81 FR 94277 - Transponder Requirement for Gliders; Withdrawal
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration Federal Register Volume 81, Issue 247 (December 23, 2016)
Federal Aviation Administration
Federal Register Volume 81, Issue 247 (December 23, 2016)
| Page Range | 94277-94281 | |
| FR Document | 2016-30910 |
[Federal Register Volume 81, Number 247 (Friday, December 23, 2016)] [Proposed Rules] [Pages 94277-94281] From the Federal Register Online [www.thefederalregister.org] [FR Doc No: 2016-30910] ======================================================================= ----------------------------------------------------------------------- DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION Federal Aviation Administration 14 CFR Part 91 [Docket No. FAA-2015-2147; Notice No. 15-05] RIN 2120-AK51 Transponder Requirement for Gliders; Withdrawal AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT. ACTION: Advance notice of proposed rulemaking (ANPRM); withdrawal. ----------------------------------------------------------------------- SUMMARY: The FAA is withdrawing a previously published advance notice of proposed rulemaking that sought public comment from interested persons involving glider operations in the National Airspace System. The action responded to recommendations from members of Congress and the National Transportation Safety Board and was intended to gather information to determine whether the current glider exception from transponder equipage and use provides the appropriate level of safety in the National Airspace System. The FAA is withdrawing that action because the limited safety benefit gained does not justify the high cost of equipage. DATES: This action becomes effective December 23, 2016. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For technical questions concerning this action, contact Patrick J. Moorman, Airspace Regulations Team, AJV-113, Federal Aviation Administration, 800 Independence Avenue SW., Washington, DC 20591; telephone (202) 267-8783; email: [email protected]. SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Background On August 28, 2006, a Hawker 800XP aircraft \1\ and a Schleicher ASW27-18 glider were involved in a non-fatal midair collision near Reno, Nevada. The collision occurred in flight about 42 nautical miles (NM) south-southeast of the Reno-Tahoe International Airport (RNO), at an altitude of about 16,000 feet (ft.) above mean sea level (MSL), and in an area where gliders are excepted from the transponder equipment requirements in Title 14, section 91.215(b), of the Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR).\2\ The glider was equipped with a transponder, but the transponder was not turned on at the time of the accident. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\ The Hawker 800XP aircraft was equipped with a Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System (TCAS). TCAS is a family of airborne devices that function independently of the ground-based air traffic control (ATC) system, and provide collision avoidance protection for a broad spectrum of aircraft types. All TCAS systems provide some degree of collision threat alerting, and a traffic display. \2\ The exceptions to the rule allow aircraft that were originally certificated without an engine-driven electrical system, such as balloons and gliders, to be operated in the following areas without a transponder: within a 30 nautical mile radius (NMR) of the 36 listed airports listed in Appendix D to part 91 (Mode C veil), provided aircraft remain outside the Class A, B, or C airspace and are below the ceiling of the airspace designated for the Class B or C airport, or 10,000 feet MSL, whichever is lower; above 10,000 feet MSL; and in the airspace from the surface to 10,000 feet MSL within a 10 NMR of any airport listed in appendix D, excluding the airspace below 1,200 feet outside of the lateral boundaries of the surface area of the airspace designated for that airport. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- On March 31, 2008, the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) provided safety recommendations to the FAA resulting from an investigation of the accident.\3\ The findings of the accident investigation address the limitations of the see-and-avoid concept in preventing midair collisions and, more specifically, the benefits of using transponders in gliders for collision avoidance. The NTSB recommended that the FAA remove the glider exceptions pertaining to the transponder equipment and use requirements, finding that ``transponders are critical to alerting pilots and controllers to the presence of nearby traffic so that collisions can be avoided.'' --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \3\ A-08-10 through 13, Safety Recommendations. National Transportation Safety Board, Washington, DC 20594, March 31, 2008. A copy of this letter has been placed in the docket. www.regulations.gov docket FAA-2005-2147. Note: while NTSB used the term ``exemption'' the correct term as it relates to this airspace is ``excepted.'' --------------------------------------------------------------------------- On June 16, 2015, the FAA published an Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPRM) to respond to recommendations from two members of Congress \4\ and the NTSB. 80 FR 34346. The ANPRM requested comments on a proposed rulemaking that would require gliders operating in the National Airspace System (NAS) to be equipped with transponders. The FAA did not propose specific regulatory changes but rather sought public comment on the use of transponders in gliders operating within the excepted areas of Sec. 91.215. The ANPRM also sought input on more recent alternatives to glider equipage including the use of Traffic Awareness Beacon System (TABS) \5\ and Automatic Dependent Surveillance Broadcast (ADS-B) Out equipment.\6\ The FAA asked for comments from the public and industry to aid in the development of a proposed rule and the analysis of its economic impact. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \4\ The FAA received letters from Senator Harry Reid (D-NV) and Representative Mark E. Amodei (R-NV); Letters are posted to the docket at www.regulations.gov, docket no. FAA-2015-2147. \5\ TABS is a surveillance system derived from existing transponder and ADS-B requirements. It was developed to increase safety by providing a standard for a low cost surveillance solution for aircraft excepted from Sec. Sec. 91.215 and 91.225. An aircraft equipped with TABS is visible to other aircraft equipped with collision avoidance systems such as Traffic Advisory System (TAS), Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) I, TCAS-II, and ADS-B In. However, a TABS-equipped aircraft is not displayed to controllers. The FAA published Technical Standard Order (TSO)-C199, the standard for TABS, on October 10, 2014. \6\ ADS-B is a satellite-based surveillance system that uses Global Positioning System (GPS) technology to determine an aircraft's location, airspeed, and other data, and broadcasts that information to a network of ground stations, which relays the data to air traffic control displays, and to nearby aircraft equipped to receive the data via ADS-B In. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Overview of Withdrawal Based on the information gathered from the ANPRM and a review of the current operating environment, the FAA finds that it does not have sufficient basis to move forward with rulemaking at this time. While the FAA has determined it is not warranted to move forward with a proposal to remove the glider exception in Sec. 91.215, the FAA will continue to work with local glider communities to increase safety awareness. The FAA will also continue to consider surveillance system alternatives and to work with interested persons to mitigate the risk of aircraft collision with gliders. Further, the FAA recommends that all glider aircraft owners equip their gliders with a transponder meeting regulatory requirements, a rule-compliant ADS-B Out system, or a TABS device. Comment Summary The FAA received 231comments in response to its ANPRM. Of the 231 comments received, approximately 18 organizations and 213 individual or anonymous commenters responded. Approximately 161 comments were unfavorable (adverse), 52 comments were favorable, and 18 comments were [[Page 94278]] neutral. Of the 18 organizations that commented, 14 responded unfavorably (adverse), 2 favorably, and 2 were neutral. Three comments received after the comment period closed were also considered. The following organizations responded: Soaring Society of America (SSA), Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association (AOPA), Vintage Sailplane Association (VSA), Experimental Aircraft Association (EAA), Civil Air Patrol (CAP), National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), American Association for Justice (AAJ), and approximately 11 local soaring clubs or groups. Individual and anonymous commenters were representative of all pilot types: glider, general aviation (GA), airline and military, many commenters holding multiple ratings, with glider and general aviation pilots representing the majority. Individual and anonymous commenters in favor of removing the transponder exception were primarily concerned about safety, some relaying personal experiences not accompanied by supporting documentation, such as a near mid-air collision (NMAC) report.\7\ Several commenters recommended the FAA consider alternatives to transponder equipage, including ADS-B,TABS, or FLARM.\8\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \7\ An NMAC is an incident associated with the operation of an aircraft in which a possibility of a collision occurs as a result of proximity of less than 500 feet to another aircraft, or a report is received from flightcrew members stating that a collision hazard existed between two or more aircraft. A report does not necessarily involve the violation of regulations or error by the air traffic control system, nor does it necessarily represent an unsafe condition. The fact that flightcrew members initiate NMAC reports raises two important issues. First, to some degree the data likely will be subjective. This necessitates that considerable caution be exercised when evaluating individual NMAC reports. Second, it is most likely the number of NMAC reports filed will not represent the totality of such events. \8\ FLARM is an electronic system designed to alert pilots of potential collisions between aircraft. FLARM is approved by the European Aviation Safety Agency for fixed installation in certified aircraft. Aircraft equipped with FLARM (including a variant known as PowerFLARM that can receive transponder and ADS-B signals from other aircraft) are visible only to other FLARM-equipped aircraft. There is no FAA TSO for FLARM because FLARM uses proprietary technology rather than industry consensus standards. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- All comments are available for viewing in the rulemaking docket (FAA-2015-2147). To view comments, go to http://www.regulations.gov and insert the docket number. Discussion of Comments 1. Safety Benefit of Transponders Of the approximately 161 unfavorable (adverse) comments received, many addressed the high cost of transponder equipage and the limited safety benefit by requiring such equipage. During the ANPRM process, the FAA also reviewed glider midair and NMAC reports at the local and national level. After further analysis of safety related statistics, the FAA found that nationally, from August 2005 through August 2015, the Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) database reflects 1,841 reported NMAC for all airspace areas. Of these NMACs, 50 involve a glider and another aircraft type, or 2.72% of reported NMACs over a 10-year period for an average of 5NMACs per year. In 2008, the last year data was available for all aircraft categories, statistics show there were 236,519 active aircraft, including 1,914 gliders, or about 0.81% of the active fleet. Nationally, the removal of the glider exception from Sec. 91.215 would help to prevent those instances where a glider NMAC occurs with an aircraft equipped with a Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System (TCAS).9 10 However, instances where removal of the glider exception from Sec. 91.215 help prevent a glider NMAC due to increased air traffic controller awareness are assumed negligible overall, because the operating areas for gliders are often in places with little or no radar coverage. Furthermore, because gliders can maneuver rapidly, glider flight paths are difficult for the Air Traffic Control (ATC) automation system to accurately project. Over the 10-year period reviewed, of the 50 reported NMACs involving a glider and another aircraft type, 7 involved a glider and part 121 or 135 air carriers required to have TCAS. Using this analysis, removal of the glider exception from Sec. 91.215 has the potential to reduce the NMAC occurrences by about 0.70 occurrences per year, or about 2 NMACs every 3 years (0.38% of all reported NMACs per year over that period). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \9\ This assumes all gliders are equipped with a transponder. \10\ TCAS provides two types of advisories, a Traffic Advisory (TA) and a Resolution Advisory (RA). TCAS can provide both types of advisories using another aircraft's transponder signal. A TA provides an aural alert ``TRAFFIC, TRAFFIC'' to the flight crew and places the other aircraft on a cockpit display showing the other aircraft's position, altitude and movement relative to the TCAS- equipped aircraft. TCAS also computes the time to closest point of approach between the two aircraft. If this drops below a certain computed threshold, TCAS then provides a RA, which consists of aural commands and instrument cues to maneuver the aircraft vertically to avoid the threat. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Assuming all of these NMACs would occur between gliders and air carrier aircraft,\11\ this would represent an incremental NMAC hazard of approximately 3.8 x 10-8/flight hour to the air carrier aircraft, based on air carrier flight hour data for years 2010-2014 published on the NTSB's Web site. This rate of occurrence is within the acceptable hazard level guidelines for a Hazardous failure condition (not greater than the order of 1 x 10-7/flight hour) according to the FAA System Safety Handbook, Appendix B.\12\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \11\ Air carrier aircraft are the fleet segment of greatest safety concern to the FAA for this contemplated rulemaking. These aircraft are required by regulation to be TCAS-equipped. \12\ Appendix B of the FAA System Safety Handbook defines a hazardous failure condition as one that reduces the capability of the system or the operator ability to cope with adverse conditions to the extent that there would be: Large reduction in safety margin or functional capability; Crew physical distress/excessive workload such that operators cannot be relied upon to perform required tasks accurately or completely; Serious or fatal injury to small number of occupants of aircraft (except operators); or Fatal injury to ground personnel and/or general public. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Therefore, based on the nationwide rate of occurrence, safety risk data does not support a rule requiring glider operators to install a transponder device at this time. Furthermore, the number of gliders voluntarily equipping with collision avoidance systems has increased steadily. Per the General Aviation and Part 135 Activity Surveys, the number of gliders equipped with a transponder device has gone from 14% in 2006, to 24.3% in 2014, the last year this data was available.\13\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \13\ Number of active gliders with transponders: 2014 GA Survey, Avionics Tables, Table AV.6. https://www.faa.gov/data_research/aviation_data_statistics/general_aviation/. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Locally in the airspace surrounding Reno, Nevada, the NTSB noted four TCAS Resolution Advisory (RA) events in the 30 days prior to the accident, each between a glider and a TCAS-equipped transport category aircraft operated under 14 CFR part 121.\14\ For these RAs to occur, the glider involved in each RA would have to be flying with an operable transponder (turned on). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \14\ A-08-10 through 13, Safety Recommendations. National Transportation Safety Board, Washington, DC 20594, March 31, 2008. A copy of this letter is in the docket at www.regulations.gov, docket no. FAA-2015-2147. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Although this data supports the value of transponders in avoiding collisions, since the accident, the FAA and local glider community have also taken several measures to mitigate the risk of midair collisions within and around Reno, NV. First, advisory information on the heavy glider activity unique to the local area was published in official FAA flight information publications including the Chart Supplement, Special Notices, and Standard Terminal Arrival Routes (STARs) for Reno/Tahoe International Airport after the event. Second, on October 29, 2010, a Letter of Agreement (LOA) was signed between representatives for the local glider [[Page 94279]] community and ATC facilities having control over the airspace. The LOA establishes an area and procedures for glider operations within positive controlled airspace in the Reno area. By establishing this area and these procedures, the LOA enhances airspace awareness and communication among the Oakland Air Route Traffic Control Center, Northern California Terminal Radar Approach Control, and the Pacific Soaring Council. Additionally, the LOA outlines entry and exit procedures into the operating areas and identifies pilot responsibilities to increase communication and situational awareness in the Reno area.\15\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \15\ The LOA is posted in the docket at www.regulations.gov, docket no. FAA-2015-2147. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Finally, the local glider community has undertaken a successful education campaign to prevent further accidents. According to the SSA, ``Since the 2006 accident, the local glider community that flies near RNO has undertaken successfully to educate pilots on collision avoidance and to encourage the voluntary use of either FLARM or transponders. As a result of these voluntary efforts, the official ASRS database includes no new incidents with gliders not equipped with transponders in the RNO or MEV [Minden-Tahoe Airport] areas in [excepted] airspace since the release some 7 years ago of the NTSB report on the 2006 incident.'' \16\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \16\ SSA comment letter posted in the docket at www.regulations.gov, docket no. FAA-2015-2147. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The SSA, EAA, and several individual commenters opposing transponder equipage, noted that the glider involved in the 2006 Reno accident was equipped with a transponder, but at the time of the accident, the pilot operated the glider with the transponder turned off.\17\ The FAA acknowledges that in the 2006 accident, if the glider transponder were turned on, the Hawker aircraft would have received TCAS advisories. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \17\ 14 CFR 91.215(c) states: While in the airspace as specified in paragraph (b) of this section or in all controlled airspace, each person operating an aircraft equipped with an operable ATC transponder maintained in accordance with Sec. 91.413 of this part shall operate the transponder, including Mode C equipment if installed, and shall reply on the appropriate code or as assigned by ATC. This collision occurred at approximately 16,000 feet MSL in Class E airspace (which extends upward from 14,500 feet MSL to flight level 180 throughout the National Airspace System). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2. Estimating Glider Transponder Cost From Removal of Glider Exception Approximately 138 commenters discussed the cost of requiring gliders to equip with transponders.\18\ Of those 138 commenters discussing cost, there were just 20 comments that could be characterized as in favor of requiring gliders to equip with transponders to some degree. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \18\ Most comments addressed the cost of transponder equipage. A few comments addressed the cost to install other equipment such as ADS-B, TABS, and FLARM. The FAA sought comment on these technologies in the ANPRM. These alternatives and others are discussed later in this notice. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Three commenters stated that transponders were inexpensive, but as shown below these commenters underestimated the cost of glider transponders as ``in the few hundred dollar range'' or ``less than $2000'' and/or ignored the cost of installation or assumed installation was easy. They did not address the concern that about half the glider population does not have an electrical system, which significantly increases the cost of transponder installation. These commenters were contradicted by more than 30 commenters who provided specific cost estimates for glider transponders and installation costs. Another commenter, in favor of removing the glider exception because he believed that the safety benefits justified the costs, conceded that transponders ``are indeed costly.'' The FAA estimates the cost of requiring gliders to equip with transponders to be about $5,000 per glider and more than $7 million for the glider fleet. Owing to a lack of reliable data, the glider (and fleet) cost estimates do not take into account the possible significant cost of instrument panel modification. There may also be significant additional cost for older gliders that no longer have manufacturer support because they may require a FAA Form 337 (Major Repair and Alteration) approval if there is no prior approval (Supplemental Type Certificate (STC) or other previously approved installation). The fleet estimate assumes that (1) all active glider operators will want to operate in the currently excepted airspace and (2) the 990 inactive gliders (total glider population of 2781--1791 active gliders) in the fleet will deregister upon rule implementation.\19\ The $7 million fleet figure would be an underestimation to the extent these two assumptions are incorrect. Details of the estimates of cost per glider and glider fleet cost are shown in Table 1. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \19\ Total number of gliders and number of active gliders: 2014 GA Survey, Table 2.1. Table 1--Glider Transponder Unit Costs ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Item Cost Sources/notes ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Transponder.................... $2,339 Cost based on the Trig TT21 as it appears to be the most popular glider transponder. Cabling........................ 146 Aircraftspruce.com: Trig TT21 including custom harness--$2485. Antenna........................ 169 Cumulus-Soaring.com: RAMI AV-74-1 Blade Style Transponder or DME Antenna: ``. . . like the AV-74--but with longer mounting studs--which is nice when trying to mount it through a glider fuselage.'' Battery charger................ 25 ....................... ---------------- Total Nonrecurring hardware 2,679 ....................... Installation................... 1,300 Average of 32 ANPRM commenter estimates. ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Total Nonrecurring Cost 3,979 ....................... ---------------- Batteries (every 2.5 years).... 600 Battery choice based on comment by Philadelphia Glider Council: ``. . . one [LiFePO4]18AH or two- three 9 Ahs generally sufficient for 10 hrs of operation.'' CumulusSoaring.com: Bioenno Power BLF-1209 LiFePo4 Battery 12V, 9AHr $100, charger $25. Or BLF-1220 20AHr $205, charger $30. Duration based on ANPRM comments. Biannual inspection............ 800 $200 per inspection. Based on ANPRM comments. ---------------- [[Page 94280]] Total Recurring Costs...... 1,400 ....................... ------------------------------------------------------------------------ The nonrecurring and recurring unit costs required to estimate the cost of a rule change eliminating the glider transponder exception are shown in Table 1. The FAA estimates the costs of such a rule change over a ten-year period for the existing U.S. glider fleet. This estimation is shown in Table 2.\20\ The cost of a rule change for new production of existing glider models and new certifications is not estimated owing to a lack of the necessary forecasts. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \20\ The estimation takes into account an additional nonrecurring cost not shown in Table 1 of $400 for gliders without an electrical system. Table 2--Ten-Year Cost of Removing Glider Transponder Exception ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Non-recurring PV recurring Year Item costs Description costs costs @7% \21\ ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 0.................................. $3,979 Hardware & Installation.... $3,979 .............. 1.................................. .............. ........................... .............. .............. 2.................................. 200 Bi-annual Inspection....... .............. $175 2.5................................ 200 Battery Replacement........ .............. 169 3.................................. .............. ........................... .............. .............. 4.................................. 200 Bi-annual Inspection....... .............. 153 5.................................. 200 Battery Replacement........ .............. 143 6.................................. 200 Bi-annual Inspection....... .............. 133 7.................................. .............. ........................... .............. .............. 7.5................................ 200 Battery Replacement........ .............. 120 8.................................. 200 Bi-annual Inspection....... .............. 116 9.................................. .............. ........................... .............. .............. 10................................. .............. ........................... .............. .............. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- Totals......................... .............. ........................... 3,979 1,009 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \21\ A discount rate of 7 percent is recommended by Office of Management & Budget, Circular A-94, ``Guidelines and Discount Rates for Benefit-Cost Analysis of Federal Programs,'' October 29, 1992, p. 8. \22\ Number of active gliders with electrical systems gliders: 2014 GA Survey, Avionics Tables, Table AV.1. https://www.faa.gov/data_research/aviation_data_statistics/general_aviation/. \23\ Number of active gliders with transponders: 2014 GA Survey, Avionics Tables, Table AV.6. https://www.faa.gov/data_research/aviation_data_statistics/general_aviation/. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Total number of active gliders 1791 Cost/glider Total cost ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Gliders with electrical systems \22\............................ 699 .............. .............. Gliders with transponders \23\.................................. 461 .............. .............. Gliders without electrical systems.............................. 1092 400 436,800 Gliders without transponders.................................... 1330 4,988 6,633,798 Cost of rule removing glider exception...................... .............. .............. 7,070,598 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Note: Due to rounding, details may not add up to totals or multiply to products. Based on the risk reduction data discussed in the previous section and the estimated costs of equipage listed in this section, the FAA finds that the degree of risk reduction that could be expected by requiring transponder equipage for gliders does not justify the cost of requiring such equipage. 3. Alternatives to Transponders Several commenters called for ``low cost'' and ``affordable'' transponders (such as a portable transponder) and ADS-B, TABS, or FLARM equipment. The NTSB noted the FAA published a final rule on May 28, 2010, that added requirements for ADS-B Out equipage that, if combined with transponder usage, would result in increased traffic awareness and collision avoidance. The NTSB also commented in response to this ANPRM that TABS may be an acceptable alternative as it is detectable by both TCAS and ADS-B-In equipped aircraft. Since the 2006 accident, technologies have developed and alternatives are available that have the potential to mitigate risk, such as TABS, FLARM, ADS-B, local LOA with ATC facilities, and ongoing outreach and education. Of the technological solutions identified here, the ones that offer the best potential to avoid collision with TCAS- equipped aircraft (besides transponder equipage) are TABS or a rule- compliant ADS-B Out system, because those systems make the glider visible to TCAS-equipped aircraft, ATC or both. The TABS standard provides for a reduction in the transmission rate and allows for a ``non-aviation grade'' GPS engine, in order to drive unit cost down while still maintaining an acceptable level of service to be considered a client in the NAS, where collision avoidance and ADS-B systems coexist. There are currently no TSO authorization holders for TABS equipment. However, we are aware that certain manufacturers currently have TABS systems in development. Some commenters recommended that the FAA allow use of portable [[Page 94281]] transponders, stating they were lower cost than fixed transponder installations and relatively affordable. While portable transponders may meet the TSO performance requirements, they are not approved for use unless they are actually installed in the aircraft. A key reason for this is placement of the transponder antenna in the aircraft. If the transponder antenna is not placed correctly, the aircraft may not be electronically detectable to other aircraft or ATC. Other commenters recommended that the FAA encourage equipage of FLARM systems. In this regard, the FAA notes that a variant of FLARM, known as PowerFLARM, will make a transponder or ADS-B Out equipped aircraft detectable to the PowerFLARM-equipped aircraft (such as a glider). However, a glider that is equipped with any version of FLARM will not be electronically detectable to the other aircraft unless both aircraft are FLARM equipped. In view of these factors, the FAA concludes that FLARM systems may provide a safety benefit (particularly for avoidance of collisions between gliders, and for PowerFLARM equipped gliders, some benefit for avoidance of collisions with powered aircraft). However, the FAA does not view FLARM (including PowerFLARM) as the most effective system to support collision avoidance with powered aircraft since a FLARM system may not make the glider detectable to the aircraft that must give way. Transponders, TABS, and ADS-B Out offer better protection against collisions with powered aircraft because those systems aid visual acquisition of the glider by the powered aircraft flightcrew, consistent with right of way rules.\24\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \24\ Section 91.113(d)(2) states that ``A glider has the right of way over powered parachute, weight-shift-aircraft, airplane, or rotorcraft.'' --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The FAA will continue to consider surveillance system alternatives for gliders for their feasibility and potential to improve safety. 4. Other Comments Several commenters were in favor of removing the current glider exception for certain high-density airspace areas. One commenter, otherwise strongly in favor of removing the glider exception, suggested an exception for gliders involved in training below 5,000 feet above ground level (AGL). The FAA has determined not to propose any changes to the rules for specific airspace areas because the accident and incident history cited in the NTSB recommendation has occurred predominantly around one specific airspace area, Reno, NV. The FAA has determined that the post accident mitigations for the Reno area discussed previously in this notice mitigate the risk for that specific airspace. Another commenter stated, ``the FAA should make clear that installing a transponder, encoder, antenna, an extra battery or batteries and possible solar panels are all considered `minor modifications' which can be signed off by the installing technician based on his judgment.'' This commenter and several others, in opposition of the removal of the glider exception, also called for exceptions for older gliders. The FAA finds that rulemaking is not necessary at this time for any gliders, but points to current guidance available to assist in installation and approval of transponder systems in gliders and sailplanes for operators wishing to voluntarily equip.\25\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \25\ Information for Operators (InFO) 09009, Installation and Approval of Transponder Systems in Gliders/Sailplanes, dated June 10, 2009. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The AAJ listed glider color, construction materials, and slender profiles as contributing factors to lack of pilot visibility or radar detection and further identified Instrument Flight Rule congested areas as concerns of undeniable risk, especially the parameters of Class B airspace. These sentiments were largely shared amongst both adverse and favorable commenters, offering similar solutions or variations thereof. The FAA has discussed its determination regarding specific airspace areas above. With regard to the other comments identified here, the FAA's decision in this notice includes consideration of those comments. Reason for Withdrawal After consideration of all comments received, the FAA is withdrawing Notice No. 15-05. The FAA finds that the high cost of transponder equipage and the limited safety benefit that is likely to result from requiring such equipage do not support rulemaking at this time. Additionally, as discussed above, the FAA has determined that a proposal to require gliders to equip with ``low-cost'' alternatives to transponders is not supportable at this time. NTSB safety recommendations, resulting from the 2006 midair collision with a glider, indicated that although the glider was equipped with a transponder, the transponder was turned off. After further analysis of safety-related statistics over a 10-year period (August 2005-August 2015) the ASRS database reflects 1841 reported NMAC for all airspace areas. The FAA found data that indicates that removal of the glider exception from Sec. 91.215 would have the potential to reduce the NMAC occurrences by about 0.70 occurrences per year, or about 2 NMACs every 3 years (0.38% of all reported NMACs per year over that period). Conclusion When further testing, research, and conclusive data is available that reflect alternative mitigations, a broader, more harmonized proposal may better serve the public interest. Withdrawal of Notice No. 15-05 does not preclude the FAA from issuing another notice on the subject matter in the future or committing the agency to any future course of action. The agency will make any necessary changes to the regulations through a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) with the opportunity for public comment. Although the FAA has determined that a regulatory course of action is not warranted at this time, the FAA will continue to work with local glider communities, encourage the voluntary equipage of transponders in gliders and encourage the use of TABS. The FAA continues to recommend that all glider aircraft owners equip their gliders with a transponder meeting the requirements of Sec. 91.215(a), a rule-compliant ADS-B Out system, or a TABS device. In consideration of the above factors, the FAA withdraws Notice No. 15-05, published in 80 FR 34346, on June 16, 2015. Issued under authority provided by 49 U.S.C. 106(f), 44701(a), and 40103 in Washington, DC, on December 16, 2016. Gary A. Norek, Deputy Director, Airspace Services. [FR Doc. 2016-30910 Filed 12-22-16; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 4910-13-P
![Federal Register / Vol. 81, No. 247 / Friday, December 23, 2016 / Proposed Rules 94277
extended until February 20, 2017. This glider were involved in a non-fatal gliders operating in the National
action will allow interested persons midair collision near Reno, Nevada. The Airspace System (NAS) to be equipped
additional time to analyze the proposal collision occurred in flight about 42 with transponders. The FAA did not
and prepare their comments. nautical miles (NM) south-southeast of propose specific regulatory changes but
By order of the Board of Governors of the the Reno-Tahoe International Airport rather sought public comment on the
Federal Reserve System, acting through the (RNO), at an altitude of about 16,000 use of transponders in gliders operating
Secretary of the Board under delegated feet (ft.) above mean sea level (MSL), within the excepted areas of § 91.215.
authority, December 20, 2016. and in an area where gliders are The ANPRM also sought input on more
Robert deV. Frierson, excepted from the transponder recent alternatives to glider equipage
Secretary of the Board. equipment requirements in Title 14, including the use of Traffic Awareness
[FR Doc. 2016–30993 Filed 12–22–16; 8:45 am]
section 91.215(b), of the Code of Federal Beacon System (TABS) 5 and Automatic
Regulations (14 CFR).2 The glider was Dependent Surveillance Broadcast
BILLING CODE 6210–01–P
equipped with a transponder, but the (ADS–B) Out equipment.6 The FAA
transponder was not turned on at the asked for comments from the public and
time of the accident. industry to aid in the development of a
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION On March 31, 2008, the National proposed rule and the analysis of its
Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) economic impact.
Federal Aviation Administration
provided safety recommendations to the
FAA resulting from an investigation of Overview of Withdrawal
14 CFR Part 91 Based on the information gathered
the accident.3 The findings of the
[Docket No. FAA–2015–2147; Notice No. 15– accident investigation address the from the ANPRM and a review of the
05] limitations of the see-and-avoid concept current operating environment, the FAA
RIN 2120–AK51 in preventing midair collisions and, finds that it does not have sufficient
more specifically, the benefits of using basis to move forward with rulemaking
Transponder Requirement for Gliders; transponders in gliders for collision at this time. While the FAA has
Withdrawal avoidance. The NTSB recommended determined it is not warranted to move
that the FAA remove the glider forward with a proposal to remove the
AGENCY: Federal Aviation exceptions pertaining to the transponder glider exception in § 91.215, the FAA
Administration (FAA), DOT. equipment and use requirements, will continue to work with local glider
ACTION: Advance notice of proposed finding that ‘‘transponders are critical to communities to increase safety
rulemaking (ANPRM); withdrawal. alerting pilots and controllers to the awareness. The FAA will also continue
presence of nearby traffic so that to consider surveillance system
SUMMARY: The FAA is withdrawing a alternatives and to work with interested
collisions can be avoided.’’
previously published advance notice of On June 16, 2015, the FAA published persons to mitigate the risk of aircraft
proposed rulemaking that sought public an Advance Notice of Proposed collision with gliders. Further, the FAA
comment from interested persons Rulemaking (ANPRM) to respond to recommends that all glider aircraft
involving glider operations in the recommendations from two members of owners equip their gliders with a
National Airspace System. The action Congress 4 and the NTSB. 80 FR 34346. transponder meeting regulatory
responded to recommendations from The ANPRM requested comments on a requirements, a rule-compliant ADS–B
members of Congress and the National proposed rulemaking that would require Out system, or a TABS device.
Transportation Safety Board and was
intended to gather information to Comment Summary
(TCAS). TCAS is a family of airborne devices that
determine whether the current glider function independently of the ground-based air The FAA received 231comments in
exception from transponder equipage traffic control (ATC) system, and provide collision response to its ANPRM. Of the 231
and use provides the appropriate level avoidance protection for a broad spectrum of
aircraft types. All TCAS systems provide some comments received, approximately 18
of safety in the National Airspace degree of collision threat alerting, and a traffic organizations and 213 individual or
System. The FAA is withdrawing that display. anonymous commenters responded.
action because the limited safety benefit 2 The exceptions to the rule allow aircraft that
Approximately 161 comments were
gained does not justify the high cost of were originally certificated without an engine-
unfavorable (adverse), 52 comments
equipage. driven electrical system, such as balloons and
gliders, to be operated in the following areas were favorable, and 18 comments were
DATES: This action becomes effective without a transponder: within a 30 nautical mile
December 23, 2016. radius (NMR) of the 36 listed airports listed in 5 TABS is a surveillance system derived from
Appendix D to part 91 (Mode C veil), provided existing transponder and ADS–B requirements. It
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For
aircraft remain outside the Class A, B, or C airspace was developed to increase safety by providing a
technical questions concerning this and are below the ceiling of the airspace designated standard for a low cost surveillance solution for
action, contact Patrick J. Moorman, for the Class B or C airport, or 10,000 feet MSL, aircraft excepted from §§ 91.215 and 91.225. An
Airspace Regulations Team, AJV–113, whichever is lower; above 10,000 feet MSL; and in aircraft equipped with TABS is visible to other
the airspace from the surface to 10,000 feet MSL aircraft equipped with collision avoidance systems
Federal Aviation Administration, 800 within a 10 NMR of any airport listed in appendix such as Traffic Advisory System (TAS), Traffic
Independence Avenue SW., D, excluding the airspace below 1,200 feet outside Alert and Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) I,
Washington, DC 20591; telephone (202) of the lateral boundaries of the surface area of the TCAS–II, and ADS–B In. However, a TABS-
267–8783; email: patrick.moorman@ airspace designated for that airport. equipped aircraft is not displayed to controllers.
3 A–08–10 through 13, Safety Recommendations. The FAA published Technical Standard Order
faa.gov.
jstallworth on DSK7TPTVN1PROD with PROPOSALS
National Transportation Safety Board, Washington, (TSO)–C199, the standard for TABS, on October 10,
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: DC 20594, March 31, 2008. A copy of this letter has 2014.
been placed in the docket. www.regulations.gov 6 ADS–B is a satellite-based surveillance system
Background docket FAA–2005–2147. Note: while NTSB used that uses Global Positioning System (GPS)
the term ‘‘exemption’’ the correct term as it relates technology to determine an aircraft’s location,
On August 28, 2006, a Hawker 800XP to this airspace is ‘‘excepted.’’ airspeed, and other data, and broadcasts that
aircraft 1 and a Schleicher ASW27–18 4 The FAA received letters from Senator Harry information to a network of ground stations, which
Reid (D–NV) and Representative Mark E. Amodei relays the data to air traffic control displays, and to
1 The Hawker 800XP aircraft was equipped with (R–NV); Letters are posted to the docket at nearby aircraft equipped to receive the data via
a Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System www.regulations.gov, docket no. FAA–2015–2147. ADS–B In.
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![Federal Register / Vol. 81, No. 247 / Friday, December 23, 2016 / Proposed Rules 94279
community and ATC facilities having The SSA, EAA, and several individual estimates for glider transponders and
control over the airspace. The LOA commenters opposing transponder installation costs. Another commenter,
establishes an area and procedures for equipage, noted that the glider involved in favor of removing the glider
glider operations within positive in the 2006 Reno accident was equipped exception because he believed that the
controlled airspace in the Reno area. By with a transponder, but at the time of safety benefits justified the costs,
establishing this area and these the accident, the pilot operated the conceded that transponders ‘‘are indeed
procedures, the LOA enhances airspace glider with the transponder turned off.17 costly.’’
awareness and communication among The FAA acknowledges that in the 2006 The FAA estimates the cost of
the Oakland Air Route Traffic Control accident, if the glider transponder were requiring gliders to equip with
turned on, the Hawker aircraft would transponders to be about $5,000 per
Center, Northern California Terminal
have received TCAS advisories. glider and more than $7 million for the
Radar Approach Control, and the Pacific
Soaring Council. Additionally, the LOA 2. Estimating Glider Transponder Cost glider fleet. Owing to a lack of reliable
outlines entry and exit procedures into From Removal of Glider Exception data, the glider (and fleet) cost estimates
the operating areas and identifies pilot do not take into account the possible
Approximately 138 commenters
responsibilities to increase significant cost of instrument panel
discussed the cost of requiring gliders to
communication and situational modification. There may also be
equip with transponders.18 Of those 138
awareness in the Reno area.15 significant additional cost for older
commenters discussing cost, there were
gliders that no longer have manufacturer
Finally, the local glider community just 20 comments that could be
characterized as in favor of requiring support because they may require a
has undertaken a successful education FAA Form 337 (Major Repair and
campaign to prevent further accidents. gliders to equip with transponders to
some degree. Alteration) approval if there is no prior
According to the SSA, ‘‘Since the 2006 approval (Supplemental Type
Three commenters stated that
accident, the local glider community Certificate (STC) or other previously
transponders were inexpensive, but as
that flies near RNO has undertaken approved installation).
shown below these commenters
successfully to educate pilots on underestimated the cost of glider The fleet estimate assumes that (1) all
collision avoidance and to encourage transponders as ‘‘in the few hundred active glider operators will want to
the voluntary use of either FLARM or dollar range’’ or ‘‘less than $2000’’ and/ operate in the currently excepted
transponders. As a result of these or ignored the cost of installation or airspace and (2) the 990 inactive gliders
voluntary efforts, the official ASRS assumed installation was easy. They did (total glider population of 2781—1791
database includes no new incidents not address the concern that about half active gliders) in the fleet will deregister
with gliders not equipped with the glider population does not have an upon rule implementation.19 The $7
transponders in the RNO or MEV electrical system, which significantly million fleet figure would be an
[Minden-Tahoe Airport] areas in increases the cost of transponder underestimation to the extent these two
[excepted] airspace since the release installation. These commenters were assumptions are incorrect. Details of the
some 7 years ago of the NTSB report on contradicted by more than 30 estimates of cost per glider and glider
the 2006 incident.’’ 16 commenters who provided specific cost fleet cost are shown in Table 1.
TABLE 1—GLIDER TRANSPONDER UNIT COSTS
Item Cost Sources/notes
Transponder .............................................. $2,339 Cost based on the Trig TT21 as it appears to be the most popular glider trans-
ponder.
Cabling ...................................................... 146 Aircraftspruce.com: Trig TT21 including custom harness—$2485.
Antenna ..................................................... 169 Cumulus-Soaring.com: RAMI AV–74–1 Blade Style Transponder or DME Antenna:
‘‘. . . like the AV–74—but with longer mounting studs—which is nice when trying
to mount it through a glider fuselage.’’
Battery charger ......................................... 25
Total Nonrecurring hardware ............. 2,679
Installation ................................................. 1,300 Average of 32 ANPRM commenter estimates.
Total Nonrecurring Cost ............. 3,979
Batteries (every 2.5 years) ....................... 600 Battery choice based on comment by Philadelphia Glider Council: ‘‘. . . one
[LiFePO4]18AH or two-three 9 Ahs generally sufficient for 10 hrs of operation.’’
CumulusSoaring.com: Bioenno Power BLF–1209 LiFePo4 Battery 12V, 9AHr
$100, charger $25. Or BLF–1220 20AHr $205, charger $30. Duration based on
ANPRM comments.
Biannual inspection ................................... 800 $200 per inspection. Based on ANPRM comments.
jstallworth on DSK7TPTVN1PROD with PROPOSALS
15 The LOA is posted in the docket at § 91.413 of this part shall operate the transponder, the cost to install other equipment such as ADS–
www.regulations.gov, docket no. FAA–2015–2147. including Mode C equipment if installed, and shall B, TABS, and FLARM. The FAA sought comment
16 SSA comment letter posted in the docket at reply on the appropriate code or as assigned by on these technologies in the ANPRM. These
www.regulations.gov, docket no. FAA–2015–2147. ATC. This collision occurred at approximately alternatives and others are discussed later in this
17 14 CFR 91.215(c) states: While in the airspace 16,000 feet MSL in Class E airspace (which extends notice.
as specified in paragraph (b) of this section or in upward from 14,500 feet MSL to flight level 180 19 Total number of gliders and number of active
all controlled airspace, each person operating an throughout the National Airspace System).
aircraft equipped with an operable ATC 18 Most comments addressed the cost of gliders: 2014 GA Survey, Table 2.1.
transponder maintained in accordance with transponder equipage. A few comments addressed
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![Federal Register / Vol. 81, No. 247 / Friday, December 23, 2016 / Proposed Rules 94281
transponders, stating they were lower airspace area, Reno, NV. The FAA has the glider exception from § 91.215
cost than fixed transponder installations determined that the post accident would have the potential to reduce the
and relatively affordable. While portable mitigations for the Reno area discussed NMAC occurrences by about 0.70
transponders may meet the TSO previously in this notice mitigate the occurrences per year, or about 2 NMACs
performance requirements, they are not risk for that specific airspace. every 3 years (0.38% of all reported
approved for use unless they are Another commenter stated, ‘‘the FAA NMACs per year over that period).
actually installed in the aircraft. A key should make clear that installing a
transponder, encoder, antenna, an extra Conclusion
reason for this is placement of the
transponder antenna in the aircraft. If battery or batteries and possible solar When further testing, research, and
the transponder antenna is not placed panels are all considered ‘minor conclusive data is available that reflect
correctly, the aircraft may not be modifications’ which can be signed off alternative mitigations, a broader, more
electronically detectable to other aircraft by the installing technician based on his harmonized proposal may better serve
or ATC. judgment.’’ This commenter and several the public interest. Withdrawal of
Other commenters recommended that others, in opposition of the removal of Notice No. 15–05 does not preclude the
the FAA encourage equipage of FLARM the glider exception, also called for FAA from issuing another notice on the
systems. In this regard, the FAA notes exceptions for older gliders. The FAA subject matter in the future or
that a variant of FLARM, known as finds that rulemaking is not necessary at committing the agency to any future
PowerFLARM, will make a transponder this time for any gliders, but points to course of action. The agency will make
or ADS–B Out equipped aircraft current guidance available to assist in any necessary changes to the regulations
detectable to the PowerFLARM- installation and approval of transponder through a notice of proposed
equipped aircraft (such as a glider). systems in gliders and sailplanes for rulemaking (NPRM) with the
However, a glider that is equipped with operators wishing to voluntarily opportunity for public comment.
any version of FLARM will not be equip.25 Although the FAA has determined
electronically detectable to the other The AAJ listed glider color, that a regulatory course of action is not
aircraft unless both aircraft are FLARM construction materials, and slender warranted at this time, the FAA will
equipped. In view of these factors, the profiles as contributing factors to lack of continue to work with local glider
FAA concludes that FLARM systems pilot visibility or radar detection and communities, encourage the voluntary
may provide a safety benefit further identified Instrument Flight Rule equipage of transponders in gliders and
(particularly for avoidance of collisions congested areas as concerns of encourage the use of TABS. The FAA
between gliders, and for PowerFLARM undeniable risk, especially the continues to recommend that all glider
equipped gliders, some benefit for parameters of Class B airspace. These aircraft owners equip their gliders with
avoidance of collisions with powered sentiments were largely shared amongst a transponder meeting the requirements
aircraft). However, the FAA does not both adverse and favorable commenters, of § 91.215(a), a rule-compliant ADS–B
view FLARM (including PowerFLARM) offering similar solutions or variations Out system, or a TABS device. In
as the most effective system to support thereof. The FAA has discussed its consideration of the above factors, the
collision avoidance with powered determination regarding specific FAA withdraws Notice No. 15–05,
aircraft since a FLARM system may not airspace areas above. With regard to the published in 80 FR 34346, on June 16,
make the glider detectable to the aircraft other comments identified here, the 2015.
that must give way. Transponders, FAA’s decision in this notice includes Issued under authority provided by 49
TABS, and ADS–B Out offer better consideration of those comments. U.S.C. 106(f), 44701(a), and 40103 in
protection against collisions with Washington, DC, on December 16, 2016.
Reason for Withdrawal
powered aircraft because those systems Gary A. Norek,
aid visual acquisition of the glider by After consideration of all comments
Deputy Director, Airspace Services.
the powered aircraft flightcrew, received, the FAA is withdrawing
[FR Doc. 2016–30910 Filed 12–22–16; 8:45 am]
consistent with right of way rules.24 Notice No. 15–05. The FAA finds that
BILLING CODE 4910–13–P
The FAA will continue to consider the high cost of transponder equipage
surveillance system alternatives for and the limited safety benefit that is
gliders for their feasibility and potential likely to result from requiring such
to improve safety. equipage do not support rulemaking at ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
this time. Additionally, as discussed AGENCY
4. Other Comments above, the FAA has determined that a
Several commenters were in favor of proposal to require gliders to equip with 40 CFR Part 52
removing the current glider exception ‘‘low-cost’’ alternatives to transponders [EPA–R03–OAR–2016–0373; FRL–9957–19–
for certain high-density airspace areas. is not supportable at this time. Region 3]
One commenter, otherwise strongly in NTSB safety recommendations,
favor of removing the glider exception, resulting from the 2006 midair collision Air Plan Approval; WV; Infrastructure
suggested an exception for gliders with a glider, indicated that although Requirements for the 2012 Fine
involved in training below 5,000 feet the glider was equipped with a Particulate Standard
above ground level (AGL). The FAA has transponder, the transponder was
determined not to propose any changes turned off. After further analysis of AGENCY: Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA).
jstallworth on DSK7TPTVN1PROD with PROPOSALS
to the rules for specific airspace areas safety-related statistics over a 10-year
because the accident and incident period (August 2005–August 2015) the ACTION: Proposed rule.
history cited in the NTSB ASRS database reflects 1841 reported
recommendation has occurred NMAC for all airspace areas. The FAA SUMMARY: The Environmental Protection
predominantly around one specific found data that indicates that removal of Agency (EPA) is proposing to approve a
state implementation plan (SIP) revision
24 Section 91.113(d)(2) states that ‘‘A glider has 25 Information for Operators (InFO) 09009, submittal from the State of West
the right of way over powered parachute, weight- Installation and Approval of Transponder Systems Virginia pursuant to the Clean Air Act
shift-aircraft, airplane, or rotorcraft.’’ in Gliders/Sailplanes, dated June 10, 2009. (CAA). Whenever new or revised
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Document Created: 2016-12-23 12:29:04
Document Modified: 2016-12-23 12:29:04
| Category | Regulatory Information | |
| Collection | Federal Register | |
| sudoc Class | AE 2.7: GS 4.107: AE 2.106: | |
| Publisher | Office of the Federal Register, National Archives and Records Administration | |
| Section | Proposed Rules | |
| Action | Advance notice of proposed rulemaking (ANPRM); withdrawal. | |
| Dates | This action becomes effective December 23, 2016. | |
| Contact | For technical questions concerning this action, contact Patrick J. Moorman, Airspace Regulations Team, AJV-113, Federal Aviation Administration, 800 Independence Avenue SW., Washington, DC 20591; telephone (202) 267-8783; email: [email protected] | |
| FR Citation | 81 FR 94277 | |
| RIN Number | 2120-AK51 |
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