82 FR 47032 - Biweekly Notice; Applications and Amendments to Facility Operating Licenses and Combined Licenses Involving No Significant Hazards Considerations
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Federal Register Volume 82, Issue 194 (October 10, 2017)
Federal Register Volume 82, Issue 194 (October 10, 2017)
| Page Range | 47032-47044 | |
| FR Document | 2017-21607 |
[Federal Register Volume 82, Number 194 (Tuesday, October 10, 2017)] [Notices] [Pages 47032-47044] From the Federal Register Online [www.thefederalregister.org] [FR Doc No: 2017-21607] ----------------------------------------------------------------------- NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION [NRC-2017-0201] Biweekly Notice; Applications and Amendments to Facility Operating Licenses and Combined Licenses Involving No Significant Hazards Considerations AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission. ACTION: Biweekly notice. ----------------------------------------------------------------------- SUMMARY: Pursuant to Section 189a. (2) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is publishing this regular biweekly notice. The Act requires the Commission to publish notice of any amendments issued, or proposed to be issued, and grants the Commission the authority to [[Page 47033]] issue and make immediately effective any amendment to an operating license or combined license, as applicable, upon a determination by the Commission that such amendment involves no significant hazards consideration, notwithstanding the pendency before the Commission of a request for a hearing from any person. This biweekly notice includes all notices of amendments issued, or proposed to be issued, from September 12, 2017, to September 25, 2017. The last biweekly notice was published on September 26, 2017. DATES: Comments must be filed by November 9, 2017. A request for a hearing must be filed by December 11, 2017. ADDRESSES: You may submit comments by any of the following methods (unless this document describes a different method for submitting comments on a specific subject):Federal Rulemaking Web site: Go to http://www.regulations.gov and search for Docket ID NRC-2017-0201. Address questions about NRC dockets to Carol Gallagher; telephone: 301-415- 3463; email: [email protected]. For technical questions, contact the individual listed in the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT section of this document. Mail comments to: Cindy Bladey, Office of Administration, Mail Stop: TWFN-8-D36M, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001. For additional direction on obtaining information and submitting comments, see ``Obtaining Information and Submitting Comments'' in the SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION section of this document. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Lynn Ronewicz, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; telephone: 301-415-1927, email: [email protected]. SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: I. Obtaining Information and Submitting Comments A. Obtaining Information Please refer to Docket ID NRC-2017-0201, facility name, unit number(s), plant docket number, application date, and subject when contacting the NRC about the availability of information for this action. You may obtain publicly-available information related to this action by any of the following methods: Federal rulemaking Web site: Go to http://www.regulations.gov and search for Docket ID NRC-2017-0201. NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS): You may obtain publicly-available documents online in the ADAMS Public Documents collection at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. To begin the search, select ``ADAMS Public Documents'' and then select ``Begin Web-based ADAMS Search.'' For problems with ADAMS, please contact the NRC's Public Document Room (PDR) reference staff at 1-800-397-4209, 301-415-4737, or by email to [email protected]. The ADAMS accession number for each document referenced (if it is available in ADAMS) is provided the first time that it is mentioned in this document. NRC's PDR: You may examine and purchase copies of public documents at the NRC's PDR, Room O1-F21, One White Flint North, 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland 20852. B. Submitting Comments Please include Docket ID NRC-2017-0201, facility name, unit number(s), plant docket number, application date, and subject in your comment submission. The NRC cautions you not to include identifying or contact information that you do not want to be publicly disclosed in your comment submission. The NRC posts all comment submissions at http://www.regulations.gov as well as entering the comment submissions into ADAMS. The NRC does not routinely edit comment submissions to remove identifying or contact information. If you are requesting or aggregating comments from other persons for submission to the NRC, then you should inform those persons not to include identifying or contact information that they do not want to be publicly disclosed in their comment submission. Your request should state that the NRC does not routinely edit comment submissions to remove such information before making the comment submissions available to the public or entering the comment submissions into ADAMS. II. Notice of Consideration of Issuance of Amendments to Facility Operating Licenses and Combined Licenses and Proposed No Significant Hazards Consideration Determination The Commission has made a proposed determination that the following amendment requests involve no significant hazards consideration. Under the Commission's regulations in Sec. 50.92 of title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR), this means that operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not (1) involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated, or (2) create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; or (3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. The basis for this proposed determination for each amendment request is shown below. The Commission is seeking public comments on this proposed determination. Any comments received within 30 days after the date of publication of this notice will be considered in making any final determination. Normally, the Commission will not issue the amendment until the expiration of 60 days after the date of publication of this notice. The Commission may issue the license amendment before expiration of the 60- day period provided that its final determination is that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration. In addition, the Commission may issue the amendment prior to the expiration of the 30- day comment period if circumstances change during the 30-day comment period such that failure to act in a timely way would result, for example in derating or shutdown of the facility. If the Commission takes action prior to the expiration of either the comment period or the notice period, it will publish in the Federal Register a notice of issuance. If the Commission makes a final no significant hazards consideration determination, any hearing will take place after issuance. The Commission expects that the need to take this action will occur very infrequently. A. Opportunity To Request a Hearing and Petition for Leave To Intervene Within 60 days after the date of publication of this notice, any persons (petitioner) whose interest may be affected by this action may file a request for a hearing and petition for leave to intervene (petition) with respect to the action. Petitions shall be filed in accordance with the Commission's ``Agency Rules of Practice and Procedure'' in 10 CFR part 2. Interested persons should consult a current copy of 10 CFR 2.309. The NRC's regulations are accessible electronically from the NRC Library on the NRC's Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/cfr/. Alternatively, a copy of the regulations is available at the NRC's Public Document Room, located at One White Flint North, Room O1-F21, 11555 Rockville Pike (first floor), Rockville, Maryland 20852. If a petition is filed, the Commission or a presiding officer [[Page 47034]] will rule on the petition and, if appropriate, a notice of a hearing will be issued. As required by 10 CFR 2.309(d) the petition should specifically explain the reasons why intervention should be permitted with particular reference to the following general requirements for standing: (1) The name, address, and telephone number of the petitioner; (2) the nature of the petitioner's right under the Act to be made a party to the proceeding; (3) the nature and extent of the petitioner's property, financial, or other interest in the proceeding; and (4) the possible effect of any decision or order which may be entered in the proceeding on the petitioner's interest. In accordance with 10 CFR 2.309(f), the petition must also set forth the specific contentions which the petitioner seeks to have litigated in the proceeding. Each contention must consist of a specific statement of the issue of law or fact to be raised or controverted. In addition, the petitioner must provide a brief explanation of the bases for the contention and a concise statement of the alleged facts or expert opinion which support the contention and on which the petitioner intends to rely in proving the contention at the hearing. The petitioner must also provide references to the specific sources and documents on which the petitioner intends to rely to support its position on the issue. The petition must include sufficient information to show that a genuine dispute exists with the applicant or licensee on a material issue of law or fact. Contentions must be limited to matters within the scope of the proceeding. The contention must be one which, if proven, would entitle the petitioner to relief. A petitioner who fails to satisfy the requirements at 10 CFR 2.309(f) with respect to at least one contention will not be permitted to participate as a party. Those permitted to intervene become parties to the proceeding, subject to any limitations in the order granting leave to intervene. Parties have the opportunity to participate fully in the conduct of the hearing with respect to resolution of that party's admitted contentions, including the opportunity to present evidence, consistent with the NRC's regulations, policies, and procedures. Petitions must be filed no later than 60 days from the date of publication of this notice. Petitions and motions for leave to file new or amended contentions that are filed after the deadline will not be entertained absent a determination by the presiding officer that the filing demonstrates good cause by satisfying the three factors in 10 CFR 2.309(c)(1)(i) through (iii). The petition must be filed in accordance with the filing instructions in the ``Electronic Submissions (E-Filing)'' section of this document. If a hearing is requested, and the Commission has not made a final determination on the issue of no significant hazards consideration, the Commission will make a final determination on the issue of no significant hazards consideration. The final determination will serve to establish when the hearing is held. If the final determination is that the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration, the Commission may issue the amendment and make it immediately effective, notwithstanding the request for a hearing. Any hearing would take place after issuance of the amendment. If the final determination is that the amendment request involves a significant hazards consideration, then any hearing held would take place before the issuance of the amendment unless the Commission finds an imminent danger to the health or safety of the public, in which case it will issue an appropriate order or rule under 10 CFR part 2. A State, local governmental body, Federally-recognized Indian Tribe, or agency thereof, may submit a petition to the Commission to participate as a party under 10 CFR 2.309(h)(1). The petition should state the nature and extent of the petitioner's interest in the proceeding. The petition should be submitted to the Commission no later than 60 days from the date of publication of this notice. The petition must be filed in accordance with the filing instructions in the ``Electronic Submissions (E-Filing)'' section of this document, and should meet the requirements for petitions set forth in this section, except that under 10 CFR 2.309(h)(2) a State, local governmental body, or federally recognized Indian Tribe, or agency thereof does not need to address the standing requirements in 10 CFR 2.309(d) if the facility is located within its boundaries. Alternatively, a State, local governmental body, Federally-recognized Indian Tribe, or agency thereof may participate as a non-party under 10 CFR 2.315(c). If a hearing is granted, any person who is not a party to the proceeding and is not affiliated with or represented by a party may, at the discretion of the presiding officer, be permitted to make a limited appearance pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 2.315(a). A person making a limited appearance may make an oral or written statement of his or her position on the issues but may not otherwise participate in the proceeding. A limited appearance may be made at any session of the hearing or at any prehearing conference, subject to the limits and conditions as may be imposed by the presiding officer. Details regarding the opportunity to make a limited appearance will be provided by the presiding officer if such sessions are scheduled. B. Electronic Submissions (E-Filing) All documents filed in NRC adjudicatory proceedings, including a request for hearing and petition for leave to intervene (petition), any motion or other document filed in the proceeding prior to the submission of a request for hearing or petition to intervene, and documents filed by interested governmental entities that request to participate under 10 CFR 2.315(c), must be filed in accordance with the NRC's E-Filing rule (72 FR 49139; August 28, 2007, as amended at 77 FR 46562, August 3, 2012). The E-Filing process requires participants to submit and serve all adjudicatory documents over the internet, or in some cases to mail copies on electronic storage media. Detailed guidance on making electronic submissions may be found in the Guidance for Electronic Submissions to the NRC and on the NRC's Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/site-help/e-submittals.html. Participants may not submit paper copies of their filings unless they seek an exemption in accordance with the procedures described below. To comply with the procedural requirements of E-Filing, at least 10 days prior to the filing deadline, the participant should contact the Office of the Secretary by email at [email protected], or by telephone at 301-415-1677, to (1) request a digital identification (ID) certificate, which allows the participant (or its counsel or representative) to digitally sign submissions and access the E-Filing system for any proceeding in which it is participating; and (2) advise the Secretary that the participant will be submitting a petition or other adjudicatory document (even in instances in which the participant, or its counsel or representative, already holds an NRC- issued digital ID certificate). Based upon this information, the Secretary will establish an electronic docket for the hearing in this proceeding if the Secretary has not already established an electronic docket. Information about applying for a digital ID certificate is available on the NRC's public Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/site-help/e-submittals/getting-started.html. Once a participant has obtained a digital ID certificate and [[Page 47035]] a docket has been created, the participant can then submit adjudicatory documents. Submissions must be in Portable Document Format (PDF). Additional guidance on PDF submissions is available on the NRC's public Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/site-help/electronic-sub-ref-mat.html. A filing is considered complete at the time the document is submitted through the NRC's E-Filing system. To be timely, an electronic filing must be submitted to the E-Filing system no later than 11:59 p.m. Eastern Time on the due date. Upon receipt of a transmission, the E- Filing system time-stamps the document and sends the submitter an email notice confirming receipt of the document. The E-Filing system also distributes an email notice that provides access to the document to the NRC's Office of the General Counsel and any others who have advised the Office of the Secretary that they wish to participate in the proceeding, so that the filer need not serve the document on those participants separately. Therefore, applicants and other participants (or their counsel or representative) must apply for and receive a digital ID certificate before adjudicatory documents are filed so that they can obtain access to the documents via the E-Filing system. A person filing electronically using the NRC's adjudicatory E- Filing system may seek assistance by contacting the NRC's Electronic Filing Help Desk through the ``Contact Us'' link located on the NRC's public Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/site-help/e-submittals.html, by email to [email protected], or by a toll-free call at 1-866-672- 7640. The NRC Electronic Filing Help Desk is available between 9 a.m. and 6 p.m., Eastern Time, Monday through Friday, excluding government holidays. Participants who believe that they have a good cause for not submitting documents electronically must file an exemption request, in accordance with 10 CFR 2.302(g), with their initial paper filing stating why there is good cause for not filing electronically and requesting authorization to continue to submit documents in paper format. Such filings must be submitted by: (1) First class mail addressed to the Office of the Secretary of the Commission, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, Attention: Rulemaking and Adjudications Staff; or (2) courier, express mail, or expedited delivery service to the Office of the Secretary, 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland 20852, Attention: Rulemaking and Adjudications Staff. Participants filing adjudicatory documents in this manner are responsible for serving the document on all other participants. Filing is considered complete by first-class mail as of the time of deposit in the mail, or by courier, express mail, or expedited delivery service upon depositing the document with the provider of the service. A presiding officer, having granted an exemption request from using E-Filing, may require a participant or party to use E-Filing if the presiding officer subsequently determines that the reason for granting the exemption from use of E-Filing no longer exists. Documents submitted in adjudicatory proceedings will appear in the NRC's electronic hearing docket which is available to the public at https://adams.nrc.gov/ehd, unless excluded pursuant to an order of the Commission or the presiding officer. If you do not have an NRC-issued digital ID certificate as described above, click cancel when the link requests certificates and you will be automatically directed to the NRC's electronic hearing dockets where you will be able to access any publicly-available documents in a particular hearing docket. Participants are requested not to include personal privacy information, such as social security numbers, home addresses, or personal phone numbers in their filings, unless an NRC regulation or other law requires submission of such information. For example, in some instances, individuals provide home addresses in order to demonstrate proximity to a facility or site. With respect to copyrighted works, except for limited excerpts that serve the purpose of the adjudicatory filings and would constitute a Fair Use application, participants are requested not to include copyrighted materials in their submission. For further details with respect to these license amendment applications, see the application for amendment, which is available for public inspection in ADAMS and at the NRC's PDR. For additional direction on accessing information related to this document, see the ``Obtaining Information and Submitting Comments'' section of this document. Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc. (DNC), Docket Nos. 50-245, 50-336, and 50-423, Millstone Power Station, Unit Nos. 1, 2, and 3, New London County, Connecticut Date of amendment request: June 15, 2017. A publicly-available version is in ADAMS under Accession No. ML17171A232. Description of amendment request: The amendments would revise the Renewed Facility Operating Licenses for Millstone Power Station, Unit Nos. 1, 2, and 3, by administratively changing the company name ``Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc.'' with ``Dominion Energy Nuclear Connecticut, Inc.'' Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented below: 1. Does the proposed amendment involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated? Response: No. The proposed amendment to each license is administrative in nature. DNC, which will be renamed Dominion Energy Nuclear Connecticut, Inc., will remain the licensee authorized to operate and possess the units, and its functions, powers, resources and management will not change. The proposed changes do not adversely affect accident initiators or precursors, and do not alter the design assumptions, conditions, or configuration of the plant or the manner in which the plant is operated and maintained. The ability of structures, systems, and components to perform their intended safety functions is not altered or prevented by the proposed changes, and the assumptions used in determining the radiological consequences of previously evaluated accidents are not affected. Therefore, the proposed changes do not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated. 2. Does the proposed amendment create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated? Response: No. The proposed amendment to each license is purely administrative in nature. The functions of the licensee will not change. These changes do not involve any physical alteration of the plant (i.e., no new or different type of equipment will be installed), and installed equipment is not being operated in a new or different manner. Thus, no new failure modes are introduced. Therefore, the proposed changes do not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated. 3. Does the proposed amendment involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety? Response: No. The proposed amendment to each license is administrative in nature. DNC, which will be renamed Dominion Energy Nuclear Connecticut, Inc., will remain the licensee authorized to operate and possess the units, and its functions will not change. The proposed changes do not alter the manner in which safety limits, limiting safety system settings, or limiting conditions for operation are determined. There are no changes to setpoints at which protective actions are [[Page 47036]] initiated, and the operability requirements for equipment assumed to operate for accident mitigation are not affected. Therefore, the proposed changes do not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration. Attorney for licensee: Lillian M. Cuoco, Senior Counsel, Dominion Energy, Inc., 120 Tredegar Street, RS-2, Richmond, VA 23219. NRC Branch Chief: James G. Danna. Entergy Operations, Inc., Docket No. 50-313, Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 1 (ANO-1), Pope County, Arkansas Date of amendment request: July 17, 2017. A publicly-available version is in ADAMS under Accession No. ML17198F072. Description of amendment request: The amendment would revise the Technical Specifications (TSs) for ANO-1 and would establish a new Completion Time in ANO-1 TS 3.7.5, ``Emergency Feedwater (EFW) System,'' where one steam supply to the turbine driven EFW pump is inoperable concurrent with an inoperable motor-driven EFW train. The amendment would also establish changes to the TSs that establish specific Actions: (1) For when the motor driven EFW train is inoperable at the same time and; (2) for when the turbine-driven EFW train is inoperable either (a) due solely to one inoperable steam supply, or (b) due to reasons other than one inoperable steam supply. The amendment request was submitted in accordance with NRC-approved Technical Specification Task Force (TSTF) Traveler, TSTF-412, Revision 3, ``Provide Actions for One Steam Supply to Turbine Driven AFW [Auxiliary Feedwater]/EFW Pump Inoperable,'' with certain plant- specific deviations identified in the application. The availability of this TS improvement was published in the Federal Register on July 17, 2007 (72 FR 39089), as part of the consolidated line item improvement process (CLIIP). Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee affirmed the applicability of the model no significant hazards consideration determination, which is presented below: 1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of any accident previously evaluated? Response: No. The Auxiliary/Emergency Feedwater (AFW/EFW) System is not an initiator of any design basis accident or event, and therefore the proposed changes do not increase the probability of any accident previously evaluated. The proposed changes to address the condition of one or two motor driven AFW/EFW trains inoperable and the turbine driven AFW/EFW train inoperable due to one steam supply inoperable do not change the response of the plant to any accidents. The proposed changes do not adversely affect accident initiators or precursors nor alter the design assumptions, conditions, and configuration of the facility or the manner in which the plant is operated and maintained. The proposed changes do not adversely affect the ability of structures, systems, and components (SSCs) to perform their intended safety function to mitigate the consequences of an initiating event within the assumed acceptance limits. The proposed changes do not affect the source term, containment isolation, or radiological release assumptions used in evaluating the radiological consequences of any accident previously evaluated. Further, the proposed changes do not increase the types and amounts of radioactive effluent that may be released offsite, nor significantly increase individual or cumulative occupational/public radiation exposures. Therefore, the changes do not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of any accident previously evaluated. 2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated? Response: No. The proposed changes do not result in a change in the manner in which the AFW/EFW System provides plant protection. The AFW/EFW System will continue to supply water to the steam generators to remove decay heat and other residual heat by delivering at least the minimum required flow rate to the steam generators. There are no design changes associated with the proposed changes. The changes to the Conditions and Required Actions do not change any existing accident scenarios, nor create any new or different accident scenarios. The changes do not involve a physical alteration of the plant (i.e., no new or different type of equipment will be installed) or a change in the methods governing normal plant operation. In addition, the changes do not impose any new or different requirements or eliminate any existing requirements. The changes do not alter assumptions made in the safety analysis. The proposed changes are consistent with the safety analysis assumptions and current plant operating practice. Therefore, the changes do not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated. 3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety? Response: No. The proposed changes do not alter the manner in which safety limits, limiting safety system settings or limiting conditions for operation are determined. The safety analysis acceptance criteria are not impacted by these changes. The proposed changes will not result in plant operation in a configuration outside the design basis. Therefore, it is concluded that the proposed change does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration. Attorney for licensee: Ms. Anna Vinson Jones, Senior Counsel, Entergy Services, Inc., 101 Constitution Avenue NW., Suite 200 East, Washington, DC 20001. NRC Branch Chief: Robert J. Pascarelli. Entergy Operations, Inc., Docket No. 50-368, Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 2 (ANO-2), Pope County, Arkansas Date of amendment request: July 17, 2017. A publicly-available version is in ADAMS under Accession No. ML17198F356. Description of amendment request: The amendment would revise the technical specifications (TSs) for ANO-2 by establishing Actions and Allowable Outage Times in TS 3.7.1.2, ``Emergency Feedwater [EFW] System,'' for several combinations of inoperable EFW trains, consistent with NUREG-1432, ``Standard Technical Specifications for Combustion Engineering Plants,'' Revision 4. Revision 4 of NUREG-1432 includes changes incorporated by Technical Specification Task Force (TSTF)-340, Revision 3, ``Allow 7 Day Completion Time for a Turbine-Driven AFW [Auxiliary Feedwater] Pump Inoperable,'' and TSTF-412, Revision 3, ``Provide Actions for One Steam Supply to Turbine Driven AFW/EFW Pump Inoperable.'' Certain proposed deviations from the NUREG-1432, Revision 4, TS changes are identified in the application. Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented below: 1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated? Response: No. [[Page 47037]] The proposed changes clarify the operability requirements of the EFW system and provide appropriate remedial actions to be performed respective to potential EFW configurations or out-of-service periods, consistent with the STS [standard technical specifications]. The EFW system is not an initiator of any design basis accident or event and, therefore, the proposed changes do not increase the probability of any accident previously evaluated. The EFW system is used to respond to accidents previously evaluated. The proposed change affects only the actions taken when portions of the EFW system are unavailable and does not affect the design of the EFW system. The proposed changes do not adversely affect accident initiators or precursors nor alter the design assumptions, conditions, and configuration of the facility or the manner in which the plant is operated and maintained. The proposed changes do not adversely affect the ability of structures, systems, and components (SSCs) to perform their intended safety function to mitigate the consequences of an initiating event within the assumed acceptance limits. The proposed changes do not affect the source term, containment isolation, or radiological release assumptions used in evaluating the radiological consequences of any accident previously evaluated. Further, the proposed changes do not increase the types and amounts of radioactive effluent that may be released offsite, nor significantly increase individual or cumulative occupational/public radiation exposures. Therefore, this change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated. 2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated? Response: No. The proposed changes do not result in a change in the manner in which the EFW system provides plant protection. The EFW system will continue to supply water to the Steam Generators (SGs) to remove decay heat and other residual heat by delivering at least the minimum required flow rate to the SGs. There are no design changes associated with the proposed changes. The changes to the related TS Actions do not change any existing accident scenarios, nor create any new or different accident scenarios. The changes do not involve a physical alteration of the plant (i.e., no new or different type of equipment will be installed) or a change in the methods governing normal plant operation. In addition, the changes do not impose any new or different requirements or eliminate any existing requirements. The changes do not alter assumptions made in the safety analysis. Therefore, this change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from an accident previously evaluated. 3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety? Response: No. The proposed changes do not alter the manner in which safety limits, limiting safety system settings, or limiting conditions for operation are determined. The safety analysis acceptance criteria are not impacted by these changes. The proposed changes will not result in continued plant operation in a configuration outside the design basis. Therefore, this change does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration. Attorney for licensee: Ms. Anna Vinson Jones, Senior Counsel, Entergy Services, Inc., 101 Constitution Avenue NW., Suite 200 East, Washington, DC 20001. NRC Branch Chief: Robert J. Pascarelli. Exelon Generation Company, LLC, Docket No. 50-219, Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station (Oyster Creek), Ocean County, New Jersey Date of amendment request: August 30, 2017. A publicly-available version is available in ADAMS under Accession No. ML17242A211. Description of amendment request: The amendment would revise the Oyster Creek Renewed Facility Operating License No. DPR-16, Section 2.C, License Condition (5) by replacing Boiling Water Reactor (BWR) Vessel and Internals Project technical report BWRVIP-18, Revision 0, as approved by NRC staff's Final Safety Evaluation Report dated December 2, 1999, with the latest BWRVIP-18 revision approved on December 21, 2016. Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented below: 1. Do the proposed changes involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated? Response: No. The proposed change to the License Condition 2.C.(5) requirements for inspection of Core Spray spargers, piping and associated components does not alter the use of the inspection methods and criteria used to determine the capability of the Core Spray System to perform its intended safety function that have been previously reviewed and approved by the NRC. The proposed change is in accordance with an NRC approved inspection and flaw evaluation guideline and as such, maintains required safety margins. The proposed change does not adversely affect accident initiators or precursors, nor does it alter the design assumptions, conditions, or configuration of the facility or the manner in which the plant is operated and maintained. The proposed change does not alter or prevent the ability of structures, systems, and components (SSCs) from performing their intended function to mitigate the consequences of an initiating event within the assumed acceptance limits. The proposed change does not require any physical change to any plant SSCs nor does it require any change in systems or plant operations. The proposed change is consistent with the safety analysis assumptions and resultant consequences. Incorporating NRG-approved inspection frequency and criteria for Core Spray spargers, piping and associated components has no physical effect on plant equipment and therefore, no impact on the course of plant transients. Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated. 2. Do the proposed changes create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated? Response: No. The proposed incorporation of NRC-approved inspection frequency and criteria for Core Spray spargers, piping and associated components is a change based upon previously approved documents and does not involve changes to the plant hardware or its operating characteristics. As a result, no new failure modes are being introduced. There are no hardware changes nor are there any changes in the method by which any plant systems perform a safety function. No new accident scenarios, failure mechanisms, or limiting single failures are introduced as a result of the proposed change. The proposed change does not introduce any new accident precursors, nor does it involve any physical plant alterations or changes in the methods governing normal plant operation. The change does not alter assumptions made in the safety analysis. Therefore, the proposed change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated. 3. Do the proposed changes involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety? Response: No. The margin of safety is established through the design of the plant structures, systems, and components, and through the parameters for safe operation and setpoints for the actuation of equipment relied upon to respond to transients and design basis accidents. The use of inspection frequency and criteria for Core Spray spargers, piping and associated components in accordance with NRC-approved methods, guidelines, and criteria provides adequate assurance that the Core Spray System can perform its safety function as required by the plant-specific [loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA)]- analysis. Therefore, the proposed change does not decrease the margin of safety. The proposed change in inspection criteria maintains the current safety margin, which protects the fuel [[Page 47038]] cladding integrity during a postulated LOCA event, but does not change the requirements governing operation or availability of safety equipment assumed to operate to preserve the margin of safety. The change does not alter the behavior of plant equipment, which remains unchanged. The proposed change to License Condition 2.C.(5) is consistent with NRC-approved methods, guidelines, and criteria and provides adequate assurance that the Core Spray System can perform its safety function as required by the plant-specific LOCA-analysis. No setpoints at which protective actions are initiated are altered by the proposed change. The proposed change does not alter the manner in which the safety limits are determined. This change is consistent with plant design and does not change the Technical Specification operability requirements; thus, previously evaluated accidents are not affected by this proposed change. Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety. The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration. Attorney for licensee: Tamra Domeyer, Associate General Counsel, Exelon Generation Company, LLC, 4300 Winfield Road, Warrenville, IL 60555. NRC Branch Chief: Douglas A. Broaddus. NextEra Energy Seabrook, LLC, Docket No. 50-443, Seabrook Station, Unit No. 1, Rockingham County, New Hampshire Date of amendment request: July 28, 2017. A publicly-available version is in ADAMS under Accession No. ML17212A034. Description of amendment request: The amendment would revise the direct current (DC) battery Technical Specifications 3.8.2.1, 3.8.2.2, 3.8.3.1, and 3.8.3.2 such that a DC electrical train is operable with one 100 percent capacity battery aligned to both DC buses in the associated electrical train. The amendment also proposes to remove a footnote to Surveillance Requirement 4.8.2.1 associated with DC battery checks. Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented below: 1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated? Response: No. The technical specification (TS) limiting conditions for operation and required actions associated with the proposed changes to the TS are not initiators of any accidents previously evaluated, so the probability of accidents previously evaluated is unaffected by the proposed changes. The proposed change does not alter the design, function, or operation of any plant structure, system, or component (SSC). The capability of any operable TS-required SSC to perform its specified safety function is not impacted by the proposed change. As a result, the outcomes of accidents previously evaluated are unaffected. Therefore, the proposed changes do not result in a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated. 2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated? Response: No. The proposed change does not challenge the integrity or performance of any safety-related systems. No plant equipment is installed or removed, and the changes do not alter the design, physical configuration, or method of operation of any plant SSC. No physical changes are made to the plant, so no new causal mechanisms are introduced. Therefore, the proposed changes to the TS do not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated. The proposed change does not challenge the integrity or performance of any safety-related systems. No plant equipment is installed or removed, and the changes do not alter the design, physical configuration, or method of operation of any plant SSC. No physical changes are made to the plant, so no new causal mechanisms are introduced. Therefore, the proposed changes to the TS do not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated. 3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety? Response: No. The ability of any operable SSC to perform its designated safety function is unaffected by the proposed changes. The proposed changes do not alter any safety analyses assumptions, safety limits, limiting safety system settings, or method of operating the plant. The changes do not adversely affect plant operating margins or the reliability of equipment credited in the safety analyses. With the proposed change, each DC electrical trains remains fully capable of performing its safety function. Therefore, the proposed changes do not involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety. The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis, and based on this review, it appears that the three standards of 50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration. Attorney for licensee: William Blair, Managing Attorney, Florida Power & Light Company, P.O. Box 14000, Juno Beach, FL 33408-0420. NRC Branch Chief: James G. Danna. Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc. (SNC), Docket Nos. 50-424, 50- 425, 52-025, and 52-026, Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 1, 2, 3, and 4, Burke County, Georgia Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc., Docket Nos. 50-348 and 50- 364, Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2, Houston County, Alabama Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc., Docket Nos. 50-321 and 50- 366, Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant, Unit Nos. 1 and 2, City of Dalton, Georgia Date of amendment request: August 30, 2017. A publicly-available version is in ADAMS under Accession No. ML17243A202. Description of amendment request: The amendments would relocate the emergency operations facility for the eight units of the SNC nuclear fleet from the SNC corporate headquarters in Birmingham, Alabama, to a new location 1.3 miles away. Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented below: 1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated? Response: No. The proposed change to relocate the consolidated EOF [emergency operations facility] within Birmingham, Alabama, requires no change to the required staff response time for supplementing onsite personnel in response to a radiological emergency. The relocated EOF is along the same major roadway and response personnel will be able to access the facility, using for the most part, the same path they currently use to travel to the corporate office. The license amendment does not request a change to the response time and the facility will be functional within the same timeframe as for the existing EOF. The functions and capabilities of the relocated EOF will continue to meet the applicable regulatory requirements. The proposed change has no effect on normal plant operation or on any accident initiator or precursors and does not impact the function of plant structures, systems, or components [(SSCs)]. The proposed change does not alter or prevent the ability of the emergency response organization to perform its intended functions to mitigate the consequences of an accident or event. Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant increase in the [[Page 47039]] probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated. 2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated? Response: No. The proposed change only concerns implementation of the standard emergency plan by relocating the Corporate EOF a short distance (1.3 miles) from its current location. The new location will not change the time the facility will be functional to provide emergency response. The functions and capabilities of the relocated EOF will continue to meet the applicable regulatory requirements. The proposed change will not change the design function or operation of SSCs. The change does not impact the accident analysis for any of the SNC nuclear plants. The change does not involve a physical alteration of any of the plants, a change in the method of plant operation, or new operator actions. The proposed change does not introduce failure modes that could result in a new accident, and the change does not alter assumptions made in safety analyses. Therefore, the proposed change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated. 3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety? Response: No. The proposed change only impacts the implementation of the emergency plan by relocating the Corporate EOF a short distance (1.3 miles) within Birmingham, Alabama. The change does not the affect staff response time or the time it takes to make the facility operational to perform its intended emergency response functions. The functions and capabilities of the relocated EOF will continue to meet the applicable regulatory requirements. Margin of safety is associated with confidence in the ability of the fission product barriers (i.e., fuel cladding, reactor coolant system pressure boundary, and containment structure) to limit the level of radiation dose to the public. The proposed change is associated with the emergency plan and does not impact operation of the plant or its response to transients or accidents. The change does not affect Technical Specifications. The change does not involve a change in the method of plant operation, and accident analyses will not be affected by the proposed change. Safety analyses acceptance criteria are not affected. The standard emergency plan and the plant annexes will continue to provide the required response staff for performing major tasks for the functional areas of the emergency plans. Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration. Attorney for licensee: Jennifer M. Buettner, Associate General Counsel, Southern Nuclear Operating Company, 40 Iverness Center Parkway, Birmingham, AL 35242. NRC Branch Chief: Michael T. Markley. Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Docket Nos. 52-025 and 52-026, Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 3 and 4, Burke County, Georgia Date of amendment request: August 31, 2017. A publicly-available version is in ADAMS under Accession No. ML17243A088. Description of amendment request: The requested amendments propose to depart from approved AP1000 Design Control Document by proposing changes to the combined license (COL) and the COL Appendix A, Technical Specifications. Specifically, the amendments, if approved, would revise the COL documents mentioned previously to reflect the proposed changes to the reactor coolant system and main steam line leakage detection systems for detection of leakage at all times and consideration of instrument sensitivities not accounted for. Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented below, with NRC staff edits in square brackets: 1. Does the proposed amendment involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated? Response: No. The [reactor coolant system (RCS)] leakage detection systems provide early warning of abnormal degradation of the reactor coolant pressure boundary (RCPB) or the main steam lines inside containment so that actions can be taken to prevent pipe breaks. The change proposed to limiting condition for operation (LCO) 3.4.9 adds limited periods during which the containment sump level and/or containment atmosphere F18 particulate monitor are not required to be operable--during and for 2 hours after use of the containment purge flow path, and during in-containment refueling water storage tank (IRWST) gutter drain isolation valve closure and for 2 hours after reopening the valves--and proposes a compensatory increase in the frequency of the RCS inventory balance during these periods. Containment purge, containment venting and IRWST gutter drain isolation valve closure are evolutions associated with normal operating conditions. The probability of a leakage flaw growing to a size that would cause pipe failure during and for 2 hours after IRWST gutter drain isolation valve inservice testing or a containment venting evolution is low because the durations of the test and venting evolution are short. The probability of a leakage flaw growing to a size that would cause pipe failure during and for 2 hours after a containment purge operation is low because containment purge operations at power are infrequent, and because containment purge in preparation for refueling is conducted concurrent with operations that will put the plant in operating modes for which LCO 3.4.9 is not applicable (MODES 5 and 6). The RCS inventory balance method of leak detection is quantitative and remains available when the plant has been operating at steady state for at least 12 hours and the leakage instrumentation is not required to be operable. In addition, the leak detection instruments will remain functional and have sensitivities such that the instrumentation will still be useful as a leak detection aid to operators during a containment purge operation or IRWST gutter drain isolation valve inservice testing. The RCS leakage detection instrumentation is not credited with consequence mitigation during any accident previously evaluated. Existing Required Action A.1 is intended to determine whether the remaining required containment sump level instrument is functioning properly when one of the required instruments is inoperable. Removal of Required Action A.1 does not increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated because a new Surveillance Requirement is proposed which will provide more appropriate monitoring to assess operability of the remaining required containment sump level channel. Therefore, the proposed amendment does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated. 2. Does the proposed amendment create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated? Response: No. The failure of the leak detection systems to detect small leaks in the reactor coolant pressure boundary could lead to large undetected leaks and possibly a loss of coolant accident. Loss of coolant accidents for a spectrum of pipe sizes and locations are already postulated in [Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR)] Chapter 15, Section 15.6. Breaks in the main steam lines inside containment are also analyzed in UFSAR Chapter 15, Section 15.1. Unidentified leakage detection and operator action in response to unidentified leakage are not postulated for any of the design basis accident analyses described in UFSAR Chapter 15. Therefore, the proposed amendment does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated. 3. Does the proposed amendment involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety? Response: No. The proposed amendment does not reduce RCS leakage detection instrument availability with respect to IRWST gutter drain isolation valve closure or reactor power level. The changes to compensate for instrument sensitivities during containment purge [[Page 47040]] operation do not represent a significant portion of the expected operating time in MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4. The containment purge isolation valves are opened temporarily during plant startup to relieve containment pressure increase due to thermal expansion. Containment purge during power operation may be required to support containment entry--which is infrequent. The containment purge flow paths are also used for venting the containment atmosphere to control containment pressure differential as weather changes affect ambient pressure. When the containment purge system is not being used to support personnel access into containment or to control the containment atmospheric pressure, the containment air filtration system containment isolation valves are maintained in their normally closed position. The IRWST gutter drain isolation valves are cycled quarterly, but are normally maintained in the open position. Therefore, use of the containment purge flow paths and closure of the IRWST gutter drain isolation valves do not represent a significant portion of the time in power operation. In addition, the action to perform a RCS inventory balance on a greater frequency during these evolutions will provide more appropriate monitoring to assess operability of the leak detection instrumentation. Therefore, the proposed amendment does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. Removing existing Required Action A.1 and adding surveillance of the containment sump level channels does not significantly decrease the margin of safety. The prescribed Action did not provide definitive information about instrument performance or operability. The new Surveillance Requirement proposed will provide a history of the operational performance of the containment sump level instrumentation that will better assist in the determination of instrument operability. Therefore, the proposed amendment does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration. Attorney for licensee: M. Stanford Blanton, Balch & Bingham LLP, 1710 Sixth Avenue, North, Birmingham, AL 35203-2015. NRC Branch Chief: Jennifer Dixon-Herrity. Virginia Electric and Power Company, Docket Nos. 50-280 and 50-281, Surry Power Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2, Surry County, Virginia Date of amendment request: May 23, 2017. A publicly-available version is in ADAMS under Accession No. ML17150A302. Description of amendment request: The amendments would add operability requirements, required actions, instrument settings, and surveillance requirements to the Technical Specifications (TSs) for the 4160 volt (V) emergency bus negative sequence voltage (open phase) protection function. Specifically, the proposed amendments would revise TS Table 3.7-2, ``Engineered Safeguards Action, Instrument Operating Conditions''; Table 3.7-4, ``Engineered Safety Feature System Initiation Limits Instrument Setting''; Table 4.1-1, ``Minimum Frequencies for Check, Calibrations and Test of Instrument Channels''; and add new TS Action 27 Table Notation to Tables 3.7-2 and 3.7-3, ``Instrument Operating Conditions for Isolation Functions.'' The negative sequence voltage (open phase) protection function provides detection and isolation of one or two open phases (i.e., an open phase condition) on a TS required offsite primary (preferred) power source and initiates transfer to the onsite emergency power source (i.e., the emergency diesel generators (EDGs)). Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented below: 1. Does the change involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated? Response: No. The proposed change adds operability requirements, required actions, instrument settings, and surveillance requirements for the negative sequence voltage (open phase) protection function associated with the 4160V emergency buses. This system provides an additional level of undervoltage protection for Class 1E electrical equipment. The proposed change will promote reliability of the negative sequence voltage (open phase) protection circuitry in the performance of its design function of detecting and mitigating an open phase condition (OPC) on a required off-site primary power source and initiating transfer to the onsite emergency power source. The new negative sequence voltage (open phase) protection function will further ensure the normally operating Class 1E motors/ equipment, which are powered from the Class 1E buses, are appropriately isolated from a primary off-site power source experiencing a consequential OPC and will not be damaged. The addition of the negative sequence voltage (open phase) protection function will continue to allow the existing undervoltage protection circuitry to function as originally designed (i.e., degraded and loss of voltage protection will remain in place and be unaffected by this change). The proposed change does not affect the probability of any accident resulting in a loss of voltage or degraded voltage condition on the Class 1E electrical buses and will enhance station response to mitigating the consequences of accidents previously evaluated as this change further ensures continued operation of Class 1E equipment throughout accident scenarios. Specific models and analyses were performed and demonstrated that the proposed negative sequence voltage (open phase) protection function, with the specified operability requirements, required actions, instrument settings, and surveillance requirements, will ensure the Class 1E system will be isolated from the off-site power source should a consequential OPC occur. The Class 1E motors will be subsequently sequenced back onto the Class 1E buses powered by the EDGs and will therefore not be damaged in the event of a consequential OPC under both accident and non-accident conditions. Therefore, the Class 1E loads will be available to perform their design basis functions should a loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA) occur concurrent with a loss-of-off-site power (LOOP) following an OPC. The loading sequence (i.e., timing) of Class 1E equipment back onto the ESF [engineered safety feature] bus, powered by the EDG, is within the existing degraded voltage time delay. The addition of the new negative sequence voltage (open phase) protection function will have no impact on accident initiators or precursors and does not alter the accident analysis assumptions. Based on the above, the proposed change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated. 2. Does the change create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated? Response: No. The proposed change does not alter the requirements for the availability of the 4160V emergency buses during accident conditions. The proposed change does not alter assumptions made in the safety analysis and is consistent with those assumptions. The addition of the negative sequence voltage (open phase) protection function TS enhances the ability of plant operators to identify and respond to an OPC in an off-site, primary power source, thereby ensuring the station electric distribution system will perform its intended safety function as designed. The proposed TS change will promote negative sequence voltage (open phase) protection function performance reliability in a manner similar to the existing loss of voltage and degraded voltage protective circuitry. The proposed change does not result in the creation of any new accident precursors; does not result in changes to any existing accident scenarios, and does not introduce any operational changes or mechanisms that would create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident. A failure mode and effects review was completed for postulated failure mechanisms of the new negative sequence voltage protection function and concluded that the addition of this protection function would not affect the existing loss of voltage and degraded voltage protection schemes; would not affect the number of occurrences of degraded voltage conditions that would cause the actuation of the existing Loss of Voltage, Degraded [[Page 47041]] Voltage or negative sequence voltage protection relays; would not affect the failure rate of the existing protection relays; and would not impact the assumptions in any existing accident scenario. Therefore, the proposed change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated. 3. Does this change involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety? Response: No. The proposed change enhances the ability of the plant to identify and isolate (an) open phase(s) in an off-site, primary power source and transfer the power source for the 4160V emergency buses to the onsite emergency power system. The proposed change does not affect the dose analysis acceptance criteria, does not result in plant operation in a configuration outside the analyses or design basis, and does not adversely affect systems that respond to safely shutdown the plant and to maintain the plant in a safe shutdown condition. With the addition of the new negative sequence voltage (open phase) protection function, the capability of Class 1E equipment to perform its safety function will be further assured and the equipment will remain capable of mitigating the consequences of previously analyzed accidents while maintaining the existing margin to safety currently assumed in the accident analyses. Therefore, the proposed TS change does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration. Attorney for licensee: Lillian M. Cuoco, Senior Counsel, Dominion Resources Services, Inc., 120 Tredegar St., RS-2, Richmond, VA 23219. NRC Branch Chief: Michael T. Markley. III. Notice of Issuance of Amendments to Facility Operating Licenses and Combined Licenses During the period since publication of the last biweekly notice, the Commission has issued the following amendments. The Commission has determined for each of these amendments that the application complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations. The Commission has made appropriate findings as required by the Act and the Commission's rules and regulations in 10 CFR chapter I, which are set forth in the license amendment. A notice of consideration of issuance of amendment to facility operating license or combined license, as applicable, proposed no significant hazards consideration determination, and opportunity for a hearing in connection with these actions, was published in the Federal Register as indicated. Unless otherwise indicated, the Commission has determined that these amendments satisfy the criteria for categorical exclusion in accordance with 10 CFR 51.22. Therefore, pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared for these amendments. If the Commission has prepared an environmental assessment under the special circumstances provision in 10 CFR 51.22(b) and has made a determination based on that assessment, it is so indicated. For further details with respect to the action see (1) the applications for amendment, (2) the amendment, and (3) the Commission's related letter, Safety Evaluation, and/or Environmental Assessment, as indicated. All of these items can be accessed as described in the ``Obtaining Information and Submitting Comments'' section of this document. Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC, Docket Nos. 50-413 and 50-414, Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2, York County, South Carolina Date of amendment request: December 15, 2016. Brief description of amendments: The amendments modified Technical Specification (TS) 3.8.1, ``AC Sources--Operating,'' to allow greater flexibility in performing Surveillance Requirements (SRs) by modifying Mode restriction notes in TS SRs 3.8.1.11, 3.8.1.16, 3.8.1.17, 3.8.1.19, 3.8.4.8, and 3.8.4.9. These proposed changes are consistent with Technical Specification Task Force (TSTF) Traveler TSTF-283-A, Revision 3, ``Modify Section 3.8 Mode Restriction Notes.'' Date of issuance: September 8, 2017. Effective date: As of the date of issuance and shall be implemented within 120 days of issuance. Amendment Nos.: 292 (Unit 1) and 288 (Unit 2). A publicly-available version is in ADAMS under Accession No. ML17178A234; documents related to these amendments are listed in the Safety Evaluation enclosed with the amendments. Renewed Facility Operating License Nos. NPF-35 and NPF-52: Amendments revised the Renewed Facility Operating Licenses and TSs. Date of initial notice in Federal Register: April 25, 2017 (82 FR 19101). The Commission's related evaluation of the amendments is contained in a Safety Evaluation dated September 8, 2017. No significant hazards consideration comments received: No. Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC, Docket Nos. 50-369 and 50-370, McGuire Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2, Mecklenburg County, North Carolina Date of amendment request: January 11, 2017. Brief description of amendments: The amendments modified Technical Specification (TS) 3.1.2, ``Core Reactivity,'' to revise the Completion Times of Required Action A.1 and A.2 from 72 hours to 7 days. This proposed change is consistent with NRC-approved Technical Specifications Task Force (TSTF) Traveler TSTF-142-A, Revision 0, ``Increase the Completion Time when the Core Reactivity Balance is Not Within Limit.'' Date of issuance: September 8, 2017. Effective date: As of the date of issuance and shall be implemented within 120 days of issuance. Amendment Nos.: 297 (Unit 1) and 276 (Unit 2). A publicly-available version is in ADAMS under Accession No. ML17207A284; documents related to these amendments are listed in the Safety Evaluation enclosed with the amendments. Renewed Facility Operating License Nos. NPF-9 and NPF-17: Amendments revised the Renewed Facility Operating Licenses and TSs. Date of initial notice in Federal Register: May 23, 2017 (82 FR 23618). The Commission's related evaluation of the amendments is contained in a Safety Evaluation dated September 8, 2017. No significant hazards consideration comments received: No. Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC, Docket Nos. 50-369 and 50-370, McGuire Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2, Mecklenburg County, North Carolina Date of amendment request: January 11, 2017. Brief description of amendments: The amendments modified Technical Specification (TS) 3.6.3, ``Containment Isolation Valves,'' to add a Note to TS Limiting Condition for Operation 3.6.3 Required Actions A.2, C.2, and E.2 to allow isolation devices that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured to be verified by use of administrative means. The changes are consistent with NRC-approved Technical Specifications Task Force (TSTF) Traveler TSTF-269-A, Revision 2, ``Allow administrative [[Page 47042]] means of position verification for locked or sealed valves.'' Date of issuance: September 18, 2017. Effective date: As of the date of issuance and shall be implemented within 120 days of issuance. Amendment Nos.: 298 (Unit 1) and 277 (Unit 2). A publicly-available version is in ADAMS under Accession No. ML17240A354; documents related to these amendments are listed in the Safety Evaluation enclosed with the amendments. Renewed Facility Operating License Nos. NPF-9 and NPF-17: Amendments revised the Renewed Facility Operating Licenses and TSs. Date of initial notice in Federal Register: May 23, 2017 (82 FR 23619). The Commission's related evaluation of the amendments is contained in a Safety Evaluation dated September 18, 2017. No significant hazards consideration comments received: No. Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC, Docket Nos. 50-369 and 50-370, McGuire Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2, Mecklenburg County, North Carolina Date of amendment request: January 11, 2017. Brief description of amendments: The amendments modified Technical Specification (TS) 3.4.12, ``Low Temperature Overpressure Protection (LTOP) System,'' to increase the time allowed for swapping charging pumps to one hour. Additionally, an existing note in the Applicability section of TS 3.4.12 was reworded and relocated to the Limiting Condition for Operation section of TS 3.4.12 as Note 2. These proposed changes were consistent with NRC-approved Technical Specifications Task Force (TSTF) Traveler TSTF-285-A, Revision 1, ``Charging Pump Swap LTOP Allowance.'' Date of issuance: September 25, 2017. Effective date: As of the date of issuance and shall be implemented within 120 days of issuance. Amendment Nos.: 299 (Unit 1) and 278 (Unit 2). A publicly-available version is in ADAMS under Accession No. ML17244A102; documents related to these amendments are listed in the Safety Evaluation enclosed with the amendments. Renewed Facility Operating License Nos. NPF-9 and NPF-17: Amendments revised the Renewed Facility Operating Licenses and TSs. Date of initial notice in Federal Register: May 23, 2017 (82 FR 23620). The Commission's related evaluation of the amendments is contained in a Safety Evaluation dated September 25, 2017. No significant hazards consideration comments received: No. Indiana Michigan Power Company, Docket Nos. 50-315 and 50-316, Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant (CNP), Unit Nos. 1 and 2, Berrien County, Michigan Date of amendment request: December 14, 2016, as supplemented by letter dated May 26, 2017. Brief description of amendments: The amendments revised the note regarding applicability of the limiting condition for operation for CNP Technical Specification 3.9.3, ``Containment Penetrations.'' Date of issuance: September 21, 2017. Effective date: As of the date of issuance and shall be implemented within 120 days of issuance. Amendment Nos.: 337 (Unit No. 1) and 319 (Unit No. 2). A publicly- available version is in ADAMS under Accession No. ML17214A550; documents related to these amendments are listed in the Safety Evaluation enclosed with the amendments. Renewed Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-58 and DPR-74: Amendments revised the Renewed Facility Operating Licenses and Technical Specifications. Date of initial notice in Federal Register: February 28, 2017 (82 FR 12133). The supplemental letter dated May 26, 2017, provided additional information that clarified the application, did not expand the scope of the application as originally noticed, and did not change the NRC staff's original proposed no significant hazards consideration determination as published in the Federal Register. The Commission's related evaluation of the amendments is contained in a Safety Evaluation dated September 21, 2017. No significant hazards consideration comments received: No. NextEra Energy Duane Arnold, LLC, Docket No. 50-331, Duane Arnold Energy Center (DAEC), Linn County, Iowa Date of amendment request: September 13, 2016, as supplemented by letters dated April 7, 2017, and June 19, 2017. Brief description of amendment: The amendment made changes to the DAEC Emergency Plan to revise the staffing and the augmentation times for certain emergency response organization positions. Date of issuance: September 21, 2017. Effective date: As of the date of issuance and shall be implemented within 180 days. Amendment No.: 301. A publicly-available version is in ADAMS under Accession No. ML17220A026; documents related to this amendment are listed in the Safety Evaluation enclosed with the amendment. Renewed Facility Operating License No. DPR-49: The amendment made changes to the DAEC Emergency Plan. Date of initial notice in Federal Register: November 22, 2016 (81 FR 83877). The supplemental letters dated April 7, 2017, and June 19, 2017, provided additional information that clarified the application, did not expand the scope of the application as originally noticed, and did not change the NRC staff's original proposed no significant hazards consideration determination as published in the Federal Register. The Commission's related evaluation of the amendment is contained in a Safety Evaluation dated September 21, 2017. No significant hazards consideration comments received: No. NextEra Energy Seabrook, LLC, Docket No. 50-443, Seabrook Station, Unit No. 1 (Seabrook), Rockingham County, New Hampshire Florida Power & Light Company, et al., Docket Nos. 50-335 and 50-389, St. Lucie Plant (St. Lucie), Unit Nos. 1 and 2, St. Lucie County, Florida Date of amendment request: March 30, 2017. Brief description of amendments: The amendments revised Technical Specification requirements to operate ventilation systems with charcoal filters from 10 hours to 15 minutes in accordance with TSTF-522, Revision 0, ``Revise Ventilation System Surveillance Requirements to Operate for 10 hours per Month.'' Date of issuance: September 11, 2017. Effective date: As of the date of issuance and shall be implemented within 90 days of issuance. Amendment Nos: 156 (Seabrook); 240 (St. Lucie, Unit No. 1) and 191 (St. Lucie, Unit No. 2). A publicly-available version is in ADAMS under Accession No. ML17219A556; documents related to these amendments are listed in the Safety Evaluation enclosed with the amendments. Facility Operating License Nos. NPF-86, DPR-67, and NPF-16: Amendments revised the Facility Operating Licenses and Technical Specifications. Date of initial notice in Federal Register: May 23, 2017 (82 FR 23627). The Commission's related evaluation of the amendments is contained in a Safety Evaluation dated September 11, 2017. No significant hazards consideration comments received: No. [[Page 47043]] Pacific Gas and Electric Company, Docket Nos. 50-275 and 50-323, Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2 (DCPP), San Luis Obispo County, California Date of amendment request: October 25, 2016, as supplemented by letters dated June 21, 2017, and August 17, 2017. Brief description of amendments: The amendments revised the Emergency Plan (E-Plan) for DCPP to adopt the Nuclear Energy Institute's (NEI's) revised Emergency Action Level (EAL) schemes described in NEI 99-01, Revision 6, ``Development of Emergency Action Levels for Non-Passive Reactors,'' November 2012. Revision 6 of NEI 99- 01 has been endorsed by the NRC by letter dated March 28, 2013. The currently approved E-Plan and associated EALs for DCPP are based on the guidance established in NEI 99-01, Revision 4 (NUMARC/NESP-007), ``Methodology for Development of Emergency Action Levels,'' January 2003, except for security-related EALs, which are based on the guidance established in NEI 99-01, Revision 5, ``Methodology for Development of Emergency Action Levels,'' February 2008. Date of issuance: September 25, 2017. Effective date: As of the date of issuance and shall be implemented within 365 days from the date of issuance. Amendment Nos.: 231 (Unit 1) and 233 (Unit 2). A publicly-available version is in ADAMS under Accession No. ML17212A379; documents related to these amendments are listed in the Safety Evaluation enclosed with the amendments. Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-80 and DPR-82: The amendments revised the Facility Operating Licenses. Date of initial notice in Federal Register: December 6, 2016 (81 FR 87973). The supplemental letters dated June 21, 2017, and August 17, 2017, provided additional information that clarified the application, did not expand the scope of the application as originally noticed, and did not change the NRC staff's original proposed no significant hazards consideration determination as published in the Federal Register. The Commission's related evaluation of the amendments is contained in a Safety Evaluation dated September 25, 2017. No significant hazards consideration comments received: No. Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc., Docket Nos. 50-348 and 50- 364, Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2, Houston County, Alabama Date of amendment request: October 11, 2016, as supplemented by letters dated May 15, 2017, and June 30, 2017. Brief description of amendments: The amendments add new Action Conditions (A, B, and C) to Technical Specification (TS) 3.8.9 that address an inoperable 600 Volt AC load center (LC) 1-2R. The amendments include appropriate Required Actions and associated Completion Times for an inoperable LC 1-2R. Appropriate corresponding changes were made to the remaining conditions to reflect these new conditions. Date of issuance: September 15, 2017. Effective date: As of the date of issuance and shall be implemented within 90 days of issuance. Amendment Nos.: 213 (Unit 1) and 210 (Unit 2). A publicly-available version is in ADAMS under Accession No. ML17205A020; documents related to these amendments are listed in the Safety Evaluation enclosed with the amendments. Renewed Facility Operating License Nos. NPF-2 and NPF-8: The amendments revised the Renewed Facility Operating Licenses and TSs. Date of initial notice in Federal Register: December 20, 2016 (81 FR 92872). The supplemental letters dated May 15, 2017, and June 30, 2017, provided additional information that clarified the application, did not expand the scope of the application as originally noticed, and did not change the NRC staff's original proposed no significant hazards consideration determination as published in the Federal Register. The Commission's related evaluation of the amendments is contained in a Safety Evaluation dated September 15, 2017. No significant hazards consideration comments received: No. Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc., Docket Nos. 50-424 and 50- 425, Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2, Burke County, Georgia Date of amendment request: March 24, 2017, as supplemented by letter dated June 15, 2017. Brief description of amendments: The amendments revised Technical Specification 3.7.9, ``Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS),'' to extend the completion time to restore one inoperable nuclear service cooling water (NSCW) basin transfer pump from 31 days to 46 days. Additionally, a new condition was added to address two inoperable NSCW basin transfer pumps. Date of issuance: September 19, 2017. Effective date: As of the date of issuance and shall be implemented within 90 days of issuance. Amendment Nos.: 192 (Unit 1) and 175 (Unit 2). A publicly-available version is in ADAMS under Accession No. ML17213A133; documents related to these amendments are listed in the Safety Evaluation enclosed with the amendments. Facility Operating License Nos. NPF-68 and NPF-81: Amendments revised the Facility Operating Licenses and Technical Specifications. Date of initial notice in Federal Register: May 9, 2017 (82 FR 21563). The Commission's related evaluation of the amendments is contained in a Safety Evaluation dated September 19, 2017. No significant hazards consideration comments received: No. Tennessee Valley Authority, Docket No. 50-391, Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Unit 2, Rhea County, Tennessee Date of amendment request: December 21, 2016, as supplemented by letter dated May 19, 2017. Brief description of amendment: The amendment revised Technical Specification (TS) Surveillance Requirements (SRs) 3.6.11.2 and 3.6.11.3 to modify the requirements for the total weight of stored ice, minimum weight of each ice basket, and average ice weight of sample baskets. The amendment also made conforming changes to TS Table SR 3.0.2-1. Date of issuance: September 14, 2017. Effective date: As of the date of issuance and shall be implemented within 30 days of issuance. Amendment No.: 14. A publicly-available version is in ADAMS under Accession No. ML17215B037; documents related to this amendment are listed in the Safety Evaluation enclosed with the amendment. Facility Operating License No. NPF-96: Amendment revised the Facility Operating License and TSs. Date of initial notice in Federal Register: March 28, 2017 (82 FR 15388). The supplemental letter dated May 19, 2017, provided additional information that clarified the application, did not expand the scope of the application as originally noticed, and did not change the NRC staff's original proposed no significant hazards consideration determination as published in the Federal Register. The Commission's related evaluation of the amendment is contained in a Safety Evaluation dated September 14, 2017. No significant hazards consideration comments received: No. [[Page 47044]] Union Electric Company, Docket No. 50-483, Callaway Plant, Unit 1, Callaway County, Missouri Date of amendment request: October 11, 2016, as supplemented by letters dated May 18, 2017, and June 2, 2017. Brief description of amendment: The amendment revised the Technical Specification (TS) requirements to reference and allow use of the NRC- approved core reload methodologies described in Westinghouse topical reports WCAP-16045-P-A, Revision 0, ``Qualification of the Two- Dimensional Transport Code PARAGON''; WCAP-16045-P-A, Addendum 1-A, Revision 0, ``Qualification of the NEXUS Nuclear Data Methodology''; and WCAP-10965-P-A, Addendum 2-A, Revision 0, ``Qualification of the New Pin Power Recovery Methodology,'' for the Callaway Plant. Date of issuance: September 15, 2017. Effective date: As of the date of issuance and shall be implemented within 90 days from the date of issuance. Amendment No.: 217. A publicly-available version is in ADAMS under Accession No. ML17236A082; documents related to this amendment are listed in the Safety Evaluation enclosed with the amendment. Renewed Facility Operating License No. NPF-30: The amendment revised the Operating License and TSs. Date of initial notice in Federal Register: January 3, 2017 (82 FR 162). The supplemental letters dated May 18, 2017, and June 2, 2017, provided additional information that clarified the application, did not expand the scope of the application as originally noticed, and did not change the NRC staff's original proposed no significant hazards consideration determination as published in the Federal Register. The Commission's related evaluation of the amendment is contained in a Safety Evaluation dated September 15, 2017. No significant hazards consideration comments received: No. Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 3rd day of October 2017. For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Anne T. Boland, Director, Division of Operating Reactor Licensing, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation. [FR Doc. 2017-21607 Filed 10-6-17; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 7590-01-P
![47032 Federal Register / Vol. 82, No. 194 / Tuesday, October 10, 2017 / Notices
action on possible noncompliance, and of spent fuel assemblies, and that have or consequences from radiological
examining facts following an incident. been, or will be, retired in place, accidents.
Therefore, their retention would not prepared for dismantlement, and Allowing the licensee partial
serve the underlying purpose of the removed from licensing basis exemption from record retention
rule. Once removed from licensing basis documents. Records that continue to requirements from which the exemption
documents, SSCs are no longer apply to retired SSCs during the is sought involve recordkeeping
governed by the NRC’s regulations, and SAFSTOR and decommissioning phase, requirements, reporting requirements of
therefore, are not subject to compliance such as records associated with an administrative, managerial, or
with the safety and health aspects of the programmatic controls pertaining to organizational nature.
nuclear environment. Therefore, residual radioactivity, security, quality Therefore, pursuant to 10 CFR
retention of these records does not serve assurance, etc., and records associated 51.22(b) and 51.22(c)(25), no
the underlying purpose of the rule of with the ISFSI and spent fuel environmental impact statement or
maintaining compliance with the safety assemblies, will continue to be environmental assessment need be
and health aspects of the nuclear maintained in an environmentally prepared in connection with the
environment or to accomplish the NRC’s suitable and retrievable condition. approval of this exemption request.
mission. IV. Conclusions
Records, which continue to serve the Environmental Considerations
underlying purpose of the rule, that is, Under 10 CFR 51.22(c)(25), granting Accordingly, the Commission has
to maintain compliance and to protect of an exemption from the requirements determined that, pursuant to 10 CFR
public health and safety, will continue of any regulation in 10 CFR Chapter I is 50.12, part 50, appendix B, Criterion
to be retained under regulations in 10 a categorical exclusion provided that (i) XVII; 10 CFR 50.59(d)(3); and 10 CFR
CFR part 50 and 10 CFR part 72. These there is no significant hazards 50.71(c) are authorized by law, will not
retained records not subject to the consideration; (ii) there is no significant present an undue risk to the public
exemption include those associated change in the types or significant health and safety, and are consistent
with programmatic controls, such as increase in the amounts of any effluents with the common defense and security.
those pertaining to residual that may be released offsite; (iii) there is Also, special circumstances are present.
radioactivity, security, quality no significant increase in individual or Therefore, the Commission hereby
assurance, etc., and records associated cumulative public or occupational grants OPPD’s partial exemptions from
with the ISFSI and spent fuel radiation exposure; (iv) there is no 10 CFR part 50, appendix B, Criterion
assemblies. significant construction impact; (v) XVII; 10 CFR 50.59(d)(3); and 10 CFR
Paragraph 50.12(a)(2) states, in part, there is no significant increase in the 50.71(c) to advance the schedule to
‘‘Special circumstance are present potential for or consequences from remove records associated with SSCs
whenever—. . . (iii) Compliance would radiological accidents; and (vi) the that have been removed from the NRC’s
result in undue hardship or other costs requirements from which an exemption licensing basis documents by
that are significantly in excess of those is sought are among those identified in appropriate change mechanisms.
contemplated when the regulation was 10 CFR 51.22(c)(25)(vi). Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 4th day
adopted . . . .’’ The Director, Division of Operating of October 2017.
The retention of records required by Reactor Licensing, Office of Nuclear For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
10 CFR part 50, appendix B, Criterion Reactor Regulation, has determined that
Anne T. Boland,
XVII, 10 CFR 50.59(d)(3), and 10 CFR approval of the exemption request
Director, Division of Operating Reactor
50.71(c) provides assurance that records involves no significant hazards
Licensing, Office of Nuclear Reactor
associated with SSCs will be captured, consideration because allowing the Regulation.
indexed, and stored in an licensee exemption from the
[FR Doc. 2017–21762 Filed 10–6–17; 8:45 am]
environmentally suitable and retrievable recordkeeping requirements of 10 CFR
BILLING CODE 7590–01–P
condition. Given the volume of records part 50, appendix B, Criterion XVII; 10
associated with the SSCs, compliance CFR 50.59(d)(3); and 10 CFR 50.71(c), at
with the records retention rules results the permanently shutdown and NUCLEAR REGULATORY
in a considerable cost to the licensee. defueled FCS does not (1) involve a COMMISSION
Retention of the volume of records significant increase in the probability or
associated with these SSCs during the consequences of an accident previously [NRC–2017–0201]
operations phase is appropriate to serve evaluated; or (2) create the possibility of
the underlying purpose of providing a new or different kind of accident from Biweekly Notice; Applications and
information to the Commission for any accident previously evaluated; or Amendments to Facility Operating
examination in the case of an event, (3) involve a significant reduction in a Licenses and Combined Licenses
incident, or other problem involving the margin of safety. Accordingly, there is Involving No Significant Hazards
public health and safety, as discussed no significant change in the types or Considerations
above. However, the cost effect of significant increase in the amounts of AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory
retaining operations phase records any effluents that may be released Commission.
beyond the operations phase until the offsite, and no significant increase in ACTION: Biweekly notice.
termination of the license was not fully individual or cumulative public or
considered or understood. Therefore, occupational radiation exposure. The SUMMARY: Pursuant to Section 189a. (2)
exempted regulation is not associated of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as
sradovich on DSK3GMQ082PROD with NOTICES
compliance with the rule would result
in an undue cost in excess of that with construction, so there is no amended (the Act), the U.S. Nuclear
contemplated when the rule was significant construction impact. The Regulatory Commission (NRC) is
adopted. exempted regulation does not concern publishing this regular biweekly notice.
The granted exemptions apply to the source term (i.e., potential amount The Act requires the Commission to
records that are associated with SSCs of radiation in an accident), nor publish notice of any amendments
that had supported the operations phase mitigation. Therefore, there is no issued, or proposed to be issued, and
of electricity generation and wet storage significant increase in the potential for, grants the Commission the authority to
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![47036 Federal Register / Vol. 82, No. 194 / Tuesday, October 10, 2017 / Notices
initiated, and the operability requirements consequences of any accident previously Response: No.
for equipment assumed to operate for evaluated? The proposed changes do not alter the
accident mitigation are not affected. Response: No. manner in which safety limits, limiting safety
Therefore, the proposed changes do not The Auxiliary/Emergency Feedwater system settings or limiting conditions for
involve a significant reduction in a margin of (AFW/EFW) System is not an initiator of any operation are determined. The safety analysis
safety. design basis accident or event, and therefore acceptance criteria are not impacted by these
the proposed changes do not increase the changes. The proposed changes will not
The NRC staff has reviewed the result in plant operation in a configuration
probability of any accident previously
licensee’s analysis and, based on this evaluated. The proposed changes to address outside the design basis.
review, it appears that the three the condition of one or two motor driven Therefore, it is concluded that the
standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are AFW/EFW trains inoperable and the turbine proposed change does not involve a
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff driven AFW/EFW train inoperable due to one significant reduction in a margin of safety.
proposes to determine that the steam supply inoperable do not change the The NRC staff has reviewed the
amendment request involves no response of the plant to any accidents.
licensee’s analysis and, based on this
significant hazards consideration. The proposed changes do not adversely
affect accident initiators or precursors nor review, it appears that the three
Attorney for licensee: Lillian M. standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are
alter the design assumptions, conditions, and
Cuoco, Senior Counsel, Dominion satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff
configuration of the facility or the manner in
Energy, Inc., 120 Tredegar Street, RS–2, which the plant is operated and maintained. proposes to determine that the
Richmond, VA 23219. The proposed changes do not adversely affect amendment request involves no
NRC Branch Chief: James G. Danna. the ability of structures, systems, and significant hazards consideration.
Entergy Operations, Inc., Docket No. 50– components (SSCs) to perform their intended Attorney for licensee: Ms. Anna
safety function to mitigate the consequences Vinson Jones, Senior Counsel, Entergy
313, Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 1
of an initiating event within the assumed
(ANO–1), Pope County, Arkansas Services, Inc., 101 Constitution Avenue
acceptance limits. The proposed changes do
Date of amendment request: July 17, not affect the source term, containment NW., Suite 200 East, Washington, DC
2017. A publicly-available version is in isolation, or radiological release assumptions 20001.
used in evaluating the radiological NRC Branch Chief: Robert J.
ADAMS under Accession No.
consequences of any accident previously Pascarelli.
ML17198F072.
Description of amendment request: evaluated. Further, the proposed changes do
Entergy Operations, Inc., Docket No. 50–
not increase the types and amounts of
The amendment would revise the radioactive effluent that may be released 368, Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 2
Technical Specifications (TSs) for offsite, nor significantly increase individual (ANO–2), Pope County, Arkansas
ANO–1 and would establish a new or cumulative occupational/public radiation Date of amendment request: July 17,
Completion Time in ANO–1 TS 3.7.5, exposures. 2017. A publicly-available version is in
‘‘Emergency Feedwater (EFW) System,’’ Therefore, the changes do not involve a ADAMS under Accession No.
where one steam supply to the turbine significant increase in the probability or
ML17198F356.
driven EFW pump is inoperable consequences of any accident previously
evaluated.
Description of amendment request:
concurrent with an inoperable motor- The amendment would revise the
driven EFW train. The amendment 2. Does the proposed change create the
possibility of a new or different kind of technical specifications (TSs) for ANO–
would also establish changes to the TSs accident from any accident previously 2 by establishing Actions and Allowable
that establish specific Actions: (1) For evaluated? Outage Times in TS 3.7.1.2, ‘‘Emergency
when the motor driven EFW train is Response: No. Feedwater [EFW] System,’’ for several
inoperable at the same time and; (2) for The proposed changes do not result in a combinations of inoperable EFW trains,
when the turbine-driven EFW train is change in the manner in which the AFW/ consistent with NUREG–1432,
inoperable either (a) due solely to one EFW System provides plant protection. The ‘‘Standard Technical Specifications for
inoperable steam supply, or (b) due to AFW/EFW System will continue to supply
water to the steam generators to remove
Combustion Engineering Plants,’’
reasons other than one inoperable steam Revision 4. Revision 4 of NUREG–1432
supply. decay heat and other residual heat by
delivering at least the minimum required includes changes incorporated by
The amendment request was Technical Specification Task Force
flow rate to the steam generators. There are
submitted in accordance with NRC- no design changes associated with the (TSTF)-340, Revision 3, ‘‘Allow 7 Day
approved Technical Specification Task proposed changes. The changes to the Completion Time for a Turbine-Driven
Force (TSTF) Traveler, TSTF–412, Conditions and Required Actions do not AFW [Auxiliary Feedwater] Pump
Revision 3, ‘‘Provide Actions for One change any existing accident scenarios, nor Inoperable,’’ and TSTF–412, Revision 3,
Steam Supply to Turbine Driven AFW create any new or different accident ‘‘Provide Actions for One Steam Supply
[Auxiliary Feedwater]/EFW Pump scenarios.
The changes do not involve a physical
to Turbine Driven AFW/EFW Pump
Inoperable,’’ with certain plant-specific Inoperable.’’ Certain proposed
deviations identified in the application. alteration of the plant (i.e., no new or
different type of equipment will be installed) deviations from the NUREG–1432,
The availability of this TS improvement Revision 4, TS changes are identified in
or a change in the methods governing normal
was published in the Federal Register plant operation. In addition, the changes do the application.
on July 17, 2007 (72 FR 39089), as part not impose any new or different Basis for proposed no significant
of the consolidated line item requirements or eliminate any existing hazards consideration determination:
improvement process (CLIIP). requirements. The changes do not alter As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the
Basis for proposed no significant assumptions made in the safety analysis. The licensee has provided its analysis of the
hazards consideration determination: proposed changes are consistent with the
sradovich on DSK3GMQ082PROD with NOTICES
issue of no significant hazards
As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the safety analysis assumptions and current plant
operating practice.
consideration, which is presented
licensee affirmed the applicability of the below:
model no significant hazards Therefore, the changes do not create the
possibility of a new or different kind of 1. Does the proposed change involve a
consideration determination, which is
accident from any accident previously significant increase in the probability or
presented below: evaluated. consequences of an accident previously
1. Does the proposed change involve a 3. Does the proposed change involve a evaluated?
significant increase in the probability or significant reduction in a margin of safety? Response: No.
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![Federal Register / Vol. 82, No. 194 / Tuesday, October 10, 2017 / Notices 47037
The proposed changes clarify the system settings, or limiting conditions for assumptions, conditions, or configuration of
operability requirements of the EFW system operation are determined. The safety analysis the facility or the manner in which the plant
and provide appropriate remedial actions to acceptance criteria are not impacted by these is operated and maintained.
be performed respective to potential EFW changes. The proposed changes will not The proposed change does not alter or
configurations or out-of-service periods, result in continued plant operation in a prevent the ability of structures, systems, and
consistent with the STS [standard technical configuration outside the design basis. components (SSCs) from performing their
specifications]. The EFW system is not an Therefore, this change does not involve a intended function to mitigate the
initiator of any design basis accident or event significant reduction in a margin of safety. consequences of an initiating event within
and, therefore, the proposed changes do not the assumed acceptance limits. The proposed
The NRC staff has reviewed the
increase the probability of any accident change does not require any physical change
previously evaluated. The EFW system is licensee’s analysis and, based on this to any plant SSCs nor does it require any
used to respond to accidents previously review, it appears that the three change in systems or plant operations. The
evaluated. The proposed change affects only standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are proposed change is consistent with the safety
the actions taken when portions of the EFW satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff analysis assumptions and resultant
system are unavailable and does not affect proposes to determine that the consequences.
the design of the EFW system. amendment request involves no Incorporating NRG-approved inspection
The proposed changes do not adversely significant hazards consideration. frequency and criteria for Core Spray
affect accident initiators or precursors nor Attorney for licensee: Ms. Anna spargers, piping and associated components
alter the design assumptions, conditions, and has no physical effect on plant equipment
configuration of the facility or the manner in
Vinson Jones, Senior Counsel, Entergy and therefore, no impact on the course of
which the plant is operated and maintained. Services, Inc., 101 Constitution Avenue plant transients.
The proposed changes do not adversely affect NW., Suite 200 East, Washington, DC Therefore, the proposed change does not
the ability of structures, systems, and 20001. involve a significant increase in the
components (SSCs) to perform their intended NRC Branch Chief: Robert J. probability or consequences of an accident
safety function to mitigate the consequences Pascarelli. previously evaluated.
of an initiating event within the assumed 2. Do the proposed changes create the
acceptance limits. The proposed changes do Exelon Generation Company, LLC, possibility of a new or different kind of
not affect the source term, containment Docket No. 50–219, Oyster Creek accident from any accident previously
isolation, or radiological release assumptions Nuclear Generating Station (Oyster evaluated?
used in evaluating the radiological Creek), Ocean County, New Jersey Response: No.
consequences of any accident previously The proposed incorporation of NRC-
Date of amendment request: August
evaluated. Further, the proposed changes do approved inspection frequency and criteria
not increase the types and amounts of 30, 2017. A publicly-available version is for Core Spray spargers, piping and
radioactive effluent that may be released available in ADAMS under Accession associated components is a change based
offsite, nor significantly increase individual No. ML17242A211. upon previously approved documents and
or cumulative occupational/public radiation Description of amendment request: does not involve changes to the plant
exposures. The amendment would revise the hardware or its operating characteristics. As
Therefore, this change does not involve a Oyster Creek Renewed Facility a result, no new failure modes are being
significant increase in the probability or Operating License No. DPR–16, Section introduced. There are no hardware changes
consequences of an accident previously 2.C, License Condition (5) by replacing nor are there any changes in the method by
evaluated. Boiling Water Reactor (BWR) Vessel and which any plant systems perform a safety
2. Does the proposed change create the function. No new accident scenarios, failure
Internals Project technical report
possibility of a new or different kind of mechanisms, or limiting single failures are
accident from any accident previously BWRVIP–18, Revision 0, as approved by introduced as a result of the proposed
evaluated? NRC staff’s Final Safety Evaluation change.
Response: No. Report dated December 2, 1999, with The proposed change does not introduce
The proposed changes do not result in a the latest BWRVIP–18 revision any new accident precursors, nor does it
change in the manner in which the EFW approved on December 21, 2016. involve any physical plant alterations or
system provides plant protection. The EFW Basis for proposed no significant changes in the methods governing normal
system will continue to supply water to the hazards consideration determination: plant operation. The change does not alter
Steam Generators (SGs) to remove decay heat As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the assumptions made in the safety analysis.
and other residual heat by delivering at least licensee has provided its analysis of the Therefore, the proposed change does not
the minimum required flow rate to the SGs. create the possibility of a new or different
issue of no significant hazards
There are no design changes associated with kind of accident from any accident
the proposed changes. The changes to the consideration, which is presented previously evaluated.
related TS Actions do not change any below: 3. Do the proposed changes involve a
existing accident scenarios, nor create any 1. Do the proposed changes involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety?
new or different accident scenarios. significant increase in the probability or Response: No.
The changes do not involve a physical consequences of an accident previously The margin of safety is established through
alteration of the plant (i.e., no new or evaluated? the design of the plant structures, systems,
different type of equipment will be installed) Response: No. and components, and through the parameters
or a change in the methods governing normal The proposed change to the License for safe operation and setpoints for the
plant operation. In addition, the changes do Condition 2.C.(5) requirements for inspection actuation of equipment relied upon to
not impose any new or different of Core Spray spargers, piping and associated respond to transients and design basis
requirements or eliminate any existing components does not alter the use of the accidents. The use of inspection frequency
requirements. The changes do not alter inspection methods and criteria used to and criteria for Core Spray spargers, piping
assumptions made in the safety analysis. determine the capability of the Core Spray and associated components in accordance
Therefore, this change does not create the System to perform its intended safety with NRC-approved methods, guidelines, and
sradovich on DSK3GMQ082PROD with NOTICES
possibility of a new or different kind of function that have been previously reviewed criteria provides adequate assurance that the
accident from an accident previously and approved by the NRC. The proposed Core Spray System can perform its safety
evaluated. change is in accordance with an NRC function as required by the plant-specific
3. Does the proposed change involve a approved inspection and flaw evaluation [loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA)]-analysis.
significant reduction in a margin of safety? guideline and as such, maintains required Therefore, the proposed change does not
Response: No. safety margins. The proposed change does decrease the margin of safety. The proposed
The proposed changes do not alter the not adversely affect accident initiators or change in inspection criteria maintains the
manner in which safety limits, limiting safety precursors, nor does it alter the design current safety margin, which protects the fuel
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![47038 Federal Register / Vol. 82, No. 194 / Tuesday, October 10, 2017 / Notices
cladding integrity during a postulated LOCA Response: No. Attorney for licensee: William Blair,
event, but does not change the requirements The technical specification (TS) limiting Managing Attorney, Florida Power &
governing operation or availability of safety conditions for operation and required actions Light Company, P.O. Box 14000, Juno
equipment assumed to operate to preserve associated with the proposed changes to the Beach, FL 33408–0420.
the margin of safety. The change does not TS are not initiators of any accidents NRC Branch Chief: James G. Danna.
alter the behavior of plant equipment, which previously evaluated, so the probability of
remains unchanged. accidents previously evaluated is unaffected Southern Nuclear Operating Company,
The proposed change to License Condition by the proposed changes. The proposed Inc. (SNC), Docket Nos. 50–424, 50–425,
2.C.(5) is consistent with NRC-approved change does not alter the design, function, or 52–025, and 52–026, Vogtle Electric
methods, guidelines, and criteria and operation of any plant structure, system, or Generating Plant, Units 1, 2, 3, and 4,
provides adequate assurance that the Core component (SSC). The capability of any
Spray System can perform its safety function Burke County, Georgia
operable TS-required SSC to perform its
as required by the plant-specific LOCA- specified safety function is not impacted by Southern Nuclear Operating Company,
analysis. No setpoints at which protective the proposed change. As a result, the Inc., Docket Nos. 50–348 and 50–364,
actions are initiated are altered by the outcomes of accidents previously evaluated Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant, Units 1
proposed change. The proposed change does are unaffected. and 2, Houston County, Alabama
not alter the manner in which the safety Therefore, the proposed changes do not
limits are determined. This change is result in a significant increase in the Southern Nuclear Operating Company,
consistent with plant design and does not probability or consequences of an accident Inc., Docket Nos. 50–321 and 50–366,
change the Technical Specification previously evaluated. Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant, Unit Nos.
operability requirements; thus, previously 2. Does the proposed change create the 1 and 2, City of Dalton, Georgia
evaluated accidents are not affected by this possibility of a new or different kind of
proposed change. accident from any previously evaluated? Date of amendment request: August
Therefore, the proposed change does not Response: No. 30, 2017. A publicly-available version is
involve a significant reduction in the margin The proposed change does not challenge in ADAMS under Accession No.
of safety. the integrity or performance of any safety- ML17243A202.
The NRC staff has reviewed the related systems. No plant equipment is Description of amendment request:
installed or removed, and the changes do not The amendments would relocate the
licensee’s analysis and, based on this
alter the design, physical configuration, or emergency operations facility for the
review, it appears that the three method of operation of any plant SSC.
standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are eight units of the SNC nuclear fleet from
No physical changes are made to the plant,
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff the SNC corporate headquarters in
so no new causal mechanisms are
proposes to determine that the introduced. Therefore, the proposed changes Birmingham, Alabama, to a new
amendment request involves no to the TS do not create the possibility of a location 1.3 miles away.
significant hazards consideration. new or different kind of accident from any Basis for proposed no significant
Attorney for licensee: Tamra Domeyer, accident previously evaluated. hazards consideration determination:
Associate General Counsel, Exelon The proposed change does not challenge As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the
Generation Company, LLC, 4300 the integrity or performance of any safety- licensee has provided its analysis of the
related systems. No plant equipment is issue of no significant hazards
Winfield Road, Warrenville, IL 60555.
installed or removed, and the changes do not consideration, which is presented
NRC Branch Chief: Douglas A. alter the design, physical configuration, or
Broaddus. below:
method of operation of any plant SSC. No
NextEra Energy Seabrook, LLC, Docket physical changes are made to the plant, so no 1. Does the proposed change involve a
new causal mechanisms are introduced. significant increase in the probability or
No. 50–443, Seabrook Station, Unit No. consequences of an accident previously
Therefore, the proposed changes to the TS
1, Rockingham County, New Hampshire do not create the possibility of a new or evaluated?
Date of amendment request: July 28, different kind of accident from any accident Response: No.
2017. A publicly-available version is in previously evaluated. The proposed change to relocate the
ADAMS under Accession No. 3. Does the proposed change involve a consolidated EOF [emergency operations
significant reduction in the margin of safety? facility] within Birmingham, Alabama,
ML17212A034. requires no change to the required staff
Description of amendment request: Response: No.
The ability of any operable SSC to perform response time for supplementing onsite
The amendment would revise the direct personnel in response to a radiological
its designated safety function is unaffected by
current (DC) battery Technical the proposed changes. The proposed changes emergency. The relocated EOF is along the
Specifications 3.8.2.1, 3.8.2.2, 3.8.3.1, do not alter any safety analyses assumptions, same major roadway and response personnel
and 3.8.3.2 such that a DC electrical safety limits, limiting safety system settings, will be able to access the facility, using for
train is operable with one 100 percent or method of operating the plant. The the most part, the same path they currently
capacity battery aligned to both DC changes do not adversely affect plant use to travel to the corporate office. The
buses in the associated electrical train. operating margins or the reliability of license amendment does not request a change
equipment credited in the safety analyses. to the response time and the facility will be
The amendment also proposes to functional within the same timeframe as for
remove a footnote to Surveillance With the proposed change, each DC electrical
trains remains fully capable of performing its the existing EOF. The functions and
Requirement 4.8.2.1 associated with DC capabilities of the relocated EOF will
safety function.
battery checks. Therefore, the proposed changes do not continue to meet the applicable regulatory
Basis for proposed no significant involve a significant reduction in the margin requirements. The proposed change has no
hazards consideration determination: of safety. effect on normal plant operation or on any
As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the accident initiator or precursors and does not
licensee has provided its analysis of the The NRC staff has reviewed the impact the function of plant structures,
sradovich on DSK3GMQ082PROD with NOTICES
issue of no significant hazards licensee’s analysis, and based on this systems, or components [(SSCs)]. The
proposed change does not alter or prevent the
consideration, which is presented review, it appears that the three
ability of the emergency response
below: standards of 50.92(c) are satisfied. organization to perform its intended
1. Does the proposed change involve a Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to functions to mitigate the consequences of an
significant increase in the probability or determine that the amendment request accident or event.
consequences of an accident previously involves no significant hazards Therefore, the proposed change does not
evaluated? consideration. involve a significant increase in the
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![Federal Register / Vol. 82, No. 194 / Tuesday, October 10, 2017 / Notices 47039
probability or consequences of an accident Attorney for licensee: Jennifer M. evolution are short. The probability of a
previously evaluated. Buettner, Associate General Counsel, leakage flaw growing to a size that would
2. Does the proposed change create the Southern Nuclear Operating Company, cause pipe failure during and for 2 hours
possibility of a new or different kind of after a containment purge operation is low
accident from any accident previously
40 Iverness Center Parkway,
because containment purge operations at
evaluated? Birmingham, AL 35242. power are infrequent, and because
Response: No. NRC Branch Chief: Michael T. containment purge in preparation for
The proposed change only concerns Markley. refueling is conducted concurrent with
implementation of the standard emergency operations that will put the plant in
plan by relocating the Corporate EOF a short
Southern Nuclear Operating Company,
operating modes for which LCO 3.4.9 is not
distance (1.3 miles) from its current location. Docket Nos. 52–025 and 52–026, Vogtle applicable (MODES 5 and 6).
The new location will not change the time Electric Generating Plant, Units 3 and 4, The RCS inventory balance method of leak
the facility will be functional to provide Burke County, Georgia detection is quantitative and remains
emergency response. The functions and Date of amendment request: August available when the plant has been operating
capabilities of the relocated EOF will at steady state for at least 12 hours and the
continue to meet the applicable regulatory 31, 2017. A publicly-available version is
leakage instrumentation is not required to be
requirements. The proposed change will not in ADAMS under Accession No. operable. In addition, the leak detection
change the design function or operation of ML17243A088. instruments will remain functional and have
SSCs. The change does not impact the Description of amendment request: sensitivities such that the instrumentation
accident analysis for any of the SNC nuclear The requested amendments propose to will still be useful as a leak detection aid to
plants. The change does not involve a depart from approved AP1000 Design operators during a containment purge
physical alteration of any of the plants, a Control Document by proposing changes operation or IRWST gutter drain isolation
change in the method of plant operation, or to the combined license (COL) and the valve inservice testing. The RCS leakage
new operator actions. The proposed change detection instrumentation is not credited
does not introduce failure modes that could COL Appendix A, Technical
Specifications. Specifically, the with consequence mitigation during any
result in a new accident, and the change does accident previously evaluated.
not alter assumptions made in safety amendments, if approved, would revise Existing Required Action A.1 is intended
analyses. the COL documents mentioned to determine whether the remaining required
Therefore, the proposed change does not previously to reflect the proposed containment sump level instrument is
create the possibility of a new or different changes to the reactor coolant system functioning properly when one of the
kind of accident from any accident and main steam line leakage detection required instruments is inoperable. Removal
previously evaluated.
3. Does the proposed change involve a
systems for detection of leakage at all of Required Action A.1 does not increase the
times and consideration of instrument probability or consequences of an accident
significant reduction in a margin of safety?
sensitivities not accounted for. previously evaluated because a new
Response: No.
Basis for proposed no significant Surveillance Requirement is proposed which
The proposed change only impacts the
implementation of the emergency plan by hazards consideration determination: will provide more appropriate monitoring to
relocating the Corporate EOF a short distance assess operability of the remaining required
As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the containment sump level channel.
(1.3 miles) within Birmingham, Alabama. licensee has provided its analysis of the
The change does not the affect staff response Therefore, the proposed amendment does
issue of no significant hazards not involve a significant increase in the
time or the time it takes to make the facility
operational to perform its intended
consideration, which is presented probability or consequences of an accident
emergency response functions. The functions below, with NRC staff edits in square previously evaluated.
and capabilities of the relocated EOF will brackets: 2. Does the proposed amendment create
continue to meet the applicable regulatory the possibility of a new or different kind of
1. Does the proposed amendment involve
requirements. Margin of safety is associated accident from any accident previously
a significant increase in the probability or
with confidence in the ability of the fission evaluated?
consequences of an accident previously
product barriers (i.e., fuel cladding, reactor evaluated? Response: No.
coolant system pressure boundary, and Response: No. The failure of the leak detection systems to
containment structure) to limit the level of The [reactor coolant system (RCS)] leakage detect small leaks in the reactor coolant
radiation dose to the public. The proposed detection systems provide early warning of pressure boundary could lead to large
change is associated with the emergency plan abnormal degradation of the reactor coolant undetected leaks and possibly a loss of
and does not impact operation of the plant pressure boundary (RCPB) or the main steam coolant accident. Loss of coolant accidents
or its response to transients or accidents. The lines inside containment so that actions can for a spectrum of pipe sizes and locations are
change does not affect Technical be taken to prevent pipe breaks. The change already postulated in [Updated Final Safety
Specifications. The change does not involve proposed to limiting condition for operation Analysis Report (UFSAR)] Chapter 15,
a change in the method of plant operation, (LCO) 3.4.9 adds limited periods during Section 15.6. Breaks in the main steam lines
and accident analyses will not be affected by which the containment sump level and/or inside containment are also analyzed in
the proposed change. Safety analyses containment atmosphere F18 particulate UFSAR Chapter 15, Section 15.1.
acceptance criteria are not affected. The monitor are not required to be operable— Unidentified leakage detection and operator
standard emergency plan and the plant during and for 2 hours after use of the action in response to unidentified leakage are
annexes will continue to provide the containment purge flow path, and during in- not postulated for any of the design basis
required response staff for performing major containment refueling water storage tank accident analyses described in UFSAR
tasks for the functional areas of the (IRWST) gutter drain isolation valve closure Chapter 15.
emergency plans. and for 2 hours after reopening the valves— Therefore, the proposed amendment does
Therefore, the proposed change does not and proposes a compensatory increase in the not create the possibility of a new or different
involve a significant reduction in a margin of frequency of the RCS inventory balance kind of accident from any accident
safety. during these periods. Containment purge, previously evaluated.
The NRC staff has reviewed the containment venting and IRWST gutter drain 3. Does the proposed amendment involve
sradovich on DSK3GMQ082PROD with NOTICES
licensee’s analysis and, based on this isolation valve closure are evolutions a significant reduction in a margin of safety?
associated with normal operating conditions. Response: No.
review, it appears that the three
The probability of a leakage flaw growing to The proposed amendment does not reduce
standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are a size that would cause pipe failure during RCS leakage detection instrument availability
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff and for 2 hours after IRWST gutter drain with respect to IRWST gutter drain isolation
proposes to determine that the isolation valve inservice testing or a valve closure or reactor power level. The
amendment request involves no containment venting evolution is low changes to compensate for instrument
significant hazards consideration. because the durations of the test and venting sensitivities during containment purge
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![47040 Federal Register / Vol. 82, No. 194 / Tuesday, October 10, 2017 / Notices
operation do not represent a significant instrument settings, and surveillance accidents previously evaluated as this change
portion of the expected operating time in requirements to the Technical further ensures continued operation of Class
MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4. The containment purge Specifications (TSs) for the 4160 volt (V) 1E equipment throughout accident scenarios.
isolation valves are opened temporarily Specific models and analyses were
emergency bus negative sequence
during plant startup to relieve containment performed and demonstrated that the
pressure increase due to thermal expansion.
voltage (open phase) protection proposed negative sequence voltage (open
Containment purge during power operation function. Specifically, the proposed phase) protection function, with the specified
may be required to support containment amendments would revise TS Table operability requirements, required actions,
entry—which is infrequent. The containment 3.7–2, ‘‘Engineered Safeguards Action, instrument settings, and surveillance
purge flow paths are also used for venting the Instrument Operating Conditions’’; requirements, will ensure the Class 1E
containment atmosphere to control Table 3.7–4, ‘‘Engineered Safety Feature system will be isolated from the off-site
containment pressure differential as weather System Initiation Limits Instrument power source should a consequential OPC
changes affect ambient pressure. When the occur. The Class 1E motors will be
Setting’’; Table 4.1–1, ‘‘Minimum
containment purge system is not being used subsequently sequenced back onto the Class
Frequencies for Check, Calibrations and 1E buses powered by the EDGs and will
to support personnel access into containment
or to control the containment atmospheric
Test of Instrument Channels’’; and add therefore not be damaged in the event of a
pressure, the containment air filtration new TS Action 27 Table Notation to consequential OPC under both accident and
system containment isolation valves are Tables 3.7–2 and 3.7–3, ‘‘Instrument non-accident conditions. Therefore, the Class
maintained in their normally closed position. Operating Conditions for Isolation 1E loads will be available to perform their
The IRWST gutter drain isolation valves are Functions.’’ The negative sequence design basis functions should a loss-of-
cycled quarterly, but are normally voltage (open phase) protection function coolant accident (LOCA) occur concurrent
maintained in the open position. Therefore, with a loss-of-off-site power (LOOP)
provides detection and isolation of one
use of the containment purge flow paths and following an OPC. The loading sequence (i.e.,
or two open phases (i.e., an open phase timing) of Class 1E equipment back onto the
closure of the IRWST gutter drain isolation condition) on a TS required offsite
valves do not represent a significant portion ESF [engineered safety feature] bus, powered
of the time in power operation. In addition,
primary (preferred) power source and by the EDG, is within the existing degraded
the action to perform a RCS inventory initiates transfer to the onsite emergency voltage time delay.
balance on a greater frequency during these power source (i.e., the emergency diesel The addition of the new negative sequence
evolutions will provide more appropriate generators (EDGs)). voltage (open phase) protection function will
monitoring to assess operability of the leak Basis for proposed no significant have no impact on accident initiators or
detection instrumentation. Therefore, the hazards consideration determination: precursors and does not alter the accident
proposed amendment does not involve a As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the analysis assumptions.
significant reduction in a margin of safety. Based on the above, the proposed change
licensee has provided its analysis of the
Removing existing Required Action A.1 does not involve a significant increase in the
issue of no significant hazards probability or consequences of an accident
and adding surveillance of the containment
consideration, which is presented previously evaluated.
sump level channels does not significantly
decrease the margin of safety. The prescribed below: 2. Does the change create the possibility of
Action did not provide definitive information 1. Does the change involve a significant a new or different kind of accident from any
about instrument performance or operability. increase in the probability or consequences accident previously evaluated?
The new Surveillance Requirement proposed of an accident previously evaluated? Response: No.
will provide a history of the operational Response: No. The proposed change does not alter the
performance of the containment sump level The proposed change adds operability requirements for the availability of the 4160V
instrumentation that will better assist in the requirements, required actions, instrument emergency buses during accident conditions.
determination of instrument operability. settings, and surveillance requirements for The proposed change does not alter
Therefore, the proposed amendment does the negative sequence voltage (open phase) assumptions made in the safety analysis and
not involve a significant reduction in a protection function associated with the is consistent with those assumptions. The
margin of safety. 4160V emergency buses. This system addition of the negative sequence voltage
provides an additional level of undervoltage (open phase) protection function TS
The NRC staff has reviewed the protection for Class 1E electrical equipment. enhances the ability of plant operators to
licensee’s analysis and, based on this The proposed change will promote reliability identify and respond to an OPC in an off-site,
review, it appears that the three of the negative sequence voltage (open phase) primary power source, thereby ensuring the
standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are protection circuitry in the performance of its station electric distribution system will
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff design function of detecting and mitigating perform its intended safety function as
proposes to determine that the an open phase condition (OPC) on a required designed. The proposed TS change will
amendment request involves no off-site primary power source and initiating promote negative sequence voltage (open
transfer to the onsite emergency power phase) protection function performance
significant hazards consideration.
source. reliability in a manner similar to the existing
Attorney for licensee: M. Stanford loss of voltage and degraded voltage
The new negative sequence voltage (open
Blanton, Balch & Bingham LLP, 1710 phase) protection function will further protective circuitry.
Sixth Avenue, North, Birmingham, AL ensure the normally operating Class 1E The proposed change does not result in the
35203–2015. motors/equipment, which are powered from creation of any new accident precursors; does
NRC Branch Chief: Jennifer Dixon- the Class 1E buses, are appropriately isolated not result in changes to any existing accident
Herrity. from a primary off-site power source scenarios, and does not introduce any
experiencing a consequential OPC and will operational changes or mechanisms that
Virginia Electric and Power Company, not be damaged. The addition of the negative would create the possibility of a new or
Docket Nos. 50–280 and 50–281, Surry sequence voltage (open phase) protection different kind of accident. A failure mode
Power Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2, Surry function will continue to allow the existing and effects review was completed for
County, Virginia undervoltage protection circuitry to function postulated failure mechanisms of the new
sradovich on DSK3GMQ082PROD with NOTICES
Date of amendment request: May 23, as originally designed (i.e., degraded and loss negative sequence voltage protection
of voltage protection will remain in place and function and concluded that the addition of
2017. A publicly-available version is in be unaffected by this change). The proposed this protection function would not affect the
ADAMS under Accession No. change does not affect the probability of any existing loss of voltage and degraded voltage
ML17150A302. accident resulting in a loss of voltage or protection schemes; would not affect the
Description of amendment request: degraded voltage condition on the Class 1E number of occurrences of degraded voltage
The amendments would add operability electrical buses and will enhance station conditions that would cause the actuation of
requirements, required actions, response to mitigating the consequences of the existing Loss of Voltage, Degraded
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![47044 Federal Register / Vol. 82, No. 194 / Tuesday, October 10, 2017 / Notices
Union Electric Company, Docket No. NUCLEAR REGULATORY White Flint North, 11555 Rockville
50–483, Callaway Plant, Unit 1, COMMISSION Pike, Rockville, Maryland 20852.
Callaway County, Missouri FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
[Docket Nos. 52–040 and 52–041; NRC–
2009–0337] Denise McGovern, Office of the
Date of amendment request: October Secretary, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
11, 2016, as supplemented by letters Florida Power and Light Company; Commission, Washington, DC 20555–
dated May 18, 2017, and June 2, 2017. Turkey Point, Units 6 and 7 0001, telephone: 301–415–0681; email:
Brief description of amendment: The Denise.McGovern@nrc.gov.
amendment revised the Technical AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Specification (TS) requirements to Commission.
ACTION: Combined license application; I. Background
reference and allow use of the NRC-
approved core reload methodologies revised notice of hearing. The Commission hereby gives notice
described in Westinghouse topical that, pursuant to Section 189a of the
SUMMARY: The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended
reports WCAP–16045–P–A, Revision 0, Commission (NRC) will convene an
‘‘Qualification of the Two-Dimensional (the Act), it will convene an evidentiary
evidentiary session to receive testimony session to receive testimony and
Transport Code PARAGON’’; WCAP– and exhibits in the uncontested portion exhibits in the uncontested portion of
16045–P–A, Addendum 1–A, Revision of this proceeding regarding the this proceeding regarding FPL’s June 30,
0, ‘‘Qualification of the NEXUS Nuclear application of Florida Power and Light 2009, application for COLs under part
Data Methodology’’; and WCAP–10965– Company (FPL) for combined licenses 52 of title 10 of the Code of Federal
P–A, Addendum 2–A, Revision 0, (COLs) to construct and operate two Regulations (10 CFR), to construct and
‘‘Qualification of the New Pin Power additional units (Units 6 and 7) at the operate two additional units (Units 6
Recovery Methodology,’’ for the Turkey Point site in Miami-Dade and 7) at the Turkey Point site in
Callaway Plant. County, Florida. This mandatory Miami-Dade County, Florida (http://
Date of issuance: September 15, 2017. hearing will concern safety and www.nrc.gov/reactors/new-reactors/col/
environmental matters relating to the turkey-point.html). The Commission
Effective date: As of the date of requested COLs.
issuance and shall be implemented had previously scheduled this hearing
DATES: The hearing will be held on for February 9, 2017, and later, for
within 90 days from the date of
December 12, 2017, beginning at 9:00 October 5, 2017.1 This mandatory
issuance. a.m. Eastern Standard Time. For the hearing will concern safety and
Amendment No.: 217. A publicly- schedule for submitting pre-filed environmental matters relating to the
available version is in ADAMS under documents and deadlines affecting requested COLs, as more fully described
Accession No. ML17236A082; Interested Government Participants, see below. Participants in the hearing are
documents related to this amendment Section V of the SUPPLEMENTARY not to address any contested issues in
are listed in the Safety Evaluation INFORMATION section of this document. their written filings or oral
enclosed with the amendment. ADDRESSES: Please refer to Docket ID presentations.
Renewed Facility Operating License 52–040 and 52–041 when contacting the II. Evidentiary Uncontested Hearing
No. NPF–30: The amendment revised NRC about the availability of
information regarding this document. The Commission will conduct this
the Operating License and TSs.
You may obtain publicly-available hearing beginning at 9:00 a.m. Eastern
Date of initial notice in Federal information related to this document Standard Time on December 12, 2017, at
Register: January 3, 2017 (82 FR 162). using any of the following methods: the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
The supplemental letters dated May 18, • NRC’s Electronic Hearing Docket: Commission, One White Flint North,
2017, and June 2, 2017, provided You may obtain publicly available 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville,
additional information that clarified the documents related to this hearing online Maryland 20852. The hearing on these
application, did not expand the scope of at http://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/ issues will continue on subsequent
the application as originally noticed, regulatory/adjudicatory.html. days, if necessary.
and did not change the NRC staff’s • NRC’s Agencywide Documents III. Presiding Officer
original proposed no significant hazards Access and Management System
consideration determination as (ADAMS): You may obtain publicly- The Commission is the presiding
published in the Federal Register. available documents online in the officer for this proceeding.
The Commission’s related evaluation ADAMS Public Documents collection at IV. Matters To Be Considered
of the amendment is contained in a http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/ The matter at issue in this proceeding
Safety Evaluation dated September 15, adams.html To begin the search, select is whether the review of the application
2017. ‘‘ADAMS Public Documents’’ and then by the Commission’s staff has been
select ‘‘Begin Web-based ADAMS adequate to support the findings found
No significant hazards consideration Search’’ For problems with ADAMS,
comments received: No. in 10 CFR 52.97 and 10 CFR 51.107.
please contact the NRC’s Public Those findings that must be made for
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 3rd day Document Room (PDR) reference staff at each COL are as follows:
of October 2017. 1–800–397–4209, 301–415–4737, or by
email to pdr.resource@nrc.gov. The Issues Pursuant to the Atomic Energy
sradovich on DSK3GMQ082PROD with NOTICES
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
ADAMS accession number for each Act of 1954, as Amended
Anne T. Boland,
document referenced (if it is available in The Commission will determine
Director, Division of Operating Reactor ADAMS) is provided the first time that
Licensing, Office of Nuclear Reactor whether (1) the applicable standards
a document is referenced. and requirements of the Act and the
Regulation.
• NRC’s PDR: You may examine and
[FR Doc. 2017–21607 Filed 10–6–17; 8:45 am] purchase copies of public documents at 1 See 81 FR 89,995 (Dec. 13, 2016) and 82 FR
BILLING CODE 7590–01–P the NRC’s PDR, Room O1–F21, One 34,995 (Jul. 27, 2017).
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Document Created: 2017-10-07 10:31:51
Document Modified: 2017-10-07 10:31:51
| Category | Regulatory Information | |
| Collection | Federal Register | |
| sudoc Class | AE 2.7: GS 4.107: AE 2.106: | |
| Publisher | Office of the Federal Register, National Archives and Records Administration | |
| Section | Notices | |
| Action | Biweekly notice. | |
| Dates | Comments must be filed by November 9, 2017. A request for a hearing must be filed by December 11, 2017. | |
| Contact | Lynn Ronewicz, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; telephone: 301-415-1927, email: [email protected] | |
| FR Citation | 82 FR 47032 |
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