81 FR 11681 - Environmental Qualification of Electrical Equipment
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Federal Register Volume 81, Issue 44 (March 7, 2016)
Federal Register Volume 81, Issue 44 (March 7, 2016)
| Page Range | 11681-11686 | |
| FR Document | 2016-05028 |
[Federal Register Volume 81, Number 44 (Monday, March 7, 2016)] [Proposed Rules] [Pages 11681-11686] From the Federal Register Online [www.thefederalregister.org] [FR Doc No: 2016-05028] ======================================================================= ----------------------------------------------------------------------- NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 10 CFR Parts 50, 52, 54, and 100 [Docket Nos. PRM-50-106; NRC-2012-0177] Environmental Qualification of Electrical Equipment AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission. ACTION: Petition for rulemaking; denial. ----------------------------------------------------------------------- SUMMARY: The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is denying a petition for rulemaking (PRM) submitted by the Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. (NRDC), and Mr. Paul M. Blanch (collectively, the petitioners) on June 18, 2012. The petitioners requested that the NRC amend its regulations to clearly and unequivocally require the environmental qualification of all safety-related cables, wires, splices, connections and other ancillary electrical equipment that may be subjected to submergence and/or moisture intrusion during normal operating conditions, severe weather, seasonal flooding, and seismic events, and post-accident conditions, both inside and outside of a reactor's containment building. The NRC is denying this petition because the current regulations already address environmental qualification in both mild and design basis event conditions of electrical equipment located both inside and outside of the containment building that is important to safety, and the petition does not provide significant new or previously unconsidered information sufficient to justify rulemaking. DATES: The docket for the petition for rulemaking, PRM-50-106, is closed on March 7, 2016. [[Page 11682]] ADDRESSES: Please refer to Docket ID NRC-2012-0177 when contacting the NRC about the availability of information regarding this petition. You may obtain publicly-available information related to the petition by using any of the following methods:Federal Rulemaking Web site: Go to http://www.regulations.gov and search for Docket ID NRC-2012-0177. Address questions about NRC dockets to Carol Gallagher; telephone: 301-415- 3463; email: [email protected]. For technical questions, contact the individual listed in the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT section of this document. NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS): You may obtain publicly-available documents online in the ADAMS Public Documents collection at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. To begin the search, select ``ADAMS Public Documents'' and then select ``Begin Web-based ADAMS Search.'' For problems with ADAMS, please contact the NRC's Public Document Room (PDR) reference staff at 1-800-397-4209, 301-415-4737, or by email to [email protected]. The ADAMS accession number for each document referenced (if it is available in ADAMS) is provided the first time that it is mentioned in the SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION section. NRC's PDR: You may examine and purchase copies of public documents at the NRC's PDR, Room O1-F21, One White Flint North, 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland 20852. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Margaret Ellenson, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, telephone: 301-415-0894; email: [email protected]. SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Table of Contents I. The Petition II. NRC Analysis III. Determination of Petition I. The Petition On June 18, 2012, the NRC received a petition for rulemaking filed jointly by the NRDC and Mr. Paul Blanch (ADAMS Accession No. ML12177A377). The petitioners requested that the NRC amend its regulations in parts 50, 52, 54, and 100 of title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) to clearly and unequivocally require the environmental qualification of all safety-related cables, wires, splices, connections and other ancillary electrical equipment that may be subjected to submergence and/or moisture intrusion during normal operating conditions, severe weather, seasonal flooding, and seismic events, and post-accident conditions, both inside and outside of a reactor's containment building. The petition was docketed by the NRC on June 22, 2012, and was assigned Docket No. PRM-50-106. On September 27, 2012 (77 FR 59345), the NRC published a notice of receipt in the Federal Register. The NRC did not request public comment on PRM-50-106. II. NRC Analysis The petitioners raised three issues in support of their request that the NRC amend the regulations related to environmental qualification of electrical equipment at nuclear power plants. The three issues and the NRC's responses to each issue are presented in this section. Issue 1: Through the issuance of Generic Letter (GL) 82-09, ``Environmental Qualification of Safety-Related Electrical Equipment,'' dated April 20, 1982 (ADAMS Accession No. ML031080281), the NRC staff limited the scope of Sec. 50.49 based on the location of the electrical equipment. The petitioners stated that as a result of the accident at Three Mile Island, the NRC strengthened the regulatory requirements for electrical equipment by, among other things, revising Sec. 50.49(e) to add paragraph (6) to address the possibility of electrical equipment submergence. The petitioners asserted that Sec. 50.49(e)(6), as written, did not limit or restrict its applicability based upon the location of the equipment, but that the NRC staff limited this applicability through a question and answer (Q&A) set in GL 82-09: Q. For equipment qualification purposes, what are the staff requirements concerning submergence of equipment outside containment? A. The staff requires that the licensee submit documentation on the qualification of safety-related equipment that could be submerged due to a high energy line break outside containment. The petitioners asserted that the problem with this excerpt from GL 82-09 is that safety-related cables and wires outside containment are routinely submerged in water not only during high energy line breaks (HELBs), but also during a reactor's normal operation. The petitioners argued that the 1979 Three Mile Island accident and laboratory testing have shown that moisture intrusion and submergence of electrical cables and wires significantly increase the probability of failure, which also causes the failure of connected components such as emergency core cooling system motors and pumps, valves, controls, and instrumentation. The petitioners asserted that the safety implications from the failure of a safety-related cable inside containment submerged by an accident, outside containment submerged by a high energy line break, or outside containment submerged by nature, are identical--the safety function is lost. NRC Response to Issue 1: The regulations at Sec. 50.49, ``Environmental qualification of electric equipment important to safety for nuclear power plants,'' are applicable to electrical equipment located outside containment as well as inside. The January 21, 1983, Federal Register notice of the final Sec. 50.49 rule (48 FR 2730) made this clear by noting that nuclear power plant equipment important to safety must be able to perform its safety functions throughout its installed life, and that this requirement applies to equipment inside as well as outside containment. (See 48 FR 2731.) The Q&A referenced by the petitioners is itself premised on the applicability of Sec. 50.49 to important to safety electrical equipment outside of containment. Regardless of its location inside or outside containment, if any important to safety electrical equipment is near enough to a high energy line (e.g., steam line, feedwater, blow-down, charging, or letdown lines) that the equipment's performance could be adversely affected by a rupture of that line, Sec. 50.49 requires that the equipment be qualified to withstand any environmental conditions that may result from such an event. Section 50.49 was established to impose additional requirements beyond those established by Sec. 50.65, ``Requirements for monitoring the effectiveness of maintenance at nuclear power plants;'' 10 CFR part 50, appendix A, ``General Design Criteria [GDC] For Nuclear Power Plants;'' \1\ and 10 CFR part 50, appendix B, ``Quality Assurance Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants and Fuel Processing Plants.'' The additional requirements in Sec. 50.49 apply to important to safety electrical equipment that could be subject to postulated design basis events (DBEs) that could affect: (1) The integrity of the reactor coolant pressure boundary; (2) the capability to shut the reactor down safely and keep it safe; or (3) the capability to prevent or mitigate accidents that could result in potential [[Page 11683]] offsite exposures comparable to NRC emergency planning guidelines. As the cited GL 82-09 Q&A indicates, a HELB was the most probable such DBE involving submergence outside of containment for which the NRC staff believed that a power reactor's important to safety electrical equipment must be environmentally qualified. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\ The GDC pertains to water cooled nuclear plants and establishes the minimum requirements for their principal design criteria (36 FR 3256; February 20, 1971, as amended). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The NRC agrees with the petitioners that safety-related cables and other electrical equipment must be fully able to function, not only within an operating environment affected by a HELB under Sec. 50.49, but also over the entire length of its system, even those portions not exposed to a HELB. Criterion 18 of 10 CFR part 50, appendix A, requires that electric power systems important to safety be designed so that important areas and features permit appropriate periodic inspection and testing. Example areas and features specified are the following: wiring, insulation, connections, and switchboards. Criterion 18 also requires the systems to be designed with a capability to test periodically the operability and functional performance of the components of the systems and the operability of the system as a whole. As the petitioners rightly point out, designing the entirety of an electrical safety system for inspectability and testability is essential because ``[i]t matters little if the portion of a safety- related cable inside [or] outside containment in a high energy line break area survive[s] if another portion of that same cable routed underground fails due to submergence.'' It is also important to note that the NRC's design and qualification requirements for underground or inaccessible wires, cables, and ancillary equipment are inspected and enforced. The NRC's inspection procedures direct that inspections of electrical equipment at risk of flooding or exposure to moisture be conducted annually. The NRC disagrees with the petitioners' assertion that GL 82-09 has restricted the applicability of Sec. 50.49 regulatory requirements for safety-related equipment according to its location. Generic letters do not have the legal authority of a final rule promulgated after due public notice and comment, as was Sec. 50.49. The Q&A in GL 82-09 does not exempt any safety-related equipment that could be submerged, inside or outside containment, from the environmental qualifications (EQ) requirements of Sec. 50.49. The purpose of the GL 82-09 Q&A cited by the petitioners was simply to clarify that under Sec. 50.49, licensees must submit information on the EQ of important to safety equipment that could be submerged due to a high energy line break outside containment. The applicability of Sec. 50.49 is not limited to a HELB, although after more than 30 years of operating experience and risk analysis, a HELB remains the most probable DBE involving submergence outside containment that meets the Sec. 50.49 criteria for the subset of DBEs that could result in a severe accident. The clarifying Q&A was important because the GL was providing information in the event of a HELB, not describing the entire universe of postulated DBEs to which Sec. 50.49 could apply. Issue 2: Safety-related cable subject to submergence, condensation, or moisture located in a ``mild environment'' should not be exempted from the environmental qualification requirements of Sec. 50.49. The petitioners argued that rulemaking is necessary to ensure that electrical cables and wires will be properly qualified for environmental conditions they may experience during normal operation (i.e., a mild environment) as well as in an accident. The petitioners claimed the need for rulemaking and clarification of Sec. 50.49 to address cables that may be exposed to non-mild environments during normal, abnormal, and accident conditions. The petitioners noted that electrical cables and wires ``are prone to accelerated failure rates when submerged in water or exposed to high humidity unless designed and qualified for these environmental conditions.'' The petitioners stated that the NRC prioritized the inspection of cable penetrations after the 1979 Three Mile Island accident based on the probability of their impairment, mostly due to submergence and moisture. The petitioners argued that ``[i]f these conditions cause a high probability of impairment following an accident, then it is logical to assume that these conditions produce a similar outcome in the absence of or prior to an accident as well.'' In support of their case for a rulemaking to address this impairment, the petitioners also referenced a 1996 study by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) (ADAMS Accession No. ML031140264) and three studies by the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI), ``Plant Support Engineering: Life Cycle Management Planning Sourcebooks: Medium-Voltage (MV) Cables and Accessories (Terminations and Splices),'' EPRI Product ID: 1013187; ``Plant Support Engineering: Aging Management Program Development Guidance for AC and DC Low-Voltage Power Cable Systems for Nuclear Power Plants,'' EPRI Product ID: 1020804; and ``Plant Support Engineering: Aging Management Program Guidance for Medium-Voltage Cable Systems for Nuclear Power Plants,'' EPRI Product ID: 1020805. The EPRI documents are available for download from www.EPRI.com. Also in support of their request for rulemaking to extend Sec. 50.49 requirements to electrical equipment in mild environments, the petitioners contended that the NRC's requirements state only that safety systems should remain functional and do not provide conditions or acceptance criteria for degraded cables. NRC Response to Issue 2: The NRC agrees that Sec. 50.49 does not apply to reactor cables and electrical equipment exposed to mild environments. This section of the rule applies EQ requirements only to important to safety cables and electrical equipment that may be exposed to non-mild environments during accident conditions. The purpose of the final Sec. 50.49 rule (48 FR 2730; January 21, 1983) was to codify accepted industry standards and NRC guidance for the EQ of safety- related electrical equipment, and non-safety-related equipment relied on by safety-related equipment, that must perform a safety function under DBE conditions. The NRC disagrees with the petitioners' assertion that Sec. 50.49 should be amended to extend EQ requirements to important to safety cables and electrical equipment exposed to submergence or moisture intrusion in mild environments. The existing rule specifically exempts from these requirements equipment exposed only to a ``mild environment,'' which is defined in Sec. 50.49(c) as an environment that would at no time be significantly more severe than the environment that would occur during normal plant operation, including anticipated operational occurrences. All important to safety equipment whether in mild or non-mild environments is subject to the requirements for monitoring the effectiveness of maintanence under the maintenance rule (Sec. 50.65). Furthermore, all important to safety equipment at plants with construction permits issued after May 21, 1971, is also subject to the design and quality requirements in 10 CFR part 50, appendix A. In addition to the above requirements, all safety-related equipment is also subject to the quality assurance requirements of 10 CFR part 50, appendix B. Therefore, equipment in mild environments exposed to submergence, condensation, and moisture intrusion, the kind of [[Page 11684]] degradation of concern to the petitioners, is subject to several existing requirements. For important to safety equipment that could be subject to environmental conditions that may result as a consequence of a DBE, Sec. 50.49 establishes additional requirements beyond those stipulated in Sec. 50.65; 10 CFR part 50, appendix A; and 10 CFR part 50, appendix B. The maintenance rule (Sec. 50.65) establishes requirements for monitoring the effectiveness of maintenance at nuclear power plants. Under Sec. 50.65(a)(1), licensees are required to monitor the condition or performance of structures, systems, or components (SSCs) in a manner providing reasonable assurance that the intended SSC functions can be fulfilled. Section 50.65(b) describes the types of SSCs subject to its requirements. The maintenance rule (Sec. 50.65) applies to safety and non-safety SSCs that includes the following: SSCs used in the plant's emergency operating procedures or relied upon to mitigate accidents or transient unsafe conditions; SSCs whose failure could prevent safety-related SSCs from fulfilling their safety-related function; or SSCs whose failure could cause a reactor scram (unplanned action to stop the fission reaction) or the actuation of a safety- related system. With this scope, the maintenance rule (Sec. 50.65) already covers the equipment specified in the petition (i.e., all safety-related cables, wires, splices, connections, and other ancillary electrical equipment that may be subjected to submergence and/or moisture intrusion). Section 50.65 covers this equipment under any normal or unusual operating or post-accident conditions, whether these conditions include severe weather, seasonal flooding, or seismic events, or whether the SSCs are inside or outside of containment. The rule also covers the petitioners' specified systems and components whether or not they are exposed to submergence in water, condensation, wetting, and other environmental stresses during routine operation and infrequent events (e.g., flooding). In its April 2012 Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.218, ``Condition- Monitoring Techniques for Electric Cables Used In Nuclear Power Plants'' (ADAMS Accession No. ML103510447), the NRC described a programmatic approach and acceptable techniques for monitoring the condition of electric cable systems and their operating environments. As authority for this guidance, RG 1.218 cited 10 CFR part 50, Criterion XI, ``Test Control,'' of appendix B. Criterion XI specifies that power reactor licensees must have a program to assure that all testing required to show that SSCs will perform satisfactorily in service is identified and performed. The test program must include, as appropriate, operational tests of SSCs during nuclear power plant operation. Test procedures must include provisions for assuring that all prerequisites for the given test have been met, that adequate test instrumentation is available and used, and that the test is performed under suitable environmental conditions. Test results under Criterion XI must also be ``documented and evaluated'' to ensure that this Criterion's requirements have been satisfied. It is important to note that Criterion XI is only one of 18 criteria that are applicable to a quality assurance program for the electrical equipment at issue in this petition. Appendix B criteria establish quality assurance requirements for the design, manufacture, construction, and operation of all safety-related equipment, and all activities affecting its functions, including not only testing, but designing, purchasing, fabricating, handling, shipping, storing, cleaning, installing, inspecting, operating, maintaining, repairing, and modifying this equipment. Criterion XVI, ``Corrective Action,'' also requires licensees to have measures assuring that conditions adverse to quality are promptly identified and corrected. Examples of such conditions are the following: failures, malfunctions, deficiencies, deviations, defective material and equipment, and nonconformances. For significant conditions adverse to quality, including the potential failure of electrical equipment to function as designed, licensees must determine the cause of the condition and ``assure'' that corrective action is taken to preclude a repetition of the adverse condition. The identified condition, its cause, and the corrective action taken to prevent its recurrence must also be documented and the appropriate levels of management informed. In addition, for important to safety cables and electrical equipment located in an area meeting the definition of a mild environment in Sec. 50.49, 10 CFR part 50, appendix A, GDC 4 requires that this equipment be designed to manage the conditions it will experience during normal operation, maintenance, testing, and postulated accidents. The NRC does not agree that its existing regulations do not require sufficient protection of important to safety electrical equipment against expected or potential environmental conditions it experiences during its period of service. Regardless of whether a cable, switch, or other piece of electrical equipment must be environmentally qualified under Sec. 50.49, it must meet maintenance, design, and quality assurance requirements established by Sec. 50.65; 10 CFR part 50, appendix A; and 10 CFR part 50, appendix B (for safety-related equipment), to provide adequate protection for public health and safety. And regardless of whether the equipment is environmentally qualified, it is subject to the same degree of NRC oversight in the form of inspections and enforcement. A rulemaking to require the environmental qualification of all electrical equipment exposed only to mild environments is, therefore, unnecessary. Moreover, the 1996 DOE study and three EPRI studies cited by the petitioners are well known to the NRC and do not constitute significant new information justifying a rulemaking. The NRC recognized the concern regarding the reliability of low-voltage power cable systems at reactors that the petitioner references and acted accordingly. Among other things, the NRC has revised its inspection procedures to ensure annual inspections of underground bunkers and manholes in a continuing repeated cycle beginning with those containing the most risk- significant cables. The NRC also issued RG 1.218, describing a programmatic approach and acceptable techniques for monitoring the condition of electric cable systems and their operating environments. The NRC disagrees with the petitioners' contention that the NRC's requirements do not provide conditions or acceptance criteria for degraded cables. Any requirement for safety-related systems to remain functional for a specified operating life is a design requirement, and any failure of the equipment before the end of that operating life would be a violation of that design requirement. Therefore, taken together, GDC 2, 4, and 18 in 10 CFR part 50, appendix A, the maintenance requirements under Sec. 50.65, and the quality assurance testing requirements in 10 CFR part 50, appendix B, Criterion XI, effectively provide an enforceable acceptance criterion for the continued use of cables or any other electrical equipment degrading during normal operation. Criterion XI states that the measured rate of degradation must not impair the equipment's ability to function in an emergency, even if the emergency were to occur on the last day of the performance period specified in the equipment's design requirement. [[Page 11685]] Guidance for the implementation of this criterion is provided in the August 25, 2009, NRC staff regulatory resolution issue protocol, ``Cable Performance Issues at Nuclear Power Plants'' (ADAMS Accession No. ML092220419), which the petitioners cited as documentation of the NRC's requirements on cable and wire submergence issues. The NRC staff position in that protocol is: (1) Licensees should monitor cables within the scope of the maintenance rule (Sec. 50.65) at an appropriate frequency to demonstrate that they can perform their design functions when called upon; and (2) cables must be designed to fulfill their intended design function in the environment to which they are subject. Under the protocol, if cables have been exposed to conditions for which they are not designed or qualified, the licensee must demonstrate, through adequate testing or condition monitoring, that the cables can perform their intended design function for the duration of the qualified period specified in the license. The NRC also inspects underground cables through established inspection procedures. In particular, Inspection Procedure (IP) Attachment 71111.06, ``Flood Protection Measures'' (ADAMS Accession No. ML11244A012), specifically directs NRC inspectors to perform an annual review of cables located in underground bunkers or manholes. The IP Attachment directs inspectors to select bunkers or manholes subject to flooding that contain multiple train or multiple risk-significant cables, and inspect those that contain more risk-significant cables before inspecting those with less risk-significant cables. The IP notes that inspectors should rotate through the bunkers or manholes until all are inspected; and then the cycle should be recommenced. The IP Attachment also clarifies that these inspections may be in addition to those for the aging management programs of plants with renewed licenses. Where ``significant moisture'' is identified at such plants, inspectors are to verify that the licensee takes action to keep the cables dry and assess cable degradation in accordance with the licensee's aging management program. Issue 3: Although GDC 2 and 4 of the NRC's regulations require that cables be able to perform their design function when subjected to anticipated environmental conditions, the NRC does not apply these and other GDC to the 57 plants with construction permits issued before May 21, 1971, the effective date of the GDC rule (36 FR 3256; February 20, 1971). Citing the August 25, 2009, NRC staff regulatory issue resolution protocol, ``Cable Performance Issues at Nuclear Power Plants,'' the petitioners asserted that this statement defined the NRC's governing regulations on submerged cable performance as explicitly including GDC 2 and GDC 4. The GDC 2 requires reactor SSCs that are important to safety be designed to withstand the effects of natural phenomena without loss of capability to perform their safety functions. The GDC 4 requires that these SSCs be designed to accommodate the effects of and be compatible with the environmental conditions associated with normal operation, maintenance, testing, and postulated accidents. The petition stated that although these GDC may contain appropriate regulatory requirements for the qualification of electrical cables and wires, the NRC has determined that these requirements are not to be applied to the majority of reactors. The petitioners noted that, at the time the petition was submitted, at least 57 of the nation`s 104 operating reactors had construction permits that were issued prior to the effective date of the GDC rule, and that the Commission, through guidance to the NRC staff, has determined that the GDC do not need to be applied to these 57 reactors. NRC Response to Issue 3: The NRC disagrees with the petitioners' suggestion that the 57 plants that received construction permits prior to May 21, 1971, are not operating safely with appropriately qualified important to safety equipment. In 1992, after more than 15 years of analysis, the NRC staff recommended that the Commission retain the current policy that no exemptions from or specific backfits for the GDC are required for plants with construction permits issued before that date. In its September 18, 1992, Staff Requirements Memorandum (SRM) (ADAMS Accession No. ML003763736), the Commission endorsed the NRC staff's recommendation not to apply the GDC to plants with construction permits issued prior to the effective date of the GDC rule. This recommendation was based on the documented results of the NRC staff's evaluations of representative designs of 10 of the 57 plants against the design requirements of a 1975 Standard Review Plan for reactor license applications based on the approved GDC. The SRM explained that at the time the GDC were promulgated, the Commission had stressed that they were not new requirements and were promulgated to articulate more clearly the licensing requirements and practice in effect at that time. The Commission stated that while compliance with the intent of the GDC is important, each plant licensed before the GDC were formally adopted was evaluated on a plant-specific basis, determined to be safe, and licensed by the NRC. Furthermore, the Commission determined that existing regulatory processes were sufficient to ensure that plants continue to be safe and comply with the intent of the GDC. As the petitioners also noted, the Commission went on to say that backfitting these 57 plants to meet the GDC would provide little or no safety benefit while requiring an extensive commitment of resources. The petitioners have not provided any significant, new, or previously unconsidered information to justify a new rulemaking or to reverse this NRC position. III. Reasons for Denial The NRC is denying PRM-50-106 because: (1) The NRC disagrees with the petitioners' assertion that GL 82-09 has restricted the applicability of Sec. 50.49 regulatory requirements for safety-related equipment according to its location. This regulation is applicable to electrical equipment located outside containment as well as inside. (2) Section 50.49 explicitly excludes important to safety electrical equipment subject only to mild environments. The petitioners have not provided significant new information sufficient to justify a change to this rule. A rulemaking to require the environmental qualification of all electrical equipment exposed only to mild environments is unnecessary because existing NRC regulations require sufficient protection of important to safety electrical equipment against expected or potential environmental conditions it experiences during its period of service. (3) With regard to the reactors that received construction permits prior to May 21, 1971, the Commission determined in response to SECY- 92-223, ``Resolution of Deviations Identified During the Systematic Evaluation Program'' (ADAMS Accession No. ML12256B290) that these plants are operating safely with appropriately qualified important to safety equipment, and that no specific backfits of the GDC to these plants were required. The petitioners have not provided any significant, new, or previously unconsidered information justifying a rulemaking to apply the GDC to the 57 reactors that received construction permits prior to May 21, 1971. [[Page 11686]] IV. Conclusion For the reasons cited in this document, the NRC is denying PRM-50- 106. The NRC is denying this petition because the current regulations already address environmental qualification in both mild and design basis event conditions of electrical equipment located both inside and outside of the containment building that is important to safety, and the petitioners did not provide significant new or previously unconsidered information sufficient to justify rulemaking. Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 29th day of February, 2016. For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Annette L. Vietti-Cook, Secretary of the Commission. [FR Doc. 2016-05028 Filed 3-4-16; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 7590-01-P
![Federal Register / Vol. 81, No. 44 / Monday, March 7, 2016 / Proposed Rules 11681
marketing order is in the current of Secretary may pursuant to this subpart (iv) To meet any other such expenses
interstate or foreign commerce or determine to be appropriate, may be recommended by the committee and
directly burdens, obstructs, or affects required under this part throughout the approved by the Secretary; and
such commerce. period it is in effect, irrespective of (v) To cover the necessary expenses of
whether particular provisions thereof liquidation in the event of termination
Order Relative to Handling
are suspended or become inoperative. of this part. Upon such termination, any
It is therefore ordered, that on and * * * * * funds not required to defray the
after the effective date hereof, all necessary expenses of liquidation shall
■ 3. Revise paragraph (a) of § 989.81 to
handling of raisins produced from be disposed of in such manner as the
read as follows:
grapes grown in California shall be in Secretary may determine to be
conformity to, and in compliance with, § 989.81 Accounting. appropriate; Provided, That to the extent
the terms and conditions of the said (a) If, at the end of the crop year, the practicable, such funds shall be
order as hereby proposed to be amended assessments collected are in excess of returned pro rata to the persons from
as follows: expenses incurred, such excess shall be whom such funds were collected.
The provisions of the proposed accounted for in accordance with one of
marketing order amending the order * * * * *
the following: [FR Doc. 2016–04623 Filed 3–4–16; 8:45 am]
contained in the proposed rule issued
(1) If such excess is not retained in a BILLING CODE 3410–02–P
by the Administrator on October 15,
reserve, as provided in paragraph (a)(2)
2015, and published in the Federal
of this section, it shall be refunded
Register (80 FR 62506) on October 16,
proportionately to the persons from
2015, will be and are the terms and NUCLEAR REGULATORY
whom collected in accordance with
provisions of this order amending the COMMISSION
§ 989.80; Provided, That any sum paid
order and are set forth in full herein.
by a person in excess of his or her pro
10 CFR Parts 50, 52, 54, and 100
PART 989—RAISINS PRODUCED rata share of expenses during any crop
FROM GRAPES GROWN IN year may be applied by the committee
[Docket Nos. PRM–50–106; NRC–2012–
CALIFORNIA at the end of such crop year as credit for 0177]
such person, toward the committee’s
■ 1. The authority citation for 7 CFR administrative operations for the Environmental Qualification of
part 989 continues to read as follows: following crop year; Provided further, Electrical Equipment
Authority: 7 U.S.C. 601–674. That the committee may credit the
excess to any outstanding obligations AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory
■ 2. Revise paragraph (c) of § 989.80 to Commission.
due the committee from such person.
read as follows:
(2) The committee may carry over ACTION: Petition for rulemaking; denial.
§ 989.80 Assessments. such excess funds into subsequent crop
years as a reserve; Provided, That funds SUMMARY: The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
* * * * * Commission (NRC) is denying a petition
(c) During any crop year or any already in the reserve do not exceed one
crop year’s budgeted expenses as for rulemaking (PRM) submitted by the
portion of a crop year for which volume
averaged over the past six years. In the Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.
percentages are not effective for a
event that funds exceed one crop year’s (NRDC), and Mr. Paul M. Blanch
varietal type, all standard raisins of that
varietal type acquired by handlers expenses, funds in excess of one crop (collectively, the petitioners) on June 18,
during such period shall be free tonnage year’s budgeted expenses shall be 2012. The petitioners requested that the
for purposes of levying assessments distributed in accordance with NRC amend its regulations to clearly
pursuant to this section. The Secretary paragraph (1) above. Such funds may be and unequivocally require the
shall fix the rate of assessment to be used: environmental qualification of all
paid by all handlers on the basis of a (i) To defray essential administrative safety-related cables, wires, splices,
specified rate per ton. At any time expenses (i.e., staff wages/salaries and connections and other ancillary
during or after a crop year, the Secretary related benefits, office rent, utilities, electrical equipment that may be
may increase the rate of assessment to postage, insurance, legal expenses, audit subjected to submergence and/or
obtain sufficient funds to cover any later costs, consulting, Web site operation moisture intrusion during normal
finding by the Secretary relative to the and maintenance, office supplies, operating conditions, severe weather,
expenses of the committee. Each repairs and maintenance, equipment seasonal flooding, and seismic events,
handler shall pay such additional leases, domestic staff travel and and post-accident conditions, both
assessment to the committee upon committee mileage reimbursement, inside and outside of a reactor’s
demand. In order to provide funds to international committee travel, containment building. The NRC is
carry out the functions of the international staff travel, bank charges, denying this petition because the
committee, the committee may accept computer software and programming, current regulations already address
advance payments from any handler to costs of compliance activities, and other environmental qualification in both
be credited toward such assessments as similar essential administrative mild and design basis event conditions
may be levied pursuant to this section expenses) exclusive of promotional of electrical equipment located both
against such handler during the crop expenses during any crop year, prior to inside and outside of the containment
mstockstill on DSK4VPTVN1PROD with PROPOSALS
year. In the event cash flow needs of the the time assessment income is sufficient building that is important to safety, and
committee are above cash available to cover such expenses; the petition does not provide significant
generated by handler assessments, the (ii) To cover deficits incurred during new or previously unconsidered
committee may borrow from a any period when assessment income is information sufficient to justify
commercial lending institution. The less than expenses; rulemaking.
payment of assessments for the (iii) To defray expenses incurred DATES:The docket for the petition for
maintenance and functioning of the during any period when any or all rulemaking, PRM–50–106, is closed on
committee, and for such purposes as the provisions of this part are suspended; March 7, 2016.
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ADDRESSES: Please refer to Docket ID moisture intrusion during normal connected components such as
NRC–2012–0177 when contacting the operating conditions, severe weather, emergency core cooling system motors
NRC about the availability of seasonal flooding, and seismic events, and pumps, valves, controls, and
information regarding this petition. You and post-accident conditions, both instrumentation. The petitioners
may obtain publicly-available inside and outside of a reactor’s asserted that the safety implications
information related to the petition by containment building. from the failure of a safety-related cable
using any of the following methods: The petition was docketed by the NRC inside containment submerged by an
• Federal Rulemaking Web site: Go to on June 22, 2012, and was assigned accident, outside containment
http://www.regulations.gov and search Docket No. PRM–50–106. On September submerged by a high energy line break,
for Docket ID NRC–2012–0177. Address 27, 2012 (77 FR 59345), the NRC or outside containment submerged by
questions about NRC dockets to Carol published a notice of receipt in the nature, are identical—the safety
Gallagher; telephone: 301–415–3463; Federal Register. The NRC did not function is lost.
email: Carol.Gallagher@nrc.gov. For request public comment on PRM–50– NRC Response to Issue 1: The
technical questions, contact the 106. regulations at § 50.49, ‘‘Environmental
individual listed in the FOR FURTHER qualification of electric equipment
II. NRC Analysis
INFORMATION CONTACT section of this important to safety for nuclear power
document. The petitioners raised three issues in plants,’’ are applicable to electrical
• NRC’s Agencywide Documents support of their request that the NRC equipment located outside containment
Access and Management System amend the regulations related to as well as inside. The January 21, 1983,
(ADAMS): You may obtain publicly- environmental qualification of electrical Federal Register notice of the final
available documents online in the equipment at nuclear power plants. The § 50.49 rule (48 FR 2730) made this
ADAMS Public Documents collection at three issues and the NRC’s responses to clear by noting that nuclear power plant
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/ each issue are presented in this section. equipment important to safety must be
adams.html. To begin the search, select Issue 1: Through the issuance of able to perform its safety functions
‘‘ADAMS Public Documents’’ and then Generic Letter (GL) 82–09, throughout its installed life, and that
select ‘‘Begin Web-based ADAMS ‘‘Environmental Qualification of Safety- this requirement applies to equipment
Search.’’ For problems with ADAMS, Related Electrical Equipment,’’ dated inside as well as outside containment.
please contact the NRC’s Public April 20, 1982 (ADAMS Accession No. (See 48 FR 2731.) The Q&A referenced
Document Room (PDR) reference staff at ML031080281), the NRC staff limited by the petitioners is itself premised on
1–800–397–4209, 301–415–4737, or by the scope of § 50.49 based on the the applicability of § 50.49 to important
email to pdr.resource@nrc.gov. The location of the electrical equipment. to safety electrical equipment outside of
ADAMS accession number for each The petitioners stated that as a result containment. Regardless of its location
document referenced (if it is available in of the accident at Three Mile Island, the inside or outside containment, if any
ADAMS) is provided the first time that NRC strengthened the regulatory important to safety electrical equipment
it is mentioned in the SUPPLEMENTARY requirements for electrical equipment is near enough to a high energy line
INFORMATION section. by, among other things, revising (e.g., steam line, feedwater, blow-down,
• NRC’s PDR: You may examine and § 50.49(e) to add paragraph (6) to charging, or letdown lines) that the
purchase copies of public documents at address the possibility of electrical equipment’s performance could be
the NRC’s PDR, Room O1–F21, One equipment submergence. The adversely affected by a rupture of that
White Flint North, 11555 Rockville petitioners asserted that § 50.49(e)(6), as line, § 50.49 requires that the equipment
Pike, Rockville, Maryland 20852. written, did not limit or restrict its be qualified to withstand any
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: applicability based upon the location of environmental conditions that may
Margaret Ellenson, Office of Nuclear the equipment, but that the NRC staff result from such an event. Section 50.49
Reactor Regulation, U.S. Nuclear limited this applicability through a was established to impose additional
Regulatory Commission, Washington, question and answer (Q&A) set in GL requirements beyond those established
DC 20555–0001, telephone: 301–415– 82–09: by § 50.65, ‘‘Requirements for
0894; email: Margaret.Ellenson@nrc.gov. Q. For equipment qualification
monitoring the effectiveness of
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
purposes, what are the staff
maintenance at nuclear power plants;’’
requirements concerning submergence
Table of Contents 10 CFR part 50, appendix A, ‘‘General
of equipment outside containment?
A. The staff requires that the licensee Design Criteria [GDC] For Nuclear
I. The Petition Power Plants;’’ 1 and 10 CFR part 50,
II. NRC Analysis submit documentation on the
qualification of safety-related equipment appendix B, ‘‘Quality Assurance Criteria
III. Determination of Petition
that could be submerged due to a high for Nuclear Power Plants and Fuel
I. The Petition energy line break outside containment. Processing Plants.’’ The additional
On June 18, 2012, the NRC received The petitioners asserted that the requirements in § 50.49 apply to
a petition for rulemaking filed jointly by problem with this excerpt from GL 82– important to safety electrical equipment
the NRDC and Mr. Paul Blanch 09 is that safety-related cables and wires that could be subject to postulated
(ADAMS Accession No. ML12177A377). outside containment are routinely design basis events (DBEs) that could
The petitioners requested that the NRC submerged in water not only during affect: (1) The integrity of the reactor
amend its regulations in parts 50, 52, 54, high energy line breaks (HELBs), but coolant pressure boundary; (2) the
mstockstill on DSK4VPTVN1PROD with PROPOSALS
and 100 of title 10 of the Code of also during a reactor’s normal operation. capability to shut the reactor down
Federal Regulations (10 CFR) to clearly The petitioners argued that the 1979 safely and keep it safe; or (3) the
and unequivocally require the Three Mile Island accident and capability to prevent or mitigate
environmental qualification of all laboratory testing have shown that accidents that could result in potential
safety-related cables, wires, splices, moisture intrusion and submergence of 1 The GDC pertains to water cooled nuclear plants
connections and other ancillary electrical cables and wires significantly and establishes the minimum requirements for their
electrical equipment that may be increase the probability of failure, principal design criteria (36 FR 3256; February 20,
subjected to submergence and/or which also causes the failure of 1971, as amended).
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![Federal Register / Vol. 81, No. 44 / Monday, March 7, 2016 / Proposed Rules 11683
offsite exposures comparable to NRC could be submerged due to a high ‘‘Plant Support Engineering: Aging
emergency planning guidelines. As the energy line break outside containment. Management Program Guidance for
cited GL 82–09 Q&A indicates, a HELB The applicability of § 50.49 is not Medium-Voltage Cable Systems for
was the most probable such DBE limited to a HELB, although after more Nuclear Power Plants,’’ EPRI Product
involving submergence outside of than 30 years of operating experience ID: 1020805. The EPRI documents are
containment for which the NRC staff and risk analysis, a HELB remains the available for download from
believed that a power reactor’s most probable DBE involving www.EPRI.com.
important to safety electrical equipment submergence outside containment that Also in support of their request for
must be environmentally qualified. meets the § 50.49 criteria for the subset rulemaking to extend § 50.49
The NRC agrees with the petitioners of DBEs that could result in a severe requirements to electrical equipment in
that safety-related cables and other accident. The clarifying Q&A was mild environments, the petitioners
electrical equipment must be fully able important because the GL was providing contended that the NRC’s requirements
to function, not only within an information in the event of a HELB, not state only that safety systems should
operating environment affected by a describing the entire universe of remain functional and do not provide
HELB under § 50.49, but also over the postulated DBEs to which § 50.49 could conditions or acceptance criteria for
entire length of its system, even those apply. degraded cables.
portions not exposed to a HELB. Issue 2: Safety-related cable subject to NRC Response to Issue 2: The NRC
Criterion 18 of 10 CFR part 50, appendix submergence, condensation, or moisture agrees that § 50.49 does not apply to
A, requires that electric power systems located in a ‘‘mild environment’’ should reactor cables and electrical equipment
important to safety be designed so that not be exempted from the exposed to mild environments. This
important areas and features permit environmental qualification section of the rule applies EQ
appropriate periodic inspection and requirements of § 50.49. requirements only to important to safety
testing. Example areas and features The petitioners argued that cables and electrical equipment that
specified are the following: wiring, rulemaking is necessary to ensure that may be exposed to non-mild
insulation, connections, and electrical cables and wires will be environments during accident
switchboards. Criterion 18 also requires properly qualified for environmental conditions. The purpose of the final
the systems to be designed with a conditions they may experience during § 50.49 rule (48 FR 2730; January 21,
capability to test periodically the normal operation (i.e., a mild 1983) was to codify accepted industry
operability and functional performance environment) as well as in an accident. standards and NRC guidance for the EQ
of the components of the systems and The petitioners claimed the need for of safety-related electrical equipment,
the operability of the system as a whole. rulemaking and clarification of § 50.49 and non-safety-related equipment relied
As the petitioners rightly point out, to address cables that may be exposed on by safety-related equipment, that
designing the entirety of an electrical to non-mild environments during must perform a safety function under
safety system for inspectability and normal, abnormal, and accident DBE conditions.
testability is essential because ‘‘[i]t conditions. The petitioners noted that The NRC disagrees with the
matters little if the portion of a safety- electrical cables and wires ‘‘are prone to petitioners’ assertion that § 50.49 should
related cable inside [or] outside accelerated failure rates when be amended to extend EQ requirements
containment in a high energy line break submerged in water or exposed to high to important to safety cables and
area survive[s] if another portion of that humidity unless designed and qualified electrical equipment exposed to
same cable routed underground fails for these environmental conditions.’’ submergence or moisture intrusion in
due to submergence.’’ It is also The petitioners stated that the NRC mild environments. The existing rule
important to note that the NRC’s design prioritized the inspection of cable specifically exempts from these
and qualification requirements for penetrations after the 1979 Three Mile requirements equipment exposed only
underground or inaccessible wires, Island accident based on the probability to a ‘‘mild environment,’’ which is
cables, and ancillary equipment are of their impairment, mostly due to defined in § 50.49(c) as an environment
inspected and enforced. The NRC’s submergence and moisture. The that would at no time be significantly
inspection procedures direct that petitioners argued that ‘‘[i]f these more severe than the environment that
inspections of electrical equipment at conditions cause a high probability of would occur during normal plant
risk of flooding or exposure to moisture impairment following an accident, then operation, including anticipated
be conducted annually. it is logical to assume that these operational occurrences.
The NRC disagrees with the conditions produce a similar outcome in All important to safety equipment
petitioners’ assertion that GL 82–09 has the absence of or prior to an accident as whether in mild or non-mild
restricted the applicability of § 50.49 well.’’ In support of their case for a environments is subject to the
regulatory requirements for safety- rulemaking to address this impairment, requirements for monitoring the
related equipment according to its the petitioners also referenced a 1996 effectiveness of maintanence under the
location. Generic letters do not have the study by the U.S. Department of Energy maintenance rule (§ 50.65).
legal authority of a final rule (DOE) (ADAMS Accession No. Furthermore, all important to safety
promulgated after due public notice and ML031140264) and three studies by the equipment at plants with construction
comment, as was § 50.49. The Q&A in Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI), permits issued after May 21, 1971, is
GL 82–09 does not exempt any safety- ‘‘Plant Support Engineering: Life Cycle also subject to the design and quality
related equipment that could be Management Planning Sourcebooks: requirements in 10 CFR part 50,
mstockstill on DSK4VPTVN1PROD with PROPOSALS
submerged, inside or outside Medium-Voltage (MV) Cables and appendix A. In addition to the above
containment, from the environmental Accessories (Terminations and requirements, all safety-related
qualifications (EQ) requirements of Splices),’’ EPRI Product ID: 1013187; equipment is also subject to the quality
§ 50.49. The purpose of the GL 82–09 ‘‘Plant Support Engineering: Aging assurance requirements of 10 CFR part
Q&A cited by the petitioners was simply Management Program Development 50, appendix B. Therefore, equipment in
to clarify that under § 50.49, licensees Guidance for AC and DC Low-Voltage mild environments exposed to
must submit information on the EQ of Power Cable Systems for Nuclear Power submergence, condensation, and
important to safety equipment that Plants,’’ EPRI Product ID: 1020804; and moisture intrusion, the kind of
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![11686 Federal Register / Vol. 81, No. 44 / Monday, March 7, 2016 / Proposed Rules
IV. Conclusion and information in response to the and/or RIN in the subject line of the
For the reasons cited in this NOPR received no later than March 14, message.
document, the NRC is denying PRM– 2016. 3. Mail: Ms. Brenda Edwards, U.S.
50–106. The NRC is denying this ADDRESSES: See the section ‘‘Public Department of Energy, Building
petition because the current regulations Participation’’ for details on submitting Technologies Program, Mailstop EE–5B,
already address environmental comments. 1000 Independence Avenue SW.,
qualification in both mild and design Washington, DC 20585–0121. If
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Ms.
basis event conditions of electrical possible, please submit all items on a
Ashley Armstrong, U.S. Department of CD. It is not necessary to include
equipment located both inside and Energy, Office of Energy Efficiency and
outside of the containment building that printed copies.
Renewable Energy, Building 4. Hand Delivery/Courier: Ms. Brenda
is important to safety, and the Technologies Program, EE–5B, 1000
petitioners did not provide significant Edwards, U.S. Department of Energy,
Independence Avenue SW., Building Technologies Program, 950
new or previously unconsidered Washington, DC 20585–0121.
information sufficient to justify L’Enfant Plaza SW., Suite 600,
Telephone: 202–586–6590. Email: Washington, DC 20024. Telephone:
rulemaking. ashley.armstrong@ee.doe.gov; or Mr. (202) 586–2945. If possible, please
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 29th day Steven Goering, U.S. Department of submit all items on a CD. It is not
of February, 2016. Energy, Office of the General Counsel, necessary to include printed copies.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Forrestal Building, GC–32, 1000 Docket: The docket, which includes
Annette L. Vietti-Cook, Independence Avenue SW., Federal Register notices, public meeting
Secretary of the Commission. Washington, DC 20585–0121. attendee lists and transcripts,
[FR Doc. 2016–05028 Filed 3–4–16; 8:45 am]
Telephone: 202–286–5691. Email: comments, and other supporting
steven.goering@hq.doe.gov. documents/materials, is available for
BILLING CODE 7590–01–P
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: On review at regulations.gov. All
December 29, 2015, the U.S. Department documents in the docket are listed in
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY of Energy (DOE) published a notice of the regulations.gov index. However,
proposed rulemaking in the Federal some documents listed in the index,
10 CFR Part 429 Register proposing that a person such as those containing information
importing into the United States any that is exempt from public disclosure,
[Docket No. EERE–2015–BT–CE–0019]
covered product or equipment subject to may not be publicly available.
RIN 1990–AA44 an applicable energy conservation A link to the docket Web page can be
standard provide, prior to importation, found at: http://www.regulations.gov/
Energy Conservation Program: a certification of admissibility to the #!docketDetail;D=EERE-2015-BT-CE-
Certification and Enforcement—Import DOE. (80 FR 81199) The comment 0019. This Web page will contain a link
Data Collection; Notice of Extension of period ended February 12, 2016. On to the docket for this notice on the
Comment Period February 17, 2016, after receiving regulations.gov site. The regulations.gov
AGENCY: Office of the General Counsel, several requests for additional time to Web page will contain simple
Department of Energy. prepare and submit comments, DOE instructions on how to access all
reopened the comment period until documents, including public comments,
ACTION: Notice of reopening of comment
February 29, 2016 (81 FR 8022). At a in the docket.
period.
public meeting held on February 19, For further information on how to
SUMMARY: On December 29, 2015, the 2016, DOE again received requests for submit a comment, review other public
U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) additional time to prepare and submit comments and the docket, or to request
published a notice of proposed comments. DOE is reopening the period a public meeting, contact Ms. Brenda
rulemaking in the Federal Register for submitting comments. Edwards at (202) 586–2945 or by email:
proposing that a person importing into DOE will accept comments, data, and Brenda.Edwards@ee.doe.gov.
the United States any covered product information in response to the NOPR Issued in Washington, DC, on February 26,
or equipment subject to an applicable received no later than March 14, 2016. 2016.
energy conservation standard provide, DOE will consider any comments in Kathleen B. Hogan,
prior to importation, a certification of response to the NOPR received by Deputy Assistant Secretary for Energy
admissibility to the DOE. The comment midnight of March 14, 2016, and deems Efficiency, Energy Efficiency and Renewable
period ended February 12, 2016. On any comments received by that time to Energy.
February 17, 2016, after receiving be timely submitted. [FR Doc. 2016–04829 Filed 3–4–16; 8:45 am]
several requests for additional time to
Public Participation BILLING CODE 6450–01–P
prepare and submit comments, DOE
reopened the comment period until Any comments submitted must
February 29, 2016. At a public meeting identify the NOPR for Import Data DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
held on February 19, 2016, DOE again Collection, and provide docket number
received requests for additional time to EERE–2015–BT–CE–0019 and/or 10 CFR Part 900
prepare and submit comments. DOE is regulatory information number (RIN)
mstockstill on DSK4VPTVN1PROD with PROPOSALS
reopening the period for submitting number 1990–AA44. Comments may be RIN 1901–AB36
comments until March 14, 2016. submitted using any of the following
methods: Coordination of Federal Authorizations
DATES: The DOE is reopening the
for Electric Transmission Facilities;
comment period for the notice of 1. Federal eRulemaking Portal:
Notice of Public Meeting
proposed rulemaking published on www.regulations.gov. Follow the
December 29, 2015 (80 FR 81199) and instructions for submitting comments. AGENCY: Office of Electricity Delivery
extended on February 29, 2016 (81 FR 2. Email: ImportData2015CE0019@ and Energy Reliability, Department of
8022). We will accept comments, data, ee.doe.gov. Include the docket number Energy.
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Document Created: 2018-02-02 15:08:04
Document Modified: 2018-02-02 15:08:04
| Category | Regulatory Information | |
| Collection | Federal Register | |
| sudoc Class | AE 2.7: GS 4.107: AE 2.106: | |
| Publisher | Office of the Federal Register, National Archives and Records Administration | |
| Section | Proposed Rules | |
| Action | Petition for rulemaking; denial. | |
| Dates | The docket for the petition for rulemaking, PRM-50-106, is closed on March 7, 2016. | |
| Contact | Margaret Ellenson, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, telephone: 301-415-0894; email: [email protected] | |
| FR Citation | 81 FR 11681 | |
| CFR Citation | 10
CFR
100 10 CFR 50 10 CFR 52 10 CFR 54 |
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