82 FR 21568 - STP Nuclear Operating Company, South Texas Project, Units 1 and 2
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Federal Register Volume 82, Issue 88 (May 9, 2017)
Federal Register Volume 82, Issue 88 (May 9, 2017)
| Page Range | 21568-21573 | |
| FR Document | 2017-09369 |
[Federal Register Volume 82, Number 88 (Tuesday, May 9, 2017)] [Notices] [Pages 21568-21573] From the Federal Register Online [www.thefederalregister.org] [FR Doc No: 2017-09369] ----------------------------------------------------------------------- NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION [Docket Nos. 50-498 and 50-499; NRC-2016-0092] STP Nuclear Operating Company, South Texas Project, Units 1 and 2 AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission. ACTION: Environmental assessment and finding of no significant impact; issuance. ----------------------------------------------------------------------- SUMMARY: The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing an environmental assessment (EA) prepared under the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA) and NRC's regulations. This EA summarizes the results of the NRC staff's environmental review, which evaluates the potential environmental impacts of granting exemptions from NRC regulations in response to a request from STP Nuclear Operating Company (STPNOC, the licensee) for Facility Operating License Nos. NPF-76 and NPF-80, for South Texas Project (STP), Units 1 and 2, respectively, located in Matagorda County, Texas. The regulatory exemptions, if granted, allow STPNOC to change the licensing basis loss-of-coolant accident analysis identified in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report to use a risk-informed approach to address safety issues discussed in Generic Safety Issue (GSI)-191 and to close Generic Letter (GL) 2004-02. DATES: May 9, 2017. ADDRESSES: Please refer to Docket ID NRC-2016-0092 when contacting the NRC about the availability of information regarding this document. You may obtain publicly-available information related to this document using any of the following methods:Federal Rulemaking Web site: Go to http://www.regulations.gov and search for Docket ID NRC-2016-0092. Address questions about NRC dockets to Carol Gallagher; telephone: 301-415- 3463; email: [email protected]. For technical questions, contact the individual listed in the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT section of this document. NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS): You may obtain publicly-available documents online in the ADAMS Public Documents collection at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. To begin the search, select ``ADAMS Public Documents'' and then select ``Begin Web-based ADAMS Search.'' For problems with ADAMS, please contact the NRC's Public Document Room (PDR) reference staff at 1-800-397-4209, 301-415-4737, or by email to [email protected]. For the convenience of the reader, the ADAMS accession numbers are provided in a table in the ``Availability of Documents'' section of this document. NRC's PDR: You may examine and purchase copies of public documents at the NRC's PDR, Room 01-F21, One White Flint North, 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland 20852. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Lisa Regner, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555- 0001; telephone: 301-415-1906, email: [email protected]. SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: I. Introduction and Background The NRC is considering a request to grant certain regulatory exemptions for Facility Operating License Nos. NPF-76 and NPF-80, issued to STPNOC for operation of STP, Units 1 and 2, located in Matagorda County, Texas, in accordance with section 50.12, ``Specific exemptions,'' of title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR), ``Application for amendment of license, construction permit, or early site permit.'' The regulatory exemptions would allow STPNOC to resolve concerns associated with GSI-191, ``Assessment of Debris Accumulation on PWR [Pressurized-Water Reactor] Sump Performance,'' and the associated GL 2004-02, ``Potential Impact of Debris Blockage on Emergency Recirculation during Design Basis Accidents at Pressurized- Water Reactors,'' issued on September 13, 2004. Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.21, ``Criteria for and identification of licensing and regulatory actions requiring environmental assessments,'' the NRC has prepared an EA summarizing the findings of its NEPA review of the proposed action. The NRC concluded that the proposed action will have no significant environmental impact. The NRC published a draft EA on the proposed action for public comment in the Federal Register on May 4, 2016 (81 FR 26838) (ADAMS Accession No. ML16032A387). No comments were received. Background The NRC established GSI-191 to determine whether the transport and accumulation of debris from a loss-of-coolant accident in the PWR containment structure would impede the operation of the emergency core cooling system (ECCS) or containment spray system (CSS). A loss-of- coolant accident within the containment structure is assumed to be caused by a break in the primary coolant loop piping. Water discharged from the pipe break would collect on the containment structure floor and within the containment emergency sump. During this type of accident, the ECCS and CSS would initially draw cooling water from the refueling water storage tank. However, realigning the ECCS pumps to the containment structure emergency sump would provide long-term cooling of the reactor core. Therefore, successful long-term cooling depends on the ability of the containment structure emergency sump to provide adequate flow to the residual heat removal recirculation pumps for extended periods of time. One of the concerns addressed by the implementation of GSI-191 is that debris, such as insulation installed on piping and components, within the containment structure could be dislodged by a jet of water and steam from a loss-of-coolant accident. Water, along with debris, would accumulate at the bottom of the containment structure and flow towards the emergency sump pumps. Insulation and other fibrous material could block the emergency sump screens and suction strainers, which in turn could prevent the ability of the containment emergency sump to provide adequate flow to the residual heat removal recirculation pumps (for more information, see NUREG-0897, ``Containment Emergency Sump Performance''). The NRC issued GL 2004-02 to address this safety concern by requesting PWR licensees, pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f), to use an NRC- approved methodology to perform a ``mechanistic evaluation of the potential for the adverse effects of post-accident [[Page 21569]] debris blockage and operation with debris-laden fluids to impede or prevent the recirculation functions of the ECCS and CSS following all postulated accidents for which the recirculation of these systems is required'' and submit this information to the NRC for evaluation. Subsequent to the issuance of GL 2004-02, the NRC staff identified another related concern with the potential for debris to bypass the sump strainers (even the new strainers) and enter the reactor core. This safety issue could result in the build-up of material on fuel assemblies and at the core inlet, inhibit heat transfer, and prevent adequate cooling of the reactor core. Since 2004, the NRC and industry have conducted tests to gain more information on this concern. In 2012, the NRC staff developed three options for resolution of GSI-191, which are discussed in SECY-12-0093, ``Closure Options for Generic Safety Issue 191, Assessment of Debris Accumulation on Pressurized-Water Reactor Sump Performance,'' dated July 9, 2012. The three options for demonstrating compliance with 10 CFR 50.46, ``Acceptance criteria for emergency core cooling systems for light- water nuclear power reactors,'' and considering the impact of debris on ECCS and CSS recirculation, are summarized as follows. 1. Option 1 allows the use of approved models and test methods. 2. Option 2 allows the industry to implement additional mitigating measures until resolution is completed and take additional time to resolve issues through further industry testing or use of a risk- informed approach. Use of this option has two alternative methods, including Option 2B, chosen by STPNOC, which allows development of a risk-informed approach to quantify the risk associated with this generic issue and submit a request to the NRC for a license amendment. 3. Option 3 allows the industry to separate the regulatory treatment of the sump strainer and in-vessel effects. The ECCS strainers will be evaluated using currently approved models, while in- vessel effects will be addressed using a risk-informed approach. The STPNOC proposed to use Option 2 to demonstrate compliance with 10 CFR 50.46, and 10 CFR part 50, appendix A, General Design Criterion (GDC) 35, ``Emergency core cooling,'' GDC 38, ``Containment heat removal,'' and GDC 41, ``Containment atmosphere cleanup,'' and to resolve GSI-191 for STP. The licensee proposed to use both a deterministic method, with plant-specific testing, and a risk-informed approach. Because, historically, the NRC staff has not allowed licensees to use a risk-informed approach to show compliance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.46, and GDCs 35, 38, and 41, STPNOC requested exemptions from 10 CFR 50.46(a)(1) and the aforementioned GDCs, to allow the use of a risk-informed approach to resolve GSI-191. If approved, the proposed action would not authorize any modifications within the containment structure, physical changes to the ECCS, or other modifications to the plant. Rather, the proposed action would only allow the use of an alternate methodology to show compliance with the regulations that require ECCS and CSS function during certain loss- of-coolant accident events. II. Environmental Assessment Description of the Proposed Action The proposed action is to amend Facility Operating License Nos. NPF-76 and NPF-80 for STP, Units 1 and 2, and to grant regulatory exemptions requested by STPNOC. The regulatory exemptions would allow STPNOC to change the licensing basis loss-of-coolant accident analysis identified in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report to use a risk- informed approach to address safety issues discussed in GSI-191 and to close GL 2004-02. If approved, no physical modifications to the nuclear plant or changes to reactor operations involving the ECCS would be required. The proposed action is in response to the licensee's application dated June 19, 2013, and supplemented by letters dated August 20, 2015, and April 13, 2016. Need for the Proposed Action As the holder of Facility Operating License Nos. NPF-76 and NPF-80, STPNOC is expected to address the safety issues discussed in GSI-191 and to close GL 2004-02 with respect to STP, Units 1 and 2. Consistent with SECY-12-0093, STPNOC chose an approach to use a risk-informed methodology. Since the NRC staff's position has long held that only deterministic or bounding calculations be used to show compliance with 10 CFR 50.46, and GDCs 35, 38, and 41, the STPNOC has requested that the NRC grant certain regulatory exemptions for STP, Units 1 and 2. Special Circumstances The NRC staff determined that special circumstances under 10 CFR 51.21 exist to prepare an EA for the proposed action because STP is the pilot plant to propose a risk-informed approach to resolve GSI-191 as recognized in Staff Requirement Memorandum SECY 12-0093, ``Closure Options for Generic Safety Issue--191, Assessment of Debris Accumulation on Pressurized-Water Reactor Sump Performance,'' dated December 14, 2012. Because this is the first NRC review of the use of a risk-informed, instead of a deterministic, approach to determine that the ECCS and CSS structures, systems, and components will provide adequate cooling for the reactor core and containment during design- basis accidents in accordance with 10 CFR 50.46 and GDCs 35, 38, and 41, the NRC staff considered the issuance of an EA to be a prudent course of action that would further the purposes of NEPA. Plant Site and Environs The STP is located on approximately 12,220 acres (4,945 hectares) in rural and sparsely populated Matagorda County, Texas, approximately 70 miles (mi) [110 kilometers (km)] south-southwest of Houston. Nearby communities include Matagorda, approximately 8 mi (13 km) south of the site; the City of Palacios, 11 mi (18 km) west of the site; and Bay City, 13 mi (21 km) north of the site. The STP power plant consists of two four-loop Westinghouse PWR units. The reactor core of each unit heats water, which is pumped to four steam generators, where the heated water is converted to steam. The steam is then used to turn turbines, which are connected to electrical generators that produce electricity. A simplified drawing of a PWR can be viewed at http://www.nrc.gov/reactors/pwrs.html. The reactor, steam generators, and other components are housed in a concrete and steel containment structure (building). The containment structure is a reinforced concrete cylinder with a concrete slab base and hemispherical dome. A welded steel liner is attached to the inside face of the concrete shell to ensure a high degree of leak tightness. In addition, the 4-foot (1.2-meter)-thick concrete walls of the containment structure serve as a radiation shield. Additional information on the plant structures and systems, as well as the environmental impact statement for license renewal, can be found in NUREG-1437, Supplement 48, ``Generic Environmental Impact Statement for License Renewal of Nuclear Plants: Supplement 48 Regarding South Texas Project, Units 1 and 2.'' Environmental Impacts of the Proposed Action Radiological and non-radiological impacts on the environment that may [[Page 21570]] result from granting the regulatory exemptions are summarized in the following sections. Radiological Impacts Radioactive Gaseous and Liquid Effluents and Solid Waste The STP uses waste treatment systems to collect, process, recycle, and dispose of gaseous, liquid, and solid wastes that contain radioactive material in a safe and controlled manner within NRC and Environmental Protection Agency radiation safety standards. Granting the regulatory exemptions will not result in any physical changes to the nuclear plant or reactor operations that would affect the types and quantities of radioactive material generated during plant operations; therefore, there will be no changes to the plant radioactive waste treatment systems. A detailed description of the STP radioactive waste handling and disposal activities is contained in Chapter 2.1.2 of Supplement 48 to NUREG-1437. Radioactive Gaseous Effluents The objectives of the STP gaseous waste management system (GWMS) are to process and control the release of radioactive gaseous effluents into the environment to be within the requirements of 10 CFR 20.1301, ``Dose limits for individual members of the public,'' and to be consistent with the as low as is reasonably achievable (ALARA) dose objectives set forth in appendix I to 10 CFR part 50. The GWMS is designed so that radiation exposure to plant workers is within the dose limits in 10 CFR 20.1201, ``Occupational dose limits for adults.'' Granting the regulatory exemptions will not result in any physical changes to the nuclear plant or reactor operations; therefore, there will be no changes to the GWMS. The existing equipment and plant procedures that control radioactive releases to the environment will continue to be used to maintain radioactive gaseous releases within the dose limits of 10 CFR 20.1301 and the ALARA dose objectives in appendix I to 10 CFR part 50. Radioactive Liquid Effluents The function of the STP liquid waste processing system (LWPS) is to collect and process radioactive liquid wastes to reduce radioactivity and chemical concentrations to levels acceptable for discharge to the environment or to recycle the liquids for use in plant systems. The principal objectives of the LWPS are to collect liquid wastes that may contain radioactive material and to maintain sufficient processing capability so that liquid waste may be discharged to the environment below the regulatory limits of 10 CFR 20.1301 and consistent with the ALARA dose objectives in appendix I to 10 CFR part 50. The waste is routed through a monitor that measures the radioactivity and can automatically terminate the release in the event radioactivity exceeds predetermined levels. The liquid waste is discharged into the main cooling reservoir. The entire main cooling reservoir is within the STP site boundary and the public is prohibited from access to the area. Granting the regulatory exemptions will not result in any physical changes to the nuclear plant or reactor operations; therefore, there will be no changes to the LWPS. The existing equipment and plant procedures that control radioactive releases to the environment will continue to be used to maintain radioactive liquid releases within the dose limits of 10 CFR 20.1301 and the ALARA dose objectives in appendix I to 10 CFR part 50. Radioactive Solid Wastes The function of the STP solid waste processing system (SWPS) is to process, package, and store the solid radioactive wastes generated by nuclear plant operations until they are shipped off site to a vendor for further processing or for permanent disposal at a licensed burial facility, or both. The storage areas have restricted access and shielding to reduce radiation rates to plant workers. The principal objectives of the SWPS are to package and transport the waste in compliance with NRC regulations in 10 CFR part 61, ``Licensing Requirements for Land Disposal of Radioactive Waste,'' and 10 CFR part 71, ``Packaging and Transportation of Radioactive Material,'' and the U.S. Department of Transportation regulations in 49 CFR parts 170 through 179; and to maintain the dose limits of 10 CFR 20.1201, 10 CFR 20.1301, and appendix I to 10 CFR part 50. Granting the regulatory exemptions will not result in any physical changes to the nuclear plant or reactor operations; therefore, the waste can be handled by the SWPS without modification. The existing equipment and plant procedures that control radioactive solid waste handling will continue to be used to maintain exposures within the dose limits of 10 CFR 20.1201, 10 CFR 20.1301, and 10 CFR part 50, appendix I. Occupational Radiation Doses The proposed action of granting the regulatory exemptions will not result in any physical changes being made to the nuclear plant or reactor operations; therefore, there will be no change to any in-plant radiation sources. The licensee's radiation protection program monitors radiation levels throughout the nuclear plant to establish appropriate work controls, training, temporary shielding, and protective equipment requirements so that worker doses will remain within the dose limits of 10 CFR part 20, subpart C, ``Occupational Dose Limits.'' Granting the regulatory exemptions will not change radiation levels within the nuclear plant and, therefore, will have no increased radiological impact to the workers. Offsite Radiation Dose The primary sources of offsite dose to members of the public from the STP are radioactive gaseous and liquid effluents. As discussed previously, there will be no change to the operation of the STP radioactive gaseous and liquid waste management systems or the ability to perform their intended functions. Also, there will be no change to the STP radiation monitoring system and procedures used to control the release of radioactive effluents in accordance with radiation protection standards in 10 CFR 20.1301, 40 CFR 190, ``Environmental Radiation Protection Standards for Nuclear Power Operations,'' and the ALARA dose objectives in appendix I to 10 CFR part 50. Based on the previous statements, the offsite radiation dose to members of the public would not change and would continue to be within regulatory limits, and, therefore, granting the regulatory exemptions will not change offsite dose levels and, consequently, the health effects of the proposed action will not be significant. Design-Basis Accidents Design-basis accidents at STP, Units 1 and 2, are evaluated by both the licensee and the NRC to ensure that the units can withstand the spectrum of postulated accidents without undue hazard to the public health and safety and the protection of the environment. Separate from its environmental review in this EA, the NRC staff is evaluating the licensee's technical and safety analyses provided in support of the proposed action of granting the exemption requests to ensure that, following the proposed action, the licensee will continue to meet the NRC regulatory requirements for safe operation. The results and conclusion of the NRC staff's safety review will be documented in a publicly available safety evaluation. If the NRC staff concludes in this safety evaluation that taking the proposed action will (1) [[Page 21571]] provide reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) provide reasonable assurance that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public, then the proposed action will also not have a significant environmental impact. The NRC will not take the proposed action absent such a safety conclusion. Radiological Cumulative Impacts The radiological dose limits for protection of the public and plant workers have been developed by the NRC and the Environmental Protection Agency to address the cumulative impact of acute and long-term exposure to radiation and radioactive material. These dose limits are codified in 10 CFR part 20, ``Standards for Protection Against Radiation,'' and 40 CFR part 190. Cumulative radiation doses are required to be within the limits set forth in the regulations cited in the previous paragraph. Granting the exemptions will not require any physical changes to the plant or plant activities, there will not be changes to in-plant radiation sources, and offsite radiation dose to members of the public will not change. Therefore, the NRC staff concludes that there would not be a significant cumulative radiological impact from the proposed action. Radiological Impacts Summary Based on these radiological evaluations, the proposed action of granting the exemptions would not result in any significant radiological impacts. Therefore, if the NRC staff concludes in its separate safety evaluation that taking the proposed action will (1) provide reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) provide reasonable assurance that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public, then the proposed action will not have a significant radiological impact. Non-Radiological Impacts No physical modifications to the nuclear plant or changes to reactor operations involving the ECCS would be required if the NRC were to grant the regulatory exemptions. Also, no physical changes would be made to other structures or land use within the STP site. Non- radiological liquid effluents or gaseous emissions would not change and therefore environmental conditions at the STP site also would not change. In addition, granting the regulatory exemptions would not result in changes to the use of resources (e.g., visual, terrestrial, or aquatic) or cause any new environmental impacts (e.g., noise). Further, granting the regulatory exemptions does not change the operation of the reactor, the heat load dissipated to the environment, or the amount of non-radiological waste. Therefore, there would be no non-radiological environmental impacts to any resource or any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources. Non-Radiological Cumulative Impacts Since granting the regulatory exemptions would not result in environmental effects, there would be no cumulative impact. Environmental Impacts of the Alternatives to the Proposed Action As discussed earlier, licensees have options in responding to GL 2004-02 and demonstrating compliance with 10 CFR 50.46 considering the impacts of debris on the emergency core cooling system. Consistent with these options and as an alternative to the proposed action, the licensee could choose to not pursue exemptions (Options 1 and 3). Depending on the results of its analysis, the licensee would instead remove fibrous insulation to reduce the debris loading and the potential for clogging the containment sumps, and would replace insulation within the reactor containment building. This alternative would involve the physical removal and disposal of significant amounts of insulation from a radiation area within the reactor containment building and replacement with insulation less likely to impact sump performance. This would be considered the ``no action alternative'' in that it would not require exemptions (actions) from the NRC. Removal of the existing insulation from the containment building would generate radiologically contaminated waste. The STPNOC estimated that 4,620 cubic feet of insulation would be removed and stored onsite until disposal. The old insulation would require special handling and packaging so that it could be safely transported from the STP site. The licensee's existing low-level radioactive and hazardous waste handling and disposal activities would likely be used to process and store this waste material. The old insulation would then be transported to a low- level radioactive or hazardous waste disposal site. Energy (fuel) would be expended to transport the insulation and land would be expended at the disposal site. The removal of the old insulation and installation of the new insulation would expose workers to radiation. In its application, STPNOC estimates that this would result in an additional collective radiation exposure of 158-176 person-roentgen equivalent man (rem) over its baseline collective radiation exposure. The NRC staff reviewed NUREG-0713, Volume 34, ``Occupational Radiation Exposure at Commercial Nuclear Power Reactors and Other Facilities 2012: Forty-Fifth Annual Report,'' and determined that STPNOC's average baseline collective radiation exposure is approximately 90 person-rem. This additional 158- 176 person-rem collective exposure would be shared across the entire work force involved with removing and reinstalling insulation. In SECY-12-0093, the NRC staff attempted to develop a total occupational dose estimate for the work involved in insulation removal and replacement associated with GSI-191. Due to uncertainties in the scope of work required to remove and replace insulation at a specific nuclear plant and other site-specific factors such as source term and hazardous materials, the NRC staff was unable to estimate the total occupational dose associated with this work. However, dose estimates were provided by the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) in a letter to the NRC dated March 30, 2012, based on information collected on occupational radiation exposures that have been, or could be, incurred during insulation removal and replacement. In the letter, NEI noted similar difficulties to those experienced by the NRC staff in estimating the potential amount of radiation exposure, but provided a ``per unit'' estimate of between 80 to 525 person-rem. The NRC staff ultimately concluded that the NEI estimates were reasonable given the uncertainties in the scope of work and other nuclear plant site- specific factors such as source term and hazardous materials. Therefore, since STPNOC's estimate of radiation exposure for insulation removal and replacement is within the NEI estimated range, the NRC staff considers STPNOC's estimate of an increase of 158-176 person-rem over the baseline exposure to be reasonable. As stated in the ``Occupational Radiation Doses'' section of this document, STPNOC's radiation protection program monitors radiation levels throughout the nuclear plant to establish appropriate work controls, [[Page 21572]] training, temporary shielding, and protective equipment requirements so that worker doses are expected to remain within the dose limits of 10 CFR 20.1201. In addition, as stated in the ``Offsite Radiation Dose'' section of this document, STPNOC also has a radiation monitoring system and procedures in place to control the release of radioactive effluents in accordance with radiation protection standards in 10 CFR 20.1301, 40 CFR part 190, and the ALARA dose objectives in appendix I to 10 CFR part 50. Therefore, radiation exposure to members of the public would not be significant and would be maintained within the NRC dose criteria in 10 CFR 20.1301, 40 CFR part 190, and the ALARA dose objectives of appendix I to 10 CFR part 50. Based on this information, impacts to members of the public from removing and replacing insulation within the reactor containment building would not be significant. However, impacts to plant workers and the environment from implementing this alternative would be greater than implementing the proposed action. Alternative Use of Resources The proposed action would not involve the use of any different resources (e.g., water, air, land, nuclear fuel) not previously considered in NUREG-1437, Supplement 48. Agencies and Persons Consulted In accordance with its stated policy, on May 1, 2017, the NRC staff consulted with the Texas State official, Mr. Robert Free, regarding the final environmental impact of the proposed action. The state official had no comments on the final EA and finding of no significant impact. III. Finding of No Significant Impact The NRC is considering STPNOC's requests to amend Facility Operating License Nos. NPF-76 and NPF-80 for STP, Units 1 and 2, and to grant exemptions for STP, Units 1 and 2, from certain requirements of 10 CFR 50.46(a)(1), and 10 CFR part 50, appendix A, GDCs 35, 38, and 41. This proposed action would not result in changes to radioactive effluents or emissions to nuclear plant workers and members of the public or any changes to radiological and non-radiological impacts to the environment. On the basis of the EA included in Section II of this notice and incorporated by reference in this finding, the NRC staff finds that the proposed action will not have a significant effect on the quality of the human environment. The NRC staff's evaluation considered the information provided in the licensee's application as supplement, and the NRC staff's review of related environmental documents. Section IV below lists the environmental documents related to the proposed action and includes information on the availability of the documents. Accordingly, the NRC has determined not to prepare an environmental impact statement for the proposed action. IV. Availability of Documents The documents identified in the following table are available for public inspection through the NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) or by using one of the methods discussed in Section I.A, ``Obtaining Information,'' of this document. ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Title Date ADAMS Accession No. ------------------------------------------------------------------------ NUREG-0897, Containment 10/1985 ML112440046 Emergency Sump Performance: Technical Findings Related to Unresolved Safety Issue A-43, Revision 1. NRC Generic Letter 2004-02, 9/13/2004 ML042360586 Potential Impact of Debris Blockage on Emergency Recirculation During Design Basis Accidents at Pressurized- Water Reactors. NEI letter to NRC, Nuclear 03/30/2012 ML12095A319 Energy Institute, GSI-191 Dose Estimates. Commission SECY-12-0093, 07/09/2012 ML121320270 Closure Options for Generic (package) Safety Issue-191, Assessment of Debris Accumulation on Pressurized-Water Reactor Sump Performance. Commission SRM-SECY-12-0093, 12/14/2012 ML12349A378 Staff Requirements--SECY-12- 0093--Closure Options for Generic Safety Issue-191, Assessment of Debris Accumulation on Pressurized- Water Reactor Sump Performance. STPNOC letter to NRC, STP Pilot 01/31/2013 ML13043A013 Submittal and Request for Exemption for a Risk-Informed Approach to Resolve Generic Safety Issue (GSI)-191. NRC letter to STPNOC, South 04/01/2013 ML13066A519 Texas Project, Units 1 and 2-- Supplemental Information Needed for Acceptance of Requested Licensing Action Re: Request for Exemption for a Risk-Informed Approach to Resolve Generic Safety Issue 191. STPNOC letter to NRC, Revised 06/19/2013 ML131750250 STP Pilot Submittal and (package) Requests for Exemptions and License Amendment for a Risk- Informed Approach to Resolving Generic Safety Issue (GSI)-191. STPNOC letter to NRC, 10/03/2013 ML13295A222 Corrections to Information Provided in Revised STP Pilot Submittal and Requests for Exemptions and License Amendment for a Risk-Informed Approach to Resolving Generic Safety Issue (GSI)-191. STPNOC letter to NRC, Submittal 10/31/2013 ML13323A673 of GSI-191 Chemical Effects (package) Test Reports. STPNOC letter to NRC, 11/13/2013 ML13323A128 Supplement 1 to Revised STP (package) Pilot Submittal and Requests for Exemptions and License Amendment for a Risk-Informed Approach to Resolving Generic Safety Issue (GSI)-191. STPNOC letter to NRC, 11/21/2013 ML13338A165 Supplement 1 to Revised STP Pilot Submittal for a Risk- Informed Approach to Resolving Generic Safety Issue (GSI)-191 to Supersede and Replace the Revised Pilot Submittal. NUREG-1437, Supplement 48, 11/2013 ML13322A890 Generic Environmental Impact Statement for License Renewal of Nuclear Plants: Supplement 48 Regarding South Texas Project, Units 1 and 2: Final Report. STPNOC letter to NRC, Response 12/23/2013 ML14015A312 to STP-GSI-191 EMCB-RAI-1. STPNOC letter to NRC, Response 12/23/2013 ML14015A311 to NRC Request for Reference Document For STP Risk-Informed GSI-191 Application. STPNOC letter to NRC, Response 03/17/2014 ML14086A383 to NRC Accident Dose Branch (package) Request for Additional Information. STPNOC letter to NRC, Response 01/09/2014 ML14029A533 to Request for Additional Information re Use of RELAP5 in Analyses for Risk-Informed GSI-191 Licensing Application. STPNOC letter to NRC, Submittal 02/13/2014 ML14052A110 (package, of CASA Grande Code and portions redacted) Analyses for STP's Risk- Informed GSI-191 Licensing Application. [[Page 21573]] STPNOC letter to NRC, Submittal 02/27/2014 ML14072A075 of GSI-191 Chemical Effects (package) Test Reports. NRC Letter to STPNOC, Request 04/15/2014 ML14087A075 for Additional Information, Round 1. NUREG-0713, Volume 34, 04/2014 ML14126A597 Occupational Radiation Exposure at Commercial Nuclear Power Reactors and Other Facilities 2012: Forty-Fifth Annual Report. STPNOC letter to NRC, Second 05/15/2014 ML14149A354 Submittal of CASA Grande Source Code for STP's Risk- Informed GSI-191 Licensing Application. STPNOC letter to NRC, First Set 05/22/2014 ML14149A439 of Responses to April, 2014, (package) Requests for Additional Information Regarding STP Risk- Informed GSl-191 Licensing Application--Revised. STPNOC letter to NRC, Second 06/25/2014 ML14178A467 Set of Responses to April, (package) 2014, Requests for Additional Information Regarding STP Risk- Informed GSI-191 Licensing Application. STPNOC letter to NRC, Third Set 07/15/2014 ML14202A045 of Responses to April, 2014, Requests for Additional Information Regarding STP Risk- Informed GSI-191 Licensing Application. NRC letter to STPNOC, Request 03/03/2015 ML14357A171 for Additional Information, Round 2. STPNOC letter to NRC, Submittal 03/10/2015 ML15072A092 of Updated CASA Grande Input for STP's Risk-Informed GSI- 191 Licensing Application. STPNOC letter to NRC, 03/25/2015 ML15091A440 Description of Revised Risk- Informed Methodology and Responses to Round 2 Requests for Additional Information Regarding STP Risk-Informed GSI-191 Licensing Application. STPNOC letter to NRC, 08/20/2015 ML15246A125 Supplement 2 to STP Pilot (package) Submittal and Requests for Exemptions and License Amendment for a Risk-Informed Approach to Address Generic Safety Issue (GSI)-191 and Respond to Generic Letter (GL) 2004-02. NRC letter to STPNOC, Request 04/11/2016 ML16082A507 for Additional Information, Round 3 (without Risk). NRC letter to STPNOC, Request 05/26/2016 ML16125A290 of Additional Information, Round 3 (Risk). STPNOC letter to NRC, First Set 05/11/2016 ML16154A117 of Responses to April 11, 2016, Requests for Additional Information Regarding STP Risk- Informed GSl-191 Licensing Application. STPNOC letter to NRC, 06/09/2016 ML16176A148 Applicability of Application Supplement 1 Correspondence to Supplement 2 Regarding STP Risk-Informed GSI-191 Licensing Application. STPNOC letter to NRC, Second 06/16/2016 ML16196A241 Set of Responses to April 11, 2016, Requests for Additional Information Regarding STP Risk- Informed GSI-191 Licensing Application. STPNOC letter to NRC, Third Set 07/18/2016 ML16209A226 of Responses to April 11, 2016, Requests for Additional Information Regarding STP Risk- Informed GSI-191 Licensing Application--Part A. STPNOC letter to NRC, Third Set 07/21/2016 ML16229A189 of Responses to April 11, 2016, Requests for Additional Information Regarding STP Risk- Informed GSI-191 Licensing Application--Part B. STPNOC letter to NRC, Third Set 07/21/2016 ML16230A232 of Responses to April 11, 2016, Requests for Additional Information Regarding STP Risk- Informed GSI-191 Licensing Application--Part C. STPNOC letter to NRC, Third Set 07/28/2016 ML16221A393 of Responses to April 11, 2016, Requests for Additional Information Regarding STP Risk- Informed GSI-191 Licensing Application--Part D. STPNOC letter to NRC, Third Set 09/12/2016 ML16272A162 of Responses to April 11, 2016, Requests for Additional Information Regarding STP Risk- Informed GSI-191 Licensing Application--Part E. STPNOC letter to NRC, 10/20/2016 ML16302A015 Supplement 3 to Revised Pilot Submittal and Requests for Exemptions and License Amendment for a Risk-Informed Approach to Address Generic Safety Issue (GSl)-191 and Respond to Generic Letter (GL) 2004-02. STPNOC letter to NRC, Response 11/9/2016 ML16321A407 to Request for Additional Information Regarding Sensitivity Studies for STPNOC Risk-Informed Pilot GSl-191 Application. STPNOC letter to NRC, Revised 12/7/2016 ML16365A006 Applicability Matrix for Response to Request for Additional Information Questions APLA-1a and APLA-1b Regarding STP Risk-Informed GSl-191 Licensing Application. STPNOC letter to NRC, Response 01/19/2017 ML17025A123 to Request for Additional Information on Revised Applicability Matrix for Questions Regarding Risk- Informed GSI-191 Licensing Application. ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 2nd day of May, 2017. For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Robert J. Pascarelli, Chief, Plant Licensing Branch IV, Division of Operating Reactor Licensing, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation. [FR Doc. 2017-09369 Filed 5-8-17; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 7590-01-P
![21568 Federal Register / Vol. 82, No. 88 / Tuesday, May 9, 2017 / Notices
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: In the FR information related to this document regulatory actions requiring
on April 25, 2017 (82 FR 19095), FR using any of the following methods: environmental assessments,’’ the NRC
Doc. 2017–08115, on page 19108, under • Federal Rulemaking Web site: Go to has prepared an EA summarizing the
Exelon Generation Company, LLC, http://www.regulations.gov and search findings of its NEPA review of the
Docket No. 50–353, Limerick Generating for Docket ID NRC–2016–0092. Address proposed action. The NRC concluded
Station, Unit 2, Montgomery County, questions about NRC dockets to Carol that the proposed action will have no
Pennsylvania, in the third column, Gallagher; telephone: 301–415–3463; significant environmental impact.
paragraph 4, line 11, ‘‘Amendment No.: email: Carol.Gallagher@nrc.gov. For The NRC published a draft EA on the
186’’ is corrected to read ‘‘Amendment technical questions, contact the proposed action for public comment in
No.: 187.’’ individual listed in the FOR FURTHER the Federal Register on May 4, 2016
INFORMATION CONTACT section of this (81 FR 26838) (ADAMS Accession No.
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 27th day
of April 2017. document. ML16032A387). No comments were
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. • NRC’s Agencywide Documents received.
V. Sreenivas,
Access and Management System Background
(ADAMS): You may obtain publicly-
Project Manager, Plant Licensing Branch I, The NRC established GSI–191 to
Division of Operating Reactor Licensing,
available documents online in the
ADAMS Public Documents collection at determine whether the transport and
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation. accumulation of debris from a loss-of-
[FR Doc. 2017–09367 Filed 5–8–17; 8:45 am]
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/
adams.html. To begin the search, select coolant accident in the PWR
BILLING CODE 7590–01–P
‘‘ADAMS Public Documents’’ and then containment structure would impede
select ‘‘Begin Web-based ADAMS the operation of the emergency core
Search.’’ For problems with ADAMS, cooling system (ECCS) or containment
NUCLEAR REGULATORY spray system (CSS). A loss-of-coolant
COMMISSION please contact the NRC’s Public
Document Room (PDR) reference staff at accident within the containment
1–800–397–4209, 301–415–4737, or by structure is assumed to be caused by a
[Docket Nos. 50–498 and 50–499; NRC– break in the primary coolant loop
email to pdr.resource@nrc.gov. For the
2016–0092] piping. Water discharged from the pipe
convenience of the reader, the ADAMS
break would collect on the containment
STP Nuclear Operating Company, accession numbers are provided in a
structure floor and within the
South Texas Project, Units 1 and 2 table in the ‘‘Availability of Documents’’
containment emergency sump. During
section of this document.
this type of accident, the ECCS and CSS
AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory • NRC’s PDR: You may examine and
Commission. would initially draw cooling water from
purchase copies of public documents at
the refueling water storage tank.
ACTION: Environmental assessment and the NRC’s PDR, Room 01–F21, One
However, realigning the ECCS pumps to
finding of no significant impact; White Flint North, 11555 Rockville
the containment structure emergency
issuance. Pike, Rockville, Maryland 20852.
sump would provide long-term cooling
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Lisa of the reactor core. Therefore, successful
SUMMARY: The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Regner, Office of Nuclear Reactor
Commission (NRC) is issuing an long-term cooling depends on the ability
Regulation, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory of the containment structure emergency
environmental assessment (EA) Commission, Washington, DC 20555–
prepared under the National sump to provide adequate flow to the
0001; telephone: 301–415–1906, email: residual heat removal recirculation
Environmental Policy Act of 1969 Lisa.Regner@nrc.gov.
(NEPA) and NRC’s regulations. This EA pumps for extended periods of time.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: One of the concerns addressed by the
summarizes the results of the NRC
implementation of GSI–191 is that
staff’s environmental review, which I. Introduction and Background
debris, such as insulation installed on
evaluates the potential environmental The NRC is considering a request to piping and components, within the
impacts of granting exemptions from grant certain regulatory exemptions for containment structure could be
NRC regulations in response to a request Facility Operating License Nos. NPF–76 dislodged by a jet of water and steam
from STP Nuclear Operating Company and NPF–80, issued to STPNOC for from a loss-of-coolant accident. Water,
(STPNOC, the licensee) for Facility operation of STP, Units 1 and 2, located along with debris, would accumulate at
Operating License Nos. NPF–76 and in Matagorda County, Texas, in the bottom of the containment structure
NPF–80, for South Texas Project (STP), accordance with section 50.12, and flow towards the emergency sump
Units 1 and 2, respectively, located in ‘‘Specific exemptions,’’ of title 10 of the pumps. Insulation and other fibrous
Matagorda County, Texas. The Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR), material could block the emergency
regulatory exemptions, if granted, allow ‘‘Application for amendment of license, sump screens and suction strainers,
STPNOC to change the licensing basis construction permit, or early site which in turn could prevent the ability
loss-of-coolant accident analysis permit.’’ The regulatory exemptions of the containment emergency sump to
identified in the Updated Final Safety would allow STPNOC to resolve provide adequate flow to the residual
Analysis Report to use a risk-informed concerns associated with GSI–191, heat removal recirculation pumps (for
approach to address safety issues ‘‘Assessment of Debris Accumulation on more information, see NUREG–0897,
discussed in Generic Safety Issue (GSI)– PWR [Pressurized-Water Reactor] Sump ‘‘Containment Emergency Sump
191 and to close Generic Letter (GL) Performance,’’ and the associated GL Performance’’).
mstockstill on DSK30JT082PROD with NOTICES
2004–02. 2004–02, ‘‘Potential Impact of Debris The NRC issued GL 2004–02 to
DATES: May 9, 2017. Blockage on Emergency Recirculation address this safety concern by
ADDRESSES: Please refer to Docket ID during Design Basis Accidents at requesting PWR licensees, pursuant to
NRC–2016–0092 when contacting the Pressurized-Water Reactors,’’ issued on 10 CFR 50.54(f), to use an NRC-
NRC about the availability of September 13, 2004. approved methodology to perform a
information regarding this document. Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.21, ‘‘Criteria ‘‘mechanistic evaluation of the potential
You may obtain publicly-available for and identification of licensing and for the adverse effects of post-accident
VerDate Sep<11>2014 18:19 May 08, 2017 Jkt 241001 PO 00000 Frm 00067 Fmt 4703 Sfmt 4703 E:\FR\FM\09MYN1.SGM 09MYN1](https://thefederalregister.org/doc/82_FR_21656/page/1.svg)
![Federal Register / Vol. 82, No. 88 / Tuesday, May 9, 2017 / Notices 21569
debris blockage and operation with approach. Because, historically, the Requirement Memorandum SECY 12–
debris-laden fluids to impede or prevent NRC staff has not allowed licensees to 0093, ‘‘Closure Options for Generic
the recirculation functions of the ECCS use a risk-informed approach to show Safety Issue—191, Assessment of Debris
and CSS following all postulated compliance with the requirements of 10 Accumulation on Pressurized-Water
accidents for which the recirculation of CFR 50.46, and GDCs 35, 38, and 41, Reactor Sump Performance,’’ dated
these systems is required’’ and submit STPNOC requested exemptions from 10 December 14, 2012. Because this is the
this information to the NRC for CFR 50.46(a)(1) and the aforementioned first NRC review of the use of a risk-
evaluation. GDCs, to allow the use of a risk- informed, instead of a deterministic,
Subsequent to the issuance of GL informed approach to resolve GSI–191. approach to determine that the ECCS
2004–02, the NRC staff identified If approved, the proposed action would and CSS structures, systems, and
another related concern with the not authorize any modifications within components will provide adequate
potential for debris to bypass the sump the containment structure, physical cooling for the reactor core and
strainers (even the new strainers) and changes to the ECCS, or other containment during design-basis
enter the reactor core. This safety issue modifications to the plant. Rather, the accidents in accordance with 10 CFR
could result in the build-up of material proposed action would only allow the 50.46 and GDCs 35, 38, and 41, the NRC
on fuel assemblies and at the core inlet, use of an alternate methodology to show staff considered the issuance of an EA
inhibit heat transfer, and prevent compliance with the regulations that to be a prudent course of action that
adequate cooling of the reactor core. require ECCS and CSS function during would further the purposes of NEPA.
Since 2004, the NRC and industry have certain loss-of-coolant accident events.
conducted tests to gain more Plant Site and Environs
information on this concern. In 2012, II. Environmental Assessment The STP is located on approximately
the NRC staff developed three options Description of the Proposed Action 12,220 acres (4,945 hectares) in rural
for resolution of GSI–191, which are and sparsely populated Matagorda
discussed in SECY–12–0093, ‘‘Closure The proposed action is to amend County, Texas, approximately 70 miles
Options for Generic Safety Issue 191, Facility Operating License Nos. NPF–76 (mi) [110 kilometers (km)] south-
Assessment of Debris Accumulation on and NPF–80 for STP, Units 1 and 2, and southwest of Houston. Nearby
Pressurized-Water Reactor Sump to grant regulatory exemptions communities include Matagorda,
Performance,’’ dated July 9, 2012. requested by STPNOC. The regulatory approximately 8 mi (13 km) south of the
The three options for demonstrating exemptions would allow STPNOC to site; the City of Palacios, 11 mi (18 km)
compliance with 10 CFR 50.46, change the licensing basis loss-of- west of the site; and Bay City, 13 mi (21
‘‘Acceptance criteria for emergency core coolant accident analysis identified in km) north of the site.
cooling systems for light-water nuclear the Updated Final Safety Analysis The STP power plant consists of two
power reactors,’’ and considering the Report to use a risk-informed approach four-loop Westinghouse PWR units. The
impact of debris on ECCS and CSS to address safety issues discussed in reactor core of each unit heats water,
recirculation, are summarized as GSI–191 and to close GL 2004–02. If which is pumped to four steam
follows. approved, no physical modifications to generators, where the heated water is
1. Option 1 allows the use of the nuclear plant or changes to reactor converted to steam. The steam is then
approved models and test methods. operations involving the ECCS would be used to turn turbines, which are
2. Option 2 allows the industry to required. The proposed action is in connected to electrical generators that
implement additional mitigating response to the licensee’s application produce electricity. A simplified
measures until resolution is completed dated June 19, 2013, and supplemented drawing of a PWR can be viewed at
and take additional time to resolve by letters dated August 20, 2015, and http://www.nrc.gov/reactors/pwrs.html.
issues through further industry testing April 13, 2016. The reactor, steam generators, and
or use of a risk-informed approach. Use other components are housed in a
Need for the Proposed Action
of this option has two alternative concrete and steel containment
methods, including Option 2B, chosen As the holder of Facility Operating structure (building). The containment
by STPNOC, which allows development License Nos. NPF–76 and NPF–80, structure is a reinforced concrete
of a risk-informed approach to quantify STPNOC is expected to address the cylinder with a concrete slab base and
the risk associated with this generic safety issues discussed in GSI–191 and hemispherical dome. A welded steel
issue and submit a request to the NRC to close GL 2004–02 with respect to liner is attached to the inside face of the
for a license amendment. STP, Units 1 and 2. Consistent with concrete shell to ensure a high degree of
3. Option 3 allows the industry to SECY–12–0093, STPNOC chose an leak tightness. In addition, the 4-foot
separate the regulatory treatment of the approach to use a risk-informed (1.2-meter)-thick concrete walls of the
sump strainer and in-vessel effects. The methodology. Since the NRC staff’s containment structure serve as a
ECCS strainers will be evaluated using position has long held that only radiation shield. Additional information
currently approved models, while in- deterministic or bounding calculations on the plant structures and systems, as
vessel effects will be addressed using a be used to show compliance with 10 well as the environmental impact
risk-informed approach. CFR 50.46, and GDCs 35, 38, and 41, the statement for license renewal, can be
The STPNOC proposed to use Option STPNOC has requested that the NRC found in NUREG–1437, Supplement 48,
2 to demonstrate compliance with 10 grant certain regulatory exemptions for ‘‘Generic Environmental Impact
CFR 50.46, and 10 CFR part 50, STP, Units 1 and 2. Statement for License Renewal of
appendix A, General Design Criterion Nuclear Plants: Supplement 48
mstockstill on DSK30JT082PROD with NOTICES
(GDC) 35, ‘‘Emergency core cooling,’’ Special Circumstances
Regarding South Texas Project, Units 1
GDC 38, ‘‘Containment heat removal,’’ The NRC staff determined that special and 2.’’
and GDC 41, ‘‘Containment atmosphere circumstances under 10 CFR 51.21 exist
cleanup,’’ and to resolve GSI–191 for to prepare an EA for the proposed action Environmental Impacts of the Proposed
STP. The licensee proposed to use both because STP is the pilot plant to Action
a deterministic method, with plant- propose a risk-informed approach to Radiological and non-radiological
specific testing, and a risk-informed resolve GSI–191 as recognized in Staff impacts on the environment that may
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![Federal Register / Vol. 82, No. 88 / Tuesday, May 9, 2017 / Notices 21573
ADAMS
Title Date Accession No.
STPNOC letter to NRC, Submittal of GSI–191 Chemical Effects Test Reports ............................................... 02/27/2014 ML14072A075
(package)
NRC Letter to STPNOC, Request for Additional Information, Round 1 ............................................................ 04/15/2014 ML14087A075
NUREG–0713, Volume 34, Occupational Radiation Exposure at Commercial Nuclear Power Reactors and 04/2014 ML14126A597
Other Facilities 2012: Forty-Fifth Annual Report.
STPNOC letter to NRC, Second Submittal of CASA Grande Source Code for STP’s Risk-Informed GSI– 05/15/2014 ML14149A354
191 Licensing Application.
STPNOC letter to NRC, First Set of Responses to April, 2014, Requests for Additional Information Regard- 05/22/2014 ML14149A439
ing STP Risk-Informed GSl–191 Licensing Application—Revised. (package)
STPNOC letter to NRC, Second Set of Responses to April, 2014, Requests for Additional Information Re- 06/25/2014 ML14178A467
garding STP Risk-Informed GSI–191 Licensing Application. (package)
STPNOC letter to NRC, Third Set of Responses to April, 2014, Requests for Additional Information Re- 07/15/2014 ML14202A045
garding STP Risk-Informed GSI–191 Licensing Application.
NRC letter to STPNOC, Request for Additional Information, Round 2 ............................................................. 03/03/2015 ML14357A171
STPNOC letter to NRC, Submittal of Updated CASA Grande Input for STP’s Risk-Informed GSI–191 Li- 03/10/2015 ML15072A092
censing Application.
STPNOC letter to NRC, Description of Revised Risk-Informed Methodology and Responses to Round 2 03/25/2015 ML15091A440
Requests for Additional Information Regarding STP Risk-Informed GSI–191 Licensing Application.
STPNOC letter to NRC, Supplement 2 to STP Pilot Submittal and Requests for Exemptions and License 08/20/2015 ML15246A125
Amendment for a Risk-Informed Approach to Address Generic Safety Issue (GSI)–191 and Respond to (package)
Generic Letter (GL) 2004–02.
NRC letter to STPNOC, Request for Additional Information, Round 3 (without Risk) ...................................... 04/11/2016 ML16082A507
NRC letter to STPNOC, Request of Additional Information, Round 3 (Risk) .................................................... 05/26/2016 ML16125A290
STPNOC letter to NRC, First Set of Responses to April 11, 2016, Requests for Additional Information Re- 05/11/2016 ML16154A117
garding STP Risk-Informed GSl–191 Licensing Application.
STPNOC letter to NRC, Applicability of Application Supplement 1 Correspondence to Supplement 2 Re- 06/09/2016 ML16176A148
garding STP Risk-Informed GSI–191 Licensing Application.
STPNOC letter to NRC, Second Set of Responses to April 11, 2016, Requests for Additional Information 06/16/2016 ML16196A241
Regarding STP Risk-Informed GSI–191 Licensing Application.
STPNOC letter to NRC, Third Set of Responses to April 11, 2016, Requests for Additional Information Re- 07/18/2016 ML16209A226
garding STP Risk-Informed GSI–191 Licensing Application—Part A.
STPNOC letter to NRC, Third Set of Responses to April 11, 2016, Requests for Additional Information Re- 07/21/2016 ML16229A189
garding STP Risk-Informed GSI–191 Licensing Application—Part B.
STPNOC letter to NRC, Third Set of Responses to April 11, 2016, Requests for Additional Information Re- 07/21/2016 ML16230A232
garding STP Risk-Informed GSI–191 Licensing Application—Part C.
STPNOC letter to NRC, Third Set of Responses to April 11, 2016, Requests for Additional Information Re- 07/28/2016 ML16221A393
garding STP Risk-Informed GSI–191 Licensing Application—Part D.
STPNOC letter to NRC, Third Set of Responses to April 11, 2016, Requests for Additional Information Re- 09/12/2016 ML16272A162
garding STP Risk-Informed GSI–191 Licensing Application—Part E.
STPNOC letter to NRC, Supplement 3 to Revised Pilot Submittal and Requests for Exemptions and Li- 10/20/2016 ML16302A015
cense Amendment for a Risk-Informed Approach to Address Generic Safety Issue (GSl)–191 and Re-
spond to Generic Letter (GL) 2004–02.
STPNOC letter to NRC, Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Sensitivity Studies for 11/9/2016 ML16321A407
STPNOC Risk-Informed Pilot GSl–191 Application.
STPNOC letter to NRC, Revised Applicability Matrix for Response to Request for Additional Information 12/7/2016 ML16365A006
Questions APLA–1a and APLA–1b Regarding STP Risk-Informed GSl–191 Licensing Application.
STPNOC letter to NRC, Response to Request for Additional Information on Revised Applicability Matrix for 01/19/2017 ML17025A123
Questions Regarding Risk-Informed GSI–191 Licensing Application.
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 2nd day SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE (‘‘Act’’) 2 and Rule 19b–4 thereunder,3
of May, 2017. COMMISSION notice is hereby given that, on April 20,
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 2017, NYSE Arca, Inc. (‘‘Exchange’’ or
Robert J. Pascarelli, [Release No. 34–80584; File No. SR– ‘‘NYSE Arca’’) filed with the Securities
Chief, Plant Licensing Branch IV, Division NYSEArca–2017–44] and Exchange Commission
of Operating Reactor Licensing, Office of (‘‘Commission’’) the proposed rule
Nuclear Reactor Regulation. Self-Regulatory Organizations; NYSE change as described in Items I and II
[FR Doc. 2017–09369 Filed 5–8–17; 8:45 am] Arca, Inc.; Notice of Filing of Proposed below, which Items have been prepared
BILLING CODE 7590–01–P Rule Change To List and Trade Shares by the self-regulatory organization. The
of the IQ Municipal Insured ETF; IQ Commission is publishing this notice to
Municipal Short Duration ETF; and IQ solicit comments on the proposed rule
Municipal Intermediate ETF Under change from interested persons.
mstockstill on DSK30JT082PROD with NOTICES
NYSE Arca Equities Rule 8.600
May 3, 2017.
Pursuant to Section 19(b)(1) 1 of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934
2 15 U.S.C. 78a.
1 15 U.S.C.78s(b)(1). 3 17 CFR 240.19b–4.
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Document Created: 2018-11-08 08:41:16
Document Modified: 2018-11-08 08:41:16
| Category | Regulatory Information | |
| Collection | Federal Register | |
| sudoc Class | AE 2.7: GS 4.107: AE 2.106: | |
| Publisher | Office of the Federal Register, National Archives and Records Administration | |
| Section | Notices | |
| Action | Environmental assessment and finding of no significant impact; issuance. | |
| Dates | May 9, 2017. | |
| Contact | Lisa Regner, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555- 0001; telephone: 301-415-1906, email: [email protected] | |
| FR Citation | 82 FR 21568 |
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