81_FR_24215 81 FR 24136 - Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc.; Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station

81 FR 24136 - Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc.; Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Federal Register Volume 81, Issue 79 (April 25, 2016)

Page Range24136-24139
FR Document2016-09558

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing an exemption from the requirement to maintain a specified level of onsite property damage insurance in response to a request from Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (ENO or the licensee) dated April 17, 2014. The exemption would permit Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station (VY) to reduce its onsite insurance from $1.06 billion to $50 million.

Federal Register, Volume 81 Issue 79 (Monday, April 25, 2016)
[Federal Register Volume 81, Number 79 (Monday, April 25, 2016)]
[Notices]
[Pages 24136-24139]
From the Federal Register Online  [www.thefederalregister.org]
[FR Doc No: 2016-09558]


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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Docket No. 50-271; NRC-2016-0017]


Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc.; Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power 
Station

AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

ACTION: Exemption; issuance.

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SUMMARY: The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing an 
exemption from the requirement to maintain a specified level of onsite 
property damage insurance in response to a request from Entergy Nuclear 
Operations, Inc. (ENO or the licensee) dated April 17, 2014. The 
exemption would permit Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station (VY) to 
reduce its onsite insurance from $1.06 billion to $50 million.

DATES: April 25, 2016.

ADDRESSES: Please refer to Docket ID NRC-2016-0017 when contacting the 
NRC about the availability of information regarding this document. You 
may obtain publicly-available information related to this document 
using any of the following methods:
     Federal Rulemaking Web site: Go to http://www.regulations.gov and search for Docket ID NRC-2016-0017. Address 
questions about NRC dockets to Carol Gallagher; telephone: 301-415-
3463; email: [email protected]. For technical questions, contact 
the individual listed in the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT section of 
this document.
     NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System 
(ADAMS): You may obtain publicly-available documents online in the 
ADAMS Public Documents collection at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. To begin the search, select ``ADAMS Public Documents'' and 
then select ``Begin Web-based ADAMS Search.'' For problems with ADAMS, 
please contact the NRC's Public Document Room (PDR) reference staff at 
1-800-397-4209, 301-415-4737, or by email to [email protected]. The 
ADAMS accession number for each document referenced (if it is available 
in ADAMS) is provided the first time that it is mentioned in this 
document.
     NRC's PDR: You may examine and purchase copies of public 
documents at the NRC's PDR, Room O1-F21, One White Flint North, 11555 
Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland 20852.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Jack D. Parrott, Office of Nuclear 
Material Safety and Safeguards, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 
Washington, DC 20555-0001; telephone: 301-415-6634, email: 
[email protected].

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

I. Background

    The VY site is a single unit facility located near the town of 
Vernon, Vermont. The site is situated in Windham County on the western 
shore of the Connecticut River, immediately upstream of the Vernon 
Hydroelectric Station. The VY facility employs a General Electric 
boiling water reactor nuclear steam supply system licensed to generate 
1,912 megawatts thermal. The boiling water reactor and supporting 
facilities are owned and operated by Entergy Vermont Yankee, a 
subsidiary of ENO. The licensee, ENO, is the holder of Renewed Facility 
Operating License No. DPR-28. The license provides, among other things, 
that the facility is subject to all rules, regulations, and orders of 
the NRC now or hereafter in effect.
    By letter dated September 23, 2013 (ADAMS Accession No. 
ML13273A204), ENO submitted a notification to the NRC indicating that 
it would permanently shut down VY in the fourth calendar quarter of 
2014. On December 29, 2014, ENO permanently ceased power operations at 
VY. On January 12, 2015, ENO certified that it had permanently defueled 
the VY reactor vessel and placed the fuel in the spent fuel pool (SFP) 
(ADAMS Accession No. ML15013A426). Accordingly, pursuant to Sec.  
50.82(a)(2) of title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR), 
the VY renewed facility operating license no longer authorized 
operation of the reactor or emplacement or retention of fuel in the 
reactor vessel. However, the licensee is still authorized to possess 
and store irradiated nuclear fuel. Irradiated fuel is currently being 
stored onsite in a SFP and independent spent fuel storage installation 
dry casks.

II. Request/Action

    Under 10 CFR 50.12, ``Specific exemptions,'' ENO has requested an 
exemption from 10 CFR 50.54(w)(1) by letter dated April 17, 2014 (ADAMS 
Accession No. ML14111A401). The exemption from the requirements of 10 
CFR 50.54(w)(1) would permit ENO to reduce its onsite property damage 
insurance from $1.06 billion to $50 million.
    The regulation in 10 CFR 50.54(w)(1) requires each licensee to have 
and maintain onsite property damage insurance to stabilize and 
decontaminate the reactor and reactor site in the event of an accident. 
The onsite insurance coverage must be either $1.06 billion or whatever 
amount of insurance is generally available from private sources 
(whichever is less).
    The licensee states that the risk of an accident at a permanently 
shutdown and defueled reactor is much less than the risk from an 
operating power reactor. In addition, since reactor operation is no 
longer authorized at VY, there are no events that would require the 
stabilization of reactor conditions after an accident. Similarly, the 
risk of an accident that would result in significant onsite 
contamination at VY is also much lower than the risk of such an event 
at operating reactors. Therefore, ENO is requesting an exemption from 
10 CFR 50.54(w)(1), effective April 15, 2016, that would permit a 
reduction in its onsite property damage insurance from $1.06 billion to

[[Page 24137]]

$50 million, commensurate with the reduced risk of an accident at the 
permanently shutdown and defueled VY reactor.

III. Discussion

    In accordance with 10 CFR 50.12, the Commission may, upon 
application by any interested person or upon its own initiative, grant 
exemptions from the requirements of 10 CFR part 50 when (1) the 
exemptions are authorized by law, will not present an undue risk to the 
public health or safety, and are consistent with the common defense and 
security; and (2) any of the special circumstances listed in 10 CFR 
50.12(a)(2) are present.
    The financial protection limits of 10 CFR 50.54(w)(1) were 
established after the Three Mile Island accident, out of concern that 
licensees may be unable to financially cover onsite cleanup costs, in 
the event of a major nuclear accident. The specified $1.06 billion 
coverage amount requirement was developed based on an analysis of an 
accident at a nuclear reactor operating at power, resulting in a large 
fission product release and requiring significant resource expenditures 
to stabilize the reactor conditions and ultimately decontaminate and 
cleanup the site (similar to the stabilization and cleanup activities 
at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power facility following the damage 
from a severe earthquake and tsunami).
    These cost estimates were developed in consideration of the 
spectrum of postulated accidents for an operating nuclear reactor. The 
costs were derived from the consequences of a release of radioactive 
material from the reactor. Although the risk of an accident at an 
operating reactor is very low, the consequences can be large. In an 
operating plant, the high temperature and pressure of the reactor 
coolant system (RCS), as well as the inventory of relatively short-
lived radionuclides, contribute to both the risk and consequences of an 
accident. With the permanent cessation of reactor operations at VY and 
the permanent removal of the fuel from the reactor core, such accidents 
are no longer possible. As a result, the reactor, RCS, and supporting 
systems no longer operate and, therefore, have no function as it 
pertains to the storage of the irradiated fuel. Hence, postulated 
accidents involving failure or malfunction of the reactor, RCS, or 
supporting systems are no longer applicable.
    During reactor decommissioning, the principal radiological risks 
are associated with the storage of spent fuel onsite. In its April 17, 
2014, exemption request, ENO describes both design-basis and beyond-
design-basis events involving irradiated fuel stored in the SFP. The 
licensee determined that there are no applicable design-basis events at 
VY that could result in a radiological release exceeding the limits 
established by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) early-
phase Protective Action Guidelines (PAGs) of one roentgen equivalent 
man (rem) at the exclusion area boundary, as a way to demonstrate that 
any possible radiological releases would be minimal and not require 
precautionary protective actions (e.g., sheltering in place or 
evacuation). The staff evaluated the radiological consequences 
associated with various decommissioning activities, and design basis 
accidents at VY, in consideration of VY's permanently shut down and 
defueled status. The possible design-basis accident scenarios at VY 
have greatly reduced radiological consequences. Based on its review, 
the staff concluded that no reasonably conceivable design-basis 
accident exists that could cause an offsite release greater than the 
EPA PAGs. The only design-basis accident that could potentially result 
in an offsite radiological release at VY is a fuel handling accident 
(FHA). Analysis performed by the licensee concluded that 17 days after 
shutdown, the radiological consequence of an FHA would not exceed the 
limits established by the EPA PAGs at the exclusion area boundary. 
Based on the time that VY has been permanently shutdown (approximately 
13 months), the staff determined that the possibility of an offsite 
radiological release from a design-basis accident that could exceed the 
EPA PAGs has been eliminated. The only event that has the potential to 
lead to a significant radiological release at a decommissioning reactor 
is a zirconium fire. The zirconium fire scenario is a postulated, but 
highly unlikely, beyond-design-basis accident scenario that involves 
the loss of water inventory from the SFP, resulting in a significant 
heat-up of the spent fuel and culminating in substantial zirconium 
cladding oxidation and fuel damage. The probability of a zirconium fire 
scenario is related to the decay heat of the irradiated fuel stored in 
the SFP. Therefore, the risks from a zirconium fire scenario continue 
to decrease as a function of the time that VY has been permanently shut 
down.
    The NRC staff has previously authorized a lesser amount of onsite 
property damage insurance coverage based on this analysis of the 
zirconium fire risk. In SECY-96-256, ``Changes to Financial Protection 
Requirements for Permanently Shutdown Nuclear Power Reactors, 10 CFR 
50.54(w)(1) and 10 CFR 140.11,'' dated December 17, 1996 (ADAMS 
Accession No. ML15062A483), the staff recommended changes to the power 
reactor insurance regulations that would allow licensees to lower 
onsite insurance levels to $50 million, upon demonstration that the 
fuel stored in the SFP can be air-cooled. In its Staff Requirements 
Memorandum to SECY-96-256, dated January 28, 1997 (ADAMS Accession No. 
ML15062A454), the Commission supported the staff's recommendation that, 
among other things, would allow permanently shutdown power reactor 
licensees to reduce commercial onsite property damage insurance 
coverage to $50 million, when the licensee was able to demonstrate the 
technical criterion that the spent fuel could be air-cooled if the SFP 
was drained of water. The staff has used this technical criterion to 
grant similar exemptions to other decommissioning reactors (e.g., Maine 
Yankee Atomic Power Station, published in the Federal Register on 
January 19, 1999 (64 FR 2920); and Zion Nuclear Power Station, 
published in the Federal Register on December 28, 1999 (64 FR 72700)). 
These prior exemptions were granted, based on these licensees 
demonstrating that the SFP could be air-cooled, consistent with the 
technical criterion discussed above.
    In SECY-00-0145, ``Integrated Rulemaking Plan for Nuclear Power 
Plant Decommissioning,'' dated June 28, 2000, and SECY-01-0100, 
``Policy Issues Related to Safeguards, Insurance, and Emergency 
Preparedness Regulations at Decommissioning Nuclear Power Plants 
Storing Fuel in Spent Fuel Pools,'' dated June 4, 2001 (ADAMS Accession 
Nos. ML003721626 and ML011450420, respectively), the NRC staff 
discussed additional information concerning SFP zirconium fire risks at 
decommissioning reactors and associated implications for onsite 
property damage insurance. Providing an analysis of when the spent fuel 
stored in the SFP is capable of air-cooling is one measure that can be 
used to demonstrate that the probability of a zirconium fire is 
exceedingly low. However, the staff has more recently used an 
additional analysis that bounds an incomplete drain down of the SFP 
water, or some other catastrophic event (such as a complete drainage of 
the SFP with rearrangement of spent fuel rack geometry and/or the 
addition of rubble to the SFP). This analysis includes an assumption of 
adiabatic conditions,

[[Page 24138]]

which means no heat transfer from the spent fuel via conduction, 
convection, or radiation.
    In the case of VY, the licensee determined that the fuel removed 
from the reactor would have sufficiently decayed by April 15, 2016, to 
significantly reduce the risk from SFP draining events. To support this 
determination, the licensee provided an adiabatic analysis indicating 
that the fuel cladding temperature would not reach levels associated 
with a significant radiological release within 10 hours after the loss 
of all means of cooling. The licensee maintains strategies and 
equipment to cool the spent fuel in the unlikely event that coolant is 
lost, and the 10-hour adiabatic heating time would provide sufficient 
time for personnel to respond with onsite equipment to restore a means 
of spent fuel cooling.
    In addition, the licensee cited NRC-staff developed reports 
concluding that the high density storage of fuel in the SFP is safe and 
the risk of a large radiological release is very low. The staff 
presented an independent evaluation of a SFP subject to a severe 
earthquake in NUREG-2161, ``Consequence Study of a Beyond-Design-Basis 
Earthquake Affecting the Spent Fuel Pool for a U.S. Mark I Boiling 
Water Reactor,'' September 2014 (ADAMS Accession No. ML14255A365). This 
evaluation concluded that, for a representative boiling-water reactor 
(BWR), fuel in a dispersed high-density configuration would be 
adequately cooled by natural circulation airflow within several months 
after discharge from a reactor if the pool was drained of water.
    By letter dated November 23, 2015 (ADAMS Accession No.ML15329A167), 
ENO confirmed that the plant design and fuel storage configuration 
considered in NUREG-2161 were consistent with the VY plant design and 
fuel storage configurations to be used in the decommissioning of VY. 
The staff independently confirmed that the fuel assembly decay power 
was also consistent. Thus, after 15.4 months decay, which will be 
reached by the requested effective date of April 15, 2016 for this 
exemption, the fuel stored in the VY SFP will be able to adequately be 
cooled by air in the unlikely event the SFP drained. For the very 
unlikely beyond-design-basis accident scenario, where the SFP coolant 
inventory is lost in such a manner that all methods of heat removal 
from the spent fuel are no longer available, there will be a minimum of 
10 hours from the initiation of the accident until the cladding reaches 
a temperature where offsite radiological release might occur. The staff 
finds that 10 hours is sufficient time to support deployment of 
mitigation equipment to prevent the zirconium cladding from reaching a 
point of rapid oxidation.
    Based on the above discussion and SECY-96-256, the NRC staff 
determined $50 million to be an adequate level of onsite property 
damage insurance for a decommissioning reactor, once the spent fuel in 
the SFP is no longer susceptible to a zirconium fire. The staff has 
postulated that there is still a potential for other radiological 
incidents at a decommissioning reactor that could result in significant 
onsite contamination besides a zirconium fire. In SECY-96-256, the NRC 
staff cited the rupture of a large contaminated liquid storage tank, 
causing soil contamination and potential groundwater contamination, as 
the most costly postulated event to decontaminate and remediate (other 
than a SFP zirconium fire). The postulated large liquid radiological 
waste storage tank rupture event was determined to have a bounding 
onsite cleanup cost of approximately $50 million. Therefore, the staff 
determined that the licensee's proposal to reduce onsite insurance to a 
level of $50 million would be consistent with the bounding cleanup and 
decontamination cost, as discussed in SECY-96-256, to account for the 
postulated rupture of a large liquid radiological waste tank at the VY 
site, should such an event occur.

A. Authorized by Law

    The regulation in 10 CFR 50.54(w)(1) requires each licensee to have 
and maintain onsite property damage insurance of either $1.06 billion 
or whatever amount of insurance is generally available from private 
sources, whichever is less. In accordance with 10 CFR 50.12, the 
Commission may grant exemptions from the regulations in 10 CFR part 50, 
as the Commission determines are authorized by law.
    As explained above, the NRC staff has determined that the 
licensee's proposed reduction in onsite property damage insurance 
coverage to a level of $50 million is consistent with SECY-96-256. 
Moreover, the staff concluded that as of April 15, 2016, sufficient 
irradiated fuel decay time will have elapsed at VY to decrease the 
probability of an onsite and offsite radiological release from a 
postulated zirconium fire accident to negligible levels. In addition, 
the licensee's proposal to reduce onsite insurance to a level of $50 
million is consistent with the maximum estimated cleanup costs for the 
recovery from the rupture of a large liquid radiological waste storage 
tank.
    The NRC staff has determined that granting of the licensee's 
proposed exemption will not result in a violation of the Atomic Energy 
Act of 1954, or other laws, as amended. Therefore, based on its review 
of ENO's exemption request, as discussed above, and consistent with 
SECY-96-256, the NRC staff concludes that the exemption is authorized 
by law.

B. No Undue Risk to Public Health and Safety

    The onsite property damage insurance requirements of 10 CFR 
50.54(w)(1) were established to provide financial assurance that 
following a significant nuclear incident, onsite conditions could be 
stabilized and the site decontaminated. The requirements of 10 CFR 
50.54(w)(1) and the existing level of onsite insurance coverage for VY 
are predicated on the assumption that the reactor is operating. 
However, VY is a permanently shutdown and defueled facility. The 
permanently defueled status of the facility has resulted in a 
significant reduction in the number and severity of potential 
accidents, and correspondingly, a significant reduction in the 
potential for and severity of onsite property damage. The proposed 
reduction in the amount of onsite insurance coverage does not impact 
the probability or consequences of potential accidents. The proposed 
level of insurance coverage is commensurate with the reduced 
consequences of potential nuclear accidents at VY. Therefore, the NRC 
staff concludes that granting the requested exemption will not present 
an undue risk to the health and safety of the public.

C. Consistent With the Common Defense and Security

    The proposed exemption would not eliminate any requirements 
associated with physical protection of the site and would not adversely 
affect ENO's ability to physically secure the site or protect special 
nuclear material. Physical security measures at VY are not affected by 
the requested exemption. Therefore, the proposed exemption is 
consistent with the common defense and security.

D. Special Circumstances

    Under 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii), special circumstances are present if 
the application of the regulation in the particular circumstances would 
not serve the underlying purpose of the rule or is not necessary to 
achieve the underlying purpose of the rule. The underlying purpose of 
10 CFR 50.54(w)(1) is to provide reasonable

[[Page 24139]]

assurance that adequate funds will be available to stabilize conditions 
and cover onsite cleanup costs associated with site decontamination, 
following an accident that results in the release of a significant 
amount of radiological material. Because VY is permanently shut down 
and defueled, it is no longer possible for the radiological 
consequences of design-basis accidents or other credible events at VY 
to exceed the limits of the EPA PAGs at the exclusion area boundary. 
The licensee has evaluated the consequences of highly unlikely, beyond-
design-basis conditions involving a loss of coolant from the SFP. The 
analyses show that after April 15, 2016, the likelihood of such an 
event leading to a large radiological release is negligible. The NRC 
staff's evaluation of the licensee's analyses confirm this conclusion.
    The NRC staff also finds that the licensee's proposed $50 million 
level of onsite insurance is consistent with the bounding cleanup and 
decontamination cost, as discussed in SECY-96-256, to account for the 
hypothetical rupture of a large liquid radiological waste tank at the 
VY site, should such an event occur. Therefore, the staff concludes 
that the application of the current requirements in 10 CFR 50.54(w)(1) 
to maintain $1.06 billion in onsite insurance coverage is not necessary 
to achieve the underlying purpose of the rule for the permanently 
shutdown and defueled VY reactor.
    Under 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(iii), special circumstances are present 
whenever compliance would result in undue hardship or other costs that 
are significantly in excess of those contemplated when the regulation 
was adopted, or that are significantly in excess of those incurred by 
others similarly situated.
    The NRC staff concludes that if the licensee was required to 
continue to maintain an onsite insurance level of $1.06 billion, the 
associated insurance premiums would be in excess of those necessary and 
commensurate with the radiological contamination risks posed by the 
site. In addition, such insurance levels would be significantly in 
excess of other decommissioning reactor facilities that have been 
granted similar exemptions by the NRC.
    The NRC staff finds that compliance with the existing rule would 
result in an undue hardship or other costs that are significantly in 
excess of those contemplated when the regulation was adopted and are 
significantly in excess of those incurred by others similarly situated.
    Therefore, the special circumstances required by 10 CFR 
50.12(a)(2)(ii) and 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(iii) exist.

E. Environmental Considerations

    The NRC approval of the exemption to insurance or indemnity 
requirements belongs to a category of actions that the Commission, by 
rule or regulation, has declared to be a categorical exclusion, after 
first finding that the category of actions does not individually or 
cumulatively have a significant effect on the human environment. 
Specifically, the exemption is categorically excluded from further 
analysis under Sec.  51.22(c)(25).
    Under 10 CFR 51.22(c)(25), granting of an exemption from the 
requirements of any regulation of Chapter I to 10 CFR is a categorical 
exclusion provided that (i) there is no significant hazards 
consideration; (ii) there is no significant change in the types or 
significant increase in the amounts of any effluents that may be 
released offsite; (iii) there is no significant increase in individual 
or cumulative public or occupational radiation exposure; (iv) there is 
no significant construction impact; (v) there is no significant 
increase in the potential for or consequences from radiological 
accidents; and (vi) the requirements from which an exemption is sought 
involve: surety, insurance, or indemnity requirements.
    The Director, Division of Decommissioning, Uranium Recovery and 
Waste Programs, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, has 
determined that approval of the exemption request involves no 
significant hazards consideration because reducing the licensee's 
onsite property damage insurance for VY does not (1) involve a 
significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident 
previously evaluated; or (2) create the possibility of a new or 
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; or 
(3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. The exempted 
financial protection regulation is unrelated to the operation of VY. 
Accordingly, there is no significant change in the types or significant 
increase in the amounts of any effluents that may be released offsite; 
and no significant increase in individual or cumulative public or 
occupational radiation exposure.
    In addition, the exempted regulation is not associated with 
construction, so there is no significant construction impact. The 
exempted regulation does not concern the source term (i.e., potential 
amount of radiation in an accident), nor mitigation. Therefore, there 
is no significant increase in the potential for, or consequences of, a 
radiological accident. In addition, there would be no significant 
impacts to biota, water resources, historic properties, cultural 
resources, or socioeconomic conditions in the region. Moreover, the 
requirement for onsite property damage insurance involves surety, 
insurance, and indemnity matters. Accordingly, the exemption request 
meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 
10 CFR 51.22(c)(25). Therefore, pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) and 
51.22(c)(25), no environmental impact statement or environmental 
assessment need be prepared in connection with the approval of this 
exemption request.

IV. Conclusions

    Accordingly, the Commission has determined that, pursuant to 10 CFR 
50.12(a), the exemption from 50.54(w)(1) is authorized by law, will not 
present an undue risk to the public health and safety, and is 
consistent with the common defense and security. In addition, special 
circumstances are present as set forth in 10 CFR 50.12. Therefore, the 
Commission hereby grants VY an exemption from the requirements of 10 
CFR 50.54(w)(1). The exemption will permit VY to lower minimum required 
onsite insurance to $50 million no earlier than April 15, 2016.
    The exemption is effective upon issuance.

    Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 15th day of April, 2016.

    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
John R. Tappert,
 Director, Division of Decommissioning, Uranium Recovery and Waste 
Programs, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards.
[FR Doc. 2016-09558 Filed 4-22-16; 8:45 am]
 BILLING CODE 7590-01-P



                                                    24136                          Federal Register / Vol. 81, No. 79 / Monday, April 25, 2016 / Notices

                                                       The schedule for Commission                          insurance from $1.06 billion to $50                   provides, among other things, that the
                                                    meetings is subject to change on short                  million.                                              facility is subject to all rules,
                                                    notice. For more information or to verify               DATES: April 25, 2016.                                regulations, and orders of the NRC now
                                                    the status of meetings, contact Denise                                                                        or hereafter in effect.
                                                                                                            ADDRESSES: Please refer to Docket ID
                                                    McGovern at 301–415–0681 or via email                                                                            By letter dated September 23, 2013
                                                                                                            NRC–2016–0017 when contacting the
                                                    at Denise.McGovern@nrc.gov.                                                                                   (ADAMS Accession No. ML13273A204),
                                                                                                            NRC about the availability of
                                                    *      *     *    *      *                                                                                    ENO submitted a notification to the
                                                                                                            information regarding this document.
                                                       The NRC Commission Meeting                                                                                 NRC indicating that it would
                                                                                                            You may obtain publicly-available                     permanently shut down VY in the
                                                    Schedule can be found on the Internet                   information related to this document
                                                    at: http://www.nrc.gov/public-involve/                                                                        fourth calendar quarter of 2014. On
                                                                                                            using any of the following methods:                   December 29, 2014, ENO permanently
                                                    public-meetings/schedule.html.                             • Federal Rulemaking Web site: Go to
                                                                                                                                                                  ceased power operations at VY. On
                                                    *      *     *    *      *                              http://www.regulations.gov and search
                                                                                                                                                                  January 12, 2015, ENO certified that it
                                                       The NRC provides reasonable                          for Docket ID NRC–2016–0017. Address
                                                                                                                                                                  had permanently defueled the VY
                                                    accommodation to individuals with                       questions about NRC dockets to Carol
                                                                                                                                                                  reactor vessel and placed the fuel in the
                                                    disabilities where appropriate. If you                  Gallagher; telephone: 301–415–3463;
                                                                                                                                                                  spent fuel pool (SFP) (ADAMS
                                                    need a reasonable accommodation to                      email: Carol.Gallagher@nrc.gov. For                   Accession No. ML15013A426).
                                                    participate in these public meetings, or                technical questions, contact the                      Accordingly, pursuant to § 50.82(a)(2) of
                                                    need this meeting notice or the                         individual listed in the FOR FURTHER                  title 10 of the Code of Federal
                                                    transcript or other information from the                INFORMATION CONTACT section of this
                                                                                                                                                                  Regulations (10 CFR), the VY renewed
                                                    public meetings in another format (e.g.                 document.                                             facility operating license no longer
                                                    braille, large print), please notify                       • NRC’s Agencywide Documents
                                                                                                                                                                  authorized operation of the reactor or
                                                    Kimberly Meyer, NRC Disability                          Access and Management System
                                                                                                                                                                  emplacement or retention of fuel in the
                                                    Program Manager, at 301–287–0739, by                    (ADAMS): You may obtain publicly-
                                                                                                                                                                  reactor vessel. However, the licensee is
                                                    videophone at 240–428–3217, or by                       available documents online in the                     still authorized to possess and store
                                                    email at Kimberly.Meyer-Chambers@                       ADAMS Public Documents collection at                  irradiated nuclear fuel. Irradiated fuel is
                                                    nrc.gov. Determinations on requests for                 http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/                        currently being stored onsite in a SFP
                                                    reasonable accommodation will be                        adams.html. To begin the search, select               and independent spent fuel storage
                                                    made on a case-by-case basis.                           ‘‘ADAMS Public Documents’’ and then                   installation dry casks.
                                                    *      *     *    *      *                              select ‘‘Begin Web-based ADAMS
                                                                                                            Search.’’ For problems with ADAMS,                    II. Request/Action
                                                       Members of the public may request to
                                                    receive this information electronically.                please contact the NRC’s Public                          Under 10 CFR 50.12, ‘‘Specific
                                                    If you would like to be added to the                    Document Room (PDR) reference staff at                exemptions,’’ ENO has requested an
                                                    distribution, please contact the Nuclear                1–800–397–4209, 301–415–4737, or by                   exemption from 10 CFR 50.54(w)(1) by
                                                    Regulatory Commission, Office of the                    email to pdr.resource@nrc.gov. The                    letter dated April 17, 2014 (ADAMS
                                                    Secretary, Washington, DC 20555 (301–                   ADAMS accession number for each                       Accession No. ML14111A401). The
                                                    415–1969), or email                                     document referenced (if it is available in            exemption from the requirements of 10
                                                    Brenda.Akstulewicz@nrc.gov or                           ADAMS) is provided the first time that                CFR 50.54(w)(1) would permit ENO to
                                                    Patricia.Jimenez@nrc.gov.                               it is mentioned in this document.                     reduce its onsite property damage
                                                                                                               • NRC’s PDR: You may examine and                   insurance from $1.06 billion to $50
                                                      Dated: April 20, 2016.                                purchase copies of public documents at                million.
                                                    Denise McGovern,                                        the NRC’s PDR, Room O1–F21, One                          The regulation in 10 CFR 50.54(w)(1)
                                                    Policy Coordinator, Office of the Secretary.            White Flint North, 11555 Rockville                    requires each licensee to have and
                                                    [FR Doc. 2016–09649 Filed 4–21–16; 11:15 am]            Pike, Rockville, Maryland 20852.                      maintain onsite property damage
                                                    BILLING CODE 7590–01–P                                  FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Jack                 insurance to stabilize and
                                                                                                            D. Parrott, Office of Nuclear Material                decontaminate the reactor and reactor
                                                                                                            Safety and Safeguards, U.S. Nuclear                   site in the event of an accident. The
                                                    NUCLEAR REGULATORY                                      Regulatory Commission, Washington,                    onsite insurance coverage must be either
                                                    COMMISSION                                              DC 20555–0001; telephone: 301–415–                    $1.06 billion or whatever amount of
                                                                                                            6634, email: Jack.Parrott@nrc.gov.                    insurance is generally available from
                                                    [Docket No. 50–271; NRC–2016–0017]
                                                                                                            SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:                            private sources (whichever is less).
                                                                                                                                                                     The licensee states that the risk of an
                                                    Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc.;                       I. Background                                         accident at a permanently shutdown
                                                    Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power
                                                                                                               The VY site is a single unit facility              and defueled reactor is much less than
                                                    Station
                                                                                                            located near the town of Vernon,                      the risk from an operating power
                                                    AGENCY:  Nuclear Regulatory                             Vermont. The site is situated in                      reactor. In addition, since reactor
                                                    Commission.                                             Windham County on the western shore                   operation is no longer authorized at VY,
                                                    ACTION: Exemption; issuance.                            of the Connecticut River, immediately                 there are no events that would require
                                                                                                            upstream of the Vernon Hydroelectric                  the stabilization of reactor conditions
                                                    SUMMARY:   The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory                  Station. The VY facility employs a                    after an accident. Similarly, the risk of
                                                    Commission (NRC) is issuing an                          General Electric boiling water reactor                an accident that would result in
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                                                    exemption from the requirement to                       nuclear steam supply system licensed to               significant onsite contamination at VY
                                                    maintain a specified level of onsite                    generate 1,912 megawatts thermal. The                 is also much lower than the risk of such
                                                    property damage insurance in response                   boiling water reactor and supporting                  an event at operating reactors.
                                                    to a request from Entergy Nuclear                       facilities are owned and operated by                  Therefore, ENO is requesting an
                                                    Operations, Inc. (ENO or the licensee)                  Entergy Vermont Yankee, a subsidiary                  exemption from 10 CFR 50.54(w)(1),
                                                    dated April 17, 2014. The exemption                     of ENO. The licensee, ENO, is the                     effective April 15, 2016, that would
                                                    would permit Vermont Yankee Nuclear                     holder of Renewed Facility Operating                  permit a reduction in its onsite property
                                                    Power Station (VY) to reduce its onsite                 License No. DPR–28. The license                       damage insurance from $1.06 billion to


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                                                                                   Federal Register / Vol. 81, No. 79 / Monday, April 25, 2016 / Notices                                           24137

                                                    $50 million, commensurate with the                      onsite. In its April 17, 2014, exemption              fire risk. In SECY–96–256, ‘‘Changes to
                                                    reduced risk of an accident at the                      request, ENO describes both design-                   Financial Protection Requirements for
                                                    permanently shutdown and defueled                       basis and beyond-design-basis events                  Permanently Shutdown Nuclear Power
                                                    VY reactor.                                             involving irradiated fuel stored in the               Reactors, 10 CFR 50.54(w)(1) and 10
                                                                                                            SFP. The licensee determined that there               CFR 140.11,’’ dated December 17, 1996
                                                    III. Discussion
                                                                                                            are no applicable design-basis events at              (ADAMS Accession No. ML15062A483),
                                                       In accordance with 10 CFR 50.12, the                 VY that could result in a radiological                the staff recommended changes to the
                                                    Commission may, upon application by                     release exceeding the limits established              power reactor insurance regulations that
                                                    any interested person or upon its own                   by the U.S. Environmental Protection                  would allow licensees to lower onsite
                                                    initiative, grant exemptions from the                   Agency (EPA) early-phase Protective                   insurance levels to $50 million, upon
                                                    requirements of 10 CFR part 50 when (1)                 Action Guidelines (PAGs) of one                       demonstration that the fuel stored in the
                                                    the exemptions are authorized by law,                   roentgen equivalent man (rem) at the                  SFP can be air-cooled. In its Staff
                                                    will not present an undue risk to the                   exclusion area boundary, as a way to                  Requirements Memorandum to SECY–
                                                    public health or safety, and are                        demonstrate that any possible                         96–256, dated January 28, 1997
                                                    consistent with the common defense                      radiological releases would be minimal                (ADAMS Accession No. ML15062A454),
                                                    and security; and (2) any of the special                and not require precautionary protective              the Commission supported the staff’s
                                                    circumstances listed in 10 CFR                          actions (e.g., sheltering in place or                 recommendation that, among other
                                                    50.12(a)(2) are present.                                evacuation). The staff evaluated the                  things, would allow permanently
                                                       The financial protection limits of 10                radiological consequences associated                  shutdown power reactor licensees to
                                                    CFR 50.54(w)(1) were established after                  with various decommissioning                          reduce commercial onsite property
                                                    the Three Mile Island accident, out of                  activities, and design basis accidents at             damage insurance coverage to $50
                                                    concern that licensees may be unable to                 VY, in consideration of VY’s                          million, when the licensee was able to
                                                    financially cover onsite cleanup costs,                                                                       demonstrate the technical criterion that
                                                                                                            permanently shut down and defueled
                                                    in the event of a major nuclear accident.
                                                                                                            status. The possible design-basis                     the spent fuel could be air-cooled if the
                                                    The specified $1.06 billion coverage
                                                                                                            accident scenarios at VY have greatly                 SFP was drained of water. The staff has
                                                    amount requirement was developed
                                                                                                            reduced radiological consequences.                    used this technical criterion to grant
                                                    based on an analysis of an accident at
                                                                                                            Based on its review, the staff concluded              similar exemptions to other
                                                    a nuclear reactor operating at power,
                                                                                                            that no reasonably conceivable design-                decommissioning reactors (e.g., Maine
                                                    resulting in a large fission product
                                                                                                            basis accident exists that could cause an             Yankee Atomic Power Station,
                                                    release and requiring significant
                                                                                                            offsite release greater than the EPA                  published in the Federal Register on
                                                    resource expenditures to stabilize the
                                                                                                            PAGs. The only design-basis accident                  January 19, 1999 (64 FR 2920); and Zion
                                                    reactor conditions and ultimately
                                                                                                            that could potentially result in an offsite           Nuclear Power Station, published in the
                                                    decontaminate and cleanup the site
                                                    (similar to the stabilization and cleanup               radiological release at VY is a fuel                  Federal Register on December 28, 1999
                                                    activities at the Fukushima Daiichi                     handling accident (FHA). Analysis                     (64 FR 72700)). These prior exemptions
                                                    nuclear power facility following the                    performed by the licensee concluded                   were granted, based on these licensees
                                                    damage from a severe earthquake and                     that 17 days after shutdown, the                      demonstrating that the SFP could be air-
                                                    tsunami).                                               radiological consequence of an FHA                    cooled, consistent with the technical
                                                       These cost estimates were developed                  would not exceed the limits established               criterion discussed above.
                                                    in consideration of the spectrum of                     by the EPA PAGs at the exclusion area                    In SECY–00–0145, ‘‘Integrated
                                                    postulated accidents for an operating                   boundary. Based on the time that VY                   Rulemaking Plan for Nuclear Power
                                                    nuclear reactor. The costs were derived                 has been permanently shutdown                         Plant Decommissioning,’’ dated June 28,
                                                    from the consequences of a release of                   (approximately 13 months), the staff                  2000, and SECY–01–0100, ‘‘Policy
                                                    radioactive material from the reactor.                  determined that the possibility of an                 Issues Related to Safeguards, Insurance,
                                                    Although the risk of an accident at an                  offsite radiological release from a                   and Emergency Preparedness
                                                    operating reactor is very low, the                      design-basis accident that could exceed               Regulations at Decommissioning
                                                    consequences can be large. In an                        the EPA PAGs has been eliminated. The                 Nuclear Power Plants Storing Fuel in
                                                    operating plant, the high temperature                   only event that has the potential to lead             Spent Fuel Pools,’’ dated June 4, 2001
                                                    and pressure of the reactor coolant                     to a significant radiological release at a            (ADAMS Accession Nos. ML003721626
                                                    system (RCS), as well as the inventory                  decommissioning reactor is a zirconium                and ML011450420, respectively), the
                                                    of relatively short-lived radionuclides,                fire. The zirconium fire scenario is a                NRC staff discussed additional
                                                    contribute to both the risk and                         postulated, but highly unlikely, beyond-              information concerning SFP zirconium
                                                    consequences of an accident. With the                   design-basis accident scenario that                   fire risks at decommissioning reactors
                                                    permanent cessation of reactor                          involves the loss of water inventory                  and associated implications for onsite
                                                    operations at VY and the permanent                      from the SFP, resulting in a significant              property damage insurance. Providing
                                                    removal of the fuel from the reactor                    heat-up of the spent fuel and                         an analysis of when the spent fuel
                                                    core, such accidents are no longer                      culminating in substantial zirconium                  stored in the SFP is capable of air-
                                                    possible. As a result, the reactor, RCS,                cladding oxidation and fuel damage.                   cooling is one measure that can be used
                                                    and supporting systems no longer                        The probability of a zirconium fire                   to demonstrate that the probability of a
                                                    operate and, therefore, have no function                scenario is related to the decay heat of              zirconium fire is exceedingly low.
                                                    as it pertains to the storage of the                    the irradiated fuel stored in the SFP.                However, the staff has more recently
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                                                    irradiated fuel. Hence, postulated                      Therefore, the risks from a zirconium                 used an additional analysis that bounds
                                                    accidents involving failure or                          fire scenario continue to decrease as a               an incomplete drain down of the SFP
                                                    malfunction of the reactor, RCS, or                     function of the time that VY has been                 water, or some other catastrophic event
                                                    supporting systems are no longer                        permanently shut down.                                (such as a complete drainage of the SFP
                                                    applicable.                                                The NRC staff has previously                       with rearrangement of spent fuel rack
                                                       During reactor decommissioning, the                  authorized a lesser amount of onsite                  geometry and/or the addition of rubble
                                                    principal radiological risks are                        property damage insurance coverage                    to the SFP). This analysis includes an
                                                    associated with the storage of spent fuel               based on this analysis of the zirconium               assumption of adiabatic conditions,


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                                                    24138                          Federal Register / Vol. 81, No. 79 / Monday, April 25, 2016 / Notices

                                                    which means no heat transfer from the                   offsite radiological release might occur.             rupture of a large liquid radiological
                                                    spent fuel via conduction, convection,                  The staff finds that 10 hours is sufficient           waste storage tank.
                                                    or radiation.                                           time to support deployment of                           The NRC staff has determined that
                                                       In the case of VY, the licensee                      mitigation equipment to prevent the                   granting of the licensee’s proposed
                                                    determined that the fuel removed from                   zirconium cladding from reaching a                    exemption will not result in a violation
                                                    the reactor would have sufficiently                     point of rapid oxidation.                             of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, or
                                                    decayed by April 15, 2016, to                              Based on the above discussion and                  other laws, as amended. Therefore,
                                                    significantly reduce the risk from SFP                  SECY–96–256, the NRC staff determined                 based on its review of ENO’s exemption
                                                    draining events. To support this                        $50 million to be an adequate level of                request, as discussed above, and
                                                    determination, the licensee provided an                 onsite property damage insurance for a                consistent with SECY–96–256, the NRC
                                                    adiabatic analysis indicating that the                  decommissioning reactor, once the                     staff concludes that the exemption is
                                                    fuel cladding temperature would not                     spent fuel in the SFP is no longer                    authorized by law.
                                                    reach levels associated with a                          susceptible to a zirconium fire. The staff            B. No Undue Risk to Public Health and
                                                    significant radiological release within                 has postulated that there is still a                  Safety
                                                    10 hours after the loss of all means of                 potential for other radiological incidents
                                                    cooling. The licensee maintains                                                                                 The onsite property damage insurance
                                                                                                            at a decommissioning reactor that could
                                                    strategies and equipment to cool the                                                                          requirements of 10 CFR 50.54(w)(1)
                                                                                                            result in significant onsite
                                                    spent fuel in the unlikely event that                                                                         were established to provide financial
                                                                                                            contamination besides a zirconium fire.
                                                    coolant is lost, and the 10-hour                                                                              assurance that following a significant
                                                                                                            In SECY–96–256, the NRC staff cited the
                                                    adiabatic heating time would provide                                                                          nuclear incident, onsite conditions
                                                                                                            rupture of a large contaminated liquid
                                                    sufficient time for personnel to respond                                                                      could be stabilized and the site
                                                                                                            storage tank, causing soil contamination
                                                    with onsite equipment to restore a                                                                            decontaminated. The requirements of 10
                                                                                                            and potential groundwater
                                                    means of spent fuel cooling.                                                                                  CFR 50.54(w)(1) and the existing level
                                                                                                            contamination, as the most costly
                                                       In addition, the licensee cited NRC-                                                                       of onsite insurance coverage for VY are
                                                                                                            postulated event to decontaminate and
                                                    staff developed reports concluding that                                                                       predicated on the assumption that the
                                                                                                            remediate (other than a SFP zirconium
                                                    the high density storage of fuel in the                                                                       reactor is operating. However, VY is a
                                                                                                            fire). The postulated large liquid
                                                    SFP is safe and the risk of a large                                                                           permanently shutdown and defueled
                                                                                                            radiological waste storage tank rupture
                                                    radiological release is very low. The                                                                         facility. The permanently defueled
                                                                                                            event was determined to have a
                                                    staff presented an independent                                                                                status of the facility has resulted in a
                                                                                                            bounding onsite cleanup cost of
                                                    evaluation of a SFP subject to a severe                                                                       significant reduction in the number and
                                                                                                            approximately $50 million. Therefore,
                                                    earthquake in NUREG–2161,                                                                                     severity of potential accidents, and
                                                                                                            the staff determined that the licensee’s
                                                    ‘‘Consequence Study of a Beyond-                                                                              correspondingly, a significant reduction
                                                    Design-Basis Earthquake Affecting the                   proposal to reduce onsite insurance to a
                                                                                                                                                                  in the potential for and severity of
                                                    Spent Fuel Pool for a U.S. Mark I                       level of $50 million would be consistent
                                                                                                                                                                  onsite property damage. The proposed
                                                    Boiling Water Reactor,’’ September 2014                 with the bounding cleanup and
                                                                                                                                                                  reduction in the amount of onsite
                                                    (ADAMS Accession No. ML14255A365).                      decontamination cost, as discussed in
                                                                                                                                                                  insurance coverage does not impact the
                                                    This evaluation concluded that, for a                   SECY–96–256, to account for the
                                                                                                                                                                  probability or consequences of potential
                                                    representative boiling-water reactor                    postulated rupture of a large liquid
                                                                                                                                                                  accidents. The proposed level of
                                                    (BWR), fuel in a dispersed high-density                 radiological waste tank at the VY site,
                                                                                                                                                                  insurance coverage is commensurate
                                                    configuration would be adequately                       should such an event occur.
                                                                                                                                                                  with the reduced consequences of
                                                    cooled by natural circulation airflow                   A. Authorized by Law                                  potential nuclear accidents at VY.
                                                    within several months after discharge                                                                         Therefore, the NRC staff concludes that
                                                    from a reactor if the pool was drained                     The regulation in 10 CFR 50.54(w)(1)
                                                                                                                                                                  granting the requested exemption will
                                                    of water.                                               requires each licensee to have and
                                                                                                                                                                  not present an undue risk to the health
                                                       By letter dated November 23, 2015                    maintain onsite property damage
                                                                                                                                                                  and safety of the public.
                                                    (ADAMS Accession No.ML15329A167),                       insurance of either $1.06 billion or
                                                    ENO confirmed that the plant design                     whatever amount of insurance is                       C. Consistent With the Common Defense
                                                    and fuel storage configuration                          generally available from private sources,             and Security
                                                    considered in NUREG–2161 were                           whichever is less. In accordance with 10                 The proposed exemption would not
                                                    consistent with the VY plant design and                 CFR 50.12, the Commission may grant                   eliminate any requirements associated
                                                    fuel storage configurations to be used in               exemptions from the regulations in 10                 with physical protection of the site and
                                                    the decommissioning of VY. The staff                    CFR part 50, as the Commission                        would not adversely affect ENO’s ability
                                                    independently confirmed that the fuel                   determines are authorized by law.                     to physically secure the site or protect
                                                    assembly decay power was also                              As explained above, the NRC staff has              special nuclear material. Physical
                                                    consistent. Thus, after 15.4 months                     determined that the licensee’s proposed               security measures at VY are not affected
                                                    decay, which will be reached by the                     reduction in onsite property damage                   by the requested exemption. Therefore,
                                                    requested effective date of April 15,                   insurance coverage to a level of $50                  the proposed exemption is consistent
                                                    2016 for this exemption, the fuel stored                million is consistent with SECY–96–                   with the common defense and security.
                                                    in the VY SFP will be able to adequately                256. Moreover, the staff concluded that
                                                    be cooled by air in the unlikely event                  as of April 15, 2016, sufficient irradiated           D. Special Circumstances
                                                    the SFP drained. For the very unlikely                  fuel decay time will have elapsed at VY                 Under 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii), special
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                                                    beyond-design-basis accident scenario,                  to decrease the probability of an onsite              circumstances are present if the
                                                    where the SFP coolant inventory is lost                 and offsite radiological release from a               application of the regulation in the
                                                    in such a manner that all methods of                    postulated zirconium fire accident to                 particular circumstances would not
                                                    heat removal from the spent fuel are no                 negligible levels. In addition, the                   serve the underlying purpose of the rule
                                                    longer available, there will be a                       licensee’s proposal to reduce onsite                  or is not necessary to achieve the
                                                    minimum of 10 hours from the                            insurance to a level of $50 million is                underlying purpose of the rule. The
                                                    initiation of the accident until the                    consistent with the maximum estimated                 underlying purpose of 10 CFR
                                                    cladding reaches a temperature where                    cleanup costs for the recovery from the               50.54(w)(1) is to provide reasonable


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                                                                                   Federal Register / Vol. 81, No. 79 / Monday, April 25, 2016 / Notices                                                  24139

                                                    assurance that adequate funds will be                   E. Environmental Considerations                       would be no significant impacts to
                                                    available to stabilize conditions and                      The NRC approval of the exemption                  biota, water resources, historic
                                                    cover onsite cleanup costs associated                   to insurance or indemnity requirements                properties, cultural resources, or
                                                    with site decontamination, following an                 belongs to a category of actions that the             socioeconomic conditions in the region.
                                                    accident that results in the release of a               Commission, by rule or regulation, has                Moreover, the requirement for onsite
                                                    significant amount of radiological                      declared to be a categorical exclusion,               property damage insurance involves
                                                    material. Because VY is permanently                     after first finding that the category of              surety, insurance, and indemnity
                                                    shut down and defueled, it is no longer                 actions does not individually or                      matters. Accordingly, the exemption
                                                    possible for the radiological                           cumulatively have a significant effect on             request meets the eligibility criteria for
                                                    consequences of design-basis accidents                  the human environment. Specifically,                  categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR
                                                    or other credible events at VY to exceed                the exemption is categorically excluded               51.22(c)(25). Therefore, pursuant to 10
                                                    the limits of the EPA PAGs at the                                                                             CFR 51.22(b) and 51.22(c)(25), no
                                                                                                            from further analysis under
                                                    exclusion area boundary. The licensee                                                                         environmental impact statement or
                                                                                                            § 51.22(c)(25).
                                                    has evaluated the consequences of                          Under 10 CFR 51.22(c)(25), granting                environmental assessment need be
                                                    highly unlikely, beyond-design-basis                    of an exemption from the requirements                 prepared in connection with the
                                                    conditions involving a loss of coolant                  of any regulation of Chapter I to 10 CFR              approval of this exemption request.
                                                    from the SFP. The analyses show that
                                                                                                            is a categorical exclusion provided that              IV. Conclusions
                                                    after April 15, 2016, the likelihood of
                                                                                                            (i) there is no significant hazards
                                                    such an event leading to a large                                                                                 Accordingly, the Commission has
                                                                                                            consideration; (ii) there is no significant
                                                    radiological release is negligible. The                                                                       determined that, pursuant to 10 CFR
                                                                                                            change in the types or significant
                                                    NRC staff’s evaluation of the licensee’s                                                                      50.12(a), the exemption from
                                                                                                            increase in the amounts of any effluents
                                                    analyses confirm this conclusion.                                                                             50.54(w)(1) is authorized by law, will
                                                       The NRC staff also finds that the                    that may be released offsite; (iii) there is
                                                                                                            no significant increase in individual or              not present an undue risk to the public
                                                    licensee’s proposed $50 million level of                                                                      health and safety, and is consistent with
                                                    onsite insurance is consistent with the                 cumulative public or occupational
                                                                                                            radiation exposure; (iv) there is no                  the common defense and security. In
                                                    bounding cleanup and decontamination                                                                          addition, special circumstances are
                                                    cost, as discussed in SECY–96–256, to                   significant construction impact; (v)
                                                                                                            there is no significant increase in the               present as set forth in 10 CFR 50.12.
                                                    account for the hypothetical rupture of                                                                       Therefore, the Commission hereby
                                                    a large liquid radiological waste tank at               potential for or consequences from
                                                                                                            radiological accidents; and (vi) the                  grants VY an exemption from the
                                                    the VY site, should such an event occur.                                                                      requirements of 10 CFR 50.54(w)(1). The
                                                    Therefore, the staff concludes that the                 requirements from which an exemption
                                                                                                            is sought involve: surety, insurance, or              exemption will permit VY to lower
                                                    application of the current requirements
                                                                                                            indemnity requirements.                               minimum required onsite insurance to
                                                    in 10 CFR 50.54(w)(1) to maintain $1.06
                                                                                                               The Director, Division of                          $50 million no earlier than April 15,
                                                    billion in onsite insurance coverage is
                                                                                                            Decommissioning, Uranium Recovery                     2016.
                                                    not necessary to achieve the underlying
                                                    purpose of the rule for the permanently                 and Waste Programs, Office of Nuclear                    The exemption is effective upon
                                                    shutdown and defueled VY reactor.                       Material Safety and Safeguards, has                   issuance.
                                                       Under 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(iii), special               determined that approval of the                         Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 15th day
                                                    circumstances are present whenever                      exemption request involves no                         of April, 2016.
                                                    compliance would result in undue                        significant hazards consideration                       For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
                                                    hardship or other costs that are                        because reducing the licensee’s onsite                John R. Tappert,
                                                    significantly in excess of those                        property damage insurance for VY does
                                                                                                                                                                  Director, Division of Decommissioning,
                                                    contemplated when the regulation was                    not (1) involve a significant increase in             Uranium Recovery and Waste Programs,
                                                    adopted, or that are significantly in                   the probability or consequences of an                 Office of Nuclear Material Safety and
                                                    excess of those incurred by others                      accident previously evaluated; or (2)                 Safeguards.
                                                    similarly situated.                                     create the possibility of a new or                    [FR Doc. 2016–09558 Filed 4–22–16; 8:45 am]
                                                       The NRC staff concludes that if the                  different kind of accident from any                   BILLING CODE 7590–01–P
                                                    licensee was required to continue to                    accident previously evaluated; or (3)
                                                    maintain an onsite insurance level of                   involve a significant reduction in a
                                                    $1.06 billion, the associated insurance                 margin of safety. The exempted                        NUCLEAR REGULATORY
                                                    premiums would be in excess of those                    financial protection regulation is                    COMMISSION
                                                    necessary and commensurate with the                     unrelated to the operation of VY.
                                                    radiological contamination risks posed                  Accordingly, there is no significant                  Advisory Committee on Reactor
                                                    by the site. In addition, such insurance                change in the types or significant                    Safeguards; Notice of Meeting
                                                    levels would be significantly in excess                 increase in the amounts of any effluents
                                                    of other decommissioning reactor                        that may be released offsite; and no                    In accordance with the purposes of
                                                    facilities that have been granted similar               significant increase in individual or                 Sections 29 and 182b of the Atomic
                                                    exemptions by the NRC.                                  cumulative public or occupational                     Energy Act (42 U.S.C. 2039, 2232b), the
                                                       The NRC staff finds that compliance                  radiation exposure.                                   Advisory Committee on Reactor
                                                    with the existing rule would result in an                  In addition, the exempted regulation               Safeguards (ACRS) will hold a meeting
                                                    undue hardship or other costs that are                  is not associated with construction, so               on May 5–7, 2016, 11545 Rockville Pike,
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                                                    significantly in excess of those                        there is no significant construction                  Rockville, Maryland.
                                                    contemplated when the regulation was                    impact. The exempted regulation does                  Thursday, May 5, 2016, Conference
                                                    adopted and are significantly in excess                 not concern the source term (i.e.,                    Room T2–B1, 11545 Rockville Pike,
                                                    of those incurred by others similarly                   potential amount of radiation in an                   Rockville, Maryland
                                                    situated.                                               accident), nor mitigation. Therefore,
                                                       Therefore, the special circumstances                 there is no significant increase in the               8:30 a.m.–8:35 a.m.: Opening Remarks
                                                    required by 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii) and                  potential for, or consequences of, a                      by the ACRS Chairman (Open)—
                                                    10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(iii) exist.                          radiological accident. In addition, there                 The ACRS Chairman will make


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Document Created: 2016-04-23 01:38:59
Document Modified: 2016-04-23 01:38:59
CategoryRegulatory Information
CollectionFederal Register
sudoc ClassAE 2.7:
GS 4.107:
AE 2.106:
PublisherOffice of the Federal Register, National Archives and Records Administration
SectionNotices
ActionExemption; issuance.
DatesApril 25, 2016.
ContactJack D. Parrott, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; telephone: 301-415-6634, email: [email protected]
FR Citation81 FR 24136 

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