82 FR 48193 - Special Conditions: ALOFT AeroArchitects, Boeing Model 737-800 Airplanes; Aircraft Electronic System Security Protection From Unauthorized External Access

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration

Federal Register Volume 82, Issue 199 (October 17, 2017)

Page Range		48193-48194
FR Document		2017-22415

These special conditions are issued for the Boeing Model 737- 800 airplane. These airplanes, as modified by ALOFT AeroArchitects (ALOFT), will have a novel or unusual design feature when compared to the state of technology envisioned in the airworthiness standards for transport-category airplanes. This design feature is a Wireless Access Point (WAP), and connection of an improved Wireless Quick Access Recorder (WQAR) to the satellite communications (SATCOM) system, to provide in-flight access to information, in the WQAR, to ground personnel. The applicable airworthiness regulations do not contain adequate or appropriate safety standards for this design feature. These special conditions contain the additional safety standards that the Administrator considers necessary to establish a level of safety equivalent to that established by the existing airworthiness standards.

Federal Register, Volume 82 Issue 199 (Tuesday, October 17, 2017)

[Federal Register Volume 82, Number 199 (Tuesday, October 17, 2017)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 48193-48194]
From the Federal Register Online  [www.thefederalregister.org]
[FR Doc No: 2017-22415]



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Rules and Regulations
                                                Federal Register
________________________________________________________________________

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having general applicability and legal effect, most of which are keyed 
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under 50 titles pursuant to 44 U.S.C. 1510.

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Federal Register / Vol. 82, No. 199 / Tuesday, October 17, 2017 / 
Rules and Regulations

[[Page 48193]]



DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 25

[Docket No. FAA-2017-0580; Special Conditions No. 25-701-SC]


Special Conditions: ALOFT AeroArchitects, Boeing Model 737-800 
Airplanes; Aircraft Electronic System Security Protection From 
Unauthorized External Access

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

ACTION: Final special conditions; request for comments.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: These special conditions are issued for the Boeing Model 737-
800 airplane. These airplanes, as modified by ALOFT AeroArchitects 
(ALOFT), will have a novel or unusual design feature when compared to 
the state of technology envisioned in the airworthiness standards for 
transport-category airplanes. This design feature is a Wireless Access 
Point (WAP), and connection of an improved Wireless Quick Access 
Recorder (WQAR) to the satellite communications (SATCOM) system, to 
provide in-flight access to information, in the WQAR, to ground 
personnel. The applicable airworthiness regulations do not contain 
adequate or appropriate safety standards for this design feature. These 
special conditions contain the additional safety standards that the 
Administrator considers necessary to establish a level of safety 
equivalent to that established by the existing airworthiness standards.

DATES: This action is effective on ALOFT on October 17, 2017. Send your 
comments by December 1, 2017.

ADDRESSES: Send comments identified by docket number FAA-2017-0580 
using any of the following methods:
     Federal eRegulations Portal: Go to http://www.regulations.gov/ and follow the online instructions for sending 
your comments electronically.
     Mail: Send comments to Docket Operations, M-30, U.S. 
Department of Transportation (DOT), 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., Room 
W12-140, West Building Ground Floor, Washington, DC, 20590-0001.
     Hand Delivery or Courier: Take comments to Docket 
Operations in Room W12-140 of the West Building Ground Floor at 1200 
New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, DC, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., 
Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays.
     Fax: Fax comments to Docket Operations at 202-493-2251.
    Privacy: The FAA will post all comments it receives, without 
change, to http://www.regulations.gov/, including any personal 
information the commenter provides. Using the search function of the 
docket Web site, anyone can find and read the electronic form of all 
comments received into any FAA docket, including the name of the 
individual sending the comment (or signing the comment for an 
association, business, labor union, etc.). DOT's complete Privacy Act 
Statement can be found in the Federal Register published on April 11, 
2000 (65 FR 19477-19478).
    Docket: Background documents or comments received may be read at 
http://www.regulations.gov/ at any time. Follow the online instructions 
for accessing the docket or go to Docket Operations in Room W12-140 of 
the West Building Ground Floor at 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., 
Washington, DC, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, 
except Federal holidays.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Varun Khanna, FAA, Airplane and 
Flightcrew Interface Section, AIR-671, Transport Standards Branch, 
Policy and Innovation Division, Aircraft Certification Service, 1601 
Lind Avenue SW., Renton, Washington 98057-3356; telephone 425-227-1298; 
facsimile 425-227-1320.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The substance of these special conditions 
has been subject to the notice and comment period in several prior 
instances and has been derived without substantive change from those 
previously issued. It is unlikely that prior public comment would 
result in a significant change from the substance contained herein. 
Therefore, because a delay would significantly affect the certification 
of the airplane, the FAA has determined that prior public notice and 
comment are unnecessary and impracticable.
    In addition, for the reasons stated above, the FAA finds it 
unnecessary to delay the effective date and finds that good cause 
exists for making these special conditions effective upon publication 
in the Federal Register.

Comments Invited

    We invite interested people to take part in this rulemaking by 
sending written comments, data, or views. The most helpful comments 
reference a specific portion of the special conditions, explain the 
reason for any recommended change, and include supporting data.
    We will consider all comments we receive by the closing date for 
comments. We may change these special conditions based on the comments 
we receive.

Background

    On December 8, 2016, ALOFT applied for a supplemental type 
certificate for installing a Wireless Access Point (WAP), and 
connection of an improved Wireless Quick Access Recorder (WQAR) to the 
satellite communications (SATCOM) system, in a Boeing Model 737-800 
airplane. The Boeing Model 737-800 airplane is a twin jet engine, 
short-to-medium-range passenger airplane with a maximum takeoff weight 
of 174,200 pounds and seating for 189 passengers.

Type Certification Basis

    Under the provisions of Title 14, Code of Federal Regulations (14 
CFR) 21.101, ALOFT must show that the Boeing Model 737-800, as changed, 
continues to meet the applicable provisions of the regulations listed 
in Type Certificate No. A16WE or the applicable regulations in effect 
on the date of application for the change, except for earlier 
amendments as agreed upon by the FAA.
    If the Administrator finds that the applicable airworthiness 
regulations (i.e., 14 CFR part 25) do not contain adequate or 
appropriate safety standards for the Boeing Model 737-800 airplane 
because of a novel or unusual design feature, special conditions are 
prescribed under the provisions of Sec.  21.16.
    Special conditions are initially applicable to the model for which 
they are issued. Should the applicant apply for a supplemental type 
certificate to

[[Page 48194]]

modify any other model included on the same type certificate, to 
incorporate the same novel or unusual design feature, these special 
conditions would also apply to the other model under Sec.  21.101.
    In addition to the applicable airworthiness regulations and special 
conditions, the Boeing Model 737-800 airplane must comply with the 
fuel-vent and exhaust-emission requirements of 14 CFR part 34, and the 
noise-certification requirements of 14 CFR part 36.
    The FAA issues special conditions, as defined in 14 CFR 11.19, in 
accordance with Sec.  11.38, and they become part of the type 
certification basis under Sec.  21.101.

Novel or Unusual Design Features

    The Boeing Model 737-800 airplane will incorporate the following 
novel or unusual design features:
    A Wireless Access Point (WAP), and connection of an improved 
Wireless Quick Access Recorder (WQAR) to the satellite communications 
(SATCOM) system, to provide in-flight access to information, in the 
WQAR, to ground personnel.

Discussion

    The applicant supplemental type certificate (STC) for the Boeing 
Model 737-800 airplane design adds wired and wireless access points to 
the aircraft-control domain and airline-information-services domain 
networks, which do not exist on current airplanes. The aircraft-control 
domain consists of the airplane electronic systems, equipment, 
instruments, networks, servers, software and hardware components, 
databases, etc., which are part of the type design of the airplane and 
are installed in the airplane to enable the safe operation of the 
airplane. These can also be referred to as flight-safety-related 
systems, and include flight controls, communication, display, 
monitoring, navigation, and other systems.
    The airline-information services domain generally consists of 
functions that are managed or controlled by the operator, such as 
administrative functions and cabin-support functions.
    This design creates a potential for unauthorized access to 
aircraft-control and airline-information-services domains, as well as 
security vulnerabilities related to the introduction of viruses, worms, 
user mistakes, and intentional sabotage of airplane electronic assets 
such as networks, systems, and databases.
    Historically, the operating systems for current airplanes are 
proprietary. Therefore, they are not as susceptible to corruption from 
worms, viruses and other malicious actions as are more widely used 
commercial operating systems, such as Microsoft Windows, because access 
to the design details of the proprietary operating system is limited to 
the system developer and airplane integrator. Some systems installed on 
the Boeing Model 737-800 airplane, as modified by ALOFT, will use 
operating systems that are widely used and commercially available from 
third-party software suppliers. The security vulnerabilities of these 
operating systems may be more widely known than are the vulnerabilities 
of proprietary operating systems currently used by avionics 
manufacturers. The increased networking of systems based on these 
popular operating systems increases the opportunity for attack by a 
larger community, especially those using scripted attacks.
    While the FAA has developed policy and guidance on the use and 
protection of certain databases and software, these documents did not 
anticipate the potential for access to the airplane systems, networks, 
and software components by external systems, and the resulting 
potential security vulnerabilities from access by unauthorized users or 
from the potential corruption of airplane system software resources 
(applications, databases, configuration files, etc.) by worms, viruses 
or other malicious entities.
    The major differences between the applicant's STC for the Boeing 
Model 737-800 airplane implementation and typical implementations 
include:
    1. The electronic transmission of updates to airplane servers of 
databases and software applications using ground data networks rather 
than physically controlled media.
    2. The connection of external data networks or devices to airplane 
data networks of the Aircraft Control Domain and the Airline 
Information Services Domain, which may use wired or wireless 
connections.
    3. The connection of wireless devices operated by the flight crew 
or operator maintenance personnel to the airplane data networks of the 
Aircraft Control Domain, and connections between the Airline 
Information Services Domain (including unprotected electronic flight 
bags and maintenance computers) and the Aircraft Control Domain.
    These special conditions contain the additional safety standards 
that the Administrator considers necessary to establish a level of 
safety equivalent to that established by the existing airworthiness 
standards.

Applicability

    As discussed above, these special conditions are applicable to the 
Boeing Model 737-800 airplane. Should ALOFT apply at a later date for a 
supplemental type certificate to modify any other model included on 
Type Certificate No. A16WE to incorporate the same novel or unusual 
design feature, these special conditions would apply to that model as 
well.

Conclusion

    This action affects only certain novel or unusual design features 
on one model series of airplanes. It is not a rule of general 
applicability and affects only the applicant who applied to the FAA for 
approval of these features on the airplane.

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 25

    Aircraft, Aviation safety, Reporting and recordkeeping 
requirements.

    The authority citation for these special conditions is as follows:

    Authority:  49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701, 44702, 44704.

The Special Conditions

    Accordingly, pursuant to the authority delegated to me by the 
Administrator, the following special conditions are issued as part of 
the type certification basis for Boeing Model 737-800 airplanes 
modified by ALOFT.
    1. The applicant must ensure airplane electronic system security 
protection from access by unauthorized sources external to the 
airplane, including those possibly caused by maintenance activity.
    2. The applicant must ensure that electronic system security 
threats are identified and assessed, and that effective electronic 
system security protection strategies are implemented to protect the 
airplane from all adverse impacts on safety, functionality, and 
continued airworthiness.
    3. The applicant must establish appropriate procedures to allow the 
operator to ensure that continued airworthiness of the aircraft is 
maintained, including all post type-certification modifications that 
may have an impact on the approved electronic system security 
safeguards.

    Issued in Renton, Washington, on September 28, 2017.
Suzanne Masterson,
Acting Manager, Transport Standards Branch, Policy and Innovation 
Division, Aircraft Certification Service.
[FR Doc. 2017-22415 Filed 10-16-17; 8:45 am]
 BILLING CODE 4910-13-P

48194 Federal Register / Vol. 82, No. 199 / Tuesday, October 17, 2017 / Rules and Regulations

modify any other model included on the other malicious actions as are more Applicability
same type certificate, to incorporate the widely used commercial operating
same novel or unusual design feature, As discussed above, these special
systems, such as Microsoft Windows,
these special conditions would also conditions are applicable to the Boeing
because access to the design details of
apply to the other model under § 21.101. Model 737–800 airplane. Should
the proprietary operating system is
In addition to the applicable ALOFT apply at a later date for a
limited to the system developer and
airworthiness regulations and special supplemental type certificate to modify
airplane integrator. Some systems
conditions, the Boeing Model 737–800 any other model included on Type
installed on the Boeing Model 737–800
airplane must comply with the fuel-vent Certificate No. A16WE to incorporate
airplane, as modified by ALOFT, will
and exhaust-emission requirements of the same novel or unusual design
use operating systems that are widely
14 CFR part 34, and the noise- feature, these special conditions would
used and commercially available from
certification requirements of 14 CFR apply to that model as well.
third-party software suppliers. The
part 36. security vulnerabilities of these Conclusion
The FAA issues special conditions, as operating systems may be more widely
defined in 14 CFR 11.19, in accordance This action affects only certain novel
known than are the vulnerabilities of
with § 11.38, and they become part of or unusual design features on one model
proprietary operating systems currently
the type certification basis under series of airplanes. It is not a rule of
used by avionics manufacturers. The
§ 21.101. general applicability and affects only
increased networking of systems based
the applicant who applied to the FAA
Novel or Unusual Design Features on these popular operating systems
for approval of these features on the
increases the opportunity for attack by airplane.
The Boeing Model 737–800 airplane
a larger community, especially those
will incorporate the following novel or
using scripted attacks. List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 25
unusual design features:
A Wireless Access Point (WAP), and While the FAA has developed policy Aircraft, Aviation safety, Reporting
connection of an improved Wireless and guidance on the use and protection and recordkeeping requirements.
Quick Access Recorder (WQAR) to the of certain databases and software, these
The authority citation for these
satellite communications (SATCOM) documents did not anticipate the
special conditions is as follows:
system, to provide in-flight access to potential for access to the airplane
information, in the WQAR, to ground systems, networks, and software Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701,
personnel. components by external systems, and 44702, 44704.
the resulting potential security The Special Conditions
Discussion
vulnerabilities from access by
The applicant supplemental type unauthorized users or from the potential Accordingly, pursuant to the
certificate (STC) for the Boeing Model corruption of airplane system software authority delegated to me by the
737–800 airplane design adds wired and resources (applications, databases, Administrator, the following special
wireless access points to the aircraft- configuration files, etc.) by worms, conditions are issued as part of the type
control domain and airline-information- viruses or other malicious entities. certification basis for Boeing Model
services domain networks, which do not 737–800 airplanes modified by ALOFT.
The major differences between the
exist on current airplanes. The aircraft- 1. The applicant must ensure airplane
applicant’s STC for the Boeing Model
control domain consists of the airplane electronic system security protection
737–800 airplane implementation and
electronic systems, equipment, from access by unauthorized sources
typical implementations include:
instruments, networks, servers, software external to the airplane, including those
and hardware components, databases, 1. The electronic transmission of possibly caused by maintenance
etc., which are part of the type design updates to airplane servers of databases activity.
of the airplane and are installed in the and software applications using ground 2. The applicant must ensure that
airplane to enable the safe operation of data networks rather than physically electronic system security threats are
the airplane. These can also be referred controlled media. identified and assessed, and that
to as flight-safety-related systems, and 2. The connection of external data effective electronic system security
include flight controls, communication, networks or devices to airplane data protection strategies are implemented to
display, monitoring, navigation, and networks of the Aircraft Control Domain protect the airplane from all adverse
other systems. and the Airline Information Services impacts on safety, functionality, and
The airline-information services Domain, which may use wired or continued airworthiness.
domain generally consists of functions wireless connections. 3. The applicant must establish
that are managed or controlled by the
3. The connection of wireless devices appropriate procedures to allow the
operator, such as administrative
operated by the flight crew or operator operator to ensure that continued
functions and cabin-support functions.
maintenance personnel to the airplane airworthiness of the aircraft is
This design creates a potential for
data networks of the Aircraft Control maintained, including all post type-
unauthorized access to aircraft-control
Domain, and connections between the certification modifications that may
and airline-information-services
Airline Information Services Domain have an impact on the approved
domains, as well as security
(including unprotected electronic flight electronic system security safeguards.
vulnerabilities related to the
introduction of viruses, worms, user bags and maintenance computers) and Issued in Renton, Washington, on
the Aircraft Control Domain. September 28, 2017.
nlaroche on DSK9F9SC42PROD with RULES

mistakes, and intentional sabotage of
airplane electronic assets such as These special conditions contain the Suzanne Masterson,
networks, systems, and databases. additional safety standards that the Acting Manager, Transport Standards
Historically, the operating systems for Administrator considers necessary to Branch, Policy and Innovation Division,
current airplanes are proprietary. establish a level of safety equivalent to Aircraft Certification Service.
Therefore, they are not as susceptible to that established by the existing [FR Doc. 2017–22415 Filed 10–16–17; 8:45 am]
corruption from worms, viruses and airworthiness standards. BILLING CODE 4910–13–P

VerDate Sep<11>2014 14:55 Oct 16, 2017 Jkt 244001 PO 00000 Frm 00002 Fmt 4700 Sfmt 9990 E:\FR\FM\17OCR1.SGM 17OCR1

Document Created: 2017-10-17 01:11:28
Document Modified: 2017-10-17 01:11:28

Category		Regulatory Information
Collection		Federal Register
sudoc Class		AE 2.7: GS 4.107: AE 2.106:
Publisher		Office of the Federal Register, National Archives and Records Administration
Section		Rules and Regulations
Action		Final special conditions; request for comments.
Dates		This action is effective on ALOFT on October 17, 2017. Send your comments by December 1, 2017.
Contact		Varun Khanna, FAA, Airplane and Flightcrew Interface Section, AIR-671, Transport Standards Branch, Policy and Innovation Division, Aircraft Certification Service, 1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, Washington 98057-3356; telephone 425-227-1298; facsimile 425-227-1320.
FR Citation		82 FR 48193
CFR Associated		Aircraft; Aviation Safety and Reporting and Recordkeeping Requirements

82 FR 48193 - Special Conditions: ALOFT AeroArchitects, Boeing Model 737-800 Airplanes; Aircraft Electronic System Security Protection From Unauthorized External Access

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATIONFederal Aviation Administration

Federal Register Volume 82, Issue 199 (October 17, 2017)

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration