80 FR 75162 - Locomotive Alerters Resetting Without Direct Engineer Action
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Railroad Administration Federal Register Volume 80, Issue 230 (December 1, 2015)
Federal Railroad Administration
Federal Register Volume 80, Issue 230 (December 1, 2015)
| Page Range | 75162-75163 | |
| FR Document | 2015-30469 |
[Federal Register Volume 80, Number 230 (Tuesday, December 1, 2015)] [Notices] [Pages 75162-75163] From the Federal Register Online [www.thefederalregister.org] [FR Doc No: 2015-30469] ======================================================================= ----------------------------------------------------------------------- DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION Federal Railroad Administration [Safety Advisory 2015-06] Locomotive Alerters Resetting Without Direct Engineer Action AGENCY: Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), Department of Transportation (DOT) ACTION: Notice of Safety Advisory. ----------------------------------------------------------------------- SUMMARY: FRA is issuing Safety Advisory 2015-06 to notify freight railroads of the circumstances of a head-on collision at Hoxie, AR, and the risks automated inputs that reset alerter warning timing cycles pose. A small number of Union Pacific Railroad (UP) locomotives were equipped with alerters that the horn sequencer reset without direct engineer action, reducing the alerters' effectiveness. UP has appropriately modified its locomotives to resolve the issue and FRA is not aware of any other locomotives equipped with alerters that automatically reset without direct engineer action. However, all freight railroads should review the operation of their locomotives equipped with alerters, and modify them as necessary, to ensure no system resets the alerter warning timing cycle without direct engineer action. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Mr. Gary Fairbanks, Staff Director, Motive Power and Equipment Division, Office of Railroad Safety, FRA, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, DC 20590, (202) 493-6322; or Mr. Michael Masci, Trial Attorney, Office of Chief Counsel, FRA, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, DC 20590, (202) 493-6037. SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Background, Including Accident Summary and Regulatory Context Locomotive Alerter Functioning A locomotive alerter is a safety feature installed on a locomotive to ensure the locomotive engineer remains alert while operating the locomotive. The alerter monitors the engineer's interactions with the locomotive and initially produces an alarm in the cab when no control actions are taken to reset the alerter warning timing cycle within a certain length of time. Because over-the-road locomotive operations often do not require frequent engineer actions (control inputs), alerter systems are also equipped with a manual reset button that allows the engineer to reset the warning timing cycle directly. If no control action or manual reset occurs after the alarm sounds, the alerter system will initiate a penalty brake application and reduce locomotive power to idle to stop the locomotive. Horn activation is a locomotive control action that will reset the alerter warning timing cycle, but when automated (using a horn sequencer) it can also interfere with the alerter's normal functionality. On many locomotives, there are two distinct ways to activate the horn: (1) During ordinary operation, the engineer holds a manual horn controller in the ``on'' position to activate it, and then releases the controller to silence it; and (2) when approaching a crossing, the engineer activates a separate switch (often a foot pedal) to initiate an automatic horn sequencer (sounding the long-long-short- long sequence FRA's regulations require for public highway-rail grade crossings, see Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 222.21(a)). The simple presence of a horn sequencer is not a safety issue. The horn sequencer is a convenient tool, because of the frequent need to sound the long-long-short-long horn sequence for public highway-rail grade crossings. However, when the horn sequencer enables the alerter warning timing cycle to reset without direct engineer action, it acts to delay the alerter's safety functionality and reduce its effectiveness, which could have serious safety consequences. Accident Summary and Testing The head-on collision at Hoxie highlights the importance of this issue.\1\ On August 17, 2014, at approximately 2:28 a.m. (CDT), a southbound UP freight train passed an approach and then a stop indication and collided with a northbound UP freight train while transitioning from double-main track to single-main track at Control Point Y 229 on the UP Hoxie Subdivision in Hoxie. The collision resulted in two crewmember fatalities. The event recorder on the lead southbound locomotive was destroyed, but the event recorder and a camera on a trailing locomotive enabled the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) to recreate certain key events leading up to the moment of impact. Four minutes and 53 seconds before impact, the engineer activated the horn sequencer, which continued to cycle for 4 minutes and 6 seconds, at which time he deactivated it after passing a grade crossing at Hickory (Milepost (MP) 227.84)). During the time the horn sequencer was operating, the engineer made one throttle change, but took no action after passing an approach signal at MP 227.4. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\ This section provides a brief summary of the circumstances surrounding the collision, based on the NTSB and FRA preliminary findings to date. The probable cause and contributing factors, if any, have not yet been established. Therefore, nothing in this safety advisory is intended to attribute a cause to this incident, or place responsibility for this accident on the acts or omissions of any person or entity. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Given the recorded speed of the train, there were two intervals during horn sequencer operation when the alerter could have sounded, alerted the crew, and initiated a penalty brake application if no response was given. The evidence available does not rule out the possibility that the engineer was manually resetting the alerter on the lead locomotive. However, if the locomotive was set up the same as the trailing locomotive, which is likely, the alerter would not have reached its intended timing cycle limit before the actual impact, regardless whether the automatic activation of the horn sequencer reset the timing cycle. The interval from deactivation of the horn sequencer to impact was 44 seconds, or 9 seconds shorter than the alerter warning timing cycle interval of 53 seconds at the impact speed of 45 mph, so no alarm or penalty brake application could have occurred in this interval. FRA cannot determine whether an alerter activation would have prevented the Hoxie collision. Yet, if the alerter had alarmed during the minutes leading up to the collision, it could have provided an opportunity to prevent or mitigate this accident. FRA tests of another locomotive in the same series verified that the horn sequencer installed in these locomotives reset the alerter warning timing cycle after each sounding of the horn, even though all but the first horn blast were initiated automatically. This series of 40 locomotives, which were built over 20 years ago, were factory-equipped with a stand- alone horn sequencer, wired to reset the alerter with every sounding of the horn, including the sounding of the horn by the horn sequencer. UP has appropriately modified this series of locomotives to address this issue. FRA did not specifically regulate the manner of the alerter's interaction with the horn sequencer when the locomotives were manufactured. As discussed below, freight locomotives of [[Page 75163]] this age will not fall under FRA's alerter regulations until January 1, 2017. FRA Regulations FRA safety regulations addressing alerters on freight locomotives are found at 49 CFR 229.140. See 77 FR 21312 (April 9, 2012). Section 229.140 requires all controlling locomotives that are placed in service for the first time on or after June 10, 2013, and operated at speeds in excess of 25 mph to be equipped with an alerter. This section also requires all controlling locomotives operated at speeds in excess of 25 mph on or after January 1, 2017, to be equipped with an alerter, regardless of when they were first placed in service. This section prohibits automatic systems from resetting the locomotive alerter. Specifically, 49 CFR 229.140(b)(3) requires movement of the engineer's horn activation handle to reset the alerter warning timing cycle. Using a horn sequencer to reset the alerter with each sounding of the horn (one for each of the long-long-short-long sequence) does not satisfy 49 CFR 229.140(b)(3), because all but the first horn blast are initiated automatically. This section requires engineers to take direct action, either by operation of certain controls or actuation of the manual reset, to restart the alerter warning timing cycle. Further, under 49 CFR 229.140(e), the alerter must be functioning and operating as intended when the locomotive is used. FRA addresses failures to comply with these regulatory requirements through inspections and enforcement activities. Recommended Action: In light of the discussion above, and because many older locomotives, including locomotives from smaller manufacturers and remanufacturers are still in service, FRA recommends that all freight railroads check the operation of their locomotives equipped with alerters to ensure that no system resets the alerter warning timing cycle without direct engineer action. This review should include, but not be limited to, the operation of horn sequencer circuitry, if equipped. Railroads should modify any such systems they find to ensure that no system interferes with the alerter warning timing cycle. In particular, FRA recommends that railroads that may have installed alerters prior to June 10, 2013, review the design of those systems and modify them as necessary, before January 1, 2017, to ensure safety and compliance with 49 CFR 229.140(b)(3). Issued in Washington, DC, on November 25, 2015. Patrick T. Warren, Deputy Associate Administrator for Safety. [FR Doc. 2015-30469 Filed 11-30-15; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 4910-06-P
![75162 Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 230 / Tuesday, December 1, 2015 / Notices
Dated: November 6, 2015. alerter warning timing cycle within a locomotive was destroyed, but the event
Michelle Bernier-Toth, certain length of time. Because over-the- recorder and a camera on a trailing
Managing Director, Bureau of Consular road locomotive operations often do not locomotive enabled the National
Affairs, Overseas Citizen Services, require frequent engineer actions Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) to
Department of State. (control inputs), alerter systems are also recreate certain key events leading up to
[FR Doc. 2015–30496 Filed 11–30–15; 8:45 am] equipped with a manual reset button the moment of impact. Four minutes
BILLING CODE 4710–06–P that allows the engineer to reset the and 53 seconds before impact, the
warning timing cycle directly. If no engineer activated the horn sequencer,
control action or manual reset occurs which continued to cycle for 4 minutes
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION after the alarm sounds, the alerter and 6 seconds, at which time he
system will initiate a penalty brake deactivated it after passing a grade
Federal Railroad Administration application and reduce locomotive crossing at Hickory (Milepost (MP)
[Safety Advisory 2015–06]
power to idle to stop the locomotive. 227.84)). During the time the horn
Horn activation is a locomotive sequencer was operating, the engineer
Locomotive Alerters Resetting Without control action that will reset the alerter made one throttle change, but took no
Direct Engineer Action warning timing cycle, but when action after passing an approach signal
automated (using a horn sequencer) it at MP 227.4.
AGENCY: Federal Railroad can also interfere with the alerter’s Given the recorded speed of the train,
Administration (FRA), Department of normal functionality. On many there were two intervals during horn
Transportation (DOT) locomotives, there are two distinct ways sequencer operation when the alerter
ACTION: Notice of Safety Advisory. to activate the horn: (1) During ordinary could have sounded, alerted the crew,
operation, the engineer holds a manual and initiated a penalty brake application
SUMMARY: FRA is issuing Safety horn controller in the ‘‘on’’ position to if no response was given. The evidence
Advisory 2015–06 to notify freight activate it, and then releases the available does not rule out the
railroads of the circumstances of a head- controller to silence it; and (2) when possibility that the engineer was
on collision at Hoxie, AR, and the risks approaching a crossing, the engineer manually resetting the alerter on the
automated inputs that reset alerter activates a separate switch (often a foot lead locomotive. However, if the
warning timing cycles pose. A small pedal) to initiate an automatic horn locomotive was set up the same as the
number of Union Pacific Railroad (UP) sequencer (sounding the long-long- trailing locomotive, which is likely, the
locomotives were equipped with short-long sequence FRA’s regulations alerter would not have reached its
alerters that the horn sequencer reset require for public highway-rail grade intended timing cycle limit before the
without direct engineer action, reducing crossings, see Title 49 Code of Federal actual impact, regardless whether the
the alerters’ effectiveness. UP has Regulations (CFR) 222.21(a)). The automatic activation of the horn
appropriately modified its locomotives simple presence of a horn sequencer is sequencer reset the timing cycle. The
to resolve the issue and FRA is not not a safety issue. The horn sequencer interval from deactivation of the horn
aware of any other locomotives is a convenient tool, because of the sequencer to impact was 44 seconds, or
equipped with alerters that frequent need to sound the long-long- 9 seconds shorter than the alerter
automatically reset without direct short-long horn sequence for public warning timing cycle interval of 53
engineer action. However, all freight highway-rail grade crossings. However, seconds at the impact speed of 45 mph,
railroads should review the operation of when the horn sequencer enables the so no alarm or penalty brake application
their locomotives equipped with alerter warning timing cycle to reset could have occurred in this interval.
alerters, and modify them as necessary, without direct engineer action, it acts to
to ensure no system resets the alerter FRA cannot determine whether an
delay the alerter’s safety functionality alerter activation would have prevented
warning timing cycle without direct and reduce its effectiveness, which
engineer action. the Hoxie collision. Yet, if the alerter
could have serious safety consequences. had alarmed during the minutes leading
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Mr.
Accident Summary and Testing up to the collision, it could have
Gary Fairbanks, Staff Director, Motive provided an opportunity to prevent or
Power and Equipment Division, Office The head-on collision at Hoxie mitigate this accident. FRA tests of
of Railroad Safety, FRA, 1200 New highlights the importance of this issue.1 another locomotive in the same series
Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, DC On August 17, 2014, at approximately verified that the horn sequencer
20590, (202) 493–6322; or Mr. Michael 2:28 a.m. (CDT), a southbound UP installed in these locomotives reset the
Masci, Trial Attorney, Office of Chief freight train passed an approach and alerter warning timing cycle after each
Counsel, FRA, 1200 New Jersey Avenue then a stop indication and collided with sounding of the horn, even though all
SE., Washington, DC 20590, (202) 493– a northbound UP freight train while but the first horn blast were initiated
6037. transitioning from double-main track to automatically. This series of 40
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: single-main track at Control Point Y 229 locomotives, which were built over 20
on the UP Hoxie Subdivision in Hoxie. years ago, were factory-equipped with a
Background, Including Accident
The collision resulted in two stand-alone horn sequencer, wired to
Summary and Regulatory Context
crewmember fatalities. The event reset the alerter with every sounding of
Locomotive Alerter Functioning recorder on the lead southbound the horn, including the sounding of the
A locomotive alerter is a safety feature horn by the horn sequencer.
1 This section provides a brief summary of the
tkelley on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with NOTICES
installed on a locomotive to ensure the circumstances surrounding the collision, based on
UP has appropriately modified this
locomotive engineer remains alert while the NTSB and FRA preliminary findings to date. series of locomotives to address this
operating the locomotive. The alerter The probable cause and contributing factors, if any, issue. FRA did not specifically regulate
monitors the engineer’s interactions have not yet been established. Therefore, nothing in the manner of the alerter’s interaction
this safety advisory is intended to attribute a cause
with the locomotive and initially to this incident, or place responsibility for this
with the horn sequencer when the
produces an alarm in the cab when no accident on the acts or omissions of any person or locomotives were manufactured. As
control actions are taken to reset the entity. discussed below, freight locomotives of
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![Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 230 / Tuesday, December 1, 2015 / Notices 75163
this age will not fall under FRA’s alerter Issued in Washington, DC, on November DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY
regulations until January 1, 2017. 25, 2015.
Patrick T. Warren, Bureau of the Fiscal Service
FRA Regulations
Deputy Associate Administrator for Safety.
Proposed Collection of Information:
FRA safety regulations addressing [FR Doc. 2015–30469 Filed 11–30–15; 8:45 am]
TreasuryDirect System
alerters on freight locomotives are found BILLING CODE 4910–06–P
at 49 CFR 229.140. See 77 FR 21312 Notice and request for
ACTION:
(April 9, 2012). Section 229.140 requires comments.
all controlling locomotives that are DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
placed in service for the first time on or SUMMARY: The Department of the
after June 10, 2013, and operated at Surface Transportation Board Treasury, as part of its continuing effort
speeds in excess of 25 mph to be to reduce paperwork and respondent
[Docket No. FD 35966] burden, invites the general public and
equipped with an alerter. This section
other Federal agencies to take this
also requires all controlling locomotives
Martin Marietta Materials, Inc.— opportunity to comment on proposed
operated at speeds in excess of 25 mph
Acquisition of Control Exemption— and/or continuing information
on or after January 1, 2017, to be collections, as required by the
equipped with an alerter, regardless of Rock & Rail LLC
Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995,
when they were first placed in service. Public Law 104–13 (44 U.S.C.
AGENCY: Surface Transportation Board,
This section prohibits automatic DOT. 3506(c)(2)(A)). Currently the Bureau of
systems from resetting the locomotive the Fiscal Service within the
alerter. Specifically, 49 CFR ACTION:Correction to notice of Department of the Treasury is soliciting
229.140(b)(3) requires movement of the exemption. comments concerning the electronic
engineer’s horn activation handle to process for selling/issuing, servicing,
reset the alerter warning timing cycle. On October 9, 2015, Martin Marietta and making payments on or redeeming
Using a horn sequencer to reset the Materials, Inc. (MMM), a noncarrier, U.S. Treasury securities.
alerter with each sounding of the horn filed a verified notice of exemption to DATES: Written comments should be
(one for each of the long-long-short-long acquire control of Rock & Rail, Inc. received on or before February 1, 2016
sequence) does not satisfy 49 CFR (RRI), a Class III railroad. On October to be assured of consideration.
229.140(b)(3), because all but the first 23, 2015, notice of the exemption was ADDRESSES: Direct all written comments
horn blast are initiated automatically. served and published in the Federal to Bureau of the Fiscal Service, Bruce A.
This section requires engineers to take Register (80 FR 64,491). The exemption Sharp, 200 Third Street A4–A,
direct action, either by operation of became effective November 8, 2015. Parkersburg, WV 26106–1328, or
certain controls or actuation of the On November 4, 2015, MMM filed a bruce.sharp@fiscal.treasury.gov.
manual reset, to restart the alerter letter with the Board advising that the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
warning timing cycle. Further, under 49 notice requires clarification. According Requests for additional information or
CFR 229.140(e), the alerter must be to MMM, RRI also owns and operates copies of the form(s) and instructions
functioning and operating as intended rail lines in Colorado Springs, Colo.1 should be directed to Ron Lewis; 200
when the locomotive is used. FRA MMM states that all of the rail lines Third Street Room 515, Parkersburg,
addresses failures to comply with these owned and operated by RRI are in WV 26106–1328, or ron.lewis@
regulatory requirements through Colorado and do not connect, nor are fiscal.treasury.gov.
inspections and enforcement activities. there plans to connect, with the SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Recommended Action: In light of the railroads controlled by MMM. MMM Title: TreasuryDirect.
discussion above, and because many also clarifies that the correct legal name OMB Number: 1535–0138.
older locomotives, including of RRI is ‘‘Rock & Rail LLC.’’ This notice Abstract: The information collected in
locomotives from smaller manufacturers corrects the information described the electronic system is requested to
and remanufacturers are still in service, above and the case caption. All other establish a new account and process any
FRA recommends that all freight information in the notice is correct. associated transactions.
railroads check the operation of their Current Actions: Extension of a
Board decisions and notices are
previously approved collection.
locomotives equipped with alerters to available on our Web site at
Type of Review: Regular.
ensure that no system resets the alerter ‘‘WWW.STB.DOT.GOV.’’ Affected Public: Individuals or
warning timing cycle without direct Decided: November 24, 2015. Households.
engineer action. This review should By the Board, Rachel D. Campbell, Estimated Number of Respondents:
include, but not be limited to, the Director, Office of Proceedings. 2.06 million.
operation of horn sequencer circuitry, if Tia Delano, Estimated Time per Respondent: 10
equipped. Railroads should modify any minutes.
Clearance Clerk.
such systems they find to ensure that no Estimated Total Annual Burden
[FR Doc. 2015–30341 Filed 11–30–15; 8:45 am]
system interferes with the alerter Hours: 97,000.
warning timing cycle. In particular, FRA BILLING CODE 4915–01–P
Request for Comments: Comments
tkelley on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with NOTICES
recommends that railroads that may submitted in response to this notice will
have installed alerters prior to June 10, be summarized and/or included in the
2013, review the design of those systems request for OMB approval. All
and modify them as necessary, before 1 MMM states that RRI obtained Board authority comments will become a matter of
January 1, 2017, to ensure safety and in Rock & Rail, Inc.—Acquis. and Operation public record. Comments are invited on:
compliance with 49 CFR 229.140(b)(3). Exemption—Railroad Lines near Kelker, El Paso (a) Whether the collection of
Cty., Colo., FD 33764 (STB served June 25, 1999). information is necessary for the proper
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Document Created: 2018-03-02 09:10:14
Document Modified: 2018-03-02 09:10:14
| Category | Regulatory Information | |
| Collection | Federal Register | |
| sudoc Class | AE 2.7: GS 4.107: AE 2.106: | |
| Publisher | Office of the Federal Register, National Archives and Records Administration | |
| Section | Notices | |
| Action | Notice of Safety Advisory. | |
| Contact | Mr. Gary Fairbanks, Staff Director, Motive Power and Equipment Division, Office of Railroad Safety, FRA, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, DC 20590, (202) 493-6322; or Mr. Michael Masci, Trial Attorney, Office of Chief Counsel, FRA, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, DC 20590, (202) 493-6037. | |
| FR Citation | 80 FR 75162 |
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