80 FR 9483 - Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc., Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Federal Register Volume 80, Issue 35 (February 23, 2015)

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing an exemption in response to a October 31, 2013, request from Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Entergy or the licensee), from certain regulatory requirements. The exemption would remove the requirement that a licensed senior operator approve the emergency suspension of security measures for Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station (VY) during certain emergency conditions or during severe weather.

[Federal Register Volume 80, Number 35 (Monday, February 23, 2015)]
[Notices]
[Pages 9483-9485]
From the Federal Register Online  [www.thefederalregister.org]
[FR Doc No: 2015-03624]


=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Docket No. 50-271; NRC-2015-0034]


Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc., Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power 
Station

AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

ACTION: Exemption; issuance.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing an 
exemption in response to a October 31, 2013, request from Entergy 
Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Entergy or the licensee), from certain 
regulatory requirements. The exemption would remove the requirement 
that a licensed senior operator approve the emergency suspension of 
security measures for Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station (VY) during 
certain emergency conditions or during severe weather.

ADDRESSES: Please refer to Docket ID NRC-2015-0034 when contacting the 
NRC about the availability of information regarding this document. You 
may obtain publicly-available information related to this document 
using any of the following methods:
     Federal Rulemaking Web site: Go to http://www.regulations.gov and search for Docket ID NRC-2015-0034. Address 
questions about NRC dockets to Carol Gallagher; telephone: 301-415-
3463; email: [email protected]. For technical questions, contact 
the individual listed in the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT section of 
this document.
     NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System 
(ADAMS): You may obtain publicly-available documents online in the 
ADAMS Public Documents collection at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. To begin the search, select ``ADAMS Public Documents'' and 
then select ``Begin Web-based ADAMS Search.'' For problems with ADAMS, 
please contact the NRC's Public Document Room (PDR) reference staff at 
1-800-397-4209, 301-415-4737, or by email to [email protected]. The 
ADAMS accession number for each document referenced in this document 
(if that document is available in ADAMS) is provided the first time 
that a document is referenced.
     NRC's PDR: You may examine and purchase copies of public 
documents at the NRC's PDR, Room O1-F21, One White Flint North, 11555 
Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland 20852.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: James Kim, Office of Nuclear Reactor 
Regulation; U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-
0001; telephone: 301-415-4125; email: [email protected].

I. Background

    Entergy is the holder of Renewed Facility Operating License No. 
DPR-28. The license provides, among other things, that the facility is 
subject to all rules, regulations, and orders of the NRC now or 
hereafter in effect. The facility consists of a boiling-water reactor 
located in Windham County, Vermont.
    By letter dated January 12, 2015, (ADAMS Accession No. 
ML15013A426), Entergy submitted to the NRC the certification, in 
accordance with Section 50.82(a)(1)(i) and 50.82(a)(1)(ii) of Title 10 
of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR), indicating it permanently 
ceased power operations and that the VY reactor vessel was permanently 
defueled.

II. Request/Action

    On October 31, 2013 (ADAMS Accession No. ML13317A077), the licensee 
requested an exemption from 10 CFR 73.55(p)(1)(i) and 73.55(p)(1)(ii), 
pursuant to 10 CFR 73.5, ``Specific exemptions.'' Section 
73.55(p)(1)(i) and 73.55(p)(1)(ii) require, in part, that the 
suspension of security measures during certain emergency conditions or 
during severe weather be approved by a licensed senior operator. The 
exemption request relates solely to the licensing

[[Page 9484]]

requirements specified in the regulations for the staff directing 
suspension of security measures in accordance with 10 CFR 
73.55(p)(1)(i) and 73.55(p)(1)(ii), and would remove the requirement 
for a licensed senior operator to provide this approval. Instead, the 
exemption would allow the suspension of security measures during 
certain emergency conditions or during severe weather by a certified 
fuel hander (CFH). Portions of the letter dated October 31, 2013, 
contain sensitive unclassified nonsafeguards information (security-
related) and, accordingly, have been withheld from public disclosure.

III. Discussion

    Historically, the Commission's security rules have long recognized 
the potential to suspend security or safeguards measures under certain 
conditions. Accordingly, 10 CFR 50.54(x) and (y), first promulgated in 
1983, allow a licensee to take reasonable steps in an emergency that 
deviate from license conditions when those steps are ``needed to 
protect the public health and safety'' and there are no conforming 
comparable measures. (48 FR 13970; April 1, 1983). As originally 
promulgated, the deviation from license conditions must be approved by, 
as a minimum, a licensed senior operator. In 1986, in its final rule, 
``Miscellaneous Amendments Concerning the Physical Protection of 
Nuclear Power Plants'' (51 FR 27817; August 4, 1986), the Commission 
promulgated 10 CFR 73.55(a), stating in part:

    In accordance with Sec.  50.54 (x) and (y) of Part 50, the 
licensee may suspend any safeguards measures pursuant to Sec.  73.55 
in an emergency when this action is immediately needed to protect 
the public health and safety and no action consistent with license 
conditions and technical specification that can provide adequate or 
equivalent protection is immediately apparent. This suspension must 
be approved as a minimum by a licensed senior operator prior to 
taking the action.

    In 1995, the Commission made a number of proposed rule changes to 
address decommissioning. Among the changes were new regulations that 
affected Sec.  50.54 (x) and (y) by allowing a non-licensed operator 
called a ``Certified Fuel Handler,'' in addition to a licensed senior 
operator, to authorize protective steps. Specifically, in addressing 
the role of the CFH during emergencies, the Commission stated in the 
proposed rule, ``Decommissioning of Nuclear Power Reactors'' (60 FR 
37379; July 20, 1995):

    The Commission is proposing to amend 10 CFR 50.54(y) to permit a 
certified fuel handler at nuclear power reactors that have 
permanently ceased operations and permanently removed fuel from the 
reactor vessel, subject to the requirements of Sec.  50.82(a) and 
consistent with the proposed definition of ``Certified Fuel 
Handler'' specified in Sec.  50.2, to make these evaluations and 
judgments. A nuclear power reactor that has permanently ceased 
operations and no longer has fuel in the reactor vessel does not 
require a licensed individual to monitor core conditions. A 
certified fuel handler at a permanently shutdown and defueled 
nuclear power reactor undergoing decommissioning is an individual 
who has the requisite knowledge and experience to evaluate plant 
conditions and make these judgments.

    In the final rule (61 FR 39298; July 29, 1996), the Commission 
added the following definition to 10 CFR 50.2: ``Certified fuel handler 
means, for a nuclear power reactor facility, a non-licensed operator 
who has qualified in accordance with a fuel handler training program 
approved by the Commission.'' However, the Decommissioning Rule did not 
propose or make parallel changes to 10 CFR 73.55(a), and did not 
discuss the role of a non-licensed certified fuel handler.
    In the final rule, ``Power Reactor Security Requirements'' (74 FR 
13926; March 27, 2009), the NRC relocated and split the security 
suspension requirements from 10 CFR 73.55(a) to 10 CFR 73.55(p)(1)(i) 
and (p)(1)(ii). The CFHs were not discussed in the rulemaking, so the 
requirements of 10 CFR 73.55(p) to use a licensed senior operator 
remain, even for a site that otherwise no longer operates.
    However, pursuant to 10 CFR 73.5, the Commission may, upon 
application by any interested person or upon its own initiative, grant 
exemptions from the requirements of 10 CFR part 73, as it determines 
are authorized by law and will not endanger life or property or the 
common defense and security, and are otherwise in the public interest.

A. The Exemption Is Authorized by Law

    The exemption from 10 CFR 73.55(p)(1)(i) and 10 CFR 73.55(p)(1)(ii) 
would remove the requirement that a licensed senior operator approve 
the suspension of security measures, under certain emergency conditions 
or severe weather. The licensee intends to align these regulations with 
10 CFR 50.54(y) by using the authority of a non-licensed CFH in place 
of a licensed senior operator to approve the suspension of security 
measures during certain emergency conditions or during severe weather.
    Per 10 CFR 73.5, the Commission is allowed to grant exemptions from 
the regulations in 10 CFR part 73, as authorized by law. The NRC staff 
has determined that granting of the licensee's proposed exemption will 
not result in a violation of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, 
or other laws. Therefore, the exemption is authorized by law.

B. Will Not Endanger Life or Property or the Common Defense and 
Security

    Removing the requirement to have a licensed senior operator approve 
suspension of security measures during emergencies or severe weather 
will not endanger life or property or the common defense and security 
for the reasons described below.
    First, 10 CFR 73.55(p)(2) continues to require that ``[s]uspended 
security measures must be reinstated as soon as conditions permit.''
    Second, the suspension for nonweather emergency conditions under 10 
CFR 73.55(p)(1)(i) will continue to be invoked only ``when this action 
is immediately needed to protect the public health and safety and no 
action consistent with license conditions and technical specifications 
that can provide adequate or equivalent protection is immediately 
apparent.'' Thus, the underlying purpose of 10 CFR 73.55(p)(1)(i) will 
continue to be to protect public health and safety even after the 
exemption is granted.
    Third, the suspension for severe weather under 10 CFR 
73.55(p)(1)(ii) will continue to be used only when ``the suspension of 
affected security measures is immediately needed to protect the 
personal health and safety of security force personnel and no other 
immediately apparent action consistent with the license conditions and 
technical specifications can provide adequate or equivalent 
protection.'' The requirement to receive input from the security 
supervisor or manager will remain. The underlying purpose of 10 CFR 
73.55(p)(1)(ii) will continue to be to protect the health and safety of 
the security force.
    Additionally, by letter dated October 1, 2014 (ADAMS Accession No. 
ML14162A209), the NRC approved Entergy's CFH training and retraining 
program for the VY facility. The NRC staff found that, among other 
things, the program addresses the safe conduct of decommissioning 
activities, safe handling and storage of spent fuel, and the 
appropriate response to plant emergencies. Because the CFH is 
sufficiently trained and qualified under an NRC-approved program, the 
NRC staff considers a CFH to have sufficient knowledge of operational 
and safety concerns, such that allowing a CFH to suspend security 
measures during the emergencies or severe weather will not

[[Page 9485]]

result in undue risk to public health and safety.
    In addition, the exemption does not reduce the overall 
effectiveness of the physical security plan and has no adverse impacts 
to Entergy's ability to physically secure the site or protect special 
nuclear material at VY, and thus would not have an effect on the common 
defense and security. The NRC staff has concluded that the exemption 
would not reduce security measures currently in place to protect 
against radiological sabotage. Therefore, removing the requirement for 
a licensed senior operator to approve the suspension of security 
measures in an emergency or during severe weather, to allow suspension 
of security measures to be authorized by a CFH, does not adversely 
affect public health and safety issues or the assurance of the common 
defense and security.

C. Is Otherwise in the Public Interest

    Entergy's proposed exemption would remove the requirement that a 
licensed senior operator approve suspension of security measures in an 
emergency when ``immediately needed to protect the public health and 
safety'' or during severe weather when ``immediately needed to protect 
the personal health and safety of security force personnel.'' Without 
the exemption, the licensee cannot implement changes to its security 
plan to authorize a CFH to approve the temporary suspension of security 
regulations during an emergency or severe weather, comparable to the 
authority given to the CFH by the Commission when it promulgated 10 CFR 
50.54(y). Instead, the regulations would continue to require that a 
licensed senior operator be available to make decisions for a 
permanently shutdown plant, even though VY no longer requires a 
licensed senior operator. However, it is unclear how the licensee would 
implement emergency or severe weather suspensions of security measures 
without a licensed senior operator. This exemption is in the public 
interest for two reasons. First, without the exemption, there is 
uncertainty on how the licensee will invoke temporary suspension of 
security matters that may be needed for protecting public health and 
safety or the safety of the security forces during emergencies and 
severe weather. The exemption would allow the licensee to make 
decisions pursuant to 73.55(p)(1)(i) & (ii) without having to maintain 
a staff of licensed senior operators. The exemption would also allow 
the licensee to have an established procedure in place to allow a 
trained CFH to suspend security measures in the event of an emergency 
or severe weather. Second, the consistent and efficient regulation of 
nuclear power plants serves the public interest. This exemption would 
assure consistency between the security regulations in 10 CFR part 73 
and the operating reactor regulations in 10 CFR part 50, and the 
requirements concerning licensed operators in 10 CFR part 55. The NRC 
staff has determined that granting of the licensee's proposed exemption 
would allow the licensee to designate an alternative position, with 
qualifications appropriate for a permanently shutdown and defueled 
reactor, to approve the suspension of security measures during an 
emergency to protect the public health and safety, and during severe 
weather to protect the safety of the security force, consistent with 
the similar authority provided by 10 CFR 50.54(y). Therefore, the 
exemption is in the public interest.

D. Environmental Considerations

    The NRC approval of the exemption to security requirements belongs 
to a category of actions that the Commission, by rule or regulation, 
has declared to be a categorical exclusion, after first finding that 
the category of actions does not individually or cumulatively have a 
significant effect on the human environment. Specifically, the 
exemption is categorically excluded from further analysis under 10 CFR 
51.22(c)(25).
    Under 10 CFR 51.22(c)(25), granting of an exemption from the 
requirements of any regulation of Chapter I to 10 CFR is a categorical 
exclusion provided that (i) there is no significant hazards 
consideration; (ii) there is no significant change in the types or 
significant increase in the amounts of any effluents that may be 
released offsite; (iii) there is no significant increase in individual 
or cumulative public or occupational radiation exposure; (iv) there is 
no significant construction impact; (v) there is no significant 
increase in the potential for or consequences from radiological 
accidents; and (vi) the requirements from which an exemption is sought 
involve: safeguard plans, and materials control and accounting 
inventory scheduling requirements; or involve other requirements of an 
administrative, managerial, or organizational nature.
    The Director, Division of Operating Reactor Licensing, Office of 
Nuclear Reactor Regulation, has determined that approval of the 
exemption request involves no significant hazards consideration because 
removing the requirement to have a licensed senior operator approve the 
security suspension at a defueled shutdown power plant does not (1) 
involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an 
accident previously evaluated; or (2) create the possibility of a new 
or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; 
or (3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. The 
exempted security regulation is unrelated to any operational 
restriction. Accordingly, there is no significant change in the types 
or significant increase in the amounts of any effluents that may be 
released offsite; and no significant increase in individual or 
cumulative public or occupational radiation exposure. The exempted 
regulation is not associated with construction, so there is no 
significant construction impact. The exempted regulation does not 
concern the source term (i.e., potential amount of radiation in an 
accident), nor mitigation. Thus, there is no significant increase in 
the potential for, or consequences of, a radiological accident. The 
requirement to have a licensed senior operator approve departure from 
security actions may be viewed as involving either safeguards, 
materials control, or managerial matters.
    Therefore, pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) and 51.22(c)(25), no 
environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be 
prepared in connection with the approval of this exemption request.

IV. Conclusions

    Accordingly, the Commission has determined that, pursuant to 10 CFR 
73.5, the exemption is authorized by law and will not endanger life or 
property or the common defense and security, and is otherwise in the 
public interest. Therefore, the Commission hereby grants the licensee's 
request for an exemption from the requirements of 10 CFR 73.55(p)(1)(i) 
and 73.55(p)(1)(ii), which otherwise would require suspension of 
security measures during emergencies and severe weather, respectively, 
to be approved by a licensed senior operator. The exemption is 
effective upon issuance.

    Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 12th day of February 2015.

    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Michele G. Evans,
Director, Division of Operating Reactor Licensing, Office of Nuclear 
Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. 2015-03624 Filed 2-20-15; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P