81 FR 71378 - Privacy Act of 1974; Implementation
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Office of the Secretary Federal Register Volume 81, Issue 200 (October 17, 2016)
Office of the Secretary
Federal Register Volume 81, Issue 200 (October 17, 2016)
| Page Range | 71378-71381 | |
| FR Document | 2016-24536 |
[Federal Register Volume 81, Number 200 (Monday, October 17, 2016)] [Rules and Regulations] [Pages 71378-71381] From the Federal Register Online [www.thefederalregister.org] [FR Doc No: 2016-24536] ======================================================================= ----------------------------------------------------------------------- DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE Office of the Secretary 32 CFR Part 310 [Docket ID: DOD-2016-OS-0059] Privacy Act of 1974; Implementation AGENCY: Office of the Secretary of Defense, DoD. ACTION: Final rule. ----------------------------------------------------------------------- SUMMARY: The Office of the Secretary of Defense is exempting records maintained in DUSDI 01-DoD, ``Department of Defense (DoD) Insider Threat Management and Analysis Center (DITMAC) and DoD Component Insider Threat Records System,'' from subsections (c)(3) and (4); (d)(1), (2), (3), and (4); (e)(1), (2), (3), (4)(G), (H), and (I), (5), and (8); and (g) of the Privacy Act. In addition, in the course of carrying out collections and analysis of information in connection with the operations of the DITMAC and DoD Component insider threat programs, exempt records received from other systems of records may become part of this system. To the extent that copies of exempt records from those other systems of records are maintained in this system, the Department also claims the same exemptions for the records from those other systems that are maintained in this system, as claimed [[Page 71379]] for the original primary system of which they are a part. DATES: Effective Date: This rule is effective October 17, 2016. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Cindy Allard, Chief, of the Defense Privacy, Civil Liberties, and Transparency Division, 703-571-0070. SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Background The DITMAC was established by the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence in order to consolidate and analyze insider threat information reported by the DoD Component insider threat programs mandated by Presidential Executive Order 13587, issued October 7, 2011, which required Federal agencies to establish an insider threat detection and prevention program to ensure the security of classified networks and the responsible sharing and safeguarding of classified information consistent with appropriate protections for privacy and civil liberties. For purposes of this system of records, the term ``insider threat'' is defined in the Minimum Standards for Executive Branch Insider Threat Task Force based on direction provided in Section 6.3(b) of Executive Order 13587. The DITMAC helps prevent, deter, detect, and/or mitigate the potential threat that personnel, including DoD military personnel, civilian employees, and contractor personnel, who have or had been granted eligibility for access to classified information or eligibility to hold a sensitive position may harm the security of the United States. This threat can include damage to the United States through espionage, terrorism, unauthorized disclosure of national security information, or through the loss or degradation of departmental resources or capabilities. The system of records will be used to analyze, monitor, and audit insider threat information for insider threat detection and mitigation within DoD on threats that persons who have or had been granted eligibility for access to classified information or eligibility to hold sensitive positions may pose to DoD and U.S. Government installations, facilities, personnel, missions, or resources. The system of records will support the DITMAC and DoD Component insider threat programs, enable the identification of systemic insider threat issues and challenges, and provide a basis for the development and recommendation of solutions to deter, detect, and/or mitigate potential insider threats. It will assist in identifying best practices among other Federal Government insider threat programs, through the use of existing DoD resources and functions and by leveraging existing authorities, policies, programs, systems, and architectures. Public Comments The Department of Defense published a proposed Privacy Act exemption rule for its Insider Threat Management and Analysis Center (DITMAC) and DoD Component Insider Threat Records Systems (hereafter Insider Threat) on May 19, 2016 (81 FR 31561). The Department of Defense received comments from seven submitters related to a proposed Federal Rulemaking (docket: DOD-2016-OS-0059, published May 19, 2016) relating to a Privacy Act exemption rule for the Department of Defense (DoD) Insider Threat Management and Analysis Center (DITMAC) and DoD Component Insider Threat Records System (hereafter Insider Threat). In addressing comments submitted to this proposed Privacy Act exemption rule, the Department notes that such rules do not mandate exemptions in every instance, and are not intended to apply to all records, but must be reviewed in each specific case. Two commenters were opposed to the proposed exemption rule but did not provide specific concerns; an additional commenter provided a number of proposals for the Insider Threat program at large, as well as one addressing an access concern which is addressed in the access discussion. The largest number of comments related to the proposed exemption from the access provisions of the Privacy Act (5 U.S.C. 552a(d)(1), (2), (3), and (4)). The Department notes that the specific exemptions upon which the access limitation is based are generally predicated on ``the identity of a source who furnished information to the Government under an express promise that the identity of the source would be held in confidence'' found in 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(2), (5), and (7). One of these commenters raised concerns that the ``largest and most common sources providing information to the DITMAC provide such information under a general promise of confidentiality.'' It is not clear to the Department which sources the commenter believes are providing information under a general promise of confidentiality, but the language used in exemptions (k)(2), (5), and (7) requires an ``express promise'' (if promised after the Act took effect). This is normally done on a case-by-case basis. One commenter noted that ``it is important to allow people as much access as possible to the data being collected about them, so that they can make informed decisions about what to do in the event of a data loss.'' In response, the Department anticipates providing access rights, except in those specific cases where an exemption rule would appropriately apply. In view of the earlier discussion in this paragraph, DoD anticipates exercising access exemption rules as the exception rather than the norm. Another commenter was also particularly concerned that ``it would become entirely possible that qualified Soldiers might unknowingly become flagged as non-promotable for being a possible insider threat.'' We note first that when exercising the (k)(7) exemption, the Department uses reasonable segregability to provide the maximum amount of the record to the subject while honoring the express promise of confidentiality to the source. Moreover, the Department notes that the Insider Threat system of records is not a source of information for the promotion selection process. Several comments also addressed the proposed exemption from the amendment provisions of the Privacy Act. The Insider Threat Hubs will aggregate information from a number of sources, the first of which is the subject of the record. Since the subjects of Insider Threat records are cleared personnel, the most appropriate place for them to address a factual error is with the appropriate DoD source (e.g., human resources offices for human resources records or the security officer for personnel security concerns). Insider Threat records are updated at scheduled intervals or upon a specified query for current information and validated prior to any investigative or administrative action taken by a DoD Component. One commenter noted that the collections and proposed exemptions asserted by the Department of Defense were overly extensive and would diminish accountability: DoD claims the authority to collect any information it wants without disclosing where it came from or even acknowledging its existence. The net result of these exemptions, coupled with DoD's proposal to collect and retain virtually unlimited information unrelated to any purpose Congress delegated to the agency, would be to diminish the legal accountability of the agency's information collection activities. In response, disclosure could interfere with or reveal information relating to actual or potential criminal, civil, or administrative investigations or actions. DoD further notes that it identified the varied sources of Insider Threat information in the System of Records Notice and has asserted exemptions to protect from disclosure sources [[Page 71380]] expressly promised confidentiality (pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(2), (5), and (7) as discussed above). Such promises apply to a relatively narrow scope of DoD records. If DoD were not able to provide such promises on a case-by-case basis, they would find it difficult, if not impossible, to gather candid information that is not generally known, precisely the type of information needed to make well-informed assessments of behavior (and potential behavior) to identify and address insider threats. As previously mentioned, exemption rules do not mandate the application of exemptions in every instance, are not intended to apply to all records, and will be applied on a case-by-case basis. The commenter claims that DoD ``contemplates collecting information that will not be relevant or necessary to a specific investigation'' and that ``the inability to determine, in advance, whether information is accurate, relevant, timely, and complete precludes its agents from complying with the obligation to ensure that the information meets these criteria after it is stored.'' In response, the Department notes that it is implementing an insider threat program required by Executive Order as well as by Public Law (e.g., Public Law 112-81, Title IX, Section 922, (10 U.S.C. 2224 note), Insider Threat Detection). The statutory note requires the use of anomaly detection techniques, which logically require ingestion of non-anomalous information in order to identify anomalous information. Further, the purpose of the Insider Threat program is to identify potential insider threat behavior; cases of concern are referred to the appropriate DoD or Federal investigative entity. DoD takes seriously its requirement under the Privacy Act to ``balance the Government's need to maintain information about individuals with the rights of those individuals to be protected from unwarranted invasions of their privacy.'' There were no comments related to the exemption of the access provisions through (k)(1), pertaining to classified information; (k)(4), applicable to records required by statute to be maintained and used solely as statistical records; or (k)(6), testing or examination material used solely to determine individual qualifications for appointment or promotion in the Federal service the disclosure of which would compromise the objectivity or fairness of the testing or examination process. The Department also asserted an access exemption under (j)(2), which addresses law enforcement activities, which did not receive comment. DoD made no changes to the regulatory text of the rule based on public comments received. Regulatory Procedures Executive Order 12866, ``Regulatory Planning and Review'' and Executive Order 13563, ``Improving Regulation and Regulatory Review'' It has been determined that this rule is not a significant rule. This rule does not (1) Have an annual effect on the economy of $100 million or more or adversely affect in a material way the economy; a sector of the economy; productivity; competition; jobs; the environment; public health or safety; or State, local, or tribal governments or communities; (2) Create a serious inconsistency or otherwise interfere with an action taken or planned by another Agency; (3) Materially alter the budgetary impact of entitlements, grants, user fees, or loan programs, or the rights and obligations of recipients thereof; or (4) Raise novel legal or policy issues arising out of legal mandates, the President's priorities, or the principles set forth in these Executive orders. Public Law 96-354, ``Regulatory Flexibility Act'' (5 U.S.C. Chapter 6) It has been certified that this rule does not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities because it is concerned only with the administration of Privacy Act systems of records within DoD. A Regulatory Flexibility Analysis is not required. Public Law 96-511, ``Paperwork Reduction Act'' (44 U.S.C. Chapter 35) It has been determined that this rule does not impose additional information collection requirements on the public under the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.). Section 202, Public Law 104-4, ``Unfunded Mandates Reform Act'' It has been determined that this rule does not involve a Federal mandate that may result in the expenditure by State, local and tribal governments, in the aggregate, or by the private sector, of $100 million or more and that it will not significantly or uniquely affect small governments. Executive Order 13132, ``Federalism'' It has been determined that this rule does not have federalism implications. This rule does not have substantial direct effects on the States, on the relationship between the National Government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government. List of Subjects in 32 CFR Part 310 Privacy. Accordingly, 32 CFR part 310 is amended as follows: PART 310 [AMENDED] 0 1. The authority citation for 32 CFR part 310 continues to read as follows: Authority: 5 U.S.C. 552a. Sec. Sec. 310.30 through 310.53 [Redesignated as Sec. Sec. 310.31 through 310.54] 0 2. Redesignate Sec. 310.30 through Sec. 310.53 as Sec. 310.31 through Sec. 310.54. 0 3. In Subpart F, add a new Sec. 310.30 to read as follows: Sec. 310.30 DoD-wide exemptions. (a) Use of DoD-wide exemptions. DoD-wide exemptions for DOD-wide systems of records are established pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(j) and (k) of the Privacy Act. (b) Promises of confidentiality. (1) Only the identity of sources that have been given an express promise of confidentiality may be protected from disclosure under paragraphs (d)(3)(i), (ii), and (iii) and (d)(4) of this section. However, the identity of sources who were given implied promises of confidentiality in inquiries conducted before September 27, 1975, also may be protected from disclosure. (2) Ensure promises of confidentiality are not automatically given but are used sparingly. Establish appropriate procedures and identify fully categories of individuals who may make such promises. Promises of confidentiality shall be made only when they are essential to obtain the information sought (see 5 CFR part 736). (c) Access to records for which DOD-wide exemptions are claimed. Deny the individual access only to those portions of the records for which the claimed exemption applies. (d) DoD-wide exemptions. The following exemptions are applicable to all components of the Department of Defense for the following system(s) of records: (1) System identifier and name: DUSDI 01-DoD ``Department of Defense (DoD) Insider Threat Management and Analysis Center (DITMAC) and DoD Component Insider Threat Records System.'' Exemption: This system of records is exempted from subsections (c)(3) and (4); (d)(1), (2), (3) and (4); (e)(1), (2), (3), (4)(G)(H) and (I), (5) and (8); and (g) of the Privacy Act pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2) and (k)(1), (2), (4), (5), (6), and (7). (2) Records are only exempt from pertinent provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552a to [[Page 71381]] the extent that such provisions have been identified and an exemption claimed for the record and the purposes underlying the exemption for the record pertain to the record. (3) Exemption from the particular subsections is justified for the following reasons: (i) Subsection (c)(3). To provide the subject with an accounting of disclosures of records in this system could inform that individual of the existence, nature, or scope of an actual or potential law enforcement or counterintelligence investigation, and thereby seriously impede law enforcement or counterintelligence efforts by permitting the record subject and other persons to whom he might disclose the records to avoid criminal penalties, civil remedies, or counterintelligence measures. Access to the accounting of disclosures could also interfere with a civil or administrative action or investigation which may impede those actions or investigations. Access also could reveal the identity of confidential sources incident to Federal employment, military service, contract, and security clearance determinations. (ii) Subsection (c)(4). This subsection is inapplicable to the extent that an exemption is being claimed for subsection (d). (iii) Subsection (d)(1). Disclosure of records in the system could reveal the identity of confidential sources and result in an unwarranted invasion of the privacy of others. Disclosure may also reveal information relating to actual or potential criminal investigations. Disclosure of classified national security information would cause damage to the national security of the United States. Disclosure could also interfere with a civil or administrative action or investigation; reveal the identity of confidential sources incident to Federal employment, military service, contract, and security clearance determinations; and reveal the confidentiality and integrity of Federal testing materials and evaluation materials used for military promotions when furnished by a confidential source. (iv) Subsection (d)(2). Amendment of the records could interfere with ongoing criminal or civil law enforcement proceedings and impose an impossible administrative burden by requiring investigations to be continuously reinvestigated. (v) Subsections (d)(3) and (4). These subsections are inapplicable to the extent exemption is claimed from (d)(1) and (2). (vi) Subsection (e)(1). It is often impossible to determine in advance if investigatory records contained in this system are accurate, relevant, timely and complete, but, in the interests of effective law enforcement and counterintelligence, it is necessary to retain this information to aid in establishing patterns of activity and provide investigative leads. (vii) Subsection (e)(2). To collect information from the subject individual could serve notice that he or she is the subject of a criminal investigation and thereby present a serious impediment to such investigations. (viii) Subsection (e)(3). To inform individuals as required by this subsection could reveal the existence of a criminal investigation and compromise investigative efforts. (ix) Subsection (e)(4)(G), (H), and (I). These subsections are inapplicable to the extent exemption is claimed from (d)(1) and (2). (x) Subsection (e)(5). It is often impossible to determine in advance if investigatory records contained in this system are accurate, relevant, timely and complete, but, in the interests of effective law enforcement, it is necessary to retain this information to aid in establishing patterns of activity and provide investigative leads. (xi) Subsection (e)(8). To serve notice could give persons sufficient warning to evade investigative efforts. (xii) Subsection (g). This subsection is inapplicable to the extent that the system is exempt from other specific subsections of the Privacy Act. (4) In addition, in the course of carrying out analysis for insider threats, exempt records from other systems of records may in turn become part of the case records maintained in this system. To the extent that copies of exempt records from those other systems of records are maintained into this system, the DoD claims the same exemptions for the records from those other systems that are entered into this system, as claimed for the original primary system of which they are a part. Dated: October 5, 2016. Aaron Siegel, Alternate OSD Federal Register Liaison Officer, Department of Defense. [FR Doc. 2016-24536 Filed 10-14-16; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 5001-06-P
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Export Administration Regulations (15 CFR (d) Individuals who are persons exportation or reexportation of items to Cuba,
parts 730 through 774) may require separate subject to U.S. jurisdiction are see §§ 515.533 and 515.559. See § 746.2(b) of
authorization from the Department of authorized to import into the United the Export Administration Regulations (15
Commerce. CFR parts 730 through 774) for the
States as accompanied baggage
Department of Commerce’s Cuba licensing
* * * * * merchandise subject to the prohibitions policy.
■ 22. Revise § 515.581 to read as in § 515.204, including Cuban-origin
follows: goods, that is purchased or acquired in Note 2 to § 515.591: See § 515.564 for a
a third country, provided that the general license authorizing travel-related and
§ 515.581 Transactions related to merchandise is imported for personal other transactions incident to professional
conferences in third countries. use only. research and professional meetings in Cuba,
Persons subject to U.S. jurisdiction § 515.533(c) for a general license authorizing
* * * * * travel-related and other transactions relating
are authorized to sponsor, organize, or
provide services in connection with, as Note 3 to § 515.585: Except as provided in to certain exports and reexports to Cuba, and
well as participate in, conferences or paragraphs (c) and (d) of this section, this § 515.575(a) for a general license authorizing
section does not authorize any transactions transactions, including travel-related
other similar events in a third country prohibited by § 515.204. transactions, related to certain humanitarian
that are attended by Cuban nationals. projects.
Note to § 515.581: The export or reexport Note 4 to § 515.585: The export or reexport
to Cuba of technology subject to the Export to Cuba of goods (including software) or
technology subject to the Export Subpart H—Procedures
Administration Regulations (15 CFR parts
730 through 774) may require separate Administration Regulations (15 CFR parts § 515.803 [Removed]
authorization from the Department of 730 through 774) may require separate
Commerce. authorization from the Department of ■ 27. Remove § 515.803 from subpart H.
Commerce. Dated: October 11, 2016.
■ 23. Amend § 515.584 by revising
paragraphs (c) and (f) to read as follows: ■ 25. Add § 515.590 to subpart E to read John E. Smith,
as follows: Acting Director, Office of Foreign Assets
§ 515.584 Certain financial transactions Control.
involving Cuba. § 515.590 Certain grants, scholarships, [FR Doc. 2016–25032 Filed 10–14–16; 8:45 am]
* * * * * and awards.
BILLING CODE 4810–AL–P
(c) Credit and debit cards. All The provision of grants, scholarships,
transactions incident to the processing or awards relating to the following
and payment of credit and debit cards activities to a Cuban national or in
involving travel-related and other which Cuba or a Cuban national DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
transactions consistent with § 515.560 otherwise has an interest is authorized:
are authorized. (a) Educational activities; Office of the Secretary
* * * * * (b) Humanitarian projects, as set forth
in § 515.575(b); 32 CFR Part 310
(f) Any banking institution, as defined
in § 515.314, that is a person subject to (c) Scientific research; and
(d) Religious activities. [Docket ID: DOD–2016–OS–0059]
U.S. jurisdiction is authorized to
provide financing for exports or ■ 26. Add § 515.591 to subpart E to read Privacy Act of 1974; Implementation
reexports of items, other than as follows:
agricultural commodities, authorized AGENCY: Office of the Secretary of
§ 515.591 Services related to Defense, DoD.
pursuant to § 515.533, including infrastructure.
issuing, advising, negotiating, paying, or ACTION: Final rule.
Persons subject to the jurisdiction of
confirming letters of credit (including
the United States are authorized to SUMMARY: The Office of the Secretary of
letters of credit issued by a financial
provide to Cuba or Cuban nationals Defense is exempting records
institution that is a national of Cuba),
services related to developing, repairing, maintained in DUSDI 01-DoD,
accepting collateral for issuing or
maintaining, and enhancing Cuban ‘‘Department of Defense (DoD) Insider
confirming letters of credit, and
infrastructure that directly benefit the Threat Management and Analysis
processing documentary collections.
Cuban people, provided that those Center (DITMAC) and DoD Component
* * * * * services are consistent with the export Insider Threat Records System,’’ from
■ 24. Amend § 515.585 by revising or reexport licensing policy of the subsections (c)(3) and (4); (d)(1), (2), (3),
paragraph (c), removing the note to Department of Commerce. For the and (4); (e)(1), (2), (3), (4)(G), (H), and
paragraph (c), adding paragraph (d), and purposes of this section, infrastructure (I), (5), and (8); and (g) of the Privacy
amending Note 3 and Note 4 to means systems and assets used to Act.
§ 515.585 to read as follows: provide the Cuban people with goods In addition, in the course of carrying
§ 515.585 Certain transactions in third and services produced or provided by out collections and analysis of
countries. the public transportation, water information in connection with the
* * * * * management, waste management, non- operations of the DITMAC and DoD
(c) Individuals who are persons nuclear electricity generation, and Component insider threat programs,
subject to U.S. jurisdiction who are electricity distribution sectors, as well exempt records received from other
present in a third country are authorized as hospitals, public housing, and systems of records may become part of
jstallworth on DSK7TPTVN1PROD with RULES
to purchase or acquire merchandise primary and secondary schools. This this system. To the extent that copies of
subject to the prohibitions in § 515.204, authorization includes projects related exempt records from those other
including Cuban-origin goods, and to to the environmental protection of U.S., systems of records are maintained in
receive or obtain services in which Cuba Cuban, and international air quality, this system, the Department also claims
or a Cuban national has an interest that waters, and coastlines. the same exemptions for the records
are ordinarily incident to travel and Note 1 to § 515.591: For provisions related from those other systems that are
maintenance within that country. to transactions ordinarily incident to the maintained in this system, as claimed
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expressly promised confidentiality DoD made no changes to the List of Subjects in 32 CFR Part 310
(pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(2), (5), and regulatory text of the rule based on Privacy.
(7) as discussed above). Such promises public comments received.
Accordingly, 32 CFR part 310 is
apply to a relatively narrow scope of
Regulatory Procedures amended as follows:
DoD records. If DoD were not able to
provide such promises on a case-by-case Executive Order 12866, ‘‘Regulatory
PART 310 [AMENDED]
basis, they would find it difficult, if not Planning and Review’’ and Executive
impossible, to gather candid Order 13563, ‘‘Improving Regulation ■ 1. The authority citation for 32 CFR
information that is not generally known, and Regulatory Review’’ part 310 continues to read as follows:
precisely the type of information needed It has been determined that this rule Authority: 5 U.S.C. 552a.
to make well-informed assessments of is not a significant rule. This rule does
behavior (and potential behavior) to not (1) Have an annual effect on the §§ 310.30 through 310.53 [Redesignated as
identify and address insider threats. As economy of $100 million or more or §§ 310.31 through 310.54]
previously mentioned, exemption rules adversely affect in a material way the ■ 2. Redesignate § 310.30 through
do not mandate the application of economy; a sector of the economy; § 310.53 as § 310.31 through § 310.54.
exemptions in every instance, are not productivity; competition; jobs; the ■ 3. In Subpart F, add a new § 310.30 to
intended to apply to all records, and environment; public health or safety; or read as follows:
will be applied on a case-by-case basis. State, local, or tribal governments or
The commenter claims that DoD communities; (2) Create a serious § 310.30 DoD-wide exemptions.
‘‘contemplates collecting information inconsistency or otherwise interfere (a) Use of DoD-wide exemptions. DoD-
that will not be relevant or necessary to with an action taken or planned by wide exemptions for DOD-wide systems
a specific investigation’’ and that ‘‘the another Agency; (3) Materially alter the of records are established pursuant to 5
inability to determine, in advance, budgetary impact of entitlements, U.S.C. 552a(j) and (k) of the Privacy Act.
whether information is accurate, grants, user fees, or loan programs, or (b) Promises of confidentiality. (1)
relevant, timely, and complete the rights and obligations of recipients Only the identity of sources that have
precludes its agents from complying thereof; or (4) Raise novel legal or policy been given an express promise of
with the obligation to ensure that the issues arising out of legal mandates, the confidentiality may be protected from
information meets these criteria after it President’s priorities, or the principles disclosure under paragraphs (d)(3)(i),
is stored.’’ In response, the Department set forth in these Executive orders. (ii), and (iii) and (d)(4) of this section.
notes that it is implementing an insider Public Law 96–354, ‘‘Regulatory However, the identity of sources who
threat program required by Executive Flexibility Act’’ (5 U.S.C. Chapter 6) were given implied promises of
Order as well as by Public Law (e.g., confidentiality in inquiries conducted
Public Law 112–81, Title IX, Section It has been certified that this rule does
before September 27, 1975, also may be
922, (10 U.S.C. 2224 note), Insider not have a significant economic impact
protected from disclosure.
Threat Detection). The statutory note on a substantial number of small entities
(2) Ensure promises of confidentiality
requires the use of anomaly detection because it is concerned only with the
are not automatically given but are used
techniques, which logically require administration of Privacy Act systems of
sparingly. Establish appropriate
ingestion of non-anomalous information records within DoD. A Regulatory
procedures and identify fully categories
in order to identify anomalous Flexibility Analysis is not required.
of individuals who may make such
information. Further, the purpose of the Public Law 96–511, ‘‘Paperwork promises. Promises of confidentiality
Insider Threat program is to identify Reduction Act’’ (44 U.S.C. Chapter 35) shall be made only when they are
potential insider threat behavior; cases essential to obtain the information
It has been determined that this rule
of concern are referred to the sought (see 5 CFR part 736).
does not impose additional information
appropriate DoD or Federal investigative (c) Access to records for which DOD-
collection requirements on the public
entity. DoD takes seriously its wide exemptions are claimed. Deny the
under the Paperwork Reduction Act of
requirement under the Privacy Act to individual access only to those portions
1995 (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.).
‘‘balance the Government’s need to of the records for which the claimed
maintain information about individuals Section 202, Public Law 104–4, exemption applies.
with the rights of those individuals to be ‘‘Unfunded Mandates Reform Act’’ (d) DoD-wide exemptions. The
protected from unwarranted invasions It has been determined that this rule following exemptions are applicable to
of their privacy.’’ does not involve a Federal mandate that all components of the Department of
There were no comments related to may result in the expenditure by State, Defense for the following system(s) of
the exemption of the access provisions local and tribal governments, in the records:
through (k)(1), pertaining to classified aggregate, or by the private sector, of (1) System identifier and name:
information; (k)(4), applicable to records $100 million or more and that it will not DUSDI 01-DoD ‘‘Department of Defense
required by statute to be maintained and significantly or uniquely affect small (DoD) Insider Threat Management and
used solely as statistical records; or governments. Analysis Center (DITMAC) and DoD
(k)(6), testing or examination material Component Insider Threat Records
used solely to determine individual Executive Order 13132, ‘‘Federalism’’ System.’’
qualifications for appointment or It has been determined that this rule Exemption: This system of records is
promotion in the Federal service the does not have federalism implications. exempted from subsections (c)(3) and
jstallworth on DSK7TPTVN1PROD with RULES
disclosure of which would compromise This rule does not have substantial (4); (d)(1), (2), (3) and (4); (e)(1), (2), (3),
the objectivity or fairness of the testing direct effects on the States, on the (4)(G)(H) and (I), (5) and (8); and (g) of
or examination process. The Department relationship between the National the Privacy Act pursuant to 5 U.S.C.
also asserted an access exemption under Government and the States, or on the 552a(j)(2) and (k)(1), (2), (4), (5), (6), and
(j)(2), which addresses law enforcement distribution of power and (7).
activities, which did not receive responsibilities among the various (2) Records are only exempt from
comment. levels of government. pertinent provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552a to
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![Federal Register / Vol. 81, No. 200 / Monday, October 17, 2016 / Rules and Regulations 71381
the extent that such provisions have proceedings and impose an impossible the records from those other systems
been identified and an exemption administrative burden by requiring that are entered into this system, as
claimed for the record and the purposes investigations to be continuously claimed for the original primary system
underlying the exemption for the record reinvestigated. of which they are a part.
pertain to the record. (v) Subsections (d)(3) and (4). These Dated: October 5, 2016.
(3) Exemption from the particular subsections are inapplicable to the
Aaron Siegel,
subsections is justified for the following extent exemption is claimed from (d)(1)
reasons: Alternate OSD Federal Register Liaison
and (2).
(i) Subsection (c)(3). To provide the Officer, Department of Defense.
(vi) Subsection (e)(1). It is often
subject with an accounting of [FR Doc. 2016–24536 Filed 10–14–16; 8:45 am]
impossible to determine in advance if
disclosures of records in this system investigatory records contained in this BILLING CODE 5001–06–P
could inform that individual of the system are accurate, relevant, timely
existence, nature, or scope of an actual and complete, but, in the interests of
or potential law enforcement or effective law enforcement and DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
counterintelligence investigation, and counterintelligence, it is necessary to SECURITY
thereby seriously impede law retain this information to aid in
enforcement or counterintelligence establishing patterns of activity and Coast Guard
efforts by permitting the record subject provide investigative leads.
and other persons to whom he might (vii) Subsection (e)(2). To collect 33 CFR Part 165
disclose the records to avoid criminal information from the subject individual
penalties, civil remedies, or [Docket No. USCG–2016–0908]
could serve notice that he or she is the
counterintelligence measures. Access to subject of a criminal investigation and Safety Zones; Fireworks Events in
the accounting of disclosures could also thereby present a serious impediment to Captain of the Port New York Zone
interfere with a civil or administrative such investigations.
action or investigation which may (viii) Subsection (e)(3). To inform AGENCY: Coast Guard, DHS.
impede those actions or investigations. individuals as required by this ACTION: Notice of enforcement of
Access also could reveal the identity of subsection could reveal the existence of regulation.
confidential sources incident to Federal a criminal investigation and
employment, military service, contract, compromise investigative efforts. SUMMARY: The Coast Guard will enforce
and security clearance determinations. (ix) Subsection (e)(4)(G), (H), and (I). various safety zones within the Captain
(ii) Subsection (c)(4). This subsection These subsections are inapplicable to of the Port New York Zone on the
is inapplicable to the extent that an the extent exemption is claimed from specified date and time. This action is
exemption is being claimed for (d)(1) and (2). necessary to ensure the safety of vessels
subsection (d). (x) Subsection (e)(5). It is often and spectators from hazards associated
(iii) Subsection (d)(1). Disclosure of impossible to determine in advance if with fireworks displays. During the
records in the system could reveal the investigatory records contained in this enforcement period, no person or vessel
identity of confidential sources and system are accurate, relevant, timely may enter the safety zone without
result in an unwarranted invasion of the and complete, but, in the interests of permission of the Captain of the Port
privacy of others. Disclosure may also effective law enforcement, it is (COTP).
reveal information relating to actual or necessary to retain this information to DATES: The regulation for the safety
potential criminal investigations. aid in establishing patterns of activity zones described in 33 CFR 165.160 will
Disclosure of classified national security and provide investigative leads. be enforced on the date and time listed
information would cause damage to the (xi) Subsection (e)(8). To serve notice
in the table below.
national security of the United States. could give persons sufficient warning to
Disclosure could also interfere with a evade investigative efforts. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: If
civil or administrative action or (xii) Subsection (g). This subsection is you have questions on this notice, call
investigation; reveal the identity of inapplicable to the extent that the or email Petty Officer First Class Ronald
confidential sources incident to Federal system is exempt from other specific Sampert U.S. Coast Guard; telephone
employment, military service, contract, subsections of the Privacy Act. 718–354–4154, email ronald.j.sampert@
and security clearance determinations; (4) In addition, in the course of uscg.mil.
and reveal the confidentiality and carrying out analysis for insider threats, SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
integrity of Federal testing materials and exempt records from other systems of The Coast Guard will enforce the
evaluation materials used for military records may in turn become part of the safety zones listed in 33 CFR 165.160 on
promotions when furnished by a case records maintained in this system. the specified dates and times as
confidential source. To the extent that copies of exempt indicated in Table 1 below. This
(iv) Subsection (d)(2). Amendment of records from those other systems of regulation was published in the Federal
the records could interfere with ongoing records are maintained into this system, Register on November 9, 2011 (76 FR
criminal or civil law enforcement the DoD claims the same exemptions for 69614).
TABLE 1
3. Tzell Travel Group Liberty Island Safety Zone 33 CFR • Launch site: A barge located in approximate position 40°41′16.5″ N.,
jstallworth on DSK7TPTVN1PROD with RULES
165.160(2.1). 074°02′23″ W. (NAD 1983), approximately 360 yards east of Liberty
Island. This Safety Zone is a 240-yard radius from the barge.
• Date: October 27, 2016.
• Time: 8:50 p.m.–10:30 p.m.
VerDate Sep<11>2014 14:00 Oct 14, 2016 Jkt 241001 PO 00000 Frm 00057 Fmt 4700 Sfmt 4700 E:\FR\FM\17OCR1.SGM 17OCR1](https://thefederalregister.org/doc/81_FR_71578/page/4.svg)
Document Created: 2016-10-15 01:52:06
Document Modified: 2016-10-15 01:52:06
| Category | Regulatory Information | |
| Collection | Federal Register | |
| sudoc Class | AE 2.7: GS 4.107: AE 2.106: | |
| Publisher | Office of the Federal Register, National Archives and Records Administration | |
| Section | Rules and Regulations | |
| Action | Final rule. | |
| Contact | Cindy Allard, Chief, of the Defense Privacy, Civil Liberties, and Transparency Division, 703-571-0070. | |
| FR Citation | 81 FR 71378 |
2025 Federal Register | Disclaimer | Privacy Policy
USC | CFR | eCFR