81_FR_89420 81 FR 89183 - Pipeline Safety: Safeguarding and Securing Pipelines From Unauthorized Access

81 FR 89183 - Pipeline Safety: Safeguarding and Securing Pipelines From Unauthorized Access

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration

Federal Register Volume 81, Issue 237 (December 9, 2016)

Page Range89183-89184
FR Document2016-29500

PHMSA is issuing this Advisory Bulletin in coordination with the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS), Transportation Security Administration (TSA), to remind all pipeline owners and operators of the importance of safeguarding and securing their pipeline facilities and monitoring their Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems for abnormal operations and/or indications of unauthorized access or interference with safe pipeline operations. Additionally, this Advisory Bulletin is to remind the public of the dangers associated with tampering with pipeline system facilities. This Advisory Bulletin follows recent incidents in the United States that highlight threats to oil and gas infrastructure. On October 11, 2016, several unauthorized persons accessed and interfered with pipeline operations in four states, creating the potential for serious infrastructure damage and significant economic and environmental harm, as well as endangering public safety. While the incidents did not result in any damage or injuries, the potential impacts emphasize the need for increased awareness and vigilance.

Federal Register, Volume 81 Issue 237 (Friday, December 9, 2016)
[Federal Register Volume 81, Number 237 (Friday, December 9, 2016)]
[Notices]
[Pages 89183-89184]
From the Federal Register Online  [www.thefederalregister.org]
[FR Doc No: 2016-29500]


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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration

[Docket No. PHMSA-2016-0137)


Pipeline Safety: Safeguarding and Securing Pipelines From 
Unauthorized Access

AGENCY: Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA); 
DOT.

ACTION: Notice; issuance of Advisory Bulletin.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: PHMSA is issuing this Advisory Bulletin in coordination with 
the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS), Transportation Security 
Administration (TSA), to remind all pipeline owners and operators of 
the importance of safeguarding and securing their pipeline facilities 
and monitoring their Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) 
systems for abnormal operations and/or indications of unauthorized 
access or interference with safe pipeline operations. Additionally, 
this Advisory Bulletin is to remind the public of the dangers 
associated with tampering with pipeline system facilities.
    This Advisory Bulletin follows recent incidents in the United 
States that highlight threats to oil and gas infrastructure. On October 
11, 2016, several unauthorized persons accessed and interfered with 
pipeline operations in four states, creating the potential for serious 
infrastructure damage and significant economic and environmental harm, 
as well as endangering public safety. While the incidents did not 
result in any damage or injuries, the potential impacts emphasize the 
need for increased awareness and vigilance.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Operators of pipelines subject to 
regulation by DOT, PHMSA, should contact Nathan A. Schoenkin by phone 
at 202-366-4774 or by email at [email protected]. Information 
about PHMSA may be found at http://phmsa.dot.gov. Pipeline operators 
with questions on TSA's Pipeline Security Guidelines should contact 
Steven Froehlich by phone at 571-227-1240 or by email at 
[email protected].

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

I. Background

Incident Details

    On Tuesday October 11, 2016, individuals contacted four pipeline 
operators informing them they would shut down the pipelines used to 
transport crude oil from Canada to the United States. The operators 
(Enbridge, Kinder Morgan, Spectra Energy, and TransCanada) took steps 
to prevent damage to the pipelines and contacted local and federal law 
enforcement. The individuals cut the chains and padlocks at valve sites 
near Leonard, Minnesota; Burlington, Washington; Eagle Butte, Montana; 
and Wahalla, North Dakota. The individuals then closed valves on 
Enbridge's Lines 4 and 67, Spectra Energy's Express Pipeline, and 
TransCanada's Keystone Pipeline. The Kinder Morgan Trans Mountain's 
Puget Sound Pipeline was not operating at the time. Several individuals 
were arrested by local law enforcement.
    Had the pipeline operators not shut down their lines in response to 
the threats, a pipeline rupture could have occurred. A pipeline rupture 
due to tampering with valves can have significant consequences such as 
death, injury, and economic and environmental harm.

Pipeline Safety and Security

    PHMSA and TSA have a mutual interest in ensuring coordinated, 
consistent, and effective activities that improve interagency 
cooperation on transportation security and safety matters. PHMSA 
focuses on the safety of the Nation's pipelines and administers the 
pipeline safety regulatory program (49 CFR part 190-199). TSA focuses 
on the security of the Nation's pipelines and has authored Pipeline 
Security Guidelines for operators available online at https://www.tsa.gov/sites/default/files/tsapipelinesecurityguidelines-2011.pdf.

II. Advisory Bulletin (ADB-2016-06)

    To: Owners and Operators of Hazardous Liquid, Carbon Dioxide and 
Gas Pipelines
    Subject: Safeguarding and Securing Pipelines from Unauthorized 
Access
    Advisory: PHMSA is issuing this Advisory Bulletin in coordination 
with TSA to remind all pipeline owners and operators of the importance 
of safeguarding and securing their pipeline facilities and monitoring 
their SCADA systems for abnormal operations and/or indications of 
unauthorized access or interference with safe pipeline operations. 
Additionally, this Advisory Bulletin is to remind the public of the 
dangers associated with tampering with pipeline system facilities.

If You See Something, Say SomethingTM

    Tampering with pipeline facilities can have deleterious effects on 
the safety of the Nation's pipeline system. Tampering or acts of 
sabotage can also lead to the loss of life, injury, and significant 
harm to the economy and environment. At 49 CFR 190.291, any person that 
willingly and knowingly injures or destroys, or attempts to injure or 
destroy a pipeline facility is subject to a fine in Title 18 of the 
United States Code and imprisonment for a term not to exceed 20 years 
for each offense. Individuals are reminded that ``If you See Something, 
Say Something''TM applies to the safety and security of our 
national pipeline infrastructure. Individuals that see something 
suspicious should reach out to their local law enforcement. Informed, 
alert communities play a vital role in keeping our Nation's energy 
infrastructure safe. Emphasizing that ``Homeland Security Starts with 
Hometown Security,'' DHS encourages businesses to ``Connect, Plan for, 
Train, and Report''. Tools and resources to help businesses plan, 
prepare, and protect themselves from suspicious activities or attacks 
are located online at https://www.dhs.gov/hometown-security.

Relationships With Local Law Enforcement

    PHMSA reminds pipeline operators that a strong relationship with 
local law enforcement is extremely beneficial for safe pipeline 
operations. Two-way communications between operators and law 
enforcement can help to stop threats before they occur. Relationships 
should be cultivated well in advance of an incident to facilitate 
mutually dependable communication during an incident.

[[Page 89184]]

Increased Security Patrols

    Pipeline operators should consider increasing the frequency of 
security patrols along their right of ways. Operators may want to 
consider the use of new technologies to aid in pipeline security 
patrols, such as unmanned aerial systems if authorized in the areas of 
operation. Frequent patrols may help inform pipeline companies of 
individuals who regularly congregate near a pipeline, or of potentially 
unsafe conditions at a valve or pump station. Information regarding 
suspicious individuals should be promptly forwarded to federal, state, 
and local law enforcement.

Protection of Facilities

    PHMSA's Office of Pipeline Safety requires pipeline operators to 
provide protection for valves on hazardous liquid pipelines at 49 CFR 
195.420(c). Additionally, at 49 CFR 195.436, hazardous liquid pipeline 
operators are required to provide protection for each pumping station, 
breakout tank area, and other exposed facility from vandalism and 
unauthorized entry. Furthermore, at 49 CFR 192.179(b)(1), natural and 
other gas pipeline operators must ensure that the valve and operating 
device to open or close the valve must be protected from tampering and 
damage. PHMSA recommends that pipeline operators review their valve and 
facility protection measures and consider taking additional steps to 
secure them.
    Operators should evaluate what type of locks and security fences 
are being used at valve stations and if they are capable of preventing 
unauthorized personnel from gaining access to pipeline valve 
facilities. Pipeline operators may choose to make mechanical operation 
of valves more difficult without proper equipment.
    The use of deterrent text and signage at pipeline facilities may be 
beneficial to decrease acts of sabotage against a pipeline facility. 
The text should include the potential consequences if a valve is closed 
improperly and a rupture was to occur. Additionally the deterrent text 
should include reference to the PHMSA regulation found at 49 CFR 
190.291 discussing the criminal penalties for tampering with pipeline 
facilities. Remote facilities should consider equipping the facilities 
with motion sensing cameras and/or motion detectors to alert control 
centers of tampering.

SCADA System Monitoring

    Due to the criticality of SCADA systems in the safe operations of a 
pipeline, operators should have strong protocols in place to ensure the 
systems will not be tampered with. SCADA systems can be tampered with 
or disabled by a physical or cyber vector. PHMSA is aware of prior 
intrusion attempts on pipeline infrastructure. An operator should 
harden physical and software borders around SCADA systems to limit the 
risk to the safe operation of pipelines. The following methods can be 
used to harden the software and physical borders around the SCADA 
system: (1) Segregating the control system network from the corporate 
network; (2) Limiting remote connection ports to the control system, 
and if necessary requiring token-based authentication to gain access; 
(3) Adding physical protection around remote sites with SCADA network 
access; (4) Enhancing user access control on SCADA system networks and 
devices and limiting access to critical system to individuals with a 
safety/business need; and [5] Employing application whitelisting and 
strict policies on peripheral devices (to include removable media, 
printers, scanners, etc.) connected to the SCADA network.
    Furthermore, DHS's Industrial Control System Cyber Emergency 
Response Team (ICS-CERT) developed a guidance document titled: 
``Recommended Practice: Improving Industrial Control System 
Cybersecurity with Defense-in-Depth Strategies.'' The document provides 
guidance for developing mitigation strategies for specific cyber 
threats and direction on how to create a Defense-in-Depth security 
program for control system environments, and is available online at 
https://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/sites/default/files/recommended_practices/NCCIC_ICS-CERT_Defense_in_Depth_2016_S508C.pdf.

Incident and Accident Reporting

    Operators are reminded that incidents and accidents must be 
promptly reported to the appropriate federal, state, and local agency. 
Requirements for immediate notification of certain incident and 
accident reporting requirements are found at 49 CFR 191.5 and 195.52. 
Furthermore, since tampering with a pipeline can lead to a release, 
PHMSA recommends that operators should contact the National Response 
Center by telephone to 800-424-8802 (in Washington, DC, 202-267-2675) 
following any physical security event that may interfere with the safe 
operation of a pipeline. Please note only ``unclassified'' incident 
details should be reported by phone to the National Response Center.
    TSA recommends in its Pipeline Security Guidelines that pipeline 
operators notify the Transportation Security Operations Center via 
phone at 866-615-5150 or email at [email protected] as soon as possible 
to report security concerns or suspicious activity. Furthermore it is 
recommended that pipeline operators notify DHS's ICS-CERT if the 
operator has an Industrial Control System concern with a cyber security 
nexus. Operators can report to ICS-CERT by emailing [email protected] 
or by calling 877-776-7585.
    PHMSA has coordinated with several components within DHS and the 
Department of Energy on this Advisory Bulletin.

    Issued in Washington, DC, on December 5, 2016, under authority 
delegated in 49 CFR 1.97.
Alan K. Mayberry,
Acting Associate Administrator for Pipeline Safety.
[FR Doc. 2016-29500 Filed 12-8-16; 8:45 am]
 BILLING CODE 4910-60-P



                                                                               Federal Register / Vol. 81, No. 237 / Friday, December 9, 2016 / Notices                                             89183

                                                  until the period of availability expires,               harm, as well as endangering public                   default/files/
                                                  the funds are fully expended, the funds                 safety. While the incidents did not                   tsapipelinesecurityguidelines-2011.pdf.
                                                  are rescinded by Congress, or the funds                 result in any damage or injuries, the
                                                                                                                                                                II. Advisory Bulletin (ADB–2016–06)
                                                  are otherwise reallocated. To meet                      potential impacts emphasize the need
                                                  program oversight responsibilities, FTA                 for increased awareness and vigilance.                   To: Owners and Operators of
                                                  must continue to collect information                                                                          Hazardous Liquid, Carbon Dioxide and
                                                                                                          FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
                                                  until the period of availability expires,                                                                     Gas Pipelines
                                                                                                          Operators of pipelines subject to                        Subject: Safeguarding and Securing
                                                  the funds are fully expended, the funds                 regulation by DOT, PHMSA, should
                                                  are rescinded by Congress, or the funds                                                                       Pipelines from Unauthorized Access
                                                                                                          contact Nathan A. Schoenkin by phone                     Advisory: PHMSA is issuing this
                                                  are otherwise reallocated.                              at 202–366–4774 or by email at
                                                    Respondents: States, Metropolitan                                                                           Advisory Bulletin in coordination with
                                                                                                          Nathan.Schoenkin@dot.gov.                             TSA to remind all pipeline owners and
                                                  Planning Organizations, and Local                       Information about PHMSA may be
                                                  Governmental Authorities.                                                                                     operators of the importance of
                                                                                                          found at http://phmsa.dot.gov. Pipeline               safeguarding and securing their pipeline
                                                    Estimated Annual Burden on                            operators with questions on TSA’s
                                                  Respondents: 15 hours for each of the                                                                         facilities and monitoring their SCADA
                                                                                                          Pipeline Security Guidelines should                   systems for abnormal operations and/or
                                                  respondents.                                            contact Steven Froehlich by phone at
                                                    Estimated Total Annual Burden: 303                                                                          indications of unauthorized access or
                                                                                                          571–227–1240 or by email at                           interference with safe pipeline
                                                  hours.                                                  Steven.Froehlich@tsa.dhs.gov.
                                                    Frequency: Annual.                                                                                          operations. Additionally, this Advisory
                                                                                                          SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:                            Bulletin is to remind the public of the
                                                  William Hyre,                                                                                                 dangers associated with tampering with
                                                                                                          I. Background
                                                  Deputy Associate Administrator for                                                                            pipeline system facilities.
                                                  Administration.                                         Incident Details
                                                                                                                                                                If You See Something, Say SomethingTM
                                                  [FR Doc. 2016–29505 Filed 12–8–16; 8:45 am]
                                                                                                             On Tuesday October 11, 2016,                          Tampering with pipeline facilities can
                                                  BILLING CODE P
                                                                                                          individuals contacted four pipeline                   have deleterious effects on the safety of
                                                                                                          operators informing them they would                   the Nation’s pipeline system. Tampering
                                                  DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION                            shut down the pipelines used to                       or acts of sabotage can also lead to the
                                                                                                          transport crude oil from Canada to the                loss of life, injury, and significant harm
                                                  Pipeline and Hazardous Materials                        United States. The operators (Enbridge,               to the economy and environment. At 49
                                                  Safety Administration                                   Kinder Morgan, Spectra Energy, and                    CFR 190.291, any person that willingly
                                                                                                          TransCanada) took steps to prevent                    and knowingly injures or destroys, or
                                                  [Docket No. PHMSA–2016–0137)                            damage to the pipelines and contacted                 attempts to injure or destroy a pipeline
                                                                                                          local and federal law enforcement. The                facility is subject to a fine in Title 18 of
                                                  Pipeline Safety: Safeguarding and                       individuals cut the chains and padlocks
                                                  Securing Pipelines From Unauthorized                                                                          the United States Code and
                                                                                                          at valve sites near Leonard, Minnesota;               imprisonment for a term not to exceed
                                                  Access                                                  Burlington, Washington; Eagle Butte,                  20 years for each offense. Individuals
                                                  AGENCY:   Pipeline and Hazardous                        Montana; and Wahalla, North Dakota.                   are reminded that ‘‘If you See
                                                  Materials Safety Administration                         The individuals then closed valves on                 Something, Say Something’’TM applies
                                                  (PHMSA); DOT.                                           Enbridge’s Lines 4 and 67, Spectra                    to the safety and security of our national
                                                  ACTION: Notice; issuance of Advisory                    Energy’s Express Pipeline, and                        pipeline infrastructure. Individuals that
                                                  Bulletin.                                               TransCanada’s Keystone Pipeline. The                  see something suspicious should reach
                                                                                                          Kinder Morgan Trans Mountain’s Puget                  out to their local law enforcement.
                                                  SUMMARY:   PHMSA is issuing this                        Sound Pipeline was not operating at the               Informed, alert communities play a vital
                                                  Advisory Bulletin in coordination with                  time. Several individuals were arrested               role in keeping our Nation’s energy
                                                  the Department of Homeland Security’s                   by local law enforcement.                             infrastructure safe. Emphasizing that
                                                  (DHS), Transportation Security                             Had the pipeline operators not shut                ‘‘Homeland Security Starts with
                                                  Administration (TSA), to remind all                     down their lines in response to the                   Hometown Security,’’ DHS encourages
                                                  pipeline owners and operators of the                    threats, a pipeline rupture could have                businesses to ‘‘Connect, Plan for, Train,
                                                  importance of safeguarding and securing                 occurred. A pipeline rupture due to                   and Report’’. Tools and resources to
                                                  their pipeline facilities and monitoring                tampering with valves can have                        help businesses plan, prepare, and
                                                  their Supervisory Control and Data                      significant consequences such as death,               protect themselves from suspicious
                                                  Acquisition (SCADA) systems for                         injury, and economic and                              activities or attacks are located online at
                                                  abnormal operations and/or indications                  environmental harm.                                   https://www.dhs.gov/hometown-
                                                  of unauthorized access or interference                                                                        security.
                                                                                                          Pipeline Safety and Security
                                                  with safe pipeline operations.
                                                  Additionally, this Advisory Bulletin is                    PHMSA and TSA have a mutual                        Relationships With Local Law
                                                  to remind the public of the dangers                     interest in ensuring coordinated,                     Enforcement
                                                  associated with tampering with pipeline                 consistent, and effective activities that               PHMSA reminds pipeline operators
                                                  system facilities.                                      improve interagency cooperation on                    that a strong relationship with local law
                                                    This Advisory Bulletin follows recent                 transportation security and safety                    enforcement is extremely beneficial for
                                                  incidents in the United States that                     matters. PHMSA focuses on the safety of               safe pipeline operations. Two-way
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                                                  highlight threats to oil and gas                        the Nation’s pipelines and administers                communications between operators and
                                                  infrastructure. On October 11, 2016,                    the pipeline safety regulatory program                law enforcement can help to stop threats
                                                  several unauthorized persons accessed                   (49 CFR part 190–199). TSA focuses on                 before they occur. Relationships should
                                                  and interfered with pipeline operations                 the security of the Nation’s pipelines                be cultivated well in advance of an
                                                  in four states, creating the potential for              and has authored Pipeline Security                    incident to facilitate mutually
                                                  serious infrastructure damage and                       Guidelines for operators available                    dependable communication during an
                                                  significant economic and environmental                  online at https://www.tsa.gov/sites/                  incident.


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                                                  89184                        Federal Register / Vol. 81, No. 237 / Friday, December 9, 2016 / Notices

                                                  Increased Security Patrols                              pipeline, operators should have strong                  TSA recommends in its Pipeline
                                                    Pipeline operators should consider                    protocols in place to ensure the systems              Security Guidelines that pipeline
                                                  increasing the frequency of security                    will not be tampered with. SCADA                      operators notify the Transportation
                                                  patrols along their right of ways.                      systems can be tampered with or                       Security Operations Center via phone at
                                                  Operators may want to consider the use                  disabled by a physical or cyber vector.               866–615–5150 or email at TSOC.ST@
                                                                                                          PHMSA is aware of prior intrusion                     dhs.gov as soon as possible to report
                                                  of new technologies to aid in pipeline
                                                                                                          attempts on pipeline infrastructure. An               security concerns or suspicious activity.
                                                  security patrols, such as unmanned
                                                                                                          operator should harden physical and                   Furthermore it is recommended that
                                                  aerial systems if authorized in the areas
                                                                                                          software borders around SCADA                         pipeline operators notify DHS’s ICS–
                                                  of operation. Frequent patrols may help
                                                                                                          systems to limit the risk to the safe                 CERT if the operator has an Industrial
                                                  inform pipeline companies of
                                                                                                          operation of pipelines. The following                 Control System concern with a cyber
                                                  individuals who regularly congregate
                                                                                                          methods can be used to harden the                     security nexus. Operators can report to
                                                  near a pipeline, or of potentially unsafe
                                                                                                          software and physical borders around                  ICS–CERT by emailing ics-cert@
                                                  conditions at a valve or pump station.
                                                                                                          the SCADA system: (1) Segregating the                 hq.dhs.gov or by calling 877–776–7585.
                                                  Information regarding suspicious                                                                                PHMSA has coordinated with several
                                                                                                          control system network from the
                                                  individuals should be promptly                          corporate network; (2) Limiting remote                components within DHS and the
                                                  forwarded to federal, state, and local                  connection ports to the control system,               Department of Energy on this Advisory
                                                  law enforcement.                                        and if necessary requiring token-based                Bulletin.
                                                  Protection of Facilities                                authentication to gain access; (3)                      Issued in Washington, DC, on December 5,
                                                                                                          Adding physical protection around                     2016, under authority delegated in 49 CFR
                                                     PHMSA’s Office of Pipeline Safety
                                                                                                          remote sites with SCADA network                       1.97.
                                                  requires pipeline operators to provide
                                                                                                          access; (4) Enhancing user access                     Alan K. Mayberry,
                                                  protection for valves on hazardous
                                                                                                          control on SCADA system networks and                  Acting Associate Administrator for Pipeline
                                                  liquid pipelines at 49 CFR 195.420(c).
                                                                                                          devices and limiting access to critical               Safety.
                                                  Additionally, at 49 CFR 195.436,
                                                                                                          system to individuals with a safety/                  [FR Doc. 2016–29500 Filed 12–8–16; 8:45 am]
                                                  hazardous liquid pipeline operators are                 business need; and [5] Employing
                                                  required to provide protection for each                                                                       BILLING CODE 4910–60–P
                                                                                                          application whitelisting and strict
                                                  pumping station, breakout tank area,                    policies on peripheral devices (to
                                                  and other exposed facility from                         include removable media, printers,
                                                  vandalism and unauthorized entry.                                                                             DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS
                                                                                                          scanners, etc.) connected to the SCADA                AFFAIRS
                                                  Furthermore, at 49 CFR 192.179(b)(1),                   network.
                                                  natural and other gas pipeline operators                   Furthermore, DHS’s Industrial Control
                                                  must ensure that the valve and                                                                                MyVA Federal Advisory Committee;
                                                                                                          System Cyber Emergency Response                       Notice of Meeting
                                                  operating device to open or close the                   Team (ICS–CERT) developed a guidance
                                                  valve must be protected from tampering                  document titled: ‘‘Recommended                           The Department of Veterans Affairs
                                                  and damage. PHMSA recommends that                       Practice: Improving Industrial Control                (VA) gives notice under the Federal
                                                  pipeline operators review their valve                   System Cybersecurity with Defense-in-                 Advisory Committee Act, 5 U.S.C. App.
                                                  and facility protection measures and                    Depth Strategies.’’ The document                      2., that the MyVA Advisory Committee
                                                  consider taking additional steps to                     provides guidance for developing                      (MVAC) will meet January 10–11, 2017,
                                                  secure them.                                            mitigation strategies for specific cyber              at the Department of Veterans Affairs,
                                                     Operators should evaluate what type                  threats and direction on how to create                Georgetown University Lohrfink
                                                  of locks and security fences are being                  a Defense-in-Depth security program for               Auditorium—Ground Floor,
                                                  used at valve stations and if they are                  control system environments, and is                   Georgetown McDonough School of
                                                  capable of preventing unauthorized                      available online at https://ics-cert.us-              Business, Rafik B. Hariri Building, 37th
                                                  personnel from gaining access to                        cert.gov/sites/default/files/                         and O Street NW., Washington, DC
                                                  pipeline valve facilities. Pipeline                     recommended_practices/NCCIC_ICS-                      20057. The meeting is open to the
                                                  operators may choose to make                            CERT_Defense_in_Depth_2016_                           public.
                                                  mechanical operation of valves more                     S508C.pdf.                                               The purpose of the Committee is to
                                                  difficult without proper equipment.                                                                           advise the Secretary, through the
                                                     The use of deterrent text and signage                Incident and Accident Reporting                       Executive Director, MyVA Task Force
                                                  at pipeline facilities may be beneficial to               Operators are reminded that incidents               Office, regarding the MyVA initiative
                                                  decrease acts of sabotage against a                     and accidents must be promptly                        and VA’s ability to rebuild trust with
                                                  pipeline facility. The text should                      reported to the appropriate federal,                  Veterans and other stakeholders,
                                                  include the potential consequences if a                 state, and local agency. Requirements                 improve service delivery with a focus
                                                  valve is closed improperly and a rupture                for immediate notification of certain                 on Veteran outcomes, and set the course
                                                  was to occur. Additionally the deterrent                incident and accident reporting                       for longer-term excellence and reform of
                                                  text should include reference to the                    requirements are found at 49 CFR 191.5                VA.
                                                  PHMSA regulation found at 49 CFR                        and 195.52. Furthermore, since                           On January 10, from 8:00 a.m. to 6:00
                                                  190.291 discussing the criminal                         tampering with a pipeline can lead to a               p.m., the Committee will convene an
                                                  penalties for tampering with pipeline                   release, PHMSA recommends that                        open session to discuss the progress on
                                                  facilities. Remote facilities should                    operators should contact the National                 and the integration of the work in the
                                                                                                          Response Center by telephone to 800–                  five key MyVA work streams—Veteran
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                                                  consider equipping the facilities with
                                                  motion sensing cameras and/or motion                    424–8802 (in Washington, DC, 202–                     Experience (explaining the efforts
                                                  detectors to alert control centers of                   267–2675) following any physical                      conducted to improve the Veteran’s
                                                  tampering.                                              security event that may interfere with                experience), Employees Experience,
                                                                                                          the safe operation of a pipeline. Please              Support Services Excellence (such as
                                                  SCADA System Monitoring                                 note only ‘‘unclassified’’ incident                   information technology, human
                                                    Due to the criticality of SCADA                       details should be reported by phone to                resources, and finance), Performance
                                                  systems in the safe operations of a                     the National Response Center.                         Improvement (projects undertaken to


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Document Created: 2018-02-14 09:03:35
Document Modified: 2018-02-14 09:03:35
CategoryRegulatory Information
CollectionFederal Register
sudoc ClassAE 2.7:
GS 4.107:
AE 2.106:
PublisherOffice of the Federal Register, National Archives and Records Administration
SectionNotices
ActionNotice; issuance of Advisory Bulletin.
ContactOperators of pipelines subject to regulation by DOT, PHMSA, should contact Nathan A. Schoenkin by phone at 202-366-4774 or by email at [email protected] Information about PHMSA may be found at http://phmsa.dot.gov. Pipeline operators with questions on TSA's Pipeline Security Guidelines should contact Steven Froehlich by phone at 571-227-1240 or by email at [email protected]
FR Citation81 FR 89183 

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