82 FR 29798 - Waiver of Flight Termination Receiver Qualification by Similarity Deficiencies
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration Federal Register Volume 82, Issue 125 (June 30, 2017)
Federal Aviation Administration
Federal Register Volume 82, Issue 125 (June 30, 2017)
| Page Range | 29798-29800 | |
| FR Document | 2017-13567 |
[Federal Register Volume 82, Number 125 (Friday, June 30, 2017)] [Proposed Rules] [Pages 29798-29800] From the Federal Register Online [www.thefederalregister.org] [FR Doc No: 2017-13567] ----------------------------------------------------------------------- DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION Federal Aviation Administration 14 CFR Part 417 Waiver of Flight Termination Receiver Qualification by Similarity Deficiencies AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Department of Transportation (DOT). ACTION: Notice of waiver. ----------------------------------------------------------------------- SUMMARY: This notice concerns three petitions for waiver submitted to the FAA by Rocket Lab USA Inc. (RL) for the Flight Termination Receiver (FTR) Qualification by Similarity (QBS): A petition to waive the requirement that a component may be qualified based on similarity to a component that has already been qualified for use only if the environments encountered by the previously qualified component during its qualification or flight history were equal or more severe than the Rocket Lab qualification environments; a petition to waive the Electromagnetic Interference and Compatibility (EMI/EMC) on the same units; and a petition to waive the requirement that the same manufacturer must produce the qualified and the unqualified component in the same location using identical tools and manufacturing processes. The FAA grants these three petitions. DATES: Issued in Washington, DC, on May 15, 2017. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For technical questions concerning this waiver, contact Michael Wiktowy, Licensing Program Lead, Commercial Space Transportation--Licensing and Evaluation Division, 800 Independence Avenue SW., Washington, DC 20591; telephone: (202) 267- 7287; email: [email protected]. SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Background RL submitted a petition to the FAA's Office of Commercial Space Transportation (AST) requesting relief from regulatory requirements for a launch license for flight of Electron test flight missions from Mahia, New Zealand. Specifically, RL requested relief from 14 CFR E417.7(f)(2) and (5), Qualification Testing and Analysis by Similarity for the Flight Termination Receiver. For Qualification, the Flight Termination Receiver is required to meet Table E417.19-2, which states with note (5): ``The same three sample components must undergo each test designated with an X. For a test designated with a quantity of less than three, each sample component tested must be one of the original three sample components.'' For Qualification Testing and Analysis by Similarity, Part 417 Appendix E section 417.7(f) provides the requirements a launch operator must satisfy in order to qualify or re-qualify a flight termination system component's design through qualification by similarity to tests performed on identical or similar hardware. Section E417.7(f)(2) states that to qualify component ``A'' based on similarity to [[Page 29799]] component ``B'', that has already been qualified for use, a launch operator must demonstrate that the environment encountered by ``B'' must have been equal to or more severe than the qualification environments required for ``A''. Specifically, RL used different components for the random vibration qualification test and the EMI/EMC qualification test instead of the original three qualification sample components used for the other tests under E417.7(f)(2). Section E417.7(f)(5) requires that the same manufacturer produce ``A'' and ``B'' in the same location using identical tools and manufacturing processes. Specifically, RL's sample ``A'' and ``B'' were manufactured at different locations with different manufacturing processes. The FAA licenses the launch of a launch vehicle and reentry of a reentry vehicle under authority granted to the Secretary of Transportation in the Commercial Space Launch Act of 1984, as amended and re-codified by 51 U.S.C. Subtitle V, chapter 509 (Chapter 509), and delegated to the FAA Administrator and the Associate Administrator for Commercial Space Transportation, who exercises licensing authority under Chapter 509. RL is a private commercial space flight company. RL seeks to lower the cost and increase the frequency of access to space for small payloads, potentially expanding the opportunity for space services and research. RL's petition for waiver addresses all upcoming Electron test flights that RL plans to launch from the Mahia Peninsula, New Zealand. The Electron launch is the first planned test flight from the privately-owned Rocket Lab Launch Complex at Mahia Peninsula in Hawkes Bay, New Zealand. The launch location is capable of hosting launches to the northeast, east, and south. The area within 20 NM surrounding the launch site is extremely remote, and has a low population density. The launch flight corridor will have minimal impact on air and marine traffic. Waiver Criteria Chapter 509 allows the FAA to waive a license requirement if the waiver (1) will not jeopardize public health and safety, safety of property; (2) will not jeopardize national security and foreign policy interests of the United States; and (3) will be in the public interest. See 51 U.S.C. 50905(b)(3) (2011); 14 CFR 404.5(b) (2011). Section E417.7(f)(2) and (5) Waiver Petition Section E417.7(f)(2) requires a launch operator wishing to qualify a component's design through qualification by similarity to tests performed on identical or similar hardware to demonstrate that the environments encountered by the component during its qualification or flight history were equal to or more severe than the qualification environments required for a component that has already been qualified for use. Section E417.7(f)(5) requires a launch operator qualifying a component's design as discussed above to demonstrate that the same manufacturer produced both the qualified component and the component the launch operator wishes to qualify in the same location using identical tools and manufacturing processes. For reasons described below, the FAA waives the requirements in section E417.7(f)(2) and (5) to allow RL to use components in its flight termination system that were qualified by similarity to more than one qualified component. In deciding whether or not to issue a waiver, the FAA had to analyze whether the waiver: (1) Would jeopardize public health and safety or safety of property; (2) would jeopardize national security and foreign policy interests of the United States; and (3) was in the public interest. See 51 U.S.C. 50905(b)(3); 14 CFR 404.5(b). i. Public Health and Safety and Safety of Property Part 417 contains requirements for qualification and acceptance testing of flight termination system components based on the approach used at the federal launch ranges. At federal launch ranges, flight termination system components are tested according to federal range- approved test procedures and requirements. Verification methods include test, analysis, and inspection. As an alternative to testing, components of an FTS are sometimes qualified by similarity. A component that has been qualified through testing for one launch vehicle may be approved for use on a different launch vehicle if it can be shown that the environments in which it must operate on the second vehicle are no harsher than those of the first. Also, with limited additional testing, the component may be qualified for a more severe environment. Although RL did not complete each of the qualification by similarity requirements for its flight termination receiver as required by the regulations, the failsafe design of the Electron's flight termination system combined with the remoteness of the operating area allow the FAA to find that RL's activities will not jeopardize public health and safety and safety of property. RL procured the Electron launch vehicle's flight termination receiver from Vendor A, who performed several qualification and delta qualification tests. A delta qualification test extends the tested environments to cover specific tests or levels that were not previously covered. RL submitted a Qualification by Similarity Analysis Report to the FAA, referencing three previous groups of similar flight termination receiver qualification and delta qualification tests performed by Vendor A. Group 1 was subjected to most of the qualification testing required by 14 CFR Table E417.19-2, with three exceptions: (a) Group 1 did not satisfy 14 CFR E417.7(f)(2) because the random vibration qualification environment encountered by Group 1 was not equal to or more severe than the random vibration qualification environment required for the Electron flight termination receivers, falling below for approximately 3.5% over the required 20 Hz to 2000 Hz test band; (b) Group 1 was not subjected to EMI/EMC testing; and (c) Group 1 did not meet the requirements of 14 CFR E417.7(f)(5) because it was not produced in the same manufacturing location using identical tools and manufacturing processes as the Rocket Lab Electron flight termination receivers. Group 1's deficiencies were mitigated by two subsequent delta qualification tests on 2 groups (referred to herein as Group 2 and Group 3) of similar receivers. Group 2 satisfied Electron's required random vibration qualification test levels for the entire required test band, and Group 2 was manufactured in the same location using identical tools and manufacturing processes as Electron flight termination receivers. Group 3 successfully passed EMI/EMC qualification testing. Group 1 also did not meet the requirements of 14 CFR E417.7(f)(5) because Group 1 was not produced in the same manufacturing location using identical tools and manufacturing processes as Group 2 and Electron flight termination receivers. Vendor A originally outsourced one of the flight termination receiver's printed circuit boards to another supplier. In late 2013, Vendor A upgraded its internal equipment and process, and assembled the printed circuit boards in- house. Group 1 and Group 3 were manufactured and qualification tested before this change in equipment and process, whereas Group 2 and Electron's flight termination receivers were assembled after the change. To verify that the equipment and process change did not invalidate previous qualification and delta qualification testing, Vendor [[Page 29800]] A applied the same heritage process profile to the new equipment, retained heritage printed circuit board samples for periodic process control comparisons, and implemented periodic visual/x-ray inspections for consistency validation. Heritage and new equipment specifications were also assessed to compare their performance characteristics. White Sand Missile Range has reviewed and accepted this process change, for U.S. Government launch vehicle programs conducting launches from its launch range, based on improved reliability and quality of the process. The FAA waives the requirements of E417.7(f)(2) and (5) because the Electron has implemented a failsafe flight safety system design that would terminate thrust to the vehicle should both flight termination receivers fail or communication was lost with the ground station, and RL's operating area is remote enough that were it to experience a catastrophic failure, it would not jeopardize public health and safety and safety of property. The Electron test flight missions would occur from the isolated Mahia Peninsula in New Zealand. The area within 20 NM of Mahia Peninsula has a very low population density. The Electron flight corridor is over the broad ocean area with minimal impact on air and marine traffic. Consequence analysis showed that less than 1 in 100,000 casualties would be expected if the worst foreseeable vehicle response mode (i.e., where the vehicle guidance is assumed to fail in a manner that leads to an attempt to guide to erroneous, randomly located points) occurred at the worst flight time (relatively early in flight before the vehicle proceeds downrange) and the flight termination receiver failed to activate. Thus, the casualty expectation given the assumption of the worst possible failure would on average still produce significantly less casualties than the FAA's limit of 1 in 10,000, which does not assume failure but rather assigns realistic failure probabilities. Also, the flight termination receiver's failsafe feature will terminate thrust if there is a loss of power or Radio Frequency carrier or pilot tone signal, providing an additional safety margin. For these reasons, the FAA has determined that waiving sections E417.7(f)(2) and (5) for the Electron test flight missions from Mahia, New Zealand will not jeopardize public health and safety or safety of property. ii. National Security and Foreign Policy Implications The FAA has identified no national security or foreign policy implications associated with granting this waiver. iii. Public Interest The waiver is consistent with the public interest goals of Chapter 509 and the National Space Transportation Policy. Three of the public policy goals of Chapter 509 are: (1) To promote economic growth and entrepreneurial activity through use of the space environment; (2) to encourage the United States private sector to provide launch and reentry vehicles and associated services; and (3) to facilitate the strengthening and expansion of the United States space transportation infrastructure to support the full range of United States space-related activities. See 51 U.S.C. 50901(b)(1), (2), (4). RL seeks to lower the cost and increase the frequency of access to space for small payloads, potentially expanding the opportunity for space services and research. These activities will help to make the U.S. launch industry more competitive internationally. The National Space Transportation Policy states that strengthening U.S. competitiveness in the international launch market and improving the cost effectiveness of U.S. space transportation services are in the public interest: Maintaining an assured capability to meet United States Government needs, while also taking the necessary steps to strengthen U.S. competitiveness in the international commercial launch market, is important to ensuring that U.S. space transportation capabilities will be reliable, robust, safe, and affordable in the future. Among other steps, improving the cost effectiveness of U.S. space transportation services could help achieve this goal by allowing the United States Government to invest a greater share of its resources in other needs such as facilities modernization, technology advancement, scientific discovery, and national security. Further, a healthier, more competitive U.S. space transportation industry would facilitate new markets, encourage new industries, create high technology jobs, lead to greater economic growth and security, and would further the Nation's leadership role in space. More specifically, Rocket Lab will be carrying onboard the Electron launch vehicle on its inaugural launch a flight test experiment for NASA Kennedy Space Center which will improve public risk mitigation capabilities from an errant launch vehicle. This component is designed and manufactured by NASA KSC and is part of the independent safety system which will be installed on the launch vehicles. This safety system will be capable of determining if the flight of the launch vehicle will pose an unacceptable increased risk to the public based on mission rules designed for its unique vehicle and flight characteristics and programmed into the safety system and terminate the flight of such launch vehicle. This type of capability is in public interest because this safety system will allow for improved protection of the public from mishaps resulting from flight of errant launch vehicles. Issued in Washington, DC, on May 15, 2017. Kenneth Wong, Commercial Space Transportation, Licensing and Evaluation Division Manager. [FR Doc. 2017-13567 Filed 6-29-17; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 4910-13-P
![29798 Federal Register / Vol. 82, No. 125 / Friday, June 30, 2017 / Proposed Rules
Revision 01, or A340–27–5067, Revision 01, by the Manager, International Branch, ANM– SUMMARY: This notice concerns three
all dated December 5, 2016, as applicable. 116, Transport Airplane Directorate, FAA; or petitions for waiver submitted to the
(4) If, during any inspection of the removed the European Aviation Safety Agency FAA by Rocket Lab USA Inc. (RL) for
THSA required by paragraph (h)(1) of this (EASA); or Airbus’s EASA Design the Flight Termination Receiver (FTR)
AD, any discrepancy specified in the Organization Approval (DOA). If approved by
Accomplishment Instructions of Airbus the DOA, the approval must include the
Qualification by Similarity (QBS): A
Service Bulletin A330–27–3218, Revision 01, DOA-authorized signature. petition to waive the requirement that a
A340–27–4203, Revision 01, or A340–27– (3) Required for Compliance (RC): Except component may be qualified based on
5067, Revision 01, all dated December 5, as required by paragraph (h)(2) of this AD: If similarity to a component that has
2016, as applicable, is detected, before any service information contains procedures already been qualified for use only if the
further flight, replace the THSA with a or tests that are identified as RC, those environments encountered by the
serviceable part (as defined in paragraph (i) procedures and tests must be done to comply previously qualified component during
of this AD), in accordance with the with this AD; any procedures or tests that are its qualification or flight history were
Accomplishment Instructions of Airbus not identified as RC are recommended. Those
Service Bulletin A330–27–3218, Revision 01,
equal or more severe than the Rocket
procedures and tests that are not identified Lab qualification environments; a
A340–27–4203, Revision 01, or A340–27– as RC may be deviated from using accepted
5067, Revision 01, all dated December 5, methods in accordance with the operator’s
petition to waive the Electromagnetic
2016, as applicable. maintenance or inspection program without Interference and Compatibility (EMI/
obtaining approval of an AMOC, provided EMC) on the same units; and a petition
(i) Definition of Serviceable THSA
the procedures and tests identified as RC can to waive the requirement that the same
For the purpose of this AD, a serviceable be done and the airplane can be put back in manufacturer must produce the
THSA is a part that has accumulated less an airworthy condition. Any substitutions or qualified and the unqualified
than 4,000 FH or 1,000 FC (for Airbus Model changes to procedures or tests identified as
A330, A340–200, or A340–300 airplanes) or component in the same location using
RC require approval of an AMOC. identical tools and manufacturing
4,000 FH or 800 FC (for Airbus Model A340–
500 or A340–600 airplanes), whichever (l) Related Information processes. The FAA grants these three
occurs first since the first flight of the (1) Refer to Mandatory Continuing petitions.
airplane, or since the last overhaul of the Airworthiness Information (MCAI) EASA AD DATES: Issued in Washington, DC, on
THSA, or since the last detailed visual 2017–044, dated March 9, 2017, for related
inspection of the THSA in accordance with May 15, 2017.
information. This MCAI may be found in the
the Accomplishment Instructions of Airbus FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For
AD docket on the Internet at http://
Service Bulletin A330–27–3218, Revision 01, www.regulations.gov by searching for and technical questions concerning this
A340–27–4203, Revision 01, or A340–27– locating Docket No. FAA–2017–0627. waiver, contact Michael Wiktowy,
5067, Revision 01, all dated December 5, (2) For more information about this AD, Licensing Program Lead, Commercial
2016, as applicable. contact Vladimir Ulyanov, Aerospace Space Transportation—Licensing and
(j) Credit for Previous Actions Engineer, International Branch, ANM–116, Evaluation Division, 800 Independence
This paragraph provides credit for actions Transport Airplane Directorate, FAA, 1601 Avenue SW., Washington, DC 20591;
required by paragraphs (g), (h)(1), (h)(3), and Lind Avenue SW., Renton, WA 98057–3356; telephone: (202) 267–7287; email:
(h)(4) of this AD, if those actions were telephone 425–227–1138; fax 425–227–1149. Michael.Wiktowy@faa.gov.
performed before the effective date of this AD (3) For service information identified in
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
using the service information specified in this AD, contact Airbus SAS, Airworthiness
paragraph (j)(1), (j)(2), or (j)(3) of this AD. Office–EAL, 1 Rond Point Maurice Bellonte, Background
(1) Airbus Service Bulletin A330–27–3218, 31707 Blagnac Cedex, France; telephone +33
5 61 93 36 96; fax +33 5 61 93 45 80; email RL submitted a petition to the FAA’s
Revision 00, dated July 1, 2016.
airworthiness.A330-A340@airbus.com; Office of Commercial Space
(2) Airbus Service Bulletin A340–27–4203,
Revision 00, dated July 1, 2016. Internet http://www.airbus.com. You may Transportation (AST) requesting relief
(3) Airbus Service Bulletin A340–27–5067, view this service information at the FAA, from regulatory requirements for a
Revision 00, dated July, 1 2016. Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind launch license for flight of Electron test
Avenue SW., Renton, WA. For information flight missions from Mahia, New
(k) Other FAA AD Provisions on the availability of this material at the Zealand. Specifically, RL requested
The following provisions also apply to this FAA, call 425–227–1221.
relief from 14 CFR E417.7(f)(2) and (5),
AD: Issued in Renton, Washington, on June 22, Qualification Testing and Analysis by
(1) Alternative Methods of Compliance 2017.
(AMOCs): The Manager, International
Similarity for the Flight Termination
John P. Piccola, Jr., Receiver. For Qualification, the Flight
Branch, ANM–116, Transport Airplane
Directorate, FAA, has the authority to Acting Manager, Transport Airplane Termination Receiver is required to
approve AMOCs for this AD, if requested Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service. meet Table E417.19–2, which states
using the procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19. [FR Doc. 2017–13780 Filed 6–29–17; 8:45 am] with note (5): ‘‘The same three sample
In accordance with 14 CFR 39.19, send your BILLING CODE 4910–13–P components must undergo each test
request to your principal inspector or local designated with an X. For a test
Flight Standards District Office, as designated with a quantity of less than
appropriate. If sending information directly
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION three, each sample component tested
to the manager of the International Branch,
send it to attention of the person identified must be one of the original three sample
Federal Aviation Administration components.’’ For Qualification Testing
in paragraph (l)(2) of this AD. Information
may be emailed to: 9-ANM-116-AMOC- and Analysis by Similarity, Part 417
REQUESTS@faa.gov. Before using any 14 CFR Part 417 Appendix E section 417.7(f) provides
mstockstill on DSK30JT082PROD with PROPOSALS
approved AMOC, notify your appropriate the requirements a launch operator must
principal inspector, or lacking a principal Waiver of Flight Termination Receiver
satisfy in order to qualify or re-qualify
inspector, the manager of the local flight Qualification by Similarity Deficiencies
a flight termination system component’s
standards district office/certificate holding
district office. AGENCY: Federal Aviation design through qualification by
(2) Contacting the Manufacturer: For any Administration (FAA), Department of similarity to tests performed on
requirement in this AD to obtain corrective Transportation (DOT). identical or similar hardware. Section
actions from a manufacturer, the action must E417.7(f)(2) states that to qualify
ACTION: Notice of waiver.
be accomplished using a method approved component ‘‘A’’ based on similarity to
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![29800 Federal Register / Vol. 82, No. 125 / Friday, June 30, 2017 / Proposed Rules
A applied the same heritage process ii. National Security and Foreign Policy is designed and manufactured by NASA
profile to the new equipment, retained Implications KSC and is part of the independent
heritage printed circuit board samples The FAA has identified no national safety system which will be installed on
for periodic process control security or foreign policy implications the launch vehicles. This safety system
comparisons, and implemented periodic associated with granting this waiver. will be capable of determining if the
visual/x-ray inspections for consistency flight of the launch vehicle will pose an
validation. Heritage and new equipment iii. Public Interest unacceptable increased risk to the
specifications were also assessed to The waiver is consistent with the public based on mission rules designed
compare their performance public interest goals of Chapter 509 and for its unique vehicle and flight
characteristics. White Sand Missile the National Space Transportation characteristics and programmed into the
Range has reviewed and accepted this Policy. Three of the public policy goals safety system and terminate the flight of
process change, for U.S. Government of Chapter 509 are: (1) To promote such launch vehicle. This type of
economic growth and entrepreneurial capability is in public interest because
launch vehicle programs conducting
activity through use of the space this safety system will allow for
launches from its launch range, based
environment; (2) to encourage the improved protection of the public from
on improved reliability and quality of
United States private sector to provide mishaps resulting from flight of errant
the process. launch vehicles.
launch and reentry vehicles and
The FAA waives the requirements of associated services; and (3) to facilitate Issued in Washington, DC, on May 15,
E417.7(f)(2) and (5) because the Electron the strengthening and expansion of the 2017.
has implemented a failsafe flight safety United States space transportation Kenneth Wong,
system design that would terminate infrastructure to support the full range Commercial Space Transportation, Licensing
thrust to the vehicle should both flight of United States space-related activities. and Evaluation Division Manager.
termination receivers fail or See 51 U.S.C. 50901(b)(1), (2), (4). [FR Doc. 2017–13567 Filed 6–29–17; 8:45 am]
communication was lost with the RL seeks to lower the cost and BILLING CODE 4910–13–P
ground station, and RL’s operating area increase the frequency of access to space
is remote enough that were it to for small payloads, potentially
experience a catastrophic failure, it expanding the opportunity for space
would not jeopardize public health and services and research. These activities DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
safety and safety of property. The will help to make the U.S. launch SECURITY
Electron test flight missions would industry more competitive
Coast Guard
occur from the isolated Mahia Peninsula internationally. The National Space
in New Zealand. The area within 20 NM Transportation Policy states that
33 CFR Part 117
of Mahia Peninsula has a very low strengthening U.S. competitiveness in
population density. The Electron flight the international launch market and [Docket No. USCG–2016–0257]
corridor is over the broad ocean area improving the cost effectiveness of U.S.
with minimal impact on air and marine space transportation services are in the RIN 1625–AA09
traffic. Consequence analysis showed public interest:
Maintaining an assured capability to Drawbridge Operation Regulation;
that less than 1 in 100,000 casualties
meet United States Government needs, Delaware River, Pennsauken
would be expected if the worst
while also taking the necessary steps to Township, NJ
foreseeable vehicle response mode (i.e., strengthen U.S. competitiveness in the
where the vehicle guidance is assumed international commercial launch AGENCY: Coast Guard, DHS.
to fail in a manner that leads to an market, is important to ensuring that ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking.
attempt to guide to erroneous, randomly U.S. space transportation capabilities
located points) occurred at the worst will be reliable, robust, safe, and SUMMARY: The Coast Guard proposes to
flight time (relatively early in flight affordable in the future. Among other modify the operating regulation that
before the vehicle proceeds downrange) steps, improving the cost effectiveness governs the DELAIR Memorial Railroad
and the flight termination receiver failed of U.S. space transportation services Bridge across the Delaware River, mile
to activate. Thus, the casualty could help achieve this goal by allowing 104.6, at Pennsauken Township, NJ.
expectation given the assumption of the the United States Government to invest This proposed regulation will allow the
worst possible failure would on average a greater share of its resources in other bridge to be remotely operated from the
needs such as facilities modernization, Conrail South Jersey dispatch center in
still produce significantly less casualties
technology advancement, scientific Mount Laurel, NJ, instead of being
than the FAA’s limit of 1 in 10,000,
discovery, and national security. operated by an on-site bridge tender.
which does not assume failure but
Further, a healthier, more competitive This regulation will not change the
rather assigns realistic failure operating schedule of the bridge.
probabilities. Also, the flight U.S. space transportation industry
would facilitate new markets, encourage DATES: Comments and related material
termination receiver’s failsafe feature
new industries, create high technology must reach the Coast Guard on or before
will terminate thrust if there is a loss of
jobs, lead to greater economic growth August 18, 2017.
power or Radio Frequency carrier or
and security, and would further the ADDRESSES: You may submit comments
mstockstill on DSK30JT082PROD with PROPOSALS
pilot tone signal, providing an
additional safety margin. For these Nation’s leadership role in space. identified by docket number USCG–
More specifically, Rocket Lab will be 2016–0257 using Federal eRulemaking
reasons, the FAA has determined that
carrying onboard the Electron launch Portal at http://www.regulations.gov.
waiving sections E417.7(f)(2) and (5) for
vehicle on its inaugural launch a flight See the ‘‘Public Participation and
the Electron test flight missions from
test experiment for NASA Kennedy Request for Comments’’ portion of the
Mahia, New Zealand will not jeopardize Space Center which will improve public SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION section
public health and safety or safety of risk mitigation capabilities from an below for instructions on submitting
property. errant launch vehicle. This component comments.
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Document Created: 2017-06-30 06:01:46
Document Modified: 2017-06-30 06:01:46
| Category | Regulatory Information | |
| Collection | Federal Register | |
| sudoc Class | AE 2.7: GS 4.107: AE 2.106: | |
| Publisher | Office of the Federal Register, National Archives and Records Administration | |
| Section | Proposed Rules | |
| Action | Notice of waiver. | |
| Dates | Issued in Washington, DC, on May 15, 2017. | |
| Contact | For technical questions concerning this waiver, contact Michael Wiktowy, Licensing Program Lead, Commercial Space Transportation--Licensing and Evaluation Division, 800 Independence Avenue SW., Washington, DC 20591; telephone: (202) 267- 7287; email: [email protected] | |
| FR Citation | 82 FR 29798 |
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