81 FR 67120 - Reliability Standard for Transmission System Planned Performance for Geomagnetic Disturbance Events
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission Federal Register Volume 81, Issue 190 (September 30, 2016)
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
Federal Register Volume 81, Issue 190 (September 30, 2016)
| Page Range | 67120-67140 | |
| FR Document | 2016-23441 |
[Federal Register Volume 81, Number 190 (Friday, September 30, 2016)] [Rules and Regulations] [Pages 67120-67140] From the Federal Register Online [www.thefederalregister.org] [FR Doc No: 2016-23441] ======================================================================= ----------------------------------------------------------------------- DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 18 CFR Part 40 [Docket No. RM15-11-000; Order No. 830] Reliability Standard for Transmission System Planned Performance for Geomagnetic Disturbance Events AGENCY: Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Department of Energy. ACTION: Final rule. ----------------------------------------------------------------------- SUMMARY: The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (Commission) approves Reliability Standard TPL-007-1 (Transmission System Planned Performance for Geomagnetic Disturbance Events). The North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC), the Commission-certified Electric Reliability Organization, submitted Reliability Standard TPL-007-1 for Commission approval in response to a Commission directive in Order No. 779. Reliability Standard TPL-007-1 establishes requirements for certain registered entities to assess the vulnerability of their transmission systems to geomagnetic disturbance events (GMDs), which occur when the sun ejects charged particles that interact with and cause changes in the earth's magnetic fields. Applicable entities that do not meet certain performance requirements, based on the results of their vulnerability assessments, must develop a plan to achieve the performance requirements. In addition, the Commission directs NERC to develop modifications to Reliability Standard TPL-007-1: To modify the benchmark GMD event definition set forth in Attachment 1 of Reliability Standard TPL-007-1, as it pertains to the required GMD Vulnerability Assessments and transformer thermal impact assessments, so that the definition is not based solely on spatially-averaged data; to require the collection of necessary geomagnetically induced current monitoring and magnetometer data and to make such data publicly available; and to include a one-year deadline for the development of corrective action plans and two and four-year deadlines to complete mitigation actions involving non-hardware and hardware mitigation, respectively. The Commission also directs NERC to submit a work plan and, subsequently, one or more informational filings that address specific GMD-related research areas. DATES: This rule will become effective November 29, 2016. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Regis Binder (Technical Information), Office of Electric Reliability, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 888 First Street NE., Washington, DC 20426, Telephone: (301) 665-1601, [email protected]. Matthew Vlissides (Legal Information), Office of the General Counsel, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 888 First Street NE., Washington, DC 20426, Telephone: (202) 502-8408, [email protected]. SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Order No. 830 Final Rule 1. Pursuant to section 215 of the Federal Power Act (FPA), the Commission approves Reliability Standard TPL-007-1 (Transmission System Planned Performance for Geomagnetic Disturbance Events).\1\ The North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC), the Commission- certified Electric Reliability Organization (ERO), submitted Reliability Standard TPL-007-1 for Commission approval in response to a Commission directive in Order No. 779.\2\ Reliability Standard TPL-007- 1 establishes requirements for certain registered entities to assess the vulnerability of their transmission systems to geomagnetic disturbance events (GMDs), which occur when the sun ejects charged particles that interact with and cause changes in the earth's magnetic fields. Reliability Standard TPL-007-1 requires applicable entities that do not meet certain performance requirements, based on the results of their vulnerability assessments, to develop a plan to achieve the requirements. Reliability Standard TPL-007-1 addresses the directives in Order No. 779 by requiring applicable Bulk-Power System owners and operators to conduct initial and on-going vulnerability assessments regarding the potential impact of a benchmark GMD event on the Bulk- Power System as a whole and on Bulk-Power System components.\3\ In addition, Reliability Standard TPL-007-1 requires applicable entities to develop and implement corrective action plans to mitigate identified vulnerabilities.\4\ Potential mitigation strategies identified in the proposed Reliability Standard include, but are not limited to, the installation, modification or removal of transmission and generation facilities and associated equipment.\5\ Accordingly, Reliability Standard TPL-007-1 constitutes an important step in addressing the risks posed by GMD events to the Bulk-Power System. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\ 16 U.S.C. 824o. \2\ Reliability Standards for Geomagnetic Disturbances, Order No. 779, 78 FR 30,747 (May 23, 2013), 143 FERC ] 61,147, reh'g denied, 144 FERC ] 61,113 (2013). \3\ See Reliability Standard TPL-007-1, Requirement R4; see also Order No. 779, 143 FERC ] 61,147 at PP 67, 71. \4\ See Reliability Standard TPL-007-1, Requirement R7; see also Order No. 779, 143 FERC ] 61,147 at P 79. \5\ See Reliability Standard TPL-007-1, Requirement R7. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2. In addition, pursuant to section 215(d)(5) of the FPA, the Commission directs NERC to develop modifications to Reliability Standard TPL-007-1: (1) To revise the benchmark GMD event definition set forth in Attachment 1 of Reliability Standard TPL-007-1, as it pertains to the required GMD Vulnerability Assessments and transformer thermal impact assessments, so that the definition is not based solely on spatially-averaged data; (2) to require the collection of necessary geomagnetically induced current (GIC) monitoring and magnetometer data and to make such data publicly available; and (3) to include a one-year deadline for the completion of corrective action plans and two- and four-year deadlines to complete mitigation actions involving non- hardware and hardware mitigation, respectively.\6\ The Commission directs NERC to submit these revisions within 18 months of the effective date of this Final Rule. The Commission also directs NERC to submit a work plan (GMD research work plan) within six months of the effective date of this Final Rule and, subsequently, one or more [[Page 67121]] informational filings that address specific GMD-related research areas. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \6\ 16 U.S.C. 824o(d)(5). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- I. Background A. Section 215 and Mandatory Reliability Standards 3. Section 215 of the FPA requires the Commission to certify an ERO to develop mandatory and enforceable Reliability Standards, subject to Commission review and approval. Once approved, the Reliability Standards may be enforced in the United States by the ERO, subject to Commission oversight, or by the Commission independently.\7\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \7\ Id. 824o(e). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- B. GMD Primer 4. GMD events occur when the sun ejects charged particles that interact with and cause changes in the earth's magnetic fields.\8\ Once a solar particle is ejected, it can take between 17 to 96 hours (depending on its energy level) to reach earth.\9\ A geoelectric field is the electric potential (measured in volts per kilometer (V/km)) on the earth's surface and is directly related to the rate of change of the magnetic fields.\10\ A geoelectric field has an amplitude and direction and acts as a voltage source that can cause GICs to flow on long conductors, such as transmission lines.\11\ The magnitude of the geoelectric field amplitude is impacted by local factors such as geomagnetic latitude and local earth conductivity.\12\ Geomagnetic latitude is the proximity to earth's magnetic north and south poles, as opposed to earth's geographic poles. Local earth conductivity is the ability of the earth's crust to conduct electricity at a certain location to depths of hundreds of kilometers down to the earth's mantle. Local earth conductivity impacts the magnitude (i.e., severity) of the geoelectric fields that are formed during a GMD event by, all else being equal, a lower earth conductivity resulting in higher geoelectric fields.\13\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \8\ North American Electric Reliability Corp., 2012 Special Reliability Assessment Interim Report: Effects of Geomagnetic Disturbances on the Bulk Power System at i-ii (February 2012), http://www.nerc.com/files/2012GMD.pdf (GMD Interim Report). \9\ Id. ii. \10\ Id. \11\ Id. \12\ NERC Petition, Ex. D (White Paper on GMD Benchmark Event Description) at 4. \13\ Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- C. Order No. 779 5. In Order No. 779, the Commission directed NERC, pursuant to section 215(d)(5) of the FPA, to develop and submit for approval proposed Reliability Standards that address the impact of geomagnetic disturbances on the reliable operation of the Bulk-Power System. The Commission based its directive on the potentially severe, wide-spread impact on the reliable operation of the Bulk-Power System that can be caused by GMD events and the absence of existing Reliability Standards to address GMD events.\14\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \14\ Order No. 779, 143 FERC ] 61,147 at P 3. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 6. Order No. 779 directed NERC to implement the directive in two stages. In the first stage, the Commission directed NERC to submit, within six months of the effective date of Order No. 779, one or more Reliability Standards (First Stage GMD Reliability Standards) that require owners and operators of the Bulk-Power System to develop and implement operational procedures to mitigate the effects of GMDs consistent with the reliable operation of the Bulk-Power System.\15\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \15\ Id. P 2. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 7. In the second stage, the Commission directed NERC to submit, within 18 months of the effective date of Order No. 779, one or more Reliability Standards (Second Stage GMD Reliability Standards) that require owners and operators of the Bulk-Power System to conduct initial and on-going assessments of the potential impact of benchmark GMD events on Bulk-Power System equipment and the Bulk-Power System as a whole. The Commission directed that the Second Stage GMD Reliability Standards must identify benchmark GMD events that specify what severity of GMD events a responsible entity must assess for potential impacts on the Bulk-Power System.\16\ Order No. 779 explained that if the assessments identified potential impacts from benchmark GMD events, the Reliability Standards should require owners and operators to develop and implement a plan to protect against instability, uncontrolled separation, or cascading failures of the Bulk-Power System, caused by damage to critical or vulnerable Bulk-Power System equipment, or otherwise, as a result of a benchmark GMD event. The Commission directed that the development of this plan could not be limited to considering operational procedures or enhanced training alone but should, subject to the potential impacts of the benchmark GMD events identified in the assessments, contain strategies for protecting against the potential impact of GMDs based on factors such as the age, condition, technical specifications, system configuration or location of specific equipment.\17\ Order No. 779 observed that these strategies could, for example, include automatically blocking GICs from entering the Bulk-Power System, instituting specification requirements for new equipment, inventory management, isolating certain equipment that is not cost effective to retrofit or a combination thereof. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \16\ Id. \17\ Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- D. Order No. 797 8. In Order No. 797, the Commission approved Reliability Standard EOP-010-1 (Geomagnetic Disturbance Operations).\18\ NERC submitted Reliability Standard EOP-010-1 for Commission approval in compliance with the Commission's directive in Order No. 779 corresponding to the First Stage GMD Reliability Standards. In Order No. 797-A, the Commission denied the Foundation for Resilient Societies' (Resilient Societies) request for rehearing of Order No. 797. The Commission stated that the rehearing request ``addressed a later stage of efforts on geomagnetic disturbances (i.e., NERC's future filing of Second Stage GMD Reliability Standards) and [that Resilient Societies] may seek to present those arguments at an appropriate time in response to that filing.'' \19\ In particular, the Commission stated that GIC monitoring requirements should be addressed in the Second Stage GMD Reliability Standards.\20\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \18\ Reliability Standard for Geomagnetic Disturbance Operations, Order No. 797, 79 FR 35,911 (June 25, 2014), 147 FERC ] 61,209, reh'g denied, Order No. 797-A, 149 FERC ] 61,027 (2014). \19\ Order No. 797-A, 149 FERC ] 61,027 at P 2. \20\ Id. P 27 (stating that the Commission continues ``to encourage NERC to address the collection, dissemination, and use of geomagnetic induced current data, by NERC, industry or others, in the Second Stage GMD Reliability Standards because such efforts could be useful in the development of GMD mitigation methods or to validate GMD models''). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- E. NERC Petition and Reliability Standard TPL-007-1 9. On January 21, 2015, NERC petitioned the Commission to approve Reliability Standard TPL-007-1 and its associated violation risk factors and violation severity levels, implementation plan, and effective dates.\21\ NERC also submitted a proposed definition for the term ``Geomagnetic Disturbance Vulnerability Assessment or GMD Vulnerability [[Page 67122]] Assessment'' for inclusion in the NERC Glossary of Terms (NERC Glossary). NERC maintains that Reliability Standard TPL-007-1 is just, reasonable, not unduly discriminatory or preferential and in the public interest. NERC further contends that Reliability Standard TPL-007-1 satisfies the directive in Order No. 779 corresponding to the Second Stage GMD Reliability Standards. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \21\ Reliability Standard TPL-007-1 is not attached to this final rule. Reliability Standard TPL-007-1 is available on the Commission's eLibrary document retrieval system in Docket No. RM15- 11-000 and on the NERC website, www.nerc.com. NERC submitted an errata on February 2, 2015 containing a corrected version of Exhibit A (Proposed Reliability Standard TPL-007-1). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 10. NERC states that Reliability Standard TPL-007-1 applies to planning coordinators, transmission planners, transmission owners and generation owners who own or whose planning coordinator area or transmission planning area includes a power transformer with a high side, wye-grounded winding connected at 200 kV or higher.\22\ NERC explains that the applicability criteria for qualifying transformers in Reliability Standard TPL-007-1 are the same as that for the First Stage GMD Reliability Standard in Reliability Standard EOP-010-1, which the Commission approved in Order No. 797. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \22\ A power transformer with a ``high side wye-grounded winding'' refers to a power transformer with windings on the high voltage side that are connected in a wye configuration and have a grounded neutral connection. NERC Petition at 13 n.32. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 11. Reliability Standard TPL-007-1 contains seven requirements. Requirement R1 requires planning coordinators and transmission planners to determine the individual and joint responsibilities in the planning coordinator's planning area for maintaining models and performing studies needed to complete the GMD Vulnerability Assessment required in Requirement R4. 12. Requirement R2 requires planning coordinators and transmission planners to maintain system models and GIC system models needed to complete the GMD Vulnerability Assessment required in Requirement R4. 13. Requirement R3 requires planning coordinators and transmission planners to have criteria for acceptable system steady state voltage limits for their systems during the benchmark GMD event described in Attachment 1 (Calculating Geoelectric Fields for the Benchmark GMD Event). 14. Requirement R4 requires planning coordinators and transmission planners to conduct a GMD Vulnerability Assessment every 60 months using the benchmark GMD event described in Attachment 1 to Reliability Standard TPL-007-1. The benchmark GMD event is based on a 1-in-100 year frequency of occurrence and is composed of four elements: (1) A reference peak geoelectric field amplitude of 8 V/km derived from statistical analysis of historical magnetometer data; (2) a scaling factor to account for local geomagnetic latitude; (3) a scaling factor to account for local earth conductivity; and (4) a reference geomagnetic field time series or wave shape to facilitate time-domain analysis of GMD impact on equipment.\23\ The product of the first three elements is referred to as the regional geoelectric field peak amplitude.\24\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \23\ See Reliability Standard TPL-007-1, Att. 1; see also NERC Petition, Ex. D (White Paper on GMD Benchmark Event Description) at 5. \24\ NERC Petition, Ex. D (White Paper on GMD Benchmark Event Description) at 5. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 15. Requirement R5 requires planning coordinators and transmission planners to provide GIC flow information, to be used in the transformer thermal impact assessment required in Requirement R6, to each transmission owner and generator owner that owns an applicable transformer within the applicable planning area. 16. Requirement R6 requires transmission owners and generator owners to conduct thermal impact assessments on solely and jointly owned applicable transformers where the maximum effective GIC value provided in Requirement R5 is 75 amperes per phase (A/phase) or greater. 17. Requirement R7 requires planning coordinators and transmission planners to develop corrective action plans if the GMD Vulnerability Assessment concludes that the system does not meet the performance requirements in Table 1 (Steady State Planning Events). F. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking 18. On May 14, 2015, the Commission issued a notice of proposed rulemaking (NOPR) proposing to approve Reliability Standard TPL-007- 1.\25\ In addition, the Commission proposed to direct that NERC develop three modifications to Reliability Standard TPL-007-1. First, the Commission proposed to direct NERC to revise the benchmark GMD event definition in Reliability Standard TPL-007-1 so that the definition is not based solely on spatially-averaged data. Second, the Commission proposed to direct NERC to revise Reliability Standard TPL-007-1 to require the installation of GIC monitors and magnetometers where necessary. Third, the Commission proposed to direct NERC to revise Reliability Standard TPL-007-1 to require corrective action plans (Requirement R7) to be developed within one year and, with respect to the mitigation actions called for in the corrective action plans, non- hardware mitigation actions to be completed within two years of finishing development of the corrective action plan and hardware mitigation to be completed within four years. The NOPR also proposed to direct NERC to submit a work plan and, subsequently, one or more informational filings that address specific GMD-related research areas and sought comment on certain issues relating to the transformer thermal impact assessments (Requirement R6) and the meaning of language in Table 1 of Reliability Standard TPL-007-1. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \25\ Reliability Standard for Transmission System Planned Performance for Geomagnetic Disturbance Events, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 80 FR 29,990 (May 26, 2015), 151 FERC ] 61,134 (2015) (NOPR). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 19. On August 20, 2015 and October 2, 2015, the Commission issued notices setting supplemental comment periods regarding specific documents. On March 1, 2016, Commission staff led a technical conference on Reliability Standard TPL-007-1 and issues raised in the NOPR.\26\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \26\ Written presentations at the March 1, 2016 Technical Conference and the Technical Conference transcript referenced in this Final Rule are accessible through the Commission's eLibrary document retrieval system in Docket No. RM15-11-000. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 20. On April 28, 2016, NERC made a filing notifying the Commission that ``NERC identified new information that may necessitate a minor revision to a figure in one of the supporting technical white papers. This revision would not require a change to any of the Requirements of the proposed Reliability Standard.'' \27\ On June 28, 2016, NERC submitted the revised technical white papers referenced in the April 28, 2016 filing. On June 29, 2016, the Commission issued a notice setting a supplemental comment period regarding the revised technical white papers submitted by NERC on June 28, 2016. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \27\ NERC April 28, 2016 Filing at 1. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 21. In response to the NOPR and subsequent notices, 28 entities filed initial and supplemental comments. We address below the issues raised in the NOPR and comments. The Appendix to this Final Rule lists the entities that filed comments in response to the NOPR and in response to the supplemental comment period notices. II. Discussion 22. Pursuant to section 215(d) of the FPA, the Commission approves Reliability Standard TPL-007-1 as just, reasonable, not unduly discriminatory or preferential and in the public interest. While we recognize that scientific and operational research regarding GMD is ongoing, we believe [[Page 67123]] that the potential threat to the bulk electric system warrants Commission action at this time, including efforts to conduct critical GMD research and update Reliability Standard TPL-007-1 as appropriate. 23. First, we find that Reliability Standard TPL-007-1 addresses the directives in Order No. 779 corresponding to the development of the Second Stage GMD Reliability Standards. Reliability Standard TPL-007-1 does this by requiring applicable Bulk-Power System owners and operators to conduct, on a recurring five-year cycle,\28\ initial and on-going vulnerability assessments regarding the potential impact of a benchmark GMD event on the Bulk-Power System as a whole and on Bulk- Power System components.\29\ In addition, Reliability Standard TPL-007- 1 requires applicable entities to develop and implement corrective action plans to mitigate vulnerabilities identified through those recurring vulnerability assessments.\30\ Potential mitigation strategies identified in the proposed Reliability Standard include, but are not limited to, the installation, modification or removal of transmission and generation facilities and associated equipment.\31\ Accordingly, Reliability Standard TPL-007-1 constitutes an important step in addressing the risks posed by GMD events to the Bulk-Power System. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \28\ A detailed explanation of the five-year GMD Vulnerability Assessment and mitigation cycle is provided in paragraph 103, infra. \29\ See Reliability Standard TPL-007-1, Requirement R4; see also Order No. 779, 143 FERC ] 61,147 at PP 67, 71. \30\ See Reliability Standard TPL-007-1, Requirement R7; see also Order No. 779, 143 FERC ] 61,147 at P 79. \31\ See Reliability Standard TPL-007-1, Requirement R7. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 24. The Commission also approves the inclusion of the term ``Geomagnetic Disturbance Vulnerability Assessment or GMD Vulnerability Assessment'' in the NERC Glossary; Reliability Standard TPL-007-1's associated violation risk factors and violation severity levels; and NERC's proposed implementation plan and effective dates. The Commission also affirms, as raised for comment in the NOPR, that cost recovery for prudent costs associated with or incurred to comply with Reliability Standard TPL-007-1 and future revisions to the Reliability Standard will be available to registered entities.\32\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \32\ NOPR, 151 FERC ] 61,134 at P 49 n.60. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 25. While we conclude that Reliability Standard TPL-007-1 satisfies the directives in Order No. 779, based on the record developed in this proceeding, the Commission determines that Reliability Standard TPL- 007-1 should be modified to reflect the new information and analyses discussed below, as proposed in the NOPR. Accordingly, pursuant to section 215(d)(5) of the FPA, the Commission directs NERC to develop and submit modifications to Reliability Standard TPL-007-1 concerning: (1) The calculation of the reference peak geoelectric field amplitude component of the benchmark GMD event definition; (2) the collection and public availability of necessary GIC monitoring and magnetometer data; and (3) deadlines for completing corrective action plans and the mitigation measures called for in corrective action plans. The Commission directs NERC to develop and submit these revisions for Commission approval within 18 months of the effective date of this Final Rule. 26. Furthermore, to improve the understanding of GMD events generally, the Commission directs NERC to submit within six months from the effective date of this Final Rule a GMD research work plan.\33\ Specifically, we direct NERC to: (1) Further analyze the area over which spatial averaging should be calculated for stability studies, including performing sensitivity analyses on squares less than 500 km per side (e.g., 100 km, 200 km); (2) further analyze earth conductivity models by, for example, using metered GIC and magnetometer readings to calculate earth conductivity and using 3-D readings; (3) determine whether new analyses and observations support modifying the use of single station readings around the earth to adjust the spatially averaged benchmark for latitude; (4) research, as discussed below, aspects of the required thermal impact assessments; and (5) in NERC's discretion, conduct any GMD-related research areas generally that may impact the development of new or modified GMD Reliability Standards. We expect that work completed through the GMD research work plan, as well as other analyses facilitated by the increased collection and availability of GIC monitoring and magnetometer data directed herein, will lead to further modifications to Reliability Standard TPL-007-1 as our collective understanding of the threats posed by GMD events improves. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \33\ Following submission of the GMD research work plan, the Commission will notice the filing for public comment and issue an order addressing its proposed content and schedule. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 27. Below we discuss the following issues raised in the NOPR and NOPR comments: (1) The benchmark GMD event definition described in Reliability Standard TPL-007-1, Attachment 1 (Calculating Geoelectric Fields for the Benchmark GMD Event); (2) transformer thermal impact assessments in Requirement R6; (3) GMD research work plan; (4) collection and public availability of GIC monitoring and magnetometer data; (5) completion of corrective action plans in Requirement R7; (6) meaning of ``minimized'' in Table 1 (Steady State Planning Events) of Reliability Standard TPL-007-1; (7) NERC's proposed implementation plan and effective dates; and (8) other issues. A. Benchmark GMD Event Definition NERC Petition 28. NERC states that the purpose of the benchmark GMD event is to ``provide a defined event for assessing system performance during a low probability, high magnitude GMD event.'' \34\ NERC explains that the benchmark GMD event represents ``the most severe GMD event expected in a 100-year period as determined by a statistical analysis of recorded geomagnetic data.'' \35\ The benchmark GMD event definition is used in the GMD Vulnerability Assessments and thermal impact assessment requirements of Reliability Standard TPL-007-1 (Requirements R4 and R6). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \34\ NERC Petition at 15. \35\ Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 29. As noted above, NERC states that the benchmark GMD event definition has four elements: (1) A reference peak geoelectric field amplitude of 8 V/km derived from statistical analysis of historical magnetometer data; (2) a scaling factor to account for local geomagnetic latitude; (3) a scaling factor to account for local earth conductivity; and (4) a reference geomagnetic field time series or wave shape to facilitate time-domain analysis of GMD impact on equipment.\36\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \36\ NERC Petition, Ex. D (White Paper on GMD Benchmark Event Description) at 5. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 30. The standard drafting team determined that a 1-in-100 year GMD event would cause an 8 V/km reference peak geoelectric field amplitude at 60 degree geomagnetic latitude using Qu[eacute]bec's earth conductivity.\37\ The standard drafting team stated that: --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \37\ Id. the reference geoelectric field amplitude was determined through statistical analysis using . . . field measurements from geomagnetic observatories in northern Europe and the reference (Quebec) earth model . . . . The Quebec earth model is generally resistive and the geological structure is relatively well understood. The statistical analysis resulted in a conservative peak geoelectric field amplitude of approximately 8 V/km . . . . [[Page 67124]] The frequency of occurrence of this benchmark GMD event is estimated to be approximately 1 in 100 years.\38\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \38\ Id. (footnotes omitted). 31. The standard drafting team explained that it used field measurements taken from the IMAGE magnetometer chain, which covers Northern Europe, for the period 1993-2013 to calculate the reference peak geoelectric field amplitude used in the benchmark GMD event definition.\39\ As described in NERC's petition, the standard drafting team ``spatially averaged'' four different station groups of IMAGE data, each spanning a square area of approximately 500 km (roughly 310 miles) in width.\40\ The standard drafting team justified the use of spatial averaging by stating that Reliability Standard TPL-007-1 is designed to ``address wide-area effects caused by a severe GMD event, such as increased var absorption and voltage depressions. Without characterizing GMD on regional scales, statistical estimates could be weighted by local effects and suggest unduly pessimistic conditions when considering cascading failure and voltage collapse.'' \41\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \39\ Id. at 8. The International Monitor for Auroral Geomagnetic Effects (IMAGE) consists of 31 magnetometer stations in northern Europe maintained by 10 institutes from Estonia, Finland, Germany, Norway, Poland, Russia, and Sweden. See IMAGE website, http://space.fmi.fi/image/beta/?page=home#. \40\ As applied by the standard drafting team, spatial averaging refers to the averaging of geoelectric field amplitude readings within a given area. NERC Petition, Ex. D (White Paper on GMD Benchmark Event Description) at 9. \41\ NERC Petition, Ex. D (White Paper on GMD Benchmark Event Description) at 9. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 32. NERC states that the benchmark GMD event includes scaling factors to enable applicable entities to tailor the reference peak geoelectric field to their specific location for conducting GMD Vulnerability Assessments. NERC explains that the scaling factors in the benchmark GMD event definition are applied to the reference peak geoelectric field amplitude to adjust the 8 V/km value for different geomagnetic latitudes and earth conductivities.\42\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \42\ NERC Petition at 18-19. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 33. The standard drafting team also identified a reference geomagnetic field time series from an Ottawa magnetic observatory during a 1989 GMD event that affected Qu[eacute]bec.\43\ The standard drafting team used this time series to estimate a geoelectric field, represented as a time series (i.e., 10-second values over a period of days), that is expected to occur at 60 degree geomagnetic latitude during a 1-in-100 year GMD event. NERC explains that this time series is used to facilitate time-domain analysis of GMD impacts on equipment.\44\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \43\ NERC Petition, Ex. D (White Paper on GMD Benchmark Event Description) at 5-6, 15-16 (``the reference geomagnetic field waveshape was selected after analyzing a number of recorded GMD events . . . the March 13-14, 1989 GMD event, measured at NRCan's Ottawa geomagnetic observatory, was selected as the reference geomagnetic field waveform because it provides generally conservative results when performing thermal analysis of power transformers''). \44\ Id. at 5-6. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 34. In the sub-sections below, we discuss two issues concerning the benchmark GMD event definition addressed in the NOPR: (1) Reference peak geoelectric field amplitude; and (2) geomagnetic latitude scaling factor. 1. Reference Peak Geoelectric Field Amplitude NOPR 35. The NOPR proposed to approve the benchmark GMD event definition. The NOPR stated that the ``benchmark GMD event definition proposed by NERC complies with the directive in Order No. 779 . . . [c]onsistent with the guidance provided in Order No. 779, the benchmark GMD event definition proposed by NERC addresses the potential widespread impact of a severe GMD event, while taking into consideration the variables of geomagnetic latitude and local earth conductivity.'' \45\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \45\ NOPR, 151 FERC ] 61,134 at P 32. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 36. In addition, the NOPR proposed to direct NERC to develop modifications to Reliability Standard TPL-007-1. Specifically, the NOPR proposed to direct NERC to modify the reference peak geoelectric field amplitude component of the benchmark GMD event definition so that it is not calculated based solely on spatially-averaged data. The NOPR explained that this could be achieved, for example, by requiring applicable entities to conduct GMD Vulnerability Assessments (and, as discussed below, thermal impact assessments) using two different benchmark GMD events: The first benchmark GMD event using the spatially-averaged reference peak geoelectric field value (8 V/km) and the second using the non-spatially averaged peak geoelectric field value cited in the GMD Interim Report (20 V/km). The NOPR stated that the revised Reliability Standard could then require applicable entities to take corrective actions, using engineering judgment, based on the results of both assessments. The NOPR explained that applicable entities would not always be required to mitigate to the level of risk identified by the non-spatially averaged analysis; instead, the selection of mitigation would reflect the range of risks bounded by the two analyses, and be based on engineering judgment within this range, considering all relevant information. The NOPR stated that, alternatively, NERC could propose an equally efficient and effective modification that does not rely exclusively on the spatially-averaged reference peak geoelectric field value. Comments 37. NERC does not support revising the benchmark GMD event definition. NERC maintains that the spatially-averaged reference peak geoelectric field amplitude value in Reliability Standard TPL-007-1 is ``technically-justified, scientifically sound, and has been published in a peer-reviewed research journal covering geomagnetism and other topics.'' \46\ NERC contends that the standard drafting team determined that using the non-spatially averaged 20 V/km figure in the GMD Interim Report would ``consistently overestimate the geoelectric field of a 1- in-100 year GMD event.'' \47\ NERC states that, by contrast, spatial averaging ``properly associates the relevant spatial scales for the analyzed and applied geoelectric fields and would not distort the complexity of the potential impacts of a GMD event.'' \48\ NERC claims that the 500 km-wide square areas used to determine the areas of spatial averaging are ``based on consideration of transmission systems and geomagnetic observation patterns . . . [and are] an appropriate scale for a system-wide impact in a transmission system.'' \49\ To support this position, NERC cites a June 2015 peer-reviewed publication authored in part by some members of the standard drafting team.\50\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \46\ NERC Comments at 6. \47\ Id. at 7. \48\ Id. at 8. \49\ Id. \50\ See Pulkkinen, A., Bernabeu, E., Eichner, J., Viljanen, A., Ngwira, C., ``Regional-Scale High-Latitude Extreme Geoelectric Fields Pertaining to Geomagnetically Induced Currents,'' Earth, Planets and Space (June 19, 2015) (2015 Pulkkinen Paper). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 38. Industry commenters, largely represented by the Trade Associations' comments, do not support revising the benchmark GMD event definition.\51\ The Trade Associations' reasons largely mirror NERC's. While recognizing that the spatially-averaged reference peak geoelectric field amplitude is lower than [[Page 67125]] the non-spatially averaged figure, the Trade Associations contend that the non-spatially averaged value is inappropriate because: (1) The peak geoelectric field only affects relatively small areas and quickly declines with distance from the peak; (2) Reliability Standard TPL-007- 1 is intended to address the wide-scale effects of a GMD event; and (3) the benchmark GMD event definition is designed to provide a realistic estimate of wide-area effects caused by a severe GMD event. The Trade Associations contend that a non-spatially averaged reference peak geoelectric field amplitude ``would be weighted by local effects and suggest unrealistic conditions for system analysis . . . [which] could lead to unnecessary costs for customers, while yielding very little tangible benefit to reliability.'' \52\ Like NERC, the Trade Associations cite to the 2015 Pulkkinen Paper to support the use of 500 km-wide squares in performing the spatial averaging analysis. The Trade Associations note, however, that the selection of 500 km is ``only the beginning . . . [of the] exploration of spatial geoelectric field structures pertaining to extreme GIC.'' \53\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \51\ Trade Associations Comments at 13-18. AEP, APS, ATC, BPA, CEA, Hydro One, ITC, Joint ISOs/RTOs and Exelon indicated that they do not support the NOPR proposal in separate comments and/or by joining the Trade Associations' comments. See AEP Comments at 3; APS Comments at 2; ATC Comments at 3; BPA Comments at 3-4; CEA Comments at 8-13; Hydro One Comments 1-2; ITC Comments at 3-5; Joint ISOs/ RTOs Comments at 4-5; Exelon Comments at 2. \52\ Trade Associations Comments at 15. \53\ Id. at 17 (quoting 2015 Pulkkinen Paper at 6). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 39. The Trade Associations, while not supportive of the NOPR proposal, recommend that if the Commission remains concerned about relying on NERC's proposed spatially-averaged reference peak geoelectric field amplitude, the Commission should: allow NERC to further determine the appropriate localized studies to be performed by moving the ``local hot spot'' around a planning area. This approach may better ensure that the peak values only impact a local area instead of unrealistically projecting uniform peak values over a broad area. This approach also should better align with the Commission's concerns because this type of study would more accurately reflect the real-world impact of a GMD event on the [Bulk-Power System]. The Trade Associations understand that existing planning tools may not yet have such capabilities, but the tools can be modified to allow such study.\54\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \54\ Id. at 16. 40. Industry commenters raise other concerns with the NOPR proposal. CEA states that it would be inappropriate to rely on the non- spatially averaged 20 V/km reference peak geoelectric field figure because that figure is found in a single publication. CEA also contends that it is impractical to use ``engineering judgment'' to weigh the GMD Vulnerability Assessments using the spatially-averaged and non- spatially averaged reference peak geoelectric field amplitudes, as described in the NOPR.\55\ ITC states that NERC's proposal is reasonable and that the reference peak geoelectric field amplitude value can be revised periodically based on new information. Joint ISOs/ RTOs state that the Commission should afford due weight to NERC's technical expertise. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \55\ See also Hydro One Comments at 1-2; Resilient Societies Comments at 24-25. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 41. A September 2015 paper prepared by the Los Alamos National Laboratory states that it analyzed the IMAGE data using a different methodology to calculate reference peak geoelectric field amplitude values based on each of eight different magnetometer installations in Northern Europe. However, unlike the standard drafting team, the Los Alamos Paper did not spatially average the IMAGE data. The authors calculated peak geoelectric field amplitudes ranging from 8.4 V/km to 16.6 V/km, with a mean of the eight values equal to 13.2 V/km.\56\ The authors used a statistical formula and probability distribution to determine their 1-in-100 year GMD event parameters, as opposed to the 20 V/km non-spatially averaged event from the 2012 paper cited in the GMD Interim Report that visually extrapolated the data. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \56\ Rivera, M., Backhaus, S., ``Review of the GMD Benchmark Event in TPL-007-1,'' Los Alamos National Laboratory (September 2015) (Los Alamos Paper). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 42. Roodman contends that ``NERC's 100-year benchmark GMD event is appropriately conservative in magnitude (except perhaps in the southern-most US) if unrealistic in some other respects.'' \57\ Roodman states that ``overall NERC's analytical frame does not strongly clash with the data.'' \58\ However, Roodman contends that actual data support local hot-spots in a larger region of lower magnitude geoelectric fields that are not typically uniform in magnitude or direction.\59\ Roodman addresses comments by Kappenman against the benchmark GMD event by stating that the Oak Ridge Report's Meta-R-319 study, authored by Kappenman, modeled a 1-in-100 year GMD event based largely on misunderstandings of historic GMDs, both in magnitude and geographic footprint.\60\ Roodman recommends that the Commission ``require a much larger array of events for simulation'' in light of the ``deep uncertainty and complexity of the GMD.'' \61\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \57\ Roodman Comments at 4. Roodman criticizes the proposed benchmark GMD event definition because it assumes that the induced electrical field resulting from a GMD event is spatially uniform. Roodman also contends that a GMD event that is less than a 1-in-100 year storm could potentially damage transformers. Id. at 12-14. \58\ Roodman Comments at 9. \59\ Id. at 10, 12-13. \60\ Id. at 5-6 (citing Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Geomagnetic Storms and Their Impacts on the U.S. Power Grid: Meta-R- 319 at pages I-1 to I-3 (January 2010), http://www.ornl.gov/sci/ees/etsd/pes/pubs/ferc_Meta-R-319.pdf (Meta-R-319 Study). \61\ Id. at 15. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 43. Commenters opposed to the benchmark GMD event definition proposed by NERC maintain that the standard drafting team significantly underestimated the reference peak geoelectric field amplitude value for a 1-in-100 year GMD event by relying on data from the IMAGE system and by applying spatial averaging to that data set.\62\ For example, Resilient Societies states that the standard drafting team should have analyzed ``real-world data from within the United States and Canada, including magnetometer readings from the [USGS] and Natural Resources Canada observatories . . . [h]ad NERC and the Standard Drafting Team collected and analyzed available real-world data, they would have likely found that the severity of GMD in 1-in-100 Year reference storm had been set far below a technically justified level and without a `strong technical basis.' '' \63\ Likewise, Kappenman contends that there are multiple examples where the benchmark GMD event and the standard drafting team's model for calculating geoelectric fields under-predict actual, historical GIC readings.\64\ Commenters opposed to NERC's proposal variously argue that the reference peak geoelectric field amplitude should be set at a level commensurate with the 1921 Railroad Storm or 1859 Carrington Event or at the 20 V/km level cited in the GMD Interim Report.\65\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \62\ See, e.g., JINSA Comments at 2; Emprimus Comments at 1. See also Gaunt Comments at 9 (indicating that the proposed benchmark GMD event definition may underestimate the effects of a 1-in-100 GMD event). \63\ Resilient Societies Comments at 20-21. \64\ Kappenman Comments at 15-29. \65\ See, e.g., EIS Comments at 2 (advocating use of 20 V/km); Gaunt Comments at 6-9 (contending that NERC's proposed figure results in a ``possible underestimation of the effects of GICs'' without suggesting an alternative figure); JINSA Comments at 2 (advocating use of 20 V/km); Emprimus Comments at 1 (advocating use of 20 V/km); Briggs Comments at 1 (advocating that the benchmark GMD event should be a ``Carrington Class solar superstorm''). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Commission Determination 44. The Commission approves the reference peak geoelectric field amplitude figure proposed by NERC. In addition, the Commission, as proposed in the NOPR, directs NERC to develop revisions to the benchmark GMD event definition so that the reference peak geoelectric field amplitude component [[Page 67126]] is not based solely on spatially-averaged data. The Commission directs NERC to submit this revision within 18 months of the effective date of this Final Rule. 45. NERC and industry comments do not contain new information to support relying solely on spatially-averaged data to calculate the reference peak geoelectric field amplitude in the benchmark GMD event definition. The 2015 Pulkkinen Paper contains the same justifications for spatial averaging as those presented in NERC's petition. In addition, the 2015 Pulkkinen Paper validates the NOPR's concerns with relying solely on spatial averaging generally and with the method used by the standard drafting team to spatially average the IMAGE data specifically. The 2015 Pulkkinen Paper, for example, states that ``regional scale geoelectric fields have not been considered earlier from the statistical and extreme analyses standpoint'' and ``selection of an area of 500 km [for spatial averaging] . . . [is] subjective.'' \66\ Further, the 2015 Pulkkinen Paper notes that ``we emphasize that the work described in this paper is only the beginning in our exploration of spatial geoelectric field structures pertaining to extreme GIC . . . [and] [w]e will . . . expand the statistical analyses to include characterization of multiple different spatial scales.'' \67\ On the latter point, NERC ``agrees that such research would provide additional modeling insights and supports further collaborative efforts between space weather researchers and electric utilities through the NERC GMD Task Force.'' \68\ These statements support the NOPR's observation that the use of spatial averaging in this context is new, and thus there is a dearth of information or research regarding its application or appropriate scale. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \66\ 2015 Pulkkinen Paper at 2. \67\ Id. at 6. \68\ NERC Comments at 8. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 46. While we believe our directive addresses concerns with relying solely on spatially-averaged data, we reiterate the position expressed in the NOPR that a GMD event will have a peak value in one or more location(s) and the amplitude will decline over distance from the peak; and, as a result, imputing the highest peak geoelectric field value in a planning area to the entire planning area may incorrectly overestimate GMD impacts.\69\ Accordingly, our directive should not be construed to prohibit the use of spatial averaging in some capacity, particularly if more research results in a better understanding of how spatial averaging can be used to reflect actual GMD events. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \69\ NOPR, 151 FERC ] 61,134 at P 35. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 47. The NOPR proposed to direct NERC to revise Reliability Standard TPL-007-1 so that the reference peak geoelectric field value is not based solely on spatially-averaged data. NERC and industry comments largely focused on the NOPR's discussion of one possible example to address the directive (i.e., by running GMD Vulnerability Assessments using spatially-averaged and non-spatially averaged reference peak geoelectric field amplitudes). However, while the method discussed in the NOPR is one possible option, the NOPR did not propose to direct NERC to develop revisions based on that option or any specific option. The Trade Associations' comments, discussed above, demonstrate that there is another way to address the NOPR directive (i.e., by performing planning models that also assess planning areas for localized ``hot spots''). This approach may have merit if, for example, the geographic size of the hot spot is supported by actual data and the hot spot is centered over one or more locations that include an entity's facilities that become critical during a GMD event. Without pre-judging how NERC proposes to address the Commission's directive, NERC's response to this directive should satisfy the NOPR's concern that reliance on spatially- averaged data alone does not address localized peaks that could potentially affect the reliable operation of the Bulk-Power System. 48. We believe our directive should also largely address the comments submitted by entities opposed to NERC's proposed reference peak geoelectric field amplitude. Those commenters endorsed using a higher reference peak geoelectric field amplitude value, such as the 20 V/km cited in the GMD Interim Report. At the outset, we observe that the comments critical of the standard drafting team's use of the IMAGE data only speculate that had the standard drafting team used other sources, the calculated reference peak geoelectric field amplitude value would have been higher.\70\ Moreover, among the commenters critical of NERC's proposal, there is disagreement over the magnitude of historical storms which some of these commenters would use as a model.\71\ While NERC has discretion on how to propose to address our directive, NERC could revise Reliability Standard TPL-007-1 to apply a higher reference peak geoelectric field amplitude value to assess the impact of localized hot spots on the Bulk-Power System, as suggested by the Trade Associations. The effects of such hot spots could include increases in GIC levels, volt-ampere reactive power consumption, harmonics on the Bulk-Power System (and associated misoperations) and transformer heating. Moreover, the directive to revise Reliability Standard TPL-007-1 and, as discussed below, the directives to research geomagnetic latitude scaling factors and earth conductivity models as part of the GMD research work plan and to revise Reliability Standard TPL-007-1 to require the collection of necessary GIC monitoring and magnetometer data to validate GMD models should largely address or at least help to focus-in on factors that may be causing any inaccuracies in the standard drafting team's model. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \70\ See, e.g., Resilient Societies Comments at 21 (``Had NERC and the Standard Drafting Team collected and analyzed available real-world data, they would have likely found that the severity of GMD in 1-in-100 Year reference storm had been set far below a technically justified level . . .'' (emphasis added)). \71\ See, e.g., Gaunt Comments at 13 (stating that the 1859 Carrington Event is ``probably outside the re-occurrence frequency of 1:100 years adopted by NERC for the benchmark event''); Briggs Comments at 1 (advocating using a `` `Carrington Class' super storm'' as the benchmark GMD event). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 49. Consistent with Order No. 779, the Commission does not specify a particular reference peak geoelectric field amplitude value that should be applied to hot spots given present uncertainties. While 20 V/ km would seem to be a possible value, the Los Alamos Paper suggests that the 20 V/km figure may be too high. The Los Alamos Paper analyzed the non-spatially averaged IMAGE data to calculate a reference peak geoelectric field amplitude range (i.e., 8.4 V/km to 16.6 V/km) that is between NERC's proposed spatially-averaged value of 8 V/km and the non- spatially averaged 20 V/km figure cited in the GMD Interim Report. 50. Although the NOPR did not propose to direct NERC to submit revisions to Reliability Standard TPL-007-1 by a certain date with respect to the benchmark GMD event definition, the Commission determines that it is appropriate to impose an 18-month deadline from the effective date of this Final Rule. As discussed below, the Commission approves the five-year implementation period for Reliability Standard TPL-007-1 proposed by NERC. Having NERC submit revisions to the benchmark GMD event definition within 18 months of the effective date of this Final Rule, with the Commission acting promptly on the revised Reliability Standard, should afford [[Page 67127]] enough time to apply the revised benchmark GMD event definition in the first GMD Vulnerability Assessment under the timeline set forth in Reliability Standard TPL-007-1's implementation plan. If circumstances, such as the complexity of the revised benchmark GMD event, require it, NERC may propose and justify a revised implementation plan. 2. Geomagnetic Latitude Scaling Factor NOPR 51. The NOPR proposed to approve the geomagnetic latitude scaling factor in NERC's proposed benchmark GMD event definition. However, the NOPR sought comment on whether, in light of studies indicating that GMD events could have pronounced effects on lower geomagnetic latitudes, a modification is warranted to reduce the impact of the scaling factors.\72\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \72\ NOPR, 151 FERC ] 61,134 at P 37 (citing Ngwira, C.M., Pulkkinen, A., Kuznetsova, M.M., Glocer, A., ``Modeling extreme `Carrington-type' space weather events using three-dimensional global MHD simulations,'' 119 Journal of Geophysical Research: Space Physics 4472 (2014) (finding that in Carrington-type events ``the region of large induced ground electric fields is displaced further equatorward . . . [and] thereby may affect power grids . . . such as [those in] southern states of [the] continental U.S.''); Gaunt, C.T., Coetzee, G., ``Transformer Failures in Regions Incorrectly Considered to have Low GIC-Risk,'' 2007 IEEE Lausanne 807 (July 2007) (stating that twelve transformers were damaged and taken out of service in South Africa (at -40 degrees latitude) during the October 2003 Halloween Storm GMD event)). See also Liu, C., Li, Y., Pirjola, R., ``Observations and modeling of GIC in the Chinese large-scale high-voltage power networks,'' Journal Space Weather Space Climate 4 at A03-p6 (2014) (Liu Paper), http://www.swsc-journal.org/articles/swsc/pdf/2014/01/swsc130009.pdf (finding that GICs of about 25A/phase had been measured in a transformer at a nuclear power plant at 22.6 degrees north latitude (significantly further away from the magnetic pole than Florida)). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Comments 52. NERC contends that the geomagnetic latitude scaling factor in Reliability Standard TPL-007-1 ``accurately models the reduction of induced geoelectric fields that occurs over the mid-latitude region during a 100-year GMD event scenario . . . [and] describes the observed drop in geoelectric field that has been exhibited in analysis of major recorded geomagnetic storms.'' \73\ NERC maintains that modifying the scaling factor is not technically justified based on the publications cited in the NOPR. NERC states that the first paper cited in the NOPR is based on models that are not mature and reflect a 1-in-150 year storm. NERC contends that the second paper does not clearly show that the purported transformer damage in South Africa was the result of abnormally high GICs during the October 2003 Halloween Storm. NERC further states that the standard drafting team analyzed the October 2003 Halloween Storm when developing the proposed geomagnetic latitude scaling factor. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \73\ NERC Comments at 9 (citing Ngwira, C., Pulkkinen, A., Wilder, F., Crowley, G., ``Extended Study of Extreme Geoelectric Field Event Scenarios for Geomagnetically Induced Current Applications,'' 11 Space Weather 121 (2013) (Ngwira 2013 Paper)). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 53. The Trade Associations support the geomagnetic latitude scaling factor proposed by NERC. Like NERC, the Trade Associations contend that the papers cited in the NOPR do not support modifications because the models in the first paper ``remain highly theoretical and not sufficiently validated'' and because the second paper likely involved other causal factors leading to the transformer failure.\74\ Joint ISOs/RTOs also support the geomagnetic latitude scaling factor proposed by NERC. ITC states that NERC's proposal is a ``reasonable approach given the current state of the science pertaining to GMD . . . [but] that as the science pertaining to GMD matures and more data becomes available, the scaling factors should be revisited and revised.'' \75\ ITC suggests revisiting the geomagnetic latitude scaling factor every five years to incorporate any new developments in GMD science. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \74\ Trade Associations Comments at 18-19. \75\ Joint ISOs/RTOs Comments at 5. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 54. Several commenters question or disagree with the geomagnetic latitude scaling factors in Reliability Standard TPL-007-1 based on simulations and reports of damage to transformers in areas expected to be at low risk due to their geomagnetic latitude.\76\ EIS contends that the proposed geomagnetic latitude scaling factor's assumption of a storm centered at 60 degrees geomagnetic latitude is inconsistent with a study relied upon by NERC.\77\ The Los Alamos Paper's analysis suggests that NERC's proposed geomagnetic latitude scaling factors, while they fit well with weaker historical GMD events from which they were derived, may not accurately represent the effects of a 1-in-100 year GMD event at lower geomagnetic latitudes. The Los Alamos Paper states that a model of the electrojet is needed to ``effectively extrapolate the small to moderate disturbance data currently in the historical record to disturbances as large as the TPL-007-1 Benchmark Event.'' \78\ The Los Alamos Paper uses a larger number of geomagnetic disturbances (122 instead of 12) and a wider range of observatories by using the world-wide SuperMAG magnetometer array data, which includes the INTERMAGNET data used to support NERC's geomagnetic latitude scaling factors. The Los Alamos Paper shows that for more severe storms (Dst <-300, for which there are nine storms in the data set) the NERC scaling factors tend to be low, off by a factor of up to two or three at some latitudes. The Los Alamos Paper also recommends ``an additional degree of conservatism in the mid-geomagnetic latitudes'' until such time as a model is developed.\79\ The Los Alamos Paper authors recommend a factor of 2 as a conservative correction. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \76\ See, e.g., Gaunt Comments at 6; JINSA Comments at 2; Emprimus Comments at 2-3; Roodman Comments at 9; Resilient Societies Comments at 31-31; Kappenman Comments at 41-42. \77\ EIS Comments at 5 (citing Ngwira 2013 Paper). \78\ Los Alamos Paper at 12. \79\ Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Commission Determination 55. The Commission approves the geomagnetic latitude scaling factor in the benchmark GMD event definition. In addition, the Commission directs NERC to conduct further research on geomagnetic latitude scaling factors as part of the GMD research work plan discussed below. 56. Based on the record, the Commission finds sufficient evidence to conclude that lower geomagnetic latitudes are, to some degree, less susceptible to the effects of GMD events. The issue identified in the NOPR and by some commenters focused on the specific scaling factors in Reliability Standard TPL-007-1 in light of some analyses and anecdotal evidence suggesting that lower geomagnetic latitudes may be impacted by GMDs to a larger degree than reflected in Reliability Standard TPL-007- 1. 57. The geomagnetic latitude scaling factor in Reliability Standard TPL-007-1 is supported by some of the available research.\80\ In addition, with the [[Page 67128]] exception of the Los Alamos Paper, commenters did not provide new information on the proposed scaling factor nor did commenters suggest alternative scaling factors. However, the Commission finds that there are enough questions regarding the effects of GMDs at lower geomagnetic latitudes to warrant directing NERC to study this issue further as part of the GMD research work plan. The Los Alamos Paper and the sources cited in the NOPR are suggestive that a 1-in-100 year GMD event could have a greater impact on lower geomagnetic latitudes than NERC's proposed scaling factor assumes. But, as the Los Alamos Paper recognizes, the current absence of historical data on large GMD events precludes a definitive conclusion based on an empirical analysis of historical observations. Moreover, in prepared comments for the March 1, 2016 Technical Conference, Dr. Backhaus, one of the authors of the Los Alamos Paper, recommended that ``the current NERC analysis should be adopted and further analysis performed with additional observational data and severe disturbance modeling efforts with the intent of refining the geomagnetic latitude scaling law in future revisions.'' \81\ The Commission directs NERC to reexamine the geomagnetic latitude scaling factors in Reliability Standard TPL-007-1 as part of the GMD research work plan, including using existing models and developing new models to extrapolate from historical data on small to moderate GMD events the impacts of a large, 1-in-100 year GMD event on lower geomagnetic latitudes. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \80\ See NERC Comments at 9 (citing Ngwira 2013 Paper). We disagree with the contention made by EIS that NERC's proposed geomagnetic latitude scaling factors are inconsistent with the Ngwira 2013 Paper. EIS maintains that the Ngwira 2013 Paper supports the conclusion that the benchmark GMD event should be centered at 50 degrees geomagnetic latitude instead of the 60 degree geomagnetic latitude figure in Reliability Standard TPL-007-1. The Ngwira 2013 Paper contains no such conclusion. Instead, the Ngwira 2013 Paper found that the latitude threshold boundary is a transition region having a definite lower bound of 50 degrees geomagnetic latitude but with an upper range as high as 55 degrees geomagnetic latitude. Ngwira 2013 Paper at 127, 130. The Ngwira 2013 Paper also stated that its findings were ``in agreement with earlier observations by [Thomson et al., 2011] and more recently by [Pulkkinen et al., 2012], which estimated the location to be within 50 [degrees]-62 [degrees].'' Id. at 124. \81\ Statement of Scott Backhaus, March 1, 2016 Technical Conference at 2. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- B. Thermal Impact Assessments NERC Petition 58. Reliability Standard TPL-007-1, Requirement R6 requires owners of transformers that are subject to the Reliability Standard to conduct thermal analyses to determine if the transformers would be able to withstand the thermal effects associated with a benchmark GMD event. NERC states that transformers are exempt from the thermal impact assessment requirement if the maximum effective GIC in the transformer is less than 75 A/phase during the benchmark GMD event as determined by an analysis of the system. NERC explains that ``based on available power transformer measurement data, transformers with an effective GIC of less than 75 A/phase during the Benchmark GMD Event are unlikely to exceed known temperature limits established by technical organizations.'' \82\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \82\ NERC Petition at 30. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 59. As provided in Requirements R5 and R6, ``the maximum GIC value for the worst case geoelectric field orientation for the benchmark GMD event described in Attachment 1'' determines whether a transformer satisfies the 75 A/phase threshold. If the 75 A/phase threshold is satisfied, Requirement R6 states, in relevant part, that a thermal impact assessment should be conducted on the qualifying transformer based on the effective GIC flow information provided in Requirement R5. 60. In its June 28, 2016 filing, NERC states that it identified an error in Figure 1 (Upper Bound of Peak Metallic Hot Spot Temperatures Calculated Using the Benchmark GMD Event) of the White Paper on Screening Criterion for Transformer Thermal Impact Assessment that resulted in incorrect plotting of simulated power transformer peak hot- spot heating from the benchmark GMD event. NERC revised Figure 1 in the White Paper on Screening Criterion for Transformer Thermal Impact Assessment and made corresponding revisions to related text, figures and tables throughout the technical white papers supporting the proposed standard. NERC maintains that even with the revision to Figure 1, ``the standard drafting team determined that the 75 A per phase threshold for transformer thermal impact assessment remains a valid criterion . . . [and] it is not necessary to revise any Requirements of the proposed Reliability Standard.'' \83\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \83\ NERC June 28, 2016 Filing at 1. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- NOPR 61. The NOPR proposed to approve the transformer thermal impact assessments in Requirement R6. In addition, as with the benchmark GMD event definition, the NOPR proposed to direct NERC to revise Requirement R6 to require registered entities to apply spatially averaged and non-spatially averaged peak geoelectric field values, or some equally efficient and effective alternative, when conducting thermal impact assessments. The NOPR also noted that Requirement R6 does not use the maximum GIC-producing orientation to conduct the thermal assessment for qualifying transformers; instead, the requirement uses the effective GIC time series described in Requirement R5.2 to conduct the thermal assessment on qualifying transformers. The NOPR sought comment from NERC as to why qualifying transformers are not assessed for thermal impacts using the maximum GIC-producing orientation and directed NERC to address whether, by not using the maximum GIC-producing orientation, the required thermal impact assessments could underestimate the impact of a benchmark GMD event on a qualifying transformer. Comments 62. NERC opposes modifying the thermal impact assessments in Requirement R6 so that the assessments do not rely only on spatially- averaged data. NERC claims that the benchmark GMD event definition will ``result in GIC calculations that are appropriately scaled for system- wide assessments.'' \84\ NERC also contends that the ``analysis performed by the standard drafting team of the impact of localized enhanced geoelectric fields on the GIC levels in transformers indicates that relatively few transformers in the system are affected.'' \85\ In response to the question in the NOPR of why qualifying transformers are not assessed for thermal impacts using the maximum GIC producing orientation, NERC states that ``the orientation of the geomagnetic field varies widely and continuously during a GMD event . . . [and] would be aligned with the maximum GIC-producing orientation for only a few minutes.'' \86\ NERC concludes that ``[i]n the context of transformer hot spot heating with time constants in the order of tens of minutes, alignment with any particular orientation for a few minutes at a particular point in time is not a driving concern.'' \87\ NERC further states that the wave shape used in Reliability Standard TPL- 007-1 provides ``generally conservative results when performing thermal analysis of power transformers.'' \88\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \84\ NERC Comments at 17. \85\ Id. \86\ Id. at 19. \87\ Id. \88\ Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 63. The Trade Associations and CEA do not support the proposed NOPR directive because, they state, it focuses too heavily on individual transformers. The Trade Associations maintain that Reliability Standard TPL-007-1 ``was never intended to address specific localized areas that might experience peak conditions and affect what we understand to be a very small number of assets that are unlikely to initiate a cascading outage.'' \89\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \89\ Trade Associations Comments at 21. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- [[Page 67129]] 64. Certain non-industry commenters contend that the 75 A/phase qualifying threshold for thermal impact assessments is not technically justified. Emprimus contends that ``many transformers have GIC ratings less than 75 amps per phase,'' but Emprimus claims that an Idaho National Lab study showed that ``GIC introduced at 10 amps per phase on high voltage transformers exceed harmonic levels allowed under IEEE 519.'' \90\ Emprimus also maintains that a 2013 IEEE paper ``suggest[s] that there can be generator rotor damage at GIC levels which exceed 50 amps per phase.'' \91\ Gaunt contends, based on his analysis of historical events, that ``degradation is initiated in transformers by currents that are significantly below the 75 amps per phase.'' \92\ Gaunt states that ``[u]ntil better records are kept of transformer [dissolved gas in oil analysis] and transformer failure, the proposed level of 75 [A/phase] of GIC needed to initiate assessment of transformer response must be considered excessively high.'' \93\ Gaunt recommends a qualifying threshold of 15 amps per phase. Resilient Societies states that the 75 A/phase threshold is based on a mathematical model for one type of transformer and that several tests referenced in the standard drafting team's White Paper on Transformer Thermal Impact Assessment were carried out under no load or minimal load conditions. In addition, Resilient Societies contends that applying the 75 A/phase threshold and NERC's proposed benchmark GMD event (i.e., using the spatially-averaged reference peak geoelectric field amplitude) results in only ``two out of approximately 560 extra high voltage transformers'' requiring thermal impact assessments in the PJM region; only one 345 kV transformer requiring thermal impact assessment in Maine; and zero transformers requiring thermal impact assessments in ATC's network.\94\ Kappenman contends that the 75 A/ phase threshold does not consider transformers with tertiary windings or autotransformers which may be impacted at lower GIC levels than 75 A/phase.\95\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \90\ Emprimus Comments at 4. \91\ Id. \92\ Gaunt Comments at 13. \93\ Id. at 14. \94\ Resilient Societies Comments at 5-14. Resilient Societies states that modeling performed by Central Maine Power Co. and Emprimus for the Maine Public Utilities Commission indicates that eight 345 kV transformers (53 percent according to Resilient Societies) would require thermal impact assessments in Maine if the reference peak geoelectric field amplitude were set at 20 V/km. Id. at 10. Resilient Societies also contends that this result is consistent with the Oak Ridge Meta-R-319 Study's finding that eight transformers would be ``at risk'' in Maine under a `` `30 Amp At- Risk Threshold scenario.' '' Id. Central Maine Power Co. calculated that the scaled NERC benchmark GMD event for the northernmost point in Maine would be 4.53 V/km. Resilient Societies' calculations regarding ATC estimate that the scaled benchmark GMD event for Wisconsin would be 2 V/km. Id. at 14. \95\ The Commission received two comments following NERC's June 28, 2016 Filing. However, the supplemental comments did not specifically address the revisions submitted in NERC's June 28, 2016 filing. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Commission Determination 65. Consistent with our determination above regarding the reference peak geoelectric field amplitude value, the Commission directs NERC to revise Requirement R6 to require registered entities to apply spatially averaged and non-spatially averaged peak geoelectric field values, or some equally efficient and effective alternative, when conducting thermal impact assessments. 66. In the NOPR, the Commission requested comment from NERC regarding why Requirement R6 does not use the maximum GIC-producing orientation to conduct the thermal assessment for qualifying transformers. After considering NERC's response, we continue to have concerns with not using the maximum GIC-producing orientation for the thermal assessment of transformers. However, at this time we do not direct NERC to modify Reliability Standard TPL-007-1. Instead, as part of the GMD research work plan discussed below, NERC is directed to study this issue to determine how the geoelectric field time series can be applied to a particular transformer so that the orientation of the time series, over time, will maximize GIC flow in the transformer, and to include the results in a filing with the Commission. 67. We are not persuaded by the comments opposed to Requirement R6's application of a 75 A/phase qualifying threshold. The standard drafting team's White Paper on Thermal Screening Criterion, as revised by NERC in the June 28, 2016 Filing, provides an adequate technical basis to approve NERC's proposal. As noted in the revised White Paper on Thermal Screening Criterion, the calculated metallic hot spot temperature corresponding to an effective GIC of 75 A/phase is 172 degrees Celsius; that figure is higher than the original figure of 150 degrees Celsius calculated by the standard drafting team but is still below the 200 degree Celsius limit specified in IEEE Std C57.91- 2011.\96\ The comments, particularly those of Gaunt, attempt to correlate historical transformer failures to past GMD events (e.g., 2003 Halloween Storm), while arguing that the transformers damaged in those events did not experience GICs of 75 A/phase. The evidence adduced by Gaunt and others is inconclusive.\97\ We therefore direct NERC to include further analysis of the thermal impact assessment qualifying threshold in the GMD research work plan. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \96\ NERC June 28, 2016 Filing, Revised White Paper on Screening Criterion for Transformer Thermal Impact Assessment at 3. \97\ See, e.g., Gaunt Comments at 13 (``Although it has not been possible to assemble an exact model of the power system during the period 29-31 October 2003, and data on the ground conductivity in Southern Africa is not known with great certainty, we are confident that the several calculations of GIC that been carried out are not grossly inaccurate.''). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 68. In NOPR comments and in comments to the standard drafting team, Kappenman stated that delta winding heating due to harmonics has not been adequately considered by the standard drafting team and that, thermally, this is a bigger concern than metallic hot spot heating.\98\ The standard drafting team responded that the vulnerability described for tertiary winding harmonic heating is based on the assumption that delta winding currents can be calculated using the turns ratio between primary and tertiary winding, which is incorrect when a transformer is under saturation.\99\ The standard drafting team concluded that Kappenman's concerns regarding delta windings being a problem from a thermal standpoint are unwarranted and that the criteria developed by the standard drafting team use state-of-the-art analysis methods and measurement-supported transformer models. The Commission believes that the heating effects of harmonics on transformers, as discussed at the March 1, 2016 Technical Conference, are of concern and require further research.\100\ Accordingly, we direct NERC to address the effects of harmonics, including tertiary winding harmonic heating and any other effects on transformers, as part of the GMD research work plan.\101\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \98\ Kappenman Comments at 45. \99\ Consideration of Comments Project 2013-03 Geomagnetic Disturbance Mitigation at 39 (December 5, 2014), http://www.nerc.com/pa/Stand/Project201303GeomagneticDisturbanceMitigation/Comment%20Report%20_2013-03_GMD_12052014.pdf. \100\ At the March 1, 2016 Technical Conference, Dr. Horton, a member of the standard drafting team, discussed the potential negative impacts of harmonics generated by GMDs on protection systems, reactive power resources and generators. Slide Presentation of Randy Horton, March 1, 2016 Technical Conference at 2-6. \101\ NERC indicated in its comments that it is already studying the issue of harmonics. NERC Comments at 14 (``NERC is collaborating with researchers to examine more complex GMD vulnerability issues, such as harmonics and mitigation assessment techniques, to enhance the modeling capabilities of the industry''). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- [[Page 67130]] C. GMD Research Work Plan NOPR 69. The NOPR proposed to address the need for more data and certainty regarding GMD events and their potential effect on the Bulk- Power System by directing NERC to submit informational filings that address GMD-related research areas. The NOPR proposed to direct NERC to submit in the first filing a GMD research work plan indicating how NERC plans to: (1) Further analyze the area over which spatial averaging should be calculated for stability studies, including performing sensitivity analyses on squares less than 500 km per side (e.g., 100 km, 200 km); (2) further analyze earth conductivity models by, for example, using metered GIC and magnetometer readings to calculate earth conductivity and using 3-D readings; (3) determine whether new analyses and observations support modifying the use of single station readings around the earth to adjust the spatially averaged benchmark for latitude; and (4) assess how to make GMD data (e.g., GIC monitoring and magnetometer data) available to researchers for study. 70. With respect to GIC monitoring and magnetometer readings, the NOPR sought comment on the barriers, if any, to public dissemination of such readings, including if their dissemination poses a security risk and if any such data should be treated as Critical Energy Infrastructure Information or otherwise restricted to authorized users. The NOPR proposed that NERC submit the GMD research work plan within six months of the effective date of a final rule in this proceeding. The NOPR also proposed that the GMD research work plan submitted by NERC should include a schedule for submitting one or more informational filings that apprise the Commission of the results of the four additional study areas, as well as any other relevant developments in GMD research, and should assess whether Reliability Standard TPL-007-1 remains valid in light of new information or whether revisions are appropriate. Comments 71. NERC states that continued GMD research is necessary and that the potential impacts of GMDs on reliability are evolving. NERC, however, prefers that the NERC GMD Task Force continue its research without the GMD research work plan proposed in the NOPR. NERC contends that allowing the NERC GMD Task Force to continue its work would ``accomplish NERC's and the Commission's shared goals in advancing GMD understanding and knowledge, while providing the flexibility necessary for NERC to work effectively with its international research partners to address risks to the reliability of the North American Bulk-Power System.'' \102\ NERC also claims that, in addition to being unnecessary given the work of the NERC GMD Task Force, the NOPR proposal ``poses practical challenges . . . [because it would] bind[] NERC to a specific and inflexible research plan and report schedule to be determined six months (or even a year) following the effective date of a final rule in this proceeding.'' \103\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \102\ NERC Comments at 13. \103\ Id. at 16. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 72. The Trade Associations and CEA do not support the GMD research work plan. Instead, they contend that NERC should be allowed to pursue GMD research independently. 73. Several commenters, while not addressing the NOPR proposal specifically, state that additional research is necessary to validate or improve elements of the benchmark GMD event definition.\104\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \104\ See, e.g., USGS Comments at 1 (addressing earth conductivity models), Bardin Comments at 2 (addressing earth conductivity models); Roodman Comments at 3 (addressing reference peak geoelectric field amplitude); Gaunt Comments at 7 (addressing spatial averaging). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 74. The Trade Associations state that monitoring data should be available for academic research purposes. Resilient Societies contends that monitoring data should be publicly disseminated on a regular basis and that there is no security risk in releasing such data because they relate to naturally occurring phenomena. Emprimus states that it supports making GIC and magnetometer monitoring data available to the public. Bardin supports making GIC and GMD-related information to the public or at least to ``legitimate researchers.'' 75. Hydro One and CEA do not support mandatory data sharing without the use of non-disclosure agreements. Commission Determination 76. The Commission recognizes, as do commenters both supporting and opposing proposed Reliability Standard TPL-007-1, that our collective understanding of the threats posed by GMD is evolving as additional research and analysis are conducted. These ongoing efforts are critical to the nation's long-term efforts to protect the grid against a major GMD event. While we approve NERC's proposed Reliability Standard TPL- 007-1 and direct certain modifications, as described above, the Commission also concludes that facilitating additional research and analysis is necessary to adequately address these threats. As discussed in the next two sections of this final rule, the Commission directs a three-prong approach to further those efforts by directing NERC to: (1) Develop, submit, and implement a GMD research work plan; (2) develop revisions to Reliability Standard TPL-007-1 to require responsible entities to collect GIC monitoring and magnetometer data; and (3) collect GIC monitoring and magnetometer data from registered entities for the period beginning May 2013, including both data existing as of the date of this order and new data going forward, and to make that information available. 77. First, the Commission adopts the NOPR proposal and directs NERC to submit a GMD research work plan and, subsequently, informational filings that address the GMD-related research areas identified in the NOPR, additional research tasks identified in this Final Rule (i.e., the research tasks identified in the thermal impact assessment discussion above) and, in NERC's discretion, any GMD-related research areas generally that may impact the development of new or modified GMD Reliability Standards.\105\ The GMD research work plan should be submitted within six months of the effective date of this final rule. The research required by this directive should be informed by ongoing GMD-related research efforts of entities such as USGS, National Atmospheric and Oceanic Administration (NOAA), National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Department of Energy, academia and other publicly available contributors, including work performed for the National Space Weather Action Plan.\106\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \105\ The GMD research work plan need not address the fourth research area identified in the NOPR (i.e., assess how to make GIC monitoring and magnetometer data available to researchers for study) given the Commission's directive and discussion below regarding the collection and dissemination of necessary GIC monitoring and magnetometer data. \106\ National Science and Technology Council, National Space Weather Action Plan (October 2015), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ostp/final_nationalspaceweatheractionplan_20151028.pdf. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 78. As part of the second research area identified in the NOPR (i.e., further analyze earth conductivity models by, for example, using metered GIC and [[Page 67131]] magnetometer readings to calculate earth conductivity and using 3-D readings), the GMD research work plan should specifically investigate ``coastal effects'' on ground conductivity models. 79. In addition, the large variances described by USGS in actual 3- D ground conductivity data raise the question of whether one time series geomagnetic field is sufficient for vulnerability assessments. The characteristics, including frequencies, of the time series interact with the ground conductivity to produce the geoelectric field that drives the GIC. Therefore, the research should address whether additional realistic time series should be selected to perform assessments in order to capture the time series that produces the most vulnerability for an area. 80. The comments largely agree that additional GMD research should be pursued, particularly with respect to the elements of the benchmark GMD event definition (i.e., the reference peak geoelectric field amplitude value, geomagnetic latitude scaling factor, and earth conductivity scaling factor). There is ample evidence in the record to support the need for additional GMD-related research.\107\ For example, USGS submitted comments indicating that USGS's one dimensional ground electrical conductivity models used by the standard drafting team have a ``significant limitation'' in that they assume that a ``[one dimensional] conductivity-with-depth profile can adequately represent a large geographic region,'' which USGS describes as a ``gross simplification.'' \108\ USGS observes that while the ``proposed standard attempted to incorporate the best scientific research available . . . it must be noted that the supporting science is quickly evolving.'' \109\ USGS recommends that ``the proposed standard should establish a process for updates and improvements that acknowledges and addresses the quickly evolving nature of relevant science and associated data.'' \110\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \107\ See, e.g., NERC October 22, 2015 Supplemental Comments at 7-8 (expressing support for additional research regarding geomagnetic latitude scaling factors and earth conductivity models). \108\ USGS Comments at 1. \109\ Id. \110\ Id. We note that Reliability Standard TPL-007-1, Att. 1 (Calculating Geoelectric Fields for the Benchmark GMD Event) already provides that a ``planner can also use specific earth model(s) with documented justification . . .'' Accordingly, Reliability Standard TPL-007-1 includes a mechanism for incorporating improvements in earth conductivity models when calculating the benchmark GMD event. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 81. Opposition to the proposal centers on the contention that the proposed directive is unnecessary and potentially counterproductive given the continuing work of the NERC GMD Task Force. We do not find these comments persuasive. Our directive requires NERC to submit a work plan for the study of GMD-related issues that are already being examined or that NERC agrees should be studied.\111\ Nothing in our directive precludes NERC from continuing to use the NERC GMD Task Force as a vehicle for conducting the directed research or other research. Indeed, we encourage NERC to continue to use the GMD Task Force as a forum for engagement with interested stakeholders. In addition, we do not set specific deadlines for completion of the research; we only require NERC to submit the GMD research work plan within six months of the effective date of a final rule. The GMD research work plan, in turn, should include target dates for the completion of research topics and the reporting of findings to the Commission. The Commission intends to notice and invite comment on the GMD research work plan. An extension of time to submit the GMD research work plan may be available if six months proves to be insufficient. In addition, given the uncertainties commonly associated with complex research projects, the Commission will be flexible regarding changes to the tasks and target dates established in the GMD research work plan. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \111\ See, e.g., NERC Comments at 8 (``NERC agrees that [spatial averaging] research would provide additional modeling insights and supports further collaborative efforts between space weather researchers and electric utilities through the NERC GMD Task Force''), at 10 (``NERC agrees that additional [geomagnetic latitude scaling] research is necessary, and supports the significant research that is occurring throughout the space weather community to develop and validate models and simulation techniques''), at 13 (``Working with EPRI, researchers at USGS, and industry, NERC will work to improve the earth conductivity models that are a vital component to understanding the risks of GMD events in each geographic region''), and at 23 (``efforts are already underway to expand GMD monitoring capabilities . . . [and] [t]hrough these efforts, NERC and industry should effectively address the concerns noted by the Commission in the NOPR, including ensuring a more complete set of data for operational and planning needs and supporting analytical validation and situational awareness''). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- D. Monitoring Data NERC Petition 82. Reliability Standard TPL-007-1, Requirement R2 requires responsible entities to ``maintain System models and GIC System models of the responsible entity's planning area for performing the study or studies needed to complete GMD Vulnerability Assessment(s).'' NERC states that Reliability Standard TPL-007-1 contains ``requirements to develop the models, studies, and assessments necessary to build a picture of overall GMD vulnerability and identify where mitigation measures may be necessary.'' \112\ NERC explains that mitigating strategies ``may include installation of hardware (e.g., GIC blocking or monitoring devices), equipment upgrades, training, or enhanced Operating Procedures.'' \113\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \112\ NERC Petition at 13. \113\ Id. at 32. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- NOPR 83. The NOPR proposed to direct NERC to revise Reliability Standard TPL-007-1 to require the installation of monitoring equipment (i.e., GIC monitors and magnetometers) to the extent there are any gaps in existing GIC monitoring and magnetometer networks. Alternatively, the NOPR sought comment on whether NERC should be responsible for installation of any additional, necessary magnetometers while affected entities would be responsible for installation of additional, necessary GIC monitors. The NOPR also proposed that, as part of NERC's work plan, NERC identify the number and location of current GIC monitors and magnetometers in the United States to assess whether there are any gaps. The NOPR sought comment on whether the Commission should adopt a policy specifically allowing recovery of costs associated with or incurred to comply with Reliability Standard TPL-007-1, including for the purchase and installation of monitoring devices. Comments 84. NERC does not support the NOPR proposal regarding the installation of GIC monitoring devices and magnetometers. NERC contends that the proposed requirement is not necessary because Reliability Standard TPL-007-1 ``supports effective GMD monitoring programs, and additional efforts are planned or underway to ensure adequate data for reliability purposes.'' \114\ NERC also maintains that the proposed directive ``poses implementation challenges . . . [because] GMD monitoring capabilities and technical information have not yet reached a level of maturity to support application in a Reliability Standard, and not all applicable entities have developed the comprehensive [[Page 67132]] understanding of system vulnerabilities that would be needed to deploy GMD monitoring devices for the greatest reliability benefit.'' \115\ NERC also notes that a requirement mandating the installation of monitoring devices for situational awareness purposes would be outside the scope of a planning Reliability Standard. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \114\ NERC Comments at 21. NERC cites as examples the 40 GIC monitoring nodes operated by EPRI's SUNBURST network; the use of GIC monitoring devices by some registered entities (e.g., PJM); and the magnetometer networks operated by USGS and EPRI. Id. at 23-25. \115\ Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 85. The Trade Associations, CEA, ITC, Hydro One and Tri-State, while agreeing that more data are useful to analytical validation and situational awareness, do not support the NOPR proposal. CEA does not support the proposal because Reliability Standard TPL-007-1 is a planning standard; a one-size-fits-all monitoring approach will not work; the responsibility for monitoring, which in Canada is done by the Canadian government, should not fall to industry or NERC; and the proposal is too costly. Likewise, ITC contends that it would not be prudent or cost effective for entities to have to install monitoring equipment. Hydro One does not support a Reliability Standard that prescribes the number and location of monitoring devices that must be installed. The Trade Associations and ITC, instead, support directing NERC to develop a plan to address this issue. The Trade Associations state that such a plan should involve a partnership between government and industry. Tri-State maintains that NERC, working with USGS and NOAA, should be responsible for determining the need for and installation of any needed magnetometers. If the Commission requires applicable entities to install monitoring devices, the Trade Associations, Tri-State and Exelon agree that there should be cost recovery. 86. BPA supports the NOPR proposal for increased monitoring because BPA believes it will improve situational awareness. As a model, BPA states that the ``Canadian government in collaboration with Canadian transmission owners'' have developed a ``technique that shows real promise of increasing visibility of GIC flows and localized impacts for a regional transmission grid.'' \116\ AEP encourages the Commission to expand the ``number and scope of the permanent geomagnetic observatories and install permanent geoelectric observatories in the United States.'' \117\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \116\ BPA Comments at 4. \117\ AEP March 29, 2016 Supplemental Comments at 1. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 87. Resilient Societies supports requiring the installation of GIC monitoring devices and magnetometers, noting that GIC monitors are commercially available and cost as little as $10,000 to $15,000 each. Emprimus supports developing criteria that inform the need for and location of monitoring devices. Commission Determination 88. We conclude that additional collection and disclosure of GIC monitoring and magnetometer data is necessary to improve our collective understanding of the threats posed by GMD events. The Commission therefore adopts the NOPR proposal in relevant part and directs NERC to develop revisions to Reliability Standard TPL-007-1 to require responsible entities to collect GIC monitoring and magnetometer data as necessary to enable model validation and situational awareness, including from any devices that must be added to meet this need. The NERC standard drafting team should address the criteria for collecting GIC monitoring and magnetometer data discussed below and provide registered entities with sufficient guidance in terms of defining the data that must be collected, and NERC should propose in the GMD research work plan how it will determine and report on the degree to which industry is following that guidance. 89. In addition, the Commission directs NERC, pursuant to Section 1600 of the NERC Rules of Procedure, to collect GIC monitoring and magnetometer data from registered entities for the period beginning May 2013, including both data existing as of the date of this order and new data going forward, and to make that information available.\118\ We also provide guidance that, as a general matter, the Commission does not believe that GIC monitoring and magnetometer data should be treated as Confidential Information pursuant to the NERC Rules of Procedure. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \118\ The Commission's directives to collect and make available GIC monitoring and magnetometer data do not apply to non-U.S. responsible entities or Alaska and Hawaii. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Collection of GIC and Magnetometer Data 90. In developing a requirement regarding the collection of magnetometer data, NERC should consider the following criteria discussed at the March 1, 2016 Technical Conference: (1) The data is sampled at a cadence of at least 10-seconds or faster; (2) the data comes from magnetometers that are physically close to GIC monitors; (3) the data comes from magnetometers that are not near sources of magnetic interference (e.g., roads and local distribution networks); and (4) data is collected from magnetometers spread across wide latitudes and longitudes and from diverse physiographic regions.\119\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \119\ Slide Presentation of Luis Marti (Third Panel), March 1, 2016 Technical Conference at 3, 9. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 91. Each responsible entity that is a transmission owner should be required to collect necessary GIC monitoring data. However, a transmission owner should be able to apply for an exemption from the GIC monitoring data collection requirement if it demonstrates that no or little value would be added to planning and operations. In developing a requirement regarding the collection of GIC monitoring data, NERC should consider the following criteria discussed at the March 1, 2016 Technical Conference: (1) The GIC data is from areas found to have high GIC based on system studies; (2) the GIC data comes from sensitive installations and key parts of the transmission grid; and (3) the data comes from GIC monitors that are not situated near transportation systems using direct current (e.g., subways or light rail).\120\ GIC monitoring and magnetometer locations should also be revisited after GIC system models are run with improved ground conductivity models. NERC may also propose to incorporate the GIC monitoring and magnetometer data collection requirements in a different Reliability Standard (e.g., real-time reliability monitoring and analysis capabilities as part of the TOP Reliability Standards). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \120\ Id. at 8. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 92. Our determination differs from the NOPR proposal in that the NOPR proposed to require the installation of GIC monitors and magnetometers. The comments raised legitimate concerns about incorporating such a requirement in Reliability Standard TPL-007-1 because of the complexities of siting and operating monitoring devices to achieve the maximum benefits for model validation and situational awareness. In particular, responsible entities may not have the technical capacity to properly install and operate magnetometers, given complicating issues such as man-made interference, calibration, and data interpretation. Accordingly, the Commission determines that requiring responsible entities to collect necessary GIC monitoring and magnetometer data, rather than install GIC monitors and magnetometers, affords greater flexibility while obtaining significant benefits. For example, responsible entities could collaborate with universities and government entities that operate magnetometers to collect necessary magnetometer data, or [[Page 67133]] responsible entities could choose to install GIC monitors or magnetometers to comply with the data collection requirement. While the Commission's primary concern is the quality of the data collected, we do not establish a requirement for either approach or promote a particular device for collecting the required data. We also find that cost recovery for prudent costs associated with or incurred to comply with Reliability Standard TPL-007-1 and future revisions to the Reliability Standard, including for the purchase and installation of monitoring devices, will be available to registered entities.\121\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \121\ NOPR, 151 FERC ] 61,134 at P 49 n.60. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Data Availability 93. We also direct NERC, pursuant to Sections 1500 and 1600 of the NERC Rules of Procedure, to collect and make GIC monitoring and magnetometer data available.\122\ We determine that the dissemination of GIC monitoring and magnetometer data will facilitate a greater understanding of GMD events that, over time, will improve Reliability Standard TPL-007-1. The record in this proceeding supports the conclusion that access to GIC monitoring and magnetometer data will help facilitate GMD research, for example, by helping to validate GMD models.\123\ To facilitate the prompt dissemination of GIC monitoring and magnetometer data, we address whether GIC monitoring or magnetometer data should qualify as Confidential Information under the NERC Rules of Procedure.\124\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \122\ If GIC monitoring and magnetometer data is already publicly available (e.g., from a government entity or university), NERC need not duplicate those efforts. \123\ See, e.g., March 1, 2016 Technical Conference Tr. 58:22- 59:13 (Love); 128:5-129:2 (Overbye); ATC Comments at 6-7 (``as more measuring devices (including magnetometers and GIC monitors) continue to propagate, the body of field data on magnetic fields and the resultant GICs will continue to increase the understanding of this phenomena and result in better models that more closely match real world conditions . . . [a]bsent this field data, it is difficult to build accurate models that can be used to plan and operate the transmission system''). \124\ Providers of GIC and magnetometer data may request that NERC treat their GIC monitoring and magnetometer data as ``Confidential Information,'' as that term is defined in Section 1500 of the NERC Rules of Procedure. Under the NERC Rules of Procedure, disclosure of Confidential Information by NERC to a requester requires a formal request, notice and opportunity for comment, and an executed non-disclosure agreement for requesters not seeking public disclosure of the information. NERC Rules of Procedure, Section 1503 (Requests for Information) (effective Nov. 4, 2015). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 94. Based on the record in this proceeding, we believe that GIC and magnetometer data typically should not be designated as Confidential Information under the NERC Rules of Procedure. We are not persuaded that the dissemination of GIC monitoring or magnetometer data poses a security risk or that the data otherwise qualify as Confidential Information. CEA and Hydro One have objected, without elaboration, to making data available without the use of non-disclosure agreements.\125\ At the March 1, 2016 Technical Conference, panelists were questioned on the topic yet could not identify a security-based or other credible reason for not making such information available to requesters. In comments submitted after the March 1, 2016 Technical Conference, the Trade Associations explained that ``GIC measurements, while not as sensitive as transmission planning studies, should also be protected . . . [because a] potentially malicious actor could conceivably combine GIC information with information from other sources to deduce the configuration and operating conditions of the grid or some portion of it.'' \126\ The Trade Associations' comments, however, do not substantiate the assertion that the release of GIC monitoring (or magnetometer data) alone poses any risk to the Bulk-Power System. The Trade Associations' comment is also vague by not identifying what ``information from other sources'' could be combined with GIC monitoring ``to deduce the configuration and operating conditions of the grid or some portion of it.'' --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \125\ CEA Comments at 15; Hydro One Comments at 2. \126\ Trade Associations March 7, 2016 Supplemental Comments at 5. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 95. In conclusion, given both the lack of substantiated concerns regarding the disclosure of GIC and magnetometer data, and the compelling demonstration that access to these data will support ongoing research and analysis of GMD threats, the Commission expects NERC to make GIC and magnetometer data available. Notwithstanding our findings here, to the extent any entity seeks confidential treatment of the data it provides to NERC, the burden rests on that entity to justify the confidential treatment.\127\ Exceptions are possible if the providing entity obtains from NERC, at the time it submits data to NERC, a determination that GIC or magnetometer data qualify as Confidential Information.\128\ Entities denied access to GIC and magnetometer data by NERC or providers denied Confidential Information treatment of GIC and magnetometer data may appeal NERC's decision to the Commission. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \127\ See NERC Rules of Procedure, Section 1502.1. To address any substantiated concerns regarding the need for confidentiality of an entity's GIC or magnetometer data, NERC could develop a policy for disseminating such data only after an appropriate time interval (e.g., six months). \128\ We understand that NERC typically does not determine whether information submitted to it under a claim of confidentiality is Confidential Information when receiving such information. See North American Electric Reliability Corp., 119 FERC ] 61,060, at PP 195-196 (2007). We expect that, when a submitter seeks a determination by NERC of a claim that GIC or magnetometer data qualify as Confidential Information, NERC will decide promptly. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- E. Corrective Action Plan Deadlines NERC Petition 96. Reliability Standard TPL-007-1, Requirement R7 provides that: Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, that concludes, through the GMD Vulnerability Assessment conducted in Requirement R4, that their System does not meet the performance requirements of Table 1 shall develop a Corrective Action Plan addressing how the performance requirements will be met . . . . NERC explains that the NERC Glossary defines corrective action plan to mean, ``A list of actions and an associated timetable for implementation to remedy a specific problem.'' \129\ Requirement R7.3 states that the corrective action plan shall be provided within ``90 calendar days of completion to the responsible entity's Reliability Coordinator, adjacent Planning Coordinator(s), adjacent Transmission Planner(s), functional entities referenced in the Corrective Action Plan, and any functional entity that submits a written request and has a reliability-related need.'' --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \129\ NERC Petition at 31. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- NOPR 97. The NOPR proposed to direct NERC to modify Reliability Standard TPL-007-1 to require corrective action plans to be developed within one year of the completion of the GMD Vulnerability Assessment. The NOPR also proposed to direct NERC to modify Reliability Standard TPL-007-1 to require a deadline for non-equipment mitigation measures that is two years following development of the corrective action plan and a deadline for mitigation measures involving equipment installation that is four years following development of the corrective action plan. Recognizing that there is little experience with installing equipment for GMD mitigation, the NOPR stated that the Commission is open to proposals that may differ from its proposal, particularly from any entities with experience in this area. The NOPR also sought comment on appropriate alternative deadlines and whether there should be a mechanism that would allow NERC to consider, on [[Page 67134]] a case-by-case basis, requests for extensions of required deadlines. Comments 98. NERC states that it does not oppose a one-year deadline for completing the development of corrective action plans.\130\ However, NERC contends that imposing deadlines on the completion of mitigation actions would be problematic because of the uncertainties regarding the amount of time needed to install necessary equipment. NERC maintains that deadlines that are too short may cause entities to take mitigation steps that, while quicker, would not be as effective as mitigations that take more time to complete. NERC supports allowing extensions if the Commission adopts the NOPR proposal. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \130\ NERC contends that a deadline is unnecessary because ``NERC expects that applicable entities would determine necessary corrective actions as part of their GMD Vulnerability Assessments for the initial assessment [due 60 months after a final rule in this proceeding goes into effect] as well as subsequent assessments [due every 60 months thereafter].'' NERC Comments at 28. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 99. AEP states that, even if possible, a one-year deadline for developing corrective action plans is too aggressive and would encourage narrow thinking (i.e., registered entities would address GMD mitigation rather than pursue system improvements generally that would also address GMD mitigation). AEP, instead, proposes a two-year deadline. AEP does not support a Commission-imposed deadline for completing mitigation actions, although it supports requiring a time- table in the corrective action plan. AEP notes that the Commission did not impose a specific deadline for completion of corrective actions in Reliability Standard TPL-001-4 (Transmission System Planning Performance). CEA does not support a deadline for the development of corrective action plans because it is already part of the GMD Vulnerability Assessment process. Like AEP, CEA does not support specific deadlines for the completion of mitigation actions and instead supports including time-tables in the corrective action plan. CEA also contends that an extension process would be impracticable. 100. Trade Associations, BPA and Tri-State support the imposition of corrective action plan deadlines as long as entities can request extensions. Gaunt supports the corrective action plan deadlines proposed in the NOPR. Emprimus supports the imposition of deadlines but contends that non-equipment mitigation actions should be completed in 6 months and that there should be a rolling four-year period for equipment mitigation (i.e., after each year, 25 percent of the total mitigation actions should be completed). Commission Determination 101. The Commission directs NERC to modify Reliability Standard TPL-007-1 to include a deadline of one year from the completion of the GMD Vulnerability Assessments to complete the development of corrective action plans. NERC's statement that it ``expects'' corrective action plans to be completed at the same time as GMD Vulnerability Assessments concedes the point made in the NOPR that Reliability Standard TPL-007-1 currently lacks a clear deadline for the development of corrective action plans. 102. The Commission also directs NERC to modify Reliability Standard TPL-007-1 to include a two-year deadline after the development of the corrective action plan to complete the implementation of non- hardware mitigation and four-year deadline to complete hardware mitigation. The comments provide contrasting views on the practicality of imposing mitigation deadlines, with NERC and some industry commenters arguing that such deadlines are not warranted while the Trade Associations and other industry commenters support their imposition. Most of these comments, however, support an extension process if the Commission determines that deadlines are necessary. The Commission agrees that NERC should consider extensions of time on a case-by-case basis. The Commission directs NERC to submit these revisions within 18 months of the effective date of this Final Rule. 103. Following adoption of the mitigation deadlines required in this final rule, Reliability Standard TPL-007-1 will establish a recurring five-year schedule for the identification and mitigation of potential GMD risks on the grid, as follows: (1) The development of corrective action plans must be completed within one year of a GMD Vulnerability Assessment; (2) non-hardware mitigation must be completed within two years following development of corrective action plans; and (3) hardware mitigation must be completed within four years following development of corrective action plans. 104. As discussed elsewhere in this final rule, the Commission recognizes and expects that our collective understanding of the science regarding GMD threats will improve over time as additional research and analysis is conducted. We believe that the recurring five-year cycle will provide, on a going-forward basis, the opportunity to update Reliability Standard TPL-007-1 to reflect new or improved scientific understanding of GMD events. F. Minimization of Load Loss and Curtailment NERC Petition 105. Reliability Standard TPL-007-1, Requirement R4 states that each responsible entity ``shall complete a GMD Vulnerability Assessment of the Near-Term Transmission Planning Horizon once every 60 calendar months.'' Requirement R4.2 further states that the ``study or studies shall be conducted based on the benchmark GMD event described in Attachment 1 to determine whether the System meets the performance requirements in Table 1.'' 106. NERC maintains that Table 1 sets forth requirements for system steady state performance. NERC explains that Requirement R4 and Table 1 ``address assessments of the effects of GICs on other Bulk[hyphen]Power System equipment, system operations, and system stability, including the loss of devices due to GIC impacts.'' \131\ Table 1 provides, in relevant part, that load loss and/or curtailment are permissible elements of the steady state: --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \131\ NERC Petition at 39. Load loss as a result of manual or automatic Load shedding (e.g. UVLS) and/or curtailment of Firm Transmission Service may be used to meet BES performance requirements during studied GMD conditions. The likelihood and magnitude of Load loss or curtailment of Firm Transmission Service should be minimized. NOPR 107. The NOPR sought comment on the provision in Table 1 that ``Load loss or curtailment of Firm Transmission Service should be minimized.'' The NOPR stated that because the term ``minimized'' does not represent an objective value, the provision is potentially subject to interpretation and assertions that the term is vague and may not be enforceable. The NOPR also explained that the modifier ``should'' might indicate that minimization of load loss or curtailment is only an expectation or a guideline rather than a requirement. The NOPR sought comment on how the provision in Table 1 regarding load loss and curtailment will be enforced, including: (1) Whether, by using the term ``should,'' Table 1 requires minimization of load loss or curtailment; or both and (2) what constitutes ``minimization'' and how it will be assessed. [[Page 67135]] Comments 108. NERC states the language in Table 1 is modeled on Reliability Standard TPL-001-4, which provides in part that ``an objective of the planning process should be to minimize the likelihood and magnitude of interruption of Firm transmission Service following Contingency events.'' NERC explains that Reliability Standard TPL-007-1 ``does not include additional load loss performance criteria used in normal contingency planning because such criteria may not be applicable to GMD Vulnerability Assessment of the impact from a 1-in-100 year GMD event.'' \132\ However, NERC points out that the enforcement of Requirement R4 ``would include an evaluation of whether the system meets the Steady State performance requirements of Table 1 which are aimed at protecting against instability, controlled separation, and Cascading.'' \133\ NERC further states that ``minimized'' in the context of Reliability Standard TPL-007-1 means that ``planned Load loss or curtailments are not to exceed amounts necessary to prevent voltage collapse.'' \134\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \132\ NERC Comments at 29. \133\ Id. \134\ Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 109. The Trade Associations agree with the NOPR that the lack of objective criteria could create compliance and enforcement challenges and could limit an operator's actions in real-time. The Trade Associations state that the Commission ``should consider whether such language in mandatory requirements invites the unintended consequences of raising reliability risks, especially during real-time emergency conditions . . . [but] [i]n the interim, the Trade Associations envision that NERC will consider further discussions with stakeholders on the issue prior to TPL-007 implementation.'' \135\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \135\ Trade Associations Comments at 28. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Commission Determination 110. The Commission accepts the explanation in NERC's comments of what is meant by the term ``minimized'' in Table 1. G. Violation Risk Factors and Violation Severity Levels 111. Each requirement of Reliability Standard TPL-007-1 includes one violation risk factor and has an associated set of at least one violation severity level. NERC states that the ranges of penalties for violations will be based on the sanctions table and supporting penalty determination process described in the Commission approved NERC Sanction Guidelines. The NOPR proposed to approve the violation risk factors and violation severity levels submitted by NERC, for the requirements in Reliability Standard TPL-007-1, consistent with the Commission's established guidelines.\136\ The Commission did not receive any comments regarding this aspect of the NOPR. Accordingly, the Commission approves the violation risk factors and violation severity levels for the requirements in Reliability Standard TPL-007-1. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \136\ North American Electric Reliability Corp., 135 FERC ] 61,166 (2011). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- H. Implementation Plan and Effective Dates NERC Petition 112. NERC proposes a phased, five-year implementation period.\137\ NERC maintains that the proposed implementation period is necessary: (1) To allow time for entities to develop the required models; (2) for proper sequencing of assessments because thermal impact assessments are dependent on GIC flow calculations that are determined by the responsible planning entity; and (3) to give time for development of viable corrective action plans, which may require applicable entities to ``develop, perform, and/or validate new or modified studies, assessments, procedures . . . [and because] [s]ome mitigation measures may have significant budget, siting, or construction planning requirements.'' \138\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \137\ NERC Petition, Ex. B (Implementation Plan for TPL-007-1). \138\ Id. at 2. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 113. The proposed implementation plan states that Requirement R1 shall become effective on the first day of the first calendar quarter that is six months after Commission approval. For Requirement R2, NERC proposes that the requirement shall become effective on the first day of the first calendar quarter that is 18 months after Commission approval. NERC proposes that Requirement R5 shall become effective on the first day of the first calendar quarter that is 24 months after Commission approval. NERC proposes that Requirement R6 shall become effective on the first day of the first calendar quarter that is 48 months after Commission approval. And for Requirement R3, Requirement R4, and Requirement R7, NERC proposes that the requirements shall become effective on the first day of the first calendar quarter that is 60 months after Commission approval. NOPR 114. The NOPR proposed to approve the implementation plan and effective dates submitted by NERC. However, given the serial nature of the requirements in Reliability Standard TPL-007-1, the Commission expressed concern about the duration of the timeline associated with any mitigation stemming from a corrective action plan and sought comment from NERC and other interested entities as to whether the length of the implementation plan, particularly with respect to Requirements R4, R5, R6, and R7, could be reasonably shortened. Comments 115. NERC does not support shortening the implementation period. NERC maintains that the proposed implementation period is ``appropriate and commensurate with the requirements of the proposed standard'' and is based on ``industry . . . projections on the time required for obtaining validated tools, models and data necessary for conducting GMD Vulnerability Assessments through the standard development process.'' \139\ NERC notes that the standard drafting team initially proposed a four-year implementation plan, but received substantial comments expressing concern with only having four years. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \139\ NERC Comments at 30. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 116. The Trade Associations, BPA, CEA, Joint ISOs/RTOs and Tri- State support the proposed implementation plan for largely the same reasons as NERC. 117. Gaunt proposes a shorter implementation period wherein the initial GMD Vulnerability Assessment would be performed 48 months following the effective date of a final rule in this proceeding, as opposed to the proposed implementation plan's 60 months. Subsequent GMD Vulnerability Assessments would be performed every 48 months thereafter. Briggs states that a ``3 or 4 year timeline would likely provide industry with enough time to implement corrective measures and should be considered.'' \140\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \140\ Briggs Comments at 7. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Commission Determination 118. The Commission approves the implementation plan submitted by NERC. When registered entities begin complying with Reliability Standard TPL-007-1, it will likely be the first time that many registered entities will have planned for a GMD event, beyond developing the GMD operational procedures required by Reliability Standard EOP-010-1. Registered [[Page 67136]] entities will gain the capacity to conduct GMD Vulnerability Assessments over the course of the five-year implementation plan by complying with, at phased intervals, the foundational requirements in Reliability Standard TPL-007-1 (i.e., establishing responsibilities for planning and developing models and performance criteria). In addition, as discussed above, NERC's implementation plan affords sufficient time for NERC to submit and for the Commission to consider the directed revisions to Reliability Standard TPL-007-1 before the completion of the first GMD Vulnerability Assessment. As such, the five-year implementation plan will allow for the incorporation of the revised Reliability Standard in the first round of GMD Vulnerability Assessments. I. Other Issues 119. Several commenters indicated that the Commission should address the threats posed by EMPs or otherwise raised the issue of EMPs.\141\ For example, Briggs states that the Commission should ``initiate a process to improve the resilience of the U.S. electric grid to the threat of high altitude electromagnetic pulse (HEMP) attacks, which can be more severe than solar superstorms.'' \142\ However, as the Commission stated in Order No. 779 in directing the development of GMD Reliability Standards and in Order No. 797 in approving the First Stage GMD Reliability Standards, EMPs are not within the scope of the GMD rulemaking proceedings.\143\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \141\ See Briggs Comments at 7; EIS Comments at 3; JINSA Comments at 2. \142\ Briggs Comments at 7. \143\ Order No. 797, 147 FERC ] 61,209 at P 42 (citing Order No. 779, 143 FERC ] 61,147 at P 14 n.20). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 120. Holdeman contends that the Commission ``should modify the current preemption of States preventing them from having more stringent reliability standards for Commission regulated entities than Commission standards.'' \144\ As the Commission indicated in response to similar comments in Order No. 797, section 215(i)(3) of the FPA provides in relevant part that section 215 does not ``preempt any authority of any State to take action to ensure the safety, adequacy, and reliability of electric service within that State, as long as such action is not inconsistent with any reliability standard.'' \145\ Moreover, Reliability Standard TPL-007-1 does not preclude users, owners, and operators of the Bulk-Power System from taking additional steps that are designed to mitigate the effects of GMD events, provided those additional steps are not inconsistent with the Commission-approved Reliability Standards. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \144\ Holdeman Comments at 2. \145\ Order No. 797, 147 FERC ] 61,209 at P 44 (citing 16 U.S.C. 824o(i)(3)). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 121. Certain commenters opposed to Reliability Standard TPL-007-1 contend that its approval could absolve industry of any legal liability should a GMD event cause a disruption to the Bulk-Power System. For example, Resilient Societies ``ask[s] the Commission to clarify its expectation that the FERC jurisdictional entities will be held to account, and be subject to liability in the event of gross negligence or willful misconduct in planning for and mitigating solar geomagnetic storms.'' \146\ Resilient Societies also contends that the Commission does not have the legal authority ``to grant immunity from liability by setting reliability standards.'' \147\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \146\ Resilient Societies Comments at 62; see also CSP Comments at 1 (``It would be far better for FERC to remand Standard TPL-007-1 in its entirety than to approve a reliability standard that would grant liability protection to utilities while blocking the electric grid protection for the public that a 21st century society requires.''). \147\ Resilient Societies Comments at 62. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 122. The Commission has never stated in the GMD Reliability Standard rulemakings that compliance with Commission-approved Reliability Standards absolves registered entities from legal liability generally, to the extent legal liability exists, should a disruption occur on the Bulk-Power System due to a GMD event. Resilient Societies' comment appears to misconstrue language in Order No. 779 in which the Commission stated, when directing the development of the Second Stage GMD Reliability Standards, that the ``Second Stage GMD Reliability Standard should not impose `strict liability' on responsible entities for failure to ensure the reliability operation of the Bulk-Power System in the face of a GMD event of unforeseen severity.'' \148\ The Commission's statement merely recognized that the Second Stage GMD Reliability Standard should require registered entities to plan against a defined benchmark GMD event, for the purpose of complying with the proposed Reliability Standard, rather than any GMD event generally (i.e., a GMD event that exceeded the severity of the benchmark GMD event). The Commission did not suggest, nor could it suggest, that compliance with a Reliability Standard would absolve registered entities from general legal liability, if any, arising from a disruption to the Bulk-Power System. The only liability the Commission was referring to in Order No. 779 was the potential for penalties or remediation under section 215 of the FPA for failure to comply with a Commission-approved Reliability Standard. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \148\ Order No. 779, 143 FERC ] 61,147 at P 84. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 123. Kappenman, Resilient Societies and Bardin filed comments that addressed the NERC ``Level 2'' Appeal Panel decision.\149\ As a threshold issue, we agree with the Appeal Panel that the issues raised by the appellants in that proceeding are not procedural; instead they address the substantive provisions of Reliability Standard TPL-007-1. Section 8 (Process for Appealing an Action or Inaction) of the NERC Standards Process Manual states: --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \149\ NERC August 17, 2015 Filing at Appendix 1 (Decision of Level 2 Appeal Panel SPM Section 8 Appeal the Foundation For Resilient Societies, Inc. TPL-007-1). Any entity that has directly and materially affected interests and that has been or will be adversely affected by any procedural action or inaction related to the development, approval, revision, reaffirmation, retirement or withdrawal of a Reliability Standard, definition, Variance, associated implementation plan, or Interpretation shall have the right to appeal. This appeals process applies only to the NERC Reliability Standards processes as defined in this manual, not to the technical content of the Reliability --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Standards action. The appellants, who have the burden of proof under the NERC Rules of Procedure, have not shown that NERC or the standard drafting team failed to comply with any procedural requirements set forth in the NERC Rules of Procedure.\150\ Instead, it would appear that the appeal constitutes a collateral attack on the substantive provisions of Reliability Standard TPL-007-1. As the appellants' substantive concerns with Reliability Standard TPL-007-1 have been addressed in this Final Rule, issues surrounding the NERC ``Level 2'' Appeal Panel decision are, in any case, moot. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \150\ NERC Rules of Procedure, Appendix 3A (Standard Processes Manual), Section 8 (Process for Appealing an Action or Inaction) (effective June 26, 2013). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- III. Information Collection Statement 124. The collection of information contained in this final rule is subject to review by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) regulations under section 3507(d) of the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (PRA).\151\ OMB's regulations require approval of certain informational collection requirements imposed by agency rules.\152\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \151\ 44 U.S.C. 3507(d). \152\ 5 CFR 1320.11. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- [[Page 67137]] 125. Upon approval of a collection(s) of information, OMB will assign an OMB control number and an expiration date. Respondents subject to the filing requirements of a rule will not be penalized for failing to respond to these collections of information unless the collections of information display a valid OMB control number. 126. The Commission solicited comments on the need for this information, whether the information will have practical utility, the accuracy of the burden estimates, ways to enhance the quality, utility, and clarity of the information to be collected or retained, and any suggested methods for minimizing respondents' burden, including the use of automated information techniques. The Commission asked that any revised burden or cost estimates submitted by commenters be supported by sufficient detail to understand how the estimates are generated. The Commission received comments on specific requirements in Reliability Standard TPL-007-1, which we address in this Final Rule. However, the Commission did not receive any comments on our reporting burden estimates or on the need for and the purpose of the information collection requirements.\153\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \153\ While noting the uncertainties surrounding the potential costs associated with implementation of Reliability Standard TPL- 007-1 and the potential costs that could arise from a revised Reliability Standard, the Trade Associations stated that they ``have no specific comments regarding the OMB cost estimate in the NOPR.'' Trade Associations Comments at 9. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Public Reporting Burden: The Commission approves Reliability Standard TPL-007-1 and the associated implementation plan, violation severity levels, and violation risk factors, as discussed above. Reliability Standard TPL-007-1 will impose new requirements for transmission planners, planning coordinators, transmission owners, and generator owners. Reliability Standard TPL-007-1, Requirement R1 requires planning coordinators, in conjunction with the applicable transmission planner, to identify the responsibilities of the planning coordinator and transmission planner in the planning coordinator's planning area for maintaining models and performing the study or studies needed to complete GMD Vulnerability Assessments. Requirements R2, R3, R4, R5, and R7 refer to the ``responsible entity, as determined by Requirement R1,'' when identifying which applicable planning coordinators or transmission planners are responsible for maintaining models and performing the necessary study or studies. Requirement R2 requires that the responsible entities maintain models for performing the studies needed to complete GMD Vulnerability Assessments, as required in Requirement R4. Requirement R3 requires responsible entities to have criteria for acceptable system steady state voltage performance during a benchmark GMD event. Requirement R4 requires responsible entities to complete a GMD Vulnerability Assessment of the near-term transmission planning horizon once every 60 calendar months. Requirement R5 requires responsible entities to provide GIC flow information to transmission owners and generator owners that own an applicable bulk electric system power transformer in the planning area. This information is necessary for applicable transmission owners and generator owners to conduct the thermal impact assessments required by proposed Requirement R6. Requirement R6 requires applicable transmission owners and generator owners to conduct thermal impact assessments where the maximum effective GIC value provided in proposed Requirement R5, Part 5.1 is 75 A/phase or greater. Requirement R7 requires responsible entities to develop a corrective action plan when its GMD Vulnerability Assessment indicates that its system does not meet the performance requirements of Table 1--Steady State Planning Events. The corrective action plan must address how the performance requirements will be met, must list the specific deficiencies and associated actions that are necessary to achieve performance, and must set forth a timetable for completion. The Commission estimates the annual reporting burden and cost as follows: FERC-725N, as Modified by the Final Rule in Docket No. RM15-11-000 [TPL-007-1 Reliability Standard for Transmission System Planned Performance for Geomagnetic Disturbance Events] \154\ -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Annual number Average burden Total annual burden Number of respondents of responses Total number hours & cost per hours & total Cost per per respondent of responses response \155\ annual cost respondent ($) (1)......................... (2) (1) * (2) = (4)................ (3) * (4) = (5).... (5) / (1) (3) -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- (One-time) Requirement 1........ 121 (PC & TP)............... 1 121 Eng. 5 hrs. 1,089 hrs. (605 $481.55 ($331.75); RK 4 Eng., 484 RK); hrs. ($149.80). $58,267.55 ($40,141.75 Eng., $18,125.80 RK). (On-going) Requirement 1........ 121 (PC & TP)............... 1 121 Eng. 3 hrs. 605 hrs. (363 Eng., 273.95 ($199.05); RK 2 242 RK); hrs. ($74.90). $33,147.95 ($24,085.05 Eng., $9,062.90 RK). (One-time) Requirement 2........ 121 (PC & TP)............... 1 121 Eng. 22 hrs. 4840 hrs. (2,662 2,133.80 ($1,459.70); RK 18 Eng., 2,178 RK); hrs. ($674.10). $258,189.80 ($176,623.70 Eng., $81,566.10 RK). (On-going) Requirement 2........ 121 (PC & TP)............... 1 121 Eng. 5 hrs. 968 hrs. (605 Eng., 444.10 ($331.75); RK 3 363 RK); hrs. ($112.35). $53,736.10 ($40,141.75 Eng., $13,594.35 RK). [[Page 67138]] (One-time) Requirement 3........ 121 (PC & TP)............... 1 121 Eng. 5 hrs. 968 hrs. (605 Eng., 444.10 ($331.75); RK 3 363 RK); hrs. ($112.35). $53,736.10 ($40,141.75 Eng., $13,594.35 RK). (On-going) Requirement 3........ 121 (PC & TP)............... 1 121 Eng. 1 hrs. 242 hrs. (121 Eng., 103.80 ($66.35);RK 1 hrs. 121 RK); ($37.45). $12,559.80 ($8,028.35 Eng., $4,531.45 RK). (On-going) Requirement 4........ 121 (PC & TP)............... 1 121 Eng. 27 hrs. 5,808 hrs. (3,267 2,277.85 ($1,791.45); RK 21 Eng., 2,541 RK); hrs. ($786.45). $311,919.85 ($216,765.45 Eng., $95,154.40 RK). (On-going) Requirement 5........ 121 (PC & TP)............... 1 121 Eng. 9 hrs. 1936 hrs. (1,089 859.30 ($597.15); RK 7 Eng., 847 RK); hrs. ($262.15). $103,975.30 ($72,255.15 Eng., $31,720.15 RK). (One-time) Requirement 6........ 881 (TO & GO)............... 1 881 Eng. 22 hrs. 35,240 hrs. (19,382 2,133.89 ($1,459.70); RK 18 Eng., 15,858 RK); hrs. ($674.19). $1,879,957.09 ($1,285,995.70 Eng., $593,961.39 RK). (On-going) Requirement 6........ 881 (TO & GO)............... 1 881 Eng. 2 hrs. 3,524 hrs. (1,762 207.60 ($132.70); RK 2 Eng., 1762 RK); hrs. ($74.90). $182,895.60 ($116,908.70 Eng., $65,986.90 RK). (On-going) Requirement 7........ 121 (PC & TP)............... 1 121 Eng. 11 hrs. 2,420 hrs. (1,331 1,066.90 ($729.85); RK 9 Eng., 1,089 RK); hrs. ($337.05). $129,094.90 ($88,311.85 Eng., $40,783.05 RK). -------------------------------- --------------- Total....................... ............................ .............. 2851 ................... 57,640 \156\ hrs. .............. (31,792 Eng., 25,848 RK); $3,077,480.04 ($2,109,399.20 Eng., $968,080.84 RK). -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Title: FERC-725N, Mandatory Reliability Standards: TPL Reliability Standards. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \154\ Eng.=engineer; RK =recordkeeping (record clerk); PC=planning coordinator; TP=transmission planner; TO=transmission owner; and GO=generator owner. \155\ The estimates for cost per response are derived using the following formula: Burden Hours per Response * $/hour = Cost per Response. The $66.35/hour figure for an engineer and the $37.45/hour figure for a record clerk are based on data on the average salary plus benefits from the Bureau of Labor Statistics obtainable at http://www.bls.gov/oes/current/naics3_221000.htm and http://www.bls.gov/news.release/ecec.nr0.htm. \156\ Of the 57,640 total burden hours, 42,137 hours are one- time burden hours, and 15,503 hours are on-going annual burden hours. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Action: Approved Additional Requirements. OMB Control No: 1902-0264. Respondents: Business or other for-profit and not-for-profit institutions. Frequency of Responses: One time and on-going. Necessity of the Information: The Commission has reviewed the requirements of Reliability Standard TPL-007-1 and has made a determination that the requirements of this Reliability Standard are necessary to implement section 215 of the FPA. Specifically, these requirements address the threat posed by GMD events to the Bulk-Power System and conform to the Commission's directives regarding development of the Second Stage GMD Reliability Standards, as set forth in Order No. 779. Internal review: The Commission has assured itself, by means of its internal review, that there is specific, objective support for the burden estimates associated with the information requirements. 127. Interested persons may obtain information on the reporting requirements by contacting the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Office of the Executive Director, 888 First Street NE., Washington, DC 20426 [Attention: Ellen Brown, e-mail: [[Page 67139]] [email protected], phone: (202) 502-8663, fax: (202) 273-0873]. 128. Comments concerning the information collections in this final rule and the associated burden estimates, should be sent to the Commission in this docket and may also be sent to the Office of Management and Budget, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs [Attention: Desk Officer for the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission]. For security reasons, comments should be sent by e-mail to OMB at the following e-mail address: [email protected]. Please reference FERC-725N and OMB Control No. 1902-0264 in your submission. IV. Environmental Analysis 129. The Commission is required to prepare an Environmental Assessment or an Environmental Impact Statement for any action that may have a significant adverse effect on the human environment.\157\ The Commission has categorically excluded certain actions from this requirement as not having a significant effect on the human environment. Included in the exclusion are rules that are clarifying, corrective, or procedural or that do not substantially change the effect of the regulations being amended.\158\ The actions here fall within this categorical exclusion in the Commission's regulations. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \157\ Regulations Implementing the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Order No. 486, 52 FR 47897 (Dec. 17, 1987), FERC Stats. & Regs. Preambles 1986-1990 ] 30,783 (1987). \158\ 18 CFR 380.4(a)(2)(ii). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- V. Regulatory Flexibility Act 130. The Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 (RFA) \159\ generally requires a description and analysis of final rules that will have significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities. The Small Business Administration's (SBA) Office of Size Standards develops the numerical definition of a small business.\160\ The SBA revised its size standard for electric utilities (effective January 22, 2014) to a standard based on the number of employees, including affiliates (from a standard based on megawatt hours).\161\ Under SBA's new size standards, planning coordinators, transmission planners, transmission owners, and generator owners are likely included in one of the following categories (with the associated size thresholds noted for each): \162\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \159\ 5 U.S.C. 601-12. \160\ 13 CFR 121.101. \161\ SBA Final Rule on ``Small Business Size Standards: Utilities,'' 78 FR 77,343 (Dec. 23, 2013). \162\ 13 CFR 121.201, Sector 22, Utilities.Hydroelectric power generation, at 500 employees Fossil fuel electric power generation, at 750 employees Nuclear electric power generation, at 750 employees Other electric power generation (e.g., solar, wind, geothermal, biomass, and other), at 250 employees Electric bulk power transmission and control,\163\ at 500 employees --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \163\ This category covers transmission planners and planning coordinators. 131. Based on these categories, the Commission will use a conservative threshold of 750 employees for all entities.\164\ Applying this threshold, the Commission estimates that there are 440 small entities that function as planning coordinators, transmission planners, transmission owners, and/or generator owners. However, the Commission estimates that only a subset of such small entities will be subject to the approved Reliability Standard given the additional applicability criterion in the approved Reliability Standard (i.e., to be subject to the requirements of the approved Reliability Standard, the applicable entity must own or must have a planning area that contains a large power transformer with a high side, wye-grounded winding with terminal voltage greater than 200 kV). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \164\ By using the highest number threshold for all types of entities, our estimate conservatively treats more entities as ``small entities.'' --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 132. Reliability Standard TPL-007-1 enhances reliability by establishing requirements that require applicable entities to perform GMD Vulnerability Assessments and to mitigate identified vulnerabilities. The Commission estimates that each of the small entities to whom the approved Reliability Standard applies will incur one-time compliance costs of $5,193.34 and annual ongoing costs of $5,233.50. 133. The Commission does not consider the estimated cost per small entity to impose a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities. Accordingly, the Commission certifies that the approved Reliability Standard will not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities. VI. Document Availability 134. In addition to publishing the full text of this document in the Federal Register, the Commission provides all interested persons an opportunity to view and/or print the contents of this document via the Internet through FERC's Home Page (http://www.ferc.gov) and in FERC's Public Reference Room during normal business hours (8:30 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. Eastern time) at 888 First Street NE., Room 2A, Washington, DC 20426. 135. From FERC's Home Page on the Internet, this information is available on eLibrary. The full text of this document is available on eLibrary in PDF and Microsoft Word format for viewing, printing, and/or downloading. To access this document in eLibrary, type the docket number excluding the last three digits of this document in the docket number field. 136. User assistance is available for eLibrary and the FERC's website during normal business hours from FERC Online Support at 202- 502-6652 (toll free at 1-866-208-3676) or email at [email protected], or the Public Reference Room at (202) 502- 8371, TTY (202) 502-8659. E-mail the Public Reference Room at [email protected]. VII. Effective Date and Congressional Notification 137. These regulations are effective November 29, 2016. The Commission has determined, with the concurrence of the Administrator of the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs of OMB, that this rule is not a ``major rule'' as defined in section 351 of the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996. By the Commission. Issued: September 22, 2016. Nathaniel J. Davis, Sr., Deputy Secretary. Appendix Commenters Initial Comments ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Abbreviation Commenter ------------------------------------------------------------------------ AEP.................................... American Electric Power Service Corporation. APS.................................... Arizona Public Service Company. ATC.................................... American Transmission Company. [[Page 67140]] Baker.................................. Greta Baker. Bardin................................. David J. Bardin. BPA.................................... Bonneville Power Administration. Briggs................................. Kevin Briggs. CEA.................................... Canadian Electricity Association. CSP.................................... Center for Security Policy. EIS.................................... Electric Infrastructure Security Council. Emprimus............................... Emprimus LLC. Exelon................................. Exelon Corporation. Gaunt.................................. Charles T. Gaunt. Holdeman............................... Eric Holdeman. Hydro One.............................. Hydro One Networks Inc. ITC.................................... International Transmission Company. Lloyd's................................ Lloyd's America, Inc. JINSA.................................. Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs. Joint ISOs/RTOs........................ ISO New England Inc., Midcontinent Independent Transmission System Operator, Inc., Independent Electricity System Operator, New York Independent System Operator, Inc., and PJM Interconnection, L.L.C. Kappenman.............................. John G. Kappenman and Curtis Birnbach. Morris................................. Eric S. Morris. NERC................................... North American Electric Reliability Corporation. Resilient Societies.................... Foundation for Resilient Societies. Roodman................................ David Roodman. Trade Associations..................... American Public Power Association, Edison Electric Institute, Electricity Consumers Resource Council, Electric Power Supply Association, Large Public Power Council, National Rural Electric Cooperative Association. Tri-State.............................. Tri-State Generation and Transmission Association, Inc. USGS................................... United States Geological Survey. ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Supplemental Comments ------------------------------------------------------------------------ ------------------------------------------------------------------------ AEP.................................... American Electric Power Service Corporation. Bardin................................. David J. Bardin. CSP.................................... Center for Security Policy. Gaunt.................................. Charles T. Gaunt. IEEE................................... IEEE Power and Energy Society Transformers Committee. Kappenman.............................. John G. Kappenman and Curtis Birnbach. NERC................................... North American Electric Reliability Corporation. Resilient Societies.................... Foundation for Resilient Societies. Roodman................................ David Roodman. Trade Associations..................... American Public Power Association, Edison Electric Institute, Electricity Consumers Resource Council, Electric Power Supply Association, Large Public Power Council, National Rural Electric Cooperative Association. USGS................................... United States Geological Survey. ------------------------------------------------------------------------ [FR Doc. 2016-23441 Filed 9-29-16; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 6717-01-P
![67120 Federal Register / Vol. 81, No. 190 / Friday, September 30, 2016 / Rules and Regulations
paper copies of the EDGAR Filer GMD event definition set forth in with and cause changes in the earth’s
Manual from the following address: Attachment 1 of Reliability Standard magnetic fields. Reliability Standard
Public Reference Room, U.S. Securities TPL–007–1, as it pertains to the TPL–007–1 requires applicable entities
and Exchange Commission, 100 F Street required GMD Vulnerability that do not meet certain performance
NE., Washington, DC 20549, on official Assessments and transformer thermal requirements, based on the results of
business days between the hours of 10 impact assessments, so that the their vulnerability assessments, to
a.m. and 3 p.m. You can also inspect the definition is not based solely on develop a plan to achieve the
document at the National Archives and spatially-averaged data; to require the requirements. Reliability Standard TPL–
Records Administration (NARA). For collection of necessary geomagnetically 007–1 addresses the directives in Order
information on the availability of this induced current monitoring and No. 779 by requiring applicable Bulk-
material at NARA, call 202–741–6030, magnetometer data and to make such Power System owners and operators to
or go to: http://www.archives.gov/ data publicly available; and to include conduct initial and on-going
federal_register/code_of_federal_ a one-year deadline for the development vulnerability assessments regarding the
regulations/ibr_locations.html. of corrective action plans and two and potential impact of a benchmark GMD
By the Commission. four-year deadlines to complete event on the Bulk-Power System as a
mitigation actions involving non- whole and on Bulk-Power System
Dated: September 20, 2016.
hardware and hardware mitigation, components.3 In addition, Reliability
Brent J. Fields, Standard TPL–007–1 requires
respectively. The Commission also
Secretary. applicable entities to develop and
directs NERC to submit a work plan
[FR Doc. 2016–23562 Filed 9–29–16; 8:45 am] and, subsequently, one or more implement corrective action plans to
BILLING CODE 8011–01–P informational filings that address mitigate identified vulnerabilities.4
specific GMD-related research areas. Potential mitigation strategies identified
DATES: This rule will become effective
in the proposed Reliability Standard
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY November 29, 2016. include, but are not limited to, the
installation, modification or removal of
Federal Energy Regulatory FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
transmission and generation facilities
Commission Regis Binder (Technical Information), and associated equipment.5
Office of Electric Reliability, Federal Accordingly, Reliability Standard TPL–
18 CFR Part 40 Energy Regulatory Commission, 888 007–1 constitutes an important step in
First Street NE., Washington, DC 20426, addressing the risks posed by GMD
[Docket No. RM15–11–000; Order No. 830] Telephone: (301) 665–1601, events to the Bulk-Power System.
Regis.Binder@ferc.gov. 2. In addition, pursuant to section
Reliability Standard for Transmission Matthew Vlissides (Legal
System Planned Performance for 215(d)(5) of the FPA, the Commission
Information), Office of the General directs NERC to develop modifications
Geomagnetic Disturbance Events Counsel, Federal Energy Regulatory to Reliability Standard TPL–007–1: (1)
AGENCY: Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 888 First Street NE., To revise the benchmark GMD event
Commission, Department of Energy. Washington, DC 20426, Telephone: definition set forth in Attachment 1 of
ACTION: Final rule. (202) 502–8408, Matthew.Vlissides@ Reliability Standard TPL–007–1, as it
ferc.gov. pertains to the required GMD
SUMMARY: The Federal Energy Vulnerability Assessments and
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Regulatory Commission (Commission) transformer thermal impact
approves Reliability Standard TPL–007– Order No. 830 assessments, so that the definition is not
1 (Transmission System Planned Final Rule based solely on spatially-averaged data;
Performance for Geomagnetic (2) to require the collection of necessary
Disturbance Events). The North 1. Pursuant to section 215 of the
Federal Power Act (FPA), the geomagnetically induced current (GIC)
American Electric Reliability monitoring and magnetometer data and
Corporation (NERC), the Commission- Commission approves Reliability
Standard TPL–007–1 (Transmission to make such data publicly available;
certified Electric Reliability and (3) to include a one-year deadline
Organization, submitted Reliability System Planned Performance for
Geomagnetic Disturbance Events).1 The for the completion of corrective action
Standard TPL–007–1 for Commission plans and two- and four-year deadlines
approval in response to a Commission North American Electric Reliability
Corporation (NERC), the Commission- to complete mitigation actions involving
directive in Order No. 779. Reliability non-hardware and hardware mitigation,
Standard TPL–007–1 establishes certified Electric Reliability
Organization (ERO), submitted respectively.6 The Commission directs
requirements for certain registered NERC to submit these revisions within
entities to assess the vulnerability of Reliability Standard TPL–007–1 for
Commission approval in response to a 18 months of the effective date of this
their transmission systems to Final Rule. The Commission also directs
geomagnetic disturbance events (GMDs), Commission directive in Order No.
779.2 Reliability Standard TPL–007–1 NERC to submit a work plan (GMD
which occur when the sun ejects research work plan) within six months
charged particles that interact with and establishes requirements for certain
registered entities to assess the of the effective date of this Final Rule
cause changes in the earth’s magnetic and, subsequently, one or more
fields. Applicable entities that do not vulnerability of their transmission
asabaliauskas on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with RULES
meet certain performance requirements, systems to geomagnetic disturbance 3 See Reliability Standard TPL–007–1,
based on the results of their events (GMDs), which occur when the Requirement R4; see also Order No. 779, 143 FERC
vulnerability assessments, must develop sun ejects charged particles that interact ¶ 61,147 at PP 67, 71.
4 See Reliability Standard TPL–007–1,
a plan to achieve the performance
1 16 U.S.C. 824o. Requirement R7; see also Order No. 779, 143 FERC
requirements. In addition, the 2 Reliability ¶ 61,147 at P 79.
Standards for Geomagnetic
Commission directs NERC to develop Disturbances, Order No. 779, 78 FR 30,747 (May 23, 5 See Reliability Standard TPL–007–1,
modifications to Reliability Standard 2013), 143 FERC ¶ 61,147, reh’g denied, 144 FERC Requirement R7.
TPL–007–1: To modify the benchmark ¶ 61,113 (2013). 6 16 U.S.C. 824o(d)(5).
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![Federal Register / Vol. 81, No. 190 / Friday, September 30, 2016 / Rules and Regulations 67121
informational filings that address geomagnetic disturbances on the equipment.17 Order No. 779 observed
specific GMD-related research areas. reliable operation of the Bulk-Power that these strategies could, for example,
System. The Commission based its include automatically blocking GICs
I. Background
directive on the potentially severe, from entering the Bulk-Power System,
A. Section 215 and Mandatory wide-spread impact on the reliable instituting specification requirements
Reliability Standards operation of the Bulk-Power System that for new equipment, inventory
3. Section 215 of the FPA requires the can be caused by GMD events and the management, isolating certain
Commission to certify an ERO to absence of existing Reliability Standards equipment that is not cost effective to
develop mandatory and enforceable to address GMD events.14 retrofit or a combination thereof.
Reliability Standards, subject to 6. Order No. 779 directed NERC to D. Order No. 797
Commission review and approval. Once implement the directive in two stages. 8. In Order No. 797, the Commission
approved, the Reliability Standards may In the first stage, the Commission approved Reliability Standard EOP–
be enforced in the United States by the directed NERC to submit, within six
months of the effective date of Order 010–1 (Geomagnetic Disturbance
ERO, subject to Commission oversight, Operations).18 NERC submitted
or by the Commission independently.7 No. 779, one or more Reliability
Reliability Standard EOP–010–1 for
Standards (First Stage GMD Reliability
B. GMD Primer Commission approval in compliance
Standards) that require owners and
with the Commission’s directive in
4. GMD events occur when the sun operators of the Bulk-Power System to
Order No. 779 corresponding to the First
ejects charged particles that interact develop and implement operational
Stage GMD Reliability Standards. In
with and cause changes in the earth’s procedures to mitigate the effects of
Order No. 797–A, the Commission
magnetic fields.8 Once a solar particle is GMDs consistent with the reliable denied the Foundation for Resilient
ejected, it can take between 17 to 96 operation of the Bulk-Power System.15
Societies’ (Resilient Societies) request
hours (depending on its energy level) to 7. In the second stage, the for rehearing of Order No. 797. The
reach earth.9 A geoelectric field is the Commission directed NERC to submit, Commission stated that the rehearing
electric potential (measured in volts per within 18 months of the effective date request ‘‘addressed a later stage of
kilometer (V/km)) on the earth’s surface of Order No. 779, one or more efforts on geomagnetic disturbances
and is directly related to the rate of Reliability Standards (Second Stage (i.e., NERC’s future filing of Second
change of the magnetic fields.10 A GMD Reliability Standards) that require Stage GMD Reliability Standards) and
geoelectric field has an amplitude and owners and operators of the Bulk-Power [that Resilient Societies] may seek to
direction and acts as a voltage source System to conduct initial and on-going present those arguments at an
that can cause GICs to flow on long assessments of the potential impact of appropriate time in response to that
conductors, such as transmission benchmark GMD events on Bulk-Power filing.’’ 19 In particular, the Commission
lines.11 The magnitude of the geoelectric System equipment and the Bulk-Power stated that GIC monitoring requirements
field amplitude is impacted by local System as a whole. The Commission should be addressed in the Second
factors such as geomagnetic latitude and directed that the Second Stage GMD Stage GMD Reliability Standards.20
local earth conductivity.12 Geomagnetic Reliability Standards must identify
latitude is the proximity to earth’s benchmark GMD events that specify E. NERC Petition and Reliability
magnetic north and south poles, as what severity of GMD events a Standard TPL–007–1
opposed to earth’s geographic poles. responsible entity must assess for 9. On January 21, 2015, NERC
Local earth conductivity is the ability of potential impacts on the Bulk-Power petitioned the Commission to approve
the earth’s crust to conduct electricity at System.16 Order No. 779 explained that Reliability Standard TPL–007–1 and its
a certain location to depths of hundreds if the assessments identified potential associated violation risk factors and
of kilometers down to the earth’s impacts from benchmark GMD events, violation severity levels,
mantle. Local earth conductivity the Reliability Standards should require implementation plan, and effective
impacts the magnitude (i.e., severity) of owners and operators to develop and dates.21 NERC also submitted a
the geoelectric fields that are formed implement a plan to protect against proposed definition for the term
during a GMD event by, all else being instability, uncontrolled separation, or ‘‘Geomagnetic Disturbance Vulnerability
equal, a lower earth conductivity cascading failures of the Bulk-Power Assessment or GMD Vulnerability
resulting in higher geoelectric fields.13 System, caused by damage to critical or
C. Order No. 779 vulnerable Bulk-Power System 17 Id.
18 Reliability Standard for Geomagnetic
equipment, or otherwise, as a result of
5. In Order No. 779, the Commission Disturbance Operations, Order No. 797, 79 FR
a benchmark GMD event. The 35,911 (June 25, 2014), 147 FERC ¶ 61,209, reh’g
directed NERC, pursuant to section Commission directed that the denied, Order No. 797–A, 149 FERC ¶ 61,027
215(d)(5) of the FPA, to develop and development of this plan could not be (2014).
submit for approval proposed Reliability limited to considering operational 19 Order No. 797–A, 149 FERC ¶ 61,027 at P 2.
Standards that address the impact of procedures or enhanced training alone 20 Id. P 27 (stating that the Commission continues
‘‘to encourage NERC to address the collection,
but should, subject to the potential dissemination, and use of geomagnetic induced
7 Id. 824o(e).
8 North American Electric Reliability Corp., 2012
impacts of the benchmark GMD events current data, by NERC, industry or others, in the
Special Reliability Assessment Interim Report:
identified in the assessments, contain Second Stage GMD Reliability Standards because
strategies for protecting against the such efforts could be useful in the development of
Effects of Geomagnetic Disturbances on the Bulk
asabaliauskas on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with RULES
GMD mitigation methods or to validate GMD
Power System at i–ii (February 2012), http:// potential impact of GMDs based on models’’).
www.nerc.com/files/2012GMD.pdf (GMD Interim factors such as the age, condition, 21 Reliability Standard TPL–007–1 is not attached
Report).
9 Id. ii.
technical specifications, system to this final rule. Reliability Standard TPL–007–1 is
10 Id. configuration or location of specific available on the Commission’s eLibrary document
retrieval system in Docket No. RM15–11–000 and
11 Id.
on the NERC website, www.nerc.com. NERC
12 NERC Petition, Ex. D (White Paper on GMD 14 Order No. 779, 143 FERC ¶ 61,147 at P 3. submitted an errata on February 2, 2015 containing
Benchmark Event Description) at 4. 15 Id. P 2. a corrected version of Exhibit A (Proposed
13 Id. 16 Id. Reliability Standard TPL–007–1).
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![67124 Federal Register / Vol. 81, No. 190 / Friday, September 30, 2016 / Rules and Regulations
The frequency of occurrence of this drafting team used this time series to range of risks bounded by the two
benchmark GMD event is estimated to be estimate a geoelectric field, represented analyses, and be based on engineering
approximately 1 in 100 years.38 as a time series (i.e., 10-second values judgment within this range, considering
31. The standard drafting team over a period of days), that is expected all relevant information. The NOPR
explained that it used field to occur at 60 degree geomagnetic stated that, alternatively, NERC could
measurements taken from the IMAGE latitude during a 1-in-100 year GMD propose an equally efficient and
magnetometer chain, which covers event. NERC explains that this time effective modification that does not rely
Northern Europe, for the period 1993– series is used to facilitate time-domain exclusively on the spatially-averaged
2013 to calculate the reference peak analysis of GMD impacts on reference peak geoelectric field value.
geoelectric field amplitude used in the equipment.44
benchmark GMD event definition.39 As 34. In the sub-sections below, we Comments
described in NERC’s petition, the discuss two issues concerning the 37. NERC does not support revising
standard drafting team ‘‘spatially benchmark GMD event definition the benchmark GMD event definition.
averaged’’ four different station groups addressed in the NOPR: (1) Reference NERC maintains that the spatially-
of IMAGE data, each spanning a square peak geoelectric field amplitude; and (2) averaged reference peak geoelectric field
area of approximately 500 km (roughly geomagnetic latitude scaling factor. amplitude value in Reliability Standard
310 miles) in width.40 The standard TPL–007–1 is ‘‘technically-justified,
1. Reference Peak Geoelectric Field scientifically sound, and has been
drafting team justified the use of spatial Amplitude
averaging by stating that Reliability published in a peer-reviewed research
Standard TPL–007–1 is designed to NOPR journal covering geomagnetism and
‘‘address wide-area effects caused by a 35. The NOPR proposed to approve other topics.’’ 46 NERC contends that the
severe GMD event, such as increased var the benchmark GMD event definition. standard drafting team determined that
absorption and voltage depressions. The NOPR stated that the ‘‘benchmark using the non-spatially averaged 20 V/
Without characterizing GMD on regional GMD event definition proposed by km figure in the GMD Interim Report
scales, statistical estimates could be NERC complies with the directive in would ‘‘consistently overestimate the
weighted by local effects and suggest Order No. 779 . . . [c]onsistent with the geoelectric field of a 1-in-100 year GMD
unduly pessimistic conditions when guidance provided in Order No. 779, the event.’’ 47 NERC states that, by contrast,
considering cascading failure and benchmark GMD event definition spatial averaging ‘‘properly associates
voltage collapse.’’ 41 proposed by NERC addresses the the relevant spatial scales for the
32. NERC states that the benchmark potential widespread impact of a severe analyzed and applied geoelectric fields
GMD event includes scaling factors to GMD event, while taking into and would not distort the complexity of
enable applicable entities to tailor the consideration the variables of the potential impacts of a GMD
reference peak geoelectric field to their geomagnetic latitude and local earth event.’’ 48 NERC claims that the 500 km-
specific location for conducting GMD conductivity.’’ 45 wide square areas used to determine the
Vulnerability Assessments. NERC 36. In addition, the NOPR proposed to areas of spatial averaging are ‘‘based on
explains that the scaling factors in the direct NERC to develop modifications to consideration of transmission systems
benchmark GMD event definition are Reliability Standard TPL–007–1. and geomagnetic observation patterns
applied to the reference peak geoelectric Specifically, the NOPR proposed to . . . [and are] an appropriate scale for
field amplitude to adjust the 8 V/km direct NERC to modify the reference a system-wide impact in a transmission
value for different geomagnetic latitudes peak geoelectric field amplitude system.’’ 49 To support this position,
and earth conductivities.42 component of the benchmark GMD NERC cites a June 2015 peer-reviewed
33. The standard drafting team also event definition so that it is not publication authored in part by some
identified a reference geomagnetic field calculated based solely on spatially- members of the standard drafting
time series from an Ottawa magnetic averaged data. The NOPR explained that team.50
observatory during a 1989 GMD event this could be achieved, for example, by 38. Industry commenters, largely
that affected Québec.43 The standard requiring applicable entities to conduct represented by the Trade Associations’
GMD Vulnerability Assessments (and, comments, do not support revising the
38 Id. (footnotes omitted). as discussed below, thermal impact benchmark GMD event definition.51 The
39 Id. at 8. The International Monitor for Auroral assessments) using two different Trade Associations’ reasons largely
Geomagnetic Effects (IMAGE) consists of 31 benchmark GMD events: The first mirror NERC’s. While recognizing that
magnetometer stations in northern Europe the spatially-averaged reference peak
maintained by 10 institutes from Estonia, Finland,
benchmark GMD event using the
Germany, Norway, Poland, Russia, and Sweden. spatially-averaged reference peak geoelectric field amplitude is lower than
See IMAGE website, http://space.fmi.fi/image/beta/ geoelectric field value (8 V/km) and the
46 NERC Comments at 6.
?page=home#. second using the non-spatially averaged
40 As applied by the standard drafting team, 47 Id. at 7.
peak geoelectric field value cited in the
spatial averaging refers to the averaging of 48 Id. at 8.
geoelectric field amplitude readings within a given
GMD Interim Report (20 V/km). The 49 Id.
area. NERC Petition, Ex. D (White Paper on GMD NOPR stated that the revised Reliability 50 See Pulkkinen, A., Bernabeu, E., Eichner, J.,
Benchmark Event Description) at 9. Standard could then require applicable Viljanen, A., Ngwira, C., ‘‘Regional-Scale High-
41 NERC Petition, Ex. D (White Paper on GMD
entities to take corrective actions, using Latitude Extreme Geoelectric Fields Pertaining to
Benchmark Event Description) at 9. engineering judgment, based on the Geomagnetically Induced Currents,’’ Earth, Planets
42 NERC Petition at 18–19. and Space (June 19, 2015) (2015 Pulkkinen Paper).
results of both assessments. The NOPR
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43 NERC Petition, Ex. D (White Paper on GMD 51 Trade Associations Comments at 13–18. AEP,
Benchmark Event Description) at 5–6, 15–16 (‘‘the explained that applicable entities would APS, ATC, BPA, CEA, Hydro One, ITC, Joint ISOs/
reference geomagnetic field waveshape was selected not always be required to mitigate to the RTOs and Exelon indicated that they do not support
after analyzing a number of recorded GMD level of risk identified by the non- the NOPR proposal in separate comments and/or by
events . . . the March 13–14, 1989 GMD event, spatially averaged analysis; instead, the joining the Trade Associations’ comments. See AEP
measured at NRCan’s Ottawa geomagnetic Comments at 3; APS Comments at 2; ATC
observatory, was selected as the reference
selection of mitigation would reflect the Comments at 3; BPA Comments at 3–4; CEA
geomagnetic field waveform because it provides Comments at 8–13; Hydro One Comments 1–2; ITC
44 Id. at 5–6.
generally conservative results when performing Comments at 3–5; Joint ISOs/RTOs Comments at 4–
thermal analysis of power transformers’’). 45 NOPR, 151 FERC ¶ 61,134 at P 32. 5; Exelon Comments at 2.
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![Federal Register / Vol. 81, No. 190 / Friday, September 30, 2016 / Rules and Regulations 67125
the non-spatially averaged figure, the amplitudes, as described in the NOPR.55 the Commission ‘‘require a much larger
Trade Associations contend that the ITC states that NERC’s proposal is array of events for simulation’’ in light
non-spatially averaged value is reasonable and that the reference peak of the ‘‘deep uncertainty and complexity
inappropriate because: (1) The peak geoelectric field amplitude value can be of the GMD.’’ 61
geoelectric field only affects relatively revised periodically based on new 43. Commenters opposed to the
small areas and quickly declines with information. Joint ISOs/RTOs state that benchmark GMD event definition
distance from the peak; (2) Reliability the Commission should afford due proposed by NERC maintain that the
Standard TPL–007–1 is intended to weight to NERC’s technical expertise. standard drafting team significantly
address the wide-scale effects of a GMD 41. A September 2015 paper prepared underestimated the reference peak
event; and (3) the benchmark GMD by the Los Alamos National Laboratory geoelectric field amplitude value for a 1-
event definition is designed to provide states that it analyzed the IMAGE data in-100 year GMD event by relying on
a realistic estimate of wide-area effects using a different methodology to data from the IMAGE system and by
caused by a severe GMD event. The calculate reference peak geoelectric field applying spatial averaging to that data
Trade Associations contend that a non- amplitude values based on each of eight set.62 For example, Resilient Societies
spatially averaged reference peak different magnetometer installations in states that the standard drafting team
geoelectric field amplitude ‘‘would be Northern Europe. However, unlike the should have analyzed ‘‘real-world data
weighted by local effects and suggest standard drafting team, the Los Alamos from within the United States and
unrealistic conditions for system Paper did not spatially average the Canada, including magnetometer
analysis . . . [which] could lead to IMAGE data. The authors calculated readings from the [USGS] and Natural
unnecessary costs for customers, while peak geoelectric field amplitudes Resources Canada observatories . . .
yielding very little tangible benefit to ranging from 8.4 V/km to 16.6 V/km, [h]ad NERC and the Standard Drafting
reliability.’’ 52 Like NERC, the Trade with a mean of the eight values equal to Team collected and analyzed available
Associations cite to the 2015 Pulkkinen 13.2 V/km.56 The authors used a real-world data, they would have likely
Paper to support the use of 500 km-wide statistical formula and probability found that the severity of GMD in 1-in-
squares in performing the spatial distribution to determine their 1-in-100 100 Year reference storm had been set
averaging analysis. The Trade year GMD event parameters, as opposed far below a technically justified level
Associations note, however, that the to the 20 V/km non-spatially averaged and without a ‘strong technical
selection of 500 km is ‘‘only the event from the 2012 paper cited in the basis.’ ’’ 63 Likewise, Kappenman
beginning . . . [of the] exploration of GMD Interim Report that visually contends that there are multiple
spatial geoelectric field structures extrapolated the data. examples where the benchmark GMD
pertaining to extreme GIC.’’ 53 42. Roodman contends that ‘‘NERC’s event and the standard drafting team’s
100-year benchmark GMD event is model for calculating geoelectric fields
39. The Trade Associations, while not
appropriately conservative in magnitude under-predict actual, historical GIC
supportive of the NOPR proposal,
(except perhaps in the southern-most readings.64 Commenters opposed to
recommend that if the Commission
US) if unrealistic in some other NERC’s proposal variously argue that
remains concerned about relying on
respects.’’ 57 Roodman states that the reference peak geoelectric field
NERC’s proposed spatially-averaged
‘‘overall NERC’s analytical frame does amplitude should be set at a level
reference peak geoelectric field
not strongly clash with the data.’’ 58 commensurate with the 1921 Railroad
amplitude, the Commission should:
However, Roodman contends that actual Storm or 1859 Carrington Event or at the
allow NERC to further determine the data support local hot-spots in a larger 20 V/km level cited in the GMD Interim
appropriate localized studies to be performed region of lower magnitude geoelectric
by moving the ‘‘local hot spot’’ around a Report.65
fields that are not typically uniform in
planning area. This approach may better Commission Determination
magnitude or direction.59 Roodman
ensure that the peak values only impact a
local area instead of unrealistically projecting addresses comments by Kappenman 44. The Commission approves the
uniform peak values over a broad area. This against the benchmark GMD event by reference peak geoelectric field
approach also should better align with the stating that the Oak Ridge Report’s amplitude figure proposed by NERC. In
Commission’s concerns because this type of Meta-R–319 study, authored by addition, the Commission, as proposed
study would more accurately reflect the real- Kappenman, modeled a 1-in-100 year in the NOPR, directs NERC to develop
world impact of a GMD event on the [Bulk- GMD event based largely on revisions to the benchmark GMD event
Power System]. The Trade Associations misunderstandings of historic GMDs, definition so that the reference peak
understand that existing planning tools may both in magnitude and geographic geoelectric field amplitude component
not yet have such capabilities, but the tools footprint.60 Roodman recommends that
can be modified to allow such study.54
etsd/pes/pubs/ferc_Meta-R-319.pdf (Meta–R–319
40. Industry commenters raise other 55 See also Hydro One Comments at 1–2; Resilient Study).
concerns with the NOPR proposal. CEA Societies Comments at 24–25. 61 Id. at 15.
56 Rivera, M., Backhaus, S., ‘‘Review of the GMD 62 See, e.g., JINSA Comments at 2; Emprimus
states that it would be inappropriate to
Benchmark Event in TPL–007–1,’’ Los Alamos Comments at 1. See also Gaunt Comments at 9
rely on the non-spatially averaged 20 V/ National Laboratory (September 2015) (Los Alamos (indicating that the proposed benchmark GMD
km reference peak geoelectric field Paper). event definition may underestimate the effects of a
figure because that figure is found in a 57 Roodman Comments at 4. Roodman criticizes 1-in-100 GMD event).
single publication. CEA also contends the proposed benchmark GMD event definition 63 Resilient Societies Comments at 20–21.
because it assumes that the induced electrical field 64 Kappenman Comments at 15–29.
that it is impractical to use ‘‘engineering
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resulting from a GMD event is spatially uniform. 65 See, e.g., EIS Comments at 2 (advocating use of
judgment’’ to weigh the GMD Roodman also contends that a GMD event that is 20 V/km); Gaunt Comments at 6–9 (contending that
Vulnerability Assessments using the less than a 1-in-100 year storm could potentially NERC’s proposed figure results in a ‘‘possible
spatially-averaged and non-spatially damage transformers. Id. at 12–14. underestimation of the effects of GICs’’ without
58 Roodman Comments at 9.
averaged reference peak geoelectric field 59 Id. at 10, 12–13.
suggesting an alternative figure); JINSA Comments
at 2 (advocating use of 20 V/km); Emprimus
60 Id. at 5–6 (citing Oak Ridge National Comments at 1 (advocating use of 20 V/km); Briggs
52 Trade Associations Comments at 15. Laboratory, Geomagnetic Storms and Their Impacts Comments at 1 (advocating that the benchmark
53 Id. at 17 (quoting 2015 Pulkkinen Paper at 6). on the U.S. Power Grid: Meta–R–319 at pages I–1 GMD event should be a ‘‘Carrington Class solar
54 Id. at 16. to I–3 (January 2010), http://www.ornl.gov/sci/ees/ superstorm’’).
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is not based solely on spatially-averaged spatial averaging can be used to reflect use as a model.71 While NERC has
data. The Commission directs NERC to actual GMD events. discretion on how to propose to address
submit this revision within 18 months 47. The NOPR proposed to direct our directive, NERC could revise
of the effective date of this Final Rule. NERC to revise Reliability Standard Reliability Standard TPL–007–1 to
45. NERC and industry comments do TPL–007–1 so that the reference peak apply a higher reference peak
not contain new information to support geoelectric field value is not based geoelectric field amplitude value to
relying solely on spatially-averaged data assess the impact of localized hot spots
solely on spatially-averaged data. NERC
to calculate the reference peak on the Bulk-Power System, as suggested
and industry comments largely focused
geoelectric field amplitude in the by the Trade Associations. The effects of
on the NOPR’s discussion of one
benchmark GMD event definition. The such hot spots could include increases
possible example to address the in GIC levels, volt-ampere reactive
2015 Pulkkinen Paper contains the same directive (i.e., by running GMD
justifications for spatial averaging as power consumption, harmonics on the
Vulnerability Assessments using Bulk-Power System (and associated
those presented in NERC’s petition. In spatially-averaged and non-spatially
addition, the 2015 Pulkkinen Paper misoperations) and transformer heating.
averaged reference peak geoelectric field Moreover, the directive to revise
validates the NOPR’s concerns with amplitudes). However, while the
relying solely on spatial averaging Reliability Standard TPL–007–1 and, as
method discussed in the NOPR is one discussed below, the directives to
generally and with the method used by possible option, the NOPR did not
the standard drafting team to spatially research geomagnetic latitude scaling
propose to direct NERC to develop factors and earth conductivity models as
average the IMAGE data specifically. revisions based on that option or any
The 2015 Pulkkinen Paper, for example, part of the GMD research work plan and
specific option. The Trade Associations’ to revise Reliability Standard TPL–007–
states that ‘‘regional scale geoelectric comments, discussed above,
fields have not been considered earlier 1 to require the collection of necessary
demonstrate that there is another way to GIC monitoring and magnetometer data
from the statistical and extreme analyses address the NOPR directive (i.e., by
standpoint’’ and ‘‘selection of an area of to validate GMD models should largely
performing planning models that also address or at least help to focus-in on
500 km [for spatial averaging] . . . [is] assess planning areas for localized ‘‘hot
subjective.’’ 66 Further, the 2015 factors that may be causing any
spots’’). This approach may have merit inaccuracies in the standard drafting
Pulkkinen Paper notes that ‘‘we
if, for example, the geographic size of team’s model.
emphasize that the work described in
the hot spot is supported by actual data 49. Consistent with Order No. 779, the
this paper is only the beginning in our Commission does not specify a
and the hot spot is centered over one or
exploration of spatial geoelectric field particular reference peak geoelectric
more locations that include an entity’s
structures pertaining to extreme GIC field amplitude value that should be
facilities that become critical during a
. . . [and] [w]e will . . . expand the applied to hot spots given present
GMD event. Without pre-judging how
statistical analyses to include uncertainties. While 20 V/km would
NERC proposes to address the
characterization of multiple different seem to be a possible value, the Los
Commission’s directive, NERC’s
spatial scales.’’ 67 On the latter point, Alamos Paper suggests that the 20 V/km
response to this directive should satisfy
NERC ‘‘agrees that such research would figure may be too high. The Los Alamos
the NOPR’s concern that reliance on
provide additional modeling insights Paper analyzed the non-spatially
and supports further collaborative spatially-averaged data alone does not
address localized peaks that could averaged IMAGE data to calculate a
efforts between space weather reference peak geoelectric field
researchers and electric utilities through potentially affect the reliable operation
of the Bulk-Power System. amplitude range (i.e., 8.4 V/km to 16.6
the NERC GMD Task Force.’’ 68 These V/km) that is between NERC’s proposed
statements support the NOPR’s 48. We believe our directive should spatially-averaged value of 8 V/km and
observation that the use of spatial also largely address the comments the non-spatially averaged 20 V/km
averaging in this context is new, and submitted by entities opposed to figure cited in the GMD Interim Report.
thus there is a dearth of information or NERC’s proposed reference peak 50. Although the NOPR did not
research regarding its application or geoelectric field amplitude. Those propose to direct NERC to submit
appropriate scale. commenters endorsed using a higher revisions to Reliability Standard TPL–
46. While we believe our directive reference peak geoelectric field 007–1 by a certain date with respect to
addresses concerns with relying solely amplitude value, such as the 20 V/km the benchmark GMD event definition,
on spatially-averaged data, we reiterate cited in the GMD Interim Report. At the the Commission determines that it is
the position expressed in the NOPR that outset, we observe that the comments appropriate to impose an 18-month
a GMD event will have a peak value in critical of the standard drafting team’s deadline from the effective date of this
one or more location(s) and the use of the IMAGE data only speculate Final Rule. As discussed below, the
amplitude will decline over distance that had the standard drafting team used Commission approves the five-year
from the peak; and, as a result, imputing other sources, the calculated reference implementation period for Reliability
the highest peak geoelectric field value peak geoelectric field amplitude value Standard TPL–007–1 proposed by
in a planning area to the entire planning would have been higher.70 Moreover, NERC. Having NERC submit revisions to
area may incorrectly overestimate GMD among the commenters critical of the benchmark GMD event definition
impacts.69 Accordingly, our directive NERC’s proposal, there is disagreement within 18 months of the effective date
should not be construed to prohibit the over the magnitude of historical storms of this Final Rule, with the Commission
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use of spatial averaging in some which some of these commenters would acting promptly on the revised
capacity, particularly if more research Reliability Standard, should afford
results in a better understanding of how 70 See, e.g., Resilient Societies Comments at 21
(‘‘Had NERC and the Standard Drafting Team 71 See, e.g., Gaunt Comments at 13 (stating that
66 2015
collected and analyzed available real-world data, the 1859 Carrington Event is ‘‘probably outside the
Pulkkinen Paper at 2. they would have likely found that the severity of re-occurrence frequency of 1:100 years adopted by
67 Id. at 6.
GMD in 1-in-100 Year reference storm had been set NERC for the benchmark event’’); Briggs Comments
68 NERC Comments at 8.
far below a technically justified level . . .’’ at 1 (advocating using a ‘‘ ‘Carrington Class’ super
69 NOPR, 151 FERC ¶ 61,134 at P 35. (emphasis added)). storm’’ as the benchmark GMD event).
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enough time to apply the revised not mature and reflect a 1-in-150 year large as the TPL–007–1 Benchmark
benchmark GMD event definition in the storm. NERC contends that the second Event.’’ 78 The Los Alamos Paper uses a
first GMD Vulnerability Assessment paper does not clearly show that the larger number of geomagnetic
under the timeline set forth in purported transformer damage in South disturbances (122 instead of 12) and a
Reliability Standard TPL–007–1’s Africa was the result of abnormally high wider range of observatories by using
implementation plan. If circumstances, GICs during the October 2003 the world-wide SuperMAG
such as the complexity of the revised Halloween Storm. NERC further states magnetometer array data, which
benchmark GMD event, require it, NERC that the standard drafting team analyzed includes the INTERMAGNET data used
may propose and justify a revised the October 2003 Halloween Storm to support NERC’s geomagnetic latitude
implementation plan. when developing the proposed scaling factors. The Los Alamos Paper
geomagnetic latitude scaling factor. shows that for more severe storms (Dst
2. Geomagnetic Latitude Scaling Factor 53. The Trade Associations support <¥300, for which there are nine storms
NOPR the geomagnetic latitude scaling factor in the data set) the NERC scaling factors
51. The NOPR proposed to approve proposed by NERC. Like NERC, the tend to be low, off by a factor of up to
the geomagnetic latitude scaling factor Trade Associations contend that the two or three at some latitudes. The Los
in NERC’s proposed benchmark GMD papers cited in the NOPR do not Alamos Paper also recommends ‘‘an
event definition. However, the NOPR support modifications because the additional degree of conservatism in the
sought comment on whether, in light of models in the first paper ‘‘remain highly mid-geomagnetic latitudes’’ until such
studies indicating that GMD events theoretical and not sufficiently time as a model is developed.79 The Los
could have pronounced effects on lower validated’’ and because the second Alamos Paper authors recommend a
geomagnetic latitudes, a modification is paper likely involved other causal factor of 2 as a conservative correction.
warranted to reduce the impact of the factors leading to the transformer
failure.74 Joint ISOs/RTOs also support Commission Determination
scaling factors.72
the geomagnetic latitude scaling factor 55. The Commission approves the
Comments proposed by NERC. ITC states that geomagnetic latitude scaling factor in
52. NERC contends that the NERC’s proposal is a ‘‘reasonable the benchmark GMD event definition. In
geomagnetic latitude scaling factor in approach given the current state of the addition, the Commission directs NERC
Reliability Standard TPL–007–1 science pertaining to GMD . . . [but] to conduct further research on
‘‘accurately models the reduction of that as the science pertaining to GMD geomagnetic latitude scaling factors as
induced geoelectric fields that occurs matures and more data becomes part of the GMD research work plan
over the mid-latitude region during a available, the scaling factors should be discussed below.
100-year GMD event scenario . . . [and] revisited and revised.’’ 75 ITC suggests
revisiting the geomagnetic latitude 56. Based on the record, the
describes the observed drop in Commission finds sufficient evidence to
geoelectric field that has been exhibited scaling factor every five years to
incorporate any new developments in conclude that lower geomagnetic
in analysis of major recorded
GMD science. latitudes are, to some degree, less
geomagnetic storms.’’ 73 NERC
54. Several commenters question or susceptible to the effects of GMD events.
maintains that modifying the scaling
disagree with the geomagnetic latitude The issue identified in the NOPR and by
factor is not technically justified based
scaling factors in Reliability Standard some commenters focused on the
on the publications cited in the NOPR.
TPL–007–1 based on simulations and specific scaling factors in Reliability
NERC states that the first paper cited in
reports of damage to transformers in Standard TPL–007–1 in light of some
the NOPR is based on models that are
areas expected to be at low risk due to analyses and anecdotal evidence
72 NOPR, 151 FERC ¶ 61,134 at P 37 (citing their geomagnetic latitude.76 EIS suggesting that lower geomagnetic
Ngwira, C.M., Pulkkinen, A., Kuznetsova, M.M., contends that the proposed geomagnetic latitudes may be impacted by GMDs to
Glocer, A., ‘‘Modeling extreme ‘Carrington-type’ latitude scaling factor’s assumption of a a larger degree than reflected in
space weather events using three-dimensional Reliability Standard TPL–007–1.
global MHD simulations,’’ 119 Journal of storm centered at 60 degrees
Geophysical Research: Space Physics 4472 (2014) geomagnetic latitude is inconsistent 57. The geomagnetic latitude scaling
(finding that in Carrington-type events ‘‘the region with a study relied upon by NERC.77 factor in Reliability Standard TPL–007–
of large induced ground electric fields is displaced The Los Alamos Paper’s analysis 1 is supported by some of the available
further equatorward . . . [and] thereby may affect
power grids . . . such as [those in] southern states suggests that NERC’s proposed research.80 In addition, with the
of [the] continental U.S.’’); Gaunt, C.T., Coetzee, G., geomagnetic latitude scaling factors,
78 Los Alamos Paper at 12.
‘‘Transformer Failures in Regions Incorrectly while they fit well with weaker
Considered to have Low GIC-Risk,’’ 2007 IEEE 79 Id.
historical GMD events from which they
Lausanne 807 (July 2007) (stating that twelve 80 See NERC Comments at 9 (citing Ngwira 2013
transformers were damaged and taken out of service were derived, may not accurately Paper). We disagree with the contention made by
in South Africa (at ¥40 degrees latitude) during the represent the effects of a 1-in-100 year EIS that NERC’s proposed geomagnetic latitude
October 2003 Halloween Storm GMD event)). See GMD event at lower geomagnetic scaling factors are inconsistent with the Ngwira
also Liu, C., Li, Y., Pirjola, R., ‘‘Observations and latitudes. The Los Alamos Paper states 2013 Paper. EIS maintains that the Ngwira 2013
modeling of GIC in the Chinese large-scale high- Paper supports the conclusion that the benchmark
voltage power networks,’’ Journal Space Weather that a model of the electrojet is needed GMD event should be centered at 50 degrees
Space Climate 4 at A03–p6 (2014) (Liu Paper), to ‘‘effectively extrapolate the small to geomagnetic latitude instead of the 60 degree
http://www.swsc-journal.org/articles/swsc/pdf/ moderate disturbance data currently in geomagnetic latitude figure in Reliability Standard
2014/01/swsc130009.pdf (finding that GICs of about the historical record to disturbances as TPL–007–1. The Ngwira 2013 Paper contains no
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25A/phase had been measured in a transformer at such conclusion. Instead, the Ngwira 2013 Paper
a nuclear power plant at 22.6 degrees north latitude found that the latitude threshold boundary is a
74 Trade Associations Comments at 18–19.
(significantly further away from the magnetic pole transition region having a definite lower bound of
75 Joint ISOs/RTOs Comments at 5.
than Florida)). 50 degrees geomagnetic latitude but with an upper
73 NERC Comments at 9 (citing Ngwira, C., 76 See, e.g., Gaunt Comments at 6; JINSA
range as high as 55 degrees geomagnetic latitude.
Pulkkinen, A., Wilder, F., Crowley, G., ‘‘Extended Comments at 2; Emprimus Comments at 2–3; Ngwira 2013 Paper at 127, 130. The Ngwira 2013
Study of Extreme Geoelectric Field Event Scenarios Roodman Comments at 9; Resilient Societies Paper also stated that its findings were ‘‘in
for Geomagnetically Induced Current Comments at 31–31; Kappenman Comments at 41– agreement with earlier observations by [Thomson et
Applications,’’ 11 Space Weather 121 (2013) 42. al., 2011] and more recently by [Pulkkinen et al.,
(Ngwira 2013 Paper)). 77 EIS Comments at 5 (citing Ngwira 2013 Paper). Continued
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exception of the Los Alamos Paper, Benchmark GMD Event are unlikely to transformers. The NOPR sought
commenters did not provide new exceed known temperature limits comment from NERC as to why
information on the proposed scaling established by technical qualifying transformers are not assessed
factor nor did commenters suggest organizations.’’ 82 for thermal impacts using the maximum
alternative scaling factors. However, the 59. As provided in Requirements R5 GIC-producing orientation and directed
Commission finds that there are enough and R6, ‘‘the maximum GIC value for NERC to address whether, by not using
questions regarding the effects of GMDs the worst case geoelectric field the maximum GIC-producing
at lower geomagnetic latitudes to orientation for the benchmark GMD orientation, the required thermal impact
warrant directing NERC to study this event described in Attachment 1’’ assessments could underestimate the
issue further as part of the GMD determines whether a transformer impact of a benchmark GMD event on
research work plan. The Los Alamos satisfies the 75 A/phase threshold. If the a qualifying transformer.
Paper and the sources cited in the NOPR 75 A/phase threshold is satisfied,
are suggestive that a 1-in-100 year GMD Requirement R6 states, in relevant part, Comments
event could have a greater impact on that a thermal impact assessment should
62. NERC opposes modifying the
lower geomagnetic latitudes than be conducted on the qualifying
thermal impact assessments in
NERC’s proposed scaling factor transformer based on the effective GIC
Requirement R6 so that the assessments
assumes. But, as the Los Alamos Paper flow information provided in
do not rely only on spatially-averaged
recognizes, the current absence of Requirement R5.
60. In its June 28, 2016 filing, NERC data. NERC claims that the benchmark
historical data on large GMD events
states that it identified an error in Figure GMD event definition will ‘‘result in
precludes a definitive conclusion based
1 (Upper Bound of Peak Metallic Hot GIC calculations that are appropriately
on an empirical analysis of historical
Spot Temperatures Calculated Using the scaled for system-wide assessments.’’ 84
observations. Moreover, in prepared
Benchmark GMD Event) of the White NERC also contends that the ‘‘analysis
comments for the March 1, 2016
Paper on Screening Criterion for performed by the standard drafting team
Technical Conference, Dr. Backhaus,
Transformer Thermal Impact of the impact of localized enhanced
one of the authors of the Los Alamos
Assessment that resulted in incorrect geoelectric fields on the GIC levels in
Paper, recommended that ‘‘the current
plotting of simulated power transformer transformers indicates that relatively
NERC analysis should be adopted and
peak hot-spot heating from the few transformers in the system are
further analysis performed with
additional observational data and severe benchmark GMD event. NERC revised affected.’’ 85 In response to the question
disturbance modeling efforts with the Figure 1 in the White Paper on in the NOPR of why qualifying
intent of refining the geomagnetic Screening Criterion for Transformer transformers are not assessed for
latitude scaling law in future Thermal Impact Assessment and made thermal impacts using the maximum
revisions.’’ 81 The Commission directs corresponding revisions to related text, GIC producing orientation, NERC states
NERC to reexamine the geomagnetic figures and tables throughout the that ‘‘the orientation of the geomagnetic
latitude scaling factors in Reliability technical white papers supporting the field varies widely and continuously
Standard TPL–007–1 as part of the GMD proposed standard. NERC maintains during a GMD event . . . [and] would
research work plan, including using that even with the revision to Figure 1, be aligned with the maximum GIC-
existing models and developing new ‘‘the standard drafting team determined producing orientation for only a few
models to extrapolate from historical that the 75 A per phase threshold for minutes.’’ 86 NERC concludes that ‘‘[i]n
data on small to moderate GMD events transformer thermal impact assessment the context of transformer hot spot
the impacts of a large, 1-in-100 year remains a valid criterion . . . [and] it is heating with time constants in the order
GMD event on lower geomagnetic not necessary to revise any of tens of minutes, alignment with any
latitudes. Requirements of the proposed particular orientation for a few minutes
Reliability Standard.’’ 83 at a particular point in time is not a
B. Thermal Impact Assessments driving concern.’’ 87 NERC further states
NOPR that the wave shape used in Reliability
NERC Petition
61. The NOPR proposed to approve Standard TPL–007–1 provides
58. Reliability Standard TPL–007–1, ‘‘generally conservative results when
the transformer thermal impact
Requirement R6 requires owners of performing thermal analysis of power
assessments in Requirement R6. In
transformers that are subject to the transformers.’’ 88
addition, as with the benchmark GMD
Reliability Standard to conduct thermal
event definition, the NOPR proposed to 63. The Trade Associations and CEA
analyses to determine if the
direct NERC to revise Requirement R6 to do not support the proposed NOPR
transformers would be able to withstand
require registered entities to apply directive because, they state, it focuses
the thermal effects associated with a
benchmark GMD event. NERC states spatially averaged and non-spatially too heavily on individual transformers.
that transformers are exempt from the averaged peak geoelectric field values, The Trade Associations maintain that
thermal impact assessment requirement or some equally efficient and effective Reliability Standard TPL–007–1 ‘‘was
if the maximum effective GIC in the alternative, when conducting thermal never intended to address specific
transformer is less than 75 A/phase impact assessments. The NOPR also localized areas that might experience
during the benchmark GMD event as noted that Requirement R6 does not use peak conditions and affect what we
determined by an analysis of the system. the maximum GIC-producing understand to be a very small number
NERC explains that ‘‘based on available orientation to conduct the thermal of assets that are unlikely to initiate a
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power transformer measurement data, assessment for qualifying transformers; cascading outage.’’ 89
transformers with an effective GIC of instead, the requirement uses the
less than 75 A/phase during the effective GIC time series described in 84 NERC Comments at 17.
Requirement R5.2 to conduct the 85 Id.
2012], which estimated the location to be within 50 thermal assessment on qualifying 86 Id. at 19.
87 Id.
[degrees]–62 [degrees].’’ Id. at 124.
81 Statement of Scott Backhaus, March 1, 2016 82 NERC Petition at 30. 88 Id.
Technical Conference at 2. 83 NERC June 28, 2016 Filing at 1. 89 Trade Associations Comments at 21.
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64. Certain non-industry commenters Kappenman contends that the 75 A/ comments, particularly those of Gaunt,
contend that the 75 A/phase qualifying phase threshold does not consider attempt to correlate historical
threshold for thermal impact transformers with tertiary windings or transformer failures to past GMD events
assessments is not technically justified. autotransformers which may be (e.g., 2003 Halloween Storm), while
Emprimus contends that ‘‘many impacted at lower GIC levels than 75 A/ arguing that the transformers damaged
transformers have GIC ratings less than phase.95 in those events did not experience GICs
75 amps per phase,’’ but Emprimus of 75 A/phase. The evidence adduced
Commission Determination
claims that an Idaho National Lab study by Gaunt and others is inconclusive.97
showed that ‘‘GIC introduced at 10 65. Consistent with our determination We therefore direct NERC to include
amps per phase on high voltage above regarding the reference peak further analysis of the thermal impact
transformers exceed harmonic levels geoelectric field amplitude value, the assessment qualifying threshold in the
allowed under IEEE 519.’’ 90 Emprimus Commission directs NERC to revise GMD research work plan.
also maintains that a 2013 IEEE paper Requirement R6 to require registered 68. In NOPR comments and in
‘‘suggest[s] that there can be generator entities to apply spatially averaged and comments to the standard drafting team,
rotor damage at GIC levels which exceed non-spatially averaged peak geoelectric Kappenman stated that delta winding
50 amps per phase.’’ 91 Gaunt contends, field values, or some equally efficient heating due to harmonics has not been
based on his analysis of historical and effective alternative, when adequately considered by the standard
events, that ‘‘degradation is initiated in conducting thermal impact assessments. drafting team and that, thermally, this is
transformers by currents that are 66. In the NOPR, the Commission a bigger concern than metallic hot spot
significantly below the 75 amps per requested comment from NERC heating.98 The standard drafting team
phase.’’ 92 Gaunt states that ‘‘[u]ntil regarding why Requirement R6 does not responded that the vulnerability
better records are kept of transformer use the maximum GIC-producing described for tertiary winding harmonic
[dissolved gas in oil analysis] and orientation to conduct the thermal heating is based on the assumption that
transformer failure, the proposed level assessment for qualifying transformers. delta winding currents can be calculated
of 75 [A/phase] of GIC needed to initiate After considering NERC’s response, we using the turns ratio between primary
assessment of transformer response continue to have concerns with not and tertiary winding, which is incorrect
must be considered excessively high.’’ 93 using the maximum GIC-producing when a transformer is under
Gaunt recommends a qualifying orientation for the thermal assessment saturation.99 The standard drafting team
threshold of 15 amps per phase. of transformers. However, at this time concluded that Kappenman’s concerns
Resilient Societies states that the 75 A/ we do not direct NERC to modify regarding delta windings being a
phase threshold is based on a Reliability Standard TPL–007–1. problem from a thermal standpoint are
mathematical model for one type of Instead, as part of the GMD research unwarranted and that the criteria
transformer and that several tests work plan discussed below, NERC is
developed by the standard drafting team
referenced in the standard drafting directed to study this issue to determine
use state-of-the-art analysis methods
team’s White Paper on Transformer how the geoelectric field time series can
and measurement-supported
Thermal Impact Assessment were be applied to a particular transformer so
transformer models. The Commission
carried out under no load or minimal that the orientation of the time series,
believes that the heating effects of
load conditions. In addition, Resilient over time, will maximize GIC flow in
harmonics on transformers, as discussed
Societies contends that applying the 75 the transformer, and to include the
at the March 1, 2016 Technical
A/phase threshold and NERC’s results in a filing with the Commission.
67. We are not persuaded by the Conference, are of concern and require
proposed benchmark GMD event (i.e., further research.100 Accordingly, we
using the spatially-averaged reference comments opposed to Requirement R6’s
application of a 75 A/phase qualifying direct NERC to address the effects of
peak geoelectric field amplitude) results harmonics, including tertiary winding
in only ‘‘two out of approximately 560 threshold. The standard drafting team’s
White Paper on Thermal Screening harmonic heating and any other effects
extra high voltage transformers’’ on transformers, as part of the GMD
Criterion, as revised by NERC in the
requiring thermal impact assessments in research work plan.101
June 28, 2016 Filing, provides an
the PJM region; only one 345 kV
adequate technical basis to approve
transformer requiring thermal impact 97 See, e.g., Gaunt Comments at 13 (‘‘Although it
NERC’s proposal. As noted in the
assessment in Maine; and zero has not been possible to assemble an exact model
revised White Paper on Thermal of the power system during the period 29–31
transformers requiring thermal impact
Screening Criterion, the calculated October 2003, and data on the ground conductivity
assessments in ATC’s network.94 in Southern Africa is not known with great
metallic hot spot temperature
certainty, we are confident that the several
90 Emprimus Comments at 4.
corresponding to an effective GIC of 75 calculations of GIC that been carried out are not
91 Id. A/phase is 172 degrees Celsius; that grossly inaccurate.’’).
92 Gaunt Comments at 13. figure is higher than the original figure 98 Kappenman Comments at 45.
93 Id. at 14. of 150 degrees Celsius calculated by the 99 Consideration of Comments Project 2013–03
94 Resilient Societies Comments at 5–14. Resilient standard drafting team but is still below Geomagnetic Disturbance Mitigation at 39
Societies states that modeling performed by Central the 200 degree Celsius limit specified in (December 5, 2014), http://www.nerc.com/pa/
Maine Power Co. and Emprimus for the Maine Stand/
IEEE Std C57.91–2011.96 The Project201303GeomagneticDisturbanceMitigation/
Public Utilities Commission indicates that eight 345
kV transformers (53 percent according to Resilient Comment%20Report%20_2013–03_GMD_
Societies) would require thermal impact regarding ATC estimate that the scaled benchmark 12052014.pdf.
asabaliauskas on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with RULES
assessments in Maine if the reference peak GMD event for Wisconsin would be 2 V/km. Id. at 100 At the March 1, 2016 Technical Conference,
geoelectric field amplitude were set at 20 V/km. Id. 14. Dr. Horton, a member of the standard drafting team,
at 10. Resilient Societies also contends that this 95 The Commission received two comments discussed the potential negative impacts of
result is consistent with the Oak Ridge Meta-R–319 following NERC’s June 28, 2016 Filing. However, harmonics generated by GMDs on protection
Study’s finding that eight transformers would be ‘‘at the supplemental comments did not specifically systems, reactive power resources and generators.
risk’’ in Maine under a ‘‘ ‘30 Amp At-Risk address the revisions submitted in NERC’s June 28, Slide Presentation of Randy Horton, March 1, 2016
Threshold scenario.’ ’’ Id. Central Maine Power Co. 2016 filing. Technical Conference at 2–6.
calculated that the scaled NERC benchmark GMD 96 NERC June 28, 2016 Filing, Revised White 101 NERC indicated in its comments that it is
event for the northernmost point in Maine would Paper on Screening Criterion for Transformer already studying the issue of harmonics. NERC
be 4.53 V/km. Resilient Societies’ calculations Thermal Impact Assessment at 3. Continued
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![67130 Federal Register / Vol. 81, No. 190 / Friday, September 30, 2016 / Rules and Regulations
C. GMD Research Work Plan continue its research without the GMD ongoing efforts are critical to the
NOPR research work plan proposed in the nation’s long-term efforts to protect the
NOPR. NERC contends that allowing the grid against a major GMD event. While
69. The NOPR proposed to address NERC GMD Task Force to continue its we approve NERC’s proposed Reliability
the need for more data and certainty work would ‘‘accomplish NERC’s and Standard TPL–007–1 and direct certain
regarding GMD events and their the Commission’s shared goals in modifications, as described above, the
potential effect on the Bulk-Power advancing GMD understanding and Commission also concludes that
System by directing NERC to submit knowledge, while providing the facilitating additional research and
informational filings that address GMD- flexibility necessary for NERC to work analysis is necessary to adequately
related research areas. The NOPR effectively with its international address these threats. As discussed in
proposed to direct NERC to submit in research partners to address risks to the the next two sections of this final rule,
the first filing a GMD research work reliability of the North American Bulk- the Commission directs a three-prong
plan indicating how NERC plans to: (1) Power System.’’ 102 NERC also claims approach to further those efforts by
Further analyze the area over which that, in addition to being unnecessary directing NERC to: (1) Develop, submit,
spatial averaging should be calculated given the work of the NERC GMD Task and implement a GMD research work
for stability studies, including Force, the NOPR proposal ‘‘poses plan; (2) develop revisions to Reliability
performing sensitivity analyses on practical challenges . . . [because it Standard TPL–007–1 to require
squares less than 500 km per side (e.g., would] bind[] NERC to a specific and responsible entities to collect GIC
100 km, 200 km); (2) further analyze inflexible research plan and report monitoring and magnetometer data; and
earth conductivity models by, for schedule to be determined six months (3) collect GIC monitoring and
example, using metered GIC and (or even a year) following the effective magnetometer data from registered
magnetometer readings to calculate date of a final rule in this entities for the period beginning May
earth conductivity and using 3–D 2013, including both data existing as of
proceeding.’’ 103
readings; (3) determine whether new 72. The Trade Associations and CEA the date of this order and new data
analyses and observations support do not support the GMD research work going forward, and to make that
modifying the use of single station plan. Instead, they contend that NERC information available.
readings around the earth to adjust the should be allowed to pursue GMD 77. First, the Commission adopts the
spatially averaged benchmark for research independently. NOPR proposal and directs NERC to
latitude; and (4) assess how to make 73. Several commenters, while not submit a GMD research work plan and,
GMD data (e.g., GIC monitoring and addressing the NOPR proposal subsequently, informational filings that
magnetometer data) available to specifically, state that additional address the GMD-related research areas
researchers for study. research is necessary to validate or identified in the NOPR, additional
70. With respect to GIC monitoring research tasks identified in this Final
improve elements of the benchmark
and magnetometer readings, the NOPR Rule (i.e., the research tasks identified
GMD event definition.104
sought comment on the barriers, if any, 74. The Trade Associations state that in the thermal impact assessment
to public dissemination of such monitoring data should be available for discussion above) and, in NERC’s
readings, including if their academic research purposes. Resilient discretion, any GMD-related research
dissemination poses a security risk and Societies contends that monitoring data areas generally that may impact the
if any such data should be treated as should be publicly disseminated on a development of new or modified GMD
Critical Energy Infrastructure Reliability Standards.105 The GMD
regular basis and that there is no
Information or otherwise restricted to research work plan should be submitted
security risk in releasing such data
authorized users. The NOPR proposed within six months of the effective date
because they relate to naturally
that NERC submit the GMD research of this final rule. The research required
occurring phenomena. Emprimus states
work plan within six months of the by this directive should be informed by
that it supports making GIC and
effective date of a final rule in this ongoing GMD-related research efforts of
magnetometer monitoring data available
proceeding. The NOPR also proposed entities such as USGS, National
to the public. Bardin supports making
that the GMD research work plan Atmospheric and Oceanic
GIC and GMD-related information to the
submitted by NERC should include a Administration (NOAA), National
public or at least to ‘‘legitimate
schedule for submitting one or more Aeronautics and Space Administration,
researchers.’’
informational filings that apprise the 75. Hydro One and CEA do not Department of Energy, academia and
Commission of the results of the four support mandatory data sharing without other publicly available contributors,
additional study areas, as well as any the use of non-disclosure agreements. including work performed for the
other relevant developments in GMD National Space Weather Action Plan.106
research, and should assess whether Commission Determination 78. As part of the second research area
Reliability Standard TPL–007–1 remains 76. The Commission recognizes, as do identified in the NOPR (i.e., further
valid in light of new information or commenters both supporting and analyze earth conductivity models by,
whether revisions are appropriate. opposing proposed Reliability Standard for example, using metered GIC and
Comments TPL–007–1, that our collective
understanding of the threats posed by 105 The GMD research work plan need not address
71. NERC states that continued GMD GMD is evolving as additional research the fourth research area identified in the NOPR (i.e.,
research is necessary and that the and analysis are conducted. These assess how to make GIC monitoring and
asabaliauskas on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with RULES
potential impacts of GMDs on reliability magnetometer data available to researchers for
study) given the Commission’s directive and
are evolving. NERC, however, prefers 102 NERC Comments at 13. discussion below regarding the collection and
that the NERC GMD Task Force 103 Id.at 16. dissemination of necessary GIC monitoring and
104 See, e.g., USGS Comments at 1 (addressing magnetometer data.
Comments at 14 (‘‘NERC is collaborating with earth conductivity models), Bardin Comments at 2 106 National Science and Technology Council,
researchers to examine more complex GMD (addressing earth conductivity models); Roodman National Space Weather Action Plan (October
vulnerability issues, such as harmonics and Comments at 3 (addressing reference peak 2015), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/
mitigation assessment techniques, to enhance the geoelectric field amplitude); Gaunt Comments at 7 files/microsites/ostp/final_
modeling capabilities of the industry’’). (addressing spatial averaging). nationalspaceweatheractionplan_20151028.pdf.
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magnetometer readings to calculate directive is unnecessary and potentially contains ‘‘requirements to develop the
earth conductivity and using 3–D counterproductive given the continuing models, studies, and assessments
readings), the GMD research work plan work of the NERC GMD Task Force. We necessary to build a picture of overall
should specifically investigate ‘‘coastal do not find these comments persuasive. GMD vulnerability and identify where
effects’’ on ground conductivity models. Our directive requires NERC to submit mitigation measures may be
79. In addition, the large variances a work plan for the study of GMD- necessary.’’ 112 NERC explains that
described by USGS in actual 3–D related issues that are already being mitigating strategies ‘‘may include
ground conductivity data raise the examined or that NERC agrees should be installation of hardware (e.g., GIC
question of whether one time series studied.111 Nothing in our directive blocking or monitoring devices),
geomagnetic field is sufficient for precludes NERC from continuing to use equipment upgrades, training, or
vulnerability assessments. The the NERC GMD Task Force as a vehicle enhanced Operating Procedures.’’ 113
characteristics, including frequencies, of for conducting the directed research or
NOPR
the time series interact with the ground other research. Indeed, we encourage
conductivity to produce the geoelectric NERC to continue to use the GMD Task 83. The NOPR proposed to direct
field that drives the GIC. Therefore, the Force as a forum for engagement with NERC to revise Reliability Standard
research should address whether interested stakeholders. In addition, we TPL–007–1 to require the installation of
additional realistic time series should be do not set specific deadlines for monitoring equipment (i.e., GIC
selected to perform assessments in order completion of the research; we only monitors and magnetometers) to the
to capture the time series that produces require NERC to submit the GMD extent there are any gaps in existing GIC
the most vulnerability for an area. research work plan within six months of monitoring and magnetometer networks.
80. The comments largely agree that the effective date of a final rule. The Alternatively, the NOPR sought
additional GMD research should be GMD research work plan, in turn, comment on whether NERC should be
pursued, particularly with respect to the should include target dates for the responsible for installation of any
elements of the benchmark GMD event completion of research topics and the additional, necessary magnetometers
definition (i.e., the reference peak reporting of findings to the Commission. while affected entities would be
geoelectric field amplitude value, The Commission intends to notice and responsible for installation of
geomagnetic latitude scaling factor, and invite comment on the GMD research additional, necessary GIC monitors. The
earth conductivity scaling factor). There work plan. An extension of time to NOPR also proposed that, as part of
is ample evidence in the record to submit the GMD research work plan NERC’s work plan, NERC identify the
support the need for additional GMD- may be available if six months proves to number and location of current GIC
related research.107 For example, USGS be insufficient. In addition, given the monitors and magnetometers in the
submitted comments indicating that uncertainties commonly associated with United States to assess whether there
USGS’s one dimensional ground complex research projects, the are any gaps. The NOPR sought
electrical conductivity models used by Commission will be flexible regarding comment on whether the Commission
the standard drafting team have a changes to the tasks and target dates should adopt a policy specifically
‘‘significant limitation’’ in that they established in the GMD research work allowing recovery of costs associated
assume that a ‘‘[one dimensional] plan. with or incurred to comply with
conductivity-with-depth profile can Reliability Standard TPL–007–1,
D. Monitoring Data
adequately represent a large geographic including for the purchase and
region,’’ which USGS describes as a NERC Petition installation of monitoring devices.
‘‘gross simplification.’’ 108 USGS 82. Reliability Standard TPL–007–1, Comments
observes that while the ‘‘proposed Requirement R2 requires responsible
84. NERC does not support the NOPR
standard attempted to incorporate the entities to ‘‘maintain System models
and GIC System models of the proposal regarding the installation of
best scientific research available . . . it GIC monitoring devices and
must be noted that the supporting responsible entity’s planning area for
performing the study or studies needed magnetometers. NERC contends that the
science is quickly evolving.’’ 109 USGS proposed requirement is not necessary
recommends that ‘‘the proposed to complete GMD Vulnerability
Assessment(s).’’ NERC states that because Reliability Standard TPL–007–
standard should establish a process for 1 ‘‘supports effective GMD monitoring
updates and improvements that Reliability Standard TPL–007–1
programs, and additional efforts are
acknowledges and addresses the quickly planned or underway to ensure
111 See, e.g., NERC Comments at 8 (‘‘NERC agrees
evolving nature of relevant science and adequate data for reliability
that [spatial averaging] research would provide
associated data.’’ 110 additional modeling insights and supports further purposes.’’ 114 NERC also maintains that
81. Opposition to the proposal centers collaborative efforts between space weather the proposed directive ‘‘poses
on the contention that the proposed researchers and electric utilities through the NERC
GMD Task Force’’), at 10 (‘‘NERC agrees that implementation challenges . . .
107 See, e.g., NERC October 22, 2015 additional [geomagnetic latitude scaling] research is [because] GMD monitoring capabilities
Supplemental Comments at 7–8 (expressing support
necessary, and supports the significant research that and technical information have not yet
is occurring throughout the space weather reached a level of maturity to support
for additional research regarding geomagnetic
community to develop and validate models and
latitude scaling factors and earth conductivity application in a Reliability Standard,
simulation techniques’’), at 13 (‘‘Working with
models).
108 USGS Comments at 1.
EPRI, researchers at USGS, and industry, NERC will and not all applicable entities have
work to improve the earth conductivity models that developed the comprehensive
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109 Id.
are a vital component to understanding the risks of
110 Id. We note that Reliability Standard TPL–
GMD events in each geographic region’’), and at 23
112 NERC Petition at 13.
007–1, Att. 1 (Calculating Geoelectric Fields for the (‘‘efforts are already underway to expand GMD
113 Id.
at 32.
Benchmark GMD Event) already provides that a monitoring capabilities . . . [and] [t]hrough these
‘‘planner can also use specific earth model(s) with efforts, NERC and industry should effectively 114 NERC Comments at 21. NERC cites as
documented justification . . .’’ Accordingly, address the concerns noted by the Commission in examples the 40 GIC monitoring nodes operated by
Reliability Standard TPL–007–1 includes a the NOPR, including ensuring a more complete set EPRI’s SUNBURST network; the use of GIC
mechanism for incorporating improvements in of data for operational and planning needs and monitoring devices by some registered entities (e.g.,
earth conductivity models when calculating the supporting analytical validation and situational PJM); and the magnetometer networks operated by
benchmark GMD event. awareness’’). USGS and EPRI. Id. at 23–25.
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responsible entities could choose to Procedure. We are not persuaded that GIC and magnetometer data by NERC or
install GIC monitors or magnetometers the dissemination of GIC monitoring or providers denied Confidential
to comply with the data collection magnetometer data poses a security risk Information treatment of GIC and
requirement. While the Commission’s or that the data otherwise qualify as magnetometer data may appeal NERC’s
primary concern is the quality of the Confidential Information. CEA and decision to the Commission.
data collected, we do not establish a Hydro One have objected, without
E. Corrective Action Plan Deadlines
requirement for either approach or elaboration, to making data available
promote a particular device for without the use of non-disclosure NERC Petition
collecting the required data. We also agreements.125 At the March 1, 2016 96. Reliability Standard TPL–007–1,
find that cost recovery for prudent costs Technical Conference, panelists were Requirement R7 provides that:
associated with or incurred to comply questioned on the topic yet could not
with Reliability Standard TPL–007–1 identify a security-based or other Each responsible entity, as determined in
Requirement R1, that concludes, through the
and future revisions to the Reliability credible reason for not making such GMD Vulnerability Assessment conducted in
Standard, including for the purchase information available to requesters. In Requirement R4, that their System does not
and installation of monitoring devices, comments submitted after the March 1, meet the performance requirements of Table
will be available to registered 2016 Technical Conference, the Trade 1 shall develop a Corrective Action Plan
entities.121 Associations explained that ‘‘GIC addressing how the performance
measurements, while not as sensitive as requirements will be met . . . .
Data Availability
transmission planning studies, should NERC explains that the NERC Glossary
93. We also direct NERC, pursuant to also be protected . . . [because a] defines corrective action plan to mean,
Sections 1500 and 1600 of the NERC potentially malicious actor could ‘‘A list of actions and an associated
Rules of Procedure, to collect and make conceivably combine GIC information timetable for implementation to remedy
GIC monitoring and magnetometer data with information from other sources to a specific problem.’’ 129 Requirement
available.122 We determine that the deduce the configuration and operating R7.3 states that the corrective action
dissemination of GIC monitoring and conditions of the grid or some portion plan shall be provided within ‘‘90
magnetometer data will facilitate a of it.’’ 126 The Trade Associations’ calendar days of completion to the
greater understanding of GMD events comments, however, do not substantiate responsible entity’s Reliability
that, over time, will improve Reliability the assertion that the release of GIC Coordinator, adjacent Planning
Standard TPL–007–1. The record in this monitoring (or magnetometer data) Coordinator(s), adjacent Transmission
proceeding supports the conclusion that alone poses any risk to the Bulk-Power Planner(s), functional entities
access to GIC monitoring and System. The Trade Associations’ referenced in the Corrective Action
magnetometer data will help facilitate comment is also vague by not Plan, and any functional entity that
GMD research, for example, by helping identifying what ‘‘information from submits a written request and has a
to validate GMD models.123 To facilitate other sources’’ could be combined with reliability-related need.’’
the prompt dissemination of GIC GIC monitoring ‘‘to deduce the
monitoring and magnetometer data, we configuration and operating conditions NOPR
address whether GIC monitoring or of the grid or some portion of it.’’ 97. The NOPR proposed to direct
magnetometer data should qualify as 95. In conclusion, given both the lack NERC to modify Reliability Standard
Confidential Information under the of substantiated concerns regarding the TPL–007–1 to require corrective action
NERC Rules of Procedure.124 disclosure of GIC and magnetometer plans to be developed within one year
94. Based on the record in this data, and the compelling demonstration of the completion of the GMD
proceeding, we believe that GIC and that access to these data will support Vulnerability Assessment. The NOPR
magnetometer data typically should not ongoing research and analysis of GMD also proposed to direct NERC to modify
be designated as Confidential threats, the Commission expects NERC Reliability Standard TPL–007–1 to
Information under the NERC Rules of to make GIC and magnetometer data require a deadline for non-equipment
available. Notwithstanding our findings mitigation measures that is two years
121 NOPR, 151 FERC ¶ 61,134 at P 49 n.60. here, to the extent any entity seeks following development of the corrective
122 If GIC monitoring and magnetometer data is
confidential treatment of the data it action plan and a deadline for
already publicly available (e.g., from a government
entity or university), NERC need not duplicate provides to NERC, the burden rests on mitigation measures involving
those efforts. that entity to justify the confidential equipment installation that is four years
123 See, e.g., March 1, 2016 Technical Conference
treatment.127 Exceptions are possible if following development of the corrective
Tr. 58:22–59:13 (Love); 128:5–129:2 (Overbye); ATC the providing entity obtains from NERC, action plan. Recognizing that there is
Comments at 6–7 (‘‘as more measuring devices
(including magnetometers and GIC monitors) at the time it submits data to NERC, a little experience with installing
continue to propagate, the body of field data on determination that GIC or magnetometer equipment for GMD mitigation, the
magnetic fields and the resultant GICs will continue data qualify as Confidential NOPR stated that the Commission is
to increase the understanding of this phenomena Information.128 Entities denied access to open to proposals that may differ from
and result in better models that more closely match its proposal, particularly from any
real world conditions . . . [a]bsent this field data,
it is difficult to build accurate models that can be
125 CEA Comments at 15; Hydro One Comments entities with experience in this area.
used to plan and operate the transmission system’’). at 2. The NOPR also sought comment on
126 Trade Associations March 7, 2016
124 Providers of GIC and magnetometer data may appropriate alternative deadlines and
request that NERC treat their GIC monitoring and Supplemental Comments at 5.
whether there should be a mechanism
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127 See NERC Rules of Procedure, Section 1502.1.
magnetometer data as ‘‘Confidential Information,’’
as that term is defined in Section 1500 of the NERC To address any substantiated concerns regarding that would allow NERC to consider, on
Rules of Procedure. Under the NERC Rules of the need for confidentiality of an entity’s GIC or
Procedure, disclosure of Confidential Information magnetometer data, NERC could develop a policy North American Electric Reliability Corp., 119 FERC
by NERC to a requester requires a formal request, for disseminating such data only after an ¶ 61,060, at PP 195–196 (2007). We expect that,
notice and opportunity for comment, and an appropriate time interval (e.g., six months). when a submitter seeks a determination by NERC
executed non-disclosure agreement for requesters 128 We understand that NERC typically does not of a claim that GIC or magnetometer data qualify as
not seeking public disclosure of the information. determine whether information submitted to it Confidential Information, NERC will decide
NERC Rules of Procedure, Section 1503 (Requests under a claim of confidentiality is Confidential promptly.
for Information) (effective Nov. 4, 2015). Information when receiving such information. See 129 NERC Petition at 31.
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![67134 Federal Register / Vol. 81, No. 190 / Friday, September 30, 2016 / Rules and Regulations
a case-by-case basis, requests for should be a rolling four-year period for opportunity to update Reliability
extensions of required deadlines. equipment mitigation (i.e., after each Standard TPL–007–1 to reflect new or
year, 25 percent of the total mitigation improved scientific understanding of
Comments
actions should be completed). GMD events.
98. NERC states that it does not
oppose a one-year deadline for Commission Determination F. Minimization of Load Loss and
completing the development of 101. The Commission directs NERC to Curtailment
corrective action plans.130 However, modify Reliability Standard TPL–007–1 NERC Petition
NERC contends that imposing deadlines to include a deadline of one year from
on the completion of mitigation actions the completion of the GMD 105. Reliability Standard TPL–007–1,
would be problematic because of the Vulnerability Assessments to complete Requirement R4 states that each
uncertainties regarding the amount of the development of corrective action responsible entity ‘‘shall complete a
time needed to install necessary plans. NERC’s statement that it GMD Vulnerability Assessment of the
equipment. NERC maintains that ‘‘expects’’ corrective action plans to be Near-Term Transmission Planning
deadlines that are too short may cause completed at the same time as GMD Horizon once every 60 calendar
entities to take mitigation steps that, Vulnerability Assessments concedes the months.’’ Requirement R4.2 further
while quicker, would not be as effective point made in the NOPR that Reliability states that the ‘‘study or studies shall be
as mitigations that take more time to Standard TPL–007–1 currently lacks a conducted based on the benchmark
complete. NERC supports allowing clear deadline for the development of GMD event described in Attachment 1
extensions if the Commission adopts the corrective action plans. to determine whether the System meets
NOPR proposal. 102. The Commission also directs the performance requirements in Table
99. AEP states that, even if possible, NERC to modify Reliability Standard 1.’’
a one-year deadline for developing TPL–007–1 to include a two-year 106. NERC maintains that Table 1 sets
corrective action plans is too aggressive deadline after the development of the forth requirements for system steady
and would encourage narrow thinking corrective action plan to complete the state performance. NERC explains that
(i.e., registered entities would address implementation of non-hardware Requirement R4 and Table 1 ‘‘address
GMD mitigation rather than pursue mitigation and four-year deadline to assessments of the effects of GICs on
system improvements generally that complete hardware mitigation. The other Bulk-Power System equipment,
would also address GMD mitigation). comments provide contrasting views on system operations, and system stability,
AEP, instead, proposes a two-year the practicality of imposing mitigation including the loss of devices due to GIC
deadline. AEP does not support a deadlines, with NERC and some impacts.’’ 131 Table 1 provides, in
Commission-imposed deadline for industry commenters arguing that such relevant part, that load loss and/or
completing mitigation actions, although deadlines are not warranted while the curtailment are permissible elements of
it supports requiring a time-table in the Trade Associations and other industry the steady state:
corrective action plan. AEP notes that commenters support their imposition. Load loss as a result of manual or
the Commission did not impose a Most of these comments, however, automatic Load shedding (e.g. UVLS) and/or
specific deadline for completion of support an extension process if the curtailment of Firm Transmission Service
corrective actions in Reliability Commission determines that deadlines may be used to meet BES performance
Standard TPL–001–4 (Transmission are necessary. The Commission agrees requirements during studied GMD
System Planning Performance). CEA that NERC should consider extensions conditions. The likelihood and magnitude of
of time on a case-by-case basis. The Load loss or curtailment of Firm
does not support a deadline for the Transmission Service should be minimized.
development of corrective action plans Commission directs NERC to submit
because it is already part of the GMD these revisions within 18 months of the NOPR
Vulnerability Assessment process. Like effective date of this Final Rule.
103. Following adoption of the 107. The NOPR sought comment on
AEP, CEA does not support specific the provision in Table 1 that ‘‘Load loss
mitigation deadlines required in this
deadlines for the completion of or curtailment of Firm Transmission
final rule, Reliability Standard TPL–
mitigation actions and instead supports Service should be minimized.’’ The
007–1 will establish a recurring five-
including time-tables in the corrective NOPR stated that because the term
year schedule for the identification and
action plan. CEA also contends that an ‘‘minimized’’ does not represent an
mitigation of potential GMD risks on the
extension process would be objective value, the provision is
grid, as follows: (1) The development of
impracticable. potentially subject to interpretation and
100. Trade Associations, BPA and Tri- corrective action plans must be
completed within one year of a GMD assertions that the term is vague and
State support the imposition of
Vulnerability Assessment; (2) non- may not be enforceable. The NOPR also
corrective action plan deadlines as long
hardware mitigation must be completed explained that the modifier ‘‘should’’
as entities can request extensions. Gaunt
within two years following development might indicate that minimization of load
supports the corrective action plan
of corrective action plans; and (3) loss or curtailment is only an
deadlines proposed in the NOPR.
hardware mitigation must be completed expectation or a guideline rather than a
Emprimus supports the imposition of
within four years following requirement. The NOPR sought
deadlines but contends that non-
development of corrective action plans. comment on how the provision in Table
equipment mitigation actions should be
104. As discussed elsewhere in this 1 regarding load loss and curtailment
completed in 6 months and that there
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final rule, the Commission recognizes will be enforced, including: (1)
130 NERC contends that a deadline is unnecessary and expects that our collective Whether, by using the term ‘‘should,’’
because ‘‘NERC expects that applicable entities understanding of the science regarding Table 1 requires minimization of load
would determine necessary corrective actions as GMD threats will improve over time as loss or curtailment; or both and (2) what
part of their GMD Vulnerability Assessments for the additional research and analysis is constitutes ‘‘minimization’’ and how it
initial assessment [due 60 months after a final rule will be assessed.
in this proceeding goes into effect] as well as
conducted. We believe that the
subsequent assessments [due every 60 months recurring five-year cycle will provide,
thereafter].’’ NERC Comments at 28. on a going-forward basis, the 131 NERC Petition at 39.
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Comments approved NERC Sanction Guidelines. NOPR
108. NERC states the language in The NOPR proposed to approve the 114. The NOPR proposed to approve
Table 1 is modeled on Reliability violation risk factors and violation the implementation plan and effective
Standard TPL–001–4, which provides in severity levels submitted by NERC, for dates submitted by NERC. However,
part that ‘‘an objective of the planning the requirements in Reliability Standard given the serial nature of the
process should be to minimize the TPL–007–1, consistent with the requirements in Reliability Standard
likelihood and magnitude of Commission’s established guidelines.136 TPL–007–1, the Commission expressed
interruption of Firm transmission The Commission did not receive any concern about the duration of the
Service following Contingency events.’’ comments regarding this aspect of the timeline associated with any mitigation
NERC explains that Reliability Standard NOPR. Accordingly, the Commission stemming from a corrective action plan
TPL–007–1 ‘‘does not include approves the violation risk factors and and sought comment from NERC and
additional load loss performance criteria violation severity levels for the other interested entities as to whether
used in normal contingency planning requirements in Reliability Standard the length of the implementation plan,
because such criteria may not be TPL–007–1. particularly with respect to
applicable to GMD Vulnerability H. Implementation Plan and Effective Requirements R4, R5, R6, and R7, could
Assessment of the impact from a 1-in- Dates be reasonably shortened.
100 year GMD event.’’ 132 However,
NERC Petition Comments
NERC points out that the enforcement of
Requirement R4 ‘‘would include an 115. NERC does not support
112. NERC proposes a phased, five- shortening the implementation period.
evaluation of whether the system meets year implementation period.137 NERC
the Steady State performance NERC maintains that the proposed
maintains that the proposed implementation period is ‘‘appropriate
requirements of Table 1 which are implementation period is necessary: (1)
aimed at protecting against instability, and commensurate with the
To allow time for entities to develop the requirements of the proposed standard’’
controlled separation, and required models; (2) for proper
Cascading.’’ 133 NERC further states that and is based on ‘‘industry . . .
sequencing of assessments because projections on the time required for
‘‘minimized’’ in the context of
thermal impact assessments are obtaining validated tools, models and
Reliability Standard TPL–007–1 means
dependent on GIC flow calculations that data necessary for conducting GMD
that ‘‘planned Load loss or curtailments
are determined by the responsible Vulnerability Assessments through the
are not to exceed amounts necessary to
planning entity; and (3) to give time for standard development process.’’ 139
prevent voltage collapse.’’ 134
109. The Trade Associations agree development of viable corrective action NERC notes that the standard drafting
with the NOPR that the lack of objective plans, which may require applicable team initially proposed a four-year
criteria could create compliance and entities to ‘‘develop, perform, and/or implementation plan, but received
enforcement challenges and could limit validate new or modified studies, substantial comments expressing
an operator’s actions in real-time. The assessments, procedures . . . [and concern with only having four years.
Trade Associations state that the because] [s]ome mitigation measures 116. The Trade Associations, BPA,
Commission ‘‘should consider whether may have significant budget, siting, or CEA, Joint ISOs/RTOs and Tri-State
such language in mandatory construction planning support the proposed implementation
requirements invites the unintended requirements.’’ 138 plan for largely the same reasons as
consequences of raising reliability risks, 113. The proposed implementation NERC.
especially during real-time emergency plan states that Requirement R1 shall 117. Gaunt proposes a shorter
conditions . . . [but] [i]n the interim, become effective on the first day of the implementation period wherein the
the Trade Associations envision that first calendar quarter that is six months initial GMD Vulnerability Assessment
NERC will consider further discussions after Commission approval. For would be performed 48 months
with stakeholders on the issue prior to Requirement R2, NERC proposes that following the effective date of a final
TPL–007 implementation.’’ 135 the requirement shall become effective rule in this proceeding, as opposed to
on the first day of the first calendar the proposed implementation plan’s 60
Commission Determination quarter that is 18 months after months. Subsequent GMD Vulnerability
110. The Commission accepts the Commission approval. NERC proposes Assessments would be performed every
explanation in NERC’s comments of that Requirement R5 shall become 48 months thereafter. Briggs states that
what is meant by the term ‘‘minimized’’ effective on the first day of the first a ‘‘3 or 4 year timeline would likely
in Table 1. calendar quarter that is 24 months after provide industry with enough time to
Commission approval. NERC proposes implement corrective measures and
G. Violation Risk Factors and Violation should be considered.’’ 140
that Requirement R6 shall become
Severity Levels
effective on the first day of the first Commission Determination
111. Each requirement of Reliability calendar quarter that is 48 months after
Standard TPL–007–1 includes one Commission approval. And for 118. The Commission approves the
violation risk factor and has an Requirement R3, Requirement R4, and implementation plan submitted by
associated set of at least one violation Requirement R7, NERC proposes that NERC. When registered entities begin
severity level. NERC states that the the requirements shall become effective complying with Reliability Standard
ranges of penalties for violations will be on the first day of the first calendar TPL–007–1, it will likely be the first
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based on the sanctions table and quarter that is 60 months after time that many registered entities will
supporting penalty determination Commission approval. have planned for a GMD event, beyond
process described in the Commission developing the GMD operational
136 North American Electric Reliability Corp., 135
procedures required by Reliability
132 NERC Comments at 29. FERC ¶ 61,166 (2011). Standard EOP–010–1. Registered
133 Id. 137 NERC Petition, Ex. B (Implementation Plan for
134 Id. TPL–007–1). 139 NERC Comments at 30.
135 Trade Associations Comments at 28. 138 Id. at 2. 140 Briggs Comments at 7.
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![67136 Federal Register / Vol. 81, No. 190 / Friday, September 30, 2016 / Rules and Regulations
entities will gain the capacity to users, owners, and operators of the disruption to the Bulk-Power System.
conduct GMD Vulnerability Bulk-Power System from taking The only liability the Commission was
Assessments over the course of the five- additional steps that are designed to referring to in Order No. 779 was the
year implementation plan by complying mitigate the effects of GMD events, potential for penalties or remediation
with, at phased intervals, the provided those additional steps are not under section 215 of the FPA for failure
foundational requirements in Reliability inconsistent with the Commission- to comply with a Commission-approved
Standard TPL–007–1 (i.e., establishing approved Reliability Standards. Reliability Standard.
responsibilities for planning and 121. Certain commenters opposed to 123. Kappenman, Resilient Societies
developing models and performance Reliability Standard TPL–007–1 and Bardin filed comments that
criteria). In addition, as discussed contend that its approval could absolve addressed the NERC ‘‘Level 2’’ Appeal
above, NERC’s implementation plan industry of any legal liability should a Panel decision.149 As a threshold issue,
affords sufficient time for NERC to GMD event cause a disruption to the we agree with the Appeal Panel that the
submit and for the Commission to Bulk-Power System. For example, issues raised by the appellants in that
consider the directed revisions to Resilient Societies ‘‘ask[s] the proceeding are not procedural; instead
Reliability Standard TPL–007–1 before Commission to clarify its expectation they address the substantive provisions
the completion of the first GMD that the FERC jurisdictional entities will of Reliability Standard TPL–007–1.
Vulnerability Assessment. As such, the be held to account, and be subject to Section 8 (Process for Appealing an
five-year implementation plan will liability in the event of gross negligence Action or Inaction) of the NERC
allow for the incorporation of the or willful misconduct in planning for Standards Process Manual states:
revised Reliability Standard in the first and mitigating solar geomagnetic
storms.’’ 146 Resilient Societies also Any entity that has directly and materially
round of GMD Vulnerability
affected interests and that has been or will be
Assessments. contends that the Commission does not adversely affected by any procedural action
have the legal authority ‘‘to grant or inaction related to the development,
I. Other Issues
immunity from liability by setting approval, revision, reaffirmation, retirement
119. Several commenters indicated reliability standards.’’ 147 or withdrawal of a Reliability Standard,
that the Commission should address the 122. The Commission has never stated definition, Variance, associated
threats posed by EMPs or otherwise in the GMD Reliability Standard implementation plan, or Interpretation shall
raised the issue of EMPs.141 For rulemakings that compliance with have the right to appeal. This appeals process
example, Briggs states that the Commission-approved Reliability applies only to the NERC Reliability
Commission should ‘‘initiate a process Standards absolves registered entities Standards processes as defined in this
to improve the resilience of the U.S. from legal liability generally, to the manual, not to the technical content of the
electric grid to the threat of high altitude Reliability Standards action.
extent legal liability exists, should a
electromagnetic pulse (HEMP) attacks, disruption occur on the Bulk-Power The appellants, who have the burden
which can be more severe than solar System due to a GMD event. Resilient of proof under the NERC Rules of
superstorms.’’ 142 However, as the Societies’ comment appears to Procedure, have not shown that NERC
Commission stated in Order No. 779 in misconstrue language in Order No. 779 or the standard drafting team failed to
directing the development of GMD in which the Commission stated, when comply with any procedural
Reliability Standards and in Order No. directing the development of the Second requirements set forth in the NERC
797 in approving the First Stage GMD Stage GMD Reliability Standards, that Rules of Procedure.150 Instead, it would
Reliability Standards, EMPs are not the ‘‘Second Stage GMD Reliability appear that the appeal constitutes a
within the scope of the GMD Standard should not impose ‘strict collateral attack on the substantive
rulemaking proceedings.143 liability’ on responsible entities for provisions of Reliability Standard TPL–
120. Holdeman contends that the failure to ensure the reliability operation 007–1. As the appellants’ substantive
Commission ‘‘should modify the current of the Bulk-Power System in the face of concerns with Reliability Standard
preemption of States preventing them a GMD event of unforeseen severity.’’ 148 TPL–007–1 have been addressed in this
from having more stringent reliability The Commission’s statement merely Final Rule, issues surrounding the
standards for Commission regulated recognized that the Second Stage GMD NERC ‘‘Level 2’’ Appeal Panel decision
entities than Commission Reliability Standard should require are, in any case, moot.
standards.’’ 144 As the Commission registered entities to plan against a
indicated in response to similar III. Information Collection Statement
defined benchmark GMD event, for the
comments in Order No. 797, section purpose of complying with the 124. The collection of information
215(i)(3) of the FPA provides in relevant proposed Reliability Standard, rather contained in this final rule is subject to
part that section 215 does not ‘‘preempt than any GMD event generally (i.e., a review by the Office of Management and
any authority of any State to take action GMD event that exceeded the severity of Budget (OMB) regulations under section
to ensure the safety, adequacy, and the benchmark GMD event). The 3507(d) of the Paperwork Reduction Act
reliability of electric service within that Commission did not suggest, nor could of 1995 (PRA).151 OMB’s regulations
State, as long as such action is not it suggest, that compliance with a require approval of certain
inconsistent with any reliability Reliability Standard would absolve informational collection requirements
standard.’’ 145 Moreover, Reliability registered entities from general legal imposed by agency rules.152
Standard TPL–007–1 does not preclude liability, if any, arising from a
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149 NERC August 17, 2015 Filing at Appendix 1
141 See Briggs Comments at 7; EIS Comments at 146 Resilient Societies Comments at 62; see also (Decision of Level 2 Appeal Panel SPM Section 8
3; JINSA Comments at 2. CSP Comments at 1 (‘‘It would be far better for Appeal the Foundation For Resilient Societies, Inc.
142 Briggs Comments at 7. TPL–007–1).
FERC to remand Standard TPL–007–1 in its entirety
143 Order No. 797, 147 FERC ¶ 61,209 at P 42 than to approve a reliability standard that would 150 NERC Rules of Procedure, Appendix 3A
(citing Order No. 779, 143 FERC ¶ 61,147 at P 14 grant liability protection to utilities while blocking (Standard Processes Manual), Section 8 (Process for
n.20). the electric grid protection for the public that a 21st Appealing an Action or Inaction) (effective June 26,
144 Holdeman Comments at 2. century society requires.’’). 2013).
145 Order No. 797, 147 FERC ¶ 61,209 at P 44 147 Resilient Societies Comments at 62. 151 44 U.S.C. 3507(d).
(citing 16 U.S.C. 824o(i)(3)). 148 Order No. 779, 143 FERC ¶ 61,147 at P 84. 152 5 CFR 1320.11.
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125. Upon approval of a collection(s) implementation plan, violation severity a GMD Vulnerability Assessment of the
of information, OMB will assign an levels, and violation risk factors, as near-term transmission planning
OMB control number and an expiration discussed above. Reliability Standard horizon once every 60 calendar months.
date. Respondents subject to the filing TPL–007–1 will impose new Requirement R5 requires responsible
requirements of a rule will not be requirements for transmission planners, entities to provide GIC flow information
penalized for failing to respond to these planning coordinators, transmission to transmission owners and generator
collections of information unless the owners, and generator owners. owners that own an applicable bulk
collections of information display a Reliability Standard TPL–007–1, electric system power transformer in the
valid OMB control number. Requirement R1 requires planning planning area. This information is
126. The Commission solicited coordinators, in conjunction with the necessary for applicable transmission
comments on the need for this applicable transmission planner, to owners and generator owners to conduct
information, whether the information identify the responsibilities of the the thermal impact assessments
will have practical utility, the accuracy planning coordinator and transmission required by proposed Requirement R6.
of the burden estimates, ways to Requirement R6 requires applicable
planner in the planning coordinator’s
enhance the quality, utility, and clarity
planning area for maintaining models transmission owners and generator
of the information to be collected or
and performing the study or studies owners to conduct thermal impact
retained, and any suggested methods for
needed to complete GMD Vulnerability assessments where the maximum
minimizing respondents’ burden,
including the use of automated Assessments. Requirements R2, R3, R4, effective GIC value provided in
information techniques. The R5, and R7 refer to the ‘‘responsible proposed Requirement R5, Part 5.1 is 75
Commission asked that any revised entity, as determined by Requirement A/phase or greater. Requirement R7
burden or cost estimates submitted by R1,’’ when identifying which applicable requires responsible entities to develop
commenters be supported by sufficient planning coordinators or transmission a corrective action plan when its GMD
detail to understand how the estimates planners are responsible for maintaining Vulnerability Assessment indicates that
are generated. The Commission received models and performing the necessary its system does not meet the
comments on specific requirements in study or studies. Requirement R2 performance requirements of Table 1—
Reliability Standard TPL–007–1, which requires that the responsible entities Steady State Planning Events. The
we address in this Final Rule. However, maintain models for performing the corrective action plan must address how
the Commission did not receive any studies needed to complete GMD the performance requirements will be
comments on our reporting burden Vulnerability Assessments, as required met, must list the specific deficiencies
estimates or on the need for and the in Requirement R4. Requirement R3 and associated actions that are
purpose of the information collection requires responsible entities to have necessary to achieve performance, and
requirements.153 criteria for acceptable system steady must set forth a timetable for
Public Reporting Burden: The state voltage performance during a completion. The Commission estimates
Commission approves Reliability benchmark GMD event. Requirement R4 the annual reporting burden and cost as
Standard TPL–007–1 and the associated requires responsible entities to complete follows:
FERC–725N, AS MODIFIED BY THE FINAL RULE IN DOCKET NO. RM15–11–000
[TPL–007–1 Reliability Standard for Transmission System Planned Performance for Geomagnetic Disturbance Events] 154
Annual Average burden Total annual burden Cost per
Number of number of Total number hours & cost per hours & total annual respondent
respondents responses per of responses response 155 cost ($)
respondent
(1) (2) (1) * (2) = (3) (4) (3) * (4) = (5) (5) ÷ (1)
(One-time) Require- 121 (PC & TP) ....... 1 121 Eng. 5 hrs. 1,089 hrs. (605 Eng., $481.55
ment 1. ($331.75); RK 4 484 RK);
hrs. ($149.80). $58,267.55
($40,141.75 Eng.,
$18,125.80 RK).
(On-going) Require- 121 (PC & TP) ....... 1 121 Eng. 3 hrs. 605 hrs. (363 Eng., 273.95
ment 1. ($199.05); RK 2 242 RK);
hrs. ($74.90). $33,147.95
($24,085.05 Eng.,
$9,062.90 RK).
(One-time) Require- 121 (PC & TP) ....... 1 121 Eng. 22 hrs. 4840 hrs. (2,662 2,133.80
ment 2. ($1,459.70); RK 18 Eng., 2,178 RK);
hrs. ($674.10). $258,189.80
($176,623.70 Eng.,
$81,566.10 RK).
(On-going) Require- 121 (PC & TP) ....... 1 121 Eng. 5 hrs. 968 hrs. (605 Eng., 444.10
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ment 2. ($331.75); RK 3 363 RK);
hrs. ($112.35). $53,736.10
($40,141.75 Eng.,
$13,594.35 RK).
153 While noting the uncertainties surrounding costs that could arise from a revised Reliability cost estimate in the NOPR.’’ Trade Associations
the potential costs associated with implementation Standard, the Trade Associations stated that they Comments at 9.
of Reliability Standard TPL–007–1 and the potential ‘‘have no specific comments regarding the OMB
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FERC–725N, AS MODIFIED BY THE FINAL RULE IN DOCKET NO. RM15–11–000—Continued
[TPL–007–1 Reliability Standard for Transmission System Planned Performance for Geomagnetic Disturbance Events] 154
Annual Average burden Total annual burden Cost per
Number of number of Total number hours & cost per hours & total annual respondent
respondents responses per of responses response 155 cost ($)
respondent
(1) (2) (1) * (2) = (3) (4) (3) * (4) = (5) (5) ÷ (1)
(One-time) Require- 121 (PC & TP) ....... 1 121 Eng. 5 hrs. 968 hrs. (605 Eng., 444.10
ment 3. ($331.75); RK 3 363 RK);
hrs. ($112.35). $53,736.10
($40,141.75 Eng.,
$13,594.35 RK).
(On-going) Require- 121 (PC & TP) ....... 1 121 Eng. 1 hrs. 242 hrs. (121 Eng., 103.80
ment 3. ($66.35);RK 1 hrs. 121 RK);
($37.45). $12,559.80
($8,028.35 Eng.,
$4,531.45 RK).
(On-going) Require- 121 (PC & TP) ....... 1 121 Eng. 27 hrs. 5,808 hrs. (3,267 2,277.85
ment 4. ($1,791.45); RK 21 Eng., 2,541 RK);
hrs. ($786.45). $311,919.85
($216,765.45 Eng.,
$95,154.40 RK).
(On-going) Require- 121 (PC & TP) ....... 1 121 Eng. 9 hrs. 1936 hrs. (1,089 859.30
ment 5. ($597.15); RK 7 Eng., 847 RK);
hrs. ($262.15). $103,975.30
($72,255.15 Eng.,
$31,720.15 RK).
(One-time) Require- 881 (TO & GO) ...... 1 881 Eng. 22 hrs. 35,240 hrs. (19,382 2,133.89
ment 6. ($1,459.70); RK 18 Eng., 15,858 RK);
hrs. ($674.19). $1,879,957.09
($1,285,995.70
Eng., $593,961.39
RK).
(On-going) Require- 881 (TO & GO) ...... 1 881 Eng. 2 hrs. 3,524 hrs. (1,762 207.60
ment 6. ($132.70); RK 2 Eng., 1762 RK);
hrs. ($74.90). $182,895.60
($116,908.70 Eng.,
$65,986.90 RK).
(On-going) Require- 121 (PC & TP) ....... 1 121 Eng. 11 hrs. 2,420 hrs. (1,331 1,066.90
ment 7. ($729.85); RK 9 Eng., 1,089 RK);
hrs. ($337.05). $129,094.90
($88,311.85 Eng.,
$40,783.05 RK).
Total ................... ................................ ........................ 2851 ................................... 57,640 156 hrs. ........................
(31,792 Eng.,
25,848 RK);
$3,077,480.04
($2,109,399.20
Eng., $968,080.84
RK).
Title: FERC–725N, Mandatory Action: Approved Additional Commission’s directives regarding
Reliability Standards: TPL Reliability Requirements. development of the Second Stage GMD
Standards. OMB Control No: 1902–0264. Reliability Standards, as set forth in
Respondents: Business or other for- Order No. 779.
154 Eng.=engineer; RK =recordkeeping (record
profit and not-for-profit institutions. Internal review: The Commission has
clerk); PC=planning coordinator; TP=transmission Frequency of Responses: One time assured itself, by means of its internal
planner; TO=transmission owner; and
GO=generator owner. and on-going. review, that there is specific, objective
155 The estimates for cost per response are derived Necessity of the Information: The support for the burden estimates
using the following formula: Burden Hours per Commission has reviewed the associated with the information
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Response * $/hour = Cost per Response. The requirements of Reliability Standard requirements.
$66.35/hour figure for an engineer and the $37.45/
hour figure for a record clerk are based on data on TPL–007–1 and has made a 127. Interested persons may obtain
the average salary plus benefits from the Bureau of determination that the requirements of information on the reporting
Labor Statistics obtainable at http://www.bls.gov/ this Reliability Standard are necessary requirements by contacting the Federal
oes/current/naics3_221000.htm and http:// to implement section 215 of the FPA. Energy Regulatory Commission, Office
www.bls.gov/news.release/ecec.nr0.htm.
156 Of the 57,640 total burden hours, 42,137 hours Specifically, these requirements address of the Executive Director, 888 First
are one-time burden hours, and 15,503 hours are the threat posed by GMD events to the Street NE., Washington, DC 20426
on-going annual burden hours. Bulk-Power System and conform to the [Attention: Ellen Brown, e-mail:
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DataClearance@ferc.gov, phone: (202) one of the following categories (with the VI. Document Availability
502–8663, fax: (202) 273–0873]. associated size thresholds noted for
128. Comments concerning the each): 162 134. In addition to publishing the full
information collections in this final rule • Hydroelectric power generation, at text of this document in the Federal
and the associated burden estimates, 500 employees Register, the Commission provides all
should be sent to the Commission in • Fossil fuel electric power generation, interested persons an opportunity to
this docket and may also be sent to the at 750 employees view and/or print the contents of this
Office of Management and Budget, • Nuclear electric power generation, at document via the Internet through
Office of Information and Regulatory 750 employees FERC’s Home Page (http://
Affairs [Attention: Desk Officer for the • Other electric power generation (e.g., www.ferc.gov) and in FERC’s Public
Federal Energy Regulatory solar, wind, geothermal, biomass, and Reference Room during normal business
Commission]. For security reasons, other), at 250 employees hours (8:30 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. Eastern
comments should be sent by e-mail to • Electric bulk power transmission and time) at 888 First Street NE., Room 2A,
OMB at the following e-mail address: control,163 at 500 employees Washington, DC 20426.
oira_submission@omb.eop.gov. Please 131. Based on these categories, the 135. From FERC’s Home Page on the
reference FERC–725N and OMB Control Commission will use a conservative Internet, this information is available on
No. 1902–0264 in your submission. threshold of 750 employees for all eLibrary. The full text of this document
IV. Environmental Analysis entities.164 Applying this threshold, the is available on eLibrary in PDF and
129. The Commission is required to Commission estimates that there are 440 Microsoft Word format for viewing,
prepare an Environmental Assessment small entities that function as planning printing, and/or downloading. To access
or an Environmental Impact Statement coordinators, transmission planners, this document in eLibrary, type the
for any action that may have a transmission owners, and/or generator docket number excluding the last three
significant adverse effect on the human owners. However, the Commission digits of this document in the docket
environment.157 The Commission has estimates that only a subset of such number field.
categorically excluded certain actions small entities will be subject to the
136. User assistance is available for
from this requirement as not having a approved Reliability Standard given the
eLibrary and the FERC’s website during
significant effect on the human additional applicability criterion in the
normal business hours from FERC
environment. Included in the exclusion approved Reliability Standard (i.e., to be
Online Support at 202–502–6652 (toll
are rules that are clarifying, corrective, subject to the requirements of the
free at 1–866–208–3676) or email at
or procedural or that do not approved Reliability Standard, the
ferconlinesupport@ferc.gov, or the
substantially change the effect of the applicable entity must own or must
Public Reference Room at (202) 502–
regulations being amended.158 The have a planning area that contains a
8371, TTY (202) 502–8659. E-mail the
actions here fall within this categorical large power transformer with a high
side, wye-grounded winding with Public Reference Room at
exclusion in the Commission’s public.referenceroom@ferc.gov.
regulations. terminal voltage greater than 200 kV).
132. Reliability Standard TPL–007–1 VII. Effective Date and Congressional
V. Regulatory Flexibility Act enhances reliability by establishing Notification
130. The Regulatory Flexibility Act of requirements that require applicable
1980 (RFA) 159 generally requires a entities to perform GMD Vulnerability 137. These regulations are effective
description and analysis of final rules Assessments and to mitigate identified November 29, 2016. The Commission
that will have significant economic vulnerabilities. The Commission has determined, with the concurrence of
impact on a substantial number of small estimates that each of the small entities the Administrator of the Office of
entities. The Small Business to whom the approved Reliability Information and Regulatory Affairs of
Administration’s (SBA) Office of Size Standard applies will incur one-time OMB, that this rule is not a ‘‘major rule’’
Standards develops the numerical compliance costs of $5,193.34 and as defined in section 351 of the Small
definition of a small business.160 The annual ongoing costs of $5,233.50. Business Regulatory Enforcement
SBA revised its size standard for electric 133. The Commission does not Fairness Act of 1996.
utilities (effective January 22, 2014) to a consider the estimated cost per small By the Commission.
standard based on the number of entity to impose a significant economic
Issued: September 22, 2016.
employees, including affiliates (from a impact on a substantial number of small
standard based on megawatt hours).161 entities. Accordingly, the Commission Nathaniel J. Davis, Sr.,
Under SBA’s new size standards, certifies that the approved Reliability Deputy Secretary.
planning coordinators, transmission Standard will not have a significant
Appendix
planners, transmission owners, and economic impact on a substantial
generator owners are likely included in number of small entities. Commenters
INITIAL COMMENTS
Abbreviation Commenter
AEP ........................................................................................................... American Electric Power Service Corporation.
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APS ........................................................................................................... Arizona Public Service Company.
ATC ........................................................................................................... American Transmission Company.
157 Regulations Implementing the National 159 5
U.S.C. 601–12. 163 This category covers transmission planners
Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Order No. 486, 160 13CFR 121.101. and planning coordinators.
52 FR 47897 (Dec. 17, 1987), FERC Stats. & Regs. 161 SBA Final Rule on ‘‘Small Business Size 164 By using the highest number threshold for all
Preambles 1986–1990 ¶ 30,783 (1987). Standards: Utilities,’’ 78 FR 77,343 (Dec. 23, 2013). types of entities, our estimate conservatively treats
158 18 CFR 380.4(a)(2)(ii). 162 13 CFR 121.201, Sector 22, Utilities. more entities as ‘‘small entities.’’
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INITIAL COMMENTS—Continued
Abbreviation Commenter
Baker ........................................................................................................ Greta Baker.
Bardin ....................................................................................................... David J. Bardin.
BPA ........................................................................................................... Bonneville Power Administration.
Briggs ........................................................................................................ Kevin Briggs.
CEA .......................................................................................................... Canadian Electricity Association.
CSP .......................................................................................................... Center for Security Policy.
EIS ............................................................................................................ Electric Infrastructure Security Council.
Emprimus .................................................................................................. Emprimus LLC.
Exelon ....................................................................................................... Exelon Corporation.
Gaunt ........................................................................................................ Charles T. Gaunt.
Holdeman ................................................................................................. Eric Holdeman.
Hydro One ................................................................................................ Hydro One Networks Inc.
ITC ............................................................................................................ International Transmission Company.
Lloyd’s ....................................................................................................... Lloyd’s America, Inc.
JINSA ........................................................................................................ Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs.
Joint ISOs/RTOs ....................................................................................... ISO New England Inc., Midcontinent Independent Transmission Sys-
tem Operator, Inc., Independent Electricity System Operator, New
York Independent System Operator, Inc., and PJM Interconnection,
L.L.C.
Kappenman .............................................................................................. John G. Kappenman and Curtis Birnbach.
Morris ........................................................................................................ Eric S. Morris.
NERC ........................................................................................................ North American Electric Reliability Corporation.
Resilient Societies .................................................................................... Foundation for Resilient Societies.
Roodman .................................................................................................. David Roodman.
Trade Associations ................................................................................... American Public Power Association, Edison Electric Institute, Electricity
Consumers Resource Council, Electric Power Supply Association,
Large Public Power Council, National Rural Electric Cooperative As-
sociation.
Tri-State .................................................................................................... Tri-State Generation and Transmission Association, Inc.
USGS ........................................................................................................ United States Geological Survey.
SUPPLEMENTAL COMMENTS
AEP ........................................................................................................... American Electric Power Service Corporation.
Bardin ....................................................................................................... David J. Bardin.
CSP .......................................................................................................... Center for Security Policy.
Gaunt ........................................................................................................ Charles T. Gaunt.
IEEE .......................................................................................................... IEEE Power and Energy Society Transformers Committee.
Kappenman .............................................................................................. John G. Kappenman and Curtis Birnbach.
NERC ........................................................................................................ North American Electric Reliability Corporation.
Resilient Societies .................................................................................... Foundation for Resilient Societies.
Roodman .................................................................................................. David Roodman.
Trade Associations ................................................................................... American Public Power Association, Edison Electric Institute, Electricity
Consumers Resource Council, Electric Power Supply Association,
Large Public Power Council, National Rural Electric Cooperative As-
sociation.
USGS ........................................................................................................ United States Geological Survey.
[FR Doc. 2016–23441 Filed 9–29–16; 8:45 am] DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND ACTION:Interim regulations; solicitation
BILLING CODE 6717–01–P SECURITY of comments.
U.S. Customs and Border Protection SUMMARY: This document amends the
U.S. Customs and Border Protection
DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY (CBP) regulations pertaining to the
importation of pesticides and pesticidal
19 CFR Part 12 devices into the United States subject to
the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and
[Docket No. USCBP–2016–0061; CBP Dec. Rodenticide Act (FIFRA). Specifically,
16–15] CBP is amending the regulations to
asabaliauskas on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with RULES
permit the option of filing an electronic
RIN 1515–AE12 alternative to the U.S. Environmental
Notice of Arrival for Importations of Protection Agency’s (EPA) ‘‘Notice of
Pesticides and Pesticidal Devices Arrival of Pesticides and Devices’’
(NOA) paper form, with entry
AGENCY: U.S. Customs and Border documentation, via any CBP-authorized
Protection, Department of Homeland electronic data interchange system. This
Security; Department of the Treasury. change will support modernization
VerDate Sep<11>2014 18:28 Sep 29, 2016 Jkt 238001 PO 00000 Frm 00050 Fmt 4700 Sfmt 4700 E:\FR\FM\30SER1.SGM 30SER1](https://thefederalregister.org/doc/81_FR_67310/page/21.svg)
Document Created: 2018-02-09 13:33:44
Document Modified: 2018-02-09 13:33:44
| Category | Regulatory Information | |
| Collection | Federal Register | |
| sudoc Class | AE 2.7: GS 4.107: AE 2.106: | |
| Publisher | Office of the Federal Register, National Archives and Records Administration | |
| Section | Rules and Regulations | |
| Action | Final rule. | |
| Dates | This rule will become effective November 29, 2016. | |
| Contact | Regis Binder (Technical Information), Office of Electric Reliability, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 888 First Street NE., Washington, DC 20426, Telephone: (301) 665-1601, [email protected] | |
| FR Citation | 81 FR 67120 |
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