82 FR 34934 - Arms Sales Notification
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Office of the Secretary Federal Register Volume 82, Issue 143 (July 27, 2017)
Office of the Secretary
Federal Register Volume 82, Issue 143 (July 27, 2017)
| Page Range | 34934-34937 | |
| FR Document | 2017-15810 |
[Federal Register Volume 82, Number 143 (Thursday, July 27, 2017)] [Notices] [Pages 34934-34937] From the Federal Register Online [www.thefederalregister.org] [FR Doc No: 2017-15810] ======================================================================= ----------------------------------------------------------------------- DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE Office of the Secretary [Transmittal No. 16-84] Arms Sales Notification AGENCY: Defense Security Cooperation Agency, Department of Defense. ACTION: Arms sales notice. ----------------------------------------------------------------------- [[Page 34935]] SUMMARY: The Department of Defense is publishing the unclassified text of a section 36(b)(1) arms sales notification. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Pamela Young, (703) 697-9107, [email protected] or Kathy Valadez, (703) 697-9217, [email protected]; DSCA/DSA-RAN. SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This 36(b)(1) arms sales notification is published to fulfill the requirements of section 155 of Public Law 104- 164 dated July 21, 1996. The following is a copy of a letter to the Speaker of the House of Representatives, Transmittal 16-84 with attached Policy Justification and Sensitivity of Technology. Dated: July 24, 2017. Aaron Siegel, Alternate OSD Federal Register Liaison Officer, Department of Defense. BILLING CODE 5001-06-P [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TN27JY17.000 BILLING CODE 5001-06-C Transmittal No. 16-84 Notice of Proposed Issuance of Letter of Offer Pursuant to Section 36(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act, as Amended (i) Prospective Purchaser: Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (ii) Total Estimated Value: Major Defense Equipment *................ $482 million Other.................................... $180 million ------------------------------ Total................................ $662 million (iii) Description and Quantity or Quantities of Articles or Services under Consideration for Purchase: Major Defense Equipment (MDE): Twenty-six (26) each AN/TPQ-53(V) Radar Systems to include Solid State Phased Array Radar with KN-4083 Selective Availability Anti-Spoofing Module (SAASM) enhanced Land/Sea Inertial Navigation System (INS) and automatic leveling system Eight hundred and forty (840), M931 Full Range Training Round, 120mm Projectiles with M781 fuzes (for live fire exercise) Two thousand, two hundred and forty (2,240), M107, 155MM Projectiles with M557 fuzes (for live fire exercise) Non-MDE includes: Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio Systems (SINCGARS) and accessories; Defense Advanced Global Positioning System (GPS) Receiver (DAGR) equipment and accessories; Miltope laptops and accessories; Medium Tactical Vehicles FMTV M1092 5-ton trucks/chassis with support and accessories; software support; support equipment; classroom simulators; government furnished equipment; technical manuals and publications; essential spares and repair parts; consumables; live fire exercise and ammunition; tools and test equipment; training; transportation; U.S. Government technical support and logistic support; contractor technical support; repair and return support; quality assurance teams; in-country [[Page 34936]] Field Service Representative (FSR) and other associated equipment and services. (iv) Military Department: Army (ZAI) (v) Prior Related Cases, if any: None (vi) Sales Commission, Fee, etc., Paid, Offered, or Agreed to be Paid: None (vii) Sensitivity of Technology Contained in the Defense Article or Defense Services Proposed to be Sold: See Annex Attached (viii) Date Report Delivered to Congress: June 5, 2017 * as defined in Section 47(6) of the Arms Export Control Act. POLICY JUSTIFICATION Kingdom of Saudi Arabia--AN/TPQ-53(V) Radar Systems and Related Support The Government of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has requested a possible sale of twenty-six (26) AN/TPQ-53(V) Radar Systems to include Solid State Phased Array Radar with KN-4083 Selective Availability Anti-Spoofing Module (SAASM) enhanced Land/Sea Inertial Navigation System (INS) and automatic leveling system; Eight hundred and forty (840), M931, 120mm Projectiles with M781 fuzes (for live fire exercise); Two thousand, two hundred and forty (2,240), M107, 155MM Projectiles with M557 fuzes (for live fire exercise); Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio Systems (SINCGARS) and accessories; Defense Advanced Global Positioning System (GPS) Receiver (DAGR) equipment and accessories; Miltope laptops and accessories; Medium Tactical Vehicles FMTV M1092 5-ton trucks/chassis with support and accessories; software support; support equipment; classroom simulators; government furnished equipment; technical manuals and publications; essential spares and repair parts; consumables; live fire exercise and ammunition; tools and test equipment; training; transportation; U.S. Government technical support and logistic support; contractor technical support; repair and return support; quality assurance teams; in-country Field Service Representative (FSR) and other associated equipment and services. The total estimated program cost is $662 million. This proposed sale will contribute to the foreign policy and national security objectives of the United States by helping to improve the security of an important partner which has been and continues to be a leading contributor of political stability and economic growth in the Middle East. Saudi Arabia intends to use these radars to support its border security requirements and modernize its armed forces with a more current capability to locate and counter the source of incoming ballistic artillery, rockets, and mortars. This will contribute to Saudi Arabia's goal to update its military capability while further enhancing greater interoperability among Saudi Arabia, the United States and other allies. Saudi Arabia will have no difficulty absorbing this equipment into its armed forces. The proposed sale of this equipment and support will not alter the basic military balance in the region. The Lockheed Martin Corporation, Liverpool, New York, is the principal contractor for the AN/TPQ-53 (V) Radars. There are no known offset agreements proposed in connection with this potential sale. Implementation of this proposed sale will require U.S. Government or contractor representatives to travel to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia for a period of four (4) months for in- processing/fielding, system checkout and new equipment training, as well as providing the support of two in-country FSRs for two years. There will be no adverse impact on U.S. defense readiness as a result of the proposed sale. Transmittal No. 16-84 Notice of Proposed Issuance of Letter of Offer Pursuant to Section 36(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act Annex Item No. vii (vii) Sensitivity of Technology: 1. The AN/TPQ-53(V) radar system is a highly mobile radar that automatically detects, classifies, tracks, and locates the point of origin of projectiles fired from mortar, artillery and rocket systems with sufficient accuracy for first round fire for effect. It mitigates close combat radar coverage gaps and replaces the AN/TPQ-36 and AN/TPQ- 37 Firefinder Radars; fully supporting Brigade Combat Teams (BCT), Division Artilleries (DIVARTYs), and Field Artillery (FA) Brigades. Designed to be transported by ship, trucks, train, or aircraft, it is capable of deploying as part of the counter-rocket, artillery, and mortar system of systems to provide a sense and warn capability for fixed and semi-fixed sites. The AN/TPQ-53(V) provides a net ready system with increased range and accuracy throughout a 90 degree search sector (stare mode) as well as 360-degree coverage (rotating). a. The Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) hardware design of the AN/TPQ-53(V) is UNCLASSIFIED. Foreign source systems of similar design and capability are available in advanced industrial nations such as Sweden and Israel. b. The AN/TPQ-53(V) software gives it an enhanced capability in terms of target detection and classification in an Electronic Countermeasure (ECM) environment. Release of detailed knowledge of the software code or test data could aid an adversary trying to identify ways of countering the detection capabilities of the AN/TPQ-53(V) or improve the performance of their own radar systems. Although the detection, classification technology, and concept used in the AN/TPQ- 53(V) has been utilized for more than a decade, the ability to incorporate such technology on a solid state air cooled radar would be a major technological improvement. The software is UNCLASSIFIED. The system is classified SECRET when employed in a theater of operations. c. The Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System (SINCGARS) is a tactical radio providing secure jam-resistant voice and data communications of command, control, targeting, and technical information for the AN/TPQ-53(V) radar system. The spread-spectrum frequency hopping Electronic Counter-Counter Measures (ECCM) technology resident in the radio is sensitive but UNCLASSIFIED. While sensitive, the frequency-hopping algorithms used to generate the ECCM waveform are unique to the country of ownership and cannot be manipulated by potential adversaries for use or interference with other countries possessing SINCGARS technology. Should a potential adversary come into possession of one of these radios, they would have the potential to intercept operational command, control, and targeting information. This potential problem is mitigated by the fact that the customer can secure information passed over the radio network using a commercial grade security capability equivalent to an AES 256-bit encryption system whose keys are controlled by the customer country. d. The Defense Advanced Global Positioning System (GPS) Receiver (DAGR) is a handheld GPS location device with map background displaying the user's location. Unlike commercial grade GPS receivers capable of receiving Standard Positioning Signals (SPS) from GPS satellites, the DAGR is capable of receiving Precise Positioning Signals (PPS). PPS satellite signals provide significantly more accurate location data than do SPS signals. This capability within DAGR is possible due to the Selective Availability Anti-Spoofing Module (SAASM). The SAASM is an [[Page 34937]] encrypted device permitting both receipt of PPS signals and the benefit of preventing potential adversaries from spoofing the system to display incorrect location information. The SAASM capability within the DAGR is sensitive but UNCLASSIFIED. The SAASM capabilities are sensitive due to the system's ability to access restricted PPS GPS satellite signals and to prevent spoofing. While sensitive, the ability of potential adversaries to exploit the system are limited. The SAASM chip goes through a special process of loading encryption signals and unique access codes keyed to the customer country. These processes are strictly controlled by the US Air Force. If the DAGR is compromised, the US Air Force can cut off the device access to PPS signals and the anti-spoofing capability. e. The same SAASM capabilities resident in the DAGR are also resident in the AN/TPQ-53(V) KN-4083 Inertial Navigation System (INS). The KN-4083 is a SAASM enhanced INS capability with a 3-axis Monolithic Ring Laser Gyro allowing extremely accurate location as well as 3-axis accelerometer to provide angular information regarding the radar position (i.e. pitch, roll, and azimuth data). While inertial navigation and accelerometer capabilities are well-known, the SAASM capability within the system makes it sensitive but UNCLASSIFIED. As with the DAGR, the US Air Force can cut off access to PPS signals and anti-spoofing capabilities, minimizing impacts should a potential adversary obtain the system. 2. If a technologically advanced adversary were to obtain knowledge of the specific radar hardware and software elements, the information could be used to identify ways of countering the detection capabilities of the AN/TPQ-53(V) Radar System or improve the performance of their radar systems. Testing and identification of methods to defeat the AN/ TPQ-53(V) ECCM capabilities would lead to improvements in the overall effectiveness of an adversary's system and improve their survivability. 3. A determination has been made that Saudi Arabia can provide substantially the same degree of protection for the technology being released as the U.S. Government. This sale is necessary in furtherance of the U.S. foreign policy and national security objectives outlined in the Policy Justification. 4. All defense articles and services listed in this transmittal have been authorized for release and export to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. [FR Doc. 2017-15810 Filed 7-26-17; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 5001-06-P
![34934 Federal Register / Vol. 82, No. 143 / Thursday, July 27, 2017 / Notices
comments.cftc.gov. Please follow the As part of this regulatory scheme, customer collateral, transfer,
instructions for submitting comments §§ 22.2(g), 22.5(a), 22.11, 22.12, 22.16, neutralization of the risks, or liquidation
through the Web site; and 22.17 impose recordkeeping and of cleared swaps in the event of default
• By mail addressed to: Christopher third-party disclosure requirements on by a Depositing FCM 5 relating to a
Kirkpatrick, Secretary of the FCMs and DCOs. In addition, Cleared Swaps Customer Account.
Commission, Commodity Futures § 22.13(c)(2) indirectly requires FCMs Section 22.17 requires that FCM
Trading Commission, Three Lafayette who post excess collateral with DCOs to produce a written notice of the reasons
Centre, 1155 21st Street NW., perform certain computations regarding and the details concerning withdrawals
Washington, DC 20581; or such collateral, although it is not from Cleared Swaps Customers Account
• By hand delivery/courier to: the expected to materially affect the total not for the benefit of Cleared Swap
address listed above for submission by paperwork burden associated with Part Customers if such withdrawal will
mail. 22. exceed 25% of the FCMs residual
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Section 22.2(g) requires each FCM interest in such account.
Jacob Chachkin, Special Counsel, 202– with Cleared Swaps Customer The Commission believes that the
418–5496, email: jchachkin@cftc.gov; or Accounts 1 to, among other things, information collection obligations
Joshua Beale, Special Counsel, 202– compute daily and report to the imposed by Commission regulations in
418–5446, email: jbeale@cftc.gov, both Commission the amount of Cleared §§ 22.2(g), 22.5(a), 22.11, 22.12, 22.16,
in the CFTC Division of Swap Dealer Swaps Customer Collateral 2 on deposit and 22.17 are essential (i) to ensuring
and Intermediary Oversight. in such accounts, the amount of such that FCMs and DCOs develop and
collateral required to be on deposit in maintain adequate customer protections
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
such accounts and the amount of the and procedures over Cleared Swap
Supporting statements. A copy of the
FCM’s residual financial interest in such Customer funds as required by the CEA,
supporting statements for the collection and Commission regulations, and (ii) to
accounts. Section 22.5(a) requires an
of information discussed herein may be the effective evaluation of these
FCM or DCO to obtain, from each
obtained by visiting http://RegInfo.gov. registrants’ actual compliance with the
depository with which it deposits
Comment instructions. All comments CEA and Commission regulations. On
cleared swaps customer funds, a letter
must be submitted in English or, if not, April 24, 2017, the Commission
acknowledging that such funds belong
accompanied by an English translation. published in the Federal Register a
to the Cleared Swaps Customers 3 of the
Comments will be posted as received to notice of the proposed extension of this
FCM or DCO, and not the FCM, DCO,
http://www.cftc.gov. You should submit information collection and provided 60
or any other person. Section 22.11
only information that you wish to make days for public comment on the
requires each FCM that intermediates
available publicly. If you wish the proposed extension. See 82 FR 18900
cleared swaps for customers on or
Commission to consider information (April 24, 2017). The Commission
subject to the rules of a DCO, whether
that you believe is exempt from received no comments.
directly as a clearing member or
disclosure under the Freedom of Burden Statement: The Commission
indirectly through a Collecting FCM,4 to
Information Act (‘‘FOIA’’), a petition for is revising its estimate of the burden for
provide the DCO or the Collecting FCM,
confidential treatment of the exempt this collection to reflect the current
as appropriate, with information
information may be submitted according number of affected registrants.
sufficient to identify each customer of
to the procedures established in § 145.9 Accordingly, the respondent burden for
the FCM whose swaps are cleared by the
of the Commission’s regulations, 17 CFR this collection is estimated to be as
FCM. Section 22.11 also requires the
145.9. The Commission reserves the follows:
FCM, at least once daily, to provide the
right, but shall have no obligation, to Number of Registrants: 68.
DCO or the Collecting FCM, as
review, pre-screen, filter, redact, refuse Estimated Average Burden Hours per
appropriate, with information sufficient
or remove any or all of your submission Registrant: 365.
to identify each customer’s portfolio of
from http://www.cftc.gov that it may Estimated Aggregate Burden Hours:
rights and obligations arising out of
deem to be inappropriate for 24,820.
cleared swaps intermediated by the Frequency of Recordkeeping: As
publication, such as obscene language.
FCM. Section 22.12 requires that each applicable.
All submissions that have been redacted
Collecting FCM and DCO, on a daily
or removed that contain comments on Authority: 44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.
basis, calculate, based on information
the merits of the ICR will be retained in
received pursuant to § 22.11 and on Dated: July 21, 2017.
the public comment file and will be
information generated and used in the Christopher J. Kirkpatrick,
considered as required under the
ordinary course of business by the Secretary of the Commission.
Administrative Procedure Act and other
Collecting FCM or DCO, and record [FR Doc. 2017–15767 Filed 7–26–17; 8:45 am]
applicable laws, and may be accessible
certain information about the amount of
under the FOIA. BILLING CODE 6351–01–P
collateral required for each Cleared
Title: Disclosure and Retention of
Swaps Customer and the sum of these
Certain Information Relating to Cleared
amounts. Section 22.16 requires that DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Swaps Customer Collateral (OMB
each FCM who has Cleared Swaps
Control No. 3038–0091). This is a
Customers disclose to each of such Office of the Secretary
request for an extension of a currently
customers the governing provisions, as
approved information collection. [Transmittal No. 16–84]
Abstract: Part 22 of the Commission’s established by DCO rules or customer
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regulations under the Commodity agreements between collecting and Arms Sales Notification
Exchange Act (‘‘CEA’’) establishes rules depositing FCMs, relating to use of
AGENCY: Defense Security Cooperation
for the protection of customer collateral 1 For Agency, Department of Defense.
the definition of Cleared Swaps Customer
held by futures commission merchants Account, see 17 CFR 22.1. ACTION: Arms sales notice.
(‘‘FCM’’) and derivatives clearing 2 Id.
organizations (‘‘DCO’’) to serve as 3 Id.
margin in cleared swaps transactions. 4 Id. 5 Id.
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![Federal Register / Vol. 82, No. 143 / Thursday, July 27, 2017 / Notices 34937
encrypted device permitting both makes it sensitive but UNCLASSIFIED. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
receipt of PPS signals and the benefit of As with the DAGR, the US Air Force can
preventing potential adversaries from cut off access to PPS signals and anti- Office of the Secretary
spoofing the system to display incorrect spoofing capabilities, minimizing
location information. The SAASM impacts should a potential adversary [Transmittal No. 17–40]
capability within the DAGR is sensitive obtain the system.
but UNCLASSIFIED. The SAASM 2. If a technologically advanced Arms Sales Notification
capabilities are sensitive due to the adversary were to obtain knowledge of
system’s ability to access restricted PPS the specific radar hardware and AGENCY: Defense Security Cooperation
GPS satellite signals and to prevent software elements, the information Agency, Department of Defense.
spoofing. While sensitive, the ability of could be used to identify ways of ACTION: Arms sales notice.
potential adversaries to exploit the countering the detection capabilities of
system are limited. The SAASM chip the AN/TPQ–53(V) Radar System or SUMMARY: The Department of Defense is
goes through a special process of improve the performance of their radar publishing the unclassified text of a
loading encryption signals and unique systems. Testing and identification of section 36(b)(1) arms sales notification.
access codes keyed to the customer methods to defeat the AN/TPQ–53(V)
country. These processes are strictly FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
ECCM capabilities would lead to
controlled by the US Air Force. If the improvements in the overall Pamela Young, (703) 697–9107,
DAGR is compromised, the US Air effectiveness of an adversary’s system pamela.a.young14.civ@mail.mil or
Force can cut off the device access to and improve their survivability. Kathy Valadez, (703) 697–9217,
PPS signals and the anti-spoofing kathy.a.valadez.civ@mail.mil; DSCA/
3. A determination has been made
capability. DSA–RAN.
that Saudi Arabia can provide
e. The same SAASM capabilities
substantially the same degree of SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This
resident in the DAGR are also resident
protection for the technology being 36(b)(1) arms sales notification is
in the AN/TPQ–53(V) KN–4083 Inertial
released as the U.S. Government. This published to fulfill the requirements of
Navigation System (INS). The KN–4083
sale is necessary in furtherance of the section 155 of Public Law 104–164
is a SAASM enhanced INS capability
U.S. foreign policy and national security dated July 21, 1996. The following is a
with a 3-axis Monolithic Ring Laser
objectives outlined in the Policy copy of a letter to the Speaker of the
Gyro allowing extremely accurate
Justification. House of Representatives, Transmittal
location as well as 3-axis accelerometer
4. All defense articles and services 17–40 with attached Policy Justification
to provide angular information
regarding the radar position (i.e. pitch, listed in this transmittal have been and Sensitivity of Technology.
roll, and azimuth data). While inertial authorized for release and export to the Dated: July 24, 2017.
navigation and accelerometer Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Aaron Siegel,
capabilities are well-known, the [FR Doc. 2017–15810 Filed 7–26–17; 8:45 am] Alternate OSD Federal Register Liaison
SAASM capability within the system BILLING CODE 5001–06–P Officer, Department of Defense.
mstockstill on DSK30JT082PROD with NOTICES
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Document Created: 2017-07-27 02:07:38
Document Modified: 2017-07-27 02:07:38
| Category | Regulatory Information | |
| Collection | Federal Register | |
| sudoc Class | AE 2.7: GS 4.107: AE 2.106: | |
| Publisher | Office of the Federal Register, National Archives and Records Administration | |
| Section | Notices | |
| Action | Arms sales notice. | |
| Contact | Pamela Young, (703) 697-9107, [email protected] or Kathy Valadez, (703) 697-9217, [email protected]; DSCA/DSA-RAN. | |
| FR Citation | 82 FR 34934 |
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