80 FR 76379 - Special Conditions: Cirrus Aircraft Corporation, SF50; Auto Throttle
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration Federal Register Volume 80, Issue 236 (December 9, 2015)
Federal Aviation Administration
Federal Register Volume 80, Issue 236 (December 9, 2015)
| Page Range | 76379-76381 | |
| FR Document | 2015-31058 |
[Federal Register Volume 80, Number 236 (Wednesday, December 9, 2015)] [Rules and Regulations] [Pages 76379-76381] From the Federal Register Online [www.thefederalregister.org] [FR Doc No: 2015-31058] ======================================================================= ----------------------------------------------------------------------- DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION Federal Aviation Administration 14 CFR Part 23 [Docket No. FAA-2015-3464; Special Conditions No. 23-272-SC] Special Conditions: Cirrus Aircraft Corporation, SF50; Auto Throttle AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT. ACTION: Final special conditions. ----------------------------------------------------------------------- SUMMARY: These special conditions are issued for the Cirrus Aircraft Corporation Model SF50 airplane. This airplane will have a novel or unusual design feature(s) associated with installation of an Auto Throttle System. The applicable airworthiness regulations do not contain adequate or appropriate safety standards for this design feature. These special conditions contain the additional safety standards that the Administrator considers necessary to establish a level of safety equivalent to that established by the existing airworthiness standards. DATES: The effective date of these special conditions is December 9, 2015 and are applicable on December 2, 2015. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Jeff Pretz, Regulations and Policy Branch, ACE-111, Federal Aviation Administration, Small Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service, ACE-111, 901 Locust, Room 301, Kansas City, MO 64106; telephone (816) 329-3239, facsimile (816) 329-4090. SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Background On September 9, 2008, Cirrus Aircraft Corporation applied for a type certificate for their new Model SF50. On December 11, 2012 Cirrus elected to adjust the certification basis of the SF50 to include 14 CFR part 23 through amendment 62. The SF50 is a low-wing, 7-seat (5 adults and 2 children), pressurized, retractable gear, carbon composite airplane with one turbofan engine mounted partially in the upper aft fuselage. It is constructed largely of carbon and fiberglass composite materials. Like other Cirrus products, the SF50 includes a ballistically deployed airframe parachute. The SF50 has a maximum operating altitude of 28,000 feet and the maximum takeoff weight will be at or below 6,000 pounds with a range at economy cruise of roughly 1,000 nautical miles. Current part 23 airworthiness regulations do not contain appropriate safety standards for an Auto Throttle System (ATS) installation; therefore, special conditions are required to establish an acceptable level of safety. Part 25 regulations contain appropriate safety standards for these systems, making the intent for this project to apply the language in Sec. 25.1329 for the auto throttle, while substituting Sec. 23.1309 and Sec. 23.143 in place of the similar part 25 regulations referenced in Sec. 25.1329. In addition, malfunction of the ATS to perform its intended function shall be evaluated per the Loss of Thrust Control (LOTC) criteria established under part 33 for electronic engine controls. An analysis must show that no single failure or malfunction or probable combinations of failures of the ATS will permit the LOTC probability to exceed those established under part 33 for an electronic engine control. Type Certification Basis Under the provisions of 14 CFR 21.17, Cirrus must show that the Model SF50 meets the applicable provisions of part 23, as amended by amendments 23-1 through 23-62 thereto. If the Administrator finds that the applicable airworthiness regulations (i.e., 14 CFR part 23) do not contain adequate or appropriate safety standards for the SF50 because of a novel or unusual design feature, special conditions are prescribed under the provisions of Sec. 21.16. Special conditions are initially applicable to the model for which they are issued. Should the type certificate for that model be amended later to include any other model that incorporates the same or similar novel or unusual design feature, the special conditions would also apply to the other model under Sec. 21.101. In addition to the applicable airworthiness regulations and special conditions, the SF50 must comply with the fuel vent and exhaust emission requirements of 14 CFR part 34 and the noise certification requirements of 14 CFR part 36 and the FAA must issue a finding of regulatory adequacy under section 611 of Public Law 92-574, the Noise Control Act of 1972. The FAA issues special conditions, as defined in 14 CFR 11.19, in accordance with Sec. 11.38, and they become part of the type- certification basis under Sec. 21.17(a)(2). Novel or Unusual Design Features The SF50 will incorporate the following novel or unusual design features: An ATS as part of the automatic flight control system. The ATS utilizes a Garmin ``smart'' autopilot servo with a physical connection to the throttle quadrant control linkage. The auto throttle may be controlled by the pilot with an optional auto throttle control panel adjacent to the throttle lever. The auto throttle also provides an envelope protection function which does not require installation of the optional control panel. Discussion Part 23 currently does not sufficiently address auto throttle (also referred to as auto thrust) technology and safety concerns. Therefore, special conditions must be developed and applied to this project to ensure an acceptable level of safety has been obtained. For approval to use the ATS during flight, the SF50 must demonstrate compliance to the intent of the requirements of Sec. 25.1329, [[Page 76380]] applying the appropriate part 23 references to Sec. 23.1309 (to include performing a functional hazard assessment or system safety assessment to determine the applicable Software and Airborne Electronic Hardware assurance levels, and compliance to DO-178C & DO-254, as required) and Sec. 23.143. In addition, a malfunction of the ATS to perform its intended function is an LOTC event, and may result in a total loss of thrust control, transients, or uncommanded thrust changes. The classification of the failure condition for an LOTC event on a Class II single-engine aircraft is hazardous for aircraft that stall at or below 61 knots. From publication AC 23.1309-1E, based upon failure probability values shown in Figure 2, an LOTC event would have to meet a probability of failure value not to exceed 1 x 10-6. In-service data for LOTC in single-engine turbine aircraft shows LOTC events exceed this probability; therefore, part 33 requirements for engine control probabilities will be accepted for the part 23 LOTC requirement. The probabilities of failure for an LOTC event on a turbine engine shall not exceed the following (see AC33.28-1 and ANE-1993-33.28TLD-R1 for further guidance): 1. Average Events per Million Hours: 10 (1x10-05 per hour) 2. Maximum Events per Million Hours: 100 (1x10-04 per hour) Note: The maximum events per flight hour are intended for Time Limited Dispatch (TLD) operation where the risk exposure is mitigated by limiting the time in which the aircraft is operated in the degraded condition. Discussion of Comments Notice of proposed special conditions No. 23-15-04-SC for the Cirrus Aircraft Corporation Model SF50 airplanes was published in the Federal Register on August 21, 2015 (80 FR 50808). No comments were received, and the special conditions are adopted as proposed. Applicability As discussed above, these special conditions are applicable to the Model SF50. Should Cirrus apply at a later date for a change to the type certificate to include another model incorporating the same novel or unusual design feature, the special conditions would apply to that model as well. Under standard practice, the effective date of final special conditions would be 30 days after the date of publication in the Federal Register; however, as the certification date for the Cirrus Aircraft Corporation Model SF50 airplane is imminent, the FAA finds that good cause exists to make these special conditions effective upon issuance. Conclusion This action affects only certain novel or unusual design features on one model of airplanes. It is not a rule of general applicability and it affects only the applicant who applied to the FAA for approval of these features on the airplane. List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 23 Aircraft, Aviation safety, Signs and symbols. Citation The authority citation for these special conditions is as follows: Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701, 44702, 44704, 14 CFR 21.16 and 14 CFR 11.38 and 11.19. The Special Conditions Accordingly, pursuant to the authority delegated to me by the Administrator, the following special conditions are issued as part of the type certification basis for Cirrus Aircraft Corporation Model SF50 airplanes. 1. Certification of Auto Throttle System Under Part 23 a. Quick disengagement controls for the auto thrust functions must be provided for each pilot. The auto thrust quick disengagement controls must be located on the thrust control levers. Quick disengagement controls must be readily accessible to each pilot while operating the thrust control levers. b. The effects of a failure of the system to disengage the auto thrust functions when manually commanded by the pilot must be assessed in accordance with the requirements of Sec. 23.1309. c. Engagement or switching of the flight guidance system, a mode, or a sensor may not cause the auto thrust system to affect a transient response that alters the airplane's flight path any greater than a minor transient, as defined in paragraph (l)(1) of this section. d. Under normal conditions, the disengagement of any automatic control function of a flight guidance system may not cause a transient response of the airplane's flight path any greater than a minor transient. e. Under rare normal and non-normal conditions, disengagement of any automatic control function of a flight guidance system may not result in a transient any greater than a significant transient, as defined in paragraph (l)(2) of this section. f. The function and direction of motion of each command reference control, such as heading select or vertical speed, must be plainly indicated on, or adjacent to, each control if necessary to prevent inappropriate use or confusion. g. Under any condition of flight appropriate to its use, the flight guidance system may not produce hazardous loads on the airplane, nor create hazardous deviations in the flight path. This applies to both fault-free operation and in the event of a malfunction, and assumes that the pilot begins corrective action within a reasonable period of time. h. When the flight guidance system is in use, a means must be provided to avoid excursions beyond an acceptable margin from the speed range of the normal flight envelope. If the airplane experiences an excursion outside this range, a means must be provided to prevent the flight guidance system from providing guidance or control to an unsafe speed. i. The flight guidance system functions, controls, indications, and alerts must be designed to minimize flight crew errors and confusion concerning the behavior and operation of the flight guidance system. Means must be provided to indicate the current mode of operation, including any armed modes, transitions, and reversions. Selector switch position is not an acceptable means of indication. The controls and indications must be grouped and presented in a logical and consistent manner. The indications must be visible to each pilot under all expected lighting conditions. j. Following disengagement of the auto thrust function, a caution (visual and auditory) must be provided to each pilot. k. During auto thrust operation, it must be possible for the flight crew to move the thrust levers without requiring excessive force. The auto thrust may not create a potential hazard when the flight crew applies an override force to the thrust levers. l. For purposes of this section, a transient is a disturbance in the control or flight path of the airplane that is not consistent with response to flight crew inputs or environmental conditions. (1) A minor transient would not significantly reduce safety margins and would involve flight crew actions that are well within their capabilities. A minor transient may involve a slight increase in flight crew workload or some physical discomfort to passengers or cabin crew. (2) A significant transient may lead to a significant reduction in safety [[Page 76381]] margins, an increase in flight crew workload, discomfort to the flight crew, or physical distress to the passengers or cabin crew, possibly including non-fatal injuries. Significant transients do not require, in order to remain within or recover to the normal flight envelope, any of the following: i. Exceptional piloting skill, alertness, or strength. ii. Forces applied by the pilot which are greater than those specified in Sec. 23.143(c). iii. Accelerations or attitudes in the airplane that might result in further hazard to secured or non-secured occupants. It must also be demonstrated, through tests and analysis, that no single failure or malfunction or probable combinations of failures of the auto thrust system components results in the probability for LOTC, or un-commanded thrust changes and transients that result in an LOTC event, to exceed the following: (1) Average Events per Million Hours: 10 (1x10-05 per hour) (2) Maximum Events per Million Hours: 100 (1x10-04 per hour) Note: The term ``probable'' in the context of ``probable combination of failures'' does not have the same meaning as used for a safety assessment process. The term ``probable'' in ``probable combination of failures'' means ``foreseeable,'' or those failure conditions anticipated to occur one or more times during the operational life of each airplane. Issued in Kansas City, Missouri, on December 2, 2015. Patrick Mullen, Acting Manager, Small Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service. [FR Doc. 2015-31058 Filed 12-8-15; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 4910-13-P
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fewer losses on an aggregate basis than The applicable airworthiness to exceed those established under part
Class A interests, the Class B interests regulations do not contain adequate or 33 for an electronic engine control.
would not qualify as common equity appropriate safety standards for this
Type Certification Basis
tier 1 capital. However, where the design feature. These special conditions
membership interests provide for contain the additional safety standards Under the provisions of 14 CFR 21.17,
disproportionate allocation of profits, that the Administrator considers Cirrus must show that the Model SF50
such as described in the example in necessary to establish a level of safety meets the applicable provisions of part
paragraph (c)(4) of this section, and the equivalent to that established by the 23, as amended by amendments 23–1
reallocation of prior distributions would existing airworthiness standards. through 23–62 thereto.
be limited to reversing the If the Administrator finds that the
DATES: The effective date of these
disproportionate portions of prior applicable airworthiness regulations
special conditions is December 9, 2015 (i.e., 14 CFR part 23) do not contain
distributions, both the Class A and Class and are applicable on December 2, 2015.
B interests could qualify as common adequate or appropriate safety standards
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Jeff for the SF50 because of a novel or
equity tier 1 capital provided that they
met all the other criteria in § 217.20(b). Pretz, Regulations and Policy Branch, unusual design feature, special
ACE–111, Federal Aviation conditions are prescribed under the
§ 217.502 Application of the Board’s Administration, Small Airplane provisions of § 21.16.
Regulatory Capital Framework to Employee Directorate, Aircraft Certification Special conditions are initially
Stock Ownership Plans that are Depository Service, ACE–111, 901 Locust, Room applicable to the model for which they
Institution Holding Companies and Certain 301, Kansas City, MO 64106; telephone are issued. Should the type certificate
Trusts that are Savings and Loan Holding (816) 329–3239, facsimile (816) 329–
Companies.
for that model be amended later to
4090. include any other model that
(a) Employee Stock Ownership Plans. incorporates the same or similar novel
Notwithstanding § 217.1(c), a bank SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
or unusual design feature, the special
holding company or covered savings Background conditions would also apply to the other
and loan holding company that is an model under § 21.101.
employee stock ownership plan is On September 9, 2008, Cirrus Aircraft
In addition to the applicable
exempt from this part until the Board Corporation applied for a type
airworthiness regulations and special
adopts regulations that directly relate to certificate for their new Model SF50. On
conditions, the SF50 must comply with
the application of capital regulations to December 11, 2012 Cirrus elected to
the fuel vent and exhaust emission
employee stock ownership plans. adjust the certification basis of the SF50
requirements of 14 CFR part 34 and the
(b) Personal or Family Trusts. to include 14 CFR part 23 through
noise certification requirements of 14
Notwithstanding § 217.1(c), a covered amendment 62. The SF50 is a low-wing,
CFR part 36 and the FAA must issue a
savings and loan holding company is 7-seat (5 adults and 2 children),
finding of regulatory adequacy under
exempt from this part if it is a personal pressurized, retractable gear, carbon
section 611 of Public Law 92–574, the
or family trust and not a business trust composite airplane with one turbofan
Noise Control Act of 1972.
until the Board adopts regulations that engine mounted partially in the upper The FAA issues special conditions, as
apply capital regulations to such a aft fuselage. It is constructed largely of defined in 14 CFR 11.19, in accordance
covered savings and loan holding carbon and fiberglass composite with § 11.38, and they become part of
company. materials. Like other Cirrus products, the type-certification basis under
By order of the Board of Governors of the the SF50 includes a ballistically § 21.17(a)(2).
Federal Reserve System, December 4, 2015. deployed airframe parachute. The SF50
has a maximum operating altitude of Novel or Unusual Design Features
Robert deV. Frierson,
28,000 feet and the maximum takeoff The SF50 will incorporate the
Secretary of the Board.
weight will be at or below 6,000 pounds following novel or unusual design
[FR Doc. 2015–31013 Filed 12–8–15; 8:45 am]
with a range at economy cruise of features: An ATS as part of the
BILLING CODE P
roughly 1,000 nautical miles. automatic flight control system. The
Current part 23 airworthiness ATS utilizes a Garmin ‘‘smart’’ autopilot
regulations do not contain appropriate servo with a physical connection to the
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION safety standards for an Auto Throttle throttle quadrant control linkage. The
System (ATS) installation; therefore, auto throttle may be controlled by the
Federal Aviation Administration
special conditions are required to pilot with an optional auto throttle
establish an acceptable level of safety. control panel adjacent to the throttle
14 CFR Part 23
Part 25 regulations contain appropriate lever. The auto throttle also provides an
[Docket No. FAA–2015–3464; Special safety standards for these systems, envelope protection function which
Conditions No. 23–272–SC] making the intent for this project to does not require installation of the
apply the language in § 25.1329 for the optional control panel.
Special Conditions: Cirrus Aircraft auto throttle, while substituting
Corporation, SF50; Auto Throttle § 23.1309 and § 23.143 in place of the Discussion
AGENCY: Federal Aviation similar part 25 regulations referenced in Part 23 currently does not sufficiently
Administration (FAA), DOT. § 25.1329. In addition, malfunction of address auto throttle (also referred to as
ACTION: Final special conditions. the ATS to perform its intended auto thrust) technology and safety
function shall be evaluated per the Loss concerns. Therefore, special conditions
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SUMMARY: These special conditions are of Thrust Control (LOTC) criteria must be developed and applied to this
issued for the Cirrus Aircraft established under part 33 for electronic project to ensure an acceptable level of
Corporation Model SF50 airplane. This engine controls. An analysis must show safety has been obtained. For approval
airplane will have a novel or unusual that no single failure or malfunction or to use the ATS during flight, the SF50
design feature(s) associated with probable combinations of failures of the must demonstrate compliance to the
installation of an Auto Throttle System. ATS will permit the LOTC probability intent of the requirements of § 25.1329,
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![Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 236 / Wednesday, December 9, 2015 / Rules and Regulations 76381
margins, an increase in flight crew S.p.A. (Agusta) Model A109A and Engineer, Safety Management Group,
workload, discomfort to the flight crew, A109A II helicopters. This AD requires Rotorcraft Directorate, FAA, 10101
or physical distress to the passengers or inspecting the slider assembly pitch Hillwood Pkwy, Fort Worth, TX 76177;
cabin crew, possibly including non-fatal control (slider) for play and replacing telephone (817) 222–5110; email
injuries. Significant transients do not the slider if the play exceeds certain martin.r.crane@faa.gov.
require, in order to remain within or limits. This AD is prompted by a report
of excessive slider play and wear that SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
recover to the normal flight envelope,
any of the following: was detected during a scheduled Comments Invited
i. Exceptional piloting skill, alertness, inspection of a Model A109A II
or strength. helicopter. These actions are intended This AD is a final rule that involves
ii. Forces applied by the pilot which to detect and prevent excessive wear requirements affecting flight safety, and
are greater than those specified in and play on a slider, which could lead we did not provide you with notice and
§ 23.143(c). to loss of tail rotor pitch control and an opportunity to provide your
iii. Accelerations or attitudes in the consequently loss of helicopter control. comments prior to it becoming effective.
airplane that might result in further DATES: This AD becomes effective However, we invite you to participate in
hazard to secured or non-secured December 24, 2015. this rulemaking by submitting written
occupants. We must receive comments on this comments, data, or views. We also
It must also be demonstrated, through AD by February 8, 2016. invite comments relating to the
tests and analysis, that no single failure ADDRESSES: You may send comments by economic, environmental, energy, or
or malfunction or probable any of the following methods: federalism impacts that resulted from
combinations of failures of the auto • Federal eRulemaking Docket: Go to adopting this AD. The most helpful
thrust system components results in the http://www.regulations.gov. Follow the comments reference a specific portion of
probability for LOTC, or un-commanded online instructions for sending your the AD, explain the reason for any
thrust changes and transients that result comments electronically. recommended change, and include
in an LOTC event, to exceed the • Fax: 202–493–2251. supporting data. To ensure the docket
following: • Mail: Send comments to the U.S.
does not contain duplicate comments,
(1) Average Events per Million Hours: 10 Department of Transportation, Docket
commenters should send only one copy
(1×10¥05 per hour) Operations, M–30, West Building
of written comments, or if comments are
(2) Maximum Events per Million Hours: 100 Ground Floor, Room W12–140, 1200
filed electronically, commenters should
(1×10¥04 per hour) New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington,
DC 20590–0001. submit them only one time. We will file
Note: The term ‘‘probable’’ in the context
• Hand Delivery: Deliver to the in the docket all comments that we
of ‘‘probable combination of failures’’ does
not have the same meaning as used for a ‘‘Mail’’ address between 9 a.m. and 5 receive, as well as a report summarizing
safety assessment process. The term p.m., Monday through Friday, except each substantive public contact with
‘‘probable’’ in ‘‘probable combination of Federal holidays. FAA personnel concerning this
failures’’ means ‘‘foreseeable,’’ or those rulemaking during the comment period.
failure conditions anticipated to occur one or Examining the AD Docket We will consider all the comments we
more times during the operational life of each You may examine the AD docket on receive and may conduct additional
airplane. the Internet at http:// rulemaking based on those comments.
Issued in Kansas City, Missouri, on www.regulations.gov by searching for
and locating Docket No. FAA–2015– Discussion
December 2, 2015.
Patrick Mullen, 3783; or in person at the Docket EASA, which is the Technical Agent
Acting Manager, Small Airplane Directorate, Operations Office between 9 a.m. and 5 for the Member States of the European
Aircraft Certification Service. p.m., Monday through Friday, except Union, has issued EASA AD No. 2015–
[FR Doc. 2015–31058 Filed 12–8–15; 8:45 am] Federal holidays. The AD docket 0097, dated June 1, 2015, to correct an
contains this AD, the European Aviation unsafe condition for Agusta Model
BILLING CODE 4910–13–P
Safety Agency (EASA) AD, the A109A and A109A II helicopters. EASA
economic evaluation, any comments advises that during a scheduled 100-
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION received, and other information. The flight-hour inspection on a Model
street address for the Docket Operations
A109A II helicopter, unusual play was
Federal Aviation Administration Office (telephone 800–647–5527) is in
detected on a part number (P/N) 109–
the ADDRESSES section. Comments will
0130–11–7 slider. Further investigation
14 CFR Part 39 be available in the AD docket shortly
revealed excessive wear of the slider
after receipt.
[Docket No. FAA–2015–3783; Directorate For service information identified in broaching at the point of contact with
Identifier 2015–SW–027–AD; Amendment
this AD, contact AgustaWestland, the tail rotor shaft. However, the cause
39–18342; AD 2015–25–04] of the excessive play and wear has not
Product Support Engineering, Via del
RIN 2120–AA64 Gregge, 100, 21015 Lonate Pozzolo (VA) been determined.
Italy, ATTN: Maurizio D’Angelo; This condition, if not detected and
Airworthiness Directives; Agusta telephone 39–0331–664757; fax 39– corrected, could lead to reduced control
S.p.A. Helicopters 0331–664680; or at http:// of the helicopter, EASA advises. EASA
AGENCY: Federal Aviation www.agustawestland.com/technical- consequently requires repetitive
bulletins. You may review the inspections of slider P/N 109–0130–11–
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Administration (FAA), Department of
Transportation (DOT). referenced service information at the 7 more frequently than those performed
FAA, Office of the Regional Counsel, at the 100-flight-hour inspection and
ACTION: Final rule; request for
Southwest Region, Room 6N–321, 10101 corrective actions depending on the
comments.
Hillwood Pkwy, Fort Worth, TX 76177. findings. EASA advises that its AD is an
SUMMARY: We are adopting a new FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: interim measure and further AD action
airworthiness directive (AD) for Agusta Martin R. Crane, Aviation Safety may follow.
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Document Created: 2015-12-14 13:33:04
Document Modified: 2015-12-14 13:33:04
| Category | Regulatory Information | |
| Collection | Federal Register | |
| sudoc Class | AE 2.7: GS 4.107: AE 2.106: | |
| Publisher | Office of the Federal Register, National Archives and Records Administration | |
| Section | Rules and Regulations | |
| Action | Final special conditions. | |
| Dates | The effective date of these special conditions is December 9, 2015 and are applicable on December 2, 2015. | |
| Contact | Jeff Pretz, Regulations and Policy Branch, ACE-111, Federal Aviation Administration, Small Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service, ACE-111, 901 Locust, Room 301, Kansas City, MO 64106; telephone (816) 329-3239, facsimile (816) 329-4090. | |
| FR Citation | 80 FR 76379 | |
| CFR Associated | Aircraft; Aviation Safety and Signs and Symbols |
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