81 FR 57758 - Special Conditions: The Boeing Company, Boeing Model 767-2C Airplane; Non-Rechargeable Lithium Battery Installations
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration Federal Register Volume 81, Issue 164 (August 24, 2016)
Federal Aviation Administration
Federal Register Volume 81, Issue 164 (August 24, 2016)
| Page Range | 57758-57761 | |
| FR Document | 2016-19991 |
[Federal Register Volume 81, Number 164 (Wednesday, August 24, 2016)] [Rules and Regulations] [Pages 57758-57761] From the Federal Register Online [www.thefederalregister.org] [FR Doc No: 2016-19991] ======================================================================= ----------------------------------------------------------------------- DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION Federal Aviation Administration 14 CFR Part 25 [Docket No. FAA-2015-5391; Special Conditions No. 25-630-SC] Special Conditions: The Boeing Company, Boeing Model 767-2C Airplane; Non-Rechargeable Lithium Battery Installations AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT. ACTION: Final special conditions. ----------------------------------------------------------------------- SUMMARY: These special conditions are issued for the Boeing Model 767- 2C airplane. This airplane will have a novel or unusual design feature when compared to the state of technology envisioned in the airworthiness standards for transport-category airplanes. This design feature is associated with non-rechargeable lithium battery installations. The applicable airworthiness regulations do not contain adequate or appropriate safety standards for this design feature. These special conditions contain the additional safety standards that the Administrator considers necessary to establish a level of safety equivalent to that established by the existing airworthiness standards. DATES: Effective April 22, 2017. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Nazih Khaouly, Airplane and Flight Crew Interface Branch, ANM-111, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service, 1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, Washington 98057-3356; telephone 425-227-2432; facsimile 425-227-1149. SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Future Requests for Installation of Non-Rechargeable Lithium Batteries The FAA anticipates that non-rechargeable lithium batteries will be installed in other makes and models of airplanes. We have determined to require special conditions for all applications requesting non- rechargeable lithium battery installations, except the installations excluded in the Applicability section, until the airworthiness requirements can be revised to address this issue. Applying special conditions to these installations across the range of all transport- airplane makes and models ensures regulatory consistency among applicants. The FAA issued special conditions no. 25-612-SC to Gulfstream Aerospace Corporation for their GVI airplane. Those are the first special conditions the FAA issued for non-rechargeable lithium battery installations. We explained in that document our determination to make those special conditions effective one year after publication of those special conditions in the Federal Register, and our intention for other special conditions for other makes and models to be effective on this same date or 30 days after their publication, whichever is later. Background On January 18, 2010, The Boeing Company (Boeing) applied for an amendment to type certificate no. A1NM to include a new Model 767-2C airplane. The Model 767-2C airplane is a twin-engine, transport- category freighter derivative of the Model 767-200 airplane currently approved under type certificate no. A1NM. This freighter has a maximum takeoff weight of 415,000 pounds and can be configured to carry up to 11 supernumeraries. The Model 767-2C airplane incorporates provisions to support subsequent supplemental type [[Page 57759]] certificate (STC) modifications, which are intended to provide additional mission capabilities, including provisions to support conversion into an aerial refueling platform (i.e., tanker) configuration. Type Certification Basis Under the provisions of Title 14, Code of Federal Regulations, (14 CFR) 21.101, Boeing must show that the Model 767-2C airplane meets the applicable provisions of the regulations listed in type certificate no. A1NM or the applicable regulations in effect on the date of application for the change, except for earlier amendments as agreed upon by the FAA. The regulations listed in the type certificate are commonly referred to as the ``original type certification basis.'' The regulations listed in type certificate no. A1NM are 14 CFR part 25, effective February 1, 1965, including Amendments 25-1 through 25-37, with exceptions listed in the type certificate. In addition, the certification basis includes other regulations, special conditions, and exemptions that are not relevant to these special conditions. Type certificate no. A1NM will be updated to include a complete description of the certification basis for this airplane model. If the Administrator finds that the applicable airworthiness regulations (i.e., 14 CFR part 25) do not contain adequate or appropriate safety standards for the Model 767-2C airplane because of a novel or unusual design feature, special conditions are prescribed under the provisions of Sec. 21.16. Special conditions are initially applicable to the airplane model for which they are issued. Should the type certificate for that model be amended later to include any other model that incorporates the same novel or unusual design feature, or should any other model already included on the same type certificate be modified to incorporate the same novel or unusual design feature, these special conditions would also apply to the other model under Sec. 21.101. In addition to the applicable airworthiness regulations and special conditions, the Model 767-2C airplane must comply with the fuel-vent and exhaust-emission requirements of 14 CFR part 34, and the noise- certification requirements of 14 CFR part 36. The FAA issues special conditions, as defined in 14 CFR 11.19, in accordance with Sec. 11.38, and they become part of the type- certification basis under Sec. 21.101. Novel or Unusual Design Features The Boeing Model 767-2C airplane will incorporate non-rechargeable lithium batteries. A battery system consists of the battery and any protective, monitoring, and alerting circuitry or hardware inside or outside of the battery. It also includes vents (where necessary) and packaging. For the purpose of these special conditions, a ``battery'' and ``battery system'' are referred to as a battery. Discussion The FAA derived the current regulations governing installation of batteries in transport-category airplanes from Civil Air Regulations (CAR) 4b.625(d) as part of the re-codification of CAR 4b that established 14 CFR part 25 in February 1965. We basically reworded the battery requirements, which are currently in Sec. 25.1353(b)(1) through (b)(4), from the CAR requirements. Non-rechargeable lithium batteries are novel and unusual with respect to the state of technology considered when these requirements were codified. These batteries introduce higher energy levels into airplane systems through new chemical compositions in various battery-cell sizes and construction. Interconnection of these cells in battery packs introduces failure modes that require unique design considerations, such as provisions for thermal management. Recent events involving rechargeable and non-rechargeable lithium batteries prompted the FAA to initiate a broad evaluation of these energy-storage technologies. In January 2013, two independent events involving rechargeable lithium-ion batteries demonstrated unanticipated failure modes. A National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) letter to the FAA, dated May 22, 2014, which is available at http://www.ntsb.gov, filename A-14-032-036.pdf, describes these events. On July 12, 2013, an event involving a non-rechargeable lithium battery in an emergency-locator-transmitter installation demonstrated unanticipated failure modes. The United Kingdom's Air Accidents Investigation Branch Bulletin S5/2013 describes this event. Some known uses of rechargeable and non-rechargeable lithium batteries on airplanes include:Flight deck and avionics systems such as displays, global positioning systems, cockpit voice recorders, flight data recorders, underwater locator beacons, navigation computers, integrated avionics computers, satellite network and communication systems, communication- management units, and remote-monitor electronic line-replaceable units; Cabin safety, entertainment, and communications equipment, including emergency-locator transmitters, life rafts, escape slides, seatbelt air bags, cabin management systems, Ethernet switches, routers and media servers, wireless systems, internet and in-flight entertainment systems, satellite televisions, remotes, and handsets; Systems in cargo areas including door controls, sensors, video surveillance equipment, and security systems. Some known potential hazards and failure modes associated with non- rechargeable lithium batteries are: Internal failures: In general, these batteries are significantly more susceptible to internal failures that can result in self-sustaining increases in temperature and pressure (i.e., thermal runaway) than their nickel-cadmium or lead-acid counterparts. The metallic lithium can ignite, resulting in a self-sustaining fire or explosion. Fast or imbalanced discharging: Fast discharging or an imbalanced discharge of one cell of a multi-cell battery may create an overheating condition that results in an uncontrollable venting condition, which in turn leads to a thermal event or an explosion. Flammability: Unlike nickel-cadmium and lead-acid batteries, lithium batteries use higher energy and current in an electrochemical system that can be configured to maximize energy storage of lithium. They also use liquid electrolytes that can be extremely flammable. The electrolyte, as well as the electrodes, can serve as a source of fuel for an external fire if the battery casing is breached. Special condition no. 1 requires that each individual cell within a non-rechargeable lithium battery be designed to maintain safe temperatures and pressures. Special condition no. 2 addresses these same issues but for the entire battery. Special condition no. 2 requires that the battery be designed to prevent propagation of a thermal event, such as self-sustained, uncontrolled increases in temperature or pressure from one cell to adjacent cells. Special condition nos. 1 and 2 are intended to ensure that the non- rechargeable lithium battery and its cells are designed to eliminate the potential for uncontrolled failures. However, a certain number of failures will occur due to various factors beyond the control of the designer. Therefore, other special conditions are intended to protect the airplane and its occupants if failure occurs. [[Page 57760]] Special condition nos. 3, 7, and 8 are self-explanatory, and the FAA does not provide further explanation for them at this time. Special condition no. 4 makes it clear that the flammable-fluid fire-protection requirements of Sec. 25.863 apply to non-rechargeable lithium battery installations. Section 25.863 is applicable to areas of the airplane that could be exposed to flammable fluid leakage from airplane systems. Non-rechargeable lithium batteries contain electrolyte that is a flammable fluid. Special condition no. 5 requires each non-rechargeable lithium battery installation to not damage surrounding structure or adjacent systems, equipment, or electrical wiring from corrosive fluids or gases that may escape. Special condition no. 6 requires each non-rechargeable lithium battery installation to have provisions to prevent any hazardous effect on airplane structure or systems caused by the maximum amount of heat it can generate due to any failure of it or its individual cells. The means of meeting these special conditions may be the same, but they are independent requirements addressing different hazards. Special condition no. 5 addresses corrosive fluids and gases, whereas special condition no. 6 addresses heat. These special conditions will apply to all non-rechargeable lithium battery installations in lieu of Sec. 25.1353(b)(1) through (b)(4) at Amendment 25-123. Sections 25.1353(b)(1) through (b)(4) at Amendment 25-123 will remain in effect for other battery installations. These special conditions contain the additional safety standards that the Administrator considers necessary to establish a level of safety equivalent to that established by the existing airworthiness standards. Discussion of Comments Notice of proposed special conditions no. 25-16-01-SC, for the Boeing 767-2C airplane, was published in the Federal Register on January 27, 2016 [81 FR 4596]. We received four substantive comments. The Aerospace Industries Association (AIA) provided several comments that were identical to their comments for special conditions no. 25-612-SC, which we issued to Gulfstream Aerospace Corporation for non-rechargeable lithium battery installations on Gulfstream GVI airplanes. The FAA responded to each of these comments in that final special conditions document. We incorporated the same revisions into these Boeing 767-2C special conditions that we incorporated into the Gulfstream GVI special conditions as a result of AIA's comments. Boeing commented that they fully support AIA's comments. Boeing requested that the FAA provide adequate time before non- rechargeable lithium battery special conditions become effective to support validation activities by foreign civil airworthiness authorities (FCAA) and to not adversely impact future airplane deliveries by all applicants. The FAA considered this same comment from Boeing for special conditions no. 25-612-SC and provided a detailed response in that document. We determined the effective date for these Boeing 767-2C special conditions based on Boeing's comment and other factors stated in special conditions no. 25-612-SC. Boeing commented that the FAA needs to clearly define the applicability of these special conditions. Boeing's comment is similar to their comment on special conditions no. 25-612-SC. We provided a detailed response in special conditions no. 25-612-SC and have clearly defined the applicability for these Boeing 767-2C special conditions. One aspect of Boeing's comment that we did not address in special conditions no. 25-612-SC is that some design changes may not change a lithium battery installation but affect it, which results in these special conditions being applicable. For example, adding a heat source next to a lithium battery can increase its possibility of entering into thermal runaway. Lithium battery installations affected by design changes must meet these special conditions. Some examples of changes that affect lithium battery installations are those that: Increase the temperatures or pressures in a battery, Increase the electrical load on a battery, Increase potential for imbalance between battery cells, Modify protective circuitry for a lithium battery, Increase the airplane level risk due to the location of an existing lithium battery. An example is installation of a new oxygen line next to an existing part that has a lithium battery. The airplane level risk may increase due to the potential hazard of a lithium battery fire in the proximity of oxygen. Gulfstream Aerospace Corporation commented that they agree with Boeing's comments and requested that the FAA consider incorporating their proposed changes into this document. AmSafe recommended that the FAA state in the preamble that design mitigation or analysis at the airplane level may be applied to show that designs meet these special conditions. The FAA has determined that these special conditions are to require the battery to be designed to minimize the potential of uncontrollable failure, and to not only rely on mitigation of a battery failure at the airplane level. Therefore, we have not incorporated the proposed revision into the preamble of these special conditions. AmSafe commented that they concur with proposed special condition no. 1 with an understanding that ``foreseeable operating conditions'' equates to the full normal operating envelope of the airplane. However, this is not a correct understanding of proposed special condition no. 1. The FAA intends for the term ``foreseeable operating conditions,'' in these special conditions, to apply at the cell level and not only at the airplane level. In addition, ``foreseeable'' includes anticipated abnormal operating conditions. AmSafe recommended revising proposed special condition no. 2 to read, ``Battery installation and/or equipment containing any non- rechargeable lithium battery must preclude the occurrence of, or mitigate the effect of self-sustaining, uncontrolled increases in temperature or pressure.'' Amsafe's rationale was based on their recommendation that design mitigation or analysis at the airplane level be acceptable. As explained above, the FAA has determined that these special conditions are to require the battery to be designed to minimize the potential of uncontrollable failure, and to not only rely on mitigation of a battery failure at the airplane level. The FAA has not incorporated the proposed revision into special condition no. 2. AmSafe recommended adding the phrase ``. . . failure which is not shown to be extremely remote . . .'' to proposed special condition no. 3. The FAA responds that service history shows that battery failure is not extremely remote. Therefore, to ensure that failures are properly anticipated and accounted for, we have not revised proposed special condition no. 3 to include these words. AmSafe recommended deleting Sec. 25.863(c)(d) from proposed special condition no 4. The FAA does not concur. Section 25.863 already applies to non-rechargeable lithium batteries since they contain electrolyte that is a flammable fluid. Since Sec. 25.863 has historically been applied to flammable fluids related to propulsion and hydraulic systems, the FAA is including special condition no. 4 to ensure that [[Page 57761]] there is no misunderstanding that Sec. 25.863 also applies to these batteries. AmSafe recommended revising proposed special condition no. 5 to prohibit damage to surrounding structure or adjacent systems, equipment, or electrical wiring from corrosive fluids or gases that may escape ``in such a way as to cause a hazardous or catastrophic failure condition.'' AIA also recommended this revision. The FAA intends for special condition no. 5 to be consistent with Sec. 25.1309. So, we added the words ``. . . in such a way as to cause a major or more- severe failure condition.'' The revised special condition now reads, ``. . . each non-rechargeable lithium battery installation must not damage surrounding structure or adjacent systems, equipment, or electrical wiring from corrosive fluids or gases that may escape in such a way as to cause a major or more-severe failure condition.'' The FAA does not concur with excluding major failure conditions. AmSafe concurred with proposed special condition no. 6. AmSafe concurred with proposed special condition no. 7 and recommended revising proposed special condition no. 8. However, the FAA deleted these proposed special conditions as explained in our response to AIA's comments in special conditions no. 25-612-SC. AmSafe recommended revising ``safe operation of the airplane'' in proposed special condition nos. 9 and 10 to ``continued safe operation of the airplane.'' The phrase ``continued safe operation of the airplane'' is used to refer to safe operation of the airplane after a failure has occurred. The phrase ``safe operation of the airplane'' is more general and appropriate for these special conditions. We did not incorporate AmSafe's proposed revision into these special conditions. The FAA has determined that ``uncontrolled'' in special condition no. 2 should be ``uncontrollable'' to more accurately describe the concern. This revision does not change the intended meaning of this special condition. Except as discussed above, the special conditions are adopted as proposed. Applicability As discussed above, these special conditions are applicable to the Model 767-2C airplane. Should the applicant apply at a later date for a change to the type certificate to include another model incorporating the same novel or unusual design feature, or should any other model already included on the same type certificate be modified to incorporate the same novel or unusual design feature, these special conditions would apply to that model as well. These special conditions are only applicable to design changes applied for after their effective date. The existing airplane fleet and follow-on deliveries of airplanes with previously certified non- rechargeable lithium battery installations are not affected. These special conditions are not applicable to previously certified non-rechargeable lithium battery installations where the only change is either cosmetic or relocating the installation to improve the safety of the airplane and occupants. The FAA determined that this exclusion is in the public interest because the need to meet all of the special conditions might otherwise deter such design changes that involve relocating batteries. A cosmetic change is a change in appearance only, and does not change any function or safety characteristic of the battery installation. Conclusion This action affects only certain novel or unusual design features on one model of airplane. It is not a rule of general applicability. List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 25 Aircraft, Aviation safety, Reporting and record keeping requirements. The authority citation for these special conditions is as follows: Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701, 44702, 44704. The Special Conditions Accordingly, the following special conditions are part of the type certification basis for the Boeing Model 767-2C airplane. Non-Rechargeable Lithium Battery Installations In lieu of Sec. 25.1353(b)(1) through (b)(4) at Amendment 25-123, each non-rechargeable lithium battery installation must: 1. Maintain safe cell temperatures and pressures under all foreseeable operating conditions to prevent fire and explosion. 2. Prevent the occurrence of self-sustaining, uncontrollable increases in temperature or pressure. 3. Not emit explosive or toxic gases, either in normal operation or as a result of its failure, that may accumulate in hazardous quantities within the airplane. 4. Meet the requirements of Sec. 25.863. 5. Not damage surrounding structure or adjacent systems, equipment, or electrical wiring from corrosive fluids or gases that may escape in such a way as to cause a major or more-severe failure condition. 6. Have provisions to prevent any hazardous effect on airplane structure or systems caused by the maximum amount of heat it can generate due to any failure of it or its individual cells. 7. Have a failure sensing and warning system to alert the flightcrew if its failure affects safe operation of the airplane. 8. Have a means for the flightcrew or maintenance personnel to determine the battery charge state if the battery's function is required for safe operation of the airplane. Note: A battery system consists of the battery and any protective, monitoring, and alerting circuitry or hardware inside or outside of the battery. It also includes vents (where necessary) and packaging. For the purpose of these special conditions, a ``battery'' and ``battery system'' are referred to as a battery. Issued in Renton, Washington, on August 11, 2016. Paul Bernado, Acting Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service. [FR Doc. 2016-19991 Filed 8-23-16; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 4910-13-P
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at the time of the rule’s posting, which publicly available a written statement safety standards for this design feature.
may include the preamble indicating how any properly filed These special conditions contain the
accompanying the rule. The Secretary requests for correction were handled. additional safety standards that the
will not consider new evidence (g) Alteration of standards. Until an Administrator considers necessary to
submitted in connection with a request. energy conservation standard has been establish a level of safety equivalent to
(4) A request under this section must published in the Federal Register, the that established by the existing
be filed in electronic format by email to Secretary may correct such standard, airworthiness standards.
the address that the rule designates for consistent with the Administrative DATES: Effective April 22, 2017.
correction requests. Should filing by Procedure Act. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
email not be feasible, the requester (h) Judicial review. For determining
Nazih Khaouly, Airplane and Flight
should contact the program point of the prematurity, timeliness, or lateness
Crew Interface Branch, ANM–111,
contact designated in the rule regarding of a petition for judicial review pursuant
Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft
an appropriate alternative means of to section 336(b) of the Act (42 U.S.C.
Certification Service, 1601 Lind Avenue
filing a request. 6306), a rule is considered ‘‘prescribed’’
(5) A request that does not comply SW., Renton, Washington 98057–3356;
on the date when the rule is published
with the requirements of this section telephone 425–227–2432; facsimile
in the Federal Register.
will not be considered. 425–227–1149.
(e) Correction of rules. The Secretary PART 431—ENERGY EFFICIENCY SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
may respond to a request for correction PROGRAM FOR CERTAIN Future Requests for Installation of Non-
under paragraph (d) of this section or COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL Rechargeable Lithium Batteries
address an Error discovered on the EQUIPMENT
Secretary’s own initiative by submitting The FAA anticipates that non-
to the Office of the Federal Register ■ 3. The authority citation for part 431 rechargeable lithium batteries will be
either a corrected rule or the rule as continues to read as follows: installed in other makes and models of
previously posted. Authority: 42 U.S.C. 6291–6317. airplanes. We have determined to
(f) Publication in the Federal require special conditions for all
■ 4. Section 431.3 is revised to read as
Register. (1) If, after receiving one or applications requesting non-
follows:
more properly filed requests for rechargeable lithium battery
correction, the Secretary decides not to § 431.3 Error Correction procedure for installations, except the installations
undertake any corrections, the Secretary energy conservation standards rules. excluded in the Applicability section,
will submit the rule for publication to Requests for error corrections until the airworthiness requirements
the Office of the Federal Register as it pertaining to an energy conservation can be revised to address this issue.
was posted pursuant to paragraph (c)(1) standard rule for commercial or Applying special conditions to these
of this section. industrial equipment shall follow those installations across the range of all
(2) If the Secretary receives no procedures and provisions detailed in transport-airplane makes and models
properly filed requests after posting a 10 CFR 430.5 of this chapter. ensures regulatory consistency among
rule and identifies no Errors on the [FR Doc. 2016–19968 Filed 8–23–16; 8:45 am] applicants.
Secretary’s own initiative, the Secretary The FAA issued special conditions
BILLING CODE 6450–01–P
will in due course submit the rule, as it no. 25–612–SC to Gulfstream Aerospace
was posted pursuant to paragraph (c)(1) Corporation for their GVI airplane.
of this section, to the Office of the Those are the first special conditions the
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Register for publication. This FAA issued for non-rechargeable
will occur after the period prescribed by Federal Aviation Administration lithium battery installations. We
paragraph (c)(2) of this section has explained in that document our
elapsed. 14 CFR Part 25 determination to make those special
(3) If the Secretary receives a properly conditions effective one year after
filed request after posting a rule [Docket No. FAA–2015–5391; Special publication of those special conditions
Conditions No. 25–630–SC] in the Federal Register, and our
pursuant to (c)(1) and determines that a
correction is necessary, the Secretary intention for other special conditions for
Special Conditions: The Boeing
will, absent extenuating circumstances, other makes and models to be effective
Company, Boeing Model 767–2C
submit a corrected rule for publication on this same date or 30 days after their
Airplane; Non-Rechargeable Lithium
in the Federal Register within 30 days publication, whichever is later.
Battery Installations
after the period prescribed by paragraph Background
(c)(2) of this section has elapsed. AGENCY: Federal Aviation
(4) Consistent with the Act, Administration (FAA), DOT. On January 18, 2010, The Boeing
compliance with an energy conservation ACTION: Final special conditions. Company (Boeing) applied for an
standard will be required upon the amendment to type certificate no.
specified compliance date as published SUMMARY: These special conditions are A1NM to include a new Model 767–2C
in the relevant rule in the Federal issued for the Boeing Model 767–2C airplane. The Model 767–2C airplane is
Register. airplane. This airplane will have a novel a twin-engine, transport-category
(5) Consistent with the Administrative or unusual design feature when freighter derivative of the Model 767–
Procedure Act, and other applicable compared to the state of technology 200 airplane currently approved under
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law, the Secretary will ordinarily envisioned in the airworthiness type certificate no. A1NM. This freighter
designate an effective date for a rule standards for transport-category has a maximum takeoff weight of
under this section that is no less than 30 airplanes. This design feature is 415,000 pounds and can be configured
days after the publication of the rule in associated with non-rechargeable to carry up to 11 supernumeraries.
the Federal Register. lithium battery installations. The The Model 767–2C airplane
(6) When the Secretary submits a rule applicable airworthiness regulations do incorporates provisions to support
for publication, the Secretary will make not contain adequate or appropriate subsequent supplemental type
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Special condition nos. 3, 7, and 8 are incorporated into the Gulfstream GVI mitigation or analysis at the airplane
self-explanatory, and the FAA does not special conditions as a result of AIA’s level may be applied to show that
provide further explanation for them at comments. designs meet these special conditions.
this time. Boeing commented that they fully The FAA has determined that these
Special condition no. 4 makes it clear support AIA’s comments. special conditions are to require the
that the flammable-fluid fire-protection Boeing requested that the FAA battery to be designed to minimize the
requirements of § 25.863 apply to non- provide adequate time before non- potential of uncontrollable failure, and
rechargeable lithium battery rechargeable lithium battery special to not only rely on mitigation of a
installations. Section 25.863 is conditions become effective to support battery failure at the airplane level.
applicable to areas of the airplane that validation activities by foreign civil Therefore, we have not incorporated the
could be exposed to flammable fluid airworthiness authorities (FCAA) and to proposed revision into the preamble of
leakage from airplane systems. Non- not adversely impact future airplane these special conditions.
rechargeable lithium batteries contain deliveries by all applicants. The FAA AmSafe commented that they concur
electrolyte that is a flammable fluid. considered this same comment from with proposed special condition no. 1
Special condition no. 5 requires each Boeing for special conditions no. 25– with an understanding that ‘‘foreseeable
non-rechargeable lithium battery 612–SC and provided a detailed operating conditions’’ equates to the full
installation to not damage surrounding response in that document. We normal operating envelope of the
structure or adjacent systems, determined the effective date for these airplane. However, this is not a correct
equipment, or electrical wiring from Boeing 767–2C special conditions based understanding of proposed special
corrosive fluids or gases that may on Boeing’s comment and other factors condition no. 1. The FAA intends for
escape. Special condition no. 6 requires stated in special conditions no. 25–612– the term ‘‘foreseeable operating
each non-rechargeable lithium battery SC. conditions,’’ in these special conditions,
installation to have provisions to Boeing commented that the FAA to apply at the cell level and not only
prevent any hazardous effect on needs to clearly define the applicability at the airplane level. In addition,
airplane structure or systems caused by of these special conditions. Boeing’s ‘‘foreseeable’’ includes anticipated
the maximum amount of heat it can comment is similar to their comment on abnormal operating conditions.
generate due to any failure of it or its special conditions no. 25–612–SC. We AmSafe recommended revising
individual cells. The means of meeting provided a detailed response in special proposed special condition no. 2 to
these special conditions may be the conditions no. 25–612–SC and have read, ‘‘Battery installation and/or
same, but they are independent clearly defined the applicability for equipment containing any non-
requirements addressing different these Boeing 767–2C special conditions. rechargeable lithium battery must
hazards. Special condition no. 5 One aspect of Boeing’s comment that we preclude the occurrence of, or mitigate
addresses corrosive fluids and gases, did not address in special conditions the effect of self-sustaining,
whereas special condition no. 6 no. 25–612–SC is that some design uncontrolled increases in temperature
addresses heat. changes may not change a lithium or pressure.’’ Amsafe’s rationale was
These special conditions will apply to battery installation but affect it, which based on their recommendation that
all non-rechargeable lithium battery results in these special conditions being design mitigation or analysis at the
installations in lieu of § 25.1353(b)(1) applicable. For example, adding a heat airplane level be acceptable. As
through (b)(4) at Amendment 25–123. source next to a lithium battery can explained above, the FAA has
Sections 25.1353(b)(1) through (b)(4) at increase its possibility of entering into determined that these special conditions
Amendment 25–123 will remain in thermal runaway. Lithium battery are to require the battery to be designed
effect for other battery installations. installations affected by design changes to minimize the potential of
These special conditions contain the must meet these special conditions. uncontrollable failure, and to not only
additional safety standards that the Some examples of changes that affect rely on mitigation of a battery failure at
Administrator considers necessary to lithium battery installations are those the airplane level. The FAA has not
establish a level of safety equivalent to that: incorporated the proposed revision into
that established by the existing • Increase the temperatures or special condition no. 2.
airworthiness standards. pressures in a battery, AmSafe recommended adding the
• Increase the electrical load on a phrase ‘‘. . . failure which is not shown
Discussion of Comments to be extremely remote . . .’’ to
battery,
Notice of proposed special conditions • Increase potential for imbalance proposed special condition no. 3. The
no. 25–16–01–SC, for the Boeing 767– between battery cells, FAA responds that service history
2C airplane, was published in the • Modify protective circuitry for a shows that battery failure is not
Federal Register on January 27, 2016 lithium battery, extremely remote. Therefore, to ensure
[81 FR 4596]. We received four • Increase the airplane level risk due that failures are properly anticipated
substantive comments. to the location of an existing lithium and accounted for, we have not revised
The Aerospace Industries Association battery. An example is installation of a proposed special condition no. 3 to
(AIA) provided several comments that new oxygen line next to an existing part include these words.
were identical to their comments for that has a lithium battery. The airplane AmSafe recommended deleting
special conditions no. 25–612–SC, level risk may increase due to the § 25.863(c)(d) from proposed special
which we issued to Gulfstream potential hazard of a lithium battery fire condition no 4. The FAA does not
Aerospace Corporation for non- in the proximity of oxygen. concur. Section 25.863 already applies
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rechargeable lithium battery Gulfstream Aerospace Corporation to non-rechargeable lithium batteries
installations on Gulfstream GVI commented that they agree with since they contain electrolyte that is a
airplanes. The FAA responded to each Boeing’s comments and requested that flammable fluid. Since § 25.863 has
of these comments in that final special the FAA consider incorporating their historically been applied to flammable
conditions document. We incorporated proposed changes into this document. fluids related to propulsion and
the same revisions into these Boeing AmSafe recommended that the FAA hydraulic systems, the FAA is including
767–2C special conditions that we state in the preamble that design special condition no. 4 to ensure that
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![Federal Register / Vol. 81, No. 164 / Wednesday, August 24, 2016 / Rules and Regulations 57761
there is no misunderstanding that design feature, these special conditions to cause a major or more-severe failure
§ 25.863 also applies to these batteries. would apply to that model as well. condition.
AmSafe recommended revising These special conditions are only 6. Have provisions to prevent any
proposed special condition no. 5 to applicable to design changes applied for hazardous effect on airplane structure or
prohibit damage to surrounding after their effective date. The existing systems caused by the maximum
structure or adjacent systems, airplane fleet and follow-on deliveries amount of heat it can generate due to
equipment, or electrical wiring from of airplanes with previously certified any failure of it or its individual cells.
corrosive fluids or gases that may escape non-rechargeable lithium battery 7. Have a failure sensing and warning
‘‘in such a way as to cause a hazardous installations are not affected. system to alert the flightcrew if its
or catastrophic failure condition.’’ AIA These special conditions are not failure affects safe operation of the
also recommended this revision. The applicable to previously certified non- airplane.
FAA intends for special condition no. 5 rechargeable lithium battery 8. Have a means for the flightcrew or
to be consistent with § 25.1309. So, we installations where the only change is maintenance personnel to determine the
added the words ‘‘. . . in such a way as either cosmetic or relocating the battery charge state if the battery’s
to cause a major or more-severe failure installation to improve the safety of the function is required for safe operation of
condition.’’ The revised special airplane and occupants. The FAA the airplane.
condition now reads, ‘‘. . . each non- determined that this exclusion is in the Note: A battery system consists of the
rechargeable lithium battery installation public interest because the need to meet battery and any protective, monitoring,
must not damage surrounding structure all of the special conditions might and alerting circuitry or hardware inside
or adjacent systems, equipment, or otherwise deter such design changes or outside of the battery. It also includes
electrical wiring from corrosive fluids or that involve relocating batteries. A vents (where necessary) and packaging.
gases that may escape in such a way as cosmetic change is a change in For the purpose of these special
to cause a major or more-severe failure appearance only, and does not change conditions, a ‘‘battery’’ and ‘‘battery
condition.’’ The FAA does not concur any function or safety characteristic of system’’ are referred to as a battery.
with excluding major failure conditions. the battery installation. Issued in Renton, Washington, on August
AmSafe concurred with proposed Conclusion 11, 2016.
special condition no. 6. Paul Bernado,
This action affects only certain novel
AmSafe concurred with proposed Acting Manager, Transport Airplane
or unusual design features on one model
special condition no. 7 and Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service.
of airplane. It is not a rule of general
recommended revising proposed special [FR Doc. 2016–19991 Filed 8–23–16; 8:45 am]
applicability.
condition no. 8. However, the FAA BILLING CODE 4910–13–P
deleted these proposed special List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 25
conditions as explained in our response Aircraft, Aviation safety, Reporting
to AIA’s comments in special conditions and record keeping requirements. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
no. 25–612–SC.
The authority citation for these Federal Aviation Administration
AmSafe recommended revising ‘‘safe
special conditions is as follows:
operation of the airplane’’ in proposed
special condition nos. 9 and 10 to Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701, 14 CFR Part 95
‘‘continued safe operation of the 44702, 44704.
[Docket No. 31093; Amdt. No. 528]
airplane.’’ The phrase ‘‘continued safe The Special Conditions
operation of the airplane’’ is used to IFR Altitudes; Miscellaneous
Accordingly, the following special
refer to safe operation of the airplane Amendments
conditions are part of the type
after a failure has occurred. The phrase
certification basis for the Boeing Model AGENCY: Federal Aviation
‘‘safe operation of the airplane’’ is more
767–2C airplane. Administration (FAA), DOT.
general and appropriate for these special
conditions. We did not incorporate Non-Rechargeable Lithium Battery ACTION: Final rule
AmSafe’s proposed revision into these Installations
special conditions. SUMMARY: This amendment adopts
In lieu of § 25.1353(b)(1) through miscellaneous amendments to the
The FAA has determined that (b)(4) at Amendment 25–123, each non-
‘‘uncontrolled’’ in special condition no. required IFR (instrument flight rules)
rechargeable lithium battery installation altitudes and changeover points for
2 should be ‘‘uncontrollable’’ to more must:
accurately describe the concern. This certain Federal airways, jet routes, or
1. Maintain safe cell temperatures and direct routes for which a minimum or
revision does not change the intended pressures under all foreseeable
meaning of this special condition. maximum en route authorized IFR
operating conditions to prevent fire and altitude is prescribed. This regulatory
Except as discussed above, the special explosion.
conditions are adopted as proposed. action is needed because of changes
2. Prevent the occurrence of self- occurring in the National Airspace
Applicability sustaining, uncontrollable increases in System. These changes are designed to
temperature or pressure. provide for the safe and efficient use of
As discussed above, these special 3. Not emit explosive or toxic gases,
conditions are applicable to the Model the navigable airspace under instrument
either in normal operation or as a result
767–2C airplane. Should the applicant conditions in the affected areas.
of its failure, that may accumulate in
mstockstill on DSK3G9T082PROD with RULES
apply at a later date for a change to the hazardous quantities within the DATES: Effective Date: 0901 UTC,
type certificate to include another airplane. September 15, 2016.
model incorporating the same novel or 4. Meet the requirements of § 25.863. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
unusual design feature, or should any 5. Not damage surrounding structure Richard A. Dunham, Flight Procedure
other model already included on the or adjacent systems, equipment, or Standards Branch (AMCAFS–420),
same type certificate be modified to electrical wiring from corrosive fluids or Flight Technologies and Programs
incorporate the same novel or unusual gases that may escape in such a way as Division, Flight Standards Service,
VerDate Sep<11>2014 17:56 Aug 23, 2016 Jkt 238001 PO 00000 Frm 00017 Fmt 4700 Sfmt 4700 E:\FR\FM\24AUR1.SGM 24AUR1](https://thefederalregister.org/doc/81_FR_57922/page/4.svg)
Document Created: 2016-08-24 03:03:10
Document Modified: 2016-08-24 03:03:10
| Category | Regulatory Information | |
| Collection | Federal Register | |
| sudoc Class | AE 2.7: GS 4.107: AE 2.106: | |
| Publisher | Office of the Federal Register, National Archives and Records Administration | |
| Section | Rules and Regulations | |
| Action | Final special conditions. | |
| Dates | Effective April 22, 2017. | |
| Contact | Nazih Khaouly, Airplane and Flight Crew Interface Branch, ANM-111, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service, 1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, Washington 98057-3356; telephone 425-227-2432; facsimile 425-227-1149. | |
| FR Citation | 81 FR 57758 | |
| CFR Associated | Aircraft; Aviation Safety and Reporting and Record Keeping Requirements |
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