50.59. load capacities and load limit controls modes, nor does the proposed change alter
The probability of occurrence of a required for the manipulator crane limits will existing system relationships. The proposed
previously evaluated accident is not be controlled in accordance with 10 CFR change does not affect plant operation[.]
increased because these changes do not 50.59. The proposed changes do not Further, the proposed change does not
introduce any new potential accident physically alter any SSC. There will be no increase the likelihood of the malfunction of
initiating conditions. The consequences of effect on those SSCs necessary to assure the any SSC [structure, system or component] or
accidents previously evaluated in the UFSAR accomplishment of protection functions. impact any analyzed accident. Consequently,
are not affected because the ability of the There will be no impact on the overpower the probability of an accident previously
components to perform their required limit, departure from nucleate boiling ratio evaluated is not affected and there is no
functions is not affected. (DNBR) limits, loss of cooling accident peak significant increase in the consequences of
Therefore, the proposed change does not cladding temperature (LOCA PCT), or any any accident previously evaluated.
involve a significant increase in the other margin of safety. The applicable Therefore, the proposed change does not
probability or consequences of an accident radiological dose consequence acceptance involve a significant increase in the
previously evaluated. criteria will continue to be met. probability or consequences of an accident
2. Does the proposed change create the
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Therefore, the proposed changes do not previously evaluated.
possibility of a new or different kind of involve a significant reduction in a margin of 2. Does the proposed change create the
accident from any accident previously safety. possibility of a new or different kind of
evaluated? accident from any accident previously
Response: No. The NRC staff has reviewed the evaluated?
The proposed changes act to remove the licensee’s analysis and, based on this Response: No.
current necessity of establishing and review, it appears that the three The proposed change revises the TS SR for
maintaining communications between the standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are the purpose of restoring a value to be
control room and the refueling station and satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff consistent with the licensing basis. The
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![Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 197 / Tuesday, October 13, 2015 / Notices 61485
based on Revision 2 of NRC-approved 3. Does the proposed amendment involve (SFPSAFS)’’; and 10c.3.a, ‘‘Safety
Technical Specification Task Force a significant reduction in a margin of safety? Injection Pump Room Air Filtration
(TSTF) Traveler TSTF–523, ‘‘Generic Response: No. System (SIPRAFS),’’ and TS 3.6(3)c,
The proposed change [revises or] adds SRs
Letter 2008–01, Managing Gas ‘‘Containment Recirculating Air Cooling
that require verification that the ECCS, the
Accumulation,’’ dated February 21, RHR System, and the CS System are not and Filtering System,’’ also known as
2013 (ADAMS Accession No. rendered inoperable due to accumulated gas the Containment Air Cooling and
ML13053A075). The NRC staff issued a and to provide allowances which permit Filtering System (CACFS).
Notice of Availability for TSTF–523, performance of the revised verification. The Basis for proposed no significant
Revision 2, for plant-specific adoption proposed change adds new requirements to hazards consideration determination:
using the consolidated line item manage gas accumulation in order to ensure As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the
improvement process, in the Federal the subject systems are capable of performing licensee has provided its analysis of the
their assumed safety functions. The proposed issue of no significant hazards
Register on January 15, 2014 (79 FR
SRs will ensure that the assumptions of the
2700). consideration, which is presented
safety analysis are protected. The proposed
Basis for proposed no significant change does not adversely affect any current below:
hazards consideration determination: plant safety margins or the reliability of the 1. Does the proposed change involve a
As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the equipment assumed in the safety analysis. significant increase in the probability or
licensee has provided its analysis of the Therefore, there are no changes being made consequences of an accident previously
issue of no significant hazards to any safety analysis assumptions, safety evaluated?
limits[,] or limiting safety system settings that Response: No.
consideration, which is provided below: The proposed change replaces an existing
would adversely affect plant safety as a result
1. Does the proposed amendment involve of the proposed change. SR to operate the CRAFS for ten (10)
a significant increase in the probability or Therefore, the proposed licensing basis continuous hours every month with heaters
consequences of an accident previously change does not involve a significant operating with a requirement to operate the
evaluated? reduction in a margin of safety. system for 15 continuous minutes every
Response: No. month with heaters operating. The proposed
The proposed change revises or adds The NRC staff has reviewed the change also replaces existing SRs to operate
Surveillance Requirements (SRs) that require licensee’s analysis and, based on this the SFPSAFS, the SIPRAFS, and the CACFS
verification that the Emergency Core Cooling review, it appears that the three for ten (10) hours every month with a
System (ECCS), the Residual Heat Removal standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are requirement to operate these systems for 15
(RHR) System, and the Containment Spray satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff continuous minutes every month.
(CS) System are not rendered inoperable due proposes to determine that the These systems are not accident initiators
to accumulated gas and to provide and therefore, these changes do not involve
amendment request involves no a significant increase in the probability of an
allowances which permit performance of the significant hazards consideration.
revised verification. Gas accumulation in the accident. The proposed system and filter
Attorney for licensee: Peter M. Glass, testing changes are consistent with current
subject systems is not an initiator of any
Assistant General Counsel, Xcel Energy regulatory guidance for these systems. The
accident previously evaluated. As a result,
the probability of any accident previously Services, Inc., 414 Nicollet Mall, proposed changes continue to ensure that
evaluated is not significantly increased. The Minneapolis, MN 55401. these systems perform their design function,
proposed SRs ensure that the subject systems NRC Branch Chief: David L. Pelton. which may include mitigating accidents.
continue to be capable to perform their Thus, the change does not involve a
Omaha Public Power District, Docket significant increase in the consequences of an
assumed safety function and are not rendered
inoperable due to gas accumulation. Thus,
No. 50–285, Fort Calhoun Station, Unit accident.
No. 1, Washington County, Nebraska Therefore, it is concluded that this change
the consequences of any accident previously
does not involve a significant increase in the
evaluated are not significantly increased. Date of amendment request: July 24, probability or consequences of an accident
Therefore, the proposed licensing basis 2015. A publicly-available version is in previously evaluated.
change does not involve a significant ADAMS under Accession No. 2. Does the proposed change create the
increase in the probability or consequences ML15205A276. possibility of a new or different kind of
of an accident previously evaluated. Description of amendment request: accident from any accident previously
2. Does the proposed amendment create evaluated?
the possibility of a new or different kind of
The amendment would revise the
Technical Specification (TS) Response: No.
accident from any accident previously The proposed change replaces an existing
evaluated? Surveillance Requirements (SRs), which SR to operate the CRAFS for ten (10)
Response: No. currently require operating ventilation continuous hours every month with heaters
The proposed change [revises or] adds SRs systems with charcoal filters for a 10- operating with a requirement to operate the
that require verification that the ECCS, the hour period at a monthly frequency. The system for 15 continuous minutes every
RHR System, and the CS System are not SRs would be revised to require month with heaters operating. The proposed
rendered inoperable due to accumulated gas operation of the systems for 15 change also replaces existing SRs to operate
and to provide allowances which permit continuous minutes at a monthly the SFPSAFS, the SIPRAFS, and the CACFS
performance of the revised verification. The for ten (10) hours every month with a
proposed change does not involve a physical
frequency. The proposed amendment is
requirement to operate these systems for 15
alteration of the plant (i.e., no new or consistent with NRC-approved continuous minutes every month.
different type of equipment will be installed) Technical Specifications Task Force The change proposed for these ventilation
or a change in the methods governing normal (TSTF) Traveler TSTF-522, Revision 0, systems does not change any system
plant operation. In addition, the proposed ‘‘Revise Ventilation System Surveillance operations or maintenance activities. Testing
change does not impose any new or different Requirements to Operate for 10 hours requirements will be revised and will
requirements that could initiate an accident.
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per Month,’’ as published in the Federal continue to demonstrate that the Limiting
The proposed change does not alter Register on September 20, 2012 (77 FR Conditions for Operation are met and/or the
assumptions made in the safety analysis and 58428), with variations due to plant- system components are capable of
is consistent with the safety analysis performing their intended safety functions.
assumptions.
specific nomenclature. The changes The change does not create new failure
Therefore, the proposed licensing basis would revise TS 3.2, Table 3-5; SR Items modes or mechanisms and no new accident
change does not create the possibility of a 10a.3.a, ‘‘Control Room Air Filtration precursors are generated.
new or different kind of accident from any System (CRAFS)’’; 10b.3.a, ‘‘Spent Fuel Therefore, it is concluded that this change
accident previously evaluated. Pool Storage Area Filtration System does not create the possibility of a new or
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![61486 Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 197 / Tuesday, October 13, 2015 / Notices
different kind of accident from any accident Basis for proposed no significant satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff
previously evaluated. hazards consideration determination: proposes to determine that the
3. Does the proposed change involve a As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the amendment request involves no
significant reduction in a margin of safety?
licensee has provided its analysis of the significant hazards consideration.
Response: No.
The proposed change replaces an existing issue of no significant hazards Attorney for licensee: David A. Repka,
SR to operate the CRAFS for ten (10) consideration, which is presented Esq., Winston & Strawn, 1700 K Street
continuous hours every month with heaters below: NW., Washington, DC 20006-3817.
operating with a requirement to operate the 1. Does the proposed amendment involve
NRC Branch Chief: Michael T.
system for 15 continuous minutes every a significant increase in the probability or Markley.
month with heaters operating. The proposed consequences of an accident previously
change also replaces existing SRs to operate Pacific Gas and Electric Company
evaluated?
the SFPSAFS, the SIPRAFS, and the CACFS (PG&E), Docket Nos. 50-275 and 50-323,
Response: No.
for ten (10) hours every month with a The proposed changes are administrative Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant
requirement to operate these systems for 15 in nature, involving changes to personnel (DCPP), Unit Nos. 1 and 2, San Luis
continuous minutes every month. and committee titles, deletion and or re- Obispo County, California
The design basis for the CRAFS heaters is location of requirements redundant to
to heat the incoming air, which reduces the Date of amendment request: June 17,
regulations, and deletion of conditions
relative humidity. The heater testing change 2015, as supplemented by letter dated
controlling the first performance of testing
proposed for the CRAFS will continue to that has since been completed. The proposed August 31, 2015. Publicly-available
demonstrate that the heaters are capable of changes do not involve a significant increase versions are in ADAMS under
heating the air and will perform their design in the probability or consequences of an Accession Nos. ML15176A539 and
function. The SFPSAFS, and the SIPRAFS accident previously evaluated because: (1) ML15243A363, respectively.
are tested for adsorption at a relative the proposed amendment does not represent Description of amendment request:
humidity of [95 percent (%)] in accordance a change to the system design, (2) the The amendments would revise the
with RG [Regulatory Guide] 1.52, Revision 3, proposed amendment does not alter, degrade, licensing bases to adopt the alternative
and do not require heaters for these systems or prevent action described or assumed in
to perform their specified safety function.
source term (AST) as allowed by 10 CFR
any accident in the USAR from being
The CACFS does not need to be tested performed, (3) the proposed amendment does
50.67, ‘‘Accident source term.’’ The AST
similarly because the CACFS charcoal filters not alter any assumptions previously made in methodology, as established in NRC
are not credited for the removal of evaluating radiological consequences, and Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.183,
radioiodines. The proposed change is [(4)] the proposed amendment does not affect ‘‘Alternative Radiological Source Terms
consistent with regulatory guidance. the integrity of any fission product barrier. for Evaluating Design Basis Accidents at
Therefore, it is concluded that this change No other safety related equipment is affected Nuclear Power Reactors,’’ July 2000
does not involve a significant reduction in a by the proposed change. (ADAMS Accession No. ML003716792),
margin of safety. Therefore, the proposed changes do not is used to calculate the offsite and
The NRC staff has reviewed the involve a significant increase in the control room radiological consequences
probability or consequences of an accident
licensee’s analysis and, based on this of postulated accidents for DCPP, Unit
previously evaluated.
review, it appears that the three 2. Does the proposed amendment create Nos. 1 and 2.
standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are the possibility of a new or different kind of Basis for proposed no significant
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff accident from any accident previously hazards consideration determination:
proposes to determine that the evaluated? As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the
amendment request involves no Response: No. licensee has provided its analysis of the
significant hazards consideration. The proposed changes do not alter the issue of no significant hazards
Attorney for licensee: David A. Repka, physical design, safety limits, or safety consideration, which is presented
Esq., Winston & Strawn, 1700 K Street, analysis assumptions associated with the below:
NW., Washington, DC 20006-3817. operation of the plant. Hence, the proposed
changes do not introduce any new accident 1. Does the proposed change involve a
NRC Branch Chief: Michael T. significant increase in the probability or
initiators, nor do these changes reduce or
Markley. adversely affect the capabilities of any plant consequences of an accident previously
Omaha Public Power District, Docket structure or system in the performance of evaluated?
their safety function. Response: No.
No. 50–285, Fort Calhoun Station, Unit This license amendment does not
No. 1, Washington County, Nebraska Therefore, the proposed changes do not
create the possibility of a new or different physically impact any system, structure, or
Date of amendment request: August kind of accident from any previously component (SSC) that is a potential initiator
20, 2015. A publicly-available version is evaluated. of an accident. Therefore, implementation of
in ADAMS under Accession No. 3. Does the proposed amendment involve AST, the AST assumptions and inputs, the
ML15233A494. a significant reduction in a margin of safety? proposed [Technical Specification (TS)]
Description of amendment request: Response: No. changes, and new c/Q values have no impact
The proposed changes do not alter the on the probability for initiation of any design
The amendment would make basis accident. Once the occurrence of an
manner in which safety limits or limiting
administrative changes to update accident has been postulated, the new
safety system settings are determined. The
personnel and committee titles in the safety analysis acceptance criteria are not accident source term and [atmospheric
Technical Specifications (TSs), delete affected by these proposed changes. Further, dispersion factors (c/Q)] values are inputs to
outdated or completed additional the proposed changes do not change the analyses that evaluate the radiological
actions contained in Appendix B of the design function of any equipment assumed to consequences of the postulated events.
Reactor coolant specific activity, testing
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license, and relocate the definition of operate in the event of an accident.
Process Control Program from the TSs to Therefore, the proposed changes do not criteria of charcoal filters, and the accident
the Updated Safety Analysis Report involve a significant reduction in a margin of induced primary-to-secondary system
safety. leakage performance criterion are not
(USAR). The changes are proposed by initiators for any accident previously
the licensee to use consistent The NRC staff has reviewed the evaluated. The proposed change to require
terminology with Exelon Generation licensee’s analysis and, based on this the 48-inch containment purge valves to be
Company as part of their Operating review, it appears that the three sealed closed during operating MODES 1, 2,
Services Agreement. standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are 3, and 4 is not an accident initiator for any
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![Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 197 / Tuesday, October 13, 2015 / Notices 61487
accident previously evaluated. The change in Procedures. Usage of recirculation spray modes, alter the nature of events postulated
the classifications of a portion of the 40-inch reduces the consequence of the postulated in the UFSAR, nor introduce any unique
Containment Penetration Area Ventilation event. Likewise, the additional shielding to precursor mechanism.
line and a portion of the 2-inch gaseous the Control Room and the addition of a [high- Requiring the 48-inch containment purge
radwaste system line is also not an accident efficiency particulate air (HEPA)] filter to the valves to be sealed closed during operating
initiator for any accident previously [Technical Support Center (TSC)] ventilation MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 does not introduce any
evaluated. Thus, the proposed TS changes system reduces the consequences of the new accident precursor. This change only
and AST implementation will not increase postulated event to the Control Room and eliminates a potential release path for
the probability of an accident. TSC personnel. Lowering the limit for [Dose radionuclides following a LOCA.
The change to the decay time prior to fuel Equivalent XE-133 (DEX)] lowers potential The proposed TS testing criteria for the
movement is not an accident initiator. Decay releases. By reclassifying a portion of the 40- auxiliary building ventilation system
time is used to determine the source term for inch Containment Penetration Area charcoal filters and the proposed
the dose consequence calculation following a Ventilation line and a portion of the 2-inch performance criteria for steam generator tube
potential [fuel handling accident (FHA)] and gaseous radwaste system line to PG&E Design integrity also cannot create an accident, but
has no effect on the probability of the Class I, these lines will be seismically results in requiring more efficient filtration of
accident. Likewise, the change to the Control qualified, thus assuring that post-LOCA potentially released iodine and less allowable
Room radiation monitors setpoint cannot release points are the same as those used for primary-to-secondary leakage. The proposed
cause an accident and the operation of determining c/Q values. changes to the DEX activity limit, the TS
containment spray during the recirculation The change to the decay time from 100 terminology, and the decay time of the fuel
phase is used for mitigation of a [loss-of- hours to 72 hours prior to fuel movement is before movement are also unrelated to
coolant accident (LOCA)], and thus not an an input to the FHA. Although less decay accident initiators.
accident initiator. will result in higher released activity, the The only physical changes to the plant
As a result, there are no proposed changes results of the FHA dose consequence analysis being made in support of AST is the addition
to the parameters or conditions that could remain within the dose acceptance criteria of of Control Room shielding in an area
contribute to the initiation of an accident the event. Also, the radiation levels to an previously modified, the addition of a HEPA
previously evaluated in Chapter 15 of the operator from a raised fuel assembly may filter at the intake of the TSC normal
Updated Final Safety Analysis Report increase due to a lower decay time, however, ventilation system, and the upgrade to the
(UFSAR). As such, the AST cannot affect the any exposure will continue to be maintained damper actuators, pressure switches, and
probability of an accident previously under 10 CFR 20 limits by the plant damper solenoid valves to support
evaluated. Radiation Protection Program. reclassifying a portion of the Containment
Regarding accident consequences, Plant-specific radiological analyses have Penetration Area Ventilation line to PG&E
equipment and components affected by the been performed using the AST methodology, Design Class I. Both Control Room shielding
proposed changes are mitigative in nature assumption and inputs, as well as new c/Q and HEPA filtration are mitigative in nature
and relied upon once the accident has been values. The results of the dose consequences and do not have any impact on plant
postulated. The license amendment analyses demonstrate that the regulatory operation or system response following an
implements a new calculation methodology acceptance criteria are met for each analyzed accident. The Control Room modification for
for determining accident consequences and event. Implementing the AST involves no adding the shielding will meet applicable
does not adversely affect any plant facility equipment, procedure, or process loading limits, so the addition of the
component or system that is credited to changes that could significantly affect the shielding cannot initiate a failure. Upgrading
mitigate fuel damage. Subsequently, no radioactive material actually released during damper actuators, pressure switches, and
conditions have been created that could an event. Subsequently, no conditions have damper solenoid valves involve replacing
significantly increase the consequences of been created that could significantly increase existing components with components that
any accidents previously evaluated. the consequences of any of the events being are PG&E Design Class I. Therefore, the
Requiring that the 48-inch containment evaluated. addition of shielding, a HEPA filter, and
purge supply and exhaust valves be sealed Based on the above discussion, the upgrading components cannot create a new
closed during operating MODES 1, 2, 3, and proposed changes do not involve a or different kind of accident.
4 eliminates a potential path for radiological significant increase in the probability or Since the function of the SSCs has not
release following events that result in consequences of an accident previously changed for AST implementation, no new
radioactive material releases to the evaluated. failure modes are created by this proposed
containment, thus reducing potential 2. Does the proposed change create the change. The AST change itself does not have
consequences of the event. The steam possibility of a new or different accident the capability to initiate accidents.
generator tube inspection testing criterion for from any accident previously evaluated? Therefore, the proposed change does not
accident induced leakage is being changed, Response: No. create the possibility of a new or different
resulting in lower leakage rates, and thus less This license amendment does not alter or type of accident from any accident
potential releases due to primary-to- place any SSC in a configuration outside its previously evaluated.
secondary leakage. The auxiliary building design or analysis limits and does not create 3. Does the proposed change involve a
ventilation system allowable methyl iodide any new accident scenarios. significant reduction in a margin of safety?
penetration limit is being changed, which The AST methodology is not an accident Response: No.
results in more stringent testing initiator, as it is a method used to estimate Implementing the AST is relevant only to
requirements, and thus higher filter resulting postulated design basis accident calculated dose consequences of potential
efficiencies for reducing potential releases. doses. The proposed TS changes reflect the design basis accidents evaluated in Chapter
Changes to the operation of the plant configuration that supports 15 of the UFSAR. The changes proposed in
containment spray system to require implementation of the new methodology and this license amendment involve the use of a
operation during the recirculation mode are supports reduction in dose consequences. new analysis methodology and related
also mitigative in nature. While the plant DCPP is designed and licensed to operate regulatory acceptance criteria. New
design basis has always included the ability using containment spray in the recirculation atmospheric dispersion factors, which are
to implement containment spray during mode. This change will not affect any based on site specific meteorological data,
recirculation, this license amendment now operational aspect of the system or any other were calculated in accordance with
mstockstill on DSK4VPTVN1PROD with NOTICES
requires operation of containment spray in system, thus no new modes of operation are regulatory guidelines. The proposed TS, TS
the recirculation mode for dose mitigation. introduced by the proposed change. Bases, and UFSAR changes reflect the plant
DCPP is designed and licensed to operate The function of the radiation monitors has configuration that will support
using containment spray in the recirculation not changed; only the setpoint has changed implementation of the new methodology and
mode. As such, operation of containment as a result of an assessment of all potential result in operation in accordance with
spray in the recirculation mode has already release pathways. The continued operation of regulatory guidelines that support the
been analyzed, evaluated, and is currently containment spray and the radiation monitor revisions to the radiological analyses of the
controlled by Emergency Operating setpoint change do not create any new failure limiting design basis accidents. Conservative
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![61488 Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 197 / Tuesday, October 13, 2015 / Notices
methodologies, per the guidance of RG 1.183, 1. Does the proposed amendment involve Therefore, the proposed changes do not
have been used in performing the accident a significant increase in the probability or involve a significant reduction in a margin of
analyses. The radiological consequences of consequences of an accident previously safety.
these accidents are all within the regulatory evaluated?
The NRC staff has reviewed the
acceptance criteria associated with the use of Response: No.
AST methodology. The design functions of the VES for the licensee’s analysis and, based on this
The change to the minimum decay time main control room (MCR) are to provide review, it appears that the three
prior to fuel movement results in higher breathable air, maintain positive standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are
fission product releases after a FHA. pressurization relative to the outside, provide satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff
However, the results of the FHA dose cooling of MCR equipment and facilities, and proposes to determine that the
consequence analysis remain within the dose provide passive air filtration within the MCR amendment request involves no
acceptance criteria of the event. boundary. The VES is designed to satisfy significant hazards consideration.
The proposed changes continue to ensure these functions for up to 72 hours following Attorney for licensee: Ms. Kathryn M.
that the dose consequences of design basis a design basis accident.
Sutton, Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLC,
accidents at the exclusion area, low The proposed changes to the ASME
[American Society of Mechanical Engineers] 1111 Pennsylvania Avenue NW.,
population zone boundaries, in the TSC, and
in the Control Room are within the safety classification of components, Washington, DC 20004–2514.
corresponding acceptance criteria presented equipment orientation and configuration, NRC Branch Chief: Lawrence J.
in RG 1.183 and 10 CFR 50.67. The margin addition and deletion of components, and Burkhart.
of safety for the radiological consequences of correction to the number of emergency air
storage tanks would not adversely affect any III. Previously Published Notices of
these accidents is provided by meeting the
design function. The proposed changes Consideration of Issuance of
applicable regulatory limits, which are set at
or below the 10 CFR 50.67 limits. An maintain the design function of the VES with Amendments to Facility Operating
acceptable margin of safety is inherent in safety-related equipment and system Licenses and Combined Licenses,
these limits. configuration consistent with the Proposed No Significant Hazards
Therefore, the proposed change does not descriptions in UFSAR [Updated Final Safety Consideration Determination, and
involve a significant reduction in a margin of Analysis Report] Subsection 6.4.2. The Opportunity for a Hearing
safety. proposed changes do not affect the support
or operation of mechanical and fluid systems. The following notices were previously
The NRC staff has reviewed the There is no change to the response of systems published as separate individual
licensee’s analysis and, based on this to postulated accident conditions. There is notices. The notice content was the
review, it appears that the three no change to the predicted radioactive same as above. They were published as
standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are releases due to postulated accident individual notices either because time
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff conditions. The plant response to previously did not allow the Commission to wait
proposes to determine that the evaluated accidents or external events is not for this biweekly notice or because the
amendment requests involve no adversely affected, nor do the proposed
action involved exigent circumstances.
changes described create any new accident
significant hazards consideration. precursors. They are repeated here because the
Attorney for licensee: Jennifer Post, Therefore, the proposed amendment does biweekly notice lists all amendments
Esq., Pacific Gas and Electric Company, not involve a significant increase in the issued or proposed to be issued
P.O. Box 7442, San Francisco, California probability or consequences of an accident involving no significant hazards
94120. previously evaluated. consideration.
NRC Branch Chief: Michael T. 2. Does the proposed amendment create For details, see the individual notice
Markley. the possibility of a new or different kind of in the Federal Register on the day and
accident from any accident previously page cited. This notice does not extend
South Carolina Electric & Gas Company, evaluated?
Docket Nos. 52-027 and 52–028, Virgil the notice period of the original notice.
Response: No.
C. Summer Units 2 and 3, Fairfield The proposed changes to revise the VES Tennessee Valley Authority, Docket No.
County, South Carolina design related to the ASME safety 50–390, Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Unit 1,
classification, equipment orientation and Rhea County, Tennessee
Date of amendment request: June 30, configuration, addition and deletion of
2015. A publicly-available version is in components, and correction to the number of Date of amendment request: June 17,
ADAMS under Accession No. emergency air storage tanks maintains 2015, as supplemented by letters dated
ML15181A470. consistency with the design function July 14, August 28, and September 3,
Description of amendment request: information in the USFAR. The proposed 2015. Publicly-available versions are in
The amendment request proposes changes do not create a new fault or sequence ADAMS under Accession Nos.
changes to the Main Control Room of events that could result in a radioactive ML15170A474, ML15197A357,
Emergency Habitability System (VES) release. The proposed changes would not ML15243A044, and ML15246A638,
configuration and equipment safety affect any safety-related accident mitigating
function.
respectively.
designation. Because, this proposed Therefore, the proposed changes do not
Brief description of amendment
change requires a departure from Tier 1 create the possibility of a new or different request: The amendment would modify
information in the Westinghouse kind of accident from any previously the technical specifications to define
Advanced Passive 1000 Design Control evaluated. support systems needed in the first 48
Document (DCD), the licensee also 3. Does the proposed amendment involve hours after a unit shutdown when steam
requested an exemption from the a significant reduction in a margin of safety? generators are not available for heat
requirements of the Generic DCD Tier 1 Response: No. removal. The amendment would also
The proposed changes do not affect the
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in accordance with 10 CFR 52.63(b)(1). make changes consistent with Technical
Basis for proposed no significant ability of the VES to maintain the safety- Specification Task Force Traveler-273-
related functions to the MCR. The VES
hazards consideration determination: A, Revision 2, to provide clarifications
continues to meet the requirements for which
As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the it was designed and continues to meet the related to the requirements of the Safety
licensee has provided its analysis of the regulations. No safety analysis or design basis Function Determination Program.
issue of no significant hazards acceptance limit/criterion is challenged or Date of publication of individual
consideration, which is presented exceeded by the proposed changes, and no notice in Federal Register: September
below: margin of safety is reduced. 15, 2015 (80 FR 55383).
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![61492 Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 197 / Tuesday, October 13, 2015 / Notices
requestor’s/petitioner’s interest. The Effective date: This license ACTION: Notice of hearing.
petition must also identify the specific amendment is effective as of the date of
contentions which the requestor/ issuance and shall be implemented SUMMARY: The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
petitioner seeks to have litigated at the prior to the SR 3.1.5.3 performance due Commission (NRC or the Commission)
proceeding. date for CEA 88 in Unit 2, Cycle 19. will convene an evidentiary session to
Each contention must consist of a Amendment No.: 196. A publicly- receive testimony and exhibits in the
specific statement of the issue of law or available version is in ADAMS under uncontested portion of this proceeding
fact to be raised or controverted. In Accession No. ML15266A005; regarding the application of Nuclear
addition, the requestor/petitioner shall documents related to this amendment Innovation North America LLC (NINA)
provide a brief explanation of the bases are listed in the Safety Evaluation for combined licenses (COLs) to
for the contention and a concise enclosed with the amendment. construct and operate two additional
statement of the alleged facts or expert Renewed Facility Operating License units (Units 3 and 4) at the South Texas
opinion which support the contention No. NPF-51: Amendment revised the Project (STP) Electric Generating Station
and on which the petitioner intends to Operating License and Technical site in Matagorda County near Bay City,
rely in proving the contention at the Specifications. Texas. This mandatory hearing will
hearing. The petitioner must also Public comments requested as to concern safety and environmental
provide references to those specific proposed no significant hazards matters relating to the requested COLs.
sources and documents of which the consideration (NSHC): Yes. Public DATES: The hearing will be held on
petitioner is aware and on which the notice of the proposed amendment was November 19, 2015, beginning at 8:30
petitioner intends to rely to establish published in the Arizona Republic, a.m. Eastern Time. For the schedule for
those facts or expert opinion. The located in Phoenix, Arizona, from submitting pre-filed documents and
petition must include sufficient September 21 through September 22, deadlines affecting Interested
information to show that a genuine 2015. The notice provided an Government Participants, see Section VI
dispute exists with the applicant on a opportunity to submit comments on the of the SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION
material issue of law or fact. Commission’s proposed NSHC section of this document.
Contentions shall be limited to matters determination. No comments were
within the scope of the amendment received. The supplemental letter dated ADDRESSES: Please refer to Docket IDs
under consideration. The contention September 15, 2015, provided 52–012 and 52–013 when contacting the
must be one which, if proven, would additional information that clarified the NRC about the availability of
entitle the petitioner to relief. A application, did not expand the scope of information regarding this document.
requestor/petitioner who fails to satisfy the application as originally noticed, You may obtain publicly-available
these requirements with respect to at and did not change the staff’s original information related to this document
least one contention will not be proposed NSHC determination as using any of the following methods:
permitted to participate as a party. published in the Arizona Republic. • NRC’s Electronic Hearing Docket:
Those permitted to intervene become The Commission’s related evaluation You may obtain publicly available
parties to the proceeding, subject to any of the amendment, finding of exigent documents related to this hearing online
limitations in the order granting leave to circumstances, state consultation, and at http://www.nrc.gov/abaout-nrc/
intervene, and have the opportunity to final NSHC determination are contained regulatory/adjudicatory.html.
participate fully in the conduct of the in a Safety Evaluation dated September • NRC’s Agencywide Documents
hearing. Since the Commission has 25, 2015. Access and Management System
made a final determination that the Attorney for licensee: William A. (ADAMS): You may obtain publicly
amendment involves no significant Horin, Esq., Winston & Strawn, 1700 K available documents online in the
hazards consideration, if a hearing is Street NW., Washington, DC 20006– ADAMS Public Documents collection at
requested, it will not stay the 3817. http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/
effectiveness of the amendment. Any NRC Branch Chief: Michael T. adams.html. To begin the search, select
hearing held would take place while the Markley. ‘‘ADAMS Public Documents’’ and then
amendment is in effect. Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 1st day select ‘‘Begin Web-based ADAMS
of October 2015. Search.’’ For problems with ADAMS,
Arizona Public Service Company, please contact the NRC’s Public
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Docket No. 50–529, Palo Verde Nuclear Document Room (PDR) reference staff at
Generating Station, Unit 2, Maricopa Anne T. Boland,
Director, Division of Operating Reactor 1–800–397–4209, 301–415–4737, or by
County, Arizona email to pdr.resource@nrc.gov. The
Licensing, Office of Nuclear Reactor
Date of amendment request: Regulation. ADAMS accession number for each
September 4, 2015, as supplemented by [FR Doc. 2015–25860 Filed 10–9–15; 8:45 am] document referenced (if it is available in
letter dated September 15, 2015. BILLING CODE 7590–01–P
ADAMS) is provided the first time that
Description of amendment request: a document is referenced.
The amendment added a Note to • NRC’s PDR: You may examine and
Technical Specification Surveillance NUCLEAR REGULATORY purchase copies of public documents at
Requirement (SR) 3.1.5.3, Control COMMISSION the NRC’s PDR, Room O1–F21, One
Element Assembly (CEA) freedom of White Flint North, 11555 Rockville
movement surveillance, such that Unit [Docket Nos. 52–012 and 52–013; NRC–
2008–0091]
Pike, Rockville, Maryland 20852.
mstockstill on DSK4VPTVN1PROD with NOTICES
2, CEA 88 may be excluded from the
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
remaining quarterly performance of the In the Matter of Nuclear Innovation Glenn Ellmers, Office of the Secretary,
SR in Unit 2, Cycle 19 due to a degraded North America LLC, Combined U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
upper gripper coil. The amendment Licenses for South Texas Project, Washington, DC 20555–0001, telephone:
allows the licensee to delay exercising Units 3 and 4; Notice of Hearing 301–415–0442; email: Glenn.Ellmers@
CEA 88 until after repairs can be made
nrc.gov.
during the upcoming fall 2015 outage. AGENCY:Nuclear Regulatory
Date of issuance: September 25, 2015. Commission. SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
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Document Created: 2018-02-27 08:48:20
Document Modified: 2018-02-27 08:48:20
| Category | Regulatory Information | |
| Collection | Federal Register | |
| sudoc Class | AE 2.7: GS 4.107: AE 2.106: | |
| Publisher | Office of the Federal Register, National Archives and Records Administration | |
| Section | Notices | |
| Action | Biweekly notice. | |
| Dates | Comments must be filed by November 12, 2015. A request for a hearing must be filed by December 14, 2015. | |
| Contact | Janet Burkhardt, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington DC 20555-0001; telephone: 301-415-1384, email: [email protected] | |
| FR Citation | 80 FR 61476 |
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